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HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY
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&c. &c. &c.

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BOOK XXV.

JENA.

IT was the height of imprudence on the part of Prussia to enter into a contest with Napoleon, at a moment when the French army, returning from Austerlitz, was still in the heart of Germany, and more capable of acting than any army ever was. It was above all an extreme inconsistency in her to rush into a war, single-handed, after she had not dared venture upon it in the preceding year, when she would have had Austria, Russia, England, Sweden, and Naples for allies. Now, on the contrary, Austria, exhausted by her late efforts, irritated by the indifference manifested towards her, was resolved to remain in her turn a quiet spectator of the disasters of another. Russia was again placed at her natural distance by the retreat of her troops upon the Vistula. England, exasperated at the occupation of Hanover, had declared war against Prussia. Sweden had followed her example. Naples no longer existed. It is true that every friend of France, on becoming her enemy, might reckon with certainty on a speedy reconciliation with England, and with the auxiliaries whom she had in her pay. But it would have been necessary to enter into explanations with the British cabinet, and to set out with the immediate restitution of Hanover, which would never have taken place, at least without compensation, from the very worst terms on which Prussia could be with France. Russia, though awakened from her first dreams of glory, was nevertheless disposed to try once more

the fortune of arms in company with the Prussian troops, the only troops in Europe in which she had any confidence. But several months must elapse before her armies could get into line, and, besides, she had no inclination whatever to push them on so far as in 1805. Prussia, therefore, was liable to find herself for some time opposed unaided to Napoleon. She went to meet him in October, 1806, in the heart of Saxony, as Austria had met him in 1805 in the heart of Bavaria, but with this most disadvantageous difference for her, that he had not now to overcome the obstacle of distance, for, instead of being encamped on the shores of the Ocean, he was in the very centre of Germany, within two or three marches only of the Prussian frontier.

Nothing short of the most fatal infatuation could account for the conduct of Prussia; but such is party-spirit, such are its incurable illusions, that in all quarters this war was considered as likely to offer unforeseen chances, and to open new prospects to vanquished Europe. Napoleon, it was alleged, had triumphed over the weakness of the Austrians and the ignorance of the Russians, but this time he would have to encounter disciples of the great Frederick, the sole heirs of genuine military traditions, and perhaps instead of Austerlitz he might find a Rosbach. By dint of repeating such language, people had well nigh convinced themselves that it would be verified; and the Prussians, who ought to have trembled at the idea of a rencounter with the French, had conceived the most extravagant confidence in their own strength. Discreet minds, nevertheless, knew what was to be thought of these silly hopes; and a mixture of surprise and satisfaction was felt at Vienna on seeing those vaunted Prussians put to the test in their turn, and opposed to that captain, who owed his glory, so it was asserted, solely to the degeneracy of the Austrian army. A momentary joy, therefore, pervaded the enemies of France, who believed that the term of her greatness had arrived. Unfortunately that term was destined to arrive, but not so soon, not till after faults, none of which had then been committed.

Napoleon, on his part, felt not the least concern about the approaching war. He was unacquainted with the Prussians, for he had never yet met them on the field of battle. But he said to himself that those Prussians to whom all sorts of merit were attributed since they had become his adversaries, had gained fewer advantages over the raw French troops of 1792 than the Austrians; and that, if they could not beat volunteers raised in haste, still less would they beat an accomplished army, of which he was the general. Accordingly, he wrote to his brothers at Naples and in Holland, assuring them that they need not give themselves any uneasiness, that the present struggle would be terminated more speedily than the preceding; that Prussia and her allies, be they who they might, would be

crushed, but that this time he would settle finally with Europe, and *put it out of the power of his enemies to stir for ten years*. Such are the very expressions which he used in his letters to the kings of Holland and Naples.

A leader not less prudent than bold, he took as great pains to succeed as if he had been about to fight soldiers and generals equal or superior to his own. Though he could not give the Prussians credit for all that rumour affected to publish concerning them, still he followed that wise precept of prudence which enjoins us to estimate at his full value the enemy whom we know, and the enemy whom we do not know, still more highly than he deserves. With this consideration was coupled another for stimulating his active forecast: he was resolved to push to extremity the conflict with the continent, and, despairing of his maritime means, he determined to conquer England in her allies, by following them up till he had forced them to drop their arms. Without being decided respecting the extent and the duration of this new war, he presumed that he should have to advance very far northward, and perhaps be obliged to seek Russia in her own territory. Astonished at the last proceedings of Prussia, unable to guess, at the distance of Paris from Berlin, the various and complicated causes which induced her to act, he imagined that, in September 1806, as in September 1805, a great coalition, secretly formed, was about to burst forth; that the unaccustomed boldness of king Frederick William was but the first symptom of it; and he expected to see all Europe rush upon him, Austria included, notwithstanding the pacific protestations of this latter. The very natural mistrust excited in him by the aggression of the preceding year was, nevertheless, unfounded. A new coalition was certainly destined to result from the resolution just taken by Prussia, but it would be the effect instead of being the cause of it. For the rest, every body in Europe was as much surprised as Napoleon at what was passing in Berlin, for in cabinets people are determined to see calculations only, never passions. They are not free from them, however, and those sudden irritations which, in private life, sometimes seize two men and put weapons into their hands, are quite as often, more often than a maturely weighed interest, the cause that urges two nations to attack each other. The moral soreness of Prussia arose from her faults, and the treatment which those faults had drawn upon her on the part of Napoleon was, far more than any meditated treachery, the real cause of her sudden, unintelligible exasperation, which nobody knew how to account for.

Impressed, therefore, with the idea of a new coalition, and determined this time to pursue it into the recesses of the frozen regions of the North, Napoleon proportioned his preparations to the circumstances which he foresaw. He provided not only for the means of attack upon his adversaries—means which

were to be found ready prepared in the great army collected in the heart of Germany—but also for the means of defence for the vast countries which he would have to leave behind him while he was proceeding to the Elbe, the Oder, perhaps to the Vistula and the Niemen. As his dominion increased, he was obliged to proportion his solicitude to the growing extent of his empire. He had to attend to Italy, from the Strait of Messina to the Isonzo, and even beyond it, since Dalmatia belonged to him. He had to attend to Holland, turned from an allied State into a family kingdom. He was obliged to provide for the guard of these numerous countries, and for their government to boot, since his brothers were seated upon their thrones.

It is not to be denied that, by placing the crown of the Two Sicilies in his family, Napoleon had added as much to his difficulties as to his power. On closely considering the anxieties and the expences in men and money which his brother Joseph's new establishment at Naples cost him, one is led to believe that, instead of driving the Bourbons from the South of Italy, he had better have left them there submissive, trembling, punished for their last treachery by heavy war contributions, by reductions of territory, and by the hard obligation to exclude the English from the ports of Calabria and Sicily. It is true that he would not then have completed the regeneration of Italy; he would not have entirely wrested that noble and beautiful country from the barbarous system under which it lived oppressed; he would not have wholly associated it with the social and political system of France; it is true that he would still have had in the courts of Naples and Rome two secret enemies, ready to call in the English and the Russians. But these reasons, which were certainly powerful, and which justified Napoleon for having undertaken the conquest of the Italian peninsula from the Isonzo to Tarento, then became decisive reasons not for limiting his enterprizes in the South of Europe, but for limiting them in the North; for Dalmatia required 20,000 men, Lombardy 50,000, Naples 50,000 that is to say 120,000 for Italy alone; and if there should be still wanted two or three hundred thousand more from the Danube to the Elbe, it was to be feared that such charges could not long continue to be defrayed, and that he would fail in the North because he had extended himself too far in the South, or in the South by attempting too much in the North. We will repeat on this occasion what we have said elsewhere, that, if he limited himself in any quarter, it was better to limit himself in the North, for the Bonaparte family, striving to extend itself in Italy or in Spain, as the ancient house of Bourbon had done, was acting in the genuine spirit of French policy much more than in labouring to create for itself establishments in Germany.

Joseph, favourably received by the enlightened and wealthy

population which queen Caroline had ill-treated, applauded even for a moment by the people as a novelty, especially in the Calabrias, through which he had made a progress—Joseph was nevertheless soon aware of the immense difficulty of his task. Having neither stores in the magazines and the arsenals, nor funds in the public coffers, for the late government had not left a ducat, obliged to create all that was wanting, and fearful of loading with imposts a people whose attachment he coveted, Joseph was involved in cruel embarrassments. To ask a country for its money, when he had also to solicit its love, was perhaps the way to cause both to be refused. It was necessary, however, to provide for the wants of the French army, which Napoleon was not accustomed to pay when it was employed out of France, and Joseph drew bills upon the imperial treasury, which he besought his brother to honour. He was incessantly soliciting subsidies and troops, and Napoleon replied that he had all Europe, secretly or publicly leagued, upon his hands; that he could not pay the army of the allied kingdoms besides the army of the Empire; that it was quite enough to lend soldiers to his brothers, and that he could not lend them his finances too. However, the events which took place in the kingdom of Naples had obliged Napoleon to supply him with all that he solicited.

Gaëta, the fortress of the Neapolitan continent, was the only town in the kingdom that had not surrendered to the French army. That fortress, erected at the extremity of a promontory washed on three sides by the sea, connected on the fourth only with the land, and commanding on that side the neighbouring district, defended, moreover, by regular works, with three tier of cannon, was very difficult to besiege. It kept before its walls one part of the French army at work upon ways (*cheminements*) which they were frequently obliged to cut in the rock; while another portion of that army guarded Naples, and the rest, dispersed in the Calabrias, to prevent revolt ready to break out, consisted entirely of scattered forces. The end of the summer, so fatal in Italy to foreigners, had decimated the French troops, so that 6000 men could not have been collected at any one point.

Napoleon, whose correspondence with his brothers who had become kings would deserve to be studied as a series of profound lessons in the art of reigning, sometimes scolded Joseph with a severity springing from his reason, not at all from his heart. He reproached him with being weak, inactive, addicted to all the illusions of a good-natured and vain disposition. Joseph durst not levy imposts, and yet he was desirous to raise a Neapolitan army; he pretended to form a body guard; he kept about him for his personal safety a great part of the troops placed at his disposal; he misconducted the siege of Gaëta;

and lastly, he made no preparations for the expedition to Sicily.

What you owe to your people, wrote Napoleon to him, is order in the finances, but you cannot spare them the charges of the war, for there must be taxes in order to pay the public force. Naples ought to furnish a hundred millions, like the vice-royalty of Italy, and thirty of these hundred millions are sufficient to pay 40,000 men. (Letter of the 6th of March, 1806.) Hope not to render yourself beloved through weakness, especially by Neapolitans. They tell you that queen Caroline is odious, and that your good-nature is already making you popular—a chimera of your flatterers! If I were to lose a battle to-morrow on the Isonzo, you would soon learn what was to be thought of your popularity, and of the pretended unpopularity of queen Caroline. Those men are mean, cringing, submissive to force alone. Suppose a reverse (which is always liable to befall me), and you would see that people rise all together and shout, "Death to the French! death to Joseph! Caroline for ever!" You would come to my camp. (Letter of the 9th of August, 1806.) *An exiled and vagabond king is a silly personage.* You must govern with justice and severity, suppress the abuses of the old system, establish order everywhere, prevent the dilapidations of Frenchmen as well as of Neapolitans, create finances, and pay my army, by which you exist. (Letter of the 22nd of April, 1806.) As for a royal guard, it is a luxury, worthy at most of the vast empire which I govern, and which would appear too expensive even to me, if it were not my duty to make sacrifices to the majesty of that empire, and to the interests of my old soldiers, who find a means of comfortable subsistence in the institution of a body of *élite*. As for raising a Neapolitan army, don't think of it. It would desert you at the first danger, and betray you for another master. Form, if you will, three or four regiments, and send them to me. I will enable them to acquire what is to be acquired only in war, discipline, bravery, the sentiment of honour, fidelity, and I will send them back to you worthy to form the nucleus of the Neapolitan army. Meanwhile, take Swiss, for I could not long leave you fifty thousand French, even if you were able to pay them. The Swiss are the only foreign soldiers who are brave and faithful. (Letter of the 9th of August.) Have in the Calabrias some moveable columns composed of Corsicans. They are excellent for that kind of warfare, and will carry it on with zeal for our family. (Letter of 22nd of April, 1806.) Do not disperse your forces. You have fifty thousand men—a great many more than are needed, if you knew how to make use of them. With twenty-five thousand only, I would guard every part of your kingdom, and on the day of battle be stronger than the enemy in the field. The first care of a general ought to be

so to distribute his forces as to be ready everywhere. But, added Napoleon, therein lies the real secret of the art which nobody possesses—nobody—not even Massena, great as he nevertheless is in dangers.

Napoleon would have had the guard of Naples confined to two regiments of cavalry and a few batteries of light artillery; he would then have had the rest of the army posted *en echelons* from Naples to the extremity of the Calabrias, with a strong detachment placed facing Sicily, from which side an English army was liable to come, so that it might at any time be possible to collect in three marches a considerable body of troops either at Naples, or in the Calabrias, or at the presumed point of landing. He wished, above all, that haste should be made to reduce Gaëta, the siege of which absorbed part of the disposable forces; that, on terminating this siege, attention should be paid to the creation of a large fortress, which might serve for a support to the new royalty, which should be situated in the very heart of the kingdom, into which a king of Naples might throw himself with his treasure, his archives, the Neapolitans who adhered to his cause, and the wrecks of his armies, and where he might for six months resist a besieging force of sixty thousand Anglo-Russians. (Letter of 2nd September, 1806.) Napoleon was of opinion that the position of Naples was not adapted to such a destination; besides, according to him, a foreigner king could not, without some danger, place himself amidst a numerous and necessarily inimical population. He desired that this fortress should have action upon the capital, upon the sea, and upon the interior of the kingdom. On due examination, after discussing various points, particularly Naples and Capua, he had preferred Castellamare, on account of its proximity to Naples, its maritime site, and its central position. Having made this choice upon the map, he had given directions for surveys of the ground, in order to decide upon the nature of the works. Five or six millions a year ought to be devoted for ten years to this great creation, in such a manner that, with each expenditure of six millions, a degree of strength should be gained; and that, so early as the second or third year, you might be able to shut yourself up in this vast fortress; for neither you nor I know what is to befall us in two, three, or four years. *Centuries are not for us.* And if you are energetic, you may hold out in such an asylum long enough to defy the rigours of Fortune, and to await the return of her favour.

Lastly, Napoleon was desirous that means should gradually be prepared for crossing the Strait of Messina with 10,000 men, a force sufficient, in his opinion, to conquer Sicily, and moreover easily transportable in the feluccas with which the sea of Italy abounds. In consequence, he had recommended defensive works to be commenced immediately either at Scylla or at Messina, in order to collect there in safety the little naval force

which would be needed. But above all he urged the siege of Gaëta, the reduction of which would render half the army disposable; he besought his brother to make a different distribution of his forces, for, he incessantly repeated to him, you will have before long a landing and an insurrection; and you will no more be able to repel the one than to suppress the other.

Joseph comprehended these wise counsels, complained sometimes of the language in which they were conveyed, and followed them according to the measure of his talents. Surrounded by some Frenchmen, his personal friends, by M. Røederer, who was actively engaged in administrative and financial reforms, by general Mathieu Dumas, who applied himself with intelligence to the organization of the public force, he did his best to create a government and to regenerate the fine country committed to his care. Salicetti, the Corsican, a man of ability and courage, directed his police with the vigour which circumstances commanded. But while Joseph was striving to perform his royal task, the English, verifying the anticipations of Napoleon, took advantage of the length of the siege of Gaëta, which divided the army, and of the fever which decimated it, to land in the Gulf of St. Euphemia, and appeared there to the number of 8,000 men, under general Stuart. General Reynier, posted at Cosenza, could scarcely collect 4,000 French, and boldly proceeded to the point of disembarkation. That officer, skilful and brave, but unlucky, whom Napoleon had consented to employ in Naples, notwithstanding the remembrance of the faults committed in Egypt, was not more favoured by Fortune on this occasion than he had been formerly in the plains of Alexandria. Attacking general Stuart amidst a marshy ground, where it was impossible for him to make his 4,000 men act with a unity which might have compensated for their numerical inferiority, he was repulsed and forced to retire into the interior of the Calabrias. This miscarriage, though it ought not to be considered as a lost battle, was nevertheless attended with the consequences of one, and excited a rising of the Calabrese in the rear of the French. General Reynier had to fight obstinate battles in order to re-unite his scattered detachments; he beheld his sick and his wounded basely murdered without being able to afford them assistance; and he was obliged to cut his way through the insurgents, to burn villages, and to put the inhabitants to the sword. For the rest he conducted himself with energy and promptness, and contrived to maintain himself amidst a frightful conflagration. General Stuart's conduct on this occasion deserves to be recorded with honour. The massacre of the French was so general and so horrible, that he was revolted at it. Striving to make the love of money supply the place of humanity in those ferocious mountaineers, he promised ten ducats for each soldier, and fifteen for each

officer, brought to him alive, and those whom he succeeded in saving he treated with the attentions due from one civilised nation to another, when they are doomed to make war.

These events, which proved so strongly the wisdom of Napoleon's advice, became an active stimulant to the new Neapolitan government. Joseph accelerated the siege of Gaëta, in order that he might be able to carry back the entire army to the Calabrias. He had with him Massena, whose mere name made the Neapolitan populace tremble. He had committed to him the task of taking Gaëta, but, having delayed sending him till the day on which the works of approach were finished, it was necessary to exert great vigour. Generals Campredon and Vallongue, of the engineers, were charged with the direction of the operations of the siege. They followed the prescriptions of Napoleon, who desired that the action of the heavy artillery should be reserved till the besiegers should have approached quite close to the body of the place. Obligated to open the trenches in ground where stone was frequently met with, they proceeded slowly, and endured the fire of an enormous quantity of cannon and mortars without returning it. The besiegers received 120,000 balls and 21,000 bombs before they once replied to this mass of projectiles. Having at length approached within a proper distance for establishing breaching batteries, they commenced a destructive fire. The solid walls of Gaëta, founded on the rock, after having at first resisted, at length fell all at once, and presented two wide and practicable breaches. The soldiers earnestly called for the assault as the reward of their long exertions, and Massena, having formed two columns of attack, was about to grant it to them, when the besieged offered to capitulate. The place was delivered up on the eighteenth of July, with all the *matériel* that it contained. The garrison embarked for Sicily, after engaging not to serve any more against king Joseph. This siege had cost the besiegers 1,000 men, and the besieged as many. General Vallongue, of the engineers, one of the most distinguished officers of his arm, lost his life there ; and the prince of Hesse-Philippsthal, governor of the place, was severely wounded.

Massena set out immediately with the troops which the reduction of Gaëta rendered disposable, passed through Naples on the 1st of August, and hastened to the assistance of General Reynier, who maintained his ground at Cosenza, amidst the insurgent Calabrese. The reinforcement brought by Massena increased our principal corps to 13 or 14 thousand men. It was more than were required, without reckoning the presence of Massena, to throw the English into the sea. Of this they were so well aware that, on the mere news of the approach of the illustrious marshal, they embarked on the 5th of September. Massena had then none but the insurgents to fight. He found them more numerous, more implacable, than he had at first expected. He was reduced to the necessity of burning several

villages and putting to the sword the troops of banditti which slaughtered the French. He displayed on this occasion his accustomed vigour, and succeeded in a few weeks in reducing very considerably the flames of insurrection. At the moment when the great events which we are about to relate commenced in Prussia, tranquillity began to be restored in the South of Italy, and king Joseph might consider himself established, for some time at least, in his new kingdom.

At the same period, important events were passing in Dalmatia, the Russians still retained the mouths of the Cattaro. Napoleon, taking pattern from their conduct on this point, and in particular from the manner in which they had occupied Corfu, and usurped the sovereignty of it, had resolved to seize the little republic of Ragusa, which separated Cattaro from the rest of Dalmatia. He had sent thither his aide-de-camp Lauriston, with a brigade of infantry, for the purpose of establishing himself there. Lauriston was presently surrounded by the insurgent Montenegrins and by a Russian corps of some thousand men. Blockaded by the English on the sea side, besieged by ferocious mountaineers and a regular Russian force on the land side, he found himself in real danger, which, however, he faced with courage. Fortunately, general Molitor, an equally faithful companion in arms and firm and skilful officer in presence of the enemy, flew to his relief. That general, not following the example too frequent in the army of the Rhine, of leaving in the lurch a neighbour whom one dislikes, proceeded spontaneously by forced marches to Ragusa, with a corps of 4,000 men, resolutely attacked the camp of the Russians and the Montenegrins, carried it though strongly entrenched, and thus extricated the French who were in the place. He put to the sword a great number of Montenegrins and deterred them for a long time from their incursions into Dalmatia.

It was not without difficulty, as we see, that the French sway was established over these distant countries. It had required great battles to obtain them from Europe; it required daily fights to gain them from the inhabitants. At the other extremity of the empire, the foundation of a second family kingdom, that of Holland, was attended with difficulties of a different kind, but quite as serious. The grave and peaceful Hollanders were not people to raise an insurrection like the mountaineers of the Calabrias and of Illyria; but they opposed their inertness to king Louis, and gave him not less embarrassment than did the Calabrese to Joseph. The government of the Stadtholder had left Holland many debts. The governments which had since followed, had, in turn, contracted others to a very considerable amount to defray the expenses of the war, so that king Louis, on his arrival in Holland, had found a budget composed of an expenditure of 78 million florins and a revenue of 35. In this expenditure of 78 millions, the charge

for the interest of the debt amounted alone to 35 millions of florins. The surplus was allotted to the service of the army, the navy, and the dikes. Notwithstanding this situation, the Dutch would not hear either of new taxes or of any reduction whatever of the interest of the debt ; for these lenders by profession, accustomed to lend their capitals to all governments, national and foreign, considered the debt as the most sacred of properties. The idea of a contribution on the *rentes*, to which the government had been led, because the *rentes* in Holland were the most widely diffused and important of assets, and consequently formed the largest basis for impost—this idea shocked them. It was found necessary to give it up. Here, then the new government was threatened not with an insurrection as in Naples, but with an interruption of all the services. For the rest, the Dutch were not inimical to the new royalty, from hatred to monarchy, or in consequence of their attachment to the house of Orange ; but they ardently longed for a maritime peace and regretted that peace, the source of all their wealth, much more than the republic or the Stadtholdership. Linked to the English by strong bonds of interest, and not less strong conformities of manners, they would have been attracted towards England had she not notoriously coveted their colonies. To no purpose they were told that, but for the difficulty arising from these colonies, peace would be easier by half ; that their participation in the expenses of the war was the just price of the efforts made by France in all the negotiations to recover their maritime possessions ; and that one would be justified in abandoning them if they would not contribute to keep up the contest—to no purpose was all this said to them ; they replied that they were ready to renounce their colonies, in order to obtain peace. They spoke thus, though ready to raise just clamours, if France had treated on such a basis. From the riches of Java at this day, one may judge whether it was an inconsiderable interest that France defended in defending their colonies. King Louis decided to pursue the course that seemed to him to be the easiest, that is, to fall in with the views of the Dutch, and to attach them to him by acceding to their desires. Most assuredly, when a person accepts the government of a country, he ought to espouse its interests ; but a distinction must be made between its permanent and its temporary interests ; he must serve the one, place himself above the other ; and if he has become king of a foreign nation, through the army of his country, he must renounce a part which would oblige him to betray the one or the other. King Louis was not reduced to this hard necessity, for the true policy of the Dutch ought to have consisted in uniting themselves firmly with France, in order to combat the maritime supremacy of England. On the triumph of that supremacy, they could not fail to lose the freedom of the seas on which their lives were passed, and their colonies,

without which they could not subsist. Striving rather to please than to serve them, king Louis accepted a system of finance conformable to their views at the moment. To the revenue of 35 millions of florins were added new contributions of about 15 millions, which made the total amount of the revenue 50 millions of florins, and, to reduce the expenditure of 78 millions to 50, a proportionable reduction was made in the army and navy. The king of Holland wrote to Paris that he would abdicate royalty, if these reductions were not agreed to. Napoleon thus had to encounter in his own brothers the spirit of resistance of the allied nations, which he had expected to attach more closely to himself by the institution of family royalties. He was deeply hurt at it, for under this spirit of resistance lurked great ingratitude, both on the part of the nations which France had emancipated, and of the kings whom she had crowned. Repressing his sentiments, however, he replied that he assented to the proposed reductions, but that Holland ought not to be astonished, if in present or future negotiations, she were left to her own means. Holland, he said, had certainly a right to refuse her resources, but France had also a right to refuse her support.

The closest secrets are soon penetrated by the malice of enemies. From a certain attitude of king Louis, his resistance to Napoleon was inferred, and he became extremely popular for it. That monarch, moreover, affected a severity of manners, which coincided with the tastes of an economical and discreet country, and he became on that account still more agreeable to the Dutch people. This same king, while making a show of simplicity, resolved nevertheless to go to the expense of a coronation and of a royal guard, hoping by these double means to secure the more firmly to himself the possession of the throne of Holland, of which he was more tenacious than he chose to acknowledge. Napoleon censured the institution of a royal guard, for the reasons already given to Joseph, and peremptorily opposed the ceremony of a coronation, at a moment when Europe was about to be involved in the flames of a general war. Thus, from the very first days, the difficulties inherent in these family royalties, which Napoleon had resolved to found out of affection or from system, began to make their appearance. Independent allies, treated according to the services which he might have received from them, would certainly have proved much better for his power and for his heart.

Such was the general state of things in the vast extent of the French Empire at the very moment of the rupture with Prussia. Exclusively of the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine and of the kingdom of Italy, Napoleon had about 500,000 men, among whom must be comprehended the Swiss serving in virtue of capitulations, besides some Valaisans, Poles, and Germans, who had entered into the service of France. After the usual deduction of the gendarmes, veterans, invalids, there remained

active troops amounting to 450,000 men. Of this number 130,000 were beyond the Alps, including depôts, 170,000 in the grand army, cantoned in the Upper Palatinate and Franconia, 5,000 left in Holland, 5,000 placed in garrison on board the ships, and lastly 140,000 dispersed in the interior. These last comprehended the imperial guard, the regiments not employed abroad, and the depôts. Excepting some regiments of infantry consisting of four battalions, all the others had three, two of which were war battalions destined to take the field, and one a dépôt battalion, placed in general on the frontier. The dépôt battalions of the grand army were ranged along the Rhine, from Huningen to Wesel; some were at the camp of Boulogne. Those of the army of Italy were in Piedmont and Lombardy. Napoleon paid extreme attention to the organisation of the depôts. He resolved to make the conscripts repair thither a year beforehand, that, during this year, instructed, trained, inured to fatigue, they might be rendered capable of replacing the old soldiers carried off by time or war. The entire conscription of 1805, called out at the end of 1805, and half of that of 1806, called out at the commencement of 1806, had filled up the skeletons with men fit for service, and a good number of whom, already trained, had been sent to Germany and Italy. Napoleon moreover caused the second half of the class of 1806, designated by the name of reserve in the laws of that period, to be called out. The annual contingent then furnished 60,000 men, actually fit to be embodied; and it is a circumstance worthy of remark that the government still refrained from enforcing the conscription law in the seven or eight departments of Bretagne and La Vendée. Thirty thousand more men would thus be poured into the skeletons. But the departure of the men already trained would produce a sufficient vacancy in them to make room for the newcomers. Napoleon, besides, designed to send a great part of these latter towards Italy. In regard to the conscripts destined to pass the Alps, he took particular precautions. Even before their incorporation, he despatched them in large detachments, under the conduct of officers, and clothed in military uniform, that they might not appear out of the Empire, like stragglers travelling in the attire of peasants.

Having provided for the increase of the army, Napoleon distributed the whole of his resources with consummate skill.

Austria protested her pacific intentions. Napoleon replied by similar protestations: he, nevertheless, resolved to take his measures as if, profiting by his absence, she should think of falling upon Italy. General Marmont occupied Dalmatia with 20,000 men. Napoleon directed him, after placing some detachments *en echelon* from the centre of the province to Ragusa, to keep the bulk of his forces in Zara itself, a fortified town and the capital of the country; to collect there stores of pro-

visions, arms, ammunition, in short, to make it the pivot of all his operations, defensive or offensive.

If he should be attacked, Zara was to serve him for a *point d'appui*, and to enable him to make a long resistance. If, on the contrary, he should be obliged to withdraw from it for the purpose of concurring in the operations of the army of Italy, he had in that fortress a safe place for depositing his *matériel*, his wounded, his sick, whatever was unfit for active war, and every thing that he could not take along with him.

Eugene, viceroy of Italy, who was in the secret of Napoleon's intentions, had orders to leave in Dalmatia nothing more, either in *matériel* or men, than was absolutely indispensable there, and to collect all the rest in the fortresses of Italy. Since the conquest of the Venetian states, these places had been subjected to a new ably calculated classification, and they were covered with labourers, engaged in constructing works proposed by general Chasseloup, and ordered by Napoleon. The principal of them and the nearest to Austria was Palma-Nova. Next to the famous citadel of Alexandria, it was the works of this place that Napoleon pushed forward with most activity, because it commanded the plain of the Friuli. Next came, a little to the left, closing the gorges of the Julian Alps, Osopo, then Legnago, on the Adige, Mantua, on the Mincio, lastly, on the Tanaro, Alexandria, the essential base of the French power in Italy. Orders had been given to shut up in these fortresses the artillery, amounting to more than 800 pieces, and not to leave outside them any article whatever, cannon, musket, projectile, likely to be carried off in case of surprise from the enemy. Venice, whose defences were not yet completed, but which had its lagoons in its favour, was added to this classification. Napoleon had selected general Miollis, an officer of extraordinary energy, to command it. He had enjoined him to execute in haste the works necessary for turning to account the advantages of the situation, till the regular works which were to render the places impregnable could be constructed. It was among these retreats of Osopo, Palma-Nova, Legnago, Venice, Mantua, Alexandria, that Napoleon had distributed the depôts. Such as belonged to the armies in Dalmatia and Lombardy were divided among the fortresses from Palma-Nova to Alexandria in order to keep garrison in them and to be trained. Those which belonged to the army of Naples had been assembled in the Legations. To these depôts, the fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts destined for Italy were to direct their course. Napoleon, incessantly repeating that on the attention paid to the dépôt battalions depended the quality and the duration of an army, had prescribed the measures necessary in order that the health and training of the men might be alike attended to, and that these battalions might at all times be able to furnish, not

only the regular recruits for the war-battalions and the garrisons of the fortresses, but likewise one or two divisions of reinforcements ready to be despatched to the points where an unforeseen want might happen to be felt. The defence of the fortresses being thus ensured, the whole of the active army became disposable. It consisted for Lombardy of 15,000 men, scattered in the Friule, and of 24,000 *en échelons* from Milan to Turin, both ready for marching. There remained the army of Naples, about 50,000 strong, a great part of which was fit for acting immediately. Massena was on the spot: if war broke out with Austria, he had instructions to fall back upon Upper Italy with 30,000 men, and to unite them with the 40,000 who occupied Piedmont and Lombardy. There was no Austrian army capable of forcing the obstinate Massena, having 70,000 French at his disposal, having, moreover, such *appuis* as Palma-Nova, Osopo, Venice, Mantua, and Alexandria. Lastly, in this case, general Marmont himself was to play a useful part; for, if he was blockaded in Dalmatia, he was sure to keep before him 30,000 Austrians at least, and, if he was not, he could fall upon the flank or the rear of the enemy.

Such were the instructions addressed to prince Eugene for the defence of Italy. They concluded with the following recommendation:—"Read all these instructions, and at night call yourself to account for what you have done in the day towards their execution, but without noise, without effervescence of head, and without exciting alarm in any quarter." (St. Cloud, 18th of September, 1806.)

Napoleon, always thinking of what Austria might attempt while he was in Prussia, ordered similar precautions in regard to Bavaria. He had enjoined Marshal Soult to leave a strong garrison at Braunau, a fortress of some importance, on account of its situation upon the Inn. He had recommended that the most urgent works should be constructed, and the timber floated down from the Alps by the Inn collected there, saying that, with arms and wood one might create a fortress where nothing whatever existed. He had placed the 3rd of the line, a fine regiment of four battalions, three of them war battalions, in garrison there, besides 500 artillery, 500 cavalry, a Bavarian detachment, numerous engineer officers, the whole forming a force of about 5,000 men. He had amassed there provisions for eight months, a great quantity of ammunition, and a considerable sum of money; to these precautions he had added the appointment of an energetic commandant, to whom he gave instructions worthy to serve for a lesson to all the governors of besieged towns. These instructions contained an order to defend himself to the last extremity, not to surrender unless in case of absolute necessity, and after withstanding three repeated assaults on the body of the place.

Napoleon had, moreover, decided that a part of the Bavarian army, which was at his disposal in virtue of the treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine, should be assembled on the banks of the Inn. He had ordered a division of 15,000 men of all arms to be formed and placed under the guns of Braunau. Such forces, if they could not keep the field, were, nevertheless, a first obstacle opposed to an enemy debouching unawares, and a ready prepared *point d'appui* for the army coming to the assistance of Bavaria. Napoleon, in fact, how advanced soever he might be in Germany, would always have it in his power, after beating off the Prussians and the Russians by gaining a battle, to face about, fall by Silesia or by Saxony upon Bohemia, and severely punish Austria, if she durst attempt a fresh aggression. After guarding against Austria, he thought of those parts of the empire which the English threatened with a landing.

He directed his brother Louis to form a camp at Utrecht, composed of twelve or fifteen thousand Dutch, and of the 5,000 French left in Holland. He assembled around the fortress of Wesel, recently annexed to France, since the assignment of the duchy of Berg to Murat, a French division of ten or twelve thousand men. King Louis was to proceed to Wesel, to assume the command of this division, and, joining it with the troops in the camp of Utrecht, feign, with 30,000 men an attack on Westphalia. It was even recommended to him to spread a report of an assemblage of 80,000 men, and to make some preparations in *matériel* calculated to accredit that rumour. For reasons, which the reader will presently appreciate, Napoleon certainly did wish to draw the attention of the Prussians to that quarter, but, in reality, he desired that king Louis, without removing too far from Holland, should be constantly ready, either to defend his kingdom against the English, or to connect his movements with those of the French corps placed on the Rhine or at Boulogne. Besides the seven corps of the grand army destined to distant warfare, Napoleon had resolved to form an eighth under marshal Mortier, who should be charged to turn as upon a pivot round Mayence, to watch Hesse, to encourage by his presence the German Confederates, and lastly to give a hand to king Louis about Wesel. This corps, taken from the troops in the interior, was to be 20,000 thousand strong. It required all Napoleon's ingenuity to raise it to that number; for, out of the 140,000 men stationed in the interior, on deducting the dépôts and the imperial guard, very few disposable troops were left. Besides this eighth corps, marshal Brune was directed this year, as the last, to guard the Boulogne flotilla, by employing in this duty the seamen and some dépôt battalions amounting to about 18,000 men. It was only with extreme circumspection that Napoleon purposed to make use of the national guards, because he was fearful of agitating the country, and par-

ticularly of extending the burdens of the war to too large a proportion of the population. Reckoning nevertheless, on the warlike spirit of certain frontier provinces, he had no scruple to raise in Lorraine, in Alsace, and in Flanders, a few, not numerous, select detachments, composed of companies of *élite*, that is of grenadiers and voltigeurs, and paid at the moment of their removal. He had fixed their number at 6,000 for the North and 6,000 for the East. The 6,000 national guards of the North assembled under general Rampon, established at St. Omer, organized with care at but little distance from their homes, furnished a useful reserve, always ready to hasten to Marshal Brune, and to afford him the aid of its patriotism. The 6000 national guards of the East were to assemble at Mayence, to form the garrison of that place, and thus to render marshal Mortier's troops more disposable.

Marshal Kellermann, one of the veterans whom Napoleon was accustomed to put at the head of the reserves, commanded the dépôts stationed along the Rhine; and, while attending to their instruction, he could, by making use of soldiers already trained, form a corps of some value, and if danger threatened the Upper Rhine, proceed rapidly to that quarter.

Thanks to this combination of means, there was wherewithal to provide against all contingencies. Suppose that Hesse, for example, instigated by the Prussians, excited uneasiness, marshal Mortier, starting from Mayence, was ready to proceed thither with the eighth corps. King Louis, placed *en échelon*, was to bring to him part of the camp of Utrecht and of Wesel. If danger threatened Holland, king Louis and marshal Mortier had orders to unite their forces. Marshal Brune also was to proceed to that quarter. If, on the contrary, Boulogne was in peril, marshal Brune was to receive succour from king Louis, who was directed by his instructions to hasten, in case of need, towards that part of the frontiers of the Empire. By this system of *échelons*, calculated with strict precision, all the points exposed to any accident whatever, from the Upper Rhine to Holland, from Holland to Boulogne, could be assisted in useful time, and as promptly as the march of the most expeditious enemy would require.

The French coast from Normandy to Bretagne yet remained to be guarded. Napoleon had left several regiments in these provinces, and, according to his custom, he had assembled the companies of *élite* in a flying camp at Pontivy, to the number of 2,100 grenadiers and voltigeurs. General Boyer was appointed to command them. He had at his disposal secret funds, spies, and detachments of gendarmes. He was to keep patrols in suspicious places, and, if a landing threatened Cherbourg or Brest, to hasten thither with the 2,400 men under his command. Napoleon kept in Paris only a corps of 8,000 men, composed of three regiments of infantry and some squadrons

of cavalry. These regiments had received their contingent of conscripts. Junot, governor of Paris, had special orders to attend incessantly to their training, and to consider that as the first of his duties. These 8,000 men were a last reserve, ready to proceed whithersoever their presence might be needed. Napoleon had recently conceived the idea of making the troops travel post, and he had employed this method for the imperial guard, which was conveyed in six days from Paris to the Rhine. The troops destined to travel in that way made, on the day of their departure a forced march on foot; they were then put into carts each carrying ten men, and which were drawn up *en échelon* at ten leagues' distance, so as to travel twenty leagues per day. The carts were paid for at the rate of five francs per horse, and the farmers required for this service were far from complaining. Napoleon had had a carriage made for the roads of Picardy, Normandy, and Bretagne, for the purpose of conveying in four, five, or six days, to Boulogne, Cherbourg, or Brest, the 8,000 men left in Paris. "We must," said Napoleon to prince Cambacérès, who was expressing his uneasiness on this subject—"we must accustom Paris not to see so many sentinels at every corner of a street." There was to be left in Paris nothing but the municipal guard, then amounting to 3,000 men. The name of Napoleon, the tranquillity of the time, rendered it needless to devote a greater force to the guard of the capital.

As for the ports of Toulon and Genoa, Napoleon had left sufficient garrisons there. But well he knew that the English were not so silly as to hazard any attempt upon places of such strength. It was concerning Boulogne alone that he had any serious apprehensions.

Thus, in the vast circle of his foresight, he had parried all possible dangers. If Austria, extending to Prussia a succour which she had not received from her, took part in the war, the army of Italy, concentrated under Massena, and appuyed upon fortresses of the first order, Palma Nova, Mantua, Venice, Alexandria, would be able to oppose 70,000 men to the Austrians, while general Marmont, with twelve or fifteen thousand, would throw himself into their flank by the Dalmatia road. The Inn, Braunau, and the Bavarians, would suffice in the first moment for the defence of Bavaria. Marshal Kellermann had the dépôts for covering the Upper Rhine. Marshal Mortier, king Louis, marshal Brune, by a movement towards each other, would be enabled to assemble 50,000 men on any point that might be threatened, from Mayence to the Helder, from the Helder to Boulogne. Lastly, Paris might, in urgent danger, confine itself to its police troops, and despatch a corps of reserve to the coasts of Normandy or Bretagne.

These various combinations, described with striking perspicuity, with the most minute attention to details, had been com-

municated to prince Eugene, to king Joseph, to king Louis, to marshals Kellermann, Mortier, and Brune, to all those, in short, who were to concur in their execution. Each of them knew all that was necessary for the due performance of his task. The whole had been communicated to the archchancellor Cambacérès alone, who, placed at the centre, was charged to give orders in the name of the Emperor.

Twenty-four or forty-eight hours were sufficient for Napoleon to form his plans and to arrange the details, when he had once resolved to act. He then dictated, for one or two days, almost without intermission, so many as one hundred or two hundred letters, all of which have been preserved, all of which will remain everlasting models of the art of administering armies and empires. Prince Berthier, the usual interpreter of his commands, having had to stay at Munich on business of the Confederation of the Rhine, he sent for general Clarke, and passed the 18th and 19th of September in dictating his orders to him. Napoleon foresaw that twenty days might yet pass in vain explanations with Prussia, after which war would inevitably commence, for explanations would thenceforth be powerless for terminating such a quarrel. He resolved therefore to employ those twenty days in completing the grand army, and in providing it with every thing that might yet be necessary for it.

It is not in twenty days that it is possible to place a numerous army on the war footing, were even the regiments destined to compose it completely organized each for itself. To collect it on the principal point of assembly, to distribute it into brigades and divisions, to form a staff, to procure for it parks, equipages, *matériel* of all sorts, would still require a series of long and complicated operations. But Napoleon, surprised in the preceding year by Austria at the moment of passing over to England, and this year by Prussia, on his return from Austerlitz, had his army quite ready, and this time even transported to the theatre of war, since it was in the Upper Palatinate and Franconia. It left nothing to be desired in any respect. Discipline, training, habit of war recently renewed in an astounding campaign, strength recruited by a rest of several months, perfect health, ardour for fighting, love of glory, unbounded devotedness to its leader, nothing was wanting. If it had lost somewhat of that regularity of manœuvres which distinguished it when leaving Boulogne, it had gained, in place of that more showy than solid quality, an assurance and freedom of movements which are not to be acquired but in fields of battle. The uniforms, worn, but neat, added to its martial air. As we have said elsewhere, it had refrained from taking either its new clothes or its pay from the dépôts, reserving the enjoyment of all this for the fêtes which Napoleon was preparing for it in September—superb, but chimerical fêtes, alas! like the thousand millions formerly promised by the Convention. That

heroic army, thenceforth doomed to an everlasting war, was no longer to know any other fêtes than battles, entries of conquered capitals, the admiration of the vanquished. How few of the brave men who composed it were destined to behold their homes again and to die in the quiet of peace! And even those, as they grew old were doomed to see their country invaded, dismembered, stripped of that greatness which she owed to the effusion of their generous blood!

Still, how well prepared soever an army may be, it never can be prepared to such a degree as not to feel any want. With his profound experience of the organization of the troops, Napoleon united a personal knowledge of his army that was truly extraordinary. He knew the residence, the state, the strength, of all his regiments. He knew what each of them was deficient in men or in *matériel*; and, if they had left anywhere a detachment which weakened them, he knew where to find it. His first care was always for the foot-clothing of the soldier, and to secure him from cold. He ordered shoes and great coats to be immediately despatched. He required that each man should have a pair of shoes on his feet and two pair in his knapsack. One of these two pair was given as a gratuity to all the corps, and the soldier's fortune is so slender that even this small donation had its value. He ordered all the saddle and draught-horses that could be procured to be bought up in France and abroad. The army was not in actual need of them, but, in his solicitude for the dépôts, he desired that there should not be a deficiency of horses any more than of men. He then ordered three or four hundred men per regiment to be despatched from the dépôts, which were about to be replenished with conscripts, in order to increase the war battalions to an effective of eight or nine hundred men each, well knowing that, in two months' campaign, they would presently be reduced to that of six or seven hundred. The force of the grand army would thus be increased by 20,000 fighting men, and it would then be possible to discharge without weakening it too much the soldiers worn out with fatigue; for, with this army of the Revolution, there had hitherto been no other term to its devotedness to the service than wounds or death. There were to be seen in the ranks old soldiers attached to their regiment as to a family, exempted from all duty, but ever ready, in any danger, to display their ancient valour, and taking advantage of their leisure to relate to their young successors the marvels in which they had borne a part. In the rank of captain in particular, there were many officers, who were incapacitated for service. Napoleon ordered all the young men whose age rendered them fit for war to be removed from the military schools and trained for officers. He highly appreciated the materials furnished by those schools; he found their pupils not only well-informed but brave, for education elevates the heart as much as the mind.

After taking the means of infusing new vigour into the army, he turned his attention to the organization of its equipages. He wished that it should gain in celerity, and not be too much encumbered with baggage. His experience did not incline him to dispense with magazines, as it has sometimes been asserted, for he disdained no kind of providence, and he no more neglected the laying up of stores than the fortresses. But offensive war, which he preferred to any other, scarcely admitted of the creation of magazines, since they must have been formed in the enemy's territory, which it was his custom to overrun at the very commencement of the operations. His system of alimentation consisted in living every night upon the country occupied, in spreading himself sufficiently to find subsistence, but not so much as to be dispersed, and in taking along with him in caissons bread for several days. This kind of supply managed with care, and renewed whenever the army halted, served for cases of extraordinary concentrations, which preceded and followed battles. For its conveyance Napoleon had calculated that two caissons per battalion were required, and one caisson per squadron. Adding to these the vehicles necessary for the sick and wounded, four or five hundred caissons would be sufficient for all the wants of the army. He expressly forbade any officer, any general, to appropriate to his use the carriages destined for the troops. The transport was at that time executed by a company which let to the State its caissons ready horsed. Having discovered that one of the marshals, favoured by this company, had several caissons at his disposal, Napoleon repressed this infraction of the rules with the utmost severity, and made prince Berthier responsible for the fulfilment of his orders. The army was then free from the abuses, which time and the increasing wealth of its chiefs soon afterwards introduced.

Napoleon then ordered large purchases of corn to be made all along the Rhine, and an immense quantity of biscuit to be made. These provisions were to be collected at Mayence, and from Mayence sent by the navigation of the Mayn to Würzburg. Situated in Upper Franconia, quite close to the defiles that lead into Saxony, and commanded by an excellent citadel, Würzburg was to be our base of operation. Napoleon wished to ascertain whether there were not other fortified posts in the environs. The officers secretly sent to reconnoitre, having pointed out Forchheim and Kronach, he ordered them to be armed, and the provisions, ammunition, and tools, collected by his direction, to be deposited there in safety.

Würzburg had belonged for some months to the archduke Ferdinand, the same who had been successively grand-duke of Tuscany, elector of Salzburg, and finally, since the last peace with Austria, duke of Würzburg. This prince solicited his admission into the Confederation of the Rhine, by the States

of which his new dominions were enclosed. He was mild, discreet, and as well disposed towards France as an Austrian prince could be; and the Emperor was sure of obtaining from him all the facilities desirable for the preparations that he purposed to make. Würzburg thus became the centre of the assemblages of men and *matériel* ordered by Napoleon.

There had been no want of money since the financial crisis of the preceding winter. In the treasure of the army, Napoleon had, moreover, a precious resource. Without expending this treasure, exclusively devoted to the endowments (*dotations*) of his soldiers, he made loans with it which the State was afterwards to reimburse by paying the interest and the principal of the sums borrowed. Napoleon had sent a great quantity of specie to Strasburg, and consigned funds to prince Berthier, in order to conquer by the power of ready money the obstacles which might oppose the execution of his designs.

The imperial guard had travelled post, as we have seen, thanks to the relays of carts prepared upon the road. In this manner, 3,000 grenadiers and dismounted chasseurs had been despatched. As this mode of conveyance could not be employed for the cavalry and the artillery, the mounted grenadiers and chasseurs, forming nearly 3,000 horse, as well as the park of artillery of the guard, amounting to 40 pieces, were forwarded by the usual way. This was a reserve of 7,000 men, fit for warding off all unforeseen accidents. Napoleon, as prudent in the execution as he was bold in the conception of his plans, set a high value upon reserves, and it was chiefly for the purpose of creating one that he had instituted the imperial guard. But, quick in discovering the inconveniences attached to the most excellent things, he found the keeping up of this guard too expensive, and he was fearful that the recruiting of it would drain the army of choice men. The *velites*, a sort of enlisted volunteers, the creation of which he had devised, for the purpose of augmenting the guard without drafting from the army, had appeared too costly also, and not numerous enough. He therefore ordered the formation of a new regiment of infantry, under the title of *fusiliers of the guard*, all the soldiers of which should be selected from the annual contingent, and the officers and subalterns taken out of the guard, which should wear the uniform of the latter, which should serve with it, only be treated as young troops, that is to say, less spared under fire, have a slight increase of pay, and soon acquire all the qualities of the guard itself, without costing as much, and without depriving the army of its best soldiers. While awaiting the result of this ingenious combination, Napoleon had recourse to an expedient already practised, of separating the companies of the grenadiers and those of the voltigeurs from the corps, and to collect them into battalions. In this manner there had been formed in 1804 the grenadiers of Arras, after-

wards called Oudinot's grenadiers. At that time, there had been taken the grenadier companies of all the regiments which were not destined to form part of the Boulogne expedition. After Austerlitz, several of these companies had been sent back to their corps. With those which had continued together, Napoleon gave orders for joining the grenadiers and voltigeurs of the depôts and regiments stationed in the 25th and 26th military divisions (the country comprised between the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Sambre) for organizing them in battalions of six companies each, and for despatching them to Mayence. This was a new corps of 7,000 men, which, united with the imperial guard, would make the reserve of the army amount to 14,000 men. He added to it 2,400 dragoons of *élite*, formed into battalions of four companies or squadrons, and destined to serve, either on foot or mounted, always by the side of the guard. These dragoons, drawn from Champagne, Burgundy, Lorraine, and Alsace, might be transported in twenty days to the Mayn.

The reserves, whose composition we have just described, added to the conscripts taken from the depôts, would form a considerable accession to the forces ready to march for Prussia. The grand army was composed of seven corps, six only of which were in Germany, the second, under general Marmont, having gone to Dalmatia. These corps continued to be commanded by the same officers. Marshal Bernadotte commanded the first corps, 20,000 strong; marshal Davout, the third, 27,000 strong; marshal Soult was at the head of the fourth, the force of which amounted to 32,000 men. Marshal Lannes, always devoted, but always sensitive and irritable, had for a moment quitted the fifth corps, in consequence of a transient discontent. On the first rumour of war, he came to resume the command of it. This corps amounted to 22,000 men, even after Oudinot's grenadiers ceased to form part of it. Marshal Ney had remained at the head of the sixth, which, continued at an effective of 20,000 men present under colours. The seventh, under marshal Augereau, numbered 17,000. The cavalry reserve, scattered through districts abounding in forage, could assemble 28,000 horse. Murat, still continued in the command of it, had received orders to quit the duchy of Berg: he hastened, overjoyed, to recommence a species of war in which he so eminently distinguished himself, and to gain a glimpse not of a duchy but of a kingdom as the prize of his exploits.

These six corps, with the reserve of cavalry, comprehended no fewer than 170,000 fighting men. If we add the guard, the troops of *élite*, the staffs, the park of reserve, we may say that the grand army amounted to about 190,000 men. It was to be presumed that in the first days it would not be completely assembled, for, out of the guard and the companies of *élite*, the

foot guard only would have arrived. But 170,000 men were sufficient, and more than sufficient, for the commencement of that war. The corps were composed of the same divisions, the same brigades, the same regiments, as in the last campaign—a very wise arrangement, for officers and soldiers had learned to know and to have confidence in each other. As for the general organization, it continued to be the same. It was that which Napoleon had substituted for the organization of the army of the Rhine, and the excellence of which he had proved in the Austrian campaign, the very first in which 200,000 men had been seen marching under a single commander. The army was still divided into corps which were complete in infantry and artillery, but which, as to cavalry, had only a few chasseurs and hussars to guard it. The bulk of the cavalry was still concentrated under Murat, and placed directly under the hand of Napoleon, from motives which we have assigned elsewhere. The guard and the companies of *élite* formed a general reserve of all arms, never quitting Napoleon, and marching close to him, not to ensure the safety of his person, but to execute his commands the more expeditiously.

Orders for moving were given so as to be executed in the first days of October. Napoleon enjoined marshals Ney and Soult to unite in the country of Bayreuth, in order to form the right of the army; marshals Davout and Bernadotte to join about Bamberg, to form its centre; marshals Lannes and Augereau to form a junction in the environs of Coburg, to compose its left. He thus concentrated his forces on the frontiers of Saxony, in military views, the extent and profundity of which the reader will soon appreciate. Murat had orders to assemble the cavalry at Würzburg. The foot guard, conveyed in six days to the Rhine, marched towards the same point. These different corps were to reach their posts by the 3rd or 4th of October. It was expressly recommended to them not to pass the frontiers of Saxony.

Every thing being prepared, both for the safety of the Empire and for the active war in which Napoleon was about to engage, he left Paris. Nothing new had taken place in the relations with Prussia. Laforest, the minister, had kept the silence enjoined by Napoleon, but he wrote that the king, swayed by the passions of the court and of the young aristocracy, having set out for his army, no hope was left of preventing war, unless the two monarchs, present in their head-quarters, should exchange some direct explanations, which should put an end to a deplorable misunderstanding, and suffice to satisfy the pride of the two governments. Unfortunately, such explanations were not to be expected. M. de Knobelsdorf, who continued in Paris protested the pacific intentions of his cabinet. But little initiated into the secret of affairs, neither sharing nor comprehending the passions which ran away with his court, he per-

formed, at that of Napoleon, the part of a respected but useless personage. The news from the North represented Russia as anxious to comply with the wishes of Prussia, and engaged in preparing her armies. The intelligence from Austria described her as exhausted, full of rancour against Prussia, and not to be feared by France unless in case of a great reverse. As for England, when once Mr. Fox was dead, the war party, thenceforth triumphant, had resumed its pretensions in inadmissible propositions, such as the cession of the Balearic Islands, Sicily, and Dalmatia, to the Bourbons of Naples, that is to say, to the English themselves—propositions which lord Lauderdale, a sincere friend of peace, supported methodically, and with a simple ignorance of the real intentions of his cabinet. Napoleon did not choose to dismiss him abruptly, but he directed an answer equivalent to the sending of his passports to be addressed to him. He then prescribed a communication to the Senate detailing the long negotiations of France with Prussia, and the melancholy conclusion which had terminated them. This communication, however, he ordered to be deferred till war was irrevocably declared between the two courts. Nevertheless, as it was necessary to assign a motive for his departure from Paris, he caused it to be intimated that, at a moment when the powers of the North were assuming a threatening attitude, he deemed it expedient to put himself at the head of his army, to be ready for whatever might happen. He held a last council, to explain to the dignitaries of the Empire their duty and the part they had to act in the various cases that might occur. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, a man for whom he reserved all his confidence, even when he left his two brothers, Louis and Joseph, in Paris, must of course have possessed it in a still greater degree when he left not one of the princes of his family in the capital. Napoleon conferred on him the most extensive powers under the different titles of president of the Senate, president of the Council of State, and president of the Council of the Empire. Junot, one of the men most attached to the Emperor, had the command of the troops cantoned in the capital. None of the imperial family but the females were left in Paris. Again Josephine, terrified to see Napoleon exposed to new dangers, had solicited and obtained permission to accompany him to the banks of the Rhine. She hoped, by establishing herself at Mayence, to be more speedily and more frequently informed of what was passing. Besides the government of the Empire, the arch-chancellor was to have that of the imperial family. He was charged to advise and to restrain the individuals of that family who should in any way offend against the laws of decorum or against the rules prescribed by the Emperor himself.

Napoleon set out in the night between the 24th and the 25th of September, accompanied by the Empress and M. de Talley-

rand, stopped a few hours at Metz, to see the place, and then directed his course towards Mayence, where he arrived on the 28th. In that city he learned that a courier from Berlin, with the final explanations of the court of Prussia, had crossed him in his course, and continued his journey to Paris. It was not, therefore, till he advanced further into Germany that he was able to obtain the definitive explanations which he expected. At Mayence he saw marshal Kellermann, who superintended the organization of the dépôts, and marshal Mortier, appointed to the command of the eighth corps, and again explained to them how they were to conduct themselves according to circumstances. He directed the provisioning of Mayence to be completed; he made some alterations in the arming of the place; he hastened the departure of the young soldiers taken from the dépôts, the transport of the provisions and ammunition destined to pass out of the Rhine into the Mayn, and then to ascend the Mayn to Würzburg. A troop of orderly officers, running in all directions, came every moment to report upon the missions which they had fulfilled; and, accustomed not to affirm any more than they had seen with their own eyes, they went and came incessantly, to acquaint him with the real state of things, and what progress had been made in the execution of his orders. At Mayence, Napoleon sent back his civil establishment, retaining about him his military household alone. He could not for a moment control his emotion on seeing the tears shed by the empress. Though full of confidence, he at length gave way himself to the general uneasiness excited around him by the prospect of a long war in the North, in distant regions, against new nations. He parted, therefore, with some pain from Josephine and M. de Talleyrand, and advanced beyond the Rhine: absorbed by his vast thoughts, by the spectacle of immense preparations, he was soon diverted from a species of emotion, which he was glad to banish from his heart, and still more so from his calm and imperious countenance.

A great concourse of German generals and princes were waiting at Würzburg to pay their respects to him. The new duke of Würzburg, proprietor and sovereign of the place, had preceded all the others. This prince, whom he had known in Italy, reminded Napoleon of the first days of his glory, as well as of the most friendly relations; for he was the only one of the Italian sovereigns whom he had not found intent on injuring the French army. Hence it was not without pain that he had found himself obliged to make him bear his part in the general vicissitudes. Napoleon was received in the palace of the former bishops of Würzburg, a magnificent palace, little inferior to that of Versailles, a pompous monument of the wealth of the Germanic Church, formerly so powerful and so largely endowed, now so poor and so decayed. He had a long conversation with the archduke Ferdinand, on the general state of

things, and particularly on the dispositions of the court of Austria, to which this prince was most nearly allied, for he was the brother of the emperor Francis, and with which he was perfectly acquainted. The duke of Würzburg, a friend of peace, possessing the intelligence of the German princes educated in Tuscany, was solicitous, for the sake of his own quiet, for a good understanding between Austria and France. He took occasion from the late events to speak to Napoleon on the grave question of alliances, to decry that of Prussia, and to extol that of Austria. He strove to insinuate some ideas which had prevailed in the last century, when the two cabinets of Versailles and Vienna, united against that of Berlin, were connected at once by a common war and by marriages. He reminded him that this alliance had been the brilliant period of the French navy, and took pains to demonstrate to him that France, more powerful on the continent than she had need to be, was at present destitute of the maritime force necessary for re-establishing and protecting her commerce, destroyed for the last fifteen years. This language had nothing new for Napoleon, for M. de Talleyrand daily dinned his ears with it. The duke of Würzburg appeared to believe that the court of Vienna would gladly seize this occasion of courting the friendship of France, and of creating in her a support instead of an incessantly threatening enemy. Napoleon, disposed by the circumstances of the moment to entertain such ideas, was so touched by them that he wrote himself to his ambassador, M. de La Rochefoucauld, and ordered him to make amicable overtures at Vienna—overtures reserved enough not to compromise his dignity, significant enough for Austria to know that it depended upon herself to form a close connexion with France.*

* We quote the following letter written to M. de La Rochefoucauld by Napoleon, as a proof of the dispositions which we attribute to him at this moment. The violent expressions which he uses in speaking of Prussia must be ascribed solely to the irritation excited by the unexpected conduct of that court towards him. It was not in these terms that he usually expressed himself, especially in regard to the king of Prussia, for whom he had never ceased to feel and to profess a real esteem.

To M. de La Rochefoucauld, my ambassador to his Majesty the emperor of Austria.

Würzburg, the 6th of October, 1806.

I have been since yesterday at Würzburg which has given me occasion to converse for a long time with H.R.H. I have acquainted him with my firm resolution to break all the ties of alliance which bind me to Prussia, be the result of the present affairs what it may. According to my last accounts from Berlin, it is possible that war may not take place, but I am resolved not to be the ally of a power so versatile and so despicable. I shall be at peace with her, no doubt, because I have no right to spill the blood of my people under vain prettexts. Still, the necessity for directing my efforts towards my navy renders an alliance upon the continent indispensable for me. Circumstances had led me to an alliance with Prussia, but that power is at this day what it was in 1740, and what it has been at all times, without consistency and without honour. I have esteemed the emperor of Austria, even amidst

Powerful and confident as he was, Napoleon began to believe that, without a great continental alliance, he should always be liable to fresh coalitions, diverted from his contest with England, and obliged to expend upon land resources which he ought to expend exclusively upon sea. The alliance of Prussia, which he had cultivated, unfortunately with too little care, having slipped through his hands, he was naturally led to the idea of an alliance with Austria. But this idea, very recent with him, was the illusion of a moment, unworthy of the firm perspicacity of his mind. No doubt, had he been willing to pay with a sacrifice for this new alliance, and to restore to Austria some of the spoils which he had wrested from her, the agreement might have been possible and sincere—but God knows ! But how propose to Austria, stripped in ten years of the Netherlands, of Lombardy, of the duchies of Modena and Tuscany, of Suabia, of the Tyrol, of the Germanic crown—how propose to her to ally herself to the conqueror, who had wrested from her such territories and such power ! One might, indeed, hope for her neutrality after the word given at the bivouac of Urschitz, and under the influence of the remembrance of Rivoli, of Marengo, of Austerlitz ; but to induce her to an alliance was a chimera of M. de Talleyrand's and of the duke of Würzburg's, the one giving way to his personal predilections, the other swayed by the interests of his new position. This tendency to seek an impossible alliance clearly proves what a fault had been committed in treating lightly the alliance of Prussia, which was at once possible, easy, founded on great common interests. For the rest, this accommodation with Austria was an experiment which Napoleon hazarded *en passant*, in order not to neglect a useful idea, but the success of which he did not consider as in-

his reverses and the events which have divided us ; I believe him to be constant and faithful to his word. You must explain yourself in this spirit, without, however, employing a too misplaced urgency. My position and my forces are such that I need not fear any body ; but all these efforts press at last upon my people. Of the three powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, I must have one for my ally. In no case can Prussia be trusted : Russia and Austria alone are left me. The navy flourished formerly in France through the benefit which we derived from the alliance of Austria. That power, besides, feels a necessity for remaining quiet,—a sentiment in which I also heartily join. An alliance founded on the independence of the Ottoman empire, on the guarantee of our dominions, and on amicable arrangements which would consolidate the peace of Europe and would enable me to throw my efforts upon my navy, would suit me. The house of Austria having frequently made insinuations to me, the present moment, if it knows how to profit by it, is the most favourable of all. I shall say no more to you. I have explained my sentiments more at length to the prince of Benevento, who will not fail to inform you of them. For the rest, your mission will be fulfilled whenever you signify in the slightest possible manner that I am not averse from adhering to a system, which should knit more firmly my ties with Austria. Fail not to keep an eye on Moldavia and Wallachia, and to inform me of the movements of the Russians against the Ottoman empire. Whereupon, &c. &c.,

NAPOLEON.

dispensable, in the high degree of power to which he had attained. He hoped, in fact, notwithstanding all that was said of the Prussians, to beat them so completely and so quickly, that he should soon have all Europe at his feet, and for ally the exhaustion of his enemies, in default of their good-will.

An important member of the Confederation of the Rhine arrived also at Würzburg: this was the king of Wirtemberg, formerly a mere elector, now a king of Napoleon's creation, a prince known for the warmth of his temper and the penetration of his mind. Napoleon had to settle with him the details of a marriage already agreed upon between prince Jerome Bonaparte and the princess Catherine of Wirtemberg. After attending to this family business, Napoleon arranged with the king of Wirtemberg concerning the meeting of the Confederates of the Rhine, who, among them, were to furnish about 40,000 men, independently of the 15,000 Bavarians concentrated around Braunau. The Germans had found themselves harshly used when serving under marshal Bernadotte in the Austrian campaign. The Bavarians, in particular, had solicited as a special favour that they might not be again placed under that marshal. It was decided that all the German auxiliaries should be collected into a single corps, and that they should be placed in the rear of the grand army under the command of prince Jerome, who had quitted the naval service for the land service. This prince being destined to marry a German princess, and probably to receive her dowery in Germany, it was wise to familiarize him with the Germans, and to familiarize the Germans with him.

The conversation of the emperor of the French and the German monarch then turned upon the court of Prussia. The king of Wirtemberg had it in his power to give Napoleon useful information, for he had handfuls of letters from Berlin, which gave a lively account of the vertigo which had seized all heads, and even those which were to be supposed the soundest. The duke of Brunswick, whose age and whose enlightened reason ought to have preserved him from the general infatuation, had himself given way to it, and he had written to the king of Wirtemberg, threatening that he would soon plant the Prussian eagles in Stuttgart, if that prince did not abandon the Confederation of the Rhine. The king of Wirtemberg, unintimidated by such threats, showed all these letters to Napoleon, who turned them to account, and felt redoubled irritation against the court of Prussia. Napoleon made much inquiry concerning the Prussian army and its real merit. The king of Wirtemberg extolled the Prussian cavalry beyond measure, and represented it as so formidable that Napoleon, struck with what he was told, spoke upon the subject himself to all his officers, took care to prepare them for this rencounter, reminded them of the manner of manœuvring in Egypt, and

said to them with that vivacity of expression which was peculiar to him, that they must march to Berlin *in a square of two hundred thousand men*.

Though Napoleon received no definitive declaration from the court of Prussia, he decided, upon the mere fact of the invasion of Saxony by a Prussian army, to consider war as declared. In the preceding year he had designated as hostility the invasion of Bavaria by Austria; this year, in like manner, he designated as hostility the invasion of Saxony by Prussia. This was a skilful way of stating the question, for he appeared to interfere in Germany solely for the purpose of protecting the second-rate German princes against those of the first order. On these conditions, for the rest, war was completely declared at the moment, for the Prussians had crossed the Elbe by the bridge of Dresden, and they already lined the extreme frontier of Saxony, as the French lined it by occupying the Franconian territory.

The reader would not comprehend Napoleon's plan of campaign against Prussia, one of the finest and grandest that was ever conceived and executed, without casting a look at the general configuration of Germany.

Austria and Prussia divide the soil of Germany, as they divide its wealth, its dominion, and its politics, leaving between them a certain number of petty States, whose geographical situation, the laws of the Empire, and French influence have hitherto maintained in their dependence. Austria is in the East of Germany, Prussia in the North. Austria occupies and fills almost entirely that beautiful valley of the Danube, long, winding, at first contracted by the Alps and the mountains of Bohemia, then opening below Vienna, and becoming a hundred leagues wide between the Carpathians and the mountains of Illyria, embracing in these vast slopes the superb kingdom of Hungary. It is to the extremity of this valley that you must go to look for Austria, crossing the Upper Rhine between Strasburg and Basle, then traversing the defiles of Suabia, and descending by a perilous progress the course of the Danube, to the basin amidst which rises Vienna, and which it overlooks—Prussia, on the contrary, has established herself in the vast plains of the North, the entrance of which she occupies—hence her old appellation of the *March* or *Mark* of Brandenburg. To reach her, you must not ascend the Upper Rhine to Basle, but pass it at about the middle of its course, at Mayence, or descend to Wesel, and thus cross or turn the mountainous centre of Germany. No sooner are you beyond the moderately elevated mountains of Franconia, Thuringia, and Hesse, than you enter an immense plain, traversed successively by the Weser, the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, and the Niemen, terminating to the north at the North Sea, and to the east at the foot of the Uralian mountains. This plain is called Westphalia, Hanover, Prussia, along the North Sea, Poland, in the interior of the continent, Russia as

far as the Ural. On the slope of the mountains of Germany, by which you arrive at it, that is to say, in Saxony, in Thuringia, in Hesse, it is covered with a solid, vegetable mould, and on the banks of the rivers with a rich, alluvial soil. But, in the intervals which separate these rivers, and especially along the sea, it is invariably sandy; the waters, having no drain, there form innumerable lakes and marshes. The only feature that varies the surface is sand-hills, the only vegetation, the fir, the birch, and a few oaks. It is grave and gloomy like the sea, of the aspect of which it frequently reminds you, like the slender and dark vegetation with which it is covered, like the sky of the north. It is extremely fertile on the banks of the rivers, but in the interior scanty crops are raised here and there amidst the clearings of the pine forests; and if at times it exhibits the spectacle of abundance, it is where numerous cattle have enriched the soil. But such is the power of economy, of courage, of perseverance, that among these sands has been formed a State of the first order, if not wealthy. at least in easy circumstances, Prussia, the bold and patient work of a great man, Frederick II., and of a succession of princes, who, before or after him, though not possessing his genius, were animated by the same spirit. And such, too, is the power of civilisation, that, from amidst these marshes, surrounded by sand-hills, the great Frederick caused the royal mansion of Potsdam to spring forth, that Versailles of the north, where the genius of the arts has had the skill to impress the sadness of these cold and dreary regions with grace and elegance.

The Elbe, the first great river which you meet with in this plain, when you descend from the mountains of central Germany, is the principal seat of the power of Prussia, the bulwark which covers her, the vehicle which conveys her productions. In its upper course, it waters the plains of Saxony, runs through Dresden, and washes the foot of the formerly Saxon fortress of Torgau. It then proceeds into the heart of Prussia, runs round Magdeburg, her principal fortress, protects Berlin, her capital, situated beyond it, at an equal distance from the Elbe and the Oder, among lakes, sand-hills, and canals. Lastly, before it falls into the North Sea, it forms the port of the wealthy city of Hamburg, which introduces into Germany, by the waters of this river, the productions of the whole world. From this brief sketch of the Elbe, one may easily comprehend the ambition of Prussia to possess its entire course, and to absorb Saxony on the one side, the Hanseatic towns and Hanover on the other—an ambition which slumbers at the present moment; for all the European ambitions, glutted at the expense of France in 1815, appear to be asleep for a time. But, at the period to which this history relates, the convulsion of States had inflamed and made manifest all desires. Prussia had demanded of us the Hanseatic towns; as for Saxony, she had never ventured to claim more than its dependence under the title of Confederation of the North; and it is natural that Napoleon should

have felt all that jealousy which he felt on account of Bavaria, when he committed the fault of being jealous of Prussia.

The Elbe, then, is the river which you must reach and cross, when you would make war upon Prussia, as the Danube is that, the course of which you must descend when you want to make war upon Austria. As soon as you have succeeded in forcing the Elbe, the defences of Prussia fall, for you take Saxony from her, you annul Magdeburg, and Berlin is left unprotected. The channels of commerce themselves are occupied by the assailant, and this becomes a serious matter if the war is prolonged. Thus, while you are obliged, in the case of the Danube, after reaching its sources, to descend its course to Vienna, in the case of the Elbe, in order to attain your principal object, it is sufficient to have crossed it; and if you have a conception of the vast designs of Napoleon, it then becomes necessary to push on to the Oder, in order to interpose between Prussia and Russia, to intercept succours from one to the other. You must even advance to the Vistula, beat Russia in Poland, where so many resentments are brooding against her, and follow the example of Hannibal, who carried the war into the heart of the Italian provinces, trembling under the insecurely riveted yoke of ancient Rome. Such are the steps of that immense march to the North, which has hitherto been attempted by one man only, by Napoleon. Will it ever be attempted again? That the world knows not. If such be the will of Providence, may it be at last a serious attempt, conducive to the freedom and the independence of the West!

But, to reach that northern plain, at the entrance of which Prussia is situated, you must traverse the mountainous country which forms the centre of Germany, or turn it, by proceeding to that level beach which, under the name of Westphalia, extends from the mountains to the North Sea.

This country, which closes the entrance to Prussia, is composed of a long and broad groupe of wooded heights, connecting on the one side with Bohemia, extending northward to the plains of Westphalia, amidst which it terminates, after rising for a moment, to form the summits of the Harz, so rich in metals. This mountainous groupe, which separates the waters of the Rhine from those of the Elbe, covered in its upper part with forests, throws into the Rhine, the Mayn, the Lahn, the Sieg, the Ruhr, the Lippe, into the Elbe, the Elster, the Saale, the Unstrut, and lastly, directly into the North Sea, the Ems, and the Weser.

Various routes for traversing this tract present themselves. In the first place, setting out from Mayence, you can proceed to the right, and ascend the winding valley of the Mayn to above Würzburg, and even to its sources. There, in the environs of Coburg, you meet with wood-covered heights, which, under the name of the forest of Thuringia, separate Franconia from Saxony, and from which flow the Mayn on the one side, the Saale on the other. They are traversed by three defiles, those

from Bayreuth to Hof, from Kronach to Schleiz, from Coburg to Saalfeld; then you descend into Saxony through the valley of the Saale. Such is the first route. The second is to the left of those wooded heights which form the forest of Thuringia. If you take this, you ascend the Mayn from Mayence to Hanau; there you leave it, throw yourself into the valley of the Werra, or country of Fulda, leave the forest of Thuringia to the right, descend by Eisenach, Gotha, Weimar, into the plain of Thuringia and Saxony, and arrive on the banks of the Elbe. The latter has always been the main road of Germany, that from Frankfurt to Leipzig.

The third and last route consists in turning the mountainous centre of Germany, and proceeding northward till you have reached the plain of Westphalia, which you do by following the course of the Rhine to Wesel, crossing at Wesel, then traversing Westphalia and Hanover, having the mountains on the right, the sea on the left. You meet, by the way, with the Ems, the Weser, and lastly the Elbe, become, at this extremity of its course, one of the most considerable rivers in Europe.

Of these various ways of penetrating into the plain of the North, Napoleon had chosen the first, that leading from the sources of the Mayn to the sources of the Saale by traversing the defiles of Franconia.

The motives for his choice were profound. In the first place, he had his troops in Upper Franconia, and, if he had marched them northward to reach Westphalia, he would have exposed himself to the inconvenience of travelling double or treble the distance, and to the risk of unmasking his movements by the mere length of the journey. Independently of the length and meaning of this journey, he would have met with the Ems, the Weser, the Elbe, and been obliged to cross those rivers in the lower part of their courses, when they have become formidable obstacles. These reasons left a choice between two courses only: either to take the great central road of Germany, which runs through Frankfurt, Hanau, Fulda, Gotha, Weimar, to Leipzig, and passes to the left of the forest of Thuringia; or to ascend the Mayn to its source, and to throw himself out of the valley of the Mayn into the valley of the Saale, which consisted in passing to the right of the forest of Thuringia. Of these two routes, however, the second was far preferable, for a reason pertaining to the general plan of Napoleon and to his system of warfare. The farther he passed to the right, the more chance he had of turning the Prussians by their left, to reach the Elbe before them, to cut them off from Saxony, to deprive them of its resources and its soldiers, to cross the Elbe in the part of its course where it is easiest to cross, to make himself master of Berlin, and lastly, after outstripping the Prussians at the Elbe, to get before them to the Oder, on which side the Russians might be coming to their assistance. If Napoleon attained this object he would do some-

thing like what he had accomplished in the preceding year, by turning the Austrian general, Mack, by separating him from the Russian succours, and by cutting in two the forces of the coalition, and beating one portion after the other. To be first at the Elbe and the Oder was therefore the grand problem to be resolved in this war. With this object, the defiles leading from Franconia into Saxony, and passing through the forest of Thuringia, were the route that Napoleon must prefer, without taking into account that his troops were all brought thither, and that they had only to set out from the point where they were to get into action.

But a point in which it behoved him to take especial pains to succeed, was to leave the Prussians in doubt respecting his real design, to persuade them that he should take the road through Fulda, Eisenach, and Weimar, that is to say the central road of Germany, that which runs to the left of the forest of Thuringia. To this end, he had placed part of his left wing, composed of the fifth and seventh corps, commanded by marshals Lannes and Augereau, about Königshofen and Hildburghausen, on the Werra, to induce a belief that he was going into Upper Hesse. And, in fact, there was enough in this to mislead them. Napoleon had not confined himself to this demonstration; with a view to increase their uncertainty, he had ordered other demonstrations towards Westphalia. The march of the king of Holland, preceded by false reports, had had that object. Nevertheless, it could not deceive the Prussians so much as to persuade them that Napoleon would attack by Westphalia. Besides the presence of the French army in Franconia, an accessory circumstance had been sufficient to enlighten them. Dupont's division, always employed separately since the battles of Haslach and Albeck, had been sent to the Lower Rhine to occupy the grand-duchy of Berg. On the approach of war, it had been brought back by the way of Mayence and Frankfurt. This movement from left to right contradicted the probability of any offensive operation in the quarter of Westphalia, and led to a belief that the attack would take place either from the country of Fulda or from Franconia, either to the left or to the right of the forest of Thuringia. But which of these two passages would be preferred by Napoleon, there lay the doubt, which that profound calculator took infinite pains to keep up in the minds of the Prussian generals.

Nothing can give an idea of the agitation which prevailed among those unfortunate generals. They were all assembled at Erfurt, at the back of the forest of Thuringia, with the ministers, the king, the queen, and the court, deliberating in a sort of confusion difficult to describe. The Prussian forces, first assembled in each military district, had been afterwards concentrated in two masses, one in the environs of Magdeburg, under the duke of Brunswick, the other in the environs of Dresden, under the prince of Hohenlohe. The principal army, moved from Magdeburg to Naumburg on the Saale, then to Weimar and Erfurt,

was at this moment around the latter town, ranged behind the forest of Thuringia, its front covered by the length of the forest, and its left by the steep banks of the Saale. The duke of Weimar, with a strong detachment of light troops, occupied the interior of the forest, and pushed reconnaissances beyond it. General Ruchel formed the right of this army, with the troops of Westphalia.

This principal army might be computed at 93,000 men, including the corps of general Ruchel. The second army, organized in Silesia, had been marched to Saxony for the purpose of gaining over the unfortunate elector, who had neither interest in the war nor liking for it, partly by persuasion, partly by fear. Yielding, at length, after much hesitation, he had just promised 20,000 Saxons, very good troops, and to deliver the bridge of Dresden to the Prussians, on condition that they should cover Saxony by placing one of the two acting armies there. The 20,000 Saxons were not ready, and detained the prince of Hohenlohe, who was slowly ascending the Saale to take a position opposite to the defiles leading from Franconia into Saxony, facing the assemblage of the French troops. The Prussian contingent of the country of Bayreuth, under the command of general Tauenzien, had fallen back upon Schleiz on our approach, and thus formed the advanced guard of prince Hohenlohe. The latter, with the 20,000 Saxons, whom he was waiting for, and the thirty and odd thousand Prussians from Silesia, would have under him a corps of more than 50,000 men.

Such were the two Prussian armies. For the whole reserve, there was at Magdeburg a corps of about 15,000 men, placed under the command of the prince of Wirtemberg, who had quarrelled with his family. To this enumeration must be added the garrisons of the fortresses of the Oder and the Vistula, amounting to about 25,000 men. Thus the Prussians had not more than 180 or 185 thousand soldiers, including the Saxons at their disposal, and numbered of their own not more than 160 or 165 thousand.*

* The following is, we believe, a most accurate statement of the Prussian forces.

Advanced guard under the duke of Weimar	10,000	men.
Principal corps under the duke of Brunswick	66,000	"
Troops of Westphalia under general Ruchel, forming the right of the duke of Brunswick	17,000	"
		<hr/>
Total of the principal army	93,000	"
Corps of the prince of Hohenlohe, including Saxons	50,000	"
Reserve under the prince of Wirtemberg	15,000	"
Garrisons of the Oder and Vistula	25,000	"
		<hr/>
Total of the Prussian forces	183,000	"

They may, however, be set down at 185,000, for the corps of the prince of Hohenlohe was in general computed at more than 50,000 men.

Thus 180,000 Germans were about to be opposed to 190,000 French, who were soon to be followed by 100,000 more, and who were so inured to war, that they might be pitted in the proportion of one to two, sometimes even of one to three, against the best troops in Europe. We say nothing of the weight thrown into the scale by the genius and the presence of Napoleon. The folly of such a contest on the part of the Prussians was consequently very great, without reckoning the political fault of a war between Prussia and France, a fault, it is true, equal on both sides. For the rest, the Prussians were brave, as the Germans always have been; but, since the Seven Years War, that is to say, ever since 1763, they had not been engaged in any serious war; for their intervention in 1792, in the first struggle of Europe against the French Revolution, had not been either very long or very energetic. Hence they had taken no share in the changes introduced during the last fifteen years into the organization of the European troops; they deemed the art of war to consist in a regularity of movements which is much more serviceable at a review than in a field of battle; they were followed by a quantity of baggage, sufficient of itself to undo an army by the obstacles which it throws in the way of its march. For the rest, pride, which is a great moral force, was extreme in the Prussians, especially among the officers; and in them it was accompanied by a still nobler sentiment, an inconsiderate but ardent patriotism.

Their army was not less to be found fault with for the confusion of its counsels than for the quality of the troops. The king had committed the direction of this war to the duke of Brunswick, out of deference to the old renown of this nephew, this disciple, of the great Frederick. There are established reputations, which are sometimes destined to ruin empires; the command, in fact, cannot be refused them; and when it has been conferred, the public, which perceives the insufficiency under the glory, censures the choice which it has imposed, and renders it still more mischievous, by weakening with its animadversions the moral authority of command, without which material authority is nothing. Such was the case with the duke of Brunswick. This choice was generally deplored among the Prussians, and they expressed themselves on the subject with a boldness, of which it would be impossible to find an example elsewhere, for it seemed that in this nation freedom of mind and language was to spring from the bosom of the army. The duke of Brunswick, endowed with an enlightened understanding (an advantage not always possessed by men whose merit Fame has exaggerated), deemed himself unfit for the so active and so terrible wars of the time. He had accepted the command, out of an old man's weakness, that he might not have the mortification of leaving it to rivals, and he felt overwhelmed by this burden. Judging of

others as justly as of himself, he appreciated as it deserved the folly of the court and that of the young military nobility, and he was not less alarmed at it than at his own insufficiency. Beside the duke of Brunswick, was another relic of the reign of the great Frederick—old marshal Mollendorf; he, too, bowed by years, but modest, devoted, exercising no authority, and called solely to give his opinion; for the king, uncertain in every thing, not daring to assume the command, and unable to resolve to commit it entirely to another, wished to consult upon every resolution of his staff, and to judge of every order, before he permitted its execution. To the weakness of the old men were added the pretensions of the young, convinced that to them alone belonged the talent and the right to command armies. The principal of them was the prince of Hohenlohe, commander of the second army, and one of the German sovereigns stripped of their dominions by the new Confederation of the Rhine. Full of passions and pride, he owed to a few daring acts in the war of 1792 the reputation of an able and enterprising general. That reputation, not very justly deserved, was sufficient to excite in him an ambition to be independent of the generalissimo, and to act according to his personal notions. He had addressed an application to the king, who, not daring either to accede to his wishes, or to refuse them, had suffered a secondary command, ill defined, tending to separation and insubordination, to spring up beside the command-in-chief. Desirous to draw the war to himself, the prince of Hohenlohe strove to establish the theatre of the principal operations on the Upper Saale, where he was, while the duke of Brunswick endeavoured to fix it at the back of the forest of Thuringia, where he had placed himself. From this deplorable squabble, the most mischievous consequences could not fail very soon to arise. Then came the declaimers, general Ruel, who had not scrupled to insult M. de Haugwitz; prince Louis, who had so mainly contributed to infatuate the court, alike decided to favour no plan but what tended to an immediate offensive, out of fear of a return to pacific ideas and of an accommodation between Frederick William and Napoleon. Among these generals, and forming a contrast to them, marshal Kalkreuth was conspicuous. Not so aged as the one, not so young as the others, superior to all by his talents, still adequate to fatigue, though he had borne a glorious part in the campaigns of the great Frederick, enjoying and deserving the confidence of the army, he considered the present war as extravagant, the commander appointed to direct it incapable; declaring his opinion, moreover, with a boldness which contributed to shake profoundly the authority of the generalissimo. It was by him that the army would have wished to be commanded; though, in presence of French soldiers and Napoleon, he might have done no better than the duke of Brunswick himself. To these military personages were added several civil personages—M. de Haugwitz, first minister, M. Lombard,

the king's secretary, M de Lucchesini, minister of Prussia at Paris, besides a great number of German princes, among the rest, the elector of Hesse, whom vain efforts were made to drag into the war; and lastly, completing this medley, the queen, with some of her ladies, riding on horseback, and showing herself to the troops, who greeted her with their acclamations. When sensible people inquired what that august personage did there, she, who by her position and rank seemed so out of place in headquarters? the reply was, that her energy was useful—that she alone kept the king steady—prevented his swerving; and thus there was alleged, in excuse for her presence, a reason not less indecorous than her presence itself.

M. de Haugwitz, M. Lombard, and all the old partisans of French alliance, strove to obtain their pardon by not the most honourable disavowal of their anterior conduct. Messrs. de Haugwitz and Lombard, who had sufficient intelligence to judge of what was passing before their faces, and who ought to have retired when peace politics had become impossible, and have left to M. de Hardenberg the consequences of war politics, affected, on the contrary, the greatest warmth of sentiments, in order to gain credit for the sincerity of their change. They carried their weakness to such a length as to calumniate themselves, by insinuating that their attachment to French alliance had been but a feint on their part to deceive Napoleon, and to defer a rupture, which they foresaw, but which the king, always a friend to peace, had imperatively commanded them to postpone. To give themselves the character of knaves in times past, in order to pass for honest men at the present moment, was neither very clever nor very honourable. All that M. de Haugwitz gained by this sort of conduct was, to lose in a day the merit of a wise policy which belonged to him, to assume the responsibility of a disastrous policy with which he had nothing to do.

There was at that time, in Germany, an able and eloquent pamphleteer, a bitter enemy to France, and whose patriotic passions, though genuine, were not disinterested, for he was paid for his attacks by the courts of Vienna and London: this pamphleteer was M. de Gentz. It was he who, for several years, wrote the manifestoes of the coalition, and filled the journals of Europe with virulent declamations against France. MM. de Haugwitz and Lombard had invited him to the Prussian headquarters, to beg him to draw up the Prussian manifesto; and there were they, before this scribbler of libels, imploring, coaxing, wheedling, loading him with attentions and marks of distinction, even presenting him to the queen herself, and procuring him interviews with that princess. After they had frequently denounced him to France as a firebrand sold to England, they besought him at this moment to inflame all German hearts against that same France. They had requested him, moreover, to be surety to Austria for their sincerity, excusing themselves for being so late

to fight the common enemy, by the assurance that they had always detested him.

It was amidst this strange medley of military officers, princes, ministers, men, women, all obtruding their opinion, advice, approbation, or censure, that politics and war were discussed. M. de Haugwitz, who sought to prolong his illusions as he had sought to prolong his power, strove to persuade every body that all was going on well—very well, better than could have been hoped for. He boasted of having found very amicable dispositions in Austria, and even talked of secret communications, which encouraged an expectation of the speedy concurrence of that power. He extolled the generosity of the emperor Alexander, and published as authentic news the immediate arrival of the Russian troops on the Elbe. He represented the adhesion of the elector of Hesse as secured, and the junction of 30,000 Hessians, the best soldiers of the Confederation, to the Prussian army. Lastly, he announced the sudden reconciliation of Prussia with England, and the departure of a British plenipotentiary for the Prussian head-quarters. M. de Haugwitz, however, could not believe such news to be true; for he knew that Austria, well remembering the conduct held towards her, would not join Prussia till the day when Napoleon should be vanquished, that is to say, when there would be no further need of her assistance; that the Russian troops would not reach the Elbe for three or four months, that is to say, not till the question would be decided; that the elector of Hesse, always crafty, awaited the issue of the first battle to declare himself; that, lastly, England, whose reconciliation with Prussia was in fact certain, could furnish nothing but money, whereas Prussia wanted soldiers to oppose to the terrible soldiers of Napoleon. He knew that the question still consisted in conquering with the Prussian army, limited to its own force, enervated by a long peace, commanded by an old man, the French army, constantly victorious for fifteen years past, and commanded by Napoleon. But, striving to deceive himself for a day, for an hour longer, he circulated reports which he disbelieved, and endeavoured to throw some shade over the precipice towards which all were rushing.

No better disposition of mind was manifested in discussing the plans of campaign. All the conclusion drawn from the grand lessons in the military art given by Napoleon to Europe was, that it was necessary to take the offensive immediately, to beat the French with their own weapons, that is, with daring and celerity, and, as Prussia was not capable of supporting for any long time the expense of so great an armament, to lose no time in settling the business by fighting a decisive battle with the whole collected force of the monarchy. The Prussians seriously persuaded themselves, even after Austerlitz, even after Hohenlinden and a hundred other pitched battles, that the French, brisk and adroit, were chiefly fit for a war of posts, but that, in a general action, in which large masses are engaged, the solid

and scientific tactics of the Prussian army would get the better of their inconsistent agility. What was requisite above all to please these agitated people, to be favourably listened to by them, was to talk of offensive war. Whoever had brought a plan of defensive war, let the grounds on which that plan was founded be ever so sound; whoever, appealing to the everlasting rules of prudence, had dared to say that, to an enemy profoundly experienced, singularly impetuous, till then invincible, it was necessary to oppose time, space, natural obstacles judiciously chosen, and to wait for suitable occasions, that Fortune yields neither to the rash who outrun her, nor to the timid who flee from her, but to the skilful who grasp her when she presents herself—whoever had dared to give such advice, would have been regarded as a coward or a traitor, sold to Napoleon. Still, as the Prussian army could not then make head against the French army, the plainest common sense suggested that other obstacles than the bosoms of soldiers ought to be opposed to Napoleon. These obstacles, such as one already had a glimpse of them, and such as experience soon revealed them, were the distance, the climate, the junction of the German and Russian forces in the frost-bound recesses of the North. There was no need then, by moving forward, to spare Napoleon half the distance, to transfer the war to a temperate climate, and to afford him the advantage of fighting the Prussians before the arrival of the Russians. There was no need, especially in presence of an enemy so prompt, so adroit, so skilful in profiting by a false movement, for the former, by taking a too advanced position, to run the risk of being cut off from their line of operation, separated from the Elbe or the Oder, enveloped, annihilated, at the very outset of the war. The Austrians, whom they had so severely censured in the preceding year, ought to have served for a lesson, and to have prevented them by the remembrance of their disasters from exhibiting a second time the spectacle of Germans, surprised, beaten, disarmed, before the arrival of their auxiliaries from the North.

Thus prudence taught that, instead of advancing to the woody mountains which separate the valley of the Elbe from that of the Rhine, they ought merely to keep, *en masse*, behind the Elbe (the only obstacle capable of stopping the French), to dispute the passage of it to the best of their power; then, when they had crossed the Elbe, to fall back to the Oder, and from the Oder to the Vistula, till they had joined the Russians, avoiding any but partial actions, which, without compromising any thing, would have renewed in the Prussians the long-lost habit of war. When 150,000 Prussians should be joined by 150,000 Russians, in the alternately muddy or frozen plains of Poland, then serious difficulties would commence for Napoleon.

It required no genius, we repeat it, but only plain common sense, to conceive such a plan. Besides, a Frenchman, a great general, Dumouriez, who had formerly saved France against that

same duke of Brunswick, and who, corrupted since by exile, was taking pains to advise our enemies, but without being listened to by them—Dumouriez sent memorials upon memorials to the European cabinets, urging that to fall back, and to oppose to Napoleon distances, climate, hunger, rains, were the safe means of fighting him. Napoleon himself was so convinced of this, that, when he was informed that the Prussians were advancing beyond the Elbe, he refused at first to believe it.*

It is true that, by the adoption of such a plan, they would lose the concurrence of Hesse and Saxony, the finest provinces of the monarchy, abandoned without fighting to the enemy, the resources in which those provinces abounded, the capital, and lastly, the honour of their arms, compromised by so rapid a retreat. But these objections, serious, it is true, were more specious than solid. Hesse, in fact, would not give herself up to men who already had the stamp of defeat on their brow. Twenty thousand Saxons were not worth the sacrifice of a good system of war. The provinces which they scrupled to abandon were liable to be lost, either willingly or by force, by an offensive movement of Napoleon's; and, after he had been seen traversing Austria with giant strides, without being stopped by mountains or rivers, it was puerile to compute space with him. Those lines of the forest of Thuringia, of the Elbe, of the Oder, which they were afraid to give up to him, they were certain to see wrested from them by a single manœuvre of Napoleon's, without their being able to take the successive steps of a well-calculated retreat, and losing at the same time not only the provinces contained between those lines, but the army itself, that is to say, the monarchy. Lastly, as for the honour of the arms, little account must be taken of appearances: a retreat which can be imputed to calculation has never compromised the reputation of an army.

For the rest, none of these ideas had been discussed in the tumultuous council, where king, princes, ministers, generals,

* Here is a fragment of a letter which reveals Napoleon's way of thinking on this point:—

To M. the marshal prince of Neufchatel.

St. Cloud, 24th September, 1806.

My Cousin, I send the copy of the orders of movement of the army, which I addressed to you on the morning of the 20th instant, and which I am sorry not to have sent you twelve hours after the departure of my courier of the 20th of September, because he was liable to be intercepted. However, I have no reason to apprehend it. You must have received by noon on the 24th the first courier of the 20th. When this reaches you, which will no doubt be on the 27th, orders will have been given to marshal Soult, who will have set out on the 26th; and as it will take him three or four days' march to get to Amberg, he would be able to get there by the 30th, though he has orders not to do so till the 3rd. You will receive the present courier on the 27th, in order that you may accelerate the movement of marshal Soult. It is of importance that he should speedily reach Amberg, because the enemy is at Hof, an extravagance of which I did not believe him to be capable, conceiving that he would remain on the defensive along the Elbe.

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deliberated upon the operations of the impending war. Such was the ardour prevailing in it, that no discussion of any but offensive plans was allowed; and all these plans tended to transfer the Prussian army to Franconia, amidst the cantonments of the French army, for the purpose of surprising the latter, and driving it to the Rhine, before it had time to concentrate itself.

The plan which would have agreed best with the prudence of the duke of Brunswick, would have been to continue to lie close at the back of the forest of Thuringia, and to wait in this position for Napoleon to debouch by one side of that forest or the other, by the defiles of Franconia in Saxony, or by the central route of Germany, which goes from Frankfurt to Weimar. In the first case, the Prussians, with their right at that forest of Thuringia, their front covered by the Saale, had only to allow Napoleon to advance. If he purposed to attack them before he went further, they would oppose to him the banks of the Saale, which it was almost impossible to cross before an army of 140,000 men. If he were to hasten to the Elbe, they would follow him, still covered by those same banks of the Saale. If, on the contrary, what was less probable, considering the place chosen for the assembling of his troops, Napoleon, traversing all Franconia, should gain the central route of Germany, the way was so long, that they would have time to collect *en masse*, and choose a suitable spot for giving him battle at the moment when he should debouch from the mountains. Certainly, if the line of the Elbe were not adopted from the outset as the first theatre of defensive war, the next best thing to be done was to place themselves behind the forest of Thuringia, as the duke of Brunswick was disposed to do.

But, though this was his opinion, he durst not propose it. Giving way to the general impulsion, he devised one plan of offensive warfare. The prince of Hohenlohe, usually in contradiction to him, devised another. To take the position which they occupied, the duke of Brunswick had set out from Magdeburg, the prince of Hohenlohe from Dresden—the first ascending the left bank, the second ascending the right bank of the Saale. In the system of offensive warfare, the Prussians might pass, as we have observed, on either side of the forest of Thuringia, or ascend the Upper Saale, and traverse the defiles that place Saxony in communication with Franconia, before which the French were then assembling; or, taking the opposite side, traverse Upper Hesse, and march from Eisenach upon Fulda, Schweinfurt, and Würzburg. The prince of Hohenlohe, desiring to play the principal part, proposed to leave the duke of Brunswick where he was, to ascend the Upper Saale, to pass through the defiles of Franconia, to throw himself upon the Upper Mayn, to surprise the French before they were quite assembled, and to make them fall back upon the Upper Mayn, upon Würzburg, Frankfurt, and Mayence. As soon as the

retreat commenced, the duke of Brunswick was to join him, no matter by what road, to complete the rout of the French, with the whole mass of the Prussian forces.

The duke of Brunswick's plan for acting on the opposite side was to advance by Eisenach, Fulda, Schweinfurt, Würzburg, that is to say, by the central route of Germany, to fall upon Würzburg itself, and thus to cut off from Mayence all the French who were in Franconia. This plan was assuredly the better of the two; for, while the prince of Hohenlohe, proposing to debouch upon the Upper Mayn, would have flung the French back upon the Upper Mayn, from Coburg upon Würzburg, and would have tended to rally them as they fell back, the duke of Brunswick, on the contrary, directing his course upon Würzburg itself, would have cut off the French who were on the Upper Mayn from those who were on the Lower Mayn, and placed himself between Würzburg, which was the centre of their assemblages, and Mayence, which was their base of operation. Besides, he would have acted with a united force of 140,000 men, and have entered upon the offensive with the mass of troops that ought to be devoted to the purpose when one does venture to take it. But, whichever plan were adopted, that there might be some chance of succeeding, it would have been requisite, in the first place, that the Prussian army should be, if not equal in quality to the French army, at least capable of withstanding its shock; in the second place, that it should anticipate Napoleon, and surprise him before he had concentrated all his forces upon Würzburg. Now the duke of Brunswick had given orders for moving on the 10th of October, and Napoleon was at Würzburg on the 3rd, at the head of his assembled forces, and ready to meet all events.

While the Prussians were thus disputing about these offensive plans, all founded on the ridiculous datum of surprising the French on the 10th of October, when Napoleon was so early as on the 3rd in the midst of his assembled troops, they received intelligence of his arrival at Würzburg, and began to get a glimpse of his dispositions. They were then aware that they had miscalculated in measuring his activity by that which they had themselves; and the duke of Brunswick, who, without possessing the rapid comprehension, the resolution, the activity of a great general, was nevertheless endowed with a practised judgment, was more keenly sensible of the danger of confronting the French army, already formed, and having Napoleon at its head. From that moment he renounced all the plans of offensive operations adopted out of condescension, and confined himself more and more to the defensive position taken at the back of the forest of Thuringia. He strove to demonstrate to all around him the advantages of this position; for, he incessantly repeated to them that, if Napoleon should direct his course by Königshofen, Eisenach, Gotha, and Erfurt, which would bring him into Germany by the great central road, they

might take him in flank at the moment when he was debouching from the mountains; if, on the contrary, passing through the defiles leading from Franconia into Saxony, he appeared upon the Upper Saale, they would occupy the course of that river, and await him without stirring, behind its steep banks. Other reasons, not avowed by the duke of Brunswick, inspired him with a decided preference for this position. At bottom, he disapproved the war, and he had just discovered with joy a chance of preventing it. According to the reports of the spies, Napoleon was having great defensive works executed towards Schweinfurt, on the very road from Würzburg to Königshofen and Eisenach. It was true that Napoleon had ordered works in different directions, especially in the direction of Schweinfurt, Königshofen, Hildburghausen, and Eisenach. The duke of Brunswick thence concluded not that Napoleon purposed to advance by the great central road from Frankfurt to Weimar, but that he meant to establish himself about Würzburg, and there take a defensive position. His conversations with M. de Lucchesini contributed equally to produce this persuasion. That ambassador, who had unfortunately irritated his cabinet two months before by exaggerated reports, now mixing a little truth with much that was false, affirmed that, at bottom, Napoleon was not desirous of war; that he had, no doubt, treated Prussia slightly, but that he had never harboured any design of aggression against her; and that it was very possible that he had come to post himself at Würzburg, in order to await there, behind good entrenchments, the final decision of king Frederick William.

It was very late to dare to bring forward this truth, and it was choosing a moment to bring it forward when it had ceased to be accurate. If, in fact, Napoleon, before he left Paris, had been disposed to settle matters with Prussia by means of amicable explanations, now that he was at the head of his army and his sword half unsheathed, he was ready to draw it completely, and to act with the promptness which was natural to him. Nothing was less in unison with his character than the plan of establishing himself in a defensive position before Würzburg. But, from this plan, falsely attributed to Napoleon, and the reports of M. de Lucchesini, the duke of Brunswick concluded with secret joy that it would be possible to avoid war, especially if the precaution were taken to remain at the back of the forest of Thuringia, and to leave between the two armies that obstacle to their collision.

The king, without avowing it, was of the same opinion. A last council was therefore held at Erfurt on the 5th of October, at which the duke of Brunswick, the prince of Hohenlohe, marshal Mollendorf, several officers of the staff, the commanders of corps, the king himself and his ministers, were present. This council lasted for two whole days. The duke proposed the following question: "Was it prudent to go and seek Napoleon in an unsailable position, when they no longer entertained, as according to the first offensive plan, any hope of surprising him?" Long

and violent discussions ensued on this point. The prince of Hohenlohe again put forward, through the medium of the chief of his staff, the idea of operating by the Upper Saale, and of passing through the defiles at the outlets of which Napoleon had assembled his troops. This idea was combated on the part of the duke of Brunswick, and the advantages of the position taken behind the forest of Thuringia were again expatiated upon. Thus the two generals in chief kept up an obstinate contest by means of their staff-officers. For the rest, there was no harmony any where. While the duke of Brunswick was engaged in warm contention with the prince of Hohenlohe, M. de Haugwitz was disputing with M. de Lucchesini, and maintaining, in regard to the pacific dispositions attributed to Napoleon, that they were no longer to be reckoned upon. To the clash of ideas was added the class of passions, and general Ruchel ventured to offer a new affront to M. de Haugwitz. From this debate each carried away only a greater confusion of mind and a deeper bitterness of heart. The king in particular, who earnestly sought to enlighten himself, not daring to trust to his own judgment, and who was sensible of the imminence of the danger—the king was grieved to the very heart. As it was impossible to come to any decision, the council, feeling the necessity for learning more precisely the real resolutions of Napoleon, adopted the plan of a general reconnaissance, to be executed simultaneously by the three principal corps of the prince of Hohenlohe, the duke of Brunswick, and general Ruchel. The king caused a modification of this singular resolution by reducing the three reconnaissances to one only, directed by colonel de Muffling, an officer of the duke of Brunswick's staff, on that same road from Eisenach to Schweinfurt, towards which Napoleon seemed to be making some preparations of defence. Orders were given to the prince of Hohenlohe to continue the concentration of the army of Silesia on the Upper Saale, leaving general Tauenzien, with the detachment of Bayreuth, in observation towards the defiles of Franconia. To this military measure was added a political measure, namely, to send a definitive note to Napoleon, signifying the irrevocable resolutions of the court of Prussia. This note was to set forth the relations which had existed between the two courts, the harsh usage with which France had repaid the friendly conduct of Prussia, the obligation imposed upon the cabinet of Berlin to demand an explanation bearing upon all the points at issue, and which ought to be preceded by a step for the satisfaction of Germany, namely, the immediate retreat of the French troops to the other side of the Rhine. This retreat was required to be effected by a specified day, and to commence on the 8th of October.

Assuredly, if Prussia was still desirous of peace, the projected note was a very ill-contrived expedient for maintaining it; for it was mistaking the character of Napoleon most egregiously to send him a summons to retire by a certain day. But while the duke

of Brunswick and the king were striving to save for themselves a last chance of peace, by continuing at the back of the forest of Thuringia, they were forced, in order to satisfy the furious partisans of war, to make some apparent demonstrations of haughtiness, thus submitting to the caprices of an army, which had transformed itself into a popular multitude, and which shouted, dictated, ordered, like the mob, when the reins are resigned to it.

Such was the way in which the Prussians spent the time that Napoleon, on his part, was devoting to preparations so active and so ably conceived. Without tarrying at Würzburg, he had proceeded to Bamberg, where he deferred his entry into Saxony for the final explanations of Prussia, with whom, and not with him, lay the wrong of the aggression. His right, composed of the corps of marshals Soult and Ney, was in advance of Bayreuth, ready to debouch, by the road from Bayreuth to Hof, upon the Upper Saale. His centre, formed by the corps of marshals Bernadotte and Davout, preceded by the reserve of cavalry, and followed by the foot-guard, was at Kronach, waiting only for orders to advance by Lobenstein upon Saalburg and Schleiz. His left, consisting of the corps of marshals Lannes and Augereau, making deceitful demonstrations towards Hildburghausen, was, at the first signal, to move from left to right, from Coburg towards Neustadt, in order to debouch by Grafenthal upon Saalfeld. These three columns had to traverse the narrow defiles, bordered with woods and rocks, which place Franconia in communication with Saxony, and run to the Upper Saale. The frontier of Saxony, however, was not yet passed, and they continued on the Franconian territory, with one foot raised for marching. The imperial guard was not, it is true, completely assembled: the cavalry and artillery of that guard were still wanting, because they could not travel post, like the infantry; the companies of *élite* and the great park also were still deficient. But Napoleon had at hand about 170,000 men, and those were more than he needed to crush the Prussian army.

When he received, on the 7th, the note of Prussia, he was extremely exasperated. Major-general Berthier was with him. "Prince," said he, "we will be punctual to the appointment; and on the 8th, instead of being in France, we shall be in Saxony." He immediately addressed to his army the following proclamation:

"Soldiers,—

"The order for your return to France was issued; you had already made several marches; triumphal festivities awaited you! But, while we were indulging in this too confident security, fresh plots were hatching under the mask of friendship and alliance. Cries of war were raised in Berlin. The same spirit of infatuation which, by favour of our intestine dissensions, led the Prussians, fourteen years ago, into the plains of Champagne, still pervades their counsels. If it is not Paris that they would fain

raze to its foundations, it is now their flags that they would boast of planting in the capitals of our allies; it is our laurels that they would snatch from our brows! They insist that we should evacuate Germany at sight of their army. . . . Soldiers, there is not one of you who would wish to return to France by any other way than that of honour. It behoves us not to enter it again, but under arches of triumph. Should we then have defied seasons, seas, deserts, conquered Europe several times leagued against us, carried our glory from east to west, to return this day to our country as fugitives, after deserting our allies, and to hear it said that the French eagle had fled, affrighted at sight of the Prussian eagles? Woe, then, be to those who provoke us! Let the Prussians meet with the same fate which they experienced fourteen years ago! Let them learn that it is easy to acquire an increase of territory and of power, with the friendship of the great nation: its enmity is more terrible than the tempests of the Ocean."

On the following day, the 8th of October, Napoleon gave orders for the whole army to cross the frontier of Saxony. The three columns of which it was composed broke up simultaneously. Murat, who preceded the centre, entered first, at the head of the light cavalry, and of the 27th light, and pushed his squadrons by the central defile, that of Kronach, to Lobenstein. No sooner was he past the woody heights which separate Franconia from Saxony, than he despatched several detachments—upon the right towards Hof, upon the left towards Saalfeld—to clear the outlet of the *debouchés*, by which the other columns of the army would have to penetrate. He then marched direct from Lobenstein for Saalburg. There he found posted upon the Saale a body of infantry and cavalry belonging to the corps of general Tauenzien. The enemy at first seemed disposed to defend the Saale, which is a feeble obstacle in this part of its course, and sent several rounds of cannon-shot at our horse. He was answered by several pieces of light artillery, usually attached to the reserve of the cavalry; he was then shown some companies of infantry, of the 27th light. He defended neither the passage of the Saale, nor Saalburg, and retreated towards Schleiz, at some distance from the place of this first encounter. Towards Hof, on our right, the cavalry discovered nothing that could impede the march of marshals Soult and Ney, who, however, were sufficiently strong to clear a way for themselves. On the left, on the contrary, towards Saalfeld, it perceived at a distance a considerable body, commanded by prince Louis. These two corps of general Tauenzien and prince Louis formed part of the army of the prince of Hohenlohe, who, in spite of the formal order which he had received to cross to the left bank of the Saale, and to support himself upon the duke of Brunswick, delayed obeying, and remained dispersed in the hilly country which the Saale traverses at its source.

The three columns of the French army kept advancing simultaneously by the defiles already specified, that of the left, however, being a little behind, because it had to go back from Coburg towards Grafenthal, which obliged it to travel twelve leagues upon roads scarcely passable for artillery. For the rest, no serious obstacle checked the march of our troops. The spirit of the army was excellent: the soldier displayed the greatest cheerfulness, and seemed to make light of some hardships, inevitable in a poor and difficult country. Victory, of which he had no doubt, was for him a compensation for all sufferings.

On the next day, the 9th of October, the centre left Saalburg, and advanced upon Schleiz, after crossing the Saale. Murat, with two regiments of light cavalry, and Bernadotte, with Drouet's division, marched at the head. They arrived before Schleiz about noon. Schleiz is a small town situated on a stream, which is called the Wiesenthal, and which discharges itself into the Saale. At the foot of a height beyond Schleiz and the Wiesenthal was perceived general Tauenzien's corps, drawn up in order of battle. It was backed upon the height, its infantry deployed, its cavalry disposed on the wings, the artillery on its front. It appeared to consist of about 8,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Napoleon, who had slept in the environs of Saalburg, hastened to the spot in the morning, and, at sight of the enemy, gave orders for the attack. Marshal Bernadotte directed some companies of the 27th light, commanded by general Maison, upon Schleiz. General Tauenzien, apprized that the bulk of the French army was following this advanced guard, had no idea of defending the ground which he occupied. He contented himself with reinforcing the detachment which guarded Schleiz, in order to gain time by a petty action for the rear-guard to retire. General Maison entered Schleiz with the 27th light, and drove out the Prussians. At that moment the 94th and 95th regiments of the line, of Drouet's division, were crossing the Wiesenthal, the one below Schleiz, the other at Schleiz itself, and contributed to hasten the retreat of the enemy, who proceeded towards the heights in rear of Schleiz. He was briskly pursued upon these heights, and, on reaching their summit, followed down the back of them. Murat, accompanied by the 4th hussars and the 5th chasseurs (the latter being a little behind) closely pressed the enemy's infantry, which was escorted by 2,000 horse. Perceiving the small number of the force at the disposal of Murat, some Prussian squadrons rushed towards it. Murat got the start of them, charged them, sword in hand, at the head of the 4th hussars, and repulsed them. But, being soon driven back by a more numerous cavalry, he sent in all haste for the 5th chasseurs, as well as general Maison's light infantry, which had not yet been able to join him. He had meanwhile several charges to sustain, and he met them with his accustomed valour. Luckily, the 5th chasseurs came up at a gallop, rallied the 4th hussars, and made

a vigorous charge in its turn. But general Tauenzien, wishing to rid himself of those two regiments of light cavalry, sent the Saxon red dragoons and the Prussian hussars against them. At this moment, five companies of the 27th light, headed by general Maison, came up. Not having time to form them in square, he halted them on the spot in such a manner as to cover the flank of our cavalry, and then caused a volley to be discharged within point blank range with such precision as to extend two hundred of the red dragoons upon the pavement. The whole of the Prussian cavalry then betook itself to flight. Murat, with the 4th hussars and the 5th chasseurs, dashed after it, and drove general Tauenzien's cavalry and infantry pell-mell into the woods. The enemy retreated in the utmost haste, throwing away upon the roads a great number of muskets and hats, and leaving in our hands about 400 prisoners, besides 300 killed or wounded. But the moral effect of the action was greater than the material effect, and the Prussians could then see what sort of soldiers they had to deal with. If Murat, as Napoleon remarked to him, had had at hand a few more cavalry, he would not have been obliged to expose himself so much, and the results would have been more considerable.*

Napoleon was extremely pleased with this first action, which proved how little the Prussian cavalry, though excellently mounted, and very skilful in the management of its horses, was to be feared for the sake of his solid infantry and his bold horse-soldiers. He

* *To the Grand-duke of Berg and Cleves at Schleiz.*

Imperial and Royal Head-quarters,
October 10, 1806, 5 A. M.

General Rapp has acquainted me with the successful result of yesterday. It appears to me that you had not a sufficient collected force of cavalry at hand. If you scatter it all, you will have none left. You have 6 regiments; I have recommended to you to have at least 4 at hand. I do not see that you had yesterday more than 2. Reconnaissances on the right are now becoming much less important: on the arrival of marshal Soult at Plauen, it is upon Prosneck and Saalfeld that strong reconnaissances must be directed, to learn what is passing there. Marshal Lannes arrived on the evening of the 9th at Grafenthal. He will attack Saalfeld to-morrow. You know how important it is to me to be informed during the day of the movement upon Saalfeld, that, if the enemy had assembled there more than 25,000 men, I might be able to march reinforcements thither by Possheim, and take them in rear. I have ordered Dupont's and Beaumont's divisions to proceed to Schleiz. We must, at all events, find a good position in advance of Schleiz, suitable for a field of battle for more than 80,000 men. This need not prevent you from taking advantage of day-break to push strong reconnaissances upon Auma and Possneck, and to let them even be supported by Drouet's division. Marshal Davoust's first division will be at Saalburg, the two other divisions will be in advance, near Obersdorf, and his light cavalry beyond. I am giving orders to marshal Ney to march to Tanna. Your chief business to-day ought to be, in the first place to profit by yesterday's advantage to pick up as many prisoners as possible, and to get from them all the information you can; in the second place, to reconnoitre Auma and Saalfeld, in order to ascertain positively what are the movements of the enemy. Whereupon, &c.

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established his head-quarters at Schleiz, in order to wait there for the rest of the column of the centre, in order more especially to give his right, headed by marshals Ney and Soult, his left, led by marshals Lannes and Augereau, time to clear the defiles, and to come and take a position of battle upon its wings. From what he saw, and from what was reported to him by his spies, who had found the country covered by detached columns, he judged that he had surprised the enemy in a movement of concentration, and that he was likely to give him a great deal of trouble. The reports from the right wing, sent by marshals Soult and Ney, stated that they had nothing before them, and that they perceived only occasional detachments of cavalry, retiring on their approach. The tidings from the left, on the contrary, made mention of a corps at Saalfeld, before which marshal Lannes would arrive on the following day, the 10th.

Napoleon thence concluded that the enemy was then retiring towards the Saale, and leaving the high road to Dresden open. He was resolved not to venture upon it till he had beaten the Prussians, and to beat them without delay, whether they came to meet him with the intention of barring his way, or he was obliged to seek them behind the steep banks of the Saale.*

* We quote the following letter illustrative of Napoleon's ideas at this moment.

To Marshal Soult, at Plauen.

Obersdorf, the 10th October, 1806, 8 A.M.

We yesterday thrashed the 8,000 men, who had retired from Hof to Schleiz, where they expected reinforcements in the night. Their cavalry has been cut in pieces and a colonel taken. More than 2,000 muskets and caps were found on the field of battle. The Prussian infantry did not stand its ground. We have picked up but two or three hundred prisoners, because it was dark, and they dispersed in the woods. I reckon upon a good number this morning.

What seems to me perfectly clear is this : it appears that the Prussians designed to attack ; that their left will debouch to-morrow by Jena, Saalfeld, and Coburg ; that the prince of Hohenlohe had his head-quarters at Jena, and prince Louis at Saalfeld. The other column debouches by Meiningen upon Fulda. So that I am inclined to think that you have nobody before you, perhaps not a thousand men as far as Dresden. If you can crush a corps of theirs, do so. Such are my plans for to-day. I cannot march ; I have too many things in arrear. I shall push my advanced guard to Auma. I have discovered a good field of battle for 80 or 100 thousand men in advance of Schleiz. I am making marshal Ney march to Tanna : there he will be two leagues from Schleiz. At Plauen you will yourself not be so far off as not to be able to come thither in twenty-four hours.

On the 5th the Prussian army again made a movement upon Thuringia, so that I believe it to be a great number of days behindhand. My junction with my left is not yet made, unless it be by posts of cavalry, which signify nothing.

Marshal Lannes is not to arrive till to-day at Saalfeld, unless the enemy is there in considerable force.

Thus the 10th and 11th will be lost for marching forward. If my junction is made, I shall push on to Neustadt and Triplitz. After that, whatever the enemy may do, I shall be delighted : if he suffers himself to be attacked, I will not fail to be at him. If he files off by Magdeburg, you will be at Dresden before him. I long for a battle. If the enemy has been desirous to attack me,

The prince of Hohenlohe, persuaded that he alone had penetrated the plans of Napoleon, that he alone had devised the true means of thwarting them, by proposing to get to the defiles of Franconia before him, fluctuated amidst a thousand different ideas. Sometimes he inclined to execute the orders of the duke of Brunswick and to recross the Saale; at others he formed the silly resolution of proceeding to Mittel-Pöllnitz and giving battle there, and thus issued orders and counter-orders which harassed his troops, not in the best condition for marching, laden with baggage, and ill provisioned. Meanwhile, prince Louis, impatient to meet the French, and insisting at any rate on forming the advanced guard of the Prussian army, had, on his solicitation, been left at Saalfeld, where he still was on the morning of the 10th of October.

It was towards this point that the French left column was to march, as soon as it should have debouched from Grafenthal. Having reached Grafenthal on the 9th, Lannes, who formed the head of that column, marched for Saalfeld on the morning of the 10th. He had set out at a very early hour. The wooded heights, which generally skirt the Saale, receding at this point from its bed, leave a marshy plain, amidst which rises the little town of Saalfeld, surrounded by walls, and seated on the very margin of the river. On reaching the circumference of these heights, which overlook Saalfeld, Lannes perceived, in advance of the town, the corps of prince Louis, consisting of about 7000 foot and 2000 horse. The prince had taken a rather unmilitary position. His left, composed of infantry, was appuyed upon the town and the river; his right, composed of cavalry, extended into the plain. Commanded in front by the circle of the heights,

it is because he has great confidence in his strength. In this case, it is not impossible that he may attack. He could do nothing that would please me better. After that battle, I shall be at Dresden and at Berlin before him.

I am waiting impatiently for my horse-guards; 40 pieces of artillery and 3000 horse, such as they, are not to be disdained. You now see my plans for to-day and to-morrow. You are at liberty to act as you judge best, but procure bread for yourself, that, if you come and join me, you may have sufficient for some days.

If you find something to do against the enemy at the distance of one march from you, you may do it boldly. Establish little posts of cavalry to communicate rapidly between Schleiz and Plauen. Up to this hour, it seems to me that the campaign commences under the happiest auspices.

I imagine that you are at Plauen. It is highly expedient that you should get possession of it.

Let me know what you believe you have before you. None of the troops that were at Hof have retired upon Dresden.

P.S.—I receive this moment your despatch of the 9th at 6 P. M. I approve the dispositions which you have made. The intelligence that the thousand horse who were at Plauen have retired to Gera leaves me in no doubt that Gera will be the point of concentration of the enemy's army. However, in the course of the day I shall receive further information. I shall have more precise ideas. You, being at Plauen will be furnished with them by letters intercepted at the post.

whence the French artillery could pour its fire upon him, he had in his rear a little marshy stream, the Schwartz, which falls into the Saale below Saalfeld, and which is rather difficult to cross. His retreat was consequently very ill secured. Had he been capable of any prudence, and less obliged by his preceding bravadoes to appear rash, he should have retired as speedily as possible, and descended the Saale to Rudolstadt or Jena. Unfortunately, it was not consistent either with his character or his part to recoil from the first meeting with the French. Lannes had not at hand either Augereau's corps, forming with him the left column, or even his own entire corps. He was reduced to the mere division of Suchet, and two regiments of light cavalry, the 9th and 10th hussars. He nevertheless commenced the attack immediately. In the first place, he ranged his artillery upon the heights, which commanded the line of battle of prince Louis, and opened a brisk cannonade upon it. He then threw part of Suchet's division upon his left, with orders to file along the woods which crowned the heights, and to turn the right of prince Louis, by descending to the banks of the Schwartz. In a few moments this movement was executed. While the artillery, placed in battery on the front of the Prussians, occupied them by sweeping off their men, our tirailleurs, slipping through the woods, commenced an unexpected and destructively well-aimed fire upon their rear. Lannes then made his infantry descend *en masse* into the plain to overturn the enemy's infantry. In this position there was no judicious course for prince Louis to adopt, had he even had that experience in war of which he was not possessed. He began by moving towards his infantry, in order to meet the shock of Suchet's division. But, after efforts of bravery, worthy of being better employed, he saw his battalions broken and driven back in confusion upon the walls of Saalfeld. Not knowing what to do, he hastened to his cavalry, with the intention of charging the two regiments of hussars, which had followed the movements of our tirailleurs. He charged them with impetuosity, and at first repulsed them. But those two regiments, having rallied, dashed vigorously forward, broke his numerous cavalry, and pursued it with such ardour, that, finding it impossible to form again, it threw itself in disorder into the marshes of the Schwartz. The prince, in a brilliant uniform, adorned with all his decorations, behaved during the action with the valour befitting his birth and character. Two of his aides-de-camp were killed by his side. Being soon surrounded, he tried to escape, but his horse having entangled himself in a hedge, he was forced to stop. A quartermaster of the 10th hussars, taking him for an officer of high rank, but by no means for a prince of the blood-royal, ran up to him, crying, "General, surrender!" To this summons the prince replied by a lunge with his sword. The quartermaster then gave him a thrust in the middle of the chest, and he dropped dead at the foot of his horse. A concourse

collected round the body of the prince, which was recognised and deposited, with all the honours due to his rank and his misfortune, in the town of Saalfeld. The Prussian and Saxon troops, for there were both at this point, deprived of their commander, and enclosed in a spot having no outlet, escaped as they best could, leaving behind 20 pieces of cannon, 400 killed or wounded, and about a thousand prisoners.

Such was the opening of the campaign. The first blow of the war, as Napoleon observed next day in the bulletin of the action, had killed one of its authors. So near were the two armies to each other, that Napoleon at Schleiz heard the cannon of Saalfeld, that the prince of Hohenlohe heard them on his side upon the heights of Mittel-Pölnitz, and that, towards Jena, on the line occupied by the Prussian main army, their distant rolling was distinctly perceptible. All sensible men in the Prussian army shuddered at it as a signal which announced tragic events. Napoleon, detecting the point whence these reports proceeded, sent off a reinforcement to Lannes, and a great number of officers in quest of news. The prince of Hohenlohe, on his part, roamed about on horseback, without giving any orders, and questioning goers and comers concerning what was passing. It was a lamentable sight to see such incapacity and imprudence battling with such vigilance and genius.

A few hours afterwards, the fugitives informed both armies of the result of the first encounter, and the tragic end of prince Louis, an end well worthy of his life, on the double score of imprudence and courage. The Prussians were enabled to judge what was to be expected from their scientific tactics, opposed to the simple, practical, and rapid mode of acting pursued by the French generals.

The consternation spread from Saalfeld to Jena and Weimar. The prince of Hohenlohe, already informed by his own eyes of the discouragement which had seized general Tauenzien's troops, his mind impressed with the rash adventure of Saalfeld, repaired in person to Jena, and despatched orders in all directions to fall back upon the Saale, in order to cover himself with that river, if, however, after so many contradictory movements, the Prussians could flatter themselves with the hope of reaching it in time. It was the third counter-order given to those unfortunate men, who knew not what was wanted of them, and who were not habituated, like the French, to make several marches in a day, and to live upon what they procured for themselves on march. Some fugitives of the corps beaten at Saalfeld, hurrying towards Jena, and firing without motive like soldiers going upon the stroll, were mistaken for French tirailleurs. At sight of them, an inexpressible terror pervaded the troops marching towards Jena and the numerous drivers of the baggage train. They fled in disorder, rushing towards the bridges over the Saale, and from those bridges into the streets of Jena. In a few moments all was

frightful confusion—a luckless omen of the events that were about to follow.

Napoleon, apprized of the action at Saalfeld, and anxious to bring his wings again nearer to the centre, in proportion as it issued from the defiles by which it had entered Saxony, directed Lannes not to ascend the Saale, which would have removed him too far from himself and brought him too near to the enemy, but to make a movement to the right, and to proceed by Posneck and Neustadt to Auma, where the head-quarters were fixed. Augereau was to fill the vacancy left between the Saale and the corps of Lannes. Ordering a like movement of concentration on his right, Napoleon had despatched marshal Soult upon Weida and Gera, along the Elster, and sent word for marshal Ney to occupy Auma, when the head-quarters should have left. He would thus have 170,000 men at hand, within the distance of seven or eight leagues, with the faculty of collecting 100,000 of them in a few hours; and, while concentrating himself, he kept advancing, ready to cross the Saale, if it were necessary to force the enemy's position there, or to push on to the Elbe, if he wanted to get thither before him. For the rest, he had not marched more than four or five leagues a day, in order to give his corps time to rejoin; for his reserves were still behind-hand, especially the artillery and the cavalry of the guard, as well as the battalions of *élite*. Though he knew from the two actions of the preceding days what he ought to think of the Prussian troops, he marched with the prudence of great captains, in presence of an army which could have opposed to him from 130 to 140 thousand men collected into a single mass. In the evening of the 12th he left Auma for Gera.

The cavalry, moving about in all directions among the baggage columns of the unfortunate Saxons, made rich and numerous prizes. Five hundred carriages were taken at one blow. The cavalry as Napoleon wrote, was “seamed with gold” (*cousue d'or*). At length, intercepted letters and the reports of spies began to agree, and to represent the Prussian grand army as changing position, and advancing from Erfurt upon Weimar, with a view to approach the banks of the Saale. It might be coming thither with one of the two following intentions: either to occupy the bridge over the Saale at Naumburg, over which passes the great central road of Germany, in order to retire upon the Elbe, while covering Leipzig and Dresden; or to approach the course of the Saale, for the purpose of defending its banks against the French. To meet this double contingency, Napoleon took a first precaution, which was to despatch marshal Davout immediately to Naumburg, with orders to bar the passage of the bridge there with the 26,000 men of the third corps. He sent Murat, with the cavalry, along the banks of the Saale, to watch its course, and to push reconnaissances as far Leipzig. He directed marshal Bernadotte upon Naumburg, with instructions to support marshal

Davout in case of need. He sent marshals Lannes and Augereau to Jena itself. His object was to make himself master immediately of the two principal passages of the Saale, those at Naumburg and Jena, either to stop the Prussian army there, if it should design to cross and to retire to the Elbe, or to go and seek it on the heights bordering that river, if it purposed to remain there on the defensive. As for himself, he continued with marshals Ney and Soult within reach of Naumburg and Jena, ready to march for either point according to circumstances.

On the morning of the 13th, he learned by more circumstantial accounts that the enemy was definitively approaching the Saale, with the yet uncertain resolution of fighting a defensive battle on its banks, or of crossing and pushing on to the Elbe. It was in the direction from Weimar to Jena that the largest assemblage appeared. Without losing a moment, Napoleon mounted his horse to proceed to Jena. He gave himself his instructions to marshals Soult and Ney, and enjoined them to be at Jena in the evening, or at latest in the night. He directed Murat to bring his cavalry towards Jena, and marshal Bernadotte to take at Dornburg an intermediate position between Jena and Naumburg. He set out immediately, sending officers to stop all troops on march to Gera, and to make them turn back for Jena.

In the evening of the preceding day, marshal Davout had entered Naumburg, occupied the bridge of the Saale, and taken considerable magazines, with a fine bridge equipage. Marshal Bernadotte had joined him. Murat had sent his light cavalry as far as Leipzig, and surprised the gates of that great commercial city. Lannes had proceeded towards Jena, a small university town, seated on the very banks of the Saale, and had driven back pell-mell the enemy's troops left beyond the river, as well as the baggage, which encumbered the road. He had taken possession of Jena, and immediately pushed his advanced posts upon the heights which command it. From these heights he had perceived the army of the prince of Hohenlohe, which, after recrossing the Saale, encamped between Jena and Weimar, and he had reason to suspect that a great assemblage was collecting in that place.

The Prussian army was, in fact, concentrated here, and ready to take its final determinations. The prince of Hohenlohe had decided to obey the orders of the duke of Brunswick, and to recross the Saale, for the purpose of rejoining the Prussian grand army. He would have reached that position in better order, and without losing his baggage, had he obeyed sooner. His troops were assembled there confusedly, and without provisions, not knowing where to procure any, applying for them in vain to the principal army, which possessed only just enough for itself. The Saxons, whose conduct had been honourable, but whom the chance of events had put forward conspicuously in the first two encounters, and who saw their country delivered over without defence to the French, complained bitterly of being ill-treated,

ill fed, and dragged into a war which set out with the most sinister prospects. Great pains were taken to pacify them; and this time they were placed in second line behind the Prussians. However, in spite of this deplorable commencement, the Prussians were assembled along the forest of Thuringia, in advance of the Saale, to stop the French, if they attempted to cross it, or to descend in safety to the Elbe, if they were in haste to reach that river. This was the case, since they had attached such value to this position as to persevere in the idea that had been formed of it, and to avail themselves of the advantages which it offered. The Saale, in fact, though, fordable, runs in a bed which forms a sort of continuous gorge. The left bank, on which the Prussians were encamped, is covered by abrupt heights, the foot of which is washed by the river, and the summit clothed with a series of woods. Beyond are undulated plateaux, well adapted to receive an army. In descending from Jena to Naumburg, the difficulties become greater than anywhere else. Besides Jena and Naumburg, there were but three avenues by which access could be gained, those of Löbstedt, Dornburg, and Camburg, about two leagues distant from each other, and very easy to defend. Since, instead of establishing themselves behind the Elbe, the Prussians had determined to go and meet the French, and fight them *en masse*, there was not a more advantageous site than the left bank of the Saale for a general action. They had deprived themselves, it is true, of 10,000 men, composing the advanced guard of the duke of Weimar, and sent to reconnoitre beyond the forest of Thuringia; they had lost five or six thousand in killed, prisoners, and fugitives, in the actions of Schleiz and Saalfeld; but the prince of Hohenlohe had still 50,000 men left, the duke of Brunswick 66,000, general Ruchel 17 or 18 thousand, that is to say, 134,000 men—a very formidable army, behind such a position as that of the Saale from Jena to Naumburg. By placing strong detachments before the principal passages, and the mass a little in rear, in a central position, so as to be able to hasten in force to the point attacked, they would be capable of fighting a dangerous battle for the French army, and if not to wrest victory from it, to dispute it with such effect as to render retreat easy and the issue of the war uncertain.

But the perturbation of mind continued only to increase in the Prussian staff. The duke of Brunswick, who had hitherto displayed sound reasoning powers, and who had appeared to appreciate the position occupied in the different possible cases—the duke of Brunswick, now that one of those cases, and the most foreseen, was realized, seemed suddenly to have lost his senses, and was for decamping with the utmost expedition. The movement of marshal Davout upon Naumburg had been a flash of light for him. He had concluded from the appearance of that marshal on the way to Naumburg that it was Napoleon's intention not to give battle, but to hasten his march to the Elbe, to

cut off the Prussians from Saxony, and even from Prussia, as he had cut off general Mack from Bavaria and Austria. The fear of being surrounded, as general Mack had been, and forced, like him, to lay down his arms, disturbed the generally just judgment of this unfortunate old man. He resolved, therefore, to set off instantly for the Elbe. In Prussia the unfortunate Mack had been jeered so mercilessly and with so little justice, that people lost their reason at the bare idea of finding themselves in the same situation, and that, in order to avoid it, they ran the risk of falling into other positions which were not better. The present situation was, nevertheless, far from resembling that of the Austrian general. The duke of Brunswick might, it is true, be turned, separated from Saxony by a rapid movement of Napoleon's towards the Elbe; perhaps the French might reach Berlin before him, but it was impossible that he could be enveloped and obliged to capitulate. Whether he lost a battle on the Saale, whether Napoleon got the start of him on the Elbe, he had a sure retreat to Magdeburg and the Lower Elbe, and though he was liable to arrive there in bad plight, he could not be taken in the vast plains of the North, like the Austrians in that close gorge of the valley of the Danube. Besides, while general Mack's army numbered at most 70,000 men, that of the duke of Brunswick would amount to 144,000, if the duke of Weimar were called in; and such an army is not easily surrounded so completely as to be obliged to lay down its arms. But, since the Prussians had been so intent on fighting, had so earnestly desired to meet the French, even thought of crossing the mountains, in order to go and seek them in Franconia, when they at length fell in with them on a ground excellent for themselves, very difficult for the enemy, wherefore not establish themselves upon it *en masse*, and fling them into the deep and rocky bed of the Saale, the moment they should attempt to ascend its heights? But they had lost all presence of mind, since the enemy, whom they defied at a distance, was so close to them, since it had been shown at Schleiz and Saalfeld that the quality of the Prussian army was so little superior to that of the Austrian and Russian armies.

The duke of Brunswick, impatient to secure himself from the so dreaded fate of general Mack, determined to decamp immediately, and to push on by forced marches for the Elbe, covering himself with the Saale, which course would entail the relinquishment of Leipzig, of Dresden, and of all Saxony, to the French. The prince of Hohenlohe, having tardily decided on recrossing the Saale, encamped upon the heights of Jena. The duke of Brunswick enjoined him to remain there, to close that *debouché*, while the principal army, filing behind the army of Silesia, should join the Saale at Naumburg, and descend it to the Elbe.

He ordered general Ruchel to stay at Weimar for the time required to rally the advanced guard, engaged in a useless reconnaissance beyond the forest of Thuringia; and, as for himself,

taking with him the five divisions of the principal army, he resolved to decamp on the 13th, to follow the high road from Weimar to Leipzig as far as the bridge of Naumburg, to leave three divisions at that bridge to guard it, while he should go with the two others to secure the passage of the Unstrut, one of the tributaries of the Saale; then, that obstacle overcome, to fall back upon the three divisions posted at Naumburg, to draw to him the prince of Hohenlohe and general Ruchel, left in rear, and to march along the banks of the Saale to the junction of that river with the Elbe in the environs of Magdeburg.

Such was the plan of retreat adopted by the duke of Brunswick. It was not worth while to quit the defensive line of the Elbe, which ought never to have been left, for the purpose of regaining it so soon and with such great dangers.

In consequence, the principal army received orders to break up on the same day, the 13th of October. The prince of Hohenlohe was directed to occupy the heights of Jena, and to close that passage, while the five divisions of the duke of Brunswick, leaving Weimar, were to go and pass the night at Naumburg. These five divisions were to follow one another at the distance of a league, and to march six leagues that day. It is not thus that the French march, when they have an important end to attain. Weimar being evacuated, general Ruchel was to proceed thither immediately. All these dispositions being settled and communicated to those who were appointed to execute them, the army of the duke of Brunswick commenced its march, having at its head the king, the princes, the queen herself, and followed by such a mass of baggage as to render any manœuvre impossible. The cannon were heard so near that the queen could not be allowed to continue at the head-quarters. Her presence, after being indecorous, became perilous for herself and a subject of uneasiness for the king. It required a formal injunction from the latter to decide her to leave. At length she departed, her eyes full of tears, no longer doubting, since the actions of Schleiz and Saalfeld, the fatal consequences of a policy of which she was the hapless instigator.

While the duke of Brunswick was thus marching towards Naumburg, the prince of Hohenlohe, left upon the heights of Jena with 50,000 men, and having as rear-guard general Ruchel with 18,000, endeavoured to restore a little order among his troops, sent out waggons to scour the country in quest of provisions, and in particular to procure some relief for the Saxons, whose discontent was extreme. Coinciding in opinion with the duke of Brunswick, that the French were hastening to Leipzig and Dresden, in order to get first to the Elbe, he gave himself little concern about the town of Jena, and paid little attention to the heights situated behind it.

During this same afternoon of the 13th of October, Napoleon, as we have seen, had moved rapidly from Gera towards Jena,

followed by all his forces. He arrived there himself about noon: marshal Lannes, who had outstripped him, was waiting for him with impatience. Without losing a moment, both mounted their horses to reconnoitre the localities. At Jena itself, the valley of the Saale begins to widen. The right bank, on which we were marching, is low, damp, and covered with meadows. The left bank, on the contrary, that which the Prussians occupied, presents steep heights, whose peaked tops overlook the town of Jena, and which are ascended by narrow, winding ravines, overhung with wood. On the left of Jena, a gorge more open, less abrupt, called the Mühlthal, has become the passage through which the high road from Jena to Weimar has been carried. This road first keeps along the bottom of the Mühlthal, then rises in form of a spiral staircase, and opens upon the plateaux in rear. It would have required a fierce assault to force this pass; more open, it is true, but guarded by a great portion of the Prussian army. Of course, to climb the plateaux at this point, in order to give battle there to the Prussians, was wholly out of the question.

But another resource presented itself. The bold tirailleurs of Lannes, entering the ravines which are met with on going out of Jena, had succeeded in ascending the principal height, and all at once perceived the Prussian army encamped on the plateaux of the left bank. Followed presently by some detachments of Suchet's division, they had made room for themselves by driving in general Tauenzien's advanced posts. Thus, thanks to the boldness of our soldiers, the heights which command the left bank of the Saale were conquered, but by a route which, unfortunately, was scarcely accessible to artillery. Thither Lannes conducted Napoleon, amidst an incessant fire of tirailleurs which rendered reconnaissances extremely dangerous.

The principal of the heights that overlook the town of Jena is called Landgrafenberg, and, since the memorable events of which it has been the theatre, it has received from the inhabitants the name of Napoleonsberg. It is the highest in these parts. Napoleon and Lannes, surveying from that height the surrounding country, with their backs turned to Jena, beheld on their right the Saale running in a deep, winding, wooded gorge, to Naumburg, which is six or seven leagues from Jena. Before them they saw undulated plateaux, extending to a distance, and subsiding by a gentle slope to the little valley of the Ilm, at the extremity of which is situated the town of Weimar. They perceived on their left the high road from Jena to Weimar, rising by a series of slopes from the gorge of the Mühlthal to these plateaux, and running in a straight line to Weimar. These slopes, somewhat resembling a sort of snail's shell, have thence received in German the appellation of the *Schnecke* (snail). On this same road from Jena to Weimar was posted *en échelons* the Prussian army of the prince of Hohenlohe, but it was not possible to judge precisely of its number. As for the corps of general

Ruchel posted at Weimar, the distance did not permit that to be discerned. In the same predicament was the grand army of the duke of Brunswick, which, marching from Weimar to Naumburg, was hidden in the bottoms of the valley of the Ilm.

Napoleon, having before him a mass of troops, the force of which could scarcely be estimated, supposed that the Prussian army had chosen this ground for a field of battle, and immediately made his dispositions, so as to debouch with his army on the Landgrafenberg, before the enemy should hasten up, *en masse*, to hurl him into the precipices of the Saale. He was obliged to make the best use of his time, and to take advantage of the space gained by the tirailleurs to establish himself on the height. He had, it is true, no more of it than the summit, for, only a few paces off, there was the corps of general Tauenzien, separated from our troops only by a slight ridge of ground. This corps was appuyed on two villages, one on our right, that of Closewitz, surrounded by a small wood, the other on our left, that of Cospoda, likewise surrounded by a wood of some extent. Napoleon purposed to leave the Prussians quiet in this position till the next day, and meanwhile to lead part of his army up the Landgrafenberg. The space which it occupied was capable of containing the corps of Lannes and the guard. He ordered them to be led up immediately through the steep ravines which serve to ascend from Jena to the Landgrafenberg. On the left he placed Gazan's division, on the right, Suchet's division, in the centre, and a little in rear, the foot-guard. He made the latter encamp in a square of four thousand men, and in the centre of this square he established his own bivouac. Ever since that time, the people of the country have called that height the Napoleonsberg, marking by a heap of rough stones the spot where this personage, popular everywhere, even in places where he has only shown himself terrible, passed that memorable night.

But it was not enough to bring infantry upon the Landgrafenberg—it was necessary to mount artillery too upon it. Napoleon, riding about in all directions, discovered a passage less steep than the others, and by which the artillery might be dragged up with great exertion. Unluckily, the way was too narrow. Napoleon sent forthwith for a detachment of the engineers, and had it widened, by cutting the rock; he himself, in his impatience, directed the works, torch in hand. He did not retire till the night was far advanced, when he had seen the first pieces of cannon rolled up. It required twelve horses to draw each gun-carriage to the top of the Landgrafenberg. Napoleon proposed to attack general Tauenzien at day-break, and, by pushing him briskly, to conquer the space necessary for deploying his army. Fearful, however, of debouching by a single outlet, wishing also to divide the attention of the enemy, he directed Augereau towards the left, to enter the gorge of the Mühlthal, to march one of his two divisions upon the Weimar road, and to gain with the

other the back of the Landgrafenberg, in order to fall upon the rear of general Tauenzien. On the right, he ordered marshal Soult, whose corps, breaking up from Gera, was to arrive in the night, to ascend the other ravines, which, running from Löbstedt and Dornburg, debouch upon Closewitz, likewise for the purpose of falling upon the rear of general Tauenzien. With this double diversion, on the right and on the left, Napoleon had no doubt of forcing the Prussians in their position, and gaining for himself the space needed by his army for deploying. Marshals Ney and Murat were to ascend the Landgrafenberg by the route which Lannes and the guard had followed.

The day of the 13th had closed; profound darkness enveloped the field of battle. Napoleon had placed his tent in the centre of the square formed by his guard, and had suffered only a few fires to be lighted; but all those of the Prussian army were kindled. The fires of the prince of Hohenlohe were to be seen over the whole extent of the plateaux, and at the horizon on the right, topped by the old castle of Eckartsberg, those of the army of the duke of Brunswick, which had all at once become visible for Napoleon. He conceived that, so far from retiring, the whole of the Prussian forces had come to take part in the battle. He sent immediately fresh orders to marshals Davout and Bernadotte. He enjoined marshal Davout to guard strictly the bridge of Naumburg, even to cross it, if possible, and to fall upon the rear of the Prussians, while they were engaged in front. He ordered marshal Bernadotte, placed intermediately, to concur in the projected movement, either by joining marshal Davout, if he was near the latter, or by throwing himself directly on the flank of the Prussians, if he had already taken at Dornburg a position nearer to Jena. Lastly, he desired Murat to arrive as speedily as possible with his cavalry.

While Napoleon was making these dispositions, the prince of Hohenlohe was in complete ignorance of the lot which awaited him. Still persuaded that the bulk of the French army, instead of halting before Jena, was hurrying to Leipzig and Dresden, he supposed that he should at most have to deal with the corps of marshals Lannes and Augereau, which, having passed the Saale after the action at Saalfeld, would, he imagined, make their appearance between Jena and Weimar, as if they had descended from the heights of the forest of Thuringia. Under this idea, not thinking of making front towards Jena, he had on that side opposed only the corps of general Tauenzien, and ranged his army along the road from Jena to Weimar. His left, composed of Saxons, guarded the summit of the Schnecke; his right extended to Weimar, and connected itself with General Ruchel's corps. However, a fire of tirailleurs, which was heard on the Landgrafenberg, having excited a sort of alarm, and general Tauenzien applying for succour, the prince of Hohenlohe ordered the Saxon brigade of Cerrini, the Prussian brigade of Sanitz, and

several squadrons of cavalry, to get under arms, and despatched these forces to the Landgrafenberg, to dislodge from it the French, whom he conceived to be scarcely established on that point. At the moment when he was about to execute this resolution, colonel de Massenbach brought him from the duke of Brunswick a reiterated order not to involve himself in any serious action, to guard well the passages of the Saale, and particularly that of Dornburg, which excited uneasiness because some light troops had been perceived there. The prince of Hohenlohe, who had become one of the most obedient of lieutenants, when he ought not to have been so, desisted at once, in compliance with these injunctions from the head-quarters. It was singular, nevertheless, that, in obeying the order not to fight, he should abandon the *debouché* by which, on the morrow, a disastrous battle was to be forced upon him. Be this as it may, relinquishing the idea of retaking the Landgrafenberg, he contented himself with sending the Saxon brigade of Cerrini to general Tauenzien, and with placing at Nerkwitz, facing Dornburg, the Prussian brigade of Sanitz, the Pelet fusiliers, a battalion of Schemmelpfennig, lastly several detachments of cavalry and artillery, under the command of general Holzendorf. He sent some light horse to Dornburg itself, to learn what was passing there. The prince of Hohenlohe confined himself to these dispositions: he returned to his head-quarters at Capellendorf, near Weimar, saying that, with 50,000 men, and even 70,000, including Ruchel's corps, kept towards Dornburg by general Holzendorf, towards Jena by general Tauenzien, fronting to the road from Jena to Weimar, he would punish the two marshals Lannes and Augereau for their audacity, if they dared to attack him with the 30 or 40 thousand French at their disposal, and retrieve the honour of the Prussian arms, seriously compromised at Schleiz and Saalfeld.

Napoleon, stirring before daylight, gave his last instructions to his lieutenants, and orders for his soldiers to get under arms. The night was cold, the country covered to a distance with a thick fog, like that which for some hours enveloped the field of Austerlitz. Escorted by men carrying torches, Napoleon went along the front of the troops, talking to the officers and soldiers. He explained the position of the two armies, demonstrated to them that the Prussians were as deeply compromised as the Austrians in the preceding year; that, if vanquished in that engagement, they would be cut off from the Elbe and the Oder, separated from the Russians, and forced to abandon to the French the whole Prussian monarchy; that, in such a situation, the French corps which should suffer itself to be beaten, would frustrate the grandest designs and disgrace itself for ever. He exhorted them to keep on their guard against the Prussian cavalry, and to receive it in square with their usual firmness. His words everywhere drew forth shouts of "Forward! *vive l'Empereur!*" Though the fog was thick, yet through its veil the enemy's advanced posts per-

ceived the glare of the torches, heard the acclamations of our soldiers, and went to give the alarm to general Tauenzien. At that moment, the corps of Lannes set itself in motion, on a signal from Napoleon. Suchet's division, formed into three brigades, advanced first. Claparède's brigade, composed of the 17th light and a battalion of *élite*, marched at the head, deployed in a single line. On the wings of this line, and to preserve it from attacks of cavalry, the 34th and 40th regiments, forming the second brigade, were disposed in close column. Vedel's brigade deployed, closed this sort of square. On the left of Suchet's division, but a little in rear, came Gazan's division, ranged in two lines and preceded by its artillery. Thus they advanced, groping their way through the fog. Suchet's division directed its course towards the village of Closewitz, which was on the right, Gazan's division towards the village of Cospoda, which was on the left. The Saxon battalions of Frederick Augustus and Rechten, and the Prussian battalion of Zweifel, perceiving through the fog a mass in motion, fired all together. The 17th light sustained that fire, and immediately returned it. This fire of musketry was kept up for a few minutes, the parties seeing the flash, and hearing the report, but not discerning one another. The French, on approaching, at length discovered the little wood which surrounded the village of Closewitz. General Claparède briskly threw himself into it, and, after a fight hand to hand, had soon carried it, as well as the village of Closewitz itself. Having deprived general Tauenzien's line of this *appui*, the French continued their march amidst the balls that issued from that thick fog. Gazan's division, on its part, took the village of Cospoda and established itself there. Between these two villages, but a little farther off, was a small hamlet, that of Lutzenrode, occupied by Erichsen's fusiliers. Gazan's division carried that also, and was then able to deploy more at its ease. At this moment the two divisions of Lannes were assailed by fresh discharges of artillery and musketry. These were from the Saxon grenadiers of the Cerrini brigade, who, after taking up the advanced posts of general Tauenzien, continued to move forward, firing battalion volleys with as much precision as if they had been at a review. The 17th light, which formed the head of Suchet's division, having exhausted its cartridges, was sent to the rear. The 34th took its place, kept up the fire for some time, then encountered the Saxon grenadiers with the bayonet, and broke them. The rout having soon extended to the whole corps of general Tauenzien, Gazan's and Suchet's divisions picked up about twenty pieces of cannon and many fugitives. From the Landgrafenberg, the undulated plateaux, on which the French had just deployed, gradually subsided, as we have said, to the little valley of the Ilm. Hence they marched rapidly upon sloping ground, at the heels of a fleeing enemy. In this quick movement they encountered two battalions of Cerrini, and also Pelet's fusiliers,

which had been left in the environs of Closewitz. These troops were flung back for the rest of the day towards general Holendorff, commissioned on the preceding day to guard the *de-bouché* of Dornburg.

This action had not lasted two hours. It was nine o'clock, and Napoleon had thus early realized the first part of his plan, which consisted in gaining the space necessary for deploying his army. At the same moment his instructions were executing at all points with remarkable punctuality. Towards the left, marshal Augereau, having sent off Heudelet's division and likewise his artillery and cavalry to the extremity of the Mühlthal, on the high road from Weimar, was climbing, with Desjardins' division, the back of the Landgrafenberg, and coming to form on the plateaux the left of Gazan's division. Marshal Soult, only one of whose divisions, that of general St. Hilaire, had arrived, was ascending from Löbstedt, in the rear of Closewitz, facing the positions of Nerkwitz and Alten-Krone, occupied by the relics of Tauenzien's corps and by the detachment of general Holendorff's. Marshal Ney, impatient to share in the battle, had detached from his corps a battalion of voltigeurs, a battalion of grenadiers, the 25th light, two regiments of cavalry, and had gone on before with this body of *élite*. He entered Jena at the very hour when the first act of the engagement was over. Lastly, Murat, returning at a gallop, with the dragoons and cuirassiers, from reconnaissances executed on the Lower Saale, was mounting in breathless haste towards Jena. Napoleon resolved therefore, to halt for a few moments on the conquered ground, to afford his troops time to get into line.

Meanwhile, the fugitives belonging to general Tauenzien's force, had given the alarm to the whole camp of the Prussians. At the sound of the cannon, the prince of Hohenlohe had hastened to the Weimar road, where the Prussian infantry was encamped, not yet believing the action to be general, and complaining that the troops were harassed by being obliged needlessly to get under arms. Being soon undeceived, he took his measures for giving battle. Knowing that the French had passed the Saale at Saalfeld, he had expected to see them make their appearance between Jena and Weimar, and drawn up his army along the road running from one to the other of these towns. As this conjecture was not realized, he was obliged to change his dispositions, and he did it with promptness and resolution. He sent the bulk of the Prussian infantry, under the command of general Grawert, to occupy the positions abandoned by general Tauenzien. Towards the Schnecké, which was to form his right, he left the Niesemeuschel division, composed of the two Saxon brigades of Burgsdorf and Nehroff, of the Prussian Boguslawski battalion, and of a numerous artillery, with orders to defend to the last extremity the winding slopes by which the Weimar road rises to the plateaux. To aid them, he gave them the Cerrini

brigade, rallied and reinforced by four Saxon battalions. In rear of his centre, he placed a reserve of five battalions under general Dyhern, to support general Grawert. He had the wrecks of Tauenzien's corps rallied at some distance from the field of battle and supplied with ammunition. As for his left, he directed general Holzendorf to push forward, if he could, and to fall upon the right of the French, while he would himself endeavour to stop them in front. He sent general Ruchel information of what was passing, and begged him to hasten his march. Lastly, he hurried off himself with the Prussian cavalry and the artillery horsed, to meet the French, for the purpose of keeping them in check and covering the formation of general Grawert's infantry.

It was about ten o'clock, and the action of the morning, interrupted for an hour, was about to begin again with greater violence. While, on the right, Marshal Soult, debouching from Löbstedt, was climbing the heights with St. Hilaire's division; while, in the centre, marshal Lannes, with Suchet's and Gazan's divisions, was deploying on the plateaux won in the morning; and while, on the left, marshal Augereau, ascending from the bottom of the Mühlthal, had reached the village of Iserstedt, marshal Ney, in his ardour for fighting had advanced with his 3000 men of the *élite*, concealed by the fog, and had placed himself between Lannes and Augereau, facing the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, which occupied the centre of the field of battle. He arrived at the very moment when the prince of Hohenlohe was hastening up at the head of the Prussian cavalry. Finding himself all at once facing the enemy, he engaged before the Emperor had given orders for renewing the action. The horse-artillery of the prince of Hohenlohe, having already placed itself in battery, Ney pushed the 10th chasseurs upon this artillery. This regiment, taking advantage of a clump of trees to form, dashed forward on the gallop, ascended by its right upon the flank of the Prussian artillery, cut down the gunners, and took seven pieces of cannon, under the fire of the whole line of the enemy. But a mass of Prussian cuirassiers rushed upon it, and it was obliged to retire with precipitation. Ney then despatched the 3rd hussars. This regiment, manœuvring as the 10th chasseurs had done, took advantage of the clump of trees to form, ascended upon the flank of the cuirassiers, then fell upon them suddenly, threw them into disorder, and forced them to retire. Two regiments of light cavalry, however, were not enough to make head against thirty squadrons of dragoons and cuirassiers. Our chasseurs and our hussars were soon obliged to seek shelter behind our infantry. Marshal Ney then sent forward the battalion of grenadiers and the battalion of voltigeurs which he had brought, formed two squares, then placing himself in one of them, opposed the charges of the Prussian cavalry. He allowed the enemy's cuirassiers to approach within twenty paces of his bayonets, and terrified them by the aspect of a motionless infantry which had reserved its fire.

At his signal, a discharge within point-blank range strewed the ground with dead and wounded. Though several times assailed, these two squares remained unbroken.

Napoleon, on the top of the Landgrafenberg, had been highly astonished to hear the firing recommence without his order. He learned with still more astonishment that Marshal Ney, whom he had supposed to be in rear, was engaged with the Prussians. He hastened up greatly displeased, and, on approaching Vierzeñ-Heiligen, perceived from the height marshal Ney defending himself, in the middle of two weak squares, against the whole of the Prussian cavalry. This heroic countenance was enough to dispel all displeasure. Napoleon sent general Bertrand with two regiments of light cavalry, all that he had at hand in the absence of Murat, to assist in extricating Ney, and ordered Lannes to advance with his infantry. During the time that elapsed before relief arrived, the intrepid Ney was not disconcerted. While, with four regiments of horse, he renewed his charges of cavalry, he moved the 25th infantry to his left, in order to appuy himself on the wood of Iserstedt, which Augereau, on his part, was striving to reach; he made the battalion of grenadiers advance as far as the little wood which had protected his chasseurs, and despatched the battalion of voltigeurs to gain possession of the village of Vierzeñ-Heiligen. But, at the same instant, Lannes, coming to his assistance, threw the 21st regiment of light infantry into the village of Vierzeñ-Heiligen, and, putting himself at the head of the 100th, 103rd, 34th, 64th, and 88th of the line, debouched in the face of the Prussian infantry of general Grawert. The latter deployed before the village of Vierzeñ-Heiligen, with a regularity of movement due to long exercises. It drew up in order of battle and opened a regular and terrible fire of small arms. Ney's three little detachments suffered severely; but Lannes, ascending on the right of general Grawert's infantry, endeavoured to turn it in spite of repeated charges of the prince of Hohenlohe's cavalry, which came to attack him in his march.

The prince of Hohenlohe bravely supported his troops amidst the danger. The regiment of Sanitz was completely broken; he formed it anew under the fire. He then purposed that the Zastrow regiment should retake the village of Vierzeñ-Heiligen at the point of the bayonet, hoping thereby to decide the victory. Meanwhile, he was informed that more hostile columns began to appear; that general Holzerdoff, engaged with superior forces, was incapable of ascending him; that general Ruchel, however, was on the point of joining him with his corps. He then judged it expedient to wait for this powerful succour, and poured a shower of shells into the village of Vierzeñ-Heiligen, resolved to try the effect of flames before he attacked it with his bayonets. He sent at the same time officers after officers to general Ruchel to urge him to hasten up, and to promise him the victory if he arrived in time; for, according to him the French were on the point of

giving way. Vain illusion of an impetuous but blind courage! At that very hour Fortune was deciding otherwise. Augereau debouching at last from the wood of Iserstedt with Desjardins' division, disengaged Ney's left, and began to exchange a fire of musketry with the Saxons who were defending the Schnecke, while general Heudelet attacked them in column on the high road from Jena to Weimar. On the other side of the field of battle, the corps of marshal Soult, after driving the remains of the Cerrini brigade, as well as the Pelet fusiliers, out of the wood of Closewitz, and flinging back Holzendorf's detachment to a distance, opened its guns on the flank of the Prussians. Napoleon, seeing the progress of his two wings, and learning the arrival of the troops which had been left in rear, was no longer afraid to bring into action all the forces present on the ground, the guard included, and gave orders for advancing. An irresistible impulsion was communicated to the whole line. The Prussians were driven back, broken, and hurled down the sloping ground which descends from Landgrafenberg to the valley of the Ilm. The regiments of Hohenlohe and the Hahn grenadiers, of Grawert's division, were almost entirely destroyed by the fire or by the bayonet. General Grawert himself was severely wounded, while directing his infantry. No corps manifested greater firmness. The Cerrini brigade, assailed with grape, fell back upon the Dyhern reserve, which in vain opposed its five battalions to the movement of the French. That reserve, being soon left uncovered, found itself attacked, surrounded on all sides, and forced to disperse. Tauenzien's corps, rallied for a moment and brought back into the fire by the prince of Hohenlohe, was hurried away, like the others, in the general rout. The Prussian cavalry, taking advantage of the absence of the heavy French cavalry, made charges to cover its broken infantry; but our chasseurs and hussars kept it in check; and, though driven back several times, returned incessantly to the charge, upheld, intoxicated, by victory. A terrible carnage followed this disorderly retreat. At every step prisoners were made; artillery was taken by whole batteries.

In this great danger, general Ruchel at length made his appearance, but too late. He marched in two lines of infantry, having on the left the cavalry belonging to his corps, and on the right the Saxon cavalry, commanded by the brave general Zeschwitz, who had come of his own accord and taken that position. He ascended at a foot pace those plateaux, sloping from the Landgrafenberg to the Ilm. While mounting, Prussians and French poured down around him like a torrent, the one pursued by the other. He was thus met by a sort of tempest, at the moment of his appearance on the field of battle. While he was advancing, his heart rent with grief at the sight of this disaster, the French rushed upon him with the impetuosity of victory. The cavalry which covered his left flank was first dispersed. That unfortunate

general, an unwise but ardent friend of his country, was the first to oppose the shock in person. A ball entered his chest, and he was borne off dying in the arms of his soldiers. His infantry, deprived of the cavalry which covered it, found itself attacked in flank by the troops of marshal Soult, and threatened in front by those of marshals Lannes and Ney. The battalions placed at the left extremity of the line, seized with terror, dispersed, and hurried along the rest of the corps in their flight. To aggravate the disaster, the French dragoons and cuirassiers came up at a gallop, under the conduct of Murat, impatient to take a share in the battle. They surrounded those hapless dispersed battalions, cut in pieces all who attempted to resist, and pursued the others to the banks of the Ilm, where they made a great number of prisoners.

On the field of battle were left only the two Saxon brigades of Burgsdorf and Nehroff, which, after honourably defending the Schnecke against Heudelet's and Desjardins' divisions of Augereau's corps, had been forced in their position by the address of the French tirailleurs, and effected their retreat formed into two squares. These squares presented three sides of infantry and one of artillery, the latter being the rear side. The two Saxon brigades retired, halting alternately, firing their guns, and then resuming their march. Augereau's artillery followed, sending balls after them: a swarm of French tirailleurs ran after them, harassing them with their small arms. Murat, who had just overthrown the relics of Ruchel's corps, fell upon the two Saxon brigades, and ordered them to be charged to the utmost extremity by his dragoons and cuirassiers. The dragoons attacked first without forcing an entrance; but they returned to the charge, penetrated, and broke the square. General d'Hautpoul, with the cuirassiers, attacked the second, broke it, and made that havoc which a victorious cavalry inflicts on a broken infantry. Those unfortunate men had no other resource but to surrender. The Prussian battalion of Boguslawski was forced in its turn, and treated like the others. The brave general Zeschwitz, who had hastened with the Saxon cavalry to the assistance of its infantry, made vain efforts to support it, and was driven back, and forced to give way to the general rout.

Murat rallied his squadrons, and hastened to Weimar, to collect fresh trophies. At some distance from that town were crowded together, pell-mell, detachments of infantry, cavalry, artillery, at the top of a long and steep slope, formed by the high road leading down to the bottom of the valley of the Ilm. These troops, confusedly huddled together, were supported upon a small wood, called the wood of Webicht. All at once, the bright helmets of the French cavalry made their appearance. A few musket-shots were instinctively fired by this affrighted crowd. At this signal, the mass, seized with terror, rushed down the hill, at the foot of which Weimar is situated: foot, horse, artillerymen, all tumbled one over another into this gulf—a new disaster, and well worthy

of pity. Murat sent after them a part of his dragoons, who goaded on this mob with the points of their swords, and pursued it into the streets of Weimar. With the others he made a circuit to the other side of Weimar, and cut off the retreat of the fugitives, who surrendered by thousands.

Out of the 70,000 Prussians who had appeared on the field of battle, not a single corps remained entire, not one retreated in order. Out of the 100,000 French, composed of the corps of marshals Soult, Lannes, Augereau, Ney, Murat, and the guard, not more than 50,000 had fought, and they had been sufficient to overthrow the Prussian army. The greater part of that army, seized with a sort of vertigo, throwing away its arms, ceasing to know either its colours or its officers, covered all the roads of Thuringia. About 12,000 Prussians and Saxons, killed and wounded, about 4000 French killed and wounded also, strewed the ground from Jena to Weimar. On that ground were seen stretched a great number—a greater number, indeed, than usual—of Prussian officers, who had nobly paid for their silly passions with their lives. Fifteen thousand prisoners, 200 pieces of cannon, were in the hands of our soldiers, intoxicated with joy. The shells of the Prussians had set fire to the town of Jena, and from the plateaux where the battle was fought, columns of flame were seen bursting from the dark bosom of night. French shells ploughed up the city of Weimar, and threatened it with a similar fate. The shrieks of fugitives while running through the streets, the tramp of Murat's cavalry, dashing through them at a gallop, slaughtering without mercy all who were not quick enough in flinging down their arms, had filled with horror that charming city—the noble asylum of letters, the peaceful theatre of the most exquisite intercourse of mind that was then to be found in the world. At Weimar, as at Jena, part of the inhabitants had fled. The conquerors, disposing like masters of these almost deserted towns, established their magazines and their hospitals in the churches and public buildings. Napoleon, on returning from Jena, directed his attention, according to his custom, to the collecting of the wounded, and heard shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* mingled with the moans of the dying. Terrible scenes, the sight of which would be intolerable, did not the genius and heroism displayed redeem their horror, and did not glory, that light which embellishes every thing, throw over them its dazzling rays!

But, great as were the results already obtained, Napoleon knew not yet the full extent of his victory, nor the Prussians the full extent of their disaster. While the cannon were heard rolling at Jena, they were also heard in the distance, on the right towards Naumburg. Napoleon had often looked that way, saying that marshals Davout and Bernadotte, who had around them 250,000 men, had not much to fear from the remnant of the Prussian army, the greater part of which he had had, as he conceived,

upon his hands. He had several times repeated the order to hold out to the last man, rather than abandon the bridge of Naumburg.

The prince of Hohenlohe, who retired with a spirit racked by grief, had also heard the cannon towards Naumburg, and was inclined to proceed thither, alternately attracted and repelled by news brought from Auerstädt, the place where the army of the duke of Brunswick was encamped. Scouts declared that this army had gained a complete victory; others said, on the contrary, that it had sustained a more signal disaster than the army of the prince of Hohenlohe. The prince soon learned the truth. Here follows what passed on that same memorable day, marked by two sanguinary battles, fought at the distance of four leagues from one another.

The royal army had marched on the preceding day in five divisions on the high road from Weimar to Naumburg. Crossing those plateaux, undulated like the waves of the sea, which form the surface of Thuringia, and terminate in abrupt hills towards the banks of the Saale, it had halted at Auerstädt, a little in advance of the defile of Kösen, a well-known military position. It had marched five or six leagues, and this was considered much for troops not accustomed to the fatigues of war. It had therefore bivouacked in the evening of the 13th of October, in front and rear of the village of Auerstädt, and fared very ill, from not knowing how to subsist without magazines. Like the prince of Hohenlohe, the duke of Brunswick appeared to pay little attention to the outlets by which it was possible for the French to come upon him. Beyond Auerstädt, and before you reach the bridge of Naumburg, over the Saale, you come to a sort of basin of considerable magnitude, intersected by a rivulet, which after a few windings runs to join the Ilm and the Saale. This basin, the two sides of which incline towards each other, seems to be a field of battle ready formed to receive two armies, opposing nothing to their meeting but the slender obstacle of a brook easy to cross. The road from Weimar to Naumburg runs all through it, at first descending towards the stream, crossing it by a bridge, then ascending on the opposite side, passing through a village called Hassenhausen, and which is the only *point d'appui* that there is on this clear spot. Beyond Hassenhausen, the road, having reached the outer margin of the basin in question, stops all at once, and descends by rapid windings to the banks of the Saale. Here is what is called the defile of Kösen. Below, there is a bridge which has been named the bridge of Kösen or of Naumburg.

As it was known that the French were on the other side of the Saale, at Naumburg, it was natural to take a position with at least one division on the top of the winding descent of Kösen, not for the purpose of clearing the pass, which there was merely an idea of masking, but to bar the access against the French, while the other divisions should prosecute their movement of retreat, covered by the Saale.

Not an individual of the Prussian staff thought of this. They contented themselves with sending a few cavalry patrols to reconnoitre, and these retired after exchanging pistol-shots with the advanced posts of marshal Davout. From these patrols it was learned that the French had not established themselves at the defile of Kösen, and it was concluded that all was safe. On the following day, three divisions were to pass through the basin that we have just described, to occupy the winding slopes which lead down to the banks of the Saale, and the two other divisions under marshal Kalkreuth, marching after the first three, had orders to possess themselves of the bridge of Freyburg over the Unstrut, in order to secure to the army the passage of that tributary of the Saale.

In war, it is in vain to think of many things, if one does not think of all: the forgotten point is precisely the one by which the enemy surprises you. It was as gross a fault at this moment to neglect the defile of Kösen as to relinquish the Landgrafenberg to Napoleon.

Marshal Davout, whom Napoleon had placed at Naumburg, united with the soundest sense, extraordinary firmness and inflexible severity. He was stimulated to vigilance as much by love of duty as by the feeling of a natural infirmity—very weak sight. Thus this illustrious warrior was indebted to a physical defect for a moral quality. Being scarcely able to discern objects, he took the pains to observe them very closely: when he had seen them himself, he made others look at them: he incessantly overwhelmed all about him with questions, and neither took any rest himself, nor allowed them any, till he thought himself sufficiently informed; never being content to live in that uncertainty in which so many generals go to sleep, and risk their own glory and the lives of their soldiers. In the evening, he had gone himself to ascertain what was passing in the defile of Kösen. Some prisoners, taken in a skirmish, had informed him that the Prussian grand army was approaching, headed by the king, the princes, and the duke of Brunswick. He had immediately despatched a battalion to the bridge of Kösen, and enjoined these troops to be stirring by midnight, for the purpose of occupying the heights commanding the Saale before the enemy.

Marshal Bernadotte was at the moment at Naumburg, with orders to go to any point where he conceived that he should be most useful, and especially to second marshal Davout, if he had need of him. Marshal Davout proceeded to Naumburg, communicated to marshal Bernadotte what he had just learned, proposed to him that they should give battle together, offered even to put himself under his command; for 46,000 men, which they had between them, were not too many to cope with the 80,000 that rumour assigned to the Prussian army. Marshal Davout urged this proposal for the sake of the most important considerations. Had marshal Lannes, or any other, been in the place of marshal Ber-

bernadotte, so much time would not have been lost in useless explanations. The generous Lannes would, on the appearance of the enemy, have embraced even a hated rival, and have fought with the utmost devotedness. But marshal Bernadotte, interpreting the emperor's orders in the falsest manner, absolutely persisted in leaving Naumburg and proceeding to Dornburg, where the enemy was not stated to be.* Whence could so strange a resolution proceed? It proceeded from that detestable sentiment, which often causes the blood of men, the welfare of the State, to be sacrificed to envy, to hatred, to revenge. Marshal Bernadotte felt a deep aversion, conceived on the most frivolous motives, for marshal Davout. The latter was left with three divisions of infantry, and three regiments of light cavalry. Marshal Bernadotte took with him a division of dragoons, which had been detached from the cavalry reserve, to second the first and the third corps, and which he had no right to dispose of exclusively.

Marshal Davout, however, was under no hesitation concerning the resolution which he had to take. He determined to bar the enemy's way, and to perish with the last men of his corps, rather than leave open a road which Napoleon made it such an important point to close. In the night between the 13th and 14th, he was on march for the bridge of Kösen, with the three divisions of Gudin, Friant, and Morand, forming 26,000 men present under arms, the greater part infantry, luckily the best in the army, for the discipline was of iron under that inflexible marshal. With these 26,000 men, he expected to have to fight 70,000, according to some, 80,000, according to others, in reality 66,000. As for the soldiers, they were not accustomed to count their enemies, how numerous soever they might be. Under all circumstances, they held themselves bound and certain to conquer.

The marshal having his troops under arms long before it was light, crossed the bridge of Kösen, which he had occupied the

* We quote a letter from the Emperor to the prince of Ponte Corvo, written after the battle of Auerstädt, which confirms all our assertions. It manifests a dissatisfaction which Napoleon felt still more strongly than he expressed.

“To the prince of Ponte Corvo.

“Wittenberg, 23rd October, 1806.

“I have received your letter. I am not in the habit of recriminating upon the past, since it is without remedy. Your *corps d'armée* was not on the field of battle, and that might have been extremely disastrous for me. Still, agreeably to a very precise order, you ought to have been at Dornburg, which is one of the principal *debouchés* of the Saale, on the same day that marshal Lannes was at Jena, marshal Augereau at Kala, and marshal Davout at Naumburg. In default of having executed these dispositions, I had let you know in the night, that, if you were still at Naumburg, you were to march towards marshal Davout for the purpose of supporting him. When this order arrived, you were at Naumburg; and yet you preferred making a false march and returning to Dornburg, and in consequence you were not at the battle, and marshal Davout had principally to bear the brunt of the enemy's efforts. All this is certainly very unfortunate, &c. ; NAPOLEON.”

preceding evening, ascended with Friant's division the winding slopes of Kösen, and debouched, about six in the morning, on the heights forming one side of the basin of Hassenhausen. In a few moments, the Prussians appeared on the opposite side, so that the armies might have perceived each other at the two extremities of this kind of amphitheatre, if the fog which at that hour enveloped the field of battle of Jena had not covered that of Auerstädt also. The Prussian division of Schmettau marched at the head, preceded by an advanced guard of 600 horse, under the command of general Blücher. A little in rear came the king, with the duke of Brunswick and marshal Mollendorf. General Blücher had descended to the muddy stream which runs through the basin, crossed the little bridge, and was ascending the high road at a foot pace, when he met a French detachment of cavalry commanded by colonel Bourke and captain Hulot. Pistol-shots were exchanged amidst the fog, and on our side some prisoners were taken from the Prussians. The French detachment, after this bold reconnaissance, executed in a dense fog, went and placed itself under the protection of the 25th of the line, headed by marshal Davout. The marshal ordered some pieces of artillery to be placed on the road itself, and fired with grape at general Blücher's 600 horse, who were soon thrown into great disorder. A horsed battery, which followed this detachment of cavalry, was taken by two companies of the 25th and conveyed to Hassenhausen. This first encounter revealed the extremely critical nature of the situation. We should have a great battle to fight. At any rate the fog must retard the engagement, for neither party could attempt any serious movement in presence of an enemy who might be said to be invisible. Marshal Davout, coming from Naumburg to cut off the retreat of the Prussians, turned his back on the Elbe and on Germany. He had the Saale on his left, wooded heights on his right; the Prussians coming from Weimar had the contrary position. Marshal Davout, thanks to the delay caused by the fog, had time to post in a suitable manner Gudin's division, the first that arrived, and composed of the 25th, 85th, 12th, and 21st of the line, and six squadrons of chasseurs. He placed the 85th in the village of Hassenhausen, and as on the right of Hassenhausen (the right of the French) there was a small wood of willows, he dispersed in this wood a great number of tirailleurs, who opened a destructive fire upon the Prussian line, which began to be discernible. The three other regiments were posted on the right of the village, two of them deployed, and ranged in such a manner as to present a double line, the third in column, ready to form into square on the flank of the division. The ground on the left of Hassenhausen was reserved for the troops of general Morand. As for those of general Friant, their position would be determined by the circumstances of the battle.

The king of Prussia, the duke of Brunswick, and marshal Mollendorf, who had crossed the rivulet with Schmettau's division,

deliberated, at sight of the dispositions which they perceived in front of Hassenhausen, whether they should attack immediately. The duke of Brunswick advised waiting for Wartensleben's division, that they might act with greater unity; but the king and marshal Mollendorf were of opinion that the combat should not be deferred. Besides, the fire of musketry became so brisk that it was necessary to reply to it and to engage immediately. They deployed therefore with Schmettau's division, facing the ground occupied by the French, having before them Hassenhausen, which, situated amidst this open ground, was soon to become the pivot of the battle. They tried to repulse the French tirailleurs in ambush behind the willows, but with no effect, and then they moved a little to the right of Hassenhausen (right for the French, left for the Prussians) to secure themselves from a downward and destructive fire. Schmettau's division approached the lines of our infantry to fire at it, and, the fog beginning to clear off, it discovered the infantry of Gudin's division drawn up to the right of Hassenhausen. At this sight, general Blucher collected his numerous cavalry, and, making a circuit, advanced to charge Gudin's division in flank. The latter, however, did not allow him time to do so. The 25th, which was in first line, immediately formed its right battalion into square; the 21st, which was in second line, followed that example; lastly, the 12th regiment, which was in rear-guard, formed a single square of its two battalions, and these three masses, bristling with bayonets, waited with calm assurance for general Blucher's squadrons. Generals Petit, Gudin, Gauthier, had each placed themselves in a square. The marshal went from one to another. General Blucher, who was distinguished for impetuous courage, made a first charge, which he took care to direct in person. But his squadrons failed to reach our bayonets, a shower of balls stopping them short, and obliging them to turn about precipitately. General Blucher had his horse killed; he took that of a trumpeter, made three more attempts to charge, but always unsuccessfully, and was soon himself borne away in the rout of his cavalry. Our squadrons of chasseurs, carefully kept in reserve, under the protection of a small wood, dashed away in pursuit of that fugitive cavalry, and obliged it to scamper off still more speedily by killing several men.

Thus far the third corps maintained its ground without any wavering. Friant's division, which had behaved so well at Austerlitz, appeared at this moment on the field of battle. Marshal Davout, perceiving that the enemy's efforts were directed upon the right of Hassenhausen, sent Friant's division to that point, and concentrated Gudin's division around Hassenhausen, which according to all appearance was about to be violently attacked. He sent orders at the same time to general Morand to hasten his coming, and to place himself on the left of the village.

On the side of the Prussians, the second division, that of War-

tensleben, arrived quite out of breath, delayed as it had been by an encumbrance of the baggage, which had taken place on its rear. Orange's division also arrived breathless, having been long detained by the same cause. From a deficiency of the habit of war, the movements of that army were slow, unconnected, awkward.

The moment had arrived when the combat began to be furious, Wartensleben's division moved to the left of Hassenhausen, while Schmettau's division, led with vigour by the Prussian officers, advanced in front of Hassenhausen itself, then drew back its two wings above that village, in order to surround it. Fortunately, three of general Gudin's regiments had thrown themselves into it. The 85th, which occupied the front of it, behaved in this engagement with heroic valour. Driven back into the interior of the village, it barred the passage into it with invincible firmness, replying by a continued and well-directed fire to the tremendous mass of the Prussian fire. That regiment had lost more than half of its effective: still it stood firm and unshaken. Meanwhile, Wartensleben's division, taking advantage of the circumstance that Morand's division had not yet occupied the left of Hassenhausen, threatened to turn the village, having an immense cavalry to precede it. At this sight, general Gudin had deployed the fourth of his regiments, the 12th, to the left of Hassenhausen, to prevent his being turned. It was evident to all eyes, that, on this open ground, the village of Hassenhausen being the only appui of the one, the only obstacle to the other, the possession of it must be obstinately disputed. The brave general Schmettau, at the head of his infantry, received a shot which obliged him to retire. The duke of Brunswick, witnessing the determined resistance of the French, felt a secret despair, and believed that the catastrophe, a presentiment of which had for a month past oppressed his dejected spirit, was near at hand. This aged warrior, hesitating in council, never under fire, resolved to put himself at the head of the Prussian grenadiers, and to lead them to the assault of Hassenhausen, along a ridge of ground running by the side of the road, and by which the village might be more surely reached. While encouraging and showing them the way, a rifle ball struck him in the face and gave him a mortal wound. He was borne away with a handkerchief over his face, that the army might not recognize the illustrious sufferer. On the news of this event, a noble rage seized the Prussian staff. The worthy Mollendorf determined not to survive that day; he advanced and was, in his turn, mortally wounded. The king and the princes exposed themselves to danger, like the lowest of the soldiers. The king had a horse killed, but would not move out of the fire. At length, the division of Orange arrived. It was parted into two brigades; one went to support Wartensleben's division on the left of Hassenhausen (left of the French) to try to reduce that position by turning it; the other to occupy the space left vacant by Schmettau's division, and to throw itself upon Hassenhausen. This second brigade was especially

destined to curb Friant's division, which began to gain ground on the flank of the Prussian army.

Marshal Davout, ever present in the greatest danger, pushed to the right Friant's division, which was exchanging a brisk fire of musketry with the brigade of the Orange division opposed to it. At the centre, at Hassenhausen itself, he cheered all hearts by announcing the arrival of Morand. At length Morand appeared on the left, and he hastened thither to range that division, not the bravest of the three, for all were equally brave, but the most numerous. The intrepid Morand brought five regiments, the 13th light, and the 61st, 51st, 30th, and 17th of the line. These five regiments furnished nine battalions, the 10th having been left to guard the bridge of Kösen. They came to occupy the level ground which is on the left of Hassenhausen. The Prussians had planted upon this ground a numerous artillery, ready to play upon any troops that might appear. Each of the nine battalions, after ascending the winding slopes of Kösen, would have to debouch upon the plateau, amidst the grape-shot of the enemy. They deployed, however, one after another, forming at the very moment when they got into line, in spite of the repeated discharges of the Prussian artillery. The 13th light appeared first, formed, and moved rapidly forward; but, having advanced too far, it was obliged to fall back upon the other regiments. The 61st, which came next, received in the same manner as the 31st, was not staggered by it. A soldier, whom his comrades had nick-named the Emperor, on account of a certain resemblance to Napoleon, perceiving some wavering in his company, ran forward, drew himself up erect, and cried, "My lads, follow your Emperor!" All followed him, keeping close to each other, amidst that shower of grape-shot. The nine battalions finished deploying, and marched in columns, with their artillery in the interval between one battalion and the next. Marshal Davout, while conducting his battalions, was struck on the head by a rifle ball, which pierced his hat at the height of the cockade, and carried away some hair, without touching the skull. The nine battalions placed themselves facing the enemy's line, and obliged Wartensleben's division to fall back, as well as the brigade of Orange, which came to its support. By gaining ground, they disengaged the flank of Hassenhausen, and obliged Schmettau's division to draw back its wings, which it had extended around the village. After a long firing of musketry, Morand's division perceived a fresh storm gathering over its head: an enormous mass of cavalry was seen collecting behind the ranks of Wartensleben's division. The royal army had with it the better and more numerous portion of the Prussian cavalry. It could produce fourteen or fifteen thousand horse, excellently mounted, and trained to manœuvres by long exercises. With this mass of cavalry, the Prussians intended to make a desperate effort against Morand's division. They flattered themselves that, on the level

ground between Hassenhausen and the Saale, they should trample it under their horses' feet, or hurl it from top to bottom of the spiral slopes of Kösen. If they succeeded, the left of the French army being overthrown, Hassenhausen surrounded, Gudin taken in the village, Friant's division could do no other than beat a running retreat. But general Morand, on perceiving this assemblage, disposed seven of his battalions in squares, and left two deployed, to connect him with Hassenhausen. He placed himself in one of these squares, marshal Davout placed himself in another, and they prepared to receive with firmness the mass of enemies ready to rush upon them. All at once, the ranks of Wartensleben's infantry opened, and vomited forth torrents of Prussian cavalry, which at this point numbered not fewer than 10,000 horse, led by prince William. It attempted a series of charges, which were several times renewed. Every time, our intrepid foot soldiers, coolly awaiting the order of their officers, allowed the enemy's squadrons to come within thirty or forty paces of their lines, and then poured upon them volleys, so well aimed, and so destructive, as to strike down hundreds of men and horses, and thus to form for themselves a rampart of carcases. In the interval between these charges, general Morand and marshal Davout passed from one square to another, to give to each of them the encouragement of their presence. The Prussian horse repeated these fierce assaults, but never advanced even so far as our bayonets. At length, after a frequent repetition of this tumultuous scene, the disheartened Prussian cavalry retired behind its infantry. Then general Morand, breaking his squares, deployed his battalions, formed them into columns of attack, and pushed them upon Wartensleben's division. The Prussian infantry, assailed with vigour, gave way before our soldiers, and descended, while falling back, to the bank of the rivulet. At the same time, general Friant, on the right, forced the first brigade of the division of Orange to retire; and, in consequence of this double movement, Schmettau's division, left exposed on both its wings, horribly decimated, was compelled to give way, and to move off from that village of Hassenhausen, so violently contested with Gudin's division.

The three Prussian divisions were thus driven beyond the marshy brook which runs through the field of battle. There the French army halted for a moment to take breath, for that unequal combat had lasted for six hours, and our soldiers were fatigued to death. Gudin's division, charged to defend Hassenhausen, had sustained prodigious loss; but Friant's division had suffered moderately; Morand's division, not much hurt by the cavalry, like all infantry that has not been broken, but worse treated by the artillery, was nevertheless in fighting condition, and all three were ready to begin again, if necessary, in order to make head against the two Prussian divisions of reserve, which had remained spectators of the engagement, on the opposite side of the basin

where the battle took place. These two divisions of reserve, Kühnheim's and Arnim's, under marshal Kalkreuth, awaited the signal for entering into line in their turn, and renewing the conflict.

Meanwhile, those around the king of Prussia were engaged in deliberation. General Blucher was for uniting the entire mass of cavalry with the two divisions of reserve, and dashing with fury upon the enemy. The king had at first been of the same opinion, but it was represented to him that, if they waited but for a single day, they should be joined by prince Hohenlohe's and general Ruchel's corps, and that they should crush the French by means of this union of forces. The supposition was not well-founded; for, if they were authorised to reckon upon the junction of the corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, the French whom they had before them were likely to be joined also by the grand army. No chance, therefore, could be better than that which might be found in a last effort, made immediately, and with the determination to conquer or die, though that chance was not great, considering the state of Friant's and Morand's divisions. Orders, however, were given for retreat. The king had shown remarkable bravery, but bravery is not firmness. Besides, the minds of those about him were overwhelmed with despondency.

The movement of retreat was commenced in the afternoon. Marshal Kalkreuth went forward to cover it with his two fresh divisions. General Morand had taken advantage of an elevation called the Sonnenberg to place batteries which poured a most incommodious fire upon the right of the Prussians. Marshal Davout set in motion his three divisions, and carried them briskly beyond the brook. They marched, in spite of the fire of the divisions of reserve, came up within musket-shot of them, and forced them to retreat without disorder, it is true, but precipitately. If marshal Davout had had the regiment of dragoons carried away with him by marshal Bernadotte on the preceding day, he might have taken thousands of prisoners. He did nevertheless take 3,000, besides 115 pieces of cannon—an enormous capture for a corps which had itself only 44. On reaching the other side of the basin, where the battle had been fought, he halted his infantry, and, perceiving the troops of marshal Bernadotte in the environs of Apolda, he requested him to fall upon the enemy, and to pick up the vanquished whom his corps, exhausted with fatigue, could not pursue much longer. The soldiers of marshal Bernadotte were indignant, and asked one another what could be thought of their courage at such a moment.

The Prussian army had lost 3,000 prisoners, nine or ten thousand men killed and wounded, besides the duke of Brunswick, marshal Mollendorf, and general Schmettau, mortally, and a prodigious number of other officers, who had bravely done their duty. The corps of marshal Davout had sustained a heavy loss.

Out of 26,000 men, there were 7,000 *hors de combat*. Generals Morand and Gudin were wounded; general de Billy was killed; half the generals of brigade and colonels were dead or severely wounded. Never, since Marengo, had there been so bloody a day for the arms of France, and never had a grander example of heroic firmness been given by a general and his soldiers.

The royal army retired, under the protection of the two divisions of reserve, commanded by marshal Kalkreuth. The rendezvous appointed for all the corps disorganized by the battle was Weimar, behind prince Hohenlohe, who was supposed to be still safe and sound. The king marched thither, deeply grieved, no doubt, but yet calculating, if not on a turn of fortune, at least on a retreat in good order, thanks to the 70,000 men under the prince of Hohenlohe and general Ruchel. He was proceeding, accompanied by a strong detachment of cavalry, when the troops of marshal Bernadotte were descried on the rear of the field of battle of Jena. At sight of them, no doubt was entertained that some accident had befallen the army of prince Hohenlohe. Precipitately leaving the Weimar road, the Prussians turned off to the right into that of Sommerda. But the whole truth was soon known, for the army of prince Hohenlohe sought at that moment from the king's army that support which the king's army was seeking from it. They met in a thousand detached parties, running in all directions, and each learned that the other had been beaten. At this intelligence, the disorder, not so great at first in the king's army, because it was not pursued, rose to the highest pitch. A sudden panic seized the minds of all: they set off running confusedly along the high roads and the by-roads, seeing the enemy everywhere, and taking affrighted fugitives themselves for the victorious French. To aggravate the disaster, they found upon the roads that enormous mass of baggage which the Prussian army, softened by a long peace, carried with it, and among the rest a quantity of royal baggage not in accordance with the personal simplicity of king Frederick William, but which the presence of the court had rendered necessary. Impatient to withdraw from the danger, the two Prussian armies regarded these obstacles to the rapidity of their flight as a calamity. The cavalry turned off, crossing the country, and escaping in detached squadrons. The infantry broke their ranks, ransacking and overturning this incommodious baggage, and leaving to the conqueror the trouble of pillaging it, because they were anxious above all things to get away. The two divisions of marshal Kalkreuth, which alone had hitherto continued in good order, were soon infected with the general despair; and, in spite of the energy of their commander, they began to disband themselves. The ranks thinned from hour to hour, and the soldiers, who had not shared the passions of their officers, thought that the simplest way to escape the consequences of the defeat was to sling away their arms and hide themselves in the woods. The roads were strewed with

knapsacks, muskets, cannon. Thus it was that the Prussian army retired across the plains of Thuringia, and towards the mountains of the Harz, presenting a very different spectacle from that which it had a few days before exhibited, when it promised to behave before the French far otherwise than the Austrians and the Russians had done.*

The army of Hohenlohe fled partly to the right towards Sommerda, partly to the left towards Erfurt, beyond Weimar. Half of the royal army, that which had first quitted the field of battle, with orders to proceed to Weimar, finding that town in the hands of the enemy, went to Erfurt, carrying its mortally wounded chiefs, the duke of Brunswick, marshal Mollendorf, and general Schmettau, along with it. The rest of the royal army marched towards Sommerda, not that this was ordered, but because Sommerda and Erfurt were towns situated on the rear of the country in which they had fought. Since that delirium of terror which had seized all heads, no person was capable of giving an order. The king, surrounded by some cavalry, marched towards Sommerda. The prince of Hohenlohe, who had retired with twelve or fifteen hundred horse, had not 200 when he arrived next morning, the 15th, at Tennstädt. He made inquiries about the king, who, on his part, inquired about him. No chief knew where the others were.

During that terrible night, the victors suffered not less than the vanquished. They lay upon the ground, bivouacking in an intensely cold night, having scarcely any thing to eat, after a day of battle, naturally unproductive of provisions. Many of them, wounded more or less severely, were stretched on the bare earth, beside wounded enemies, mingling their groans; for it is not in so short a time that the best organized medical establishment could have picked up twelve or fifteen thousand wounded. Napoleon, from feeling as much as from calculation, had for several hours personally superintended their removal; and he had then returned to Jena, where he, too, had found an accession of news, namely the account of a second victory, still more glorious than that which had been gained before his own eyes. He refused at first to believe all that was told him; because a letter from marshal Bernadotte, in order to excuse by a lie his unpardonable conduct, asserted that marshal Davout had not more than nine or ten thousand men before him. Captain Trobriant, an officer of marshal Davout's, having come to apprise him that he had 70,000 men to fight, he could not believe this statement, and replied, "Your marshal must see double." But, when he was made acquainted with all the details, his joy was extreme, and he lavished praises and soon afterwards recompenses upon the admirable conduct of the third corps. He was indignant with marshal Bernadotte, but not much surprized. In the first moment, he intended

* We merely repeat here the statements made by Prussian officers themselves in the various narratives which they have published.

to use the utmost rigour, and even thought of ordering a trial before a council of war. But relationship, and a sort of weakness which would not allow him to vent spleen otherwise than in vehement words, softened down his resolution of severity into a dissatisfaction, which, for the rest, he took no pains to conceal. Marshal Bernadotte got off with letters from prince Berthier and Napoleon himself—letters which must have made him profoundly wretched, if he had possessed the heart of a citizen and a soldier.

Next morning marshal Duroc was sent to Naumburg. He was the bearer of a letter from the Emperor to marshal Davout, and signal testimonies of satisfaction for the whole *corps d'armée*. "Your soldiers and yourself, monsieur le maréchal," said Napoleon, "have gained an everlasting right to my esteem and gratitude." Duroc was to go to the hospitals, to visit the wounded, to convey to them the promise of magnificent rewards, and to distribute money among all those who were in need of it. The Emperor's letter was read in the chambers where the wounded were crowded together, and these unfortunate men, shouting *Vive l'Empereur!* amidst their sufferings, expressed a desire for the recovery of their health, that they might again devote their lives to him.

On the very next day, the 15th of October, Napoleon took measures for following up the victory with that activity which no captain, ancient or modern, has ever equalled. In the first place, he enjoined marshals Davout, Lannes, and Augereau, whose corps had suffered much on the 14th, to rest for two or three days at Naumburg, Jena, and Weimar. But marshal Bernadotte, whose soldiers had not fired a shot, marshals Soult and Ney, part only of whose troops had been engaged, Murat, whose cavalry had suffered nothing but fatigue, were ordered forward, to harass the Prussian army, to pick up its wrecks, easy to capture in the state of disorganization into which it had fallen. Murat, who had slept at Weimar, had orders to hasten with his dragoons to Erfurt on the morning of the 15th, and Ney to follow him immediately. Marshal Soult was to march by Sommerda, Greussen, Sondershausen, Nordhausen, after the enemy's army, to pursue it through Thuringia, towards the mountains of the Harz, where it seemed in its disorder to purpose seeking refuge. Marshal Bernadotte was enjoined to direct his course that very day towards the Elbe, by proceeding towards the right of the army through Halle and Dessau. It will be remarked that Napoleon, careful to concentrate himself on the eve of a great battle, next day, when he had struck the enemy, spread his corps, like a vast net, to catch all that fled, skilful in thus modifying the application of the principles of war according to circumstances, and always with that accuracy and fitness which ensures success.

Having given these orders, Napoleon bestowed some attention on politics. The direction which the Prussians were following in their retreat removed them to a distance from Saxony. Napo-

leon held, moreover, in his power a considerable number of Saxon troops, who had fought honourably, though far from pleased either at the war into which their country had been dragged, or with the ill-usage of which they conceived that they had reason to complain on the part of the Prussians. Napoleon assembled the officers of the Saxon troops at Jena in one of the halls of the University. Making use of an *employé* of the foreign affairs, called to be about him, he addressed them in words which were immediately translated. He said that he knew not why he was at war with their sovereign, a wise, pacific prince, and deserving of respect; that he had even drawn the sword to rescue their country from the humiliating dependence in which it was held by Prussia, and that he could not see why the Saxons and the French, with so few motives for hating each other, should persist in fighting together: that he was ready, for his part, to give a first pledge of his amicable dispositions by setting them at liberty, and by sparing Saxony, provided that they would promise on their part never more to bear arms against France; and that the principal of them should go to Dresden to propose peace and to induce its acceptance. The Saxon officers, seized with admiration on beholding the extraordinary personage who was speaking to them, touched by the generosity of his proposals, replied by a unanimous oath not to serve, either themselves or their soldiers, during that war. Some of them offered to set out immediately for Dresden, declaring that before the end of three days they would be back, bringing the consent of their sovereign.

By this politic act Napoleon purposed to disarm German patriotism, so strongly excited through the efforts of Prussia, and, by treating a prince justly respected with this kindness, to acquire a right to treat with severity a prince whom nobody esteemed. This latter was the elector of Hesse, who had contributed by his falsehoods to provoke the war, and who, since the war, sought to traffic with his adhesion, resolved to give himself up to that power of the two which victory should favour. He was a secret enemy, devoted to the English, with whom he had deposited his wealth. Napoleon, on advancing into Prussia, did not care to leave such an enemy on his rear. The principles of war commanded him to be got rid of, and those of an upright policy did not defend him, for this prince had been a faithless neighbour both to Prussia and France. Immediately, before he proceeded further, Napoleon ordered the eighth corps to leave Mayence and to march to Cassel, though that corps could not yet number more than ten or twelve thousand men. He directed his brother Louis to march by Westphalia for Hesse, and to join marshal Mortier with twelve or fifteen thousand men, in order to concur in the execution of the decrees of victory. However, deeming it inexpedient to charge one of his brothers with so rigorous a commission, he advised king Louis to send his troops to marshal Mortier, and to relinquish to the latter the execution of the task of

dispossessing the house of Hesse, with the obedience and the probity that distinguished him. Marshal Mortier was to declare that the elector of Hesse had ceased to reign (a form already adopted in regard to the house of Naples), to take possession of his dominions in the name of France, and to disband his army, giving to such of the Hessian soldiers as chose to continue to serve the offer of going to Italy. They were mostly robust men, well-disciplined, accustomed to bear arms out of their own country in behalf of those who paid them, especially in behalf of the English, who employed them in India with great advantage. The Hessian army was composed of 32,000 of all arms. It was an important point not to leave behind one this formidable force, especially when expecting to proceed so far northward as Napoleon intended to do.

With these different orders Napoleon sent tidings of his brilliant successes, tidings which could not fail to dispel the hopes of his enemies and the fears of his friends, and to increase in his soldiers left in the interior a zeal to join the grand army. According to custom, he added a multitude of instructions for the calling out of the conscripts, for the organisation of the depôts, for the departure of the detachments destined to recruit incomplete regiments, and for the regulation of the civil affairs, which, during his reign, never suffered from the preoccupations of war.

From Jena, Napoleon proceeded to Weimar. He found there the whole court of the grand-duke, including the grand-duchess, sister of the emperor Alexander. The grand-duke alone was absent, having the command of a Prussian division. This polished and learned court had made Weimar the Athens of modern Germany, and, under its protection, Göthe, Schiller, Wieland, lived honoured, rich, and happy. The grand-duchess, who was accused of having contributed to the war, went to meet Napoleon, and, agitated at the tumult which prevailed around her, she said, on approaching him, "Sire, I recommend my subjects to you." "You see, madam, what war is," replied Napoleon, coldly. For the rest, he confined himself to this vengeance, and treated this inimical but lettered court as Alexander would have treated a city of Greece, showed himself full of courtesy towards the grand-duchess, expressed to her no displeasure at the conduct of her husband, caused the town of Weimar to be respected, and ordered due attention to be paid to the wounded generals of whom it was full. From Weimar he bore to the right, directing his course to Naumburg, to congratulate in person the corps of marshal Davout, while his lieutenants were pursuing the Prussian army to the last extremity.

In this interval, the indefatigable Murat had galloped with his squadrons to Erfurt, and invested the place, which, though of but moderate strength, was surrounded with very good walls and provided with a considerable *matériel*. It was crowded with wounded and fugitives. Thither had been conveyed marshal

Mollendorf, to whom Napoleon had ordered the utmost attention to be paid. Murat summoned Erfurt, and employed marshal Ney's infantry to enforce the summons. Among the Prussian fugitives there was not one capable of making head against the French, and of replying by any energetic resistance to the impetuosity of their pursuit. Besides, fourteen or fifteen thousand fugitives, 6,000 of whom were wounded, most of them dying, were any thing but elements of defence. The place capitulated in the evening of the 15th. Here were picked up, exclusively of the 6,000 wounded Prussians, 9,000 prisoners and an immense booty. Murat and Ney left the town immediately, to pursue the main body of the Prussian army.

Murat had sent Klein's dragoons to Weissensee, to intercept the corps that were fleeing separately. That town was between Sommerda, where the king of Prussia had passed the first night, and Sondershausen, where he was to pass the second. General Klein reached it before the Prussians. General Blucher, on arriving with his cavalry, was quite astonished to find Murat's dragoons already in his way. Having desired to parley, he entered into a sort of negotiation with general Klein, founded on a letter alleged to have been written by Napoleon to the king of Prussia, a letter containing, it was said, offers of peace: he affirmed upon his word that an armistice had just been signed. General Klein believed general Blucher, and opposed no obstacle to his retreat. This stratagem saved the relics of the Prussian army. General Blucher and marshal Kalkreuth were thus enabled to repair to Greussen. But marshal Soult was following these corps upon the same road. Next morning, the 16th, he overtook at Greussen the rear-guard of marshal Kalkreuth, who, wishing to gain time, had recourse in his turn to the fable of an armistice. Marshal Soult was not to be duped: he declared that he disbelieved the existence of an armistice; and, after passing a few moments in parley, in order to allow his infantry time to rejoin, he attacked Greussen, carried it by main force, and picked up many more prisoners, horses, and cannon.

On the following day, the 17th, pursued and pursuers continued their course for Sondershausen and Nordhausen, the one abandoning to the other baggage, cannon, entire battalions. More than 200 pieces of artillery had already been picked up on all the roads and several thousand prisoners.

The king of Prussia, on arriving at Nordhausen, found the prince of Hohenlohe there. Still believing in the talents of that general, who had been beaten like the duke of Brunswick, but who had in the eyes of the army the merit of having censured the plan of the generalissimo, he conferred upon him the command in chief. At the same time he left the command of the two divisions of the reserve to old Kalkreuth, who had also the merit of having found great fault with all that had been done. This was the only measure taken by the king after that great disaster.

Dejected, reserved, showing a stern countenance to those senseless persons who had been partizans of war, but sparing them reproaches, which they might have returned, for, if they had been silly, he had been weak, he proceeded towards Berlin, at a moment when his presence with the army was most needed to restore the temper of downcast, divided, soured minds, to mould all those wrecks into a corps, which should retard the passage of the Elbe, cover Berlin for some time, and, on retiring to the Oder, bring to the Russians a contingent of a certain value. This departure was a serious fault, and unworthy of the personal courage shown by Frederick William during the battle. That monarch added but one act to the nomination of the prince of Hohenlohe, and that was to write to Napoleon, to express his regret at being at war with France, and to propose to open a negotiation immediately.

The king, having left the head-quarters without giving any military instructions to his generals, these acted without the slightest concert. The prince of Hohenlohe collected the wrecks of the two armies, excepting the reserve committed to marshal Kalkreuth, and formed it into three detachments, two of troops retaining some organization, the third containing the mass of the runaways. He directed them all, by a movement to the right, towards the Elbe, making them march by three different lines of route, but all running in the same direction, from Nordhausen to Magdeburg. There would have been little advantage in throwing himself into the Harz, for, besides the deficiency of resources in the way of provisions, that mountainous chain was neither sufficiently distant, nor had it depth enough to serve for an asylum to the fugitive army. It would have been pursued thither by the French, who are very alert in mountains, and perhaps, on crossing the chain, it would have found them beyond it, barring the way to the Elbe. It was, therefore, a judicious determination to turn off to the right, with a view to proceed directly to the Elbe and Magdeburg. It dragged along with it nevertheless, a train of heavy artillery, which greatly retarded its march. The idea was conceived of consigning it to the care of general Blucher, who, turning the mountains of the Harz on the opposite side by Osterode, Seesen, and Brunswick, was likely to descend into the plains of Hanover, without being followed by the French; for it was to be presumed that these would throw themselves *en masse* into the track of the Prussian main army, and not run after a detachment along the difficult roads of Hesse. In consequence, general Blucher, with two battalions and a considerable corps of cavalry, undertook to escort the great park. The duke of Weimar, who had plunged with the advanced guard into the forest of Thuringia, soon left it on hearing of the two lost battles. Keeping along the foot of the mountains, he skirted at as great a distance as possible the two armies, French and Prussian. He received timely information of the movement which general Blucher was

to execute, and resolved to join him by way of Osterode and Seesen. Marshal Kalkreuth, after halting a few hours at Nordhausen to cover the retreat, proceeded directly for the Elbe, below Magdeburg, choosing to march alone, dissatisfied at having passed under the command of two successive generals, whom he held in little estimation, while he conceived, and not without reason, that he had himself deserved the chief command.

Marshals Ney, Soult, and Murat, started in pursuit of the main Prussian army, making forced marches to overtake it, and taking prisoners and *matériel* at every step. But the route from Nordhausen to Magdeburg was not long enough to allow them time to get up with the Prussians. They attained, however, the principal object, by leaving them not a day's rest, and thus depriving them of all means of reorganising themselves, and still forming a force of some consistency upon the Elbe.

Meanwhile, marshal Bernadotte had marched for Halle, intending to pass the Saale there, and to reach the Elbe towards Barby or Dessau. Halle is on the Lower Saale, below the point where that river receives the Elster, and above the point where it falls into the Elbe. The duke of Brunswick, on his departure from Weimar, for the purpose of retiring to the Elbe under cover of the Saale, had ordered prince Eugene of Wirtemberg to proceed to Halle to meet the Prussian main army. That prince had come thither with a corps of about seventeen or eighteen thousand men, forming the last resource of the monarchy. He had established himself there, as in a good post for collecting the beaten army. But, having taken the Magdeburg road, it never came near him, and, instead of it, a detachment of French troops made its appearance on the morning of the 17th of October. It was Dupont's division, which, for the moment, accompanied marshal Bernadotte's corps. No sooner was general Dupont in sight of Halle than, having orders to attack, he hastened to reconnoitre himself the position of the enemy. Before the city of Halle, the Saale divides into several branches. It is passed by a bridge of great length, which at the same time crosses overflowed meadows and several arms of the river. This bridge was provided with artillery, and in advance of it there was a body of infantry. On the islands which separate the river into several branches had been formed batteries, enfilading the road by which the French were approaching. At the extremity of the bridge stands the city, the gates of which were barricaded. Lastly, beyond it, upon the heights which command the course of the Saale, was perceived the corps of the prince of Wirtemberg, drawn up in order of battle. Thus the French would have to cross the bridge, to force the gates of Halle, to penetrate into the city, to pass through it, and to take the heights in the rear. These were a series of difficulties almost insurmountable. At this sight general Dupont, who had commanded in the brilliant actions of Haslach and Dirnstein, instantly formed his resolution.

He determined to dislodge the troops posted at the avenues to the bridge, then to carry the bridge, the town, and the heights. He went back, withdrew his division out of the hands of marshal Bernadotte, who had most unseasonably scattered it,* and disposed it in the following manner. He placed the 9th light in column upon the road, on the right the 32nd (which had made itself so famous in Italy, and was still commanded by colonel Darricau), and then the 9th in rear to support the whole movement. This done, he gave the signal, and, heading the troops in person, he advanced with them at a run upon the post of infantry placed at the head of the bridge. They had to sustain tremendous discharges of musketry and grape, but darted to the bridge with the rapidity of lightning, drove back upon it the troops which guarded it, and pursued them, in spite of the fire poured from all sides, and striking French and Prussians. After a conflict of a few minutes, the former forced their way to the further end of the bridge, and entered the city pell-mell with the fugitives. There a vehement fire of musketry took place in the streets with the Prussians; however, they were soon expelled from the town and the gates closed upon them.

General Dupont had sustained some loss, but he had taken almost all the troops that defended the bridge, and likewise their numerous artillery. Still, the operation was not finished. The corps of the prince of Wirtemberg was posted on the other side of the town upon the heights in rear. It was necessary for general Dupont to dislodge him from them if he would remain master of Halle and of the bridge over the Saale. Having left his troops time to recover breath, he ordered the city gates to be thrown open, and directed his division towards the foot of the heights. The three French regiments, now numbering not more than 5,000 combatants, were received with the fire of 12,000 men well posted. They advanced, nevertheless, in several columns, with the vigour of troops not accustomed to shrink from any obstacle. At the same time, general Dupont sent one of his battalions upon the flank of the position, turned it, and, perceiving the effect produced by this manœuvre, pushed forward his columns of attack. His three regiments dashed on in spite of the enemy's fire, scaled the heights, and, reaching the summit, dislodged the Prussians. A new action ensued with the whole corps of the prince of Wirtemberg, on the ground situated beyond. But Drouet's division arrived at the moment, and its presence, extinguishing all the enemy's hopes, put an end to his efforts.

This brilliant action cost the French about 600 killed and

* We here repeat an assertion contained in the Memoirs of General Dupont. We can affirm that in those Memoirs, still in manuscript and very interesting, general Dupont is no detractor of marshal Bernadotte's. He treats him like a friend, as well as all those who triumphed in 1815, when France was overcome.

wounded, and the Prussians about 1,000. Four thousand more were made prisoners. The duke of Wirtemberg retired in disorder towards the Elbe, by Dessau and Wittenberg, destroying all the bridges without loss of time. One of his regiments, that of Trescow, which was coming from Magdeburg, along the left bank of the Saale, to join him, was surprised, and almost the whole of it taken. Thus the reserve even of the Prussians was in flight, and as disorganized as the rest of their army.

Napoleon, having come to Naumburg to see the field of battle of Auerstädt, and to compliment the corps of marshal Davout on its brilliant conduct, had stopped there a very short time and proceeded to Merseburg. On his way was the spot where the battle of Rosbach was fought. Perfectly versed in military history, he was accurately acquainted with the minutest details of that celebrated action, and he sent general Savary to seek the monument which had been erected in memory of the battle. General Savary discovered it in a stubble field. It was a small column, only a few feet high. The inscriptions were effaced. Troops belonging to Lannes' corps, passing the spot, carried it away and put the pieces into a caisson, which was sent off to France.

Napoleon then proceeded to Halle. He could not help admiring the exploit of Dupont's division. Upon the ground lay the dead of that division, whom there had not been time to bury, dressed in the uniform of the 32nd regiment. "What!" exclaimed Napoleon, "the 32nd again! So many of it were killed in Italy, that I thought there could be none left." He was lavish of his praises upon the troops of general Dupont.

The movements of the enemy's army began to become clear. Napoleon directed the pursuit, conformably to his general plan, which consisted in turning the Prussians, getting before them to the Elbe and the Oder, and passing that river by means of a bridge of boats near Barby, not far from the confluence of the Saale and the Elbe. He enjoined marshals Lannes and Augereau, who had had two or three days for recruiting themselves, to cross the Saale by the bridge of Halle, and the Elbe by the bridge of Dessau, replacing the latter if it were destroyed. He had already directed marshal Davout to leave all his wounded at Naumburg, to proceed with his corps to Leipzig, and from Leipzig to Wittenberg, to make himself master of the passage of the Elbe at this latter point. If he could gain timely possession of the course of the Elbe from Wittenberg to Barby, he had the greatest chance of arriving first at Berlin and upon the Oder.

On his way, although Leipzig belonged to the elector of Saxony, Napoleon prescribed to marshal Davout a rigorous measure against the merchants of that city, who were the principal traders in English commodities in Germany. Napoleon, to revenge himself upon the commerce of Great Britain for the war which she made upon France, strove to intimidate the commercial cities of the North, such as Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, Leipzig, Dantzic,

which strove to open the continent to the English while he was striving to close it against them. He required, therefore, every merchant to declare what English goods he possessed, adding, that if the declarations appeared false, their accuracy would be tested by ocular inspection, and false allegations punished with heavy penalties. All the goods declared were to be confiscated for the benefit of the French army.

Meanwhile, our troops continued their march towards the Elbe. Marshal Bernadotte passed that river at Barby, but less promptly than he had orders to do. Napoleon, who had restrained himself after the affair of Auerstädt, gave vent this time to his displeasure, and made prince Berthier address a letter to marshal Bernadotte, in which, in reference to his tardy passage of the Elbe, he was bitterly reminded of his precipitate departure from Naumburg on the day of the two battles of Jena and Auerstädt.* However, as it is the case, when we follow the rules of cold justice less than the impulses of the heart, Napoleon, too indulgent the first time, was almost too rigorous the second, because the tardiness of marshal Bernadotte in passing the Elbe was the fault of the elements much more than his. Lannes threw himself upon Dessau, and thence upon the bridge over the Elbe, which the Prussians had half destroyed. He lost no time in repairing it. Marshal Davout, on reaching Wittenberg, found the Prussians there also employed

* We quote this letter, which is at the *Depôt de la Guerre*.—

Marshal Berthier to marshal Bernadotte.

Halle, 21st October, 1806.

The Emperor, monsieur le maréchal, desires me to inform you that he is highly displeased because you have not executed the order which you received to proceed yesterday to Calbe, for the purpose of throwing a bridge over the mouth of the Saale at Barby. Yet you must be aware that all the Emperor's dispositions were combined.

His Majesty, who is extremely angry that you have not executed his orders, reminds you, in reference to this subject, that you were not at the battle of Jena; that this might have been sufficient to endanger the safety of the army, and to thwart the grand combinations of his Majesty; and that it rendered that battle doubtful and very sanguinary, when otherwise it would have been much less so. Deeply mortified as the Emperor was, he refrained from speaking to you on the subject, because he was fearful lest, in calling to mind your former services, he should hurt your feelings, and because the consideration which he has for you induced him to be silent; but, on this occasion, when you have not gone to Calbe, and when you have not tried to pass the Elbe, either at Barby or at the mouth of the Saale, the Emperor is determined to speak his mind, because he is not accustomed to see his operations sacrificed to mere etiquettes of command.

The Emperor, monsieur le maréchal, directs me also to speak to you about a matter of less consequence, namely that, in spite of the order which you received yesterday, you have not yet sent hither three companies to escort your prisoners. There remain in Halle 3,500 without any escort. The Emperor, monsieur le maréchal, orders you to send immediately a staff officer at the head of three complete companies, forming 300 men, to take all the prisoners that are at Halle and to conduct them to Erfurt. There are no troops left here but the imperial guard, and the Emperor does not choose that it should escort the prisoners taken by your corps. It is nine o'clock, and there are no signs of the three companies for which I applied to you yesterday.

in destroying the bridge over the Elbe, and ready to blow up a powder magazine not far from the town. The inhabitants, who were Saxons, and who already knew that Napoleon wished to spare Saxony the consequences of the war, hastened to save the bridge of Wittenberg themselves, to remove the matches, and to assist the French to prevent an explosion. It was on the 20th of October, that marshals Davout, Lannes, and Bernadotte, crossed the Elbe, six days after the battles of Jena and Auerstädt. As we see, there had not been an hour lost. Two great battles, and a very smart action at Halle, had taken up only the time spent in fighting, and the march of our columns had not been suspended for a moment. The Prussians themselves, though their flight was rapid, did not reach the Elbe till the 20th of October, and they passed it at Magdeburg, on the same day that marshals Lannes and Davout passed it at Dessau and Wittenberg. But they arrived there in a state of increasing disorganization, incapable of defending the lower course of the river, and not even having any hope of reaching the Oder before the French—a condition upon which their safety depended.

Napoleon, notwithstanding his impatience to get to Berlin, in order to direct his troops to the Oder, stopped a day at Wittenberg to take there marching precautions which he was careful to multiply in proportion as he carried the war to greater distances. We have already seen him, when penetrating into Austria, securing points of support at Augsburg, at Braunau, at Linz. In the expedition of far greater length which he was now undertaking, he purposed to create upon his route places of safety for his sick or fatigued men, for the recruits sent from France, for the stores of ammunition and provisions that he intended to collect. Erfurt being taken, he had changed his line of stations, and, instead of making it pass through Franconia, the province through which he had entered Prussia, he had given it again its natural direction, and made it pass along the ordinary and central high road of Germany, by Mayence, Frankfurt, Eisenach, Erfurt, Weimar, Naumburg, Halle, and Wittenberg. Erfurt was provided with very good defences, and stored with a considerable *matériel*. Napoleon made it the first station on the military road which he was resolved to mark out across Germany. Wittenberg possessed ancient half-destroyed fortifications. On this account, but chiefly for the sake of the bridge existing there over the Elbe, Napoleon ordered this place to be put into condition, as far as that could be done in the space of two or three weeks. He put into the hands of general Chasseloup a large sum of money, for the purpose of employing six or seven thousand native labourers, and, in default of regular works, for constructing field-works of great solidity. He ordered the old scarps to be bared at the foot, those which wanted height to be raised, and where time would not permit the employment of masonry, he directed wood, which was very abundant in the neighbouring forests, to

be substituted for stone. Immense palisades were set up, a Roman camp was in some sort constructed, such as the ancient conquerors of the world constructed against Gaul and Germany. In the same town of Wittenberg, Napoleon had ovens built, corn collected, biscuit made. He determined also that the great park of artillery should be collected in this place, and that workshops for repairs should be established there. He took possession of the public edifices and places, to turn them into hospitals capable of containing the sick and wounded of a numerous army. Lastly, on the suddenly raised ramparts of this vast dépôt he ordered more than a hundred pieces of heavy artillery, collected in his victorious march, to be placed in battery. He had appointed general Clarke governor of Erfurt; he nominated general Lemarrois one of his aides-de-camp, governor of Wittenberg. The wounded, separated into two classes, *great* and *little* wounded, that is to say such as would be able to return to the ranks in a few days, and those whose recovery would require a long time, were divided between Wittenberg and Erfurt. The little wounded remained at Wittenberg, so that they could rejoin their corps immediately; the others were sent to Erfurt. Each regiment, besides the principal dépôt which it had in France, had also a field depot at Wittenberg. In the latter could be left men who were fatigued or slightly indisposed, that, by means of the attentions of a few days, they might be enabled to march afresh, without encumbering the roads, without exhibiting there the spectacle of a tail of an army, sick, impotent, increasing in length in proportion to the rapidity of the movements and the duration of the war. The detachments of conscripts, when leaving France in bodies, had orders to halt at Erfurt and Wittenberg, to be there reviewed, provided with what they needed, augmented by convalescents, and directed to their regiments. Lastly, to the same dépôts, but especially to that of Wittenberg, Napoleon ordered the immense quantity of fine horses picked up in all parts of Germany, to be sent. He directed all the regiments of cavalry to pass through them in their turn, in order to be remounted. The same order was given to dragoons coming from France on foot. There they would find horses, which they could not procure in France. Thus Napoleon concentrated at these points, in a well-defended asylum, all the resources of the conquered country, which he had the art to take from the enemy and to apply to his own use. Victorious, and marching forward, he had in them relays abundantly furnished with every thing, provisions ammunition, *matériel*, and situated on the route of the corps coming to reinforce the army. If obliged to retire, they would be supports and means of re-fitting, placed on the lines of retreat.

After inspecting and ordering every thing himself, Napoleon left Wittenberg, and took the road for Berlin. Fate decreed that, in the space of a year, he should visit Berlin and Vienna

as conqueror. The king of Prussia, who had written to solicit peace, sent to him M. de Lucchesini to negotiate an armistice. Napoleon would not see M. de Lucchesini, and charged marshal Duroc to deliver to the minister of king Frederick William the answer commanded by circumstances. It would in fact have been giving the Russians time to succour the Prussians, to grant an armistice. This military reason admitted of no reply; unless the formal powers of Russia and Prussia were produced for treating immediately for peace on the conditions which Napoleon had a right to impose after the late victories.

He despatched orders, therefore, to all his corps to march to Berlin. Marshal Davout was to start from Wittenberg, taking the direct route from Wittenberg to Berlin, that of Jüterbock; Lannes and Augereau were to follow that from Treuenbrietzen to Potsdam. Napoleon, with the guard, horse and foot, now united and reinforced by seven thousand grenadiers and voltigeurs, marched between these two columns. He purposed that, in recompence for the victory of Auerstädt, marshal Davout should be the first to enter Berlin, and receive the keys of the capital from the hands of the magistrates. As for himself, before he went to Berlin, he intended to stay awhile at Potsdam, in the retreat of the great Frederick. Marshals Soult and Ney had orders to invest Magdeburg, Murat to remain in ambush for a few days about that great fortress, to intercept the bands of fugitives crowding thither. "It is a trap," wrote Napoleon to him, "in which, with your cavalry, you will catch all the detached parties that are seeking a safe place for crossing the Elbe."—Murat was afterwards to join the grand army at Berlin, and thence post off to the Oder.

Having waited to allow his *corps d'armée* to get the start of him a little, Napoleon set out on the 24th of October, and passed through Kropstadt on his way to Potsdam. Performing the journey on horseback, he was caught in a violent storm, though the weather had continued very fine ever since the opening of the campaign. It was not his custom to stop for such a reason. However, he was offered shelter in a house situated amid woods, and belonging to an officer of the hunting establishment of the court of Saxony. He accepted the offer. Some females, who seemed from their language and dress to be of elevated rank, received, around a great fire, this group of French officers, whom, from fear as much as out of politeness, they treated with much civility. They seemed not to be aware who was the principal of these officers, around whom the others respectfully ranged themselves, when one of them, still young, seized with a strong emotion, exclaimed, "That is the Emperor!" "How came you to know me?" asked Napoleon, drily. "Sire," she answered, "I was with your Majesty in Egypt." "And what were you doing in Egypt?" "I was the wife of an officer, who has since died in your service. I have solicited a pension for myself and

my son, but I was a foreigner, and could not obtain it; and I am come to live with the mistress of this house, who has kindly received me, and entrusted me with the education of her children." The countenance of Napoleon, who was displeased at being recognized, stern at first, all at once assumed a soft expression: "Madam," said he, "you shall have a pension; and as for your son, I charge myself with his education."

The same evening he took care to affix his signature to both these resolutions, and said, smiling, "I never yet met with an adventure in a forest, in consequence of a storm: here is one, however, and a most agreeable one."

He arrived in the evening of the 25th of October at Potsdam. He immediately went to visit the retreat of the great captain, the great king, who called himself "The Philosopher of Sans-Souci," and with some reason, who seemed to wield sword and sceptre with a jeering indifference, as if in mockery of all the courts of Europe, one might venture to add, of his own people, if he had not taken so much pains to govern them well. Napoleon went through the great and little palace of Potsdam, desired to be shown Frederick's works, crowded with Voltaire's notes, sought to discover in his library on what books he was accustomed to feast his great mind, and then went to the church of Potsdam, to inspect the modest tomb where rests the founder of Prussia. At Potsdam were kept the sword of Frederick, his belt, his order of the Black Eagle. Napoleon seized them, exclaiming, "What a capital present for the Invalides, especially for those who have formed part of the army of Hanover! They will be delighted, no doubt, when they see in our possession the sword of him who beat them at Rosbach." Napoleon, in seizing these precious relics with so much respect, most assuredly offered no affront either to Frederick or the Prussian nation. But how extraordinary, how worthy of meditation is that mysterious concatenation which binds, blends, separates, or brings together, the things of this world! Frederick and Napoleon met here in a very strange manner. That philosopher king, who, unknown to himself, had been from his elevated throne one of the promoters of the French Revolution, now lying in his coffin, received a visit from the general of that Revolution, become Emperor and conqueror of Berlin and Potsdam! The victor at Rosbach received a visit from the victor at Jena! What a sight! Unfortunately, these reverses of fortune were not the last.

While the head-quarters were at Potsdam, marshal Davout entered Berlin with his corps, on the 25th of October. King Frederick William, when he withdrew, had left Berlin to the government of the citizens, under the presidency of a considerable personage, the prince de Hatzfeld. The representatives of the civic body offered to marshal Davout the keys of the capital, which he gave back to them, saying, that they belonged to one greater than he—to Napoleon. He left a single regiment in the

city, to do the police duty jointly with the city militia. He then went and established himself at Friedrichsfeld, a league distant, with his right to the Spree, and his left to the woods. By order of Napoleon, he encamped militarily, with the artillery pointed, and part of the soldiers on duty as sentinels at the camp, while the others went alternately to visit the capital conquered through their exploits. He ordered hovels to be made with straw and fir, that the troops might be sheltered from the inclemency of the season. It was not necessary to recommend discipline to marshal Davout: there was no need to watch him, unless to render him less severe. Marshal Davout promised to respect persons and property, as civilized conquerors ought to do, on condition that they would obtain from the inhabitants complete submission and provisions, during the short time that the army had to spend within their walls, which, for such a city as Berlin, could not constitute a very heavy burden.

The day after the entry of the French into Berlin, the shops were open. The inhabitants were walking peaceably in the wide streets of that capital, and even in greater numbers than usual. They seemed to be at once mortified and curious, natural impressions among a people patriotic but passionate, enlightened, struck with all that is great, eager to know the most renowned generals and soldiers then in the world. They disapproved moreover of their government having undertaken a senseless war; and that disapprobation could not but diminish the hatred which they bore to the provoked conquerors. Marshal Lannes was sent to Potsdam and Spandau. Marshal Augereau passed through Berlin at the heels of marshal Davout; and Napoleon, having staid the 25th and 26th at Potsdam, and the 27th at Charlottenburg, fixed on the 28th for his entry into Berlin.

It was the first time that he had ever made a triumphant entry, like Alexander or Caesar, into a conquered capital. He had not entered Vienna in that manner: indeed he had scarcely visited the Austrian capital at all, living constantly at Schönbrunn, out of the sight of its inhabitants. But, on this day, whether from pride at having demolished an army reputed to be invincible, or from a desire to awe Europe by a striking spectacle, or perhaps from the intoxication of victory mounting higher than usual into his head, he chose the morning of the 28th for his triumphant entry into Berlin.

The whole population of the city was abroad to witness this grand scene. Napoleon entered, surrounded by his guard, and followed by the fine cuirassiers of generals d'Hautpoul and Nansouty. The imperial guard, in rich uniform, was on this day more imposing than ever. In front the grenadiers and dismounted chasseurs, in rear the horse grenadiers and chasseurs, in the middle marshals Berthier, Duroc, Davout, Augereau, and, in the centre of this group, left by himself out of respect, Napoleon, in the simple dress which he wore in the Tuileries and in fields of

battle. Napoleon, the object of all eyes in that immense concourse, silent, impressed at once with sorrow and admiration.—Such was the spectacle exhibited in that long and spacious street of Berlin leading from the gate of Charlottenburg to the palace of the kings of Prussia. The populace were in the streets, the wealthy citizens at the windows. As for the nobility, it had fled full of fear and with confusion. The wives of the Prussian burghers seemed to devour the spectacle that was before their eyes: some shed tears, but none uttered either cries of hatred or cries of flattery for the conqueror. Happy Prussia, not to be divided and to keep up her dignity in her disaster! The entry of the enemy was not with her the ruin of one party, the triumph of another, and she had not in her bosom an unworthy faction, feeling an odious joy, applauding the presence of foreign soldiers. We French, more unfortunate in our reverses, have witnessed that execrable joy, for we have seen every thing in this century, the extremes of victory and defeat, of greatness and abasement, of the purest devotedness and the blackest treachery!

Napoleon received the keys of Berlin from the magistrates, then proceeded to the palace, where he gave audience to all the public authorities, used mild, cheering language, promised order on the part of the soldiers, on condition of order on the part of the inhabitants, showed no severity in his expressions but towards the German aristocracy, which was, he said, the sole author of all the calamities of Germany, which had dared to provoke him to the fight, and which he would chastise by obliging it to beg its bread in England. He established himself in the king's palace, received the foreign ministers representing friendly courts, and summoned M. de Talleyrand to Berlin.

His bulletins, narratives of all that the army accomplished daily, often, too, violent answers to his enemies, series of political reflections, lessons to kings and nations, were rapidly dictated by him, and usually revised by M. de Talleyrand before they were published. He there recorded each of the progresses which he made in the enemy's country; he even related what he heard concerning the political causes of the war. In those which he published in Prussia, he affected to lavish homage to the memory of the great Frederick, tokens of esteem on his unfortunate successor, taking good care indeed that some pity for his weakness should peep through, and the most virulent sarcasms on queens who meddle in affairs of state, who expose their husbands and their country to frightful disasters; treatment most ungenerous towards the queen of Prussia, who was sufficiently racked by the sense of her faults and her misfortunes to be spared the addition of outrage to adversity. These bulletins, which betrayed with too little reserve the licentiousness of the victorious soldier, exposed Napoleon to more than one censure amidst the shouts of admiration which his triumphs drew from his enemies themselves.

In his irritation against the Prussian party which promoted the

war, he received sternly the envoys of the duke of Brunswick, who had been mortally wounded at the battle of Auerstädt, and who, before he expired, recommended his family and his subjects to the conqueror. "What would he who sent you have to say," replied Napoleon—"what would he have to say, if I were to inflict on the city of Brunswick that subversion with which, fifteen years ago, he threatened the capital of the great nation which I command? The duke of Brunswick had disavowed the insensate manifesto of 1792; one would have thought that with age reason had begun to get the better of the passions, and yet he has again lent the authority of his name to the follies of hot-headed youth, which have brought ruin upon Prussia. To him it belonged to put women, courtiers, young officers, into their proper places, and to make all feel the authority of his age, of his understanding, and of his position. But he had not the force to do so, and the Prussian monarchy is demolished and the States of Brunswick are in my power. Tell the duke of Brunswick that I shall show him that consideration which is due to an unfortunate general, justly celebrated, struck by that fate which may reach us all, but that I cannot recognize a sovereign prince in a general of the Prussian army."

These words, published through the usual channel of the bulletins, intimated that Napoleon would not treat the sovereignty of the duke of Brunswick any better than that of the elector of Hesse. If, however, he showed asperity to some, he showed himself kind and generous to others, taking care to vary his treatment according to the known participation of each in the war. His expressions in regard to old marshal Mollendorf were perfectly decorous. There was in Berlin prince Ferdinand, brother of the great Frederick and father of prince Louis, as well as the princess his wife. There were also the widow of Prince Henry and two sisters of the king's, one lying in, the other ill. Napoleon went to visit all these members of the royal family, with all the signs of profound respect, and touched them by testimonies coming from so high a personage, for there was not then a sovereign whose attentions had so great a value as his. In the situation to which he had attained, he knew how to calculate his slightest tokens of kindness or severity. Exercising at this moment the right belonging to all generals in time of war, that of intercepting correspondence, to discover the movements of the enemy, he seized a letter from the prince de Hatzfeld, in which he appeared to inform prince Hohenlohe of the position of the French army around Berlin. The prince de Hatzfeld, as head of the municipal government established in Berlin, had promised upon oath not to attempt any thing against the French army, and to attend solely to the quiet, safety, and welfare of the capital. It was an engagement of loyalty towards the conqueror, who suffered an authority which he could have abolished to subsist for the benefit of the conquered country. The fault, however, was very ex-

cusable, since it proceeded from the most honourable of sentiments, patriotism. Napoleon, who was apprehensive that other burgomasters would imitate this example, and that, in this case, all his movements would be revealed from hour to hour to the enemy—Napoleon, resolved to intimidate the Prussian authorities by an act of signal severity, and was not sorry that this act of severity should fall upon one of the principal members of the nobility, accused of having been a warm partisan of war, but accused falsely, for the prince de Hatzfeld was of the number of the Prussian nobles, who had moderation because they had understanding. Napoleon sent for prince Berthier, and ordered marshal Davout, on whose severity he could reckon, to form a military commission, which should apply to the conduct of the prince de Hatzfeld the laws of war against *espionnage*. Prince Berthier, on learning the resolution adopted by Napoleon, endeavoured in vain to dissuade him from it. Generals Rapp, Caulaincourt, Savary, not presuming to hazard remonstrances which seemed misplaced from any other lips than those of the major-general, were alarmed. Not knowing to what means to resort, they hid the prince in the very palace, upon pretext of having him arrested, and then informed the princess de Hatzfeld, an interesting person, and who was then pregnant, of the danger which threatened her husband. She hastened to the palace. It was high time; for the commission, having assembled, was applying for the evidence. Napoleon, returning from a ride in Berlin, had just alighted from his horse, the guard beating the march; and, as he crossed the threshold of the palace, the princess de Hatzfeld, conducted by Duroc, appeared all in tears before him. Thus taken by surprise, he could not refuse to receive her: he granted her an audience in his cabinet. She was seized with terror. Napoleon, touched by her distress, desired her to approach, and handed her the intercepted letter to read. "Well, madam," said he, "do you recognize the hand-writing of your husband?" The princess, trembling, knew not what to reply. Presently, however, taking care to cheer her, Napoleon added, "Throw that paper into the fire, and the military commission will have no evidence to convict upon."

This act of clemency, which Napoleon could not refuse after he had seen the princess de Hatzfeld, was, nevertheless, a sacrifice for him, because it was part of his design to intimidate the German nobility, particularly the magistrates of the towns, who revealed to the enemy the secrets of his operations. He learned subsequently to know the prince de Hatzfeld, appreciated his character and his understanding, and was glad that he had not given him up to military justice. Happy the governments that have discreet friends, who contrive to delay their severities! It is not necessary that this delay should be long, before they have ceased to purpose acts upon which, at first, they were most resolutely bent.

Napoleon, in this interval, had incessantly directed the movements of his lieutenants against the wrecks of the Prussian army. Placed at Berlin with his principal forces, he cut off the Prussians from the direct route from the Elbe to the Oder, and left them no roads for reaching the latter river, but such as were long, almost impassable, and easy to intercept. Berlin, in fact, is situated between the Elbe and the Oder, at an equal distance from the two rivers. The plains of sand which we have already described, as they approach the Baltic towards Mecklenburg, rise into sand-hills, and present a series of lakes of all dimensions, parallel to the sea. These lakes, being prevented by the chain of sand-hills from discharging themselves directly into the sea, find a channel towards the interior of the country, in an inconsiderable and rather sluggish stream, the Havel, which runs towards Berlin, where it falls in with the Spree, coming from an opposite direction, that is to say, from Lusatia, a province which separates Saxony from Silesia. The Havel and Spree, united near Berlin, expand about Spandau and Potsdam, and there form new lakes, which the hand of the great Frederick took pains to embellish, and, turning to the left, proceed to the Elbe. They thus describe a transverse line, which, on one side, unites Berlin to the Elbe, and, continued by the Finow canal on the other, joins that capital to the Oder. It was through this tract, intersected by natural or artificial streams, covered with lakes, forests, and sand, that the vagrant relics of the Prussian army had to take their flight.

Napoleon, established since the 25th of October at Potsdam and Berlin, had it in his power to anticipate them in all directions. He kept Lannes' corps at Spandau, the corps of Augereau and Davout in Berlin itself, lastly, Bernadotte's corps beyond Berlin—all of them ready to march on the first indication they should have of the direction taken by the enemy. Napoleon had spread the cavalry around Berlin and Potsdam, and upon the banks of the Havel and the Elbe, to pick up intelligence.

Spandau had already surrendered. That fortress, situated very near Berlin, amidst the waters of the Spree and the Havel, strong by its situation and its works, was capable of making a long resistance. But such had been the presumption and the carelessness of the Prussian government, that it had not even armed the place, though the magazines which it contained were provided with a considerable *matériel*. On the 25th, the day of marshal Davout's entry into Berlin, Lannes had appeared under the walls of Spandau, and threatened the governor with the severest treatment if he refused to surrender. The guns were not upon the walls; the garrison, participating in the terror which had seized all hearts, desired to capitulate. The governor was an old soldier, whom age had bereft of all energy. Lannes saw him, frightened him by the account of the disasters of the Prussian army, and wrung from him a capitulation, by virtue of which the

place was immediately delivered up to the French, and the garrison declared prisoners of war. It would require at once the improvidence of the government, which had neglected to arm the fortress, and the demoralization which everywhere prevailed, to account for so strange a capitulation.

The Emperor hastened in person to Spandau, and resolved to make it his third depôt in Germany. This new refuge offered the more advantages, inasmuch as it was situated within three or four leagues of Berlin, surrounded by water, perfectly fortified, and contained an immense quantity of corn. Napoleon ordered it to be armed forthwith, ovens built there, ammunition amassed, hospitals organized—in short, the same establishments created as at Wittenberg and Erfurt. He sent thither immediately all the artillery, muskets, and munitions of war taken at Berlin. In that capital had been found 300 pieces of cannon, 100,000 muskets, and a great quantity of powder and projectiles. This vast *matériel*, added to considerable stores of grain, was a sort of guarantee against any attempt of the people of Berlin, now very quiet and docile, but whose submission any reverse which we might sustain would be liable to change into revolt.

While the Emperor was occupied with these provident measures, the uninterrupted expeditions of the light cavalry had revealed the march of the Prussian army. The eleven days which had elapsed since the battle of Jena, those eleven days employed by the French in gaining the Elbe, in crossing it, in occupying Berlin, had been employed by the Prussians also in gaining the Elbe, in there collecting their scattered wrecks, in then proceeding towards Mecklenburg, in order to reach the line of the Oder by means of a circuit to the north. This movement towards Mecklenburg being unmasked, Napoleon despatched Murat, by way of Oranienburg and Zehdenick, to follow the banks of the Havel and the Finow canal. It was along these military lines, and protected by them, that the prince of Hohenlohe would march. Napoleon ordered them to proceed along these lines in such a manner as to keep constantly between the enemy and the Oder, and then, when they had turned the Prussians, to endeavour to envelop them, and take them to the last man. Marshal Lannes had set out with Murat, and with the recommendation to march as rapidly as the cavalry. Marshal Bernadotte had orders to follow Lannes. Marshal Davout, after the three or four days' rest which he needed, was to proceed to Frankfurt on the Oder; marshal Augereau and the guard were to remain at Berlin. Marshals Ney and Soult had been sent, as we have said, to invest Magdeburg.

The unfortunate prince of Hohenlohe had actually taken the resolution that was attributed to him. Pursued most perseveringly by the French, he had arrived at Magdeburg, hoping to find there rest, provisions, *matériel*, and, above all, the time necessary for the reorganization of his army. Vain hope! The want

of precautions against a retreat so easy to be foreseen prevailed everywhere. At Magdeburg there were no supplies but what were indispensable for the garrison. The old governor, M. de Kleist, having provided for the first wants of the fugitives, and given them a small quantity of bread, refused to feed them any longer, fearful of diminishing his own resources, if he should be besieged. The interior of Magdeburg was so encumbered with baggage, that the army could not be lodged there: the cavalry was established, as a matter of necessity, on the glacis; the infantry in the covered ways. Very soon the Prussian troops, continually harassed by the French cavalry, which came and carried off whole detachments under the cannon of the place, were obliged to pass to the other side of the Elbe. At length M. de Kleist, terrified at the disorder prevailing within and without Magdeburg, earnestly requested the prince of Hohenlohe to continue his retreat towards the Oder, and to leave him the liberty which he so much needed to put himself into a state of defence. The prince of Hohenlohe had, therefore, but two days to reorganize an army composed of nothing but wrecks, and in which several battalions had to be united in order to form one. Moreover, marshal Kalkreuth having been sent for by the king, who was in East Prussia, the prince of Hohenlohe was ordered to pick up the two divisions of reserve, and obliged to go to the Lower Elbe, far below Magdeburg, to join them.

Amidst these embarrassments, the prince of Hohenlohe commenced his march in three columns. On his right, general Schimmelpfennig, with a detachment of cavalry and infantry, was to cover the army towards Potsdam, Spandau, and Berlin, to keep at first along the Havel, then, when he had ascended high enough to turn Berlin, to proceed along the Finow canal, and thus flank the retreat as far as Prenzlau and Stettin, for, owing to the position of the French, it was only towards the mouth of the Oder that the Prussians could reach that river. The bulk of the infantry, marching at the centre, at an equal distance from the corps of Schimmelpfennig and the Elbe, was to proceed through Genthin, Rathenau, Gransee, and Prenzlau. The cavalry, which was already on the banks of the Elbe, where it profited by the abundance of forage, was to follow the banks of that river by Jerichow and Havelberg, then leave them to proceed northward, and, passing through Wittstock, Mirow, Strelitz, Prenzlau, arrive at the common point, Stettin.

The corps of the duke of Weimar and the grand park, under the conduct of general Blucher, had fortunately turned the Harz by Hesse and Hanover, without being annoyed by the French, who were hastening to reach the Elbe. The duke of Weimar, by means of a very clever manœuvre, had continued to deceive marshal Soult. Feigning at first to attack the line of investment around Magdeburg, and then slipping off all at once, he had suddenly crossed the Elbe at Tangermunde, and thus gained the

right bank. He had with him twelve or fourteen thousand men. General Blucher had passed the river below. The prince of Hohenlohe assigned to the duke of Weimar the concerted rendezvous of Stettin, which he was to reach by crossing Mecklenburg, and gave general Blucher the command of the troops beaten before Halle, troops which had passed out of the hands of the duke of Wirtemberg into those of general Natzmer. General Blucher was directed to form with these troops the rear-guard of the Prussian army.

If these forces had contrived to escape the French and to reach Stettin, they might, after being reorganized and joined by the contingent of East Prussia, have composed behind the Oder an army of some value, and lent a useful hand to the Russians. The prince of Hohenlohe, had kept together 25,000 men at least. Natzmer's corps, with the other wrecks of general Blucher's, numbered nine or ten thousand. The troops of the duke of Weimar amounted to thirteen or fourteen thousand. There was consequently a total force of about 50,000 men, which, joined to about 20,000, left in East Prussia, could still have presented 70,000 fighting men, and, combined with the Russians, have played an important part. There were left 22,000 men to defend Magdeburg. The Saxons, hastening to avail themselves of the clemency of Napoleon towards them, had returned to their homes.

The prince of Hohenlohe had to effect his retreat through a poor country, difficult to traverse, and amidst numerous squadrons of French cavalry. The latter, which was at first cautious in presence of the Prussian cavalry, the excellence of which was highly extolled to it, now, intoxicated with its successes, had become so daring that mere chasseurs were no longer afraid to encounter cuirassiers.

The prince set out then on the 22nd of October, by the roads specified, Schimmelpfennig's corps of flankers proceeding for Plauen, the infantry for Genthin, the cavalry for Jerichow. They marched slowly, on account of the sands, the exhausted state of men and horses, and their being unused to fatigue. Seven or eight leagues a day were as much as these troops could perform, while the French infantry, in case of need, would clear fifteen. Moreover, a very great indiscipline had crept into the corps. Disaster, which sours men's minds, had diminished the respect due to officers. The cavalry, in particular, marched in a confused manner, without obeying any orders. The prince of Hohenlohe was obliged to halt the army, and to address it in very sharp terms to bring it back to a sense of its duty. He even caused a horse-soldier, who had wounded an officer, to be shot. For the rest, it must be confessed that such is the usual effect of great reverses, and sometimes, too, of great successes, for victory has its disorder as well as defeat. The French, eager after booty, ran,

like the Prussians, in all directions, without heeding the commands of their officers; and marshal Ney wrote to the Emperor, that, unless he were authorized to make some examples, the lives of the officers would be no longer safe. Singular consequences of the dissolution of States! The precipitate movements caused by this dissolution disorganize the conquered and the conqueror. We had arrived at the perfection of the highest department of war, and were already approaching the limit where it becomes an immense confusion.

On the 23rd the Prussians were, the infantry at Rathenau, the cavalry at Havelberg. But the pains which they took to break down the bridges impeded the march of the corps on the right, that of Schimmelpfennig, and they were obliged to approach the Elbe by a wheel to the left, in order to avoid the numerous streams which are met with between the Havel and the Elbe. They turned off as far as Rhinow. On the 24th, they were, the cavalry at Kiritz, the infantry at Neustadt, the corps of Schimmelpfennig at Fehrbellin. Natzmer's corps, transferred here to general Blucher, took near Rhinow the place of the principal corps, the rear-guard of which it formed.

Having reached this point, the prince of Hohenlohe had to deliberate on the further course to be pursued. They had ascended to the north far beyond Berlin, Spandau, and Potsdam. At every step the army became more and more disorganized. The colonel of the staff, de Massenbach, advised that the troops should be allowed a day of rest, in order to reorganize them, and to be at least in a condition for fighting, if they should chance to meet with the French. The prince of Hohenlohe replied very justly, that neither one, two, nor even three days would be sufficient to reorganize the army, and it might give the French time to cut it off from Stettin and the Oder. As usual, a middle course was adopted; a common rendezvous was fixed at Gransee, where a general review was to be held, and addresses delivered to the troops to recall them to their duty. They then continued their march without stopping. The rendezvous at Gransee was fixed for the 26th.

But, the French being already apprized, Murat's cavalry hurried to Fehrbellin on the one side, to Zehdenick on the other. Lannes, having entered Spandau on the 25th, marched in the evening of the 26th with his infantry to support Murat. Marshal Soult was pursuing the duke of Weimar, while marshal Ney invested Magdeburg. Thus three French *corps d'armée*, besides Murat's cavalry, with the exception, it is true, of the cuirassiers, kept in Berlin, were at this moment pursuing the Prussians. On the 26th, the infantry of the prince of Hohenlohe was at Gransee, at the appointed rendezvous, listening to his exhortations, imbibing hopes of being soon at Stettin, and resting behind the Oder. But, at that moment, Murat's dragoons surprised Schim-

melpfennig's corps at Zehdenick, overturned his cavalry, killed 300, and took seven or eight hundred horse, and obliged the infantry of that corps of flankers to disperse in the woods.

This intelligence, brought by peasants and fugitives to Grancee, induced the prince of Hohenlohe to decamp immediately, and to turn off once more to the left towards Fürstenberg, instead of marching to Templin, which was the direct route for Stettin. He was thus in hopes of rallying his cavalry to him, and of getting at the same time further from the French. But, while he was making this circuit, Murat proceeded by the shortest road to Templin, and Lannes, halting neither day nor night, kept constantly in sight of Murat's squadrons. The prince of Hohenlohe slept at Furstenberg, and made his infantry pass the night there, while Lannes spent that same night in marching. French and Prussians continued to pursue a northward course towards Templin and Prenzlau, the common point of the Stettin road, moving at the distance of a few leagues from each other, and separated merely by a curtain of woods and lakes. They were still 12 leagues (7 German miles) from Prenzlau. On the morning of the 27th, the prince of Hohenlohe started for Boitzenburg, sending word to the cavalry to join him, and to the rear-guard, commanded by general Blücher, to quicken its pace.

He marched all day, having no other refreshment for his troops than what was furnished them by the patriotism of the villagers, who placed upon the road piles of bread and caldrons full of potatoes. Towards evening they approached Boitzenburg, and the owner of that place, M. d'Arnim, came to intimate that he had had bivouacs prepared around his mansion and abundantly provided with victuals and drink. This was welcome news to men dying from fatigue and hunger. But, on approaching Boitzenburg, reports of fire-arms destroyed that hope of rest and food. Murat's light horse, having already reached Boitzenburg, were regaling on the provisions destined for the Prussians. Too few, however, to make head against the latter, they left Boitzenburg. The unfortunate soldiers of Prince Hohenlohe devoured what was left, but the presence of French horse warned them that they had no time to lose. They started again that same night, making another circuit to the left to avoid the French and to reach Prenzlau before them. They marched the whole night, flattering themselves that they should outstrip them. At day-break, they began to discern Prenzlau; but, on the right, across the woods and lakes which lined the route, they had caught a glimpse of horsemen riding at a rapid rate. The fog prevented them from distinguishing the colour of their uniform. Were they French? were they Prussians? Such were the questions which they asked each other. Some imagined that they perceived the white plume of a Prussian regiment; others, on the contrary, fancied that they could distinguish the helmet of Murat's dragoons. At length, amidst these conjectures of fear and hope, they arrived in sight

of Prenzlau, the French, as they were assured not having yet been seen. They pushed on into a suburb, a quarter of a league in length. Half of the Prussian army had already entered, when, all at once, the cry, *To arms!* was raised. The French dragoons, coming up at the moment when part of the Prussian army was in Prenzlau, attacked the tail of it, drove it into the town itself, charged it in all directions, and then dashed into the streets. The Pritwitz dragoons, pushed by the French dragoons, fell back upon the Prussian infantry and overturned it. Horrible was the fray that followed, terror aggravating the tumult and the danger. The Prussian army cut in several pieces, fled beyond Prenzlau, and took position as well as it could on the Stettin road. It was soon surrounded, and Murat sent to summon the prince of Hohenlohe to surrender. He conceived that Murat had brought nothing but cavalry with him. But the infantry of Lannes, which, after leaving Spandau, had marched day and night, halting only to eat, arrived at the same moment. The colonel of the staff, de Massenbach, affirmed that he had seen it. There was no chance of escaping. Murat desired to speak with the prince of Hohenlohe. The soldier who had become prince, and continued as generous as he was intrepid, consoled the Prussian general, promised him an honourable capitulation, the most honourable that he could grant within the limit prescribed by the instructions of Napoleon. Murat required that all the soldiers should be prisoners, but consented that the officers should remain free and be allowed to carry away whatever they possessed, on condition, however, of not serving again during the war. He consented also that the soldiers should be exempted from the humiliating formality of laying down their arms when filing before the French. This was a difference which, under their misfortune would distinguish them from the troops of the Austrian Mack. The prince of Hohenlohe, seeing that he could not obtain better terms, feeling even that Murat could not grant more, returned to his officers, made them form a circle around him, and, his eyes filled with tears, explained to them the state of things. He was one of those who had declaimed most vehemently against every kind of capitulation. But he was aware that there was no other resource, not even that of an honourable combat, for the ammunition was exhausted and the spirits of the troops had arrived at the lowest degree of dejection. As no officer proposed an expedient, the circle separated, uttering maledictions, and breaking their arms.

The capitulation was, therefore, signed by the prince, and, in the course of the same day, the 28th of October, a year after the catastrophe of general Mack, 14,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry surrendered themselves prisoners of war. The conquerors were intoxicated with joy, and what joy was ever better founded! Such boldness in manœuvring, such patience in enduring privations equal at least to those which the conquered had endured, such ardour in making still more rapid marches than theirs, well

deserved such a prize. Disorders unfortunately were committed at Prenzlau, caused by the eagerness of the soldiers to secure the booty, which they considered as the legitimate fruit of victory. But the French officers displayed the greatest firmness in protecting the Prussian officers. German writers themselves have done them this justice. In 1815, the departments of the north of France had not the same justice to render to the Prussians.

But the French had more trophies to collect. A number of Prussian squadrons and battalions, which had not entered Prenzlau, had marched further north towards Pasewalek. General Milhaud's light cavalry overtook them. Six regiments of cavalry, several battalions of infantry; a park of horse-artillery, laid down their arms. Lasalle, with the hussars and chasseurs, hastened to Stettin, followed by the infantry of Lannes. Wonderful to relate, an officer of light cavalry dared to summon Stettin, a fortress having a numerous garrison and an immense artillery. General Lasalle had an interview with the governor, and expatiated with such conviction on the complete annihilation of the Prussian army, that the governor surrendered the place with all that it contained and a garrison of 6,000 men prisoners of war. Lannes entered the place on the following day. Nothing assuredly could better serve to convey an idea of the demoralization of the Prussians, and of the terror excited by the French than a fact so strange and so new in the annals of war.

All now left to be taken of the Prussian army were general Blucher and the duke of Weimar, with about 20,000 men. When this last remnant should be taken, one might say that 160,000 men had been destroyed or made prisoners in a fortnight, without one of them having recrossed the Oder. General Blucher and the corps of the duke of Weimar had marshals Soult and Bernadotte in pursuit of them. They would soon be overtaken by Murat himself, and would find themselves cut off from the Oder, since Lannes occupied Stettin. They had, therefore, very little chance of escaping.

Napoleon, on receiving these tidings, was extremely delighted. "Since your chasseurs," he wrote to Murat, "take fortresses, I may disband my corps of engineers, and melt down my heavy artillery." In the bulletin he made mention of the cavalry only, and omitted the infantry of Lannes, which had nevertheless contributed to the capitulation of Prenzlau as much as the cavalry itself. This omission was owing to the circumstance that Murat, in haste to report the exploits of his cavalry, had not thought of noticing the corps of Lannes. When that marshal received the bulletin, he durst not read it to his soldiers for fear of mortifying them. "My attachment to your person," he wrote to Napoleon, "will always set me above every kind of injustice, but what am I to say to those brave soldiers, who march day and night, without rest, without food? What reward can they hope for, unless to have their deeds proclaimed by the hundred voices of Fame,

which you alone have at your disposal?" That admirable emulation, that ardent jealousy of glory, which, however, manifested themselves here in a noble pensiveness alone, was not one of the least remarkable signs of that heroic enthusiasm which then warmed all minds.

Napoleon, singularly kind to Lannes, replied: "*Are you and your soldiers children?* Can you suppose me to be unacquainted with all that you have done to second the cavalry? There is glory for all. Another time it will be your turn to fill with your name the bulletins of the grand army."

Lannes, transported, assembled his infantry in one of the public places of Stettin, and ordered Napoleon's letter to be read in the ranks. Overjoyed as himself, his soldiers greeted that letter with repeated shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur d'Occident!*" (Long live the Emperor of the West!) This singular appellation, which corresponded so perfectly with the secret ambition of Napoleon, proceeded therefore from the enthusiasm of the army, and it proved that in the estimation of all he already filled the West with his power and his glory.

Lannes, in the effusion not of his flattery but of his joy, for, pleased himself, he wished his master to be pleased too—Lannes wrote, "Sire, your soldiers shout '*Vive l'Empereur d'Occident!*' are we henceforward to address our letters to you by that title?"*

* We quote some of the letters of Marshal Lannes, which show the spirit of the French troops at this period, and may serve to impart their true character to those prodigious events.

Marshal Lannes to his Majesty the Emperor.

SIRE,—I have received the letter which your Majesty has done me the honour to write me: it is impossible for me to express the pleasure that it has given me. There is nothing in the world that I desire so much as to be sure that your Majesty knows that I do all that lies in my power for your glory.

I have communicated to my *corps d'armée* what your Majesty has been pleased to say to me for it. It would be impossible to describe to your Majesty the gratification which it afforded them. A single word from you is sufficient to make the soldiers happy.

Three hussars, having lost their way towards Gartz, found themselves in the midst of an enemy's squadron. They ran up to it, levelling their pieces, saying that it was surrounded by a regiment, and must dismount immediately. The commander of this squadron ordered it to dismount, and it surrendered its arms to those three hussars, who brought the men thither prisoners of war.

I should be glad to learn your Majesty's intentions, that I may know whether I ought to have sent Suchet's division to Stargard, and the cavalry on further. By these means, we should have spared the provisions of the fortress of Stettin, which, however, I have not yet touched. The soldiers are cantoned in the environs, and live with the inhabitants.

I have been over the fortress with general Chasseloup: he thinks it bad; and my opinion is, that a great deal of money must be spent to put it into a state of defence. We have been to Damm: it is a superb natural position; you cannot get to it but by a causeway of a league and a half, on which there are at least forty bridges. I think that, if your Majesty purposes to advance further, you will render that position impregnable.

Napoleon made no reply, and that title which gushed, as it were, from the enthusiasm of the soldiers was not assumed. As Napoleon conceived, it was only deferred. Of all the grandeurs that he ever dreamt of, this is the only one that was not realized even for a moment. If, however, he had not the title, he had the vast dominion of the Emperor of the West. But human pride is as fond of the title of power as of power itself.

The prince of Hohenlohe being taken, there was nothing left to take but general Blucher with the rear-guard and the corps

I have just been assured that the king has shown great displeasure with those gentlemen about him who advised him to the war; that he was never seen in such a passion; that he told them that they were scoundrels, that they had made him lose his crown, that he had no hope left but to go and see the great Napoleon, and that he reckoned upon his generosity.

I am, with the most profound respect, &c.,

LANNES.

Passewalck, November 1, 1806.

SIRE,—I had the honour to announce yesterday to your Majesty 30 pieces of cannon, 60 caissons, as many carts laden with ammunition, drawn by eight or ten horses each vehicle, and 1,500 light artillerymen. Indeed, sire, I never saw finer men. It is a superb park, I shall send it off this morning for Spandau. Almost all the men are mounted, and march in the greatest order. Your Majesty could, if you pleased, have them taken to Italy. I am certain that if a few officers who could speak German were to be placed with them, these men would serve most cheerfully. I wish your Majesty were to see this convoy; that would decide you to send them to the kingdom of Italy.

The grand-duke of Berg writes to me that he calculates upon coming up with the enemy, that is, the grand corps of the duke of Weimar and Blucher, with the prince of Ponte Corvo, in the course of to-morrow. He has already taken some prisoners from the tail of the column. In consequence of this information, I am recalling all the light cavalry, which I had sent off for Boitzenburg, and am going to assemble my whole *corps d'armée* at Stettin.

There have been found in this place more than 200 pieces of cannon on their carriages, and many spare ones, an infinite quantity of powder, ammunition, and magazines.

I shall throw all my light cavalry upon the right bank of the Oder. I shall have all the corn and flour I can collect to increase our stores; I shall have ovens built, and as much biscuit made as possible.

The garrison of Stettin amounted to 6,000 men: a regiment of Gazan's division shall escort it to Spandau. That general has but one regiment left. Suchet's division also has furnished a great number of men for the escort of troops, so that my *corps d'armée* is reduced very low.

If Stettin affords sufficient means for clothing the soldiers, I shall do it, for they are quite naked. An inventory of what there is in the place is preparing. I shall have the honour to send it to your Majesty.

Meanwhile, I request your Imperial Majesty to let me know your intentions as speedily as possible. My head-quarters will be to night at Stettin.

Yesterday I had your Majesty's proclamation read at the head of the troops. The concluding words deeply touched the hearts of the soldiers. They all set up shouts of *Vive l'Empereur d'Occident!* It is impossible for me to tell your Majesty how much you are beloved by these brave fellows, and, in truth, never was lover so fond of his mistress as they are of your person. I beg your Majesty to let me know if you will be pleased to have my despatches addressed in future to the Emperor of the West, and I make this inquiry in the name of my *corps d'armée*. I am, with the most profound, &c.

LANNES.

of the duke of Weimar. The latter had come under the command of general de Vinning, since the duke of Weimar, accepting the treatment granted by Napoleon to the whole house of Saxony, had left the army. There were still 22,000 men to take prisoners, after which there would not exist a single detachment of Prussian troops from the Rhine to the Oder. Napoleon ordered them to be pursued without intermission, that they might be picked up to the last man.

Lannes established himself at Stettin, with the intention of occupying that important place, and affording his infantry a rest which it greatly needed. Murat and marshals Bernadotte and Soult were sufficient to complete the destruction of 22,000 Prussians, worn out with fatigue. It was enough to march in order to take them, unless, indeed, they had the luck to reach the sea, and to find sufficient shipping to carry them to East Prussia. Murat, therefore, directed his course, in great haste, along the coast, to prevent their approach to it. He pushed as far as Stralsund, while marshal Bernadotte, setting out from the environs of Berlin, and marshal Soult from the banks of the Elbe, proceeded northward, to drive the enemy into the net of the French cavalry.

General Blucher had assumed the command of the two Prussian corps at Waren near the lake of Muritz. To retreat to East Prussia across the Oder was impossible, since that river was guarded in every part of its course by the French army. The access to the coast and to Stralsund was already intercepted by Murat's horse. There was no other resource but to turn about and go back to the Elbe. General Blucher formed this design, hoping to throw himself into Magdeburg, to increase the force there to such a degree as to convert the garrison into a real *corps d'armée*, and, supported by that great fortress, to make a brilliant resistance. He directed his course, therefore, towards the Elbe, with a view to attempt to pass it in the environs of Lauenburg.

His illusions were of short duration. Patrols of the enemy informed him that he was surrounded on all sides; that, on his right, Murat was already advancing along the coast; that, on his left, marshals Bernadotte and Soult barred the approach to Magdeburg. Not knowing what plan to pursue, he marched for some days straight forward, towards the Lower Elbe, as a French corps returning to France, through Mecklenburg and Hanover, might have done. His ranks grew thinner every moment, because his soldiers fled into the woods, or chose rather to surrender than longer to endure hardships which had become intolerable. He also lost a considerable number in rear-guard actions, which, owing to the difficult nature of the country did not always turn out complete defeats, but which invariably ended with the relinquishment of the disputed ground, and in the sacrifice of many men taken or *hors de combat*.

In this manner he marched from the 30th of October to the

5th of November. Not knowing which way to direct his course, he conceived a violent act, which, however, necessity might justify. In his road lay the city of Lübeck, one of the last free cities preserved by the Germanic constitution. Neutral by right, it ought to have been safe from all hostility. General Blücher resolved to throw himself into it by main force, to possess himself of the great resources which it contained in provisions as well as money, and, if he could not defend himself there, to seize all the merchant vessels he should find in its waters, to embark his troops, and to transport them to East Prussia.

In consequence, on the 6th of November, he entered Lübeck by force, in spite of the protest of the magistrates. The ramparts of the city, imprudently converted into a public promenade, had lost their principal strength. Besides, the city was so unprovided with garrison that general Blücher had no difficulty to penetrate into it. He quartered his soldiers upon the inhabitants, from whom they took whatever they wanted, and, besides, required a large contribution from the magistrates. Lübeck, as every body knows, is situated on the frontier of Denmark. A corps of Danish troops guarded that frontier. General Blücher signified to the Danish general that, if he suffered it to be violated by the French, he would violate it in his turn and take refuge in Holstein. The Danish general having declared that he would perish with the whole of his corps rather than suffer any violation of territory, general Blücher shut himself up in Lübeck, confident that he should not be turned by the French, if the neutrality of Denmark were respected. But, while he conceived that he should enjoy some safety in Lübeck, protected by the remains of the fortification, and find compensation in the abundance of a great commercial city for the privations of an arduous retreat, the French made their appearance. The neutrality of Lübeck had ceased to exist for them, and they had a right to pursue the Prussians thither. Arriving on the 7th, they attacked on the same day the works which covered the gates called the Burg-Thor and the Mühlen-Thor. The corps of marshal Bernadotte carried the one, that of marshal Soult the other, by escalading, under a fire of grape, and with unparalleled hardihood, works which, though weakened, still presented obstacles difficult to overcome. An obstinate conflict ensued in the street. The unfortunate inhabitants of Lübeck beheld their opulent city converted into a scene of carnage. The Prussians, cut in pieces or surrounded, were obliged to flee, leaving more than a thousand dead on the spot, about 6,000 prisoners, and all their artillery. General Blücher, sallying from Lübeck, took a position between the half inundated territory in the environs of Lübeck and the Danish frontier. There he halted, having neither provisions nor ammunition left. This time he was compelled to surrender, and, after so severely censuring Mack a year and the prince of Hohenlohe a week before, to follow their example. He wished to add a few words to the capitulation.

Murat allowed him out of respect for his misfortune. The words added were that he surrendered for want of ammunition. This capitulation gave the French 14,000 prisoners, who, with those already taken in Lübeck, formed a total of 20,000.

From this day there was not a single Prussian corps between the Rhine and the Oder: the 70,000 men who had endeavoured to gain the Oder were dispersed, killed, or prisoners.

While these events were occurring in Mecklenburg, the important fortress of Cüstrin, on the Oder submitted to a few companies of infantry, commanded by general Petit. Four thousand prisoners, considerable magazines, the second position of the Lower Oder, were the prize of this new capitulation. Thus the French occupied on the Oder the fortresses of Stettin, and Cüstrin. Marshal Lannes was established at Stettin, marshal Davout at Cüstrin.

On the Elbe there was still left the great fortress of Magdeburg, which contained a garrison of 22,000 men and a vast *matériel*. Marshal Ney had undertaken the investment of it. Having procured a few mortars for want of siege artillery, he several times threatened the place with a bombardment—a threat which he took good care not to put in execution. Two or three bombs, thrown into the air, frightened the population, who surrounded the governor's residence, begging with loud cries that they might not be exposed to useless ravages, since the Prussian monarchy was now too much reduced to be capable of defending itself. So complete was the demoralization among the Prussian generals that these reasons were held to be good, and that, the day after the capitulation of Lübeck, general Kleist surrendered Magdeburg, with 22,000 prisoners.

Thus, since the opening of the campaign, the Prussians had done four times, at Erfurt, at Prenzlau, at Lübeck, and at Magdeburg, what they had so grievously reproached the Austrians with having done once at Ulm. This remark is not designed to wound their feelings under a misfortune which has since been so fully repaired, but to prove that it had been better a year before to respect the misfortune of another, and not to declare the Austrians such cowards, from the paltry motive of making the French appear less brave and less clever.

Of the 160,000 men, who had composed the active army of the Prussians, there was not then a fraction left. Setting aside the exaggerations, which, in the surprise of such successes, were circulated in Europe, it is certain that about 25,000 men had been killed or wounded, and 100,000 made prisoners. Of the 35,000 others, not one had recrossed the Oder. Those who were Saxons had returned to Saxony. Those who were Prussians had flung away their arms and fled across the country. One might say, with perfect truth, that there was no longer a Prussian army. Napoleon was absolute master of the monarchy of the great Frederick, with the exception of a few places in Silesia,

incapable of resistance, and East Prussia, protected by the distance and by the vicinity of Russia. Napoleon had carried off all the *matériel* of Prussia in cannon, muskets, warlike stores; he had acquired provisions to subsist his army during a campaign, 20,000 horses to remount his cavalry, and colours sufficient to cover the edifices of his capital. All this had been accomplished in a month, for Napoleon had entered on the 8th of October and received the capitulation of Magdeburg, which was the last, on the 8th of November. And it is this rapid annihilation of the Prussian power, that renders the campaign, the history of which we have been relating, so marvellous. That 160,000 French, who had arrived at military perfection by fifteen years of war, should have vanquished 160,000 Prussians enervated by a long peace, is no great miracle. But it is an astonishing event, this oblique march of the French army, combined in such a manner that the Prussian army, constantly turned during a retreat of two hundred leagues, from Hof to Stettin, should not reach the Oder till the very day that this river was occupied, that it should be destroyed or taken to the last man, and that, in a month, the sovereign of a great monarchy, the second in succession from the great Frederick, should find himself without soldiers and without dominions! It is, we say, an astonishing event, when we consider that this was not the case of Macedonians beating cowardly and ignorant Persians, but a European army beating a European army, both intelligent and brave.

As for the Prussians, if you must know the secret of that unparalleled rout, after which fortresses surrendered at the summons of a few hussars, or of a few companies of light infantry, you will find it in the demoralization which usually follows overweening presumption. After having denied, not the victories of the French—they were undeniable—but their military superiority, the Prussians were so struck with it in the first encounter that they considered resistance as no longer possible, flung away their arms, and fled. They were laid prostrate, and Europe with them. She trembled all over after Jena, much more than Austerlitz; for, after Austerlitz, a confidence in the Prussian army was retained, at least by the enemies of France. After Jena, the entire continent seemed to belong to the French army. The soldiers of the great Frederick had been the last resource of envy: those soldiers vanquished, but one other resource was left to Envy, the only one, alas! that never fails her—to predict the faults of a genius thenceforth irresistible; to pretend that no human reason could bear up under such successes: and it is unfortunately true that Genius, after tormenting Envy by its successes, takes upon itself to console her by its faults.

BOOK XXVI.

EYLAU.

Effect produced in Europe by the Victories of Napoleon over Prussia—Cause to which the Exploits of the French are attributed—Ordinance of King Frederick William tending to efface the Distinctions of Birth in the Prussian Army—Napoleon decrees the Building of the Temple of La Madeleine, and gives the Name of Jena to the Bridge erected opposite to the Military School—Schemes which he conceives in Berlin in the Intoxication of his Triumphs—The Idea of CONQUERING THE SEA BY THE LAND becomes systematized in his Mind, and he replies to the *maritime Blockade* by the *continental Blockade*—Decrees of Berlin—Resolution to push the War to the North till the Subjection of the whole Continent—Plan of marching to the Vistula, and exciting Insurrection in Poland—Affluence of the Poles to Napoleon—Umbrage taken in Vienna at the Idea of re-constituting Poland—Napoleon offers Austria Silesia in exchange for Galicia—Refusal and secret Hate of the Court of Vienna—Precautions of Napoleon against that Court—The East interferes in the Quarrel of the West—Turkey and Sultan Selim—Napoleon sends general Sebastiani to Constantinople, to induce the Turks to go to war with Russia—Deposition of the Hospodars, Ipsilanti, and Maruzzi—The Russian general Michelson marches for the Provinces of the Danube—Napoleon proportions his Means to the magnitude of his Plans—The Conscription of 1807 called out—Employment of the new Levies—Organization of the Reinforcements destined for the Grand Army in marching Regiments—New Corps drawn from France and Italy—Development given to the Cavalry—Financial Means created with the Resources of Prussia—Napoleon, having been unable to agree with King Frederick William upon the Conditions of an Armistice, directs his Army upon Poland—Murat, Davout, Augereau, Lannes, march for the Vistula at the Head of eighty thousand Men—Napoleon follows with an Army of the same Force, composed of the Corps of Marshals Soult, Bernadotte, Ney, the Guard, and the Reserves—Entry of the French into Poland—Appearance of the Soil and Sky—Enthusiasm of the Poles for the French—Conditions attached by Napoleon to the Reconstitution of Poland—Spirit of the high Polish Nobility—Entry of Murat and Davout into Posen and Warsaw—Napoleon establishes himself in Posen—Occupation of the Vistula, from Warsaw to Thorn—The Russians, united with the Wrecks of the Prussian Army occupy the Banks of the Narew—Napoleon resolves to make them fall back to the Pregel, that he may winter more quietly on the Vistula—Admirable Combinations for crushing the Prussians and the Russians—Actions at Czarnowo, Golymin, and Soldau—Battle of Pultusk—The Russians, driven beyond the Narew with great Loss, cannot be pursued on Account of the State of the Roads—Embarrassment of Conquerors and Conquered amidst the Sloughs of Poland—Napoleon establishes himself in advance of the Vistula, between the Bag, the Narew, the Orezyc, and the Ukra—He places the Corps of Marshal Bernadotte at Elbing, in advance of the Lower Vistula, and forms a tenth Corps under Marshal Lefebvre, to commence the Siege of Dantzic—Admirable Forecast for provisioning and the safety of his Winter-quarters—Works of Praga, Modlin, Sierock—Material and moral State of the French Army—Gaiety of the Soldiers in a Country new to them—Prince Jerome

and General Vandamme, at the head of the German Auxiliaries, besiege the Fortresses in Silesia—Brief Joy at Vienna, where it is believed for a Moment that the Russians are successful—A more accurate Appreciation of Facts brings back the Court of Vienna to its usual Reserve—General Benningsen, appointed General-in-chief of the Russian Army, resolves to resume Hostilities in the Depth of Winter, and marches upon the Cantonments of the French Army, following the Coast of the Baltic—He is discovered by Marshal Ney, who gives the Alarm to all the other Corps—Brilliant Action fought by Marshal Bernadotte at Mohrungen—Scientific Combination of Napoleon's to fling the Russians into the Sea—This Combination is revealed to the Enemy, through the Fault of an Officer, who suffers his Despatches to be stolen—The Russians retire in time—Napoleon pursues them to extremity—Actions of Waltersdorf and Hof—The Russians, incapable of further flight, halt at Eylau, resolved to give battle—The French Army, dying of hunger, and reduced one third by marching, meets the Russian Army, and a sanguinary Battle takes place at Eylau—Coolness and Energy of Napoleon—Heroic Conduct of the French Cavalry—The Russian Army retires almost destroyed : the French Army also has sustained severe Loss—The Corps of Augereau so cut up that it must be dissolved—Napoleon pursues the Russians to Königsberg, and when he has assured himself of their Retreat beyond the Pregel, resumes his Position on the Vistula—Change in the Site of his Quarters—He leaves the Upper Vistula, to establish himself in advance of the Lower Vistula and behind the Passarge, in order to cover the better the Siege of Dantzic—Increased Attention to the Victualling of his Winter Quarters—Napoleon, established at Osterode, in a sort of Barn, where he employs his Winter in feeding and recruiting his Army, administering the Empire, and awing Europe—Tranquillity of Mind and incredible Variety of Occupations of Napoleon at Osterode and Finkenstein.

BOOK XXVI.

EYLAU.

NAPOLEON had in a month overturned the Prussian monarchy, destroyed its armies, conquered the greater part of its territory. Frederick William had nothing left but a province and 25,000 men. It is true that the Russians, who had taken refuge at Königsberg, hastened, at the earnest solicitation of the court of Berlin, as fast as the distance, the season, and the unskilfulness of a semi-barbarous administration permitted them. But the Russians had been seen at Austerlitz, and, notwithstanding their bravery, it could not be expected of them that they should change the fortune of the war. The cabinets and the aristocracies of Europe were overwhelmed with consternation. The conquered people, divided between patriotism and admiration, could not help recognizing in Napoleon the child of the French Revolution, the propagator of its ideas, the glorious applier of the most popular of them all—equality. They beheld a striking example of this equality in our generals, who were no longer designated by their names, so well known, of Berthier, Murat, Bernadotte, but by the titles of prince of Neufchatel, grand-duke of Berg, prince of Ponte Corvo! Striving to account for the unequal triumphs which we had gained over the Prussian army, they attributed them not only to our courage, to our experience in war, but to the principles on which the new French society rested. They accounted for the incredible ardour of our soldiers by the extraordinary ambition which the government had contrived to excite in them, by throwing open to them that immense career, upon which a man might enter a peasant, like the Sforzas, and leave it marshal, prince, king, emperor. It is true that the last prize was the only one of its kind in the urn of Fortune; but if there was only one emperor who had earned that distinction by a prodigious genius, how many dukes and princes were there whose superiority to their comrades was not of a nature to make any person despair!

The intercepted letters of the Prussian officers were full of strange reflections on this subject. One of them, writing to his family, said, "If nothing more was necessary than to use our strength against the French, we should very soon be conquerors. They are short, puny: one of our Germans would beat four of them. But in the fire they become supernatural beings. They are hurried away by an inexpressible ardour, not a trace of which is to be discovered in our soldiers. . . . What would you do with peasants, led into fire by nobles, whose dangers they share, without ever sharing their passions and their rewards!"*

Thus there was mingled in the mouths of the vanquished, with the glorification of our bravery, the glorification of the principles of our revolution. The king of Prussia, in fact, when a fugitive on the confines of his kingdom, was preparing an ordinance for introducing equality into the ranks of his army, and for effacing in it all the distinctions of class and birth. Singular example of the propagation of the liberal ideas, carried to the extremity of Europe by a conqueror, who is frequently represented as a giant who would fain have stifled those ideas! He had quashed some of them, it is true, but the most social of them travelled with him as far as his glory. Always inclined to give to things the brilliancy of his imagination, Napoleon, who had projected, on the morrow of Austerlitz, the column in the Place Vendôme, the Triumphal Arch of l'Etoile, the grand Rue Imperiale, decreed, in the heart of conquered Prussia, the erection of a monument, which is since become one of the grandest in the capital, the Temple of La Madeleine.

On the spot now occupied by the church of that name, which forms with the Place de la Concorde so magnificent a whole, was to have stood the new Exchange. Napoleon thought the site too fine for the temple of wealth to be erected upon it, and he resolved to raise there the temple of glory. He decided that some other quarter should be sought out for the new Exchange, and that on one of the four points seen from the middle of the Place de la Concorde should be erected a monument consecrated to the glory of our arms. He intended the front of this edifice to bear the inscription—L'EMPEREUR NAPOLEON AUX SOLDATS DE LA GRANDE ARMÉE—(The Emperor Napoleon to the Soldiers of the Grand Army). On marble tablets were to be inscribed the names of all the officers and soldiers who had been present at the great events of Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena; and on tablets of gold the names of those who had fallen in those battles. Immense basso-relievos were to represent the superior officers and the generals grouped beside each other. Statues were granted to the marshals who had commanded corps of the army. The colours

* In this passage we adhere faithfully to the sense of a great quantity of letters, the originals of which are preserved among the innumerable papers of Napoleon's in the Louvre.

taken from the enemy were to be suspended from the roof of the building. Lastly, Napoleon decided that every year a festival of antique character, like the edifice itself, should be held on the 2nd of December, in honour of the martial virtues. He gave orders for a competition, reserving to himself the right to choose, from among the plans presented, that which should seem to him the most suitable; but he determined beforehand the style of architecture which he intended to give to the new fabric. He wanted, he said, a temple of Grecian or Roman form. We have churches, he wrote to the minister of the interior, but we have not a temple, like the Parthenon, for instance: Paris must have one of that kind. France was then fond of the arts of Greece, as formerly she was fond of the arts of the middle ages; and an imitation of the Parthenon was an absolutely new present to offer to the capital. At the present day, this Grecian temple, turned into a Christian church (which cannot be a subject for regret), contrasts with its new destination, and with the arts of the present period. Thus our tastes, our passions, our ideas, are as transient as the caprices of that Fortune which has devoted this edifice to purposes so different from those to which it was originally destined. At any rate it fills majestically the spot which was at first assigned to it, and the people have not forgotten that this temple was to have been the temple of glory.*

* We quote some letters of Napoleon's on this subject, which seem to us worthy of being introduced:

To the Minister of the Interior.

Posen, 6th December, 1806.

Literature has need of encouragement: you are its minister. Propose to me some means for giving a shock to all the different branches of the belles lettres; which have in all times shed a lustre on the nation.

You will have received the decree which I have issued respecting the building of La Madeleine, and that which repeals the establishment of the Exchange on that spot. It is, however, necessary to have an Exchange in Paris. My intention is to have an Exchange built corresponding with the grandeur of the capital and the quantity of business which is some day to be transacted there. It must be spacious, in order to have walks round it. I should like a detached site.

In assigning a fund of three millions for the erection of the edifice of La Madeleine, I destined that sum for the building only, not for the ornaments, upon which, in time, I purpose to expend a much larger sum. I desire that the surrounding timber-yards be previously purchased, in order to form a large circular place, in the centre of which the structure shall stand, and around which I will have houses built on a uniform plan.

It would not be unsuitable to call the Bridge of the Military School the *Bridge of Jena*. Propose to me a decree for giving the names of the generals and colonels who were killed in that battle to the different new streets.

Whereupon, &c.

NAPOLÉON.

To the Minister of the Interior.

Finkenstein, 30th May, 1807.

After having examined attentively the different plans for a monument dedicated to the Grand Army, I have not been for a moment doubtful. That of M. Vignon is the only one which fulfils my intentions. It is a

The flatterers of the time, acquainted with the weaknesses of Napoleon, and even exaggerating them to themselves in their meanness, proposed to him to change the revolutionary name of Place de la Concorde into another name more monarchical, taken from the imperial monarchy. He replied to M. de Champagny in this very short letter ; "The Place de la Concorde must keep the

temple that I asked for, and not a church. What could one do in the style of churches that would be fit to compete with St. Geneviève, or Notre Dame, and above all with St. Peter's at Rome? M. Vignon's plan unites, with many other advantages, that of harmonizing much better with the palace of the Legislative Body, and of not crushing the Tuileries.

I will not have any thing of wood. The spectators must be placed, as I have said, upon seats of marble, forming the amphitheatres destined for the public—Nothing in this temple must be moveable and changing ; every thing, on the contrary, must be fixed in its place. If it were possible to place at the entrance of the temple the Nile and the Tiber, which have been brought from Rome, that would produce a very good effect. M. Vignon must endeavour to introduce them into his definitive plan, as well as equestrian statues to be placed outside, since they would really be out of place in the interior. It is necessary also to fix the situations where the armour of Francis. I., taken at Vienna, and the great quadriga of Berlin, are to be placed.

No timber must be used in the construction of this temple Granite and iron—such must be the materials of this monument. It may be objected that the present columns are not of granite ; but that objection would not be good, since, in time, those columns might be renewed without injuring the monument. However, if it should be proved that the use of granite would occasion too great an expense and too long delay, it must be given up ; for the principal condition of the project is that it be executed in three or four years, and at furthest five years. This monument is connected in some measure with politics ; of course, it is one of those which ought to be speedily finished. It would, nevertheless, not be amiss to seek after granite for other structures which I shall order, and which, from their nature, may allow thirty, forty, or fifty years to be given to their completion.

I presuppose that all the sculptures in the interior shall be of marble, and that no sculptures fit for the drawing-rooms and dining-rooms of the wives of Paris bankers shall be proposed to me : whatever is not of long duration ought not to be employed in this edifice. I repeat that there must be no sort of furniture, not even curtains.

As for the plan which has obtained the prize, it has not come up to my views ; it was the first that I threw aside. It is true that I made it a fundamental point to retain that portion of the building of La Madeleine which is still standing ; but that expression is an ellipsis. It meant that as much as possible of that building should be preserved ; otherwise there would have been no need of programme, and nothing more to do than to follow the original plan. My intention was not to have a church, but a temple, and I desired neither that all should be demolished, nor that all should be retained. If these two propositions were incompatible, namely, that of having a temple and that of retaining the present buildings of La Madeleine, it was plain that the definition of a temple ought to have been adhered to ; by temple, I meant such a monument as existed at Athens, but exists not in Paris. There are plenty of churches in Paris ; there are churches in all the villages. I should most assuredly not have taken it amiss if the architects had pointed out that there was a contradiction between the idea of having a temple and the intention of retaining buildings erected for a church. The first was the principal idea, the second was an accessory idea. M. Vignon has therefore divined what I wanted.

NAPOLÉON.

name it has. CONCORD—'tis that which renders France invincible." (January, 1807.) But a magnificent stone bridge, recently decreed, and erected opposite to the Military School, had not yet received a name. Napoleon ordered it to be called by the glorious name of Jena, which that bridge has retained, and which at a later period would have become fatal to it, if an honourable act of Louis XVIII. had not saved it in 1814 from the brutal rage of the Prussians.

These projects for monuments of art, formed in the midst of conquered capitals, were only accessory ideas to those vast ideas which occupied his mind. The glorious event of Austerlitz had already impressed him with the highest notion of his strength, and applied new stimulants to his gigantic ambition. That of Jena raised his confidence and his desires to the highest pitch. After that so complete and so speedy destruction of the military power in highest repute in Europe, there was nothing but what he deemed possible, nothing but what he desired. His enemies, to depreciate his anterior triumphs, having incessantly repeated that the Prussian army was the only one to be made any account of, the only one that it was difficult to conquer, he had taken them at the word, and having conquered, more than conquered, annihilated it in a month, he perceived thenceforward no bound to his power, and admitted of no limitation to his will. Europe appeared to him a field without owner, in which he could build up whatever he pleased, whatever he considered as great, wise, useful, and brilliant. Where then was he to discern a symptom of resistance? Austria, disarmed by a single manœuvre, that of Ulm, was trembling, exhausted, incapable of resuming arms. The Russians, though deemed brave, had been driven with the bayonet at their loins from Munich to Olmütz, and if they had made a stand at Hollabrunn, at Austerlitz, it was to sustain overwhelming defeats. Lastly, the Prussian monarchy had just been destroyed in thirty days. What obstacle, we repeat it, could he discover to his projects? The wrecks of the Russian armies, united in the North to 25,000 Prussians, afforded no prospect of a danger that he needed to be alarmed at. Hence he wrote to the archchancellor Cambacérès, "All here is *child's play*, to which an end must be put; and this time I will take such a course with my enemies as to settle them all." He decided therefore to push the war till he had wrung peace from all the powers, and such a peace as should be equally brilliant and durable. Not indeed that it would be difficult to wring it from the courts of the continent, but from England, which, protected by the Ocean, was the only country that had escaped the yoke with which Europe saw herself threatened. Napoleon had already said that he would gain the dominion of the sea by means of the land; and that, if the English were determined to close the Ocean against him, he would close the continent against them. Having reached the Elbe and the Oder, he confirmed himself in this idea more than

ever; he systematized it in his head, and he wrote to his brother Louis in Holland, *I am going to reconquer the colonies by means of the land.* In the fermentation of mind produced in him by the extraordinary success of the war with Prussia, he conceived the most gigantic ideas that he ever brought forth in his life. In the first place, he resolved to keep in deposit all that he had conquered, and all that he should yet conquer, till England had restored to France, to Holland, to Spain, the colonies which she had taken from them. The continental powers being in reality but subsidized auxiliaries of England, he determined to hold them all responsible for the British policy, and to lay down as the essential principle of negotiation, but he would not restore to one of them any thing that he had taken, till England should give up the whole or part of her maritime conquests. Two Prussian negotiators, M. de Lucchesini and M. de Zastrow, were at Charlottenburg, soliciting an armistice and peace. He replied to them, through Duroc, who had continued the friend of the court of Berlin, that, as for peace, it was not to be thought of till England was brought into more moderate views; and that Prussia and Germany should remain in his hands in pledge for what England had taken from the maritime powers; but that, as for an armistice, he was ready to grant one, on condition of the immediate delivery to him of the line on which he intended to winter, and which he meant to make the starting post of his future operations—the line of the Vistula. In consequence, he required all the fortresses in Silesia, such as Breslau, Glogau, Schweidnitz, Glatz, and all those on the Vistula, such as Dantzig, Graudenz, Thorn, Warsaw, to be delivered up to him immediately; for, if they were not given up, he said, he should go and reduce them in a few days.

With this intention to CONQUER THE SEA BY THE LAND, by depriving Great Britain of all her allies, and closing all the ports of the continent against her, the first thing to be done was to interdict to her without delay access to the vast coasts occupied by the French armies. Napoleon had already himself, or by means of Prussia, closed the mouths of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe. This was a natural and legitimate exercise of the right of conquest, for conquest confers all the rights of the sovereign, and especially the right of closing the ports, or intercepting the roads of the conquered country, without such rigour being held to be a violation of the right of nations towards any person whatever. But to forbid the entry of the Ems, the Elbe, and the Weser, was a measure very inadequate for attaining the end proposed to himself by Napoleon; for, in spite of the strictest watch on the coasts, English goods were introduced by smuggling not only into Hanover but into Holland, the government of which was under our direct influence, and in Belgium, which had become a French province. Besides, when the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe were closed, these goods entered by the Oder, by the Vistula, and descended

again from north to south. They grew dear, it is true, but the English, necessitated to dispose of them, sold them at a price which compensated the expenses of smuggling and freight. It was necessary, therefore, to resort to more rigorous measures against English merchandize, and Napoleon was not the man to suffer himself to be deterred from them.

England herself had just authorized all sorts of excesses against her commerce by taking an extraordinary measure, and one of the most outrageous that can be imagined against the most generally admitted right of nations, and which is called a *paper blockade*. As we have already explained several times, it is a principle with most of the maritime nations that every neutral, that is to say every flag, not a party in a war between two powers, has a right to sail from the ports of one to the ports of the other, to carry any merchandize whatever, even that of the enemy, excepting contraband of war, which consists in arms, munitions of war, and provisions cured for the use of the armies. This liberty ceases only in the case of a seaport blockaded by a naval force, so that the blockade be efficacious. In this case, the blockade being notified, the faculty of entering the blockaded place is suspended for neutrals. But if, in the restrictions imposed upon the freedom of navigation, we do not stop at this certain limit of the presence of an effective force, there is no reason why we should not lay an interdict upon whole tracts of coast, upon pretext of blockade. England had already sought to overstep the limits of the real blockade, by alleging that, with a few sail, insufficient in number to close the approaches to a sea-port, she had a right to declare the blockade. But at last she had admitted the necessity of a force of some sort against the blockaded port. Now she did not stop at this limit already so vague, and, at the time of her momentary rupture with Prussia, occasioned by the occupation of Hanover, she had ventured to forbid all commerce to neutrals on the coasts of France and Germany, from Brest to the mouths of the Elbe. This was the abuse of strength carried to the utmost excess, and thenceforward a mere British decree was sufficient to lay under interdict all the parts of the globe which England was pleased to deprive of commerce.

This incredible violation of the right of nations furnished Napoleon with a just pretext for authorizing the most rigorous measures in regard to English commerce. He devised a formidable decree, which, however excessive it might appear, was but a just reprisal of the violences of England, and which had moreover the advantage of completely answering the views which he had recently conceived. This decree, dated Berlin, the 21st of November, applicable not only to France, but to the countries occupied by her armies or in alliance with her, that is to say to France, Holland, Spain, Italy, and all Germany, declared the British Islands in a *state of blockade*. The consequences of the state of blockade were the following:

All commerce with England was absolutely prohibited;

All goods, the produce of English manufactures, or of English colonies, were to be confiscated not only on the coast but in the interior, in the houses of the merchants by whom they should be harboured;

All letters coming from or going to England, addressed to an Englishman, or written in English, were to be stopped at the post-offices and destroyed;

Every Englishman whatsoever, seized in France or in the countries under subjection to her arms, was to be declared a prisoner of war;

Every vessel having only touched at the English colonies or at any of the ports of the three kingdoms, was forbidden to enter French ports or ports under subjection to France; and, in case of a false declaration being made on this subject, she became a lawful prize;

Half of the produce of the confiscation was destined to indemnify French and allied merchants who had suffered by the spoliations of England;

Lastly, the English who fell into our power were to serve for the exchange of the French or their allies who were taken prisoners.

Such were these measures, assuredly inexcusable if England had not taken pains to justify them beforehand by her own excesses. Napoleon was fully sensible of their severity; but, in order to induce England to relinquish her tyranny at sea, he had recourse to a like tyranny upon land. He wished most especially to intimidate the agents of the English commerce, and principally the merchants of the Hanseatic towns, who, laughing at the orders issued respecting the Elbe and the Weser, distributed the prohibited goods throughout all parts of the continent. The threat of confiscation, a threat soon followed up, would make them tremble, and, if not close the outlets opened clandestinely to British commerce, at least render them very narrow.

Napoleon, saying to himself that all the commercial nations were interested in the resistance which he was opposing to the unjust pretensions of England, concluded that they would submit to the inconveniences of a struggle which had become necessary; he thought that, these inconveniences falling particularly upon the speculators of Hamburg, Bremen, Leipzig, Amsterdam, and on smugglers by profession, it was not worth while to limit his means of reprisal, out of regard for such interests.

The effect of this decree on the opinion of Europe was immense. Some regarded it as a revolting excess of despotism, others as a stroke of profound policy, all as an extraordinary act, proportioned to the conflict of giants maintained by England and France against each other, the one daring to seize the dominion of the sea, hitherto the common route of nations, and to interdict all commerce to her enemies, the other aiming at the entire occu-

pation of the continent by force of arms, to reply to the closing of the sea by the closing of the land. Unheard-of spectacle, without example in the past and probably in the future, exhibited at this moment by the unchained passions of the two greatest nations of the earth!

No sooner was this decree conceived and drawn up by Napoleon himself, and by him alone, without the participation of M. de Talleyrand—no sooner was this decree signed, than it was sent by extraordinary couriers to the governments of Holland, Spain, and Italy, with orders to some, summonses to others, to put it into immediate execution. Marshal Mortier, who had already taken possession of Hesse, was directed to proceed with the utmost expedition to the Hanseatic towns, Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, and to make himself master not only of those towns, but of the ports of Mecklenburg and Swedish Pomerania as far as the mouths of the Oder. He was enjoined to occupy the rich warehouses of the Hanseatic towns, to seize the merchandize of English origin there, to arrest the English merchants, and to do all this with punctuality, exactness, and probity. It was because Napoleon expected a more rigorous and at the same time honest execution from marshal Mortier than from any other, that he had given him such a commission. He ordered him to take with him into Germany a certain number of seamen, drafted from the Boulogne flotilla, to make them cruize in vessels at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, to arm all the passes with cannon, and to sink every suspicious ship that should attempt to force the blockade.

Such was the *continental blockade*, by which Napoleon replied to the *blockade upon paper* devised by England.

But, to subject the continent to his policy, it was requisite that Napoleon should push the war further than he had done. Austria was six months before in his mighty hands, and might be so again whenever he pleased. Prussia was there at that moment. But Russia, always repulsed when she appeared in the regions of the West, nevertheless escaped his blows, by retiring beyond the Vistula and the Niemen. She was the only ally that England had left, and he must beat her as completely as he had beaten Austria and Prussia, to realize, in its full extent, the policy of CONQUERING THE SEA BY THE LAND. Napoleon was therefore resolved to proceed northward, and to hasten to meet the Russians in the plains of Poland, where the people were ready to rise at his appearance. Never had warrior setting out from the Rhine reached the Vistula, much less the Niemen. But he, who had carried the tricoloured flag to float on the banks of the Adige, the Nile, the Jordan, the Po, the Danube, and the Elbe, could and must perform this daring march! At any rate, his presence in the regions of the North would instantly raise an immense European question, that of the re-establishment of Poland. The Poles had always said, France is our friend, but

she is at a great distance. When France approached Poland so near as the Oder, must not the idea of a great reparation become with one the subject of well-founded hope, with the other the subject of a matured project? Those unfortunate Poles, so unsteady in their conduct, so serious in their sentiments, uttered shouts of enthusiasm on hearing of our victories, and a crowd of emissaries, hastening to Berlin, besought Napoleon to proceed to the Vistula, promising him their property, their arms, their lives to assist him in reconstituting Poland. This scheme, so seductive, so generous, so politic if it had been more practicable, was one of those enterprizes with which the smitten imagination could not fail to be captivated at that moment, and one of those imposing spectacles which it befitted his greatness to give to the world. In penetrating into the heart of Poland, he was adding, it is true, to the difficulties of the present war the most important of all difficulties—that of distance and of climate; but he was depriving Prussia and Russia of the resources of the Polish provinces, considerable resources in men and alimentary substances; he was sapping the foundation of Russian power; he was striving to render Europe the most signal service that had ever been done for it; he was adding fresh pledges to those which he had already in his hands, and which were to serve him, to obtain from England maritime restitutions by means of continental restitutions. The vast countries situated upon the route from the Rhine to the Vistula, causes of weakness for an ordinary general, would be converted under the greatest of captains into abundant sources of things necessary for war; he should draw from them, thanks to a skilful administration, provisions, ammunition, arms, horses, money. As for the climate, so formidable in these countries in November and December, he took it into account no doubt; but he was resolved in this campaign to halt at the Vistula. If it were given up to him by the proposed armistice, he purposed to establish himself there; if, on the contrary, it were disputed, he would conquer it in a few marches, make the troops encamp there till the winter was over, feed them there upon the corn of Poland, warm them with the wood of its forests, recruit them with fresh soldiers brought from the Rhine, and next spring start from the Vistula to penetrate much farther north than any man had yet dared to do.

Excited by success, impelled by his genius and his good fortune to a greatness of ideas to which no head of empire or army had yet attained, he hesitated not a moment what course to pursue, and made dispositions for advancing into Poland. When passing the Rhine, he had certainly embraced in his designs the idea of a daring march to the North, but vaguely. It was in Berlin, and after the rapid and signal successes obtained over Prussia, that he formed the serious plan of its execution.

Still, in addition to the perils inherent in the enterprise itself, there was a particular danger which Napoleon did not disguise

from himself ; that is, the impression which might be produced upon Austria, which, though conquered, and conquered even to exhaustion, might nevertheless be tempted to seize the opportunity to fall upon our rear:

The present conduct of that court was of such a nature as to excite more than one fear. To the offers of alliance, which Napoleon had directed to be made, in consequence of his conversations with the duke of Wurzburg, she had replied by affected demonstrations of good-will, feigning not to understand our ambassador; and, when he had explained himself in a clearer manner, alleging that too close a connexion with France would draw upon her a rupture with Russia and Prussia, and that, so soon after a long struggle thrice renewed in the last fifteen years, she was no longer capable of waging war either for or against any power.

To these evasive words she had recently added the most significant acts. She had assembled in Bohemia 60,000 men, who, placed at first along Bavaria and Saxony, were at this moment marching towards Galicia, following, in some measure, behind their own frontiers, the movement of the belligerent armies. Independently of these 60,000 men, she had despatched fresh troops towards Poland, and she was exerting herself with extreme activity to form magazines in Bohemia and Galicia. When questioned concerning her armaments, she assigned common-place reasons, grounded on her personal safety, saying that, exposed on all sides to the contact of hostile armies which were warring with each other, she must not allow any of them to violate her territory, and that the measures which she was called to account for were but measures of pure precaution.

Napoleon was not to be duped by language so insincere. The need of an alliance, since he had lost that of Prussia, had for a moment directed his mind towards the court of Vienna ; but it was now easy to perceive that the power from which we had wrested, in fifteen years, the Netherlands, Suabia, the Milanese, the Venetian States, Tuscany, the Tyrol, Dalmatia, and lastly the Germanic crown, could never be any other than an irreconcilable enemy, dissembling out of policy, her deep resentment, but ready to let it burst forth on the first occasion. He clearly perceived that the fears of Austria were feigned, for none of the belligerent parties had an interest in provoking her by a violation of territory; and he knew that, if she armed, it could only be with the perfidious intention of falling upon the rear of the French army. Attaching no more importance than was necessary to the word of a man and a sovereign, by which Francis II. had engaged not to make war again upon France, he thought, nevertheless, that the recollection of that word solemnly given must embarrass that prince; that he would need a very specious pretext for breaking it; and he had formed two maturely weighed resolutions: the first not to afford Austria any pretext for inter-

fering in the present war; and the second, to take such precautions as if she were certain to interfere, and to take them in an ostensible manner. His language was conformable to these resolutions. He first complained with the utmost frankness of the armaments going forward in Bohemia and Galicia, and in such a way as to prove that he comprehended their object. Then, with the same frankness, he intimated the precautions which he thought himself obliged to take, and which were likely to deter the cabinet of Vienna. He affirmed anew that he would not give any provocation to war, but it should be prompt and terrible, if Austria had the imprudence to recommence it. He declared that, determined not to afford any pretext for a rupture, he would not countenance a rising in the provinces of Poland belonging to Austria; that the rising in Prussian and Russian Poland was imputable exclusively to those who had been bent on war; that he did not disguise from himself the difficulty of repressing the Poles dependent on Austria, when the Poles dependent on Russia and Prussia were stirring; but that, if people at Vienna thought on that point as he did, and if, like him, they were convinced of the enormous fault committed in the last century, in destroying a monarchy which was the bulwark of the West, he suggested a very simple expedient for repairing that loss in reconstituting Poland, and offering to the house of Austria an ample indemnification for the provinces to the sacrifice of which she would have to submit. This indemnification was the restitution of Silesia, wrested from Maria Theresa by Frederick the Great. Silesia was certainly as valuable as the Gallicias, and this would be a signal reparation of the disasters, the outrages, which the founder of the Prussian monarchy had inflicted on the house of Austria.

Assuredly, in the situation in which Napoleon was placed, nothing was better calculated than such a proposal. Led, in fact, by the course of events to destroy the work of the great Frederick by humbling Prussia, he could not do better than to destroy that work completely, by restoring to Austria what Frederick had taken away, and by taking from her what Frederick had given her. For the rest, he offered this exchange, without pretending to impose it upon her. If such a proposal, which formerly would have filled Austria with joy, should awaken her old sentiments in regard to Silesia, he was quite ready, he said, to carry it into effect; if not, it must be considered as not having been made; and he reserved himself to act in Prussian and Russian Poland as events should suggest to him, engaging only not to undertake any thing injurious to the rights of Austria. While taking care to furnish no pretext for complaint to the court of Vienna, Napoleon nevertheless repeated that he was quite prepared, and that, if she was bent on war, she would not take him at unawares. Though satisfied with the services of his ambassador, M. de La-Rochefoucauld, he appointed in his stead general Andreossy, who, as a military man, and perfectly acquainted with Austria, was capable of ob-

serving with a more correct eye the nature and extent of the preparations of that power.

Napoleon, at this extraordinary moment of his reign, conceived the idea of making the East subservient to his projects in the West. Turkey was in a state of crisis, by which he hoped to benefit. That unfortunate empire, threatened ever since the reign of Catherine even by its friends, who, seeing its provinces on the point of being rent from it, hastened to prevent their rivals from seizing them—witness the conduct of France in Egypt—that unfortunate empire had sometimes been attracted towards Napoleon by the instinct of a common interest, sometimes drawn away from him by the intrigues of England and Russia, working up the Divan by the recollection of the Pyramids and Aboukir. Having made peace at the time of the Consulate, relapsed into coldness at the time of the creation of the Empire, which he had refused to recognize, sultan Selim had been definitively brought by the battle of Austerlitz to a reconciliation, which had soon become intimacy. He had not only conceded to Napoleon the title of Padishah, at first denied, but had sent to Paris an ambassador extraordinary, to carry him congratulations and presents along with the act of recognition. Sultan Selim, in acting thus, had indulged the real inclination of his heart, which drew him towards France, in spite of the intrigues with which he was beset, and the redoubling of which attested the deplorable decline of the empire. This prince, mild, discreet, enlightened as a European, fond of the civilization of the West, not from the whim of a despot, but from a strong sense of the superiority of that civilization to the civilization of the East, had, from his youth, when he was buried in the voluptuous obscurity of the Seraglio, kept up, through M. Ruffin, personal and secret correspondence with Louis XVI. Having since ascended the throne, he had retained a marked preference for France, and he was glad to find in her victories a decisive reason for giving himself up to her. The Russians and English would fain have combated this inclination even by force of arms. An opportunity offered for trying their influence at Constantinople; this was the choice to be made of the two hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia. The hospodars Ipsilanti and Maruzzi, devoted to England, to Russia, to whomsoever desired the ruin of the Turkish empire, for they were the real precursors of the Greek insurrection, showed themselves in their administration the declared accomplices of the enemies of the Porte. Things had arrived at such a point that the latter was compelled to recall unfaithful and dangerous agents. Russia had immediately ordered general Michelson to march for the Dniester, with an army of 60,000 men, and England had sent a fleet to the Dardanelles, to effect by this junction of forces the reinstatement of the deposed hospodars. The young emperor Alexander, who had appeared upon the stage of the world only to sustain the memorable defeat of Austerlitz, said to himself that, amidst this sanguinary fray of all the European

nations, it behoved him to take advantage of circumstances, and to advance towards Turkey, that, whatever might be the chances of fortune between the Rhine and the Niemen, what he should take in the East would perhaps be left him to compensate what others should take in the West.

This calculation was plausible enough; but, having Napoleon on his hands, he acted with little prudence in depriving himself of 60,000 men, and sending them upon the Pruth. The proof of this fault is manifested in the joy which Napoleon felt when informed that a rupture was likely to take place between Russia and the Porte. It was in this anticipation that he had attached such importance to the occupation of Dalmatia, which permitted him to keep an army on the frontier of Bosnia, and afforded him facility to succour or to annoy the Porte, according to the circumstances of his policy. On perceiving the approach of that crisis, which he desired the more ardently the more serious the aspect of events became, he had chosen for his ambassador at Constantinople a soldier, a native of Corsica, like himself, who united remarkable political sagacity to military experience: this was general Sebastiani, who had already been employed on a mission in Turkey, of which he had most satisfactorily acquitted himself. Napoleon had given him express instructions to excite the Turks against the Russians, and to exert all his efforts to provoke a war in the East. He had authorized him to draw from Dalmatia officers of artillery and engineers, ammunition, and even general Marmont's 25,000 men, if the Porte, driven to extremities, should desire the presence of a French army. The battle of Austerlitz having reconciled sultan Selim with Napoleon, the battle of Jena was, in fact, likely enough to embolden him to go to war. Napoleon wrote to that prince, offering him an alliance defensive and offensive, to induce him to seize this opportunity of raising the Crescent again, and informing him that he was about to render the Turks the greatest service that it was possible to do them, to repair the greatest disaster which they had ever sustained, by endeavouring to re-establish Poland. Orders were given to general Marmont to hold in readiness all the succours that should be applied for by the Porte, and to general Sebastiani to neglect nothing to kindle a conflagration which should extend from the Dardanelles to the mouths of the Danube. In thus setting the Russians and Turks together by the ears, Napoleon proposed to himself a two-fold object, that of dividing the Russian forces, and that of throwing Austria into cruel perplexities. Austria, no doubt, hated France, but, when she should see the Russians overrunning the shores of the Black Sea, she would necessarily feel apprehensions that would be a very powerful diversion to her hatred.

That immense quarrel, kept up for the last fifteen years between Europe and the French Revolution, was thus about to spread from the Rhine to the Vistula, from Berlin to Constantinople. Involved in a war of extermination, Napoleon

had recourse to means proportioned to the magnitude of his designs. His first care was to levy a new conscription. At the end of 1805, he had called out the first half of the conscription of 1806, and had just called out the second half at the moment of his entry into Prussia. He resolved to act in the same manner in regard to the conscription of 1807, and, in calling it out immediately, though it was not yet the end of 1806, to spare the young men of that class for training, for gaining their full strength, for breaking themselves to the fatigues of war. With the spirit that pervaded the skeletons, this was more than was needed to form excellent soldiers. This new levy of men would, moreover, make a considerable addition to the general effective of the army. That effective, which, in 1805, at the time of leaving Boulogne, amounted to 450,000, which was raised by the conscription of 1806 to 503,000, would be further augmented by the conscription of 1807 to 580,000. Annual liberations being forbidden during the war, the army was thus augmented by every conscription; for battle and disease did not diminish the effective by a number of men equal to that called out. The campaign of Austria had not cost more than 20,000 men; that of Prussia had not yet cost any. It is true that, the war being carried every day to a greater distance and under severer climates, the quality of the troops being lowered in proportion as young recruits stepped into the place of the veteran soldiers of the Revolution, the losses would soon be more sensibly felt. But they were as yet of little importance, and the army, composed of tried soldiers, made young rather than weakened by the addition of a certain number of conscripts to the war battalions, had attained its state of perfection.

Napoleon wrote, therefore, to M. de Lacuée ordering him to call out the class of 1807. M. de Lacuée was the person in the ministry of war officially charged with these calls. He was an able functionary, devoted to the Emperor, and determined to overcome the difficulties of a very ungrateful task, under a government under which there was so great a consumption of men. Though he was not minister of war, Napoleon corresponded immediately with him, feeling it necessary to guide, to support, to excite him by direct communications. "You will see," he wrote to him, "by a message addressed to the Senate, that I am calling out the conscription of 1807, and that I will not lay down arms till I have peace with England and Russia. I see by the statements that the whole of the conscription of 1806 will have marched You shall have no need to await my orders for the distribution among the different corps. I have not yet lost any men, but the project which I have formed is more vast than any that I ever conceived; and, from this time, I must find myself in a position to cope with all events." (Berlin, November 22nd, 1806—Depôt of the Secretary of State's Office.)

Napoleon, following the practice which he had adopted in the preceding year, of reserving for the Senate the vote of the contin-

gent, sent a message to that body to demand of it the conscription of 1807, and to acquaint it with the extension given to his policy since he had annihilated Prussia. In this message, in which the energy of the style equalled that of the ideas, he said that till then the monarchs of Europe had played with the generosity of France; that, when one coalition was conquered, another immediately sprang up; that no sooner was that of 1805 dissolved than he had had to fight that of 1806; that it behoved France to be less generous in future; that the conquered States should be retained till the general peace on land and sea; that England, regardless of all the rights of nations, launching a commercial interdict against one quarter of the globe, must be struck with the same interdict, and it must be rendered as rigorous as the nature of things permitted; that, finally, it would be better, since they were doomed to war, to plunge in wholly than to go but half-way into it; that this was the way to terminate it more completely and more solidly by a general and durable peace. His style expressed with the utmost vigour those ideas of which he was full. Pride, exasperation, confidence, were alike conspicuous. He then claimed means proportioned to his ends, and these consisted, as we have just mentioned, in the conscription of 1807 levied at the end of 1806.

We have already explained the precautions taken by Napoleon, in the two-fold hypothesis of a long war in the North, and of an unforeseen attack on any part whatever of his vast empire. The third battalions of the regiments of the grand army, forming dépôts, were, as we have seen, ranged along the Rhine, under marshal Kellermann, or in the camp of Boulogne, under marshal Brune. These third battalions, already filled by conscripts of 1806, soon to be by those of 1807, carefully trained and equipped, under marshal Kellermann, might, if wanted, join the eighth corps, commanded by marshal Mortier to cover the Rhine; or those under marshal Brune might join the king of Holland, to cover either Holland, or the coast of France as far as the Seine. Such of these regiments as were neither in Germany nor Italy, assembled in the interior, at St. Lo, at Pontivy, at Napoleonville, formed into small camps, were destined to proceed to Cherbourg, Brest, La Rochelle, or Bordeaux. Detachments of national guards, not numerous, but well chosen, one at St. Omer, one in the Lower Seine, a third in the environs of Bordeaux, were to concur in the defence of threatened points. Some corps concentrated in Paris were to travel thither by post.

The same system had been adopted, as we have already seen, for the army of Italy. The third battalions of the army, spread over Upper Italy, were dedicated to the instruction of the conscripts, and furnished at the same time the garrisons of the fortresses. The war battalions were with the three active armies of Naples, the Frioul, and Dalmatia.

Napoleon resolved, in the first place, to draw from the dépôts the reinforcements necessary for the grand army, and to fill the

vacancy which he should leave in them with the new conscription; and as that vacancy would be filled, and much more than filled, by the contingent of 1807, to avail himself of the surplus to raise the battalions to 1,000 or 1,200 men, and the cavalry regiments to an effective of 700 men, instead of 500. He resolved also to augment the effective of the companies of artillery, having perceived that the enemy, to compensate for the quality of his troops, was greatly increasing the number of his guns. The dépôt battalions, being augmented to 1,000 or 1,200 men, there might always be drafted from them, besides the recruiting of the active army, the best trained 300 or 400 men, to be sent to any quarter where an unforeseen want of them might arise.

Napoleon had already drawn from the dépôts about 12,000 men, who had been conducted in large detachments from Alsace into Franconia, from Franconia into Saxony, to fill the vacancies produced in his ranks by the war. Seven or eight thousand had just arrived, four or five thousand were still on march. This was not a full equivalent for what he had lost, much more, however, from fatigue than by battle. Bearing in mind, above all, the distance to which the war was about to be carried, he devised a system, profoundly conceived, for bringing the conscripts from the Rhine to the Vistula—for bringing them thither in such a manner, that they should incur no danger during the long journey, that they should not disperse upon the road, and that they should have it in their power to render services by the way upon the rear of the army. These detachments, drawn from each dépôt battalion, were to form several companies, according to their number; these companies were to be then united into battalions, and these battalions into provisional regiments, of twelve or fifteen hundred men. Officers, taken temporarily from the dépôts, were to be given them for the route, and they were to be organized, as if they were to form definitive regiments. Setting out with this organization, and with their complete equipment, they had orders to stop at the fortresses situated on our line of operation, such as Erfurt, Halle, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Spandau, Cüstrin, Frankfurt on the Oder; to rest if they had need of rest, and to keep garrison there, if it were necessary for the safety of our rear; and, wherever they made a halt, they were to resume the military exercises, that the instruction of the men might not be neglected during a journey of several months. They would thus cover the communications of the army, and obviate the necessity of weakening it by too great a number of garrisons left in rear, and therefore in some measure augment its effective before they could actually join it.

Having arrived at the theatre of war, they were to be dissolved by the despatch of each detachment to its corps, and the officers were to return by post to their dépôts, to fetch other recruits.

The same organization was adopted for the cavalry, with some particular precautions commanded by the nature of that arm.

In all the fortresses converted into grand dépôts, such at Würz-

burg, Erfurt, Wittenberg, Spandau, orders were given for collecting there, by means of the resources which the country afforded, clothing, shoes, arms, in abundance. The commandants of those places were enjoined to inspect every provisional regiment that passed, to supply clothing and arms for such men as were in want of them, and to detain those who had need of rest. The next corps that passed were to pick up the men left on the way by those which had preceded them, and, finding as many men and horses to take as they left behind, they were always sure to arrive complete at the theatre of war. Napoleon, reading assiduously the reports of the commandants of the fortresses through which the provisional regiments passed, incessantly comparing them together, reprimanded the slightest negligence, and thus ensured punctual attention from all. It required nothing short of such combinations, supported by such vigilance, to keep entire so large an army at so vast a distance.

Napoleon not only purposed to keep up the corps at the effective which they had at the time of entering upon the campaign, he designed also to draw new corps to the grand army. He had left, as we have seen, three regiments in Paris, to form a reserve, which could be despatched to the coasts of France, if they were threatened. He conceived that he could dispose of two of these regiments, the 58th of the line, and the 15th light, in consequence of the considerable increase of the conscripts in the dépôts. There were in Paris six third battalions belonging to regiments which had four battalions. The conscription was to raise each of them to 1,000 men. Junot, governor of Paris, had orders to review them several times a week, and to make them manœuvre in his presence. It was a reserve of 6,000 men, always ready to set out post for Boulogne, Cherbourg, or Brest, and which allowed the 58th of the line and the 15th light to be removed without inconvenience. These two regiments, considered as among the finest in the army, were marched off for the Elbe, by Wesel and Westphalia.

It will be recollected that Napoleon had resolved to convert the velites into *fusileers of the guard*. Thanks to the prompt execution of what he ordered, a regiment of two battalions, amounting to 1,400 men, the soldiers of which had been carefully selected from the annual contingent, and the officers and subalterns taken from the guard, was already completely formed. Napoleon directed it to be kept for the time strictly necessary for its instruction, and then sent by post from Paris to Mayence.

The guard of the capital was then, as now, committed to a municipal force, consisting of two regiments and called *regiments of the Paris guard*. Napoleon had recommended that the effective of these two regiments should be augmented as much as possible by men taken from the last conscription. Reaping the benefit of his foresight, he could, without stripping Paris too much, take from them two battalions, which would furnish a regiment of twelve or thirteen hundred men, of excellent quality and appearance. He

ordered them to be sent off for the army, thinking that a body of troops which had been employed in keeping order at home ought not to be deprived of the honour of contributing abroad to the greatness of the country, to which it would return better and more respected.

The workmen at the ports were without employment and without bread, because naval operations languished amidst the immense development given to the continental war. Napoleon found useful occupation and wages for them. He composed out of them battalions of infantry, which were charged to guard the ports to which they belonged, with a promise that they should never be required to leave them. They might be relied on, for they were attached to the establishments intrusted to their vigilance, and they partook besides of the martial spirit of the navy. Thanks to this idea, Napoleon was enabled to take from the coast service three fine regiments, the 19th, 15th, and 31st of the line, which were at Boulogne, Brest, and St. Lo. They were, like the others, increased to 2,000 men for the two battalions, and sent off for the grand army.

Thus there were seven new regiments of infantry, capable of forming the nucleus of a fine *corps d'armée*, that Napoleon had the art to draw from France, without weakening the interior too much. To these regiments was to be joined the legion of the North, filled with Poles, and which was already on march for Germany.

That which seemed particularly desirable to Napoleon, and the utility of which he appreciated perhaps to exaggeration, at a moment when he was leaving the plains of Prussia and entering those of Poland, was the cavalry. He had recently drawn from Mayence and marched off on foot, partly towards Hesse, partly towards Prussia, all the trained horse-soldiers that were at the dépôts. He had ordered that their horses should be left in France, and that they should be supplied from those which had been collected in Germany. Marshal Mortier, on entering the States of the elector of Hesse, had disbanded the army of that prince. This had furnished four or five thousand excellent horses, part of which had served for mounting immediately a thousand French horse-soldiers, and the others had been sent to Potsdam. There were at Potsdam vast stables, built by the great Frederick, who frequently took delight in seeing a great number of squadrons manœuvring at once in the delightful retreat where he lived as king, philosopher, and warrior. Napoleon there created, under the cannon of Spandau, an immense establishment for the accommodation of his cavalry. Here he collected all the horses taken from the enemy, besides a great quantity of others bought in the different provinces of Prussia. General Bourcier, who had quitted the active army after honourable services, was placed at the head of this dépôt, with the recommendation not to leave it for a moment, to see with his own eyes that due attention was paid to the numerous horses collected there, to mount with them the cavalry regiments coming on foot from France, to stop

those which passed through Prussia, to review them, to furnish them with horses in place of those that were knocked up or scarcely capable of service, to detain also such men as were sick, and to send them off with regiments coming after them. The workmen of Berlin, having nothing to do in consequence of the departure of the court and the nobility, were to be employed in this dépôt, for wages, in saddlers', harness-makers', shoemakers', and wheelwrights' work.

It was to Italy that Napoleon thought to have recourse for procuring cavalry. Nowhere was it of less use. In Naples, they never had to encounter any but Calabrese mountaineers or English, landing from their ships without horse-soldiers. There were at Naples sixteen regiments of cavalry, some of them cuirassiers, and among the finest in the army. Napoleon directed ten of them to be marched towards Upper Italy; leaving only six, all of which were light cavalry, and the effective of which he was enabled to increase to a thousand men each, in consequence of the great number of the conscripts sent beyond the Alps. They would thus form a force of 6,000 men, furnishing 4,000 horse-soldiers always ready to mount, and fully adequate to the service of observation, which they had to perform in the kingdom of Naples.

Neither were the intersected plains of Lombardy, in which canals, rivers, long screens of trees, render the movements of cavalry so difficult, a country where it was very necessary. Besides, ten regiments of that army, transferred from the south to the north of Italy, would allow some to be detached and sent off to the grand army. Napoleon drew from this source a division of cuirassiers, formed of four superb regiments, which afterwards distinguished themselves under the command of general d'Espagne. He drew from it light cavalry also, and gave orders for despatching successively to Germany the 19th, 24th, 15th, 3rd, and 24th regiments of chasseurs, which made, with the four of cuirassiers, nine regiments of cavalry borrowed from Italy. This was a force of 5,000 horse at least, travelling partly with their horses, partly on foot, the latter being destined to be mounted in Germany.

Napoleon was occupied at the same time in placing the army of Italy on the war footing. He had taken care to send it 20,000 men of the conscription of 1806, and he had recommended to prince Eugene to pay continual attention to their training. When ready to penetrate into the North, leaving upon his rear Austria more terrified but more hostile since Jena, he gave orders to proceed without delay to the formation of the active divisions, so that they might be fit to take the field immediately. In Frioul there were already two divisions fully organized. He ordered their artillery to be completed to twelve pieces for each division. He gave directions to form forthwith on the war footing one division at Venice, one at Brescia, a third at Alexandria, each nine or ten battalions strong, to prepare their artillery, to compose their equipages, and to appoint their staff. He followed the same course in regard to the cavalry. He directed

the regiments of dragoons drawn from Naples to be raised to their complement, both of men and horses, and to be provided moreover with a division of light artillery. These five divisions amounted together to 45,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry, making a total of 52,000 present under arms. This force, augmented in case of need by Marmont's corps and by part of the army of Naples, would be sufficient, in the hands of a man like Massena, to keep the Austrians in check, especially if it supported itself upon such fortresses as Palma-Nova, Legnago, Venice, Mantua, and Alexandria. Napoleon ordered the eight *dépôt* battalions of the army of Dalmatia to be established in Venice, the seven of the corps of the Frioul in Osopo and Palma-Nova, the fourteen of the army of Naples, in Peschiera, Legnago, and Mantua. Each of these battalions contained already more than 1,000 men since the contingent of 1806, and would soon have eleven or twelve hundred on the arrival of the contingent of 1807. It would then become easy to extract from them the companies of *voltigeurs* and *grenadiers*, and with these to compose excellent active divisions. Such was the fruit of a vigilance that was never relaxed. Napoleon moreover ordered the provisioning of the fortresses to be completed without delay.

Thus wholly engrossed in developing the vast plan of precautions adopted on his departure from Paris, Napoleon screened France from all insult on the part of the English, secured Italy from all sudden hostility on the part of the Austrians, and, without disorganizing the means of defence of either, he drew from the first seven regiments of infantry, from the second nine regiments of cavalry, independently of the provisional regiments which, setting out incessantly from the Rhine, would ensure the recruiting of the *grand army*, and the safety of his rear.

The reinforcements which, within a month, were likely to augment the *grand army* may be computed at about 50,000 men. With the corps which had already joined it, since its entry into Prussia, and which had raised it to about 190,000 men, with those which were preparing to join, with the German, Dutch, Italian auxiliaries, it would amount to near 300,000 men; and, such is the inevitable scattering of the forces, even under the direction of the ablest general, that, after deducting from these 300,000 men the wounded, the sick, who became more numerous in winter and in severe climates, the detachments on march, the corps placed in observation, you could not flatter yourself to bring more than 150,000 men into fire. So necessary is it that the resources should exceed the foreseen wants, in order that they may merely supply the real wants! And, if we extend this observation to the whole of the forces of France in 1806, we shall see that, with a total army amounting for the entire empire to 580,000—to 650,000, including the auxiliaries—300,000 at most could be present on the theatre of war, between the Rhine and the Vistula, 150,000 upon the Vistula itself, and perhaps 80,000 upon the fields of battle, where the fate of the world was to be decided. And yet never had so many men

and horses marched, never had so many cannon rolled with that force of aggregation towards one and the same goal.

It was not enough to bring the soldiers together; financial resources were required for supplying all that they needed. Napoleon, having succeeded in raising his budget in war time to 700 millions (820 with the cost of collection) had the means of keeping an army of 450,000 men. But he would soon have 600,000 to pay. He resolved to draw from the conquered countries the resources necessary for paying his new armaments. Possessed of Hesse, Westphalia, Hanover, the Hanseatic towns, Mecklenburg, lastly Prussia, he could, without inhumanity, lay contributions on these different countries. He had suffered the Prussian authorities to remain everywhere, and placed at their head general Clarke for the political administration of the country, M. Daru for the financial administration. The latter, able, assiduous, upright, had made himself master of all the financial affairs, and was as well acquainted with them as the best Prussian *employés*.

The monarchy of Frederick William, composed at this period of East Prussia, extending from Königsberg to Stettin, Polish Prussia, Silesia, Brandenburg, the provinces to the left of the Elbe, Westphalia, the enclosed districts situated in Franconia, might yield its government about 120 millions of francs, the costs of collection being paid upon the produce itself, most part of the wants of the army being supplied by local taxes, the repair of the roads ensured by certain rates imposed upon the farmers of the domains of the Crown. In these 120 millions of revenue, the land-tax furnished 35 or 36 millions, the farming of the domains of the Crown 18, the produce of the excise, which consisted of duties on liquors, and on the transit of merchandize, 50, the monopoly of salt 9 or 10. Various accessory imposts made up the remainder of the 120 millions. Functionaries, collected into provincial commissions, under the appellation of *Chambers of Domains and War*, superintended their assessment, their collection, and the farming of the domains of the Crown.

Napoleon decided that this administration should be suffered to exist, even with its abuses, which M. Daru had soon discovered, and he notified to the Prussian government itself, to assist it in correcting them, that, attached to each provincial administration, there should be a French agent to keep an eye upon the collection of the revenues, and upon their payment into the central chest of the French army. Daru was to superintend these agents, and to centralize their operations. Thus the finances of Prussia were about to be administered on the account of Napoleon and for his profit. It was foreseen, however, that the annual produce of 120 millions would sink to 70 or 80 in consequence of existing circumstances. Napoleon, exercising his right of conquest, was not content with the ordinary imposts, and decreed in addition a war contribution, which, for all Prussia, might amount to 200 millions. It was to be levied gradually, in the course of the occupation, over and above the

ordinary taxes. Napoleon also levied a war contribution on Hesse, Brunswick, Hanover, and the Hanseatic towns, independently of the seizure of English merchandize.

At this rate, the army was to subsist itself, and to consume nothing without paying for it. Numerous purchases of horses, immense orders for clothing, shoes, harness, gun-carriages, given in all the towns, but more particularly in Berlin, with the view to occupy the workmen and to provide for the wants of the French army, were paid for out of the produce of the contributions, ordinary and extraordinary.

The contributions, heavy, no doubt, were still the least vexatious mode of exercising the right of war, which authorizes the conqueror to live upon the conquered country; for it substituted the regular collection of the tax to the wasteful extravagance of the soldiers. For the rest, the most rigid discipline, the most complete respect for private property, excepting the ravages of the field of battle, happily confined to very few localities, compensated these inevitable hardships of the war. And, assuredly, if we go back to the past, we shall find that never did armies behave with less barbarity and with so much humanity.

Napoleon, disposed by policy to spare the court of Saxony, had offered it an armistice and a peace after Jena. That court, honest and timid, had joyfully accepted such an act of clemency, and submitted to the discretion of the conqueror. Napoleon agreed to admit it into the new Confederation of the Rhine, and to change the title of elector borne by the sovereign into the title of king, on condition of a military contingent of 20,000 men, reduced for this time to 6,000, in consideration of circumstances. This extension of the Confederation of the Rhine afforded great advantages, for it ensured to our armies a free passage through Germany, and the possession at all times of the line of the Elbe. To compensate the charges of military occupation, which were spared Saxony by this treaty, she agreed to pay a contribution of 25 millions, in specie or in bills of exchange at a short date.

Napoleon, therefore, could, while the war lasted, dispose of 300 millions at least. Carrying foresight to the utmost length, he did not suffer his minister of the treasury to lull himself to sleep in confidence on the resources found in Germany. The sum of 24 millions was due to the grand army for arrears of pay. Napoleon required that this sum should be deposited partly in Strasburg, partly at Paris, in metallic specie, because he would not submit to the necessity of running in a pressing emergency after paper for the payment of which there would be a longer or shorter time to wait. Accordingly, he left the money in deposit at Paris and on the Rhine, intending to use it at a future time, and meanwhile caused the arrears to be discharged out of the revenues of the conquered country, that his soldiers might have their pay to spend while they were yet in the towns of Prussia, and be able to procure for themselves those comforts which are to be found only amidst large populations.

All these dispositions being completed, general Clarke being left in Berlin to assume the political government of Prussia, and M. Daru to administer it financially, Napoleon broke up with his columns to enter Poland.

The king of Prussia had not accepted the proposed armistice, because the terms were too rigorous, and also because he had been made to wait too long. Rejoined by Duroc at Osterode in old Prussia, he replied that, notwithstanding his most sincere desire to suspend the course of a disastrous war, he could not consent to the sacrifices required of him; that, in demanding not only the part of his dominions already overrun, but also the province of Posen and the line of the Vistula, they would leave him without territory and without resources, and, above all, give up Poland to inevitable insurrection; that he had therefore made up his mind to continue the war; that he acted thus from necessity, and also from fidelity to his engagements, for, having called the Russians, it was impossible for him to send them back after the appeal which he had made to them, and which they had answered with the utmost cordiality.

In vain did MM. de Haugwitz and de Lucchesini, who, after participating for a moment in the general infatuation of the Prussian nation, had been brought back to reason by calamity—in vain did they unite their efforts to induce the acceptance of the armistice, such as it was, saying that whatever was refused to Napoleon he would conquer in a fortnight; that they should let slip the opportunity for putting a stop to the war and its ravages; that, if they were to treat at that moment, they should no doubt lose the provinces situated on the left of the Elbe, but that, if they treated later, they should lose Poland itself along with those provinces: in vain MM. de Haugwitz and de Lucchesini gave this advice; their tardy prudence obtained no credit. The court, in going to Königsberg, had placed itself under Russian influences: adversity, which had calmed discreet minds, had, on the contrary, heightened the exaltation of those destitute of reason; and the war party, instead of imputing to itself the reverses of Prussia, imputed them to alleged treasons of the peace-party. The queen, irritated by mortification, insisted more strongly than ever that the fortune of arms should be once more tried, with the remains of the Prussian forces, with the support of the Russians, and under favour of distance, which was a great advantage to the vanquished, a great disadvantage to the victor. MM. de Haugwitz and de Lucchesini, deprived of all authority, assailed by unjust accusations, sometimes overwhelmed with insults, solicited and obtained their dismissal. The king, more equitable than the court, granted it to them with demonstrations of infinite regard, especially for M. de Haugwitz, having never ceased to appreciate his intelligence, to acknowledge his long services, and to lament that he had not always followed his counsels.

The Russians had actually arrived on the Niemen. A first corps of 50,000 men, commanded by general Benningsen had passed the Niemen on the 1st of November, and was advancing towards the

Vistula. A second, of the like force, headed by general Buxhövdén, followed the first. A reserve was organized under general Essen. Part of general Michelson's troops were ascending the Dniester and hastening to Poland. The imperial guard, however, had not yet left Petersburg. A swarm of Cossacks, issuing from their deserts, preceded the regular troops. Such were the then disposable forces of that vast empire, which showed for the second time that its resources were not equal to its pretensions. Joined to the Prussians, and while awaiting the reserve of general Essen, the Russians could present themselves upon the Vistula to the number of 120,000 men. In this there was nothing to embarrass Napoleon, if the climate did not happen to bring a powerful auxiliary to the soldiers of the North; and by the climate we mean not merely the cold, but the soil, the difficulty of marching and subsisting in those immense plains, alternately muddy and sandy, and where woods exceed in extent the part under cultivation.

The English, it is true, promised a powerful co-operation in money, in *matériel*, and even in men. They announced landings on different points of the coasts of France and Germany, and particularly an expedition to Swedish Pomerania, on the rear of the French army. They had, indeed, a very convenient landing-place in the inundated fortress of Stralsund, situated upon the last tongues of the German continent. This point was guarded by the Swedes, and every thing prepared to receive the English troops in an almost inviolable retreat. But it was probable that eagerness to seize the rich colonies of Holland and Spain, ill-defended at this moment on account of the preoccupations of the continental war, would absorb the attention of the English forces. A last resource, more vain than that expected from the English, formed the complement of the means of the coalition—that was the supposed interference of Austria.

The Prussians and Russians flattered themselves that, if a single success crowned their efforts, Austria would declare in their favour, and they almost included in the effective of the belligerent troops the 80,000 Austrians at that moment assembled in Bohemia and Galicia.

All this gave little uneasiness to Napoleon, who never was fuller of confidence and pride. The refusal of the armistice had neither surprised nor nettled him, "Your majesty," he wrote to the king of Prussia, "has sent me word that you have thrown yourself into the arms of Russia . . . time will show whether you have chosen the better and more efficacious part. You have taken up the dice-box to play: the dice will decide."

The military dispositions of Napoleon for penetrating into Poland were these. He had nothing immediate to fear from the Austrians; his general preparations in France as well as in Italy, and his diplomacy in the East, having provided against all that he could have to apprehend on their part. The landings of the English and Swedes in Pomerania, tending to excite insurrection on his rear in suffering and humbled Prussia, presented a more real danger. To this danger he attached, however, but little importance, for he wrote to his

brother Louis, who importuned him with his alarms, "The English have something else to do than to land in France, Holland, or Pomerania. They had rather pillage the colonies of all nations than attempt landings: the only advantage which they reap from them is to be disgracefully flung back to the sea." Napoleon believed one point at most—that relating to the Swedes, who had twelve or fifteen thousand men at Stralsund. At any rate, the 8th corps under marshal Mortier was charged to provide against these contingencies. This corps, which had for its first mission to occupy Hesse and to reunite the grand army with the Rhine, was, now that Hesse was disarmed, to awe Prussia and to guard the coast of Germany. It was composed of four divisions: one Dutch, which had become vacant by the return of king Louis to Holland; one Italian, despatched through Hesse to Hanover; two French, which were about to be increased to the full complement with part of the regiments recently drawn from France. One portion of these troops was to besiege the Hanoverian fortress of Hameln, which remained in the hands of the Prussians, another to occupy the Hanseatic towns. The remainder, established towards Stralsund and Anklam, was destined to drive the Swedes back into Stralsund, if they should sally from it, or to proceed to Berlin, if a fit of despair should seize the people of that capital.

General Clarke had orders to concert with marshal Mortier how to parry all accidents. Not a musket had been left in Berlin; and all the *matériel* had been removed to Spandau. Sixteen hundred citizens formed the guard of Berlin, with 800 muskets, which they passed from one to another, only 800 being on duty at once. If a movement of any importance took place, general Clarke was to retire to Spandau, and to wait there for marshal Mortier. The vast cavalry *dépôt* established at Potsdam would always be capable of furnishing a thousand horses for patrol duty and for securing stragglers, who roved about the country since the dispersion of the Prussian army. To such a length had wariness been carried, as to search the woods, in order to collect the cannon which the Prussians had concealed in their flight, and to shut them up in the fortresses.

The corps of marshal Davout, which had entered Berlin before any of the others, had had time to rest there. Napoleon marched it off the first for Cüstrin, and from Cüstrin for the capital of the grand-duchy of Posen. The corps of marshal Augereau, having reached Berlin the second, and sufficiently rested also, was sent by Cüstrin and Landsberg, on the Netze, the road to the Vistula, with instructions to march to the left of marshal Davout. Further to the left still, marshal Lannes, established at Stettin ever since the capitulation of Prenzlau, having while residing there somewhat recruited his troops, reinforced by the 28th light, and supplied with great coats and shoes, had orders to take with him provisions for eight days, to cross the Oder, to pass through Stargard and Schneidmühl, and to join Augereau on the Netze. It is superfluous to add that, before he left Stettin he was to put that fortress into a

state of defence. Lastly, the indefatigable Murat, leaving his cavalry to return by short marches from Lübeck, had orders to repair himself to Berlin, to take the command of the cuirassiers there, who had been resting themselves while the dragoons were running after the Prussians, to join with the cuirassiers Beaumont's and Klein's dragoons, who had not advanced so far as the others in pursuit of the enemy, and remounted moreover with fresh horses in the depôt of Potsdam. With this cavalry, Murat was to join marshal Davout at Posen, to precede him to Warsaw, and to put himself at the head of all the troops sent to Poland, till Napoleon should come to command them himself. The Russians were still at a great distance from the Vistula. Napoleon afforded himself time for the despatch of his numerous affairs in Berlin, and left his brother-in-law to commence the movement upon Poland, and to sound the disposition of the Poles in regard to insurrection. No person was fitter than Murat to excite their enthusiasm, by participating in it himself.

While the French army, crossing the Oder, was about to advance to the Vistula, prince Jerome, having under his command the Wirtembergers and the Bavarians, seconded by an able and vigorous officer, general Vandamme, was to take possession of Silesia, to besiege the fortresses in that province, to push part of his troops as far as Kalisch, and thus to cover against Austria the right of the corps that was to march upon Posen.

The troops despatched to Poland might amount to about 80,000 men—the corps of marshal Davout consisting of 23,000, that of marshal Augereau of 17,000, that of marshal Lannes of 18,000, the detachment of prince Jerome sent to Kalisch of 14,000, lastly, Murat's reserve cavalry, of nine or ten thousand. This was more than would be required to make head against the Russian and Prussian forces which they were likely to meet with at the first moment.

Meanwhile, the corps of marshal Soult and Bernadotte were marching from Lübeck to Berlin. They were to stay some time in that capital, to recruit themselves there, and to get supplied with all that they wanted. Marshal Ney had repaired thither after the capitulation of Magdeburg, and was preparing to march for the Oder. Napoleon, with the imperial guard, with general Oudinot's division of grenadiers and voltigeurs, with the remainder of the reserve cavalry, which was resting itself at Berlin, with the three corps of marshals Soult, Bernadotte, and Ney, would have at his disposal a second army of 80,000 men, at the head of which he was to proceed to Poland, to support the movement of the first.

Marshal Davout, the first despatched for Posen, was a firm and reflective man, of whom no imprudence was to be apprehended. He had been initiated into the real ideas of Napoleon relative to Poland. Napoleon was frankly resolved to repair the serious injury done to Europe by the abolition of that ancient kingdom; but he did not

disguise from himself the immense difficulty of reconstituting a destroyed State, especially with a people whose anarchical spirit was as famous as its valour. He intended, therefore, not to involve himself in such an enterprize, unless upon conditions which should render its success, if not certain, at least sufficiently probable. It was requisite, in the first place, that he should gain signal triumphs while advancing into those plains of the North, where Charles XII. had found his ruin; there was requisite, in the next place, a unanimous rising of the Poles, to concur in those triumphs, and to satisfy him respecting the solidity of the new State that was to be founded amidst three hostile powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. When I see all the Poles afoot, said he to marshal Davout, then will I proclaim their independence, but not till then. He ordered a convoy of arms of all kinds to accompany the French troops, for the purpose of arming the insurrection, in case of its becoming general, as he was assured that it would.

Marshal Davout, preceding the *corps d'armée* which were to start from the Oder, had set himself in motion in the first days of November. He marched with that order and that strict discipline which he was accustomed to maintain among his troops. He had notified to his soldiers that, in entering Poland, they would enter a friendly country, and that it must be treated as such. As we have observed, a certain indiscipline had crept into the ranks of the light cavalry, which has a greater share in the disorders of the war, and contributes more to them. Two soldiers of that arm having committed some excesses, marshal Davout ordered them to be shot, in presence of the third corps.

He advanced upon Posen in three divisions. The country between the Oder and the Vistula is very much like that which extends from the Elbe to the Oder. Most generally you have to traverse sandy plains, upon which wood readily thrives, especially the resinous woods, and in particular the fir; and as there is found beneath the bed of sand a marl fit for culture, sometimes drowned by the sand itself, sometimes rising to the surface: amidst the fir forests you meet with vast clearings tolerably well cultivated, and in these clearings, with a scanty, poor, but robust population, dwelling under wood and thatch. On this soil, the transport of every thing is a matter of unparalleled difficulty, for moving sands are succeeded by clay, in which, when it is soaked with water, you sink to a great depth, so that, after a few days' rain, it is converted into a vast sea of mud. Men perish in it if assistance does not come to extricate them. As for horses, cannon, baggage, they are absorbed, and not the strength of a whole army could save them. Hence war is impracticable in this portion of the plain of the North, unless in summer when the ground is completely dry, or in winter when a cold of several degrees has given to it the consistence of stone. But every intermediate season is fatal to military combinations, especially to the most ingenious, which depend, as every body knows, upon the rapidity of the movements.

These physical characters do not appear all together till you approach the Vistula, and especially further on, between the Vistula and the Niemen. They begin, indeed, to be observed after crossing the Oder. A phenomenon peculiar to these vast plains, which we have already noticed, and which occurs here, is that the sand, raised into hills along the sea, repels the waters towards the interior of the country, where they form numerous lakes, discharge themselves into petty rivers, then unite into larger, till, gradually increasing in magnitude, they become vast streams, like the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula; capable of opening themselves a passage through the barrier of sand. In Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, that is to say, between the Elbe and the Oder, the country which was the theatre of the pursuit of the Prussians by our army, the reader has already had occasion to remark these peculiarities of nature. They become more striking between the Oder and the Vistula. The sands rise, retain the waters, which seek through the Netze and Warta an outlet towards the Oder. The Netze comes from the left, the Warta from the right, for any person proceeding from Berlin to Warsaw, and, after they have both circulated between the Vistula and the Oder, they unite in a single bed, and throw themselves together into the Oder near Cüstrin. The country along the sea forms what is called Prussian Pomerania. It is German by the inhabitants and by spirit. The interior, watered by the Netze and the Warta, is marshy, clayey, and Slavonian by the race of people which inhabits it. It is called Posnania, or grand-duchy of Posen, the capital of which is Posen, a town of some importance, situated on the Warta itself.

This province was the one in which the Polish spirit burst forth with the greatest ardour. The Poles, who became Prussians, seemed to endure the foreign yoke more impatiently than the others. In the first place, the German and the Slavonian races meeting on this frontier of Pomerania and the duchy of Posen, had an instinctive aversion for each other, naturally stronger on the border where they adjoined. Independently of this aversion, the usual consequence of neighbourhood, the Poles did not forget that the Prussians had been, under the great Frederick, the first authors of the partition of Poland, that they have since acted with black perfidy, and completed the ruin of their country, after favouring its insurrection. Lastly, the sight of Warsaw in the hands of the Prussians rendered them the most odious of the partitioning powers. These feelings of hatred were carried to such a length, that the Poles would almost have considered it as a deliverance to escape from the king of Prussia and to belong to an emperor of Russia, who, uniting all the Polish provinces under the same sceptre, should have proclaimed himself king of Poland. There was therefore a stronger disposition to insurrection in the duchy of Posen than in any other part of Poland.

Such was, in physical and moral respects, the country through which the French were marching at this moment. Transported

into a climate so different from their native climate, so different in particular from the climates of Egypt and Italy, where they had lived so long, they were, as ever, merry, confident, and found, in the very novelty of the country which they were traversing, a subject of humorous pleasantry rather than of bitter complaints. Besides, the favourable reception of the inhabitants compensated their hardships; for, on the roads and in the villages, the peasants ran to meet them, offering them victuals and the liquors of their country.

But it is not in the country, it is among conglomerate populations, that is to say in the bosom of cities that the patriotic enthusiasm of nations bursts forth with the greatest energy. At Posen, the moral dispositions of the Poles manifested themselves more strongly than elsewhere. That city which usually contained 15,000 souls soon contained double the number, from the affluence of the inhabitants of the neighbouring provinces thronging to meet their deliverers. It was on the 9th, 10th, and 11th of November that the three divisions of Davout's corps entered Posen. They were received there with such transports of enthusiasm that the grave marshal was touched by them, and that he himself indulged the idea of the re-establishment of Poland, an idea very popular in the mass of the French army, but not at all among its chiefs. Accordingly, he wrote to the Emperor letters strongly impregnated with the sentiment which had just broken forth around him.

He told the Poles that, in order to reconstitute their country, Napoleon must have the certainty of an immense effort on their part, in the first place to assist him to gain great successes, without which he could not impose upon Europe the re-establishment of Poland, and, in the next place, to inspire him with some confidence in the duration of the work which he was about to undertake—a very difficult work, since its object was to restore a State destroyed forty years ago, and which had been degenerating for more than a century. The Poles of Posen, more enthusiastic than those of Warsaw, promised, with the utmost cheerfulness, all that seemed to be desired of them. Nobles, priests, people, ardently wished to be delivered from the German yoke, antipathic to their religion, to their manners, to their race; and at this price there was nothing which they were not ready to do. Marshal Davout had as yet but 3000 muskets to give them; they distributed them among themselves immediately, begging to have thousands of them, and affirming that, whatever the number, they would find arms to carry them. The people formed battalions of infantry, the nobles and their vassals squadrons of cavalry. In all the villages situated between the Upper Warta and the Upper Oder, on the approach of the troops of prince Jerome, the population expelled the Prussian troops, and only spared their lives because the French troops everywhere prevented violence and excesses. From Glogau to Kalisch, prince Jerome's route, the insurrection was general.

At Posen there was established a provisional authority, with which were concerted the measures necessary for subsisting the

French army on its passage. There could not be a question about imposing war contributions on Poland. It was understood that she should be held exempt from the charges laid upon conquered countries, on condition, however, that her strength should be joined to ours, and that she should give up to us some of the corn with which she was so abundantly provided. The new Polish authority concerted with marshal Davout for the erection of ovens, the collection of corn, forage, and cattle. The zeal of the country and some funds seized in the Prussian chests were sufficient for these first preparations. Thus every thing was arranged for receiving the bulk of the French army, and particularly its commander, who was awaited with keen curiosity and ardent hopes.

Nearly about the same time marshal Augereau had reached the boundary which separates Posnania and Pomerania, leaving the Warta on the right, and bearing to the left, along the Netze. He had passed by Landsberg, Driesen, Schneidmühl, through a dreary, poor, moderately populated country, which could not give very expressive signs of life. Marshal Augereau met with nothing that could warm and exalt his imagination; he had great difficulty to march, and would have had still greater difficulty to subsist, but for a convoy of caissons laden with the bread for his troops. In the environs of Nackel, the streams cease to flow towards the Oder, and begin to run towards the Vistula. A canal joining the Netze with the Vistula commences at Nackel, and terminates at the town of Bromberg, which is the entrepôt of the commerce of the country. Augereau's corps found there some relief from its fatigues.

Marshal Lannes had advanced by Stettin, Stargard, Deutsch-Krone, Schneidmühl, Nackel, and Bromberg, flanking the march of Augereau's corps, as the latter flanked the march of Davout's corps. He, too, skirted the boundary of the German and Polish country, and traversed a tract more difficult, more dreary still, than that which marshal Augereau had passed through. He found the Germans hostile, the Poles timid, and, swayed by the impressions which he received from the wild and desert country, from the information which he collected respecting the Poles, in a country which was not favourable to them, he was led to consider the re-establishment of Poland as a rash and even foolish undertaking. We have already made mention of this extraordinary man, of his qualities, of his defects; we shall have frequent occasion to mention him hereafter, in the history of a period during which he was so lavish of his noble life. Lannes, impetuous in his sentiments, consequently unequal in character, inclined to ill-temper, even towards his master to whom he was attached, was one of those whom the sun, hiding or showing his face, by turns depressed and cheered. But, never losing his heroic temper, he recovered in dangers that calm force of which sufferings and crosses had robbed him for a moment. We should not do justice to this superior warrior, were we not to add here that in him a great fund of good sense was so joined to unevenness of temper as to influence him to censure a spirit of

immoderate enterprize in Napoleon, and to draw from him sinister predictions amidst our most glorious triumphs. After the success of the war with Prussia, he was for stopping short at the Oder, and imposed not the least restraint upon himself in the expression of this opinion. On reaching Bromberg, after a toilsome march, he wrote to Napoleon, that he had been traversing a sandy, barren country, without inhabitants, comparable, with the exception of climate, to the desert which must be traversed in going from Egypt to Syria, that the soldiers were dull, and attacked by fever, owing to the wetness of the soil and season; that the Poles were not at all disposed to rise, but trembled under the yoke of their masters; that a judgment of their dispositions must not be formed from the counterfeit enthusiasm of a few nobles attracted to Posen by a fondness for noise and novelty; that, at bottom, they were always fickle, divided, given up to anarchy; and that, by attempting to reconstitute them into one nation, we should uselessly expend the blood of France for a work without solidity and without permanence.

Napoleon, having remained in Berlin till the last days of November, received without surprise the contradictory reports of his lieutenants, and waited till the movement produced by the presence of the French should have spread to all the Polish provinces, in order to form an opinion in regard to the re-establishment of Poland, and to resolve whether to pass through that country as a field of battle, or to erect a grand political edifice upon its soil. He made Murat set out, after having again specified to him the conditions which he intended to attach to the restoration of Poland, and the instructions which he wished to be followed in marching for Warsaw.

The Russians had arrived on the Vistula, and taken possession of Warsaw. The last Prussian corps that king Frederick William had left, placed under the command of general Lestocq, an officer equally discreet and brave, was established at Thorn, having garrisons at Graudenz and Dantzic.

Napoleon desired that, on approaching Warsaw, the different corps of the French army should keep close to each other, in order that, with a mass of 80,000 men, a force far superior to what the Russians could bring together on one point, his lieutenants should be screened from any check. He recommended to them neither to seek nor to accept battle, unless they were very superior in number to the enemy, to advance with great caution, and all of them appuying to the right, to cover themselves from the Austrian frontier. At this period, the Pilica on the left side of the Vistula, the Narew on the right side, both falling into the Vistula near Warsaw, formed the Austrian frontier. By appuying therefore to the right, on leaving Posen, they would be drawing nearer to the Pilica and Narew, they would be covered on all sides by the neutrality of Austria. If the Russians designed to take the offensive, they could not do so without passing the Vistula on our left, in the environs of Thorn, and then, by dropping down on the left, the

French would obtain one of these three results—they should either fling them into the Vistula, or drive them back to the sea, or thrust them upon the bayonets of the second French army marching to Posen. For the rest, it should be added that, if Napoleon, contrary to his custom, did not on this occasion oppose a single mass to the enemy, which would have cut short all difficulties, it was because he knew that the Russians were not 50,000 all together, and because the extreme fatigue of part of his troops, having run as far as Prenzlau and Lübeck, obliged him to form two armies, one composed of those who could march immediately, the other of those who had need of a few days' rest before they started again. Thus it is that circumstances occasion variations in the application of the most invariable principles. It is for the tact of the great general to modify this application safely and fitly.

Napoleon therefore enjoined marshal Davout to bear to the right, as the route from Posen to Warsaw required, to pass through Sempolno, Klodawa, Kutno, Sochaczew, and Blonie, and to send his dragoons direct to the Vistula at Kowal, to give a hand to marshals Lannes and Augereau. Lannes, after indemnifying himself amidst the abundance of Bromberg for the privations of a long route through the sands, had taken the precedence of Augereau. He had orders to ascend the Vistula, and by his right to proceed from Bromberg to Inowracław, Brezesc, Kowal, filing away under the cannon of Thorn, and connecting himself with the corps of marshal Davout, the left of which he was to form. Marshal Augereau soon followed him, and, pursuing the same route, came to form the left of Lannes.

On the 16th of November, and the following days, marshal Davout, preceded by Murat, marched from Posen, where he left every thing in the best order, for Sempolno, Klodawa, Kutno, Lannes, after leaving Bromberg, and filing away in sight of Thorn, while covering himself with the Vistula, found that he was again surrounded by the sands, which are met with almost universally in this part of the course of the Vistula, encountered for a second time sterility, dearth, the desert, and was not on that account the more favourably disposed to the war which was about to be undertaken. He proceeded by Kowal and Kutno to appuy himself on the corps of marshal Davout. Augereau followed at his heels, participating in his impressions, as it frequently happened, for he had more than one resemblance in character to Lannes, though far inferior in talents and energy.

Murat and Davout, not at all tempted to give battle without the Emperor, having orders moreover to avoid it, advanced with great caution to the environs of Warsaw. On the 27th of November, their light cavalry drove a detachment of the enemy's out of Blonie, and advanced to the very gates of the capital. The Russians had been everywhere found retreating, or occupied in destroying provisions, or in removing them from the left bank to the right bank of the

Vistula. In retreating, they merely passed through Warsaw, which no longer seemed to them a place of safety, in proportion as the approach of the French thrilled all hearts there. They therefore recrossed the Vistula, to shut themselves up in a suburb of Praga, situated, as it is well known, on the other bank of the river. On repassing it, they destroyed the bridge of Praga, and sunk or took away with them all the craft that could serve for means of crossing.

Next day Murat, at the head of a regiment of chasseurs and dragoons of Beaumont's division, entered Warsaw. After leaving Posen, the people of the small towns and in the country had shown less cordiality than the inhabitants of that city, because they were restrained by the presence of the Russians. But, in a great population, the expression of its sentiments is proportionate to the feeling of its strength. All the inhabitants of Warsaw had hastened beyond the walls of the city to meet the French. The Poles had, from a secret instinct, long regarded the victories of France as the victories of Poland itself. They had been thrilled by the news of the battle of Austerlitz, fought so near the frontiers of Galicia, and that of Jena, which seemed gained on the very road to Warsaw. The entry of the French into Berlin, and the appearance of Davout on the Oder, had filled them with hope. They beheld at last those French so renowned, so eagerly expected, and at their head that brilliant general of cavalry, a prince to-day, to-morrow a king, who conducted their advanced guard with equal hardihood and glory. They extolled with transport his noble look, his heroic appearance on horseback, and greeted him with a thousand times repeated shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur! vivent les Français.*" A general delirium seized all classes of the population. This time, the resurrection of Poland might be considered as rather less chimerical on witnessing the appearance of the grand army, which, under the great captain, had vanquished all the armies of Europe. Joy, vehement, profound, without reserve, pervaded that unfortunate people, so long the victim of the ambition of the courts of the North, of the effeminacy of the courts of the South, feasting itself with the idea that the hour had at last arrived when the Emperor of the French would make amends for the weaknesses of the kings of France. The Austrians had everywhere destroyed the provisions, but the cordiality of the Poles supplied the deficiency. People quarrelled which should have French soldiers to lodge and to board.

Two days afterwards, marshal Davout's infantry, which had not been able to keep pace with the cavalry, entered Warsaw. There was the same intoxication, there were the same demonstrations, at sight of these veteran warriors, of Auerstädt, Austerlitz, and Marengo. All looked bright at this first moment, when the prospect of difficulties was veiled, as it were, by joy and hope.

Napoleon sincerely designed, as we have already said, to restore Poland. It was, according to his ideas, one of the most useful and most approved ways of renewing that Europe, the face of which he purposed to change. When, in fact, he created new kingdoms, to

form supports for his young empire, nothing was more natural than to raise again the most brilliant and the most to be regretted of the destroyed kingdoms. But, besides the difficulty of wringing great sacrifices of territory from Russia and Prussia, sacrifices which it was not possible to wring from them without fighting to the last extremity, there was another difficulty, that of taking the Gallicias from Austria; and if those provinces were to be left out, if he were to content himself with recomposing new Poland with two-thirds of the old, he should run the very serious risk of exciting in the cabinet of Vienna a redoubled distrust, hatred, ill-will, and perhaps of bringing an Austrian army upon the rear of the French army. Napoleon therefore would not make any but conditional engagements with the Poles, and he decided not to proclaim their independence till they should have deserved it by a unanimous outburst, by a warm zeal to second him, by the energetic resolution to defend the new country which he had recovered for them. Unfortunately, the high Polish nobility, not so easily wrought upon as the people, discouraged by the different insurrections which had been attempted, fearful of being deserted after they had committed themselves, hesitated to throw themselves into the arms of Napoleon, and found, in their actual situation, something better to do than to rise in insurrection to receive from the French an existence, independent but destitute of support, exposed to all dangers, between Prussia, Austria, and Russia. This high nobility, fallen, like Warsaw itself, under the yoke of Prussia, entertained for that court the same aversion which was felt by all the Poles who had become Prussians. Most of the members of the Warsaw nobility would have considered it as a happy change of fortune to become subjects of Alexander, upon condition of being remoulded into one nation, and acting under the emperor of Russia the same part as the Hungarians act under the emperor of Austria. To be united into one and the same nation and transferred from a German master to a Slavonian master seemed to them an almost desirable lot, the only one, at least, to which they ought to aspire in the present circumstances. It was, in the estimation of many of them, secretly influenced by Russian intrigue, the only reconstitution of Poland that was practicable, for Russia, they said, was near at hand, and capable of supporting her work when once undertaken, whereas the existence which they should receive from France would be precarious, ephemeral, and vanish as soon as the French army had withdrawn. It is true that there were some reasons of prudence to be alleged in favour of that idea of a demi-reconstitution of Poland, the offspring of a demi-patriotism: but those who formed this wish forgot that, if the existence which Poland could receive from France was liable to perish when the French had recrossed the Rhine, that which the Russians should give it was exposed to another certain and speedy danger, to the danger of being absorbed in the rest of the empire, of being subjected, in short, to a complete assimilation, a result to which Russia must incessantly tend, and which she would not fail to realise on the

first occasion, as events have since proved. It was therefore necessary either that the Poles should renounce their nationality, or that they should devote themselves to Napoleon, at any cost, at any risk, with all the uncertainties attached to such an enterprize, on the day that this mighty reformer of Europe should appear at Warsaw. Certain motives, less exalted, operated upon that portion of the nobility which gave a cold reception to the deliverance of Poland by the hand of the French; this was the jealousy excited by the Polish generals trained in our armies, returning with reputation, pretensions, an exaggerated sense of their own merit. These various motives, however, did not prevent the generality of the nobles from feeling a lively joy at sight of the French, but they rendered them more prudent, and induced them to make conditions with a man, to whom patriotism would then have advised them not to propose any. But the masses, more unanimous, less restrained by reflection, at that moment better—for there is a moment, a single moment, when reason is of less worth than the impulsion of the passions; it is when that devotedness, even if blind, is the necessary condition of the salvation of a people—the masses, we say, insisted on throwing themselves into the arms of the French, and thrust all into them without distinction, people, nobles, and priests.

Divided between these contrary sentiments, the *grandees* of Warsaw thronged around Murat, and came to submit to him their wishes, not in the form of demands but of advice, and with the aim, as they said, of producing a universal rising of the Polish people. These wishes consisted in soliciting that Napoleon would immediately proclaim the independence of Poland, not confine himself to this act, but select a king from his own family, and solemnly place him on the throne of the Sobieskis. This double guarantee given them, they added, the Poles, no longer doubting the intentions of Napoleon and his firm resolution to uphold his work, would give themselves up to him, body and possessions. The king to be chosen out of the imperial family was already designated—it was that valiant general of cavalry, so well fitted to be the king of a nation of horsemen—it was Murat himself, who actually cherished in his heart the ardent desire of a crown, and particularly of that which was offered to him at this moment, for it corresponded alike with his heroic propensities and with his frivolous and ostentatious taste. He had already accommodated his costume to this new character, and brought from Paris gorgeous habiliments calculated to give his French uniform some resemblance to the Polish uniform.

Murat, ever since his marriage to a sister of Napoleon's, was consumed by the passion for reigning. This passion, which ultimately proved fatal to his glory and his life, had been strengthened by the incitements of his wife, still more ambitious than himself, and capable, in order to accomplish her wishes, of drawing her husband into the most culpable actions. At the sight of this vacant throne of Poland, Murat could no longer curb his impatience. He had therefore no difficulty to adopt the ideas of the Polish nobility, and un-

dertook to communicate them to Napoleon. The commission, however, was a difficult one to execute, for Napoleon, though fully sensible of the brilliant and generous qualities of his brother-in-law, had nevertheless an extreme distrust of the levity of his character, and frequently proved himself a harsh and severe master to him.

Murat guessed full well what reception Napoleon would give to ideas which ran counter to his politics, and which would moreover have the appearance of an interested proposal. He took good care, therefore, not to name the king fixed upon by the Poles: he went no further than to state their ideas in a general manner, and to express their desire that the independence of Poland should be immediately proclaimed and guaranteed by a French king of the Bonaparte family.

Napoleon had himself left Berlin during the march of his *corps d'armée* to Warsaw, and arrived on the 25th of November at Posen. There it was that he received Murat's letter. He needed not to be told what he wished to know. Even under the most artful dissimulation, he detected the secrets of minds, and Murat's dissimulation was not of such a nature as to be very difficult to penetrate. He soon discovered the ambition which swayed that heart, at once so valiant and so weak. It excited equal dissatisfaction with him and with the Poles. He viewed the proposals made to him as calculations, reserves, conditions, a demi-enthusiasm, and those of them that related to himself as dangerous engagements without the equivalent of a powerful co-operation. By a singular concurrence of circumstances, he received on the same day despatches from Paris relative to the celebrated Kosciusko, whom he had purposed to draw from France, and to put at the head of new Poland. This Polish patriot, whom mistaken notions prevented at this period from doing useful service to his country, lived in Paris amidst the small number of discontented men who had not yet forgiven Napoleon the 18th Brumaire, the Concordat, the re-establishment of the monarchy. A few senators, a few members of the old Tribunate, composed this honest and vain society. Kosciusko was wrong to oppose unseasonable contradictions to the only man who then had it in his power to save his country, and who seriously intended to save it. Besides the preliminary engagements proposed by the nobles of Warsaw, and impossible to be taken in the face of Austria, Kosciusko required other political conditions, absolutely puerile, at a moment when the only question was about raising Poland again, before discussing what constitution should be given her. Finding himself thwarted at once by the Poles who had become *ideologues* in Paris, and the Poles who had become Russians in Petersburg, he conceived a distrust and coldness for the matter.

As for what related to Kosciusko, he replied to Fouché, the minister, whom he had commissioned to make proposals to him: "Kosciusko is a fool, who has not in his own country all the importance that he fancies he has, and whom I shall well do without for re-establishing Poland, if the fortune of arms seconds me." He addressed

a dry and severe letter to Murat. "Tell the Poles," he wrote, "that it is not with these calculations, with these personal precautions, that men emancipate their country which has fallen under a foreign yoke; that it is, on the contrary, by rising all at once, blindly, without reserve, and with the resolution to sacrifice fortune and life, that one may have not the certainty but the mere hope to deliver it. I am not come hither," he added, "*to beg a throne for my family, for I am not in want of thrones to give away*; I am come in behalf of the European equilibrium, to attempt the most difficult of enterprizes, by which the Poles have more to gain than any body else, since it is their national existence that is at stake, as well as the interests of Europe. If, by dint of devotedness, they second me so far as that I succeed, I will grant them independence. If not, I will do nothing, and I will leave them under their Prussian and Russian masters. I do not find here in Posen in the provincial nobility all the jealous notions of the nobility of the capital. I find in them frankness, zeal, patriotism, what is requisite, in short, for saving Poland, and what I seek in vain among the great personages of Warsaw."

Napoleon, dissatisfied, but not renouncing on that account the plan of changing the face of the north of Europe by the re-establishment of Poland, resolved not to go to Warsaw, but to remain at Posen, where he was the object of an extraordinary enthusiasm. He contented himself with sending to Warsaw M. Wibiski, a Pole, whose understanding he highly appreciated, a gentleman more versed in the science of law and politics than in that of war, but having a thorough knowledge of his country, and animated with the sincerest patriotism. Napoleon explained to him the difficulties of his situation, in presence of the three old copartners in the partition of Poland, two of whom were in arms against him, and the third ready to declare himself, the necessity he was under of using great delicacy, and of finding in a spontaneous and unanimous movement of the Poles at once a pretext for proclaiming their independence, and a support sufficient to uphold it. His language, perfectly sensible and sincere, persuaded M. Wibiski, who repaired to Warsaw for the purpose of endeavouring to impart his convictions to those of his countrymen most distinguished by their position and their talents.

This singular contest between the Poles, who expected Napoleon to begin with proclaiming their independence, and Napoleon insisting that they ought to set out with deserving it, should not be a motive of censure either for them or him, but a proof of the very difficulty of the enterprize. The Poles thereby acknowledged that they deemed an existence placed at so great a distance from the protector who had restored it to them extremely precarious, and required of him, for their satisfaction, not only a solemn engagement, but also the ties of blood.

Napoleon, on his part, acknowledged that, though powerful enough to pretend to change the face of Europe, bold enough to dare to carry the war to the Vistula, still he hesitated to proclaim

the independence of Poland, having two of the three copartitioners in front and the third on his rear. If, however, it is absolutely necessary to find here matter for censure against some one, it must be against the Poles, at least against those who calculated in that manner. Napoleon, in fact, owed nothing to the Poles, except on account of what they should do for Europe, whose representative he was, while they owed every thing to their country, even an imprudent confidence, were that confidence to entail an aggravation of their evils. When Napoleon was prudent, he did his duty; when the Poles pretended to be so, they failed in theirs; for, in the situation in which they were, their duty was not to be prudent, but devoted, even though they perished.*

Napoleon, established at Posen, among the nobility of the grand-duchy, all of whom flocked around him, employed himself in creating there one of those military establishments with which he was accustomed to mark his route, in proportion as the war was carried to a greater distance. He bought up corn, forage, in particular cloth, for there was at Posen a considerable cloth manufactory; he organized the preserving of provisions, hospitals, all that was requisite, in short, for forming a vast depôt in the heart of Poland. This place, it is true, was not fortified, like Wittenberg and Spandau; it was as open as Berlin, but it had for its defence the affection of the inhabitants, heartily devoted to the cause of the French.

Napoleon then directed the movements of the artillery, conformably to his plan of invasion. Marshal Ney had arrived at Posen. Marshals Soult and Bernadotte were proceeding thither by short marches, after taking in Berlin all the rest that their troops had need of. The guard and the grenadiers, repairing to Posen, surrounded the Emperor there. Prince Jerome had sent off the Bavarians for Kalisch, and with the Wirtembergers commenced with Glogau the investment of the fortresses of Silesia.

Napoleon sent marshal Ney from Posen to Thorn, to endeavour to gain possession of this latter place, and to secure by surprise the passage of the Vistula. He directed marshal Lannes, who had already executed that same movement, to enter Warsaw, to take the place of marshal Davout, as soon as the latter should have re-established the bridges of the Vistula, which connect the city of Warsaw with the suburb of Praga. In ordering marshals Ney and Davout to cross the Vistula as soon as possible at the two points, Thorn

* Marshal Davout, a warm partizan of the re-establishment of Poland, wrote under date of the 4th of December: "The levies of men are very easily raised, but they are in want of persons capable of directing their organization and training. Muskets also are wanting. The public spirit is excellent at Warsaw but the great exert their influence to cool the ardour which is general in the middle classes. The uncertainty of the future alarms them, and they give us plainly to understand that they will not declare themselves openly till by declaring their independence we shall have entered into a tacit engagement to guarantee it.

"Warsaw, 1st December, 1806.

and Warsaw, he recommended to them to secure the passage in a permanent manner by constructing strong *têtes de pont*. He deferred his ulterior movements till the moment when these two bases of operation should be solidly established; and meanwhile he occupied himself in bringing forward, without haste and without fatigue, the two corps of marshals Soult and Bernadotte, that they might enter into line at the head of all his collected forces.

During this interval, marshal Davout, with his *corps d'armée*, Murat with the cavalry reserve, had installed themselves in Warsaw, and were endeavouring to execute the Emperor's orders there. The Russians had employed the time of their stay in that city in carrying off or destroying the provisions, in sinking all the craft, in short in leaving no means of subsistence and no means of passage. Thanks to the zeal of the Poles, they were supplied with great part of what was wanting. Authorized by Napoleon, who never spared the money with which he was provided, bargains were made with Jew dealers, who proved themselves very expert and very clever at extracting from these extensive countries the corn in which they abounded. An Austrian cordon stationed along Galicia prevented the exportation of alimentary commodities. But the Jews were commissioned to remove the difficulty by handsome bribes to the officers of the customs, and by means of the money that was paid them, and by means of all the salt found in the Prussian magazines that was given up to them, they were induced to promise to send down the Pilica into the Vistula, by the Vistula into Warsaw, the wheat and the oats, and to bring, besides, a considerable quantity of meat.

The next thing thought of was the passage of the great river, which cut the capital in two. The weather, alternately rainy and frosty, continued unsettled, which was the worst of atmospheric conditions in such a country, for the Vistula, without being frozen over, floating down enormous flakes of ice, admitted neither of a bridge being thrown over, nor of crossing upon the ice. Detachments of light cavalry had been sent along the banks of the river, to seize the barks which the enemy had not had time to sink, and in this manner a certain number had been collected at Warsaw. Not yet able to throw a bridge, on account of the ice which the current carried down with violence, the French tried to put some detachments over in boats. It required the boldness which the habit of success had imparted to our soldiers and to our generals to venture upon such operations; for these detachments, being conveyed over one after another, might have been carried off before they were sufficiently numerous to defend themselves. But the Russian general who commanded the advanced guard, seeing this commencement to pass, took the alarm, abandoned the suburb of Praga, and retired upon the Narew, a military line, the direction of which we shall presently describe, and which is a few leagues from Warsaw. The French lost no time in taking advantage of this circumstance; a whole division of Davout's corps was carried across

the Vistula, took possession of Praga, and advanced to Jablona. The Vistula appearing somewhat less encumbered with ice, the bridges of boats were re-established, thanks to the seamen of the guard and to the zeal of the Polish boatmen. In a few days, the construction of the bridges of boats being finished, marshal Davout was enabled to pass with his whole corps to the right bank, to establish himself at Praga, and even beyond, in a strong position on the Narew. The corps of Lannes came to make itself amends in Warsaw for the privations which it had suffered in ascending the Vistula. Marshal Augereau replaced him, and took his position below Warsaw, at Utrata, opposite to Modlin, that is to say, opposite to the conflux of the Narew and the Vistula. His corps suffered much there, and had nothing but the bread which Lannes and Murat sent from Warsaw, with the zeal of good comrades.

While the passage of the Vistula was taking place at Warsaw, marshal Ney had marched for Thorn, through Griesen and Inowracław. The Prussian corps of Lestocq, which was still 15,000 strong, after furnishing garrisons for Graudenz and Dantzic, occupied Thorn by a detachment. Marshal Ney approached that town, which, by a situation quite contrary to that of Warsaw, is on the right bank of the Vistula, and has only a mere suburb on the left bank. A vast bridge, resting upon wooden arches, and supported upon an island, united the two banks; but the enemy had almost destroyed it. Marshal Ney, having advanced with merely the head of a column, made a reconnaissance of the banks of the Vistula, in company with colonel Savary, commandant of the 14th of the line. Thorn stands upon the boundary separating the Slavonian country from the German country. The two populations, ever inimical to each other, and never more so than then, were ready to come to blows before the arrival of the French. Some Polish boatmen assisted the troops of marshal Ney, and brought him a sufficient number of boats to carry over a few hundred men. Colonel Savary, with a detachment of his regiment, and some companies of the 69th of the line and of the 6th light, embarked in these boats, and ventured across the wide bed of the Vistula, navigating through the midst of enormous ice-flakes. When he approached, a fire of musketry commenced, and was the more annoying, because the ice-flakes, more compact on the banks than in the middle of the river, scarcely allowed the boats to land. The German boatmen prepared to join their efforts to this local obstacle, for the purpose of preventing the landing of the French. At this sight, the Polish boatmen, bolder and more numerous than the German, fell upon the latter, drove them away, and, wading into the water up to their waists, dragged the boats to the shore under the fire of the Prussians. The 400 French, leaping ashore, immediately darted upon the enemy. Presently, boats sent from the other side of the Vistula, brought fresh detachments, and Ney's troops were sufficiently numerous in Thorn to make themselves masters of the place.

After this daring act, so happily accomplished, marshal Ney set about making an establishment in Thorn for himself and for the corps which were coming to join him. The first thing he did was to repair the bridge, which was no difficult matter, as the destruction had been very incomplete. He discovered boats in great number, because the traffic on the Lower Vistula is more active; indeed, it is so extensive, as to send craft to Warsaw, and to the intermediate points, particularly to Utrata, where they were very necessary to marshal Augereau, for the conveyance of his provisions. He then turned his attention to the conversion of Thorn to the purposes to which Posen and Warsaw had already been applied, that is to say, to the creation of hospitals, of manufactories for preserving provisions, of establishments of all kinds. Bromberg, which is situated on the Nackel canal, at a little distance from Thorn, might there pour in part of its vast resources, and which could be done without delay, by means of the navigation. Ney then ranged the seven regiments of his *corps d'armée* around Thorn, disposing them like radii about a centre, and placing his light cavalry at the circumference, to secure himself from the Cossacks—very nimble runners, and very annoying, too.

When Napoleon learned that, through the zeal and boldness of his lieutenants, he was master of the course of the Vistula at the two principal points, Thorn and Warsaw, he immediately suspended his plan of operations till the end of autumn. He was sufficiently acquainted with the state of the country and the action of the rains on its clayey soil, to decide on taking his winter-quarters. But he intended first to strike the Russians a blow, which, if not decisive, should at least be effective enough to throw them back to the Niemen, and allow him to take his winter-quarters quietly along the Vistula. In order to comprehend clearly the movements which he meditated, we must form an accurate idea of the localities and of the position which the enemy had occupied there.

The king of Prussia, driven from the Oder, had retired upon the Vistula. Driven from the Vistula, he had fallen back upon the Pregel, at Königsberg. Having arrived at this extremity of his kingdom, there was left for him to defend, in concert with the Russians, the space comprised between the Vistula and the Pregel. The soil here exhibits the same characters as between the Elbe and the Oder, between the Oder and the Vistula, that is to say, a long chain of sand-hills parallel to the sea, retaining the waters, and forming a series of lakes extending from the Vistula to the Pregel. These lakes frequently find a channel to flow off, some directly to the sea, by small rivers which throw themselves into it, and the principal of which is the Passarge, the others into the interior of the country by a multitude of streams, such as the Omulew, the Orezyc, the Ukra, which run into the Narew, and by the Narew into the Vistula. This singular country comprised between the Vistula and the Pregel has therefore two slopes, one towards the sea, which is German, formerly colonized by the Teutonic Order, and highly

cultivated; the other turned towards the interior, thinly inhabited, scantily cultivated, covered with thick forests, and almost impenetrable in winter. You find nothing but resources in approaching the sea, nothing but obstacles, difficulty to subsist, when you penetrate into the interior. At the mouth of the Vistula, and at that of the Pregel, are seated two great commercial cities, Dantzic on the first, Königsberg on the second, full, at the period of which we are treating, of immense resources, not only the produce of the country, but such as the English had brought and were daily bringing thither. Dantzic, strongly fortified, provided with a numerous garrison, could not be reduced without a long siege. It was a *point d'appui* for the Russians and Prussians, of great importance, on the Lower Vistula, and rendered our position on the Upper Vistula precarious, by enabling the enemy at all times to pass that river on our left, and to threaten our rear. Königsberg, ill fortified, but defended by the distance, containing the last resources of Prussia in *matériel*, military stores, money, soldiers, officers, was the principal depôt of the enemy, and his medium of communication with the English. Between Dantzic and Königsberg extends the Frische Haff, a vast lagoon, like the lagoons of Venice and Holland, owing to the cause which has produced all the phenomena of this soil and to the accumulation of the sand, which, thrown up in a long bank parallel to the shore, separates the waters of the rivers from the maritime waters, and thus forms an intermediate sea. It is the same phenomenon that is remarked at the mouth of the Oder, by the name of the Great Haff, and at the mouth of the Niemen, by the name of the Curische Haff. Besides Dantzic and Königsberg, other commercial towns, Marienburg, Elbing, Braunsberg, situated along the Frische Haff, form a belt of wealthy and populous cities. These were the last wrecks of the Prussian monarchy left to Frederick William. That monarch, himself fixed at Königsberg, had his troops scattered between Dantzic and Königsberg, trusting to the Russians on the side towards Thorn. He thus defended the maritime slope with 30,000 men, including garrisons. The Russians, with 100,000, occupied the inland slope, backed upon thick forests, and covered by the Ukra and the Narew, rivers which, uniting before they fall into the Vistula, describe an angle, the apex of which supports itself upon that great river a little below Warsaw.

Two combinations were possible on the part of the allies. They could unite in one mass towards the sea, in order to avail themselves of the numerous points of support which they possessed upon the coast, particularly Dantzic, and, passing the Lower Vistula, oblige us to repass the Upper, if we did not choose to be turned. They could also, leaving to the Prussians the charge of guarding the sea, and communicating together by means of a few detachments placed on the line of the lakes, push forward the Russians in advance of the region of the forests, into the angle described by the Ukra and the Narew, thus forming a sort of wedge, and driving the point of it towards Warsaw. Napoleon was ready for either of these cases. If the Prussians and Russians operated in one mass

toward the sea, his intention was to ascend the Narew by the roads running through the inland country, and then, dropping down to the left, throw the enemy into the sea or into the Lower Vistula. If, on the contrary, leaving the Prussians towards the sea, between Dantzic and Königsberg, the Russians advanced along the Narew and the Ukra upon Warsaw, then, breaking in between the two by Thorn, he had determined to wheel about on his right, the extremity of which would rest upon Warsaw, to bear up with his left, so as to separate the Prussians from the Russians by this rotatory movement, and to fling back the latter into the chaos of the woods and marshes of the interior. He should thus cut them off from the resources of the sea, from the succours of England, and force them to flee in disorder through a horrible labyrinth. This separation effected, the maritime region, defended by a few thousand Prussians, would be easy to conquer, and with it he should take all the material riches of the coalition.

Of the two combinations which we have described, the allies seemed to have adopted the second. The Prussians occupied the maritime region, connecting themselves with the Russians by a detachment placed in the environs of Thorn. The Russians were ranged in masses in the inland region, upon the Narew and its tributaries. General Benningsen, who commanded the first Russian army, had fallen back from the Vistula upon the Narew, on the approach of the French, and had taken position in the interior of the angle formed by the Ukra and the Narew. General Buxhövdén, with the second army, composed also of four divisions, was in rear upon the Upper Narew and the Omulew, in the environs of Ostrolenka. General Essen, with the two divisions of reserve, had not yet arrived on the theatre of war. With a view to flatter the passions of the veteran Russian soldiers, there had been given them for commander-in-chief general Kamenski, an old lieutenant of Suwarrow's, having the energetic roughness of the illustrious Muscovite warrior, but none of his talents. Having at first fallen back before the French, the Russians, regretting the ground lost, were moving forward to recover it; but, at sight of our army, fully prepared to receive them, they had resumed their position behind the Ukra and the Narew.

Informed of the situation of the Prussians and Russians, the former established along the sea, the latter crowded together in the inland region, and weakly connected towards Thorn, Napoleon resolved to oppose to them the manœuvre contrived for this case, that is to say, to debouch from Thorn with his left reinforced, to separate the Prussians from the Russians, and to throw the latter into the inextricable difficulties of the interior. He had already directed marshal Ney upon Thorn; he also sent thither marshal Bernadotte, with the first corps and Dupont's division. He pushed forward the corps of marshal Soult intermediately, by Sempolno upon Plock, ordering him to pass the Vistula between Warsaw and Thorn, and recommended to him to connect himself by his left with marshals Ney and Bernadotte, by his right with marshal Augereau. The dragoons mounted at Potsdam having joined the army, Napoleon

united them with the portion of the heavy cavalry which had rested itself in Berlin, and thus composed a second reserve of horse, which he consigned to marshal Bessières, removed for a time from the command of the imperial guard. This second reserve he sent to Thorn. It formed a body of seven or eight thousand horse, which, added to the corps of marshals Ney and Bernadotte, would compose at the extreme left of the French army a column of from forty to forty-five thousand men, quite sufficient to effect the projected rotatory movement. Marshal Soult, at the head of 25,000 men, formed the centre; marshals Augereau, Davout, and Lannes, formed the right, destined to appuy itself upon Warsaw. All these corps were near enough to co-operate with each other, and to present in a few hours 70,000 men assembled on one point, wherever it might be, at which the enemy should be found in force. Napoleon supposed, therefore, that, his left advancing by rapid marches while his right wheeled round slowly, he might take the Russians in hand by the way, and, after he had separated them from the Prussians, drive them from the Ukra to the Narew, from the Narew to the Bug, far from the sea, and bury them in the interior of Poland. If the weather, favouring such designs, should facilitate marches, it was possible that the Russians might be forced back so far from their base of operation, and from the country on which they subsisted, that their rout would become a signal disaster.

Being desirous to wheel round upon Warsaw, but also to be able to move away from it if necessary, in case he should be obliged to follow the movement of his left, and to ascend with it, Napoleon had considerable works constructed in the suburb of Praga. He ordered it to be fortified by means of earth-works, provided with a revêtement in wood, which was equal to a scarp in masonry. This suburb, thus fortified, would serve for a *tête de pont* to Warsaw. Napoleon enjoined marshal Davout, who had proceeded from the Vistula to the Narew, to throw a bridge over the latter river and to put it into a state of defence. He directed marshal Augereau, who was preparing to pass the Vistula at Modlin, to establish there also a permanent bridge, and to render it unassailable on both banks. He charged general Chasseloup to mark out the works ordered. He recommended to him to employ earth and timber exclusively for them, to mount upon them the heavy artillery taken from the enemy, and to draw thither by good wages Polish workmen in great number. Napoleon was desirous that these fortifications of earth and wood, raised to an equality with a permanent fortification, should, on his leaving there the Poles of the new levy and a few French detachments, suffice for their own defence, while the army was pushing onward, if the course of the operations undertaken should require it to do so.

The orders of Napoleon were always punctually executed, unless absolute impossibility prevented, because he paid incessant attention to their execution, and urged it on most perseveringly. General Chasseloup pushed forward the prescribed works with activity, but

he had difficulty to procure workmen. The violences committed by the Russians, and the dread of similar violences on the part of the French, had induced the peasants to betake themselves, with their families, their cattle, and their means of conveyance, to the territory of Austrian Poland, the frontier of which, being extremely near, and closed against both the belligerent armies, offered a ready and a safe asylum. The inhabitants of whole villages had fled, headed by their priests, to escape the horrors of war. Hands were not to be procured, even at very high prices. There were some, it is true, at Warsaw, but the construction of ovens, the organization of the military establishments, which required to be proportioned to an army of 200,000 men, absorbed almost all of them. None at all were left to be employed elsewhere. Soldiers had to supply their place. Unfortunately, the latter began to flag, and to feel the influences of the season, which was hitherto rather wet than cold. They had also to suffer privations. The provisions ordered in Galicia were long in coming, and even at Warsaw there was found some difficulty to subsist. Marshal Lannes was encamped there with his two divisions. Marshal Davout was encamped beyond; that is to say, on the bank of the Narew, which falls into the Vistula a little below Warsaw. It was about eight leagues from Warsaw to the Narew, and in that space there were abundance of heaths, little cultivated land, and few dwelling-houses. Soldiers of Davout's corps, being obliged to eat pork for want of beef and mutton, were attacked with dysentery. They had no bread but what was sent them from day to day. Marshal Davout had his head-quarters at Jablona, and his column head on the very bank of the Narew, towards Okunin, opposite to the conflux of the Ukra and the Narew. Marshal Davout, in spite of the Russian advanced guards, had passed the Narew, thrown a bridge over that river, with the aid of some boats which had been collected, and had labourers engaged upon defensive works at both extremities of this bridge. He had it in his power, therefore, to manœuvre on either bank of the Narew. Still, having crossed it below the point where it is joined by the Ukra, he had yet to cross it higher up, or to cross the Ukra itself, in order to penetrate into the angle occupied by the Russians. But they were numerous there, and solidly entrenched on woody, elevated ground, and armed with artillery. It was impossible to attack them without passing the Ukra by main force. Such an attempt must necessarily bring on a battle, which was not to be sought but in the presence of Napoleon.

Marshal Davout's labourers almost gave the hand to those of marshal Augereau, who was actively engaged in establishing himself upon the Vistula, near Modlin, at the point where the Vistula and Narew join. But he was destitute of the necessary means, for the Russians had destroyed every thing in retiring. Twelve boats, picked up above and below Modlin, had served him to put one detachment after another across the river. He set about building a spacious bridge at Modlin, with defensive works on both banks. His troops, amidst the sands which prevail in this part of the country, fared still worse than those of marshal Davout. He was

impatient to remove to Plonsk, beyond the Vistula, opposite to the Ukra, in a more fertile country. Marshal Soult had performed the marches ordered by the Emperor, and had begun to pass at Plock, whence he could either join marshal Augereau at Plonsk, or marshals Ney and Bernadotte at Biezun, according to circumstances. As for the corps which had Thorn for their base of operation, these were in want of nothing.

These rapid conquerors, who had so speedily overrun Austria last year, and Prussia last month, found their triumphal march slackened by a damp and dreary climate, by a moving soil, alternately sandy and muddy, by the want of provisions, becoming scarcer in proportion as population and cultivation diminished. They were surprised at this, not cast down, indulged in a thousand sarcastic sallies on the attachment of the Poles to such a country, and desired nothing better than to fall in with the enemy of Austerlitz, that they might revenge upon him the annoyances of soil and climate.

On seeing the Russians by turns advance and fall back, then retire for the last time, with all the appearances of a definitive retreat, Napoleon conceived that they were retiring to the Pregel, with the intention of taking up their winter-quarters there. He therefore ordered Murat and Bessières to pursue them at the head of 25,000 horse, the one debouching from Warsaw with the first reserve of cavalry, the other debouching from Thorn with the second. But the more accurate reports of marshal Davout, who, placed at the conflux of the Narew and the Ukra, beheld the Russians solidly established on both rivers, the corresponding reports of marshal Augereau, and in particular of marshal Ney, who was in the habit of observing the enemy very closely, soon undeceived him, and proved to him that it was high time to march against the Russians, that it was even necessary to do so, if he was not disposed to let them winter in a position too near to that of the French army. Besides, the bridges over the Vistula, which he purposed to make his *points d'appui*, were finished, provided with a commencement of defensive works, and capable of a sufficient resistance, if some troops were placed in them.

Napoleon therefore left Posen in the night between the 15th and 16th of December, after a stay of nineteen days, passed through Kutno and Lowicz, gave orders everywhere for provisions, and for medical and surgical stores, in case of a retrograde movement, not very probable, but always kept sight of by his prudence; and lastly superintended the march of his columns for Warsaw, and was particularly attentive to the despatch of the guard and Oudinot's grenadiers for that city.*

* We quote the following letter, as it clearly indicates the state of things at the moment to which the above particulars relate.

To General Clarke.

Lowicz, 18th December, 1806, 7 P.M.

I have arrived at Lowicz. I write to you to relieve you from every kind of

He entered the capital of Poland at night, to avoid noisy demonstrations, for it did not suit him to pay for a few popular acclamations by imprudent engagements. Wibiski, the Pole, had preceded him, and exerted all his powers to persuade his countrymen that they ought to devote themselves to him. Many of them had been won by the reasons which he gave them. Prince Poniatowski, nephew of the last king, young, brilliant, and brave, a kind of hero lulled to sleep in the lap of voluptuousness, but ready to awake at the first clash of arms, was one of those who had offered themselves to second the plans of Napoleon. Count Potocki, old Malakouski, marshal of one of the last Diets, and others who had come to Warsaw, had collected around the French authorities, to concur in forming a government. A provisional administration had been composed, and all began to go on well, with the exception of the inevitable skirmishes between persons of little experience and strongly inclined to jealousy. Men were raised and battalions organized, either at Warsaw or at Posen. Napoleon, in order to assist the new Polish government, had exempted it from all contribution, on condition of its furnishing provisions in case of emergency. For the rest, the high society of Warsaw paid him extraordinary homage. All the Polish nobility had left their country seats, impatient to see him, to meet the great man, as well as the deliverer of Poland.

Having arrived in the night between the 18th and 19th, Napoleon mounted his horse in the morning, in order to reconnoitre himself the position of marshal Davout on the Narew. A thick fog prevented him. He made his dispositions for attacking the enemy on the 22nd or 23rd of December. It is high time, he wrote to marshal Davout, to take our winter-quarters; but this cannot be done till we have driven back the Russians.

The four divisions of general Benningsen first presented themselves. Count Tolstoy's division, posted at Czarnowo, occupied the apex of the angle formed by the junction of the Ukra and the Narew. That of general Sacken, also placed in rear towards Lopaczyn, guarded the banks of the Ukra. The division of prince Gallitzin was in reserve at Pultusk. The four divisions of general Buxhövdén were at a great distance from those of general Benningsen, and not calculated to

uneasiness. There is no news here. The armies are in presence. The Russians are on the right bank of the Narew, and we on the left. Besides Praga, we have two *têtes de pont*, one at Modlin, the other on the Narew, at the mouth of the Ukra. We have Thorn, and an army twenty leagues in advance manœuvring upon the enemy. All this news is for yourself. It is possible that, before the end of eight days, there may be an affair that will put an end to the campaign. Take your precautions, that there may not be a musket left either in Berlin or in the country, that Spandau and Cüstrin are in a good state, and that every body does good service.

Write to Mayence and to Paris, merely to say that you are writing, that there is no news. This must be done in general every day, when I have no couriers passing: that baffles unfavourable reports.

NAPOLÉON.

render support to him. Two detachments at Popowo observed the country between the Narew and the Bug. Two others were encamped still further off, at Makow and Ostrolenka. The Prussians, driven out of Thorn, were on the upper course of the Ukra, towards Soldau, connecting the Russians with the sea. As we have said, general Essen's two divisions of reserve had not yet arrived. The total mass of the allies destined to enter into action was about 115,000 men.

It is easy to perceive that the distribution of the Russian corps was not judiciously combined in the angle of the Ukra and the Narew, and that they had not sufficiently concentrated their forces. If, instead of having a single division at the point of the angle, and one on each side at too great a distance from the first, lastly, five out of reach, they had distributed themselves with intelligence over ground so favourable for the defensive; if they had strongly occupied, first the conflux, then the two rivers, the Narew from Czarnowo to Pultusk, the Ukra from Pomichowo to Kolozomb; if they had placed in reserve in a central position, at Nasielsk, for example, a principal mass, ready to run to any threatened point, they might have disputed the ground with advantage. But generals Benningesen and Buxhövdén were on bad terms; they disliked to be near each other: and old Kamenski, who had arrived only the preceding day, had neither the necessary intelligence nor spirit for prescribing other dispositions than they had adopted in following each of them their own whim.

Napoleon, who saw the position of the Russians from without only, certainly concluded that they were entrenched behind the Narew and the Ukra, for the purpose of guarding the banks, but without knowing how they were established and distributed there. He thought that it would be advisable to take, in the first place, the conflux, where, it was probable, they would defend themselves with energy, and, having carried that point, to proceed to the execution of his plan, which consisted in throwing the Russians, by a wheel from left to right, into the marshy and woody country in the interior of Poland. In consequence, having repeated the order to marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, forming his left, to proceed rapidly from Thorn to Biezun on the upper course of the Ukra, to marshals Soult and Angereau, forming his centre, to set out from Plock and Modlin, and form a junction at Plonsk on the Ukra, he put himself at the head of his right, composed of Davout's corps, Lannes' corps, of the guard, and the reserves, resolved to force immediately the position of the Russians at the conflux of the Ukra and the Narew. He left in the works of Praga the Poles of the new levy, with a division of dragoons, a force sufficient to ward off all accidents, as the army was not to remove far from Warsaw.

Having arrived on the morning of the 23rd of December at Okunin on the Narew, in wet weather, by muddy and almost impassable roads, Napoleon alighted to superintend in person the dispositions of attack. This general, who, according to some critics, while directing armies of 300,000 men, knew not how to lead a brigade into

fire, went himself to reconnoitre the enemy's positions and to place his forces on the ground, down to the very companies of the *voltigeurs*.

The Narew had been already crossed at Okunin, below the conflux of the Ukra and the Narew. To penetrate into the angle formed by those two rivers, it was necessary to pass either the Narew or the Ukra above their point of junction. The Ukra, being the narrower of the two, was deemed preferable for attempting a passage. Advantage had been taken of an island which divided it into two arms, near its mouth, in order to diminish the difficulty. On this island, the French had established themselves, and they had yet to pass the second arm to reach the point of land occupied by the Russians between the Ukra and the Narew. This point of land, covered with woods, coppices, marshes, looked like one very dense thicket. Further off, the ground became somewhat clearer, then rose and formed a steep declivity, which extended from the Narew to the Ukra. To the right of this natural entrenchment appeared the village of Czar-nowo on the Narew, to the left the village of Pomichowo on the Ukra. The Russians had advanced guards of *tirailleurs* in the thicket, seven battalions and a numerous artillery on the elevated part of the ground, two battalions in reserve, and all their cavalry in rear. Napoleon repaired to the island, mounted the roof of a barn by means of a ladder, studied the position of the Russians with a telescope, and immediately made the following dispositions. He scattered a great quantity of *tirailleurs* all along the Ukra, and to a considerable distance above the point of passage. He ordered them to keep up a brisk firing, and to kindle large fires with damp straw, so as to cover the bed of the river with a cloud of smoke, and to cause the Russians to apprehend an attack above the conflux, towards Pomichowo. He even directed to that quarter Gauthier's brigade, belonging to Davout's corps, in order the more effectually to draw the enemy's attention thither. During the execution of these orders, he collected at dusk all the companies of *voltigeurs* of Morand's division on the intended point of passage, and ordered them to fire from one bank to the other, through the clumps of wood, to drive off the enemy's posts, while the seamen of the guard were equipping the craft collected on the Narew. The 17th of the line and the 13th light were in column ready to embark by detachments, and the rest of Morand's division was assembled in rear, in order to pass as soon as the bridge was established. The other divisions of Davout's corps were at the bridge of Okunin, awaiting the moment for acting. Lannes was advancing at a rapid pace from Warsaw to Okunin.

The seamen of the guard soon brought some boats, by means of which several detachments of *voltigeurs* were conveyed from one bank to the other. These penetrated into the thicket, while the officers of the pontoniers and the seamen of the guard were occupied in forming a bridge of boats with the utmost expedition. At seven in the evening, the bridge being passable, Morand's division crossed in close column, and marched forward, preceded by the 17th of the

line and the 13th light, and by a swarm of *tirailleurs*. They advanced under cover of the darkness and the wood. The sappers of the regiments cleared a passage through the thicket for the infantry. No sooner had they overcome these first obstacles, than they found themselves unsheltered, opposite to the elevated plateau which runs from the Narew to the Ukra, and which was defended either by *abattis* or by a numerous artillery. The Russians, amidst the darkness of the night, opened upon our columns a continuous fire of grape and musketry, which did us some mischief. While the *voltigeurs* of Morand's division and the 13th light approached as *tirailleurs*, colonel Lanusse, at the head of the 17th of the line, formed in column of attack on the right, to storm the Russian batteries. He had already carried one of them, when the Russians, advancing in mass upon his left flank, obliged him to fall back. The rest of Morand's division came up to the support of the first two regiments. The 13th light, having exhausted its cartridges, was replaced by the 30th, and again they marched by the right to the attack of the village of Czarnowo, while, on the left, general Petit proceeded with 400 picked men to the attack of the Russian entrenchments facing the Ukra, opposite to Pomichowo. In spite of the darkness, they manœuvred with the utmost order. Two battalions of the 30th and one of the 17th attacked Czarnowo, one by going along the bank of the Narew, the two others, by directly climbing the plateau on which that village is seated. These three battalions carried Czarnowo, and, followed by the 51st and the 61st regiments, debouched on the plateau, driving back the Russians into the plain beyond it. At the same moment general Petit had assaulted the extremity of the enemy's entrenchments towards the Ukra, and, seconded by the fire of artillery, kept up by Gauthier's brigade from the other side of the river, had carried them. At midnight the assailants were masters of the position of the Russians from the Narew to the Ukra, but, from the tardiness of their retreat, which could be discerned in the dark, it was to be inferred that they would return to the charge, and, for this reason, marshal Davout sent the second brigade of Gudin's division to the assistance of general Petit, who was most exposed. During the night, the Russians, as it had been foreseen, returned three times to the charge, with the intention of retaking the position which they had lost, and hurling down the French from the plateau towards that point of woody and marshy ground on which they had landed. Thrice were they suffered to approach within thirty paces, and each time the French, replying to their attack by a point-blank fire, brought them to a dead stand, and then, meeting them with the bayonet, repulsed them. At length, the night being far advanced, they betook themselves, in full retreat, towards Nasielsk. Never was night action fought with greater order, precision, and hardihood. The Russians left us in killed, wounded, and prisoners, about 1,800 men, and a great quantity of artillery. We had on our side 600 wounded, and about one hundred killed.

Napoleon, who had not quitted the site of action, congratulated general Morand and marshal Davout on their gallant conduct, and hastened to reap the consequences of the passage of the Ukra, and to give such orders as the circumstance required. The Russians, deprived of the *point d'appui* which they possessed at the conflux of the Ukra and the Narew, were not likely to be tempted to defend the Ukra, the line of which had just been forced at its mouth. But, ignorant as the French were of their real situation, it was to be apprehended that they were in force at the bridge of Kolozomb, on the Ukra, opposite to Plonsk, the point at which the corps of marshals Soult and Augereau were to meet. Napoleon directed the cavalry reserve, commanded by general Nansouty in the absence of Murat, who had been taken ill at Warsaw, to ascend the Ukra on both shores, to beat the banks as far as Kolozomb, to give a hand to marshals Augereau and Soult, to assist them to pass the Ukra if they met with any difficulties, to connect them, in short, with marshal Davout, who was to march on before, and cross, at about the middle, the country comprised between the Ukra and the Narew. He ordered marshal Davout to proceed direct for Nasielsk, and despatched the guard and the reserve to support him. Lastly, he gave marshal Lannes instructions to cross the Ukra, at the same place where the passage had just been forced, and to ascend, on the right of Davout's corps, along the Narew to Pultusk. This town became a point of great importance, for the Russians, flung back from the Ukra upon the Narew, had no bridges, but those of Pultusk, for crossing the latter river. The order already despatched to marshals Soult and Augereau to march for Plonsk and cross the Ukra there, and to marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières to advance rapidly to Biezun, was, of course, confirmed.

Napoleon, continuing to keep with marshal Davout, resolved to march the same morning of the 24th for Nasielsk, notwithstanding the fatigues of the night. The precaution was, however, taken to place Friant's division at the head, in order to afford a few hours' rest to Morand's division, fatigued with the action of Czarnowo. About dusk they arrived at Nasielsk and there found in position Tolstoy's division, the same that had been driven from Czarnowo. It manifested an intention of making some resistance, for the purpose of giving the detachments sent to the Ukra time to join it.

We have already said that general Benningsen's four divisions were: Tolstoy's division at Czarnowo, to defend the conflux of the two rivers; Sacken's division at Lopaczyn, to watch the Ukra; Sedmaratzki's division at Zebroszki, to guard the Narew; lastly Gallitzin's division at Pultusk, to act as reserve, the latter, though at a great distance from the Ukra, having a strong advanced guard on that river, commanded by general Barklay de Tolly—a confused and complicated disposition, which bespoke a very feeble direction in the operations of the Russian army. The natural movement of these divisions, surprised by a vigorous attack on the Ukra, would have been to withdraw their detachments, in order to their retreating

upon the Narew. This was in fact the movement which they did adopt, and which their general-in-chief allowed to be executed rather than enjoined.

Count Tolstoy, commandant of the division which had fallen back upon Nasielsk, had maintained his ground there, till the moment when he saw the detachment charged to guard the Ukra towards Borkowa coming back pursued by the reserve cavalry. However, general Friant, having deployed his division facing the Russians, and marched up to them, obliged them to retire in the greatest haste. The dragoons dashed after them: some hundred men were killed or taken, and cannon and baggage picked up.

On this same 24th, marshal Augereau, having arrived on the banks of the Ukra, resolved to force the passage. He had the bridges of Kolozomb and Sochoczyn attacked simultaneously. The 14th of the line, under colonel Savary, who had passed the Vistula at Thorn on the 6th of December,* threw himself upon the scarcely repaired relics of the bridge of Kolozomb, and heroically passed it amidst a tremendous fire of musketry. This brave colonel fell on the other bank, having received several lance wounds. At Sochoczyn, the attack on the bridge having miscarried, the French proceeded to a neighbouring ford, and effected the passage. Thus Augereau's corps crossed, on the 24th, to the other bank of the Ukra, and advanced, pushing before it the detachments of the different Russian divisions left to guard that river. They were likewise pursued by the reserve cavalry, under the command of general Nansouty. The French marched towards Nowomiasto, in the direction from the Ukra to the Narew, so as to connect themselves with the corps of marshal Davout. To the left of Augereau's corps, marshal Soult was preparing to pass the Ukra, near Sochoczyn. The left, under Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, continued to ascend by a rapid movement from Thorn towards Biezun and Soldau.

On the morning of the 25th, Napoleon directed his columns upon Strezegocin. The weather had become frightful for an army which had to manœuvre, and above all to execute several reconnaissances, in order to discover the plans of the enemy. A complete thaw, accompanied with melting snow and rain, had soaked

* Those readers who recollect having seen the 14th of the line, with its colonel, Savary, distinguishing itself in the passage of the Vistula at Thorn, will find it difficult to comprehend how that same regiment could be, on the 24th of December, under marshal Augereau at the passage of the Ukra at Kolozomb. The explanation is easy: that regiment, left at Bromberg by marshal Augereau when he ascended the left bank of the Vistula from Thorn to Modlin, remained for a moment at the disposal of marshal Ney, and effected under his orders the passage of the Vistula at Thorn.

We should not have added this note, which may appear useless, if some inattentive and ignorant critics had not accused us of making corps figure in different actions in which they had no share. There are attacks about which one ought not to care; yet, out of respect for the impartial reader, we are anxious to prove to him that we have spared no pains to arrive at the strictest accuracy.

the ground to such a degree, that in certain places the men sank up to the knees; and some of them were even found half buried in this soil, suddenly changed into a quagmire. They were obliged to double the teams of the artillery, before they could move forward a few paces. They were gainers by this state of things, it is true, as they captured at every step the cannon and baggage of the Russians, many laggards and wounded, and lastly, a considerable number of Polish deserters, who voluntarily stayed behind to give themselves up to the French army. But they lost, on the other hand, the inestimable advantage of celerity, the benefit of the artillery, which they could no longer take with them, and the means of information, which are always proportionate to the facility of communication. Figure to yourself immense plains, covered alternately with mud and thick forests, for the most part thinly peopled, and still more scantily since the general emigration of the inhabitants, armies in pursuit or in flight through this miry desert, and you will have an idea, though inadequate, of the spectacle exhibited at this moment by the French and Russians in this part of Poland.

Napoleon discerning imperfectly the enemy's movements in this flat and woody country, and unable to make amends by repeated reconnaissances for what he could not see, was plunged into the most perplexing uncertainty. It seemed indeed to him that the retreating Russian columns were proceeding from his left to his right, from the Ukra towards the Narew. Accordingly, he had sent Lannes towards Pultusk, and, thinking that he could perceive a body of the enemy following Lannes, he had detached Gudin's division from Davout's corps, to follow the pursuers, and to prevent them from attacking Lannes in rear. But a large assemblage appeared in front of him, in the direction of Golymin. Reports were received of the presence of numerous forces, which had arrived upon the rear of the Russian army at this point. It was said that a corps of 20,000 men was retiring from the Ukra towards Ciechanow and Golymin. Amidst this chaos, Napoleon, resolving to fall forthwith upon the nearest enemy, towards whom, besides, all the others seemed to converge, left Lannes, escorted by Gudin's division, to proceed to the right upon Pultusk, and, as for himself, he advanced direct towards Golymin, with two of Davout's three divisions, with Augereau's entire corps, with the guard and the reserve cavalry. He moreover ordered marshal Soult, who had passed the Ukra, to go to Ciechanow itself. He enjoined marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, who had left Thorn, to continue their rotatory movement by Biezun, Soldau, and Mlawa, which would bring them upon the flank and nearly upon the rear of the Russians.

In this manner, the troops marched, with the greatest difficulty, the whole of the 25th and the morning of the 26th, taking two hours, sometimes three, to advance a league.

Meanwhile, the different corps of the Russian army had not taken precisely the direction which Napoleon had conjectured. Nearly the whole of general Benningesen's four divisions had fallen back upon

Pultusk. Tolstoy's division, driven from Czarnowo to Nasielsk, from Nasielsk to Strezegocin, had followed the road which runs across the middle of the tract between the Ukra and the Narew. On its arrival at Strezegocin, it had borne to the right towards Pultusk, as soon as it was able to rally its scattered detachments. Sedmaratzki's division, posted in the preceding days at Zebroszki, on the bank of the Narew, having but a few steps to go to reach Pultusk, had repaired thither immediately. Gallitzin's division, which, though its head-quarters were at Pultusk, had posts on the Ukra, had concentrated itself upon Pultusk. But the detachments of that division which guarded the Ukra, cut off by our cavalry, had sought refuge at Golymin. Lastly, Sacken's division, which particularly guarded the Ukra, and had its head-quarters at Lopaczyn, being annoyed by the French cavalry, had retired, partly to Golymin, partly to Pultusk. Thus Tolstoy's and Sedmaratzki's two entire divisions, and part of Gallitzin's and Sacken's two divisions, were on the 26th at Pultusk. The other part of Gallitzin's and Sacken's divisions, which had taken refuge in Golymin, had fallen in with one of Buxhövdén's divisions, Doctorow's division, which had moved forward, and thus given rise to the report of an assemblage of troops on the rear of the Russian army. Lastly, the Prussians, in flight before marshals Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, had quitted the Ukra, and were retiring by Soldau upon Mlaw, incessantly striving in their retreat to connect themselves with the Russians.

On the morning of the 26th, Lannes came in sight of Pultusk. He there discovered a mass of forces far superior to that which he had at his disposal. The four Russian divisions, though two of them were incomplete, numbered no fewer than 43,000 men.* Lannes, with general Becker's dragoons, had no more than 17 or 18 thousand. Five or six thousand were coming on his left with Gudin's division. Lannes, however, was but very vaguely apprized of this circumstance, and, in the state of the roads, this reinforcement, though at an inconsiderable distance from Pultusk, could not reach the field of battle till very late. Lannes was not a man to be daunted. Neither he nor his soldiers feared to meet the Russians, whatever might be their number, however tried their bravery. Lannes drew up his little army in order of battle, having taken care to send a messenger to marshal Davout to inform him of the unexpected force which he had just met with at Pultusk, and which placed him in a most critical situation.

A vast forest covered the environs of Pultusk. On issuing from this forest, you found yourself on open ground, dotted here and there with clumps of trees, drenched with rain, like all the rest of the country, rising gradually in form of a plateau, and then terminating abruptly in a steep declivity towards Pultusk and the Narew. On this ground general Benningsen had drawn up his army, having

* Ploto, the narrator, an officer of the Russian army, and an eye-witness, likewise sets down the number at 43,000.

its back turned to the town, one of its wings appuyed on the river and the bridge which crosses it, the other on a patch of wood. A strong reserve formed a support to his centre. His cavalry was placed in the intervals of his line of battle and a little in advance. Though they had lost part of their artillery, the Russians took with them so great a quantity ever since the campaign of Austerlitz, that they had sufficient left to cover their front with a line of guns, and to render the approach to that front extremely formidable.

Lannes had to oppose to them only a few pieces of small calibre, which had been dragged through the mud with the greatest exertions and by the united efforts of all the teams of the artillery. He placed Suchet's division in first line, and kept Gudin's division in reserve on the skirt of the forest, to have wherewithal to meet any events which might threaten to become serious, in the uncertainty in which every one was plunged. A few men well directed might suffice to carry this position, and had the advantage of affording less scope to the formidable artillery of the Russians. Lannes debouched, therefore, from the forest with Suchet's single division, formed into three columns; one on the right, under general Claparède, composed of the 17th light, and of general Treilhard's light cavalry; one on the left, under general Reille, composed of the second battalion of the 88th, of the 34th of the line, and of general Becker's dragoons. The plan of Lannes was to attack by his right, and towards the Narew, for, if he could but penetrate to the town, he should at once deprive the position of the Russians of all its advantages, and even place them in a disastrous situation.

He moved forward his three little columns, sallying boldly from the woods, and climbing the plateau under a shower of grape. Unfortunately the ground, soaked with rain and rendered slippery, scarcely admitted of that impetuosity of attack which might have made amends for the disadvantage of number and position. Nevertheless, advancing with difficulty, they came up to the enemy, and drove him back towards the abrupt declivities terminating the ground in a kind of fall towards the Narew and Pultusk. The French marched with ardour, and were about to throw the Russian troops of general Bagowout from the plateau into the river, when the general-in-chief, Benningsen, sent in the utmost haste to the aid of general Bagowout part of his reserve, which took in flank Claparède's brigade, forming the head of our attack. Lannes, who was in the thick of the fray, answered this manœuvre by moving from his centre towards his right Vedel's brigade, composed, as we have just said, of the 64th and the first battalion of the 88th. He himself took in flank the Russians who had come to succour general Bagowout, and driving them one upon the other towards the Narew, he would have put an end to the struggle at this point, and perhaps to the battle, if, amidst a violent squall of snow, the battalion of the 88th, surprised by the Russian cavalry before it could form into square, had not been broken and overturned. But this brave battalion was presently

rallied by one of those officers whose character is rendered conspicuous by danger. This officer, named Voisin, recovering himself immediately, and taking advantage, in his turn, of the embarrassments of the Russian cavalry, despatched with the bayonet those horsemen floundering, like our foot-soldiers, in a sea of mud.

Thus, on the right and at the centre, the action, though less decisive than it might have been, turned nevertheless to the advantage of the French, who left the Russians backed to the margin of the plateau, and liable to a dangerous fall towards the town and the river. On the left, our third column, composed of the 34th of the line, the second battalion of the 88th, and general Becker's dragoons, had to contend with the enemy for the patch of trees upon which the centre of the Russians appuyed itself. The 34th, directed by general Reille, and saluted unawares by unmasked batteries, suffered severely. Seconded by the charges of general Becker's dragoons, it carried the patch of wood; but some battalions of general Barklay de Tolly's retook it. Again the French made themselves masters of it, and maintained for three hours an obstinate and unequal fight. At length, on this point, as on the others, the Russians, forced to give way, were obliged to back as closely as possible to the town. Lannes, having got rid of the combat on the right, had moved to the left to encourage the troops by his presence. If at this moment he had been less uncertain what was passing elsewhere, and more assured of being supported, he might have brought Gazan's division into action, and then it would have been all up with the Russians, who would have been hurled down the back of the plateau and drowned in the Narew. But Lannes saw, beyond his right, and at the extreme right of the Russians, Tolstoy's division, bordering the ravine of Moczyn, and forming a hook in rear to cover the extremity of the position. He deemed it more prudent not to engage all his troops, and, by his orders, Gazan's brave division remained motionless on the skirt of the forest, exposed at the distance of three hundred paces to the balls of the enemy, but rendering the service of awing the Russians, and deterring them also from fighting with the whole of their forces.

The day was closing when Gudin's division at length arrived upon our left, hidden by the woods from our army, but perceived by the Cossacks, who immediately apprized general Benningsen of the circumstance. Of all its artillery Gudin's division brought but two pieces, which were dragged with great labour to the field of battle. It faced the extreme right of the Russians, and the point of the angle formed by the bending back of their line. General Daultanne, who, on that day, commanded Gudin's division, after a few rounds of cannon-shot, formed *en échelons* by his left, and marched resolutely up to the enemy, previously apprizing marshal Lannes of his entering into action. His attack produced a decisive effect, and forced the Russians to fall back. But this division, already separated by the woods from Lannes' corps, increased by

advancing the interval which parted them. At this instant a squall of wind drove rain and snow into the faces of our soldiers. The Russians, from a superstitious notion of northern people, which caused them to consider tempest as a favourable omen, ran forward with wild shouts. They threw themselves into the interval left between Gudin's division and the corps of Lannes, forced back the one, and turned the other. Their cavalry rushed into the gap, but the 34th on the side next to Suchet's division, the 85th on the side next to Gudin's division, formed into square, and cut short that charge, which was rather a demonstration on the part of the Russians to cover their retreat, than a serious attack.

The French, then, had on all points conquered the ground which commands Pultusk, and they had but a last effort to make to throw the Russians into the Narew, when general Benningsen, taking advantage of the darkness, withdrew his army, making it pass over the bridges of Pultusk. While he was giving his orders for retreat, Lannes, full of ardour, in high spirits on account of the arrival of Gudin's division, was deliberating whether he should immediately make a second attack or defer it till the next day. The lateness of the hour, and the difficulty of communicating in this chaos of mud, rain, and darkness, decided him to postpone the combat. Next morning, the sudden retreat of the Russians deprived the French of the prize earned by their daring and obstinate conduct.

This hard-fought action in which 18,000 men had been for a whole day in presence of 43,000, might certainly be called a victory. Owing to their small number and to the superiority of their tactics, the French had lost scarcely 1,500 men killed and wounded. We speak from authentic statements. The loss of the Russians, on the other hand, in killed and wounded exceeded 3,000 men. They left us 2,000 prisoners and an immense quantity of artillery.

Meanwhile general Benningsen, having returned to Pultusk, wrote to his sovereign that he had just gained a signal victory over the emperor Napoleon, commanding in person three *corps d'armée*, those of marshals Davout, Lannes, and Suchet, besides the cavalry of prince Murat. Now there was not, as the reader may have seen, any *corps d'armée* of marshal Suchet's, since general Suchet merely commanded a division of the corps of marshal Lannes; there were on the ground at Pultusk two divisions of marshal Lannes' corps, and one only of marshal Davout's, no cavalry of prince Murat's, and still less any emperor Napoleon commanding in person.

A great deal has been said about the lying bulletins of the Empire; still they were more true than any of the European publications of that period: but what are we to think of such a way of relating one's own acts! The Russians assuredly were brave enough to be veracious.

On that same day, the 26th, the two divisions of marshal Davout's that were left him, and likewise the two divisions composing marshal Augereau's corps, arrived opposite to Golymin. This village was surrounded by a belt of woods and marshes, studded with a few

hamlets, and beyond this belt the Russians were established, with a strong reserve at the village of Golymin itself.

Marshal Davout, debouching by the right, that is to say by the Pultusk road, ordered an attack of the woods, which formed, on his part, an obstacle to be overcome before he could penetrate into Golymin. Marshal Augereau, debouching by the left, that is to say by the Lopaczym road, had to cross the marshes, dotted with a few clumps of wood, and among these marshes to carry a village, that of Ruskovo, through which ran the only practicable road. Marshal Davout's brave infantry repulsed, not without loss, the Russian infantry of the detached corps of Sacken and Gallitzin. After a brisk fire of small arms, the former engaged the latter with the bayonet, and compelled it by hand-to-hand fights to abandon to it the woods on which it supported itself. On the right of these warmly disputed woods, marshal Davout forced the road from Pultusk to Golymin, and threw upon the Russians part of the cavalry reserve entrusted to Rapp, one of those intrepid aides-de-camp, whom Napoleon kept at hand, to employ them on difficult occasions. Rapp upset the Russian infantry, turned the woods, and thus did away with the obstacle which covered Golymin. But, being exposed to an extremely brisk fire, he had an arm broken. On the left, Augereau, crossing the marshes in spite of the hostile force placed at that point, took the village of Ruskovo, and marched, on his part, for Golymin, the common object of our concentric attacks. The French penetrated into it towards the close of the day, and made themselves masters of it, after a very hot action with the reserve of Doctorow's division. As at Pultusk, a great quantity of artillery and some prisoners were taken, and the ground was strewn with Russian corpses. In fight with them, fewer enemies were taken, but more killed.

On this day, the 26th, our columns were everywhere engaged with the Russian columns, over a space of twenty-five leagues. From an effect of chance, impossible to be prevented when the communications are difficult, while Lannes had found before him twice or thrice as many Russians as he had French, the other corps met with scarcely their equivalent, as marshals Augereau and Davout at Golymin, or no enemy to fight, as marshal Soult in his march for Ciechanow, and marshal Bernadotte in his march for Biezun. Marshal Bessières, it is true, serving for scout to our left wing, with the second cavalry reserve, had come up with the Prussians at Biezun, and taken a good number of prisoners. Marshal Ney, who formed the extreme left of the army, had marched from Strasburg to Soldau and Mlawa, driving Lestocq's corps before him. Arriving on the 26th at Soldau, at the very moment when Lannes was engaged at Pultusk, when marshals Davout and Augereau were engaged at Golymin, he had directed Marchand's division upon Mlawa, in order to turn the position of Soldau, a necessary precaution, for insurmountable difficulties might have been found there. In fact, the village of Soldau was situated amidst a marsh im-

passable except by a single causeway, from seven to eight hundred fathoms in length, resting sometimes upon the ground, sometimes upon bridges, which the enemy had taken care to break down. Six thousand Prussians, with cannon, guarded this causeway. A first battery enfiladed it longitudinally ; a second, established on a spot judiciously chosen in the marsh, took it obliquely. Ney, with the 69th, and the 76th, advanced impetuously along it. They threw planks over the broken bridges ; they carried the batteries at a run ; they overturned with the bayonet the infantry drawn up in column on the causeway, and entered the village of Soldau pell-mell with the fugitives. A most obstinate conflict with the Prussians took place there. The French had to storm Soldau house by house. This was not accomplished without unparalleled efforts, and not till nightfall. But, at this moment, the gallant general Lestocq, rallying his columns in rear of Soldau, made his soldiers swear to recover the lost post. The Prussians, treated by the Russians since Jena as the Austrians had been treated since Ulm, determined to avenge their honour, and to prove that they were not inferior in bravery to any nation. And so they did. Four times, from seven in the evening till midnight, they attacked Soldau with the bayonet, and four times they were repulsed. At last, they retired, having sustained an immense loss in killed and wounded, and prisoners.

Thus, on this day, over a space of twenty-five leagues, from Pultusk to Soldau, there had been obstinate fighting, and the Russians, defeated wherever they had attempted to resist us, had not escaped without abandoning their artillery and baggage. Their army was diminished by nearly 20,000 men out of 115,000. Great numbers of them were *hors de combat* or prisoners. Great numbers more, of Polish origin, had deserted. We had picked up more than 80 pieces of cannon, of large calibre, and a considerable quantity of baggage. We had not lost a single prisoner or a single deserter, but the fire of the enemy had deprived us of four or five thousand men, killed or wounded.

The plan of Napoleon, tending to separate the Russians from the sea, and to throw them by a rotatory movement from the Ukra upon the Narew, from the rich coast of old Prussia into the woody, marshy, uncultivated interior of Poland, had succeeded on all points, though at none had it led to one of those great battles which always marked conspicuously the scientific manœuvres of that immortal captain. The heroic action of Lannes at Pultusk was a defeat for the Russians, but a defeat without disaster, which was as great a novelty for them as for us. If, however, it had been possible to march on the next and the following day, the Russians would have been obliged to deliver to us the trophies which they could not long withhold from our bravery and our skill. Thrown beyond the Ukra, the Orezyc, and the Narew, into an impenetrable forest, above fifteen or twenty leagues in extent, comprized between Pultusk, Ostrolenka, and Ortelsburg, their complete destruction

would have been the inevitable effect of the profound combinations of Napoleon, and of the futile or unfortunate combinations of their generals.

But it was impossible to take a step without falling into inextricable embarrassments. Men sank up to the waist in those horrible quagmires, and there stuck fast till assistance came to drag them out. Many had expired in this situation, for want of timely aid.

Napoleon, whose plans had never been better conceived, whose soldiers had never been more valiant, was obliged to halt, after marching on for two or three days, to assure himself thoroughly of the rout of the Russians and of their flight towards the Pregel. A great loss in men and cannon occasioned to the enemy, and safe winter-quarters in the heart of Poland, formed a worthy termination to that extraordinary campaign, begun on the Rhine, finished on the Vistula. The state of the weather and of the ground sufficiently accounted for the circumstance that the results obtained in these last days had neither the greatness nor the suddenness to which Napoleon had accustomed the world. The Russians, no doubt surprised at not having been disposed of so speedily as the Prussians at Jena, the Austrians at Ulm, and themselves at Austerlitz, went off to pride themselves on a defeat less prompt than usual, and to circulate fables respecting their pretended successes: this there was no preventing. This time they would not have been more fortunate, if we had met with frozen lakes instead of bottomless quagmires. But the season, a very unusual one, which brought with it a muddy soil instead of a frozen soil, had saved them from a disaster. It was a freak of Fortune, who had hitherto favoured Napoleon too much for him not to forgive this slight inconstancy: only he ought to have borne this in mind, and to have learned to know her. For the rest, his soldiers encamped on the Vistula, his eagles planted in Warsaw, were a sight extraordinary enough for him to feel gratified, for Europe to remain quiet, Austria awed and affrighted, France confident.

He halted two or three days at Golymin, with the intention of allowing his army a little rest, and, on the 1st of January, 1807, he returned to Warsaw, to arrange there the establishment of his winter-quarters.

Whoever desires to have an accurate notion of the district which he chose for cantoning his troops, must figure to himself the conformation of the country beyond the Vistula. That series of lakes to which we have already several times adverted, and which here separate old Prussia from Poland, the German country from the Slavonic country, the maritime and rich region from the inland and poor region, pour the greater part of their waters into the interior by a series of rivers, as the Omulew, the Orezyc, the Ukra, which throw themselves into the Narew, and by the Narew into the Vistula. And while, by means of the Omulew, the Orezyc, and the Ukra, the Narew receives the waters of the lakes which cannot find an outlet to the sea, and which

descend from the west, it receives, by means of the Bug, the waters descending from the east and from the heart of Poland. Uniting with the Bug at Sierock, and increased by all these tributaries, it carries them in a single bed to the Vistula, into which it falls at Modlin.

The Narew, then, presents one common trunk which supports itself on the Vistula, around which the Bug on the right, the Ukra, the Orezyc and the Omulew on the left, run to attach themselves to it like so many ramifications. It was between these ramifications, and appuying himself upon the principal trunk towards Sierock and Modlin, that Napoleon distributed his *corps d'armée*.

He made Lannes take cantonments between the Vistula, the Narew, and the Bug, in the angle formed by these streams, guarding at one and the same time Warsaw by Suchet's division, Jablona, the bridge of Okunin, and Sierock, by Gazan's division. The headquarters of Lannes were at Sierock, at the conflux of the Bug and the Narew. Marshal Davout's corps was to be cantoned in the angle formed by the Bug and the Narew, his head-quarters adjoining to Pultusk, his posts extending to Brok, on the Bug, to Ostrolenka, on the Narew. The corps of marshal Soult was established behind the Orezyc having his head-quarters at Golymin, uniting the cavalry reserve with his *corps d'armée*, and thus having the means of covering the vast extent of his front by the numerous squadrons placed at his disposal. The corps of marshal Augereau was cantoned at Plonsk, behind marshal Soult, occupying the open angle between the Vistula and the Ukra, the head-quarters being at Plonsk. Marshal Ney's corps was placed on the extreme left of marshal Augereau, turned towards Mlawa, about the sources of the Orezyc and the Ukra, near the lakes, protecting the flank of the four *corps d'armée*, which formed radii around Warsaw, and connected themselves with the corps of marshal Bernadotte, who defended the Lower Vistula. The latter, cantoned close to the sea, was commissioned to guard the Lower Vistula and to cover the siege of Dantzic, which it was indispensably necessary to reduce, in order to render the position of the army secure. This siege, moreover, was destined to form the interlude between the campaign which was just over, and that which was to be opened in the spring.

Each corps had orders, on the first appearance of the enemy, to concentrate itself, that of marshal Lannes at Sierock, marshal Davout's at Pultusk, marshal Soult's at Golymin, marshal Augereau's at Plonsk, marshal Ney's at Mlawa, marshal Bernadotte's between Graudenz and Elbing, towards Osterode; the first four charged to defend Warsaw, the fifth to connect the quarters of the Narew with those of the coast, the last to protect the Lower Vistula and the siege of Dantzic.

With this able disposition of the cantonments were united precautions of admirable forecast. The soldiers, having bivouacked incessantly since the commencement of the campaign, that is to say, ever since the month of October, were at length to be lodged

in the villages and to be subsisted there, but so that they could assemble at any time on the first danger. The light cavalry, the cavalry of the line, the heavy cavalry, ranged one behind another, and appuyed on some detachments of light infantry, formed a long screen before the cantonments, to keep off the Cossacks, and to prevent surprises by means of frequent reconnaissances. The troops engaged in this very hard service were sheltered by hovels, the materials for which were furnished by the woods so abundant in Poland.

Orders were issued to scour the country in quest of the corn and the potatoes hidden under ground by the inhabitants before their flight, to collect the dispersed cattle, and to form with what should be thus got together magazines which, established for each corps, and regularly administered, would be secured from all waste. The corps which were not advantageously placed in regard to alimentary resources, were to receive supplies of corn, forage, and butchers' meat from Warsaw. What was to be sent them, embarked on the Vistula, was to descend the river to the nearest point to each corps, to be there landed and carried away by the army equipages, or by vehicles organized in the country. Napoleon had ordered all services to be paid in money, either on account of the Poles, whom he wished to conciliate, or on account of the inhabitants, whom he hoped to attract by the prospect of gain.

It should be remarked that each corps, though cantoned in such a manner as to be able to proceed rapidly to any point that might be in danger, had a base on the Vistula or on the Narew, in order to turn the water transport to account. Thus, marshal Lannes had at Warsaw, marshal Davout at Pultusk, marshal Augereau at Wyszogrod, marshal Soult at Plock, marshal Ney at Thorn, marshal Bernadotte at Marienburg and Elbing, a base on that vast line of navigation. At these different points were to be placed their depots, their hospitals, their establishments for preserving provisions, their shops for repairs, because to these places the articles necessary for those departments could be brought with the greatest facility.

In the ordinary histories of war, we see only armies completely formed and ready to enter into action; but it can scarcely be imagined what efforts it costs to bring the armed man to his post, equipped, fed, trained, lastly cured, if he has been sick or wounded. All these difficulties are increased in proportion to the change of climate, or to the distance which the army removes from the point of departure. Most generals or governments neglect this kind of attentions, and their armies melt away visibly. Those only who practise them with perseverance and skill find means to keep their troops numerous and well-disposed. The operation which we are describing is the most admirable example of this sort of difficulties completely overcome and surmounted.

Napoleon desired that, as soon as situations adapted to each cantonment were chosen, and necessaries collected, or such as were

deficient brought from Warsaw, ovens should be built, and destroyed mills repaired. He required that, when the regular supply of the troops was ensured, and when, in preparing provisions, a larger stock had accumulated than the quantity indispensable for the daily consumption, there should be formed a reserve store of bread, biscuit, spirits, not at the place where the *depôt* was fixed, but at the spot appointed for the assembling of each *corps d'armée* in case of attack. No doubt the reader guesses his motive. He wished that, if a sudden appearance of the enemy called the troops to arms, each corps might have sufficient provisions for seven or eight days' march. He took in general no more time than that to accomplish a great operation and to decide a campaign.

With the money arising from the contributions levied in Prussia, which was first collected on the Oder, and then conveyed to the Vistula in artillery waggons, he caused the troops to be punctually paid, and moreover granted extraordinary aids to the *masses* of the regiments. By *masses* are meant the portions of the pay thrown into a common fund, to feed, clothe, and warm the soldier. It was a method of increasing the comforts of the troops in proportion to the difficulty of subsisting, or to the more rapid consumption of articles of equipment.

The first days of this establishment amidst the marshes and forests of Poland, and during the inclemencies of winter, were most irksome. If the cold had been intense, the soldier, warmed at the expense of the forests of Poland, would have suffered less from the frost than from that soaking wet which drenched the ground, rendered it almost impossible to stir abroad, increased the fatigues of the service, saddened the eye, relaxed the muscles, depressed the spirits. In that country they could not have a worse winter than a rainy winter. The temperature varied incessantly from frost to thaw, never reaching below one or two degrees of cold, and returning to the moist, soft temperature of autumn. In consequence, the men longed for frost, as in the fine climates people long for the sunshine and the verdure of spring.

In a few days, however, their situation began to improve. The corps made their abode in the deserted villages; the advanced guards built themselves hovels with branches of fir. A great quantity of potatoes and cattle enough were found. But the soldiers grew tired of potatoes, and sighed after bread. By and by, they discovered corn hidden in the woods, and collected it in magazines. They also received some by the Vistula and the Narew, part of that which the ingenuity of the Jews contrived to send down to Warsaw, through the military cordons of Austria. A system of bribery, adroitly practised by these clever traders, had lulled the vigilance of the guardians of the Austrian frontier. Being paid a good price, either in salt taken in the Prussian magazines, or in ready money, the supplies were furnished with tolerable regularity. The ovens were built, and the damaged mills repaired. The reserve magazines began to be organized. The wines necessary for the health of the

soldier and for his good humour, drawn from all the cities of the North, to which commerce carries them in abundance, and conveyed by the Oder, the Warta, and the Netze, to the Vistula, arrived also, though with more difficulty. All the corps, indeed, did not enjoy the same advantages. Those of marshals Davout and Soult, pushed forwarder into the woody region, and far from the navigation of the Vistula, were most exposed to privations. The corps of marshals Lannes and Augereau, placed nearer to the great river of Poland, had less to suffer. The indefatigable Ney had by his industry and boldness opened a source of abundance for himself. He had approached very near to the German country, which is extremely rich; nay, he had even ventured to the banks of the Pregel. Sallying forth on daring expeditions, he placed his soldiers on sledges when it froze, and went marauding to the very gates of Königsberg, which indeed he had once well-nigh surprised and carried.

The corps of Bernadotte was very favourably situated for subsisting on the Lower Vistula. But the proximity of the Prussian garrisons of Graudenz, Dantzic, Elbing, annoyed him severely, and prevented him from enjoying the resources of that country so much as he might have done.

After several skirmishes with the Cossacks, they had been obliged to leave the cantonments quiet. It was perceived that the light cavalry was a sufficient guard, and that the heavy cavalry suffered much in the advanced cantonments. Accordingly, Napoleon, enlightened by the experience of a few days, made a change in his dispositions. He brought back the heavy cavalry towards the Vistula. General d'Hautpoul's cuirassiers were cantoned around Thorn; the dragoons of all the divisions from Thorn to Warsaw; general Nansouty's cuirassiers behind the Vistula, between the Vistula and the Pilica. The light cavalry, reinforced by some brigades of dragoons, remained at the advanced posts, but came by turns, two regiments at a time, to recruit itself on the Vistula, where forage abounded. Gudin's division of Davout's corps, which had suffered more than any other in the whole army, because it had borne a part in two of the hottest actions during the war, Auerstädt and Pultusk, was sent to Warsaw, to indemnify itself there for its fatigues and its combats.

The army, it is true, did not fare so well in the recesses of Poland as in the camp of Boulogne, where all the means of France and the space of two years had been devoted to providing for its wants. But it had necessities, and sometimes more. Napoleon, in reply to Fouché, the minister, who communicated to him the rumours circulated by disaffected persons respecting the hardships endured by our soldiers, wrote as follows:

"It is true that, the magazines of Warsaw not being largely stored, and the impossibility of collecting there in a short time a great quantity of corn, have rendered provisions scarce; but it is as absurd to imagine that there is no corn, no wine, no butcher's meat,

no potatoes, to be found in Poland, as to say that they are not to be got in Egypt.

"I have at Warsaw an establishment which furnishes me with 100,000 rations of biscuit per day; I have one at Thorn; I have magazines at Posen, at Lowicz, along the whole line: I have sufficient to feed an army for more than a year. You must recollect that, at the time of the expedition to Egypt, letters from the army asserted that we were dying there of hunger. Let articles be written in this spirit. It is natural that we should be short of something when we were driving the Russians from Warsaw; but the productions of the country are such, that it is impossible to feel any alarm." (Warsaw, 18th January, 1807.)

There was, however, a considerable number of sick, indeed more than usual, in that valiant army. They were seized with fevers and pains, in consequence of the continual bivouacs, beneath a cold sky, upon the wet ground. This was no more than what might be expected from what befel the chiefs themselves. Several marshals, those, in particular, who were called *Italians* and *Egyptians*, because they had served in Italy and Egypt, were seriously indisposed. Murat had not been able to take part in the last operations on the Narew. Augereau, suffering from rheumatism, was obliged to withdraw himself from the contact with a cold damp air. Lannes, taken ill at Warsaw, had been forced to leave the 5th corps, which he could no longer command.

Napoleon crowned the attentions paid to his soldiers by attentions not less assiduous to his sick and wounded. He had caused six thousand beds to be prepared at Warsaw, and an equally considerable number to be provided at Thorn, at Posen, and on the rear, between the Vistula and the Oder. There had been seized in Berlin, wool coming from the domains of the Crown, and tent-cloth; out of these mattresses were made for the hospitals. Having at his disposal Silesia, which prince Jerome had occupied, and which abounds in linen of all kinds, Napoleon ordered a great quantity to be bought and to be made into shirts. He especially committed the direction of the hospitals to M. Daru, and prescribed a peculiar organization for those establishments. He determined that in each hospital there should be a chief overseer, always provided with ready money, charged, upon his responsibility, to procure for the sick whatever they needed, under the superintendence of a Catholic priest. This priest, while exercising the spiritual ministry, was also to exercise a sort of paternal vigilance, to make reports to the Emperor, to acquaint him with the slightest negligence towards the sick, whose protector he was thus constituted. Napoleon had intended that this priest should have a salary, and that each hospital should become, in some sort, an itinerant cure in the train of the army.

Such were the infinite pains taken by this great captain whom party hatred represented, on the day of his fall, as a barbarous conqueror, driving men to the slaughter, without giving himself any

concern about feeding them when he made them march, or about their cure when he had made cripples of them, and caring no more about them than about the beasts which drew his cannon and his baggage.

After attending to the men with a zeal which is not the less noble because it was interested—for there are generals, sovereigns, who suffer the soldiers, the instruments of their power and their glory, to perish for want—Napoleon directed his attention to the works undertaken on the Vistula, and to the punctual arrival of his reinforcements, so that in spring his army might present itself to the enemy more formidable than ever. He had given orders, as we have seen, for works at Praga, purposing that Warsaw should be able to support itself unaided, with a mere garrison, in case he should move forward. Having examined every thing with his own eyes, he resolved upon the construction of eight redoubts, closed at the gorge, with scarp and counterscarp, lined with wood—a species of revêtement, the value of which the siege of Dantzic soon afforded occasion for appreciating—and embracing in their circle the extensive suburb of Praga. He resolved to add to them a work which, placed in rear of these eight redoubts, and opposite to the bridge of boats connecting Warsaw with Praga, should serve at once for an appendage to that species of fortress, and for *tête de pont* to the bridge of Warsaw. At Okunin, where bridges were thrown across the Narew and the Ukra, he ordered a mass of works, to cover them and to secure the exclusive possession of them to the French army. The same thing was prescribed at the bridge of Modlin, which had been thrown at the conflux at the Vistula and the Narew, and where advantage had been taken of an island to ground upon it the means of passage, and to construct a defensive work of the greatest strength. Thus between the three points of Warsaw, Okunin, and Modlin, where so many and so large streams meet, Napoleon secured all the passages to himself, and interdicted them all to the Russians; so that these great natural obstacles, converted into facilities for him, into insurmountable difficulties for the enemy, became in his hands powerful means of manœuvre, and could, above all, be left to themselves, if circumstances obliged him to advance further north than he had yet done. Napoleon completed this system by a work of the same kind at Sierock, at the conflux of the Narew and the Bug. With timber, which abounded on the spot, with money, which he had at his disposal, he was certain to have both materials and hands to set to work upon them.

Napoleon had drawn from Paris two regiments of infantry, the 15th light and the 58th of the line, a regiment of fusiliers of the guard, and a regiment of the municipal guard. He had also drawn one regiment from Brest, one from St. Lô, and one from Boulogne. These seven regiments were on march, as well as the provisional regiments destined to conduct the recruits of the dépôt battalions to the war battalions. Two of them, the 15th light and the 58th, had outstripped the others and joined marshal Mortier's corps, which

was thus increased to eight French regiments, besides the Dutch or Italian regiments, which were to complete its effective. Napoleon, taking advantage of this reinforcement, which at the moment exceeded the wants of the eighth corps, for thus far no enterprize seemed to threaten the shores of the Baltic, detached from it the 2nd and 15th light, forming 4,000 men, good French infantry. He joined to them the Baden troops, the eight Polish battalions raised at Posen, the legion of the North, full of veteran Poles who had long been in the service of France, the four fine regiments of cuirassiers which had come from Italy, lastly, two of the four fine regiments of cavalry, which had likewise come from Italy, the 19th and 23d chasseurs. With these troops he composed a new *corps d'armée*, to which he gave the title of tenth corps, the Germans, who were in Silesia under prince Jerome, having already received the title of ninth. He entrusted the command of this corps to old marshal Lefebvre, whom he had brought with him to the grand army, and placed temporarily at the head of the infantry of the guard. He charged him to invest Colberg and to commence the siege of Dantzic. The latter fortress had a particular importance, on account of the position which it occupied on the theatre of the war. It commanded the Lower Vistula, protected the arrivals of the enemy by sea, and contained immense resources, which would place the army in abundance, if we could make ourselves masters of it. Besides, so long as it was not taken, an offensive movement of the enemy towards the sea, pushed beyond the Lower Vistula, might oblige us to leave the Upper Vistula and to fall back towards the Oder. Napoleon was therefore resolved to make the siege of Dantzic the grand operation of the winter.

Napoleon, thus devoting the bad season to the reduction of fortresses, purposed to besiege not only those of the Lower Vistula, which were on his left, but also those of the Upper Oder, which were on his right. His brother Jerome, seconded by general Vandamme, was, as we have seen, to complete the subjection of Silesia by the successive reduction of the fortresses of the Oder. These fortresses, constructed with care by the great Frederick, to render definitive the valuable conquest which constituted the glory of his reign, presented serious difficulties to surmount, not only in the magnitude and excellence of the works, but also in the garrisons which were charged to defend them. The surrender of Magdeburg, Cüstrin, Stettin, had covered with disgrace the commandants who had given them up, under the empire of a general demoralization. A reaction had soon taken place in the Prussian army, at first so deeply discouraged after Jena. Indignant honour had spoken to the hearts of all the military men, and they were determined to die honourably, even without any hope of conquering. The king had threatened with terrible punishments those commandants who should surrender fortresses committed to their keeping, till they had done all that constitutes, according to the rules of the art, an honourable defence. It began moreover to be understood, that the fortresses remaining

on Napoleon's left and right would soon acquire a special importance, for they were so many *points d'appui* needed by his daring march, and which must second the resistance of his enemies. The resolution to defend them energetically was therefore firmly taken by all the commandants of the Prussian garrisons.

Prince Jerome had with him only Wirtembergers and Bavarians, and, with these auxiliary troops, a single French regiment, the 13th of the line, and a few squadrons of French light cavalry. These German auxiliaries had not yet acquired that military valour which they subsequently displayed on more than one occasion. But general Vandamme, who commanded the ninth corps under prince Jerome, and general Montbrun, commanding the cavalry, assisted by a young French staff, full of ardour, infused into them in a short time the spirit which then animated our army, and which it communicated to all the troops in contact with it. Vandamme, who had never directed a siege, and possessed none of the qualifications of the engineer, but who made amends for all by a happy instinct for war, had undertaken to proceed in a summary manner with the fortresses of Silesia, though he knew that the governors of those places were resolved to defend them stoutly. He intended to employ the means which had been used at Magdeburg, and to intimidate the inhabitants, in order to impel them to surrender in spite of the garrisons. He began with Glogau, the place nearest to the Lower Oder and to the military routes followed by our troops. The garrison was not numerous, and demoralization still prevailed in its ranks. Vandamme had several mortars and pieces of heavy artillery placed in battery, and, after some threats, followed up with effect, induced the place to capitulate on the 2nd of December. Here were found great resources in artillery and stores of all kinds. Vandamme then ascended the Oder, and commenced the investment of Breslau, situated on that river, about twenty leagues above Glogau.

It was with the Wirtembergers that Glogau had been taken. They were not enough to besiege Breslau, a city containing 60,000 souls, provided with a garrison of 6,000 men, numerous and solid works, and a good commandant. Prince Jerome, who had pushed on to the environs of Kalisch, while the French army was making its first entry into Poland, had returned to the Oder, since Napoleon, solidly established on the Vistula, had no further occasion for the presence of the ninth corps towards his right. Vandamme therefore had, for undertaking the siege of Breslau, the Wirtembergers, two Bavarian divisions, with some French artillerymen and engineers, and likewise the 13th of the line. To carry on a regular siege of so extensive a place appeared to him a long and difficult business. In consequence, he endeavoured, as at Glogau, to intimidate the population. He chose in a suburb, that of St. Nicholas, a site for establishing batteries for red-hot shot. A brisk fire, directed upon the interior of the city, failed of producing the intended result, owing to the vigour of the commandant. Van-

damme then turned his thoughts to a more serious attack. Breslau had for its principal defence a bastioned enclosure, bordered by a deep ditch, full of the water of the Oder. But the French engineers perceived that this enclosure was not everywhere lined, and that, at certain points, there was nothing but a scarp of earth, Vandamme resolved to attempt the assault of the enclosure, which, consisting not in a wall of masonry but a mere turf slope, might be scaled by enterprising soldiers. It would first be necessary to cross upon rafts the ditch which was supplied by the Oder. Vandamme caused whatever was requisite for this daring enterprize to be prepared. Unluckily, the preparations were discovered by the enemy; the moon shone brightly during the night of the execution; and from these various causes the attempt miscarried. Meanwhile, the prince of Anhalt-Pless, who was governor of the province, having collected detachments from all the fortresses, and raised a levy of peasants, which had procured him a corps of 12,000 men, gave the garrison hopes of succour from without. Nothing could have happened more fortunately for the besiegers than to have solved in open field the question of the capture of Breslau. Vandamme hastened to meet the prince of Anhalt with the Bavarians and the French 13th of the line, beat him twice, put him completely to the rout, and appeared again before the place now deprived of all hope of relief. At the same time, a sharp frost having set in, he resolved to cross the ditches upon the ice and to scale the earthworks. The commandant, finding himself in danger of being taken by assault, a danger most alarming for a wealthy and populous city, consented to parley, and surrendered the place on the 7th of January, after a month's resistance, on the conditions granted to Magdeburg, Cüstrin, and the other fortresses of Prussia.

This conquest was not only brilliant, but singularly useful for the resources which it afforded to the French army, by the command, in particular, which it gave us over Silesia, the richest province in Prussia, and one of the richest in Europe. Napoleon congratulated Vandamme upon it, and after Vandamme his brother Jerome, who had shown the intelligence of a good officer and the courage of a brave soldier.

A few days afterwards, the ninth corps made a further conquest, that of Brieg, situated above Breslau, on the Oder. The whole centre of Silesia being reduced, there yet remained to be taken Schweidnitz, Glatz, and Neisse, which shut the door of Silesia on the side next to Bohemia. Napoleon ordered them to be besieged one after another, and determined in, as far as he was concerned, upon a rigorous act, but yet conformable to the law of war, namely, to destroy them. In consequence, he ordered the works of those which were already in his power to be blown up. He had a two-fold reason for acting thus, one of the moment, the other prospective. At the moment, he wished to avoid scattering his troops by multiplying around him the posts to be guarded: for the future, not reckoning upon Prussia as an ally, perceiving every day that he

must not flatter himself to make a friend of Austria, he had henceforth nothing to hope but from the misunderstanding which had always divided those two courts. Silesia, dismantled on the side towards Austria, would become for Prussia an object of uneasiness, an occasion for expenses, and a cause of weakness.

Thus on the rear of the army, on the left as on the right, the visible progress of our operations attested that the enemy could not derange them, since he suffered them to be accomplished. A few partisans, indeed, sallying from the fortresses of Colberg and Dantzic, recruited by Prussian prisoners who had escaped, infested the roads. Several detachments were employed in pursuing them. A slight accident, of little consequence, did, however, excite a momentary alarm for the tranquillity of Germany. Hesse, whose sovereign Napoleon had recently dethroned, whose fortresses he had demolished, whose army he had dissolved, was naturally the worst disposed province of Germany towards the French. Thirty thousand disbanded men, without employ, deprived of pay and of the means of subsistence, were, though disarmed, a dangerous leaven, which prudence cautioned against leaving in the country. Part of them had been induced to enrol themselves, without being informed where they would be expected to serve. The intention was to employ them in Naples. The secret having transpired, through some indiscretions committed at Mayence, the enrolled men broke into insurrection, saying that the Hessians were about to be sent to perish in the Calabrias. General Lagrange, who commanded in Hesse, had but very few troops at his disposal. The insurgents disarmed a French detachment, and threatened to raise all Hesse. But the forecast of Napoleon had furnished beforehand the means of parrying this unlucky circumstance. Provisional regiments which had set out from the Rhine, and an Italian regiment on march for marshal Mortier's corps, the fusiliers of the guard drawn from Paris, and one of the regiments of chasseurs coming from Italy, were not far off. They were despatched in the utmost haste to Cassel, and the insurrection was quelled immediately.

Then the immense country extending from the Rhine to the Vistula, from the mountains of Bohemia to the sea, was brought under subjection. The fortresses surrendered one after another to our troops, and our reinforcements passed quietly through them, performing the police duty there, while marching toward the theatre of war to recruit the grand army.

Meanwhile, the Russian general Benningsen had so boldly proclaimed himself victorious, that the king of Prussia at Königsberg, the emperor Alexander at Petersburg, had received and accepted congratulations. And though the material results, such as the retreat of the Russians upon the Pregel, our tranquil establishment on the Vistula, the sieges undertaken and finished on the Oder, must have answered all these bombasts of an enemy, who fancied himself victorious when he had not sustained a disaster so complete as that of Austerlitz or Jena; people affected, nevertheless, to show

a certain joy. That joy was manifested more particularly at Vienna, and in the bosom of the imperial court. Emperor, archdukes, ministers, high personages, alike congratulated one another. Nothing was more natural and more legitimate. There was no fault to be found but with the language held by the cabinet of Vienna in its most recent communications with Napoleon — language which perhaps passed the bounds of the dissimulation allowable in such cases. At any rate, the error which caused the joy of our enemies was not of long duration. M. de Lucchesini, who had left the court of Prussia at the same time as M. de Haugwitz, was just then passing through Vienna, on his way to Lucca, his native city. He was no longer under illusion himself, he had no interest in palming illusion upon others, and, in consequence, he told the truth relative to the sanguinary encounters of which the Vistula had just been the theatre. The quagmires of Poland, he said, had paralysed vanquished and victors, and enabled the Russians to withdraw themselves from the pursuit of the French. But the Russians, beaten most soundly everywhere, had no chance to make head against the formidable soldiers of Napoleon. They need but wait till spring, perhaps only till the first frost, to see the latter make an irruption upon the Pregel or the Niemen and put an end to the war by some signal stroke. The French army, added M. de Lucchesini, was neither demoralized nor destitute of resources, as it was alleged: it lived well, accommodated itself to the damp cold climate of Poland, as it had formerly accommodated itself to the dry, scorching climate of Egypt: it had, in short, implicit faith in the genius and good fortune of its leader.

This intelligence, from a calm and disinterested observer, dispelled the false joy of the Austrians. The court of Vienna, as well to make Napoleon easy by a friendly proceeding, as to have at the French head-quarters an accurate informant, solicited an authorization to send the baron de Vincent to Warsaw. The ministers of the foreign courts who had wished to follow M. de Talleyrand to Berlin, some of them even to Warsaw, had been politely shuffled off, as inconvenient and frequently very slanderous witnesses. The mission of M. de Vincent, however, was assented to out of indulgence for Austria, and also to furnish her with a direct medium for being informed of the truth, which it was much more the interest of Napoleon to make him acquainted with than to conceal from him. Accordingly, M. de Vincent arrived towards the end of January at Warsaw.

While Napoleon was employing the month of January, 1807, either in consolidating his position on the Vistula, or in augmenting his army by reinforcements from France and Italy, or, lastly, in exciting the East against Russia, holding himself in readiness to meet any immediate attack, though believing that there would be none, the Russians, notwithstanding the severity of the season, were preparing one for him, and a most formidable one. After the affair at Pultusk, general Benningsen being beaten, whatever he might

choose to say—for what general retires in the greatest haste when he is victorious?—had passed the Narew, and found himself in the region of heaths, marshes, and woods, extending between the Narew and the Bug. He had there picked up two divisions of general Buxhövdén's, most uselessly left by the latter at Popowo, on the Bug, during the late engagements. He ascended the Narew with these two divisions and those of his army which had fought at Pultusk. At this same moment, the two demi-divisions of general Benningsen's, which had been unable to join him, rallied to the two divisions of general Buxhövdén's, which were at Golymin and Makow, and remained on the other bank of the Narew, the bridges of which had just been carried away by the ice. The two portions of the Russian army, deprived of the possibility of communicating with each other, ascended the banks of the Narew, the separation of which might have been easily overcome, if one could have been informed of their situation, and if, moreover, the state of the roads had allowed us to get at them. But who can know every thing in war? The ablest of generals is he who, by dint of application and sagacity, contrives to be a little less ignorant of the enemy's plans than the generality. Under any other circumstances, Napoleon, with his prodigious activity, with his art in following up victory, would soon have discovered the perilous situation of the Russian army, and infallibly destroyed that portion of it which he should have chosen to pursue. But buried in mud, deprived of artillery and bread, he had found it utterly impossible to stir; besides, having led his soldiers from the extremity of Europe, he had considered it as a sort of cruelty to put their attachment to a longer trial.

General Benningsen and general Buxhövdén made some attempts to join, but the bridges, several times repaired, were as often broken down again, and they found themselves obliged slowly to ascend the Narew, living as they could, and endeavouring to reach places where a junction would be practicable. They contrived, however, to meet personally, and they had an interview at Nowogrod. Though by no means disposed to come to a better understanding, they agreed to a plan, tending to nothing less than the prosecution of hostilities, in spite of the state of the country and of the season. General Benningsen, who, by dint of asserting that he was victorious at Pultusk, at length believed that he was so, absolutely insisted on resuming the offensive, and decided the immediate continuation of the military operations, by pursuing a totally different course from that which had at first been adopted. Instead of keeping along the Narew and its tributaries, and thus backing upon the woody country, which fixed the point of attack on Warsaw, it was resolved to make an extensive circuit, to turn by a movement in rear the vast mass of forest, then to traverse the line of the lakes, and to bear away towards the maritime region of Braunsberg, Elbing, Marienburg, and Dantzic. In operating on this side they were sure of provisions, owing to the richness of the soil along the coast.

They flattered themselves, moreover, that they should surprise the extreme left of the French cantonments, perhaps carry off marshal Bernadotte, established on the Lower Vistula, easily pass that river, on which they had retained several *appuis*, and, by pushing beyond Dantzic, annul at a single stroke the position of Napoleon in advance of Warsaw.

In fact, if you cast your eye on the line described by the Vistula and the Oder to discharge themselves into the Baltic, you will remark that they run at first to the north-west, the Vistula as far as the environs of Thorn, the Oder to the environs of Cüstrin, that they then turn abruptly to proceed to the north-east, thus forming a considerable elbow, the Vistula towards Thorn, the Oder towards Cüstrin. It results from this direction, particularly as far as the Vistula is concerned, that the Russian corps passing that river between Graudenz and Thorn would be much nearer to Posen, the base of our operations in Poland, than the French army encamped at Warsaw. The difference was nearly half. It was, therefore, in itself a well-conceived plan to cross the Vistula between Thorn and Marienburg, saving the able execution, on which the result of the best plans always depends. We have, in fact, already demonstrated more than once that, without precision in the calculation of distance and time, without promptness in marches, vigour in encounters, perseverance in following up an idea to its complete accomplishment, every bold manœuvre becomes as mischievous as it might have been fortunate. And here, in particular, if one failed, one would be sure to be turned by Napoleon, cut off from Königsberg, driven back to the sea, and exposed to a real disaster; for, to repeat another truth, already expressed elsewhere, in every great combination, you run as much risk as you cause your adversary to incur.

Scarcely had the two Russian generals agreed upon the plan to be adopted, when a resolution taken at St. Petersburg, in consequence of the false statements of general Benningsen, conferred on him the order of St. George, appointed him general-in-chief, and relieved him from the military supremacy of old Kamenski and from the rivalry of general Buxhövdén. These two latter were by the same resolution recalled from the army.

General Benningsen, left alone at the head of the Russian troops, naturally persisted in a plan which was his own, and hastened to carry it into execution. He ascended the Narew to Tykoczyn, passed the Bober near Goniondz, at the very spot where Charles XII. had crossed it a century before, and proceeded to traverse the line of the lakes near lake Spirding, by Arys, Rhein, Rastenburg, and Brischoffstein. The names of the places show that he had reached the German country, that is to say East Prussia. On the 22nd of January, a month after the last actions of Pultusk, Golymin, and Soldau, he arrived at Heilsberg on the Alle. It is not thus that he must march who hopes to surprise a vigilant enemy. However, concealed by that impenetrable curtain of forests and

lakes, which separated the two armies, the movement of the Russians was entirely unperceived by the French.

At this period general Essen had at last brought the two divisions of reserve so long announced, which increased the number of the divisions of the Russian army to ten, exclusively of the Prussian corps of general Lestocq. These two new divisions composed of recruits, were destined to guard not only the Bug and the Narew, but also the position previously occupied by the two divisions of general Buxhövdén, which had no share in the operations of the month of December. Sedmaratzki's division was posted at Goniondz, on the Bober, to watch the line of the lakes, to keep up the communications with the corps of general Essen, and to give umbrage to the French on their right. Of the ten divisions then, general Benningsen retained but seven, to proceed with him to the coast and to the Lower Vistula. After the losses sustained in December, they might form a force of 80,000 men, and of 90,000,* at least, with the Prussian corps of Lestocq.

We have already explained that the waters of the lakes run off, some inland by the Omulew, the Orezyc, the Ukra, into the Narew and the Vistula; others through small rivers directly to the sea, and that the principal of these is the Passarge, which falls perpendicularly into the Frische Hafl. The French corps scattered on the right about the Narew and its tributaries, on the left about the Passarge, covered the line of the Vistula from Warsaw to Elbing. Marshals Lannes and Davout had their cantonments, as we have said, along the Narew, from its fall into the Vistula to Pultusk and above it, forming the right of the French army and covering Warsaw. The corps of marshal Soult was established between the Omulew and the Orezyc, from Ostrolenka to Willenberg and Chorzellen, giving the hand on one side to the troops of marshal Davout, on the other to those of marshal Ney, and thus forming the centre of the French army. Marshal Ney, placed more forward at Hohenstein on the Upper Passarge, connected himself with the position of marshal Soult, at the sources of the Omulew, and with that of marshal Bernadotte behind the Passarge. The latter, protected by the Passarge, occupying Osterode, Mohrunen, Preuss-Holland, Elbing, formed the left of the French army toward the Frische Hafl, and covered the Lower Vistula as well as Dantzic.

Marshal Ney, who had the most advanced position, added still more to the distances which separated him from the bulk of the army by the boldness of his excursions. As soon as the frost began to give some consistence to the ground, he put his light troops into sledges, and scampered to the very environs of Königsberg in quest of provisions for his soldiers. In this manner he had made some

* Such is the assertion of Plötho, the narrator himself, who, to enhance the merit of the Russian army, lowers that of his own government, by always making a point of reducing the sum total of the forces employed. It was strange indeed not to be able, on their own frontier, to present to an enemy who came from such a distance more than 90,000 men capable of fighting.

lucky captures, which had singularly contributed to the comfort of his *corps d'armée*. The Alle, whose banks he scoured, has its sources near those of the Passarge, in a group of lakes, between Hohenstein and Allenstein, then separates from it at a right angle, and while the Passarge runs to the left towards the sea (or Frische Haff), it proceeds straight towards the Pregel, so that the Alle and the Passarge, the Pregel and the sea, form, as it were, the four sides of an oblong square. Marshal Ney, placed at Hohenstein, at the apex of the angle described by the Passarge and the Alle, before they separate, having on his right in rear the cantonments of marshal Soult, on his left in rear those of marshal Bernadotte, by turns ascending and descending the Alle in its course to the Pregel, could not fail to fall in with the Russian army in movement.

Napoleon, fearful that he would involve himself in danger, had reprimanded him several times. But the bold marshal, persisting in running further than he was authorized, fell in with the Russian army which had passed the Alle, and was about to cross the Passarge in the environs of Deppen. It advanced in two columns. That which was to cross the Passarge at Deppen was charged to make a digression towards Liebstadt, in order to approach the Lower Vistula and to surprise the cantonments of marshal Bernadotte.

Marshal Ney, whose indocile temerity had at least had the advantage of giving us timely notice (an advantage which ought not to encourage to disobedience, for it rarely has such beneficial effects), marshal Ney hastened to fall back himself, to apprise marshal Bernadotte on his left, marshal Soult on his right, of the danger which threatened them, and to send intelligence of the sudden appearance of the enemy to the head-quarters at Warsaw. He took a well-chosen post at Hohenstein, whence he could proceed either to the assistance of marshal Soult's cantonments on the Omulew, or to the assistance of marshal Bernadotte's cantonments behind the Passarge. He pointed out to the latter the position of Osterode, a capital position on plateaux, where the first and the sixth corps united would be able to present thirty and odd thousand men to the Russians in an almost impregnable situation.

But the troops of marshal Bernadotte, scattered as far as Elbing near the Frische Haff, had great distances to go in order to rally; and if general Benningsen had marched rapidly, he might have surprised and destroyed them before their concentration was effected. Marshal Bernadotte sent orders to the troops of his right to proceed direct to Osterode, and to the troops of his left, to assemble at the common point of Mohrunen, which is situated on the route to Osterode, a little in rear of Liebstadt, that is to say, very near to the Russian advanced guards. The danger was pressing, for, on the preceding day, the enemy's advanced guard had very roughly handled a French detachment left at Liebstadt. General Markoff, with about fifteen or sixteen thousand men, formed the head of the Russian right column. He was, on the morning of the 25th of January, at Pfarrers-Feldchen, having three battalions in that

village, and in rear a strong mass of infantry and cavalry. About noon, marshal Bernadotte arrived at that place, at but a short distance from Mohrungen, with troops which, having set out in the night, had already marched ten or twelve leagues. He decided upon his dispositions immediately, and threw a battalion of the 9th light into the village of Pfarrers-Feldchen, to take that first *point d'appui* from the enemy. That brave battalion entered at the point of the bayonet, under a brisk fire of musketry from the Russians, and maintained an obstinate combat in the interior of the village. Its eagle was taken in the fray, but soon recovered. Other Russian battalions having come and joined those which were engaged with it, marshal Bernadotte sent to its assistance two French battalions, which, after an extremely violent conflict, remained masters of Pfarrers-Feldchen. Beyond, upon a rising ground, was seen the bulk of the enemy's column, appuyed on one side upon woods, on the other upon lakes, and protected in front by a numerous artillery. Marshal Bernadotte, having formed the 8th, the 94th of the line, and the 27th light in line of battle, marched direct towards the Russian position, under a most murderous fire. He attacked it boldly: the Russians defended it with obstinacy. As good luck would have it, general Dupont, arriving from the shore of the Frische Haff by way of Preuss-Holland, made his appearance beyond the village of Georgenthal, on the right of the Russians. The latter, unable to withstand this double attack, abandoned the field of battle covered with slain. This action cost them fifteen or sixteen hundred killed or taken. It cost the French about six or seven hundred killed and wounded. The dispersion of the troops, and the great number of sick, had prevented marshal Bernadotte from collecting at Mohrungen more than eight or nine thousand men, to fight fifteen or sixteen thousand.

The results of this first encounter were to render the Russians extremely circumspect, and to give the troops of marshal Bernadotte time to assemble at Osterode, a position in which, when united with those of marshal Ney, they would have nothing to fear. Accordingly marshal Bernadotte, having proceeded to Osterode on the 26th and 27th of January, kept close to marshal Ney, firmly awaiting the ulterior enterprizes of the enemy. General Benningesen, whether surprised by the opposition made to his march, or desirous to concentrate his army, assembled the whole of it at Liebstadt, and there halted.

It was on the 26th and 27th of January that Napoleon, successively informed by intelligence from different quarters of the movement of the Russians, was completely fixed respecting their intentions. He had conceived at first that it was the excursions of marshal Ney, which had brought reprisals upon him, and in the first moment he had felt and expressed very great displeasure. But he was soon enlightened concerning the real cause of the appearance of the Russians, and he could not but discover that they

meditated a serious enterprize, having a totally different aim from that of contending for the cantonments.

Though this new winter campaign interrupted the rest which the troops had need of, his regret soon gave place to satisfaction, especially when he considered the new state of the temperature. A sharp frost had set in. The great rivers were not yet frozen, but the stagnant waters were completely; and Poland appeared one vast plain of ice, in which neither guns, nor horses, nor men, ran any risk of being engulfed in mud. Napoleon, recovering the freedom of manœuvring, conceived a hope of putting an end to the war by some signal stroke.

His plan was instantly determined, and conformably to the new direction taken by the enemy. When the Russians, threatening Warsaw, followed the banks of the Narew, he had designed to debouch by Thorn with his left reinforced, in order to separate them from the Prussians, and to fling them into the chaos of woods and marshes which the interior of the country exhibits. This time, on the contrary, perceiving them to be decided to skirt the coast for the purpose of passing the Lower Vistula, it was proper for him to adopt the contrary course, that is to say, to ascend the Narew himself, which they were leaving, and, proceeding high enough to turn them, then drop down suddenly upon them, in order to drive them to the sea. This manœuvre, in case of success, would be decisive; for if, by the first plan, the Russians, thrust back towards the interior of Poland, were liable to be placed in a difficult and dangerous situation, by the second, backed upon the sea, they would find themselves, like the Prussians at Prenzlau and Lübeck, obliged to capitulate.

In consequence, Napoleon resolved to assemble his whole army to the corps of marshal Soult, taking that corps for the centre of his movements. While marshal Soult, collecting his divisions to that of his left, was to march by Willenberg to Passenheim and Allenstein, marshal Davout, forming the extreme right of the army, was to proceed to the same place by Pultusk, Myszniec, and Ortelzburg; marshal Augereau, forming the rear-guard, was to come thither from Plonsk by Neidenburg and Hohenstein; marshal Ney, forming the left, was to come from Osterode. It is at this village of Allenstein, chosen by Napoleon for the general rallying point, that the Passarge and the Alle, after approaching each other for a moment, begin to separate. Having once reached this point, if the Russians persisted in crossing the Passarge, we should be already on their flank, and have almost turned them. It was therefore of importance that to this village of Allenstein the four corps of marshals Davout, Soult, Augereau, and Ney, should be timely brought.

Murat had scarcely recovered from his indisposition, but his ardour made amends for deficient strength: he mounted his horse the same day, and, having received the verbal instructions of the Emperor, he immediately assembled the light cavalry and the dragoons, to head with them the corps of marshal Soult. The heavy cavalry, cantoned on the Vistula towards Thorn, was to join him as speedily as possible.

Napoleon, apprized of the presence of general Essen between the Bug and the Narew, consented to dispense with the corps of marshal Lannes, which was the fifth, and he ordered it to place itself at Sierock, to keep in check the two Russian divisions posted on that side, and to fall upon them at the first movement they should attempt towards Warsaw. Marshal Lannes, being absolutely incapable of taking the command of the fifth corps, owing to the state of his health, Napoleon gave it to his aide-de-camp, Savary, on whose intelligence and resolution he placed entire reliance.

He directed his guard, foot and horse, to the rear of marshal Soult, and as for the reserve of grenadiers and voltigeurs, which had taken its quarters behind the Vistula, between Warsaw and Posen, he deprived himself of it on this occasion, to make it occupy the environs of Ostrolenka, and to form with it an intermediate *échelon* between the grand army and the fifth corps left upon the Narew. This reserve was charged to succour the fifth corps, if general Essen's divisions should threaten Warsaw; in the contrary case, it was to rejoin the head-quarters. These dispositions towards his right being settled, Napoleon took towards his left precautions still more profoundly calculated, and which showed how vast an extent he hoped to give to his movement. He directed marshal Bernadotte, who was at Osterode, to fall back slowly upon the Vistula, in case of emergency even as far as Thorn, to draw the enemy thither, then to slip away, covering himself with an advanced guard as with a curtain, and to come, by a forced march, to connect himself with the left of the grand army, in order to render the manœuvre by which he meant to thrust back the Russians to the sea and to the Lower Vistula the more decisive.

Napoleon, however, did not stop there. Fearing, lest the Russians, if he succeeded in turning them, might imitate the example of general Blücher, who, when separated from Stettin, ran off to Lübeck, and lest they might post away from the Vistula to the Oder, he provided against this danger by a skilful employment of the tenth corps. That corps, destined to carry on under marshal Lefebvre the siege of Dantzic, was not yet completely assembled. Marshal Lefebvre had only the 15th of the line, the 2nd light, general d'Espagne's cuirassiers, and the eight Polish battalions of Posen. Napoleon ordered him to remain with these troops along the Vistula and above Graudenz. The fusiliers of the guard, the regiment of the municipal guard of Paris, the legion of the North, two of the five regiments of chasseurs of Italy, who had already proceeded to Germany, lastly, the Baden troops, were to assemble at Stettin, under general Menard, and, ascending toward Posen, endeavour to join marshal Lefebvre, who would come to them or let them come to him, according to circumstances, so as to fall all together upon any Russian corps that should attempt to go from the Vistula to the Oder. Lastly, marshal Mortier had orders to relinquish the blockade of Stralsund, to place the troops indispensable for that blockade in good lines of circumvallation, then to join

himself with the others to the assemblage under general Menard, to take the direction of it, if that assemblage, instead of ascending to the Vistula to reinforce marshal Lefebvre, should, by the circumstances of the pursuit, be brought back towards the Oder.

Napoleon left Duroc at Warsaw, that he might have a trusty person there. Prince Poniatowski had organized some Polish battalions. Those which were most advanced in their organization were, with the provisional regiments arriving from France, to guard, under the command of general Lemarrois, the works of Praga. Napoleon caused all the vehicles which he had at his disposal to be despatched from Warsaw laden with biscuit and bread, hoping that, the frost facilitating conveyance, his soldiers might not fall short of any thing. In consequence of these orders, issued on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of January, the army was to be assembled at Allenstein on the 3rd or 4th of February. It should be remarked, that the reinforcements brought with such foresight from France and Italy were still on march; that the 2nd light, the 15th of the line, the four regiments of cuirassiers borrowed from the army of Naples, had alone arrived on the Vistula; that the other corps had not yet reached the line of the Elbe; that Napoleon had scarcely received the first detachments of recruits drawn from the dépôts the day after the battle of Jena, which had procured him a dozen thousand men at most, a very inadequate supply to fill the gaps produced either by battle or by the diseases of the season; that most of the corps were reduced a third or a fourth; that those of Lannes, Davout, Soult, Augereau, Ney, Bernadotte, with the addition of the guard, Oudinot's grenadiers, and Murat's cavalry, no longer formed one hundred and odd thousand men;* and that, leaving Lannes and Oudinot on his right, having but a very uncertain chance of bringing Bernadotte towards his left, he would have

* Here is the real force of the corps, deduced from a comparison of numerous authentic documents.

Marshal Lannes.....	12,000 men.
Marshal Davout.....	18,000 „
Marshal Soult.....	20,000 „
Marshal Augereau.....	10,000 „
Marshal Ney.....	10,000 „
Marshal Bernadotte.....	12,000 „
General Oudinot.....	6,000 „
The guard.....	6,000 „
Murat's cavalry.....	10,000 „

Total..... 104,000

Deduct from this total of 104,000 men,

12,000 Lannes,	} left in the environs of Warsaw.
6,000 Oudinot,	
12,000 Bernadotte,	to be left between Thorn and Graudenz.

30,000

There will remain 74,000 men, active troops, capable of being united under the hand of Napoleon.

75,000 men, at most, left to give battle to general Benningsen, who had 90,000, including the Prussians.

Notwithstanding this numerical inferiority, Napoleon, reckoning upon his soldiers and the roads, which seemed to admit of rapid concentrations, took the field with a heart full of hope. He wrote to the archchancellor Cambacérès and to M. de Talleyrand, that he had broken up his cantonments, *to take advantage of a fine frost and fair weather*; that the roads were superb; that they must not say a word to the empress, in order *not to give her useless uneasiness*, but that he was in full movement, and that *it would cost the Russians dear, if they did not think better of it*.

Leaving Warsaw on the 30th, he was in the evening of that day at Prasznitz, and on the 31st at Willenberg. Murat, having outstripped him, had collected in all haste the regiments of cavalry, except the cuirassiers scattered along the Vistula, and formed the advanced guard of marshal Soult, already concentrated upon Willenberg. Marshal Davout had made forced marches to reach Myszyniec, marshal Augereau to reach Neidenburg. Meanwhile, marshal Ney had collected his divisions at Hohenstein, ready to press forward, as soon as the bulk of the army had passed his right. Marshal Bernadotte, falling back slowly, had come to place himself in rear of the left of Ney, at Löbau, then at Strasburg, and lastly in the environs of Thorn. Thus far, every thing turned out according to wish. The enemy had, with his right column, followed step by step the movement of marshal Bernadotte, and with the left had scarcely advanced towards Allenstein. An incomprehensible inaction kept him for some days in that position. General Benningsen, full of boldness when he had to plan a great manœuvre on the Lower Vistula, now hesitated, when it was time to engage in that daring manœuvre, which was far above his faculties and those of his army. In order to venture upon such enterprizes, one needs the confidence derived from the habit of victory, and likewise the experience of the sudden turns of fortune through which one is doomed to pass before one arrives at success. General Benningsen, who had neither that confidence nor that experience, floated amidst a thousand uncertainties, giving others and himself the false pretexts with which irresolution covers itself, sometimes alleging that he was waiting for provisions and ammunition—sometimes affecting to believe, or really believing, that the retrograde movement of Bernadotte's corps was common to the whole French army, and that he had obtained the desired result, since Napoleon was preparing to leave the Vistula. For the rest, his hesitation, though ridiculous enough after the pompous announcement of a vast offensive operation, insured his safety; for, the further he had ventured upon the Lower Vistula, the deeper would have been the abyss into which he would have fallen. This very hesitation, it is true, if continued for two or three days longer, was just as likely to ruin him as a more decisive movement, for, during that interval,

Napoleon was continuing to ascend upon the left flank of the Russian army.

On the 1st of February, Murat and marshal Soult were at Passenheim, marshal Davout was advancing upon Ortelsburg, Augereau and Ney were drawing nearer by Hohenstein to the bulk of the army, Napoleon was with the guard at Willenberg. In twenty-four or forty-eight hours more, the French would be, to the number of 75,000 men on the left flank of the Russians. Napoleon, always careful to guide his lieutenants step by step, had sent a fresh despatch to marshal Bernadotte, to explain to him for the last time the part which he was to act in this grand manœuvre, to point out to him the manner of stealing away quickly from the enemy, and of rejoining the army, which must render the effect of the present combination more certain and more decisive. This despatch had been consigned to a young officer recently attached to the staff, who had orders to carry it with the utmost expedition to the Lower Vistula.

The troops continued marching on the 2nd and 3rd of February. In the evening of the 3rd, having got past Allenstein, they debouched before an elevated position, which extends from the Alle to the Passarge, well flanked on the right and left by those two rivers and by woods. This was the position of Jonkowo. Napoleon, who had pushed forward on the 3rd to Gettkendorf, not far from Jonkowo, hastened to the advanced guard, in order to reconnoitre the enemy. He found him in greater force than he should have supposed, and drawn up on the ground as if he intended to give battle there. Napoleon immediately made his dispositions for a general engagement on the following day, if the enemy should persist in waiting for him at Jonkowo.

He urged the arrival of marshals Augereau and Ney, who were ready to join him. He had already at hand, at Gettkendorf, marshal Soult, the guard, Murat, and, at some distance on the right, marshal Davout, who quickened his pace in order to reach the banks of the Alle. Anxious to ensure the success of the morrow, Napoleon ordered marshal Soult to file to the right, along the course of the Alle, to follow the windings of that river, to penetrate into a re-entering angle, which it formed behind the position of the Russians, and to pass it by main force at the bridge of Bergfried, whatever resistance he should meet with. This bridge carried, we should possess on the rear of the enemy a *debouché*, by which we should have it in our power to place him in the greatest danger. Two of marshal Davout's divisions were directed to this point, in order to render the result infallible.

On the evening of that same day, marshal Soult executed the Emperor's order; the village of Bergfried was carried by Leval's division, and then the bridge over the Alle, lastly the heights beyond. The action was short but brisk and bloody. The Russians lost 1,200 men, the French five or six hundred. The im-

portance of the post was worth such a sacrifice. In the course of the evening, Murat's cavalry and marshal Soult's corps gave each other the hand along the Alle. We were in presence of the Russians, deprived of appui towards their left, threatened even on their rear, and separated from us merely by a small brook, a tributary of the Alle. It was expected that the morrow would be an important day, and Napoleon asked himself how it could be that the Russians were already assembled in such great number, and concentrated so opportunely on that point. He was puzzled to account for this, since, according to all calculations of distance and time, they could not have been informed of the movements of the French army soon enough to take a determination so prompt, so discordant with their first plan of offensive march on the Upper Vistula. At any rate, be the motive that had brought them together what it might, they were in danger of losing a battle, and losing it in such a manner as to be cut off from the Pregel if they waited only till the morrow. On the morrow, in fact, our troops, full of ardour, advanced upon the position. They conceived for a moment the hope that they should come at the Russians, but they beheld their lines gradually move off and vanish. Presently, they even perceived that they had before them nothing but advanced guards, placed as a curtain to deceive them. Napoleon, at this moment, would have had reason to regret not having attacked the Russians on the preceding day, if on the preceding day his army had been assembled and early in possession of the bridge of Bergfried. But the concentration, which was complete on the morning of the 4th, was not so on the evening of the 3rd; he had therefore no delay to reproach himself with. All that he could do was to march, and to penetrate the secret of the enemy's resolutions.

This secret he soon learned, for the Russians, in their joy at having miraculously escaped certain ruin, proclaimed it themselves upon the roads. The young officer, sent to marshal Bernadotte, had been taken by the Cossacks with his despatches, which he had not had the presence of mind to destroy. General Benningsen, apprized by these despatches forty-eight hours earlier than he should have been by the movement of the French army, had had time to concentrate himself in rear of Allenstein, and, on seeing Napoleon's preparations at Jonkowo, he had decamped in the night between the 3rd and 4th, either deeming it imprudent to fight in a position where he ran the risk of being turned, or because it was not consistent with his views to accept a decisive battle. Thus this enterprising general, who was to take Warsaw and Poland from us by a single manœuvre, was already retreating upon Königsberg. He hurried back towards the Pregel by the road to Arensdorf and Eylau, parallel to the course of the Alle.

But Napoleon, whom Fortune, twice inconstant in so short a time, had deprived of the fruit of the most admirable combinations, was not best pleased with having left his cantonments for nothing, and with not having an opportunity to pay those who had disturbed his

rest for their rash enterprise. The frost, though not very intense, was nevertheless sharp enough to make the roads firm without rendering the temperature insupportable. He determined, therefore, to put the speed of his soldiers again to the test, and to endeavour still to turn the flank of the Russians, for the purpose of giving them battle in a well-chosen position, and such a battle as should put an end to the war.

He took, in the utmost haste, the way to Arensdorf, marching at the centre and on the principal road, with Murat, marshal Soult, marshal Augereau, and the guard, having marshal Davout's corps on his right towards the Alle, marshal Ney's corps on his left towards the Passarge. Judging with wonderful sagacity that the Russians, though opportunely rallied through a caprice of Fortune, had been taken too much at unawares not to have left detachments in rear, he sent off marshal Ney a little to the left toward the Passarge, and ordered him to break down the bridge of Deppen, predicting that he should there make some good prize if he could intercept the routes leading from the Passarge to the Alle. Lastly, he enjoined marshal Bernadotte to leave the banks of the Vistula immediately, and, since there was now no enemy to trick, to rejoin the grand army as speedily as possible.

The troops advanced, following the order indicated. On this same day, the 4th of February, the Russians halted for a moment at Wolfsdorf, at an equal distance from the Alle and the Passarge, to take some rest, and to see whether the Prussian corps of general Lestocq, which was behind, would find means to rejoin them. But that corps was still so far off that they could not wait for it, and, pressed by the French, they continued their march, abandoning Guttstadt, the resources which they had collected there, the wounded, the sick, and 500 men, who were made prisoners.

Though the magazines of Guttstadt were not very considerable, they were valuable to the French, who, outstripping their convoys, had no means of subsistence but what they procured for themselves by the way.

Next day, the 5th of February, they continued to march in the same order, the French having their right to the Alle, the Russians their left, each striving to surpass the other in speed. During this time, Ney, having advanced by the bridge of Deppen beyond the Passarge, in order to cut off the retreat of such of the enemy's troops as were belated, actually fell in with the Prussians on the Liebstadt road. General Lestocq, having no hope of opening a passage for himself through Ney's corps, made up his mind to a sacrifice which had become necessary. He presented to the French a strong rear-guard of three or four thousand men, and, leaving it to their attack, he sought to steal away by descending the course of the Passarge, with the intention of crossing it lower down. This calculation, which is frequently one of the most cruel necessities of war, saved seven or eight thousand Prussians by the sacrifice of three or four thousand. Ney rushed upon those who were opposed

to him at Waltersdorf, cut part of them in pieces and took the rest. At the conclusion of the fight he had 2,500 prisoners. The ground was covered with 1,000 dead and wounded, a numerous artillery, and an immense quantity of baggage. Napoleon, who attached more value to beating the Russians by the whole of his collected forces than to picking up prisoners on the roads, recommended to marshal Ney not to persevere too much in the pursuit of general Lestocq, and not to separate himself from the grand army. In consequence of these instructions, Ney relinquished the pursuit of the Prussians, striving however, not to lose sight of them, in order to prevent their junction with the Russians.

On the 6th of February, the Russians, hastening their march, reached Landsberg, incessantly harassed by the French, and abandoning the little town of Heilsburg on the Alle, where they had more magazines, sick, and laggards. Their rear-guard having endeavoured to maintain its ground there, marshal Davout caused it to be briskly pushed, and, as he advanced occupying both banks of the Alle, Friant's division encountered this advanced guard, which was running off on the right bank, dispersed it, and killed and took some hundred men.

The Russians purposed to stop for the night between the 6th and 7th at Landsberg. In consequence, they covered themselves by a large detachment placed at Hoff. In the midst of a diversified country, a strong mass of infantry, having a village on its right, woods on its left, protected moreover by a numerous cavalry, barred the way. Murat, coming up first, pushed his hussars and his chasseurs, afterwards his dragoons, on the cavalry of the Russians, upset it, but could not make an impression on their solid infantry. General d'Hautpoul's cuirassiers, arriving at the moment, were set on in their turn. The first regiment charged first, but, in vain, damped as it was in its ardour by a charge of the enemy's cavalry. Murat, then rallying the division of cuirassiers, flung it entire upon the Russian infantry. A shout of *Vive l'Empereur!* issuing from the ranks, accompanied and excited the movement of those gallant horse-soldiers. They broke the enemy's line, and cut in pieces a great number of foot, trampled down by the horses. At that instant, Legrand's division, belonging to Soult's corps, made its appearance. One of his regiments marched to the village on the left and carried it. The Russians, who attached great value to this position, which ensured their tranquillity for the night, made another attempt upon the village. Surprised in the heat of their conflict with the French infantry by a fresh charge of our cuirassiers, they were definitively overthrown, and beat a retreat after losing two thousand men, sacrificed in this rear-guard action.

General Benningsen, pursued in this manner, conceived that it would not be safe for him to pass the night in the town of Landsberg, and retired upon Eylau, which he entered in the day-time on the 7th of February.

He placed a numerous rear-guard on a plateau called the plateau

of Ziegelhoff, and before which you arrive on issuing from the woods that cover the road from Landsberg to Eylau. Generals Bagowout and Barklay de Tolly were in position on this plateau, ready to renew the action of the preceding day. General Benningsen, fully sensible that he was too closely pressed not to be obliged to fight, made it a particular point to occupy this plateau, on which the French army, debouching from the woody country, might be received with advantage. He was likewise solicitous to protect the arrival of his heavy artillery, which he had ordered to make a circuit. From all these motives his resistance at this point could not fail to be obstinate.

Murat's cavalry, seconded by marshal Soult's infantry, debouched from the woods with its usual boldness, and advanced towards the plateau of Ziegelhoff. Levasseur's brigade, composed of the 46th and 28th regiments of the line, followed it resolutely, while Viviers' brigade, filing off to the right, tried to turn the position by crossing the frozen lakes. Levasseur's brigade, urged by the fire of a numerous artillery to hasten the attack, quickened its pace. A first line of the enemy's infantry was first repulsed with the bayonet. But the Russian cavalry, charging opportunely on the left of the brigade, overturned the 28th before it had time to form in square. It cut down many of our foot, and took an eagle.

The combat, being soon renewed, was kept up on both sides with great obstinacy. Meanwhile, Viviers' brigade having turned the position of the Russians, the latter left it and retired to the town of Eylau itself. Marshal Soult forced his way into it at the same time with them. Napoleon was unwilling that the town of Eylau should be left in their possession, in the uncertain but probable case of a great battle. The French, therefore, entered Eylau at the point of the bayonet. The Russians there defended themselves obstinately from street to street. The town was turned, and one of their columns was found established in a church-yard, which has since become famous for the terrible recollections attached to it, and which was situated outside the town on the right. Viviers' brigade carried this cemetery, after the severest struggle. The Russians fell back beyond Eylau. Of all rear-guard actions, this had been the most sanguinary, and it had caused marshal Soult's corps considerable loss. The French threw themselves in some disorder into the town of Eylau, the soldiers dispersing in quest of provisions, and surprising in the houses a great number of Russians, who had not had time to escape.

The first opinion conceived by Murat, and which he transmitted to Napoleon, was that the Russians, having lost the *point d'appui* of Eylau, would go and seek a more distant one. Meanwhile, some officers, who had lost themselves in the fray, perceived the Russians established a little beyond Eylau and lighting their bivouac fires, in order to pass the night there. This observation, confirmed by fresh reports, left no doubt respecting the importance of the fight reserved for the following day, the 8th of February, and such in-

deed is that which it has acquired, that the memory of it must endure for ages.

It became evident that the Russians, halting this time after the action in the evening, and not employing the night in marching, were resolved on fighting a general battle on the morrow. The French army was harassed with fatigue, greatly reduced in number by rapid marches, pinched by hunger, and suffering from cold. But it was necessary for them to give battle, and it was not on such an occasion that soldiers, officers, generals, were accustomed to feel their hardships.

Napoleon, losing no time, despatched the same evening several officers to marshals Davout and Ney, to bring them back, the one to his right, the other to his left. Marshal Davout had continued to follow the Alle to Bartenstein, and he was not more than three or four leagues off. He replied that he should arrive at day-break upon the right of Eylau (the right of the French army) ready to fall upon the flank of the Russians. Marshal Ney, who had been directed upon the left, so as to keep the Prussians at a distance, and to be able to rush upon Königsberg, in case the Russians should throw themselves behind the Pregel—marshal Ney was marching for Kreutzburg. Messengers were despatched after him, though it was not so sure that he could be brought back in time to the field of battle, as it was that marshal Davout would make his appearance there.

Deprived of Ney's corps, the French army amounted at most to fifty and some thousand men, though the Russians raise the number to 80,000 in their relations, and a French historian, in general worthy of credit, to 68,000.* The corps of marshal Davout, whose effective presented 26,000 men at Auerstädt, considerably diminished by the battles fought since, by disease, by the last march from the Vistula to Eylau, by the detachments left on the Narew, was about 15,000 strong. The corps of marshal Soult, the most numerous of the whole army, likewise greatly reduced by dysentery, marching, rear-guard actions, could not be computed at more than 16 or 17 thousand men. That of marshal Augereau, weakened by a great number of stragglers and marauders, who had dispersed in search of provisions, numbered only 6 or 7 thousand at the bivouac of Eylau, in the evening of the 7th of February. The guard, better treated, more restrained by discipline, had not left any laggards behind. Still it amounted to no more than 6,000 men. Lastly, Murat's cavalry, composed of one division of cuirassiers and three divisions of dragoons, presented scarcely 10,000 men in the ranks. It formed, therefore, a total force of 53 or 54 thousand men, capable of any thing, it is true, but worn down with fatigue and exhausted by hunger. If marshal Ney were to arrive in time, it would be possible to oppose 63,000 men to the

* We should not venture, in the teeth of the false assertions of historians, foreign and French, to advance such a truth, if it were not based on the most authentic documents.

enemy, all present under fire. No expectation could be entertained of the arrival of Bernadotte's corps, which was thirty leagues off.

Napoleon, who slept that night but three or four hours in a chair, in the house of the postmaster, placed the corps of marshal Soult at Eylau itself, partly within the town, partly on the right and left of it, Augereau's corps and the imperial guard a little in rear, and all the cavalry upon the wings, till daylight should enable him to make his dispositions.

General Benningsen had at last determined to give battle. He was on level ground, or nearly so, excellent ground for his infantry, not much versed in manœuvres, but solid, and for his cavalry, which was numerous. His heavy artillery, which he had directed to make a circuit, that it might not cramp his movements, had just rejoined him. It was a valuable reinforcement. Besides, he was so closely pursued, that he was obliged to interrupt his march in order to make head against the French. A retreating army must have some start, that it may be able to sleep and eat. It ought also not to have the enemy too close to it; for, to suffer an attack by the way, with the back turned, is the most dangerous manner of receiving battle. There is then a moment when the wisest thing that can be done is to choose one's ground, and there halt to fight. Such was the resolution adopted by general Benningsen on the evening of the 7th. He halted beyond Eylau, determined to fight desperately. His army amounting to 78 or 80 thousand men, and to 90 thousand with the Prussians, had sustained considerable losses in the late battles, but scarcely any in marches, for an army in retreat, without being in disorder, is rallied by the enemy that pursues it, whereas the pursuing army, not having the same motives for keeping close together, always leaves part of its effective behind. Deducting the losses sustained at Mohrungen, Bergfried, Waltersdorf, Hoff, Heilsberg, and at Eylau itself,* one may say that general Benningsen's army was reduced to about 80,000 men, 72,000 of whom were Russians and 8,000 Prussians. Thus, in case general Lestocq and marshal Ney should not arrive, 54,000 French would have to fight 72,000 Russians. The Russians had moreover a formidable artillery, computed at four or five hundred pieces. Ours amounted to 200 at most, including the guard. It is true that it was superior to all the artilleries of Europe, even to that of the Austrians. General Benningsen, therefore, determined to attack at day-break. The character of his soldiers was energetic like that of the French soldiers, but governed by other motives. The Russians had neither that confidence of success nor that love of glory which the French

* The Russians had lost 1,500 men at Mohrungen.

1,000	„	at Bergfried.
3,000	„	at Waltersdorf.
2,000	„	at Hoff.
1,000	„	at Heilsberg.
500	„	at Eylau.

Total..... 9,000 men.

exhibited, but a certain fanaticism of obedience, which induced them to brave death blindly. As for the quantum of intelligence possessed by the one and by the other, it is superfluous to make any remark on the difference.

Since debouching upon Eylau, the country appeared level and open. The little town of Eylau, situated on a slight eminence, and topped by a Gothic spire, was the only conspicuous point. The ground, gently sloping, on the right of the church, presented a cemetery. In front it rose perceptibly, and on this rise, marked by some hillocks, appeared the Russians in a deep mass. Several lakes, full of water in spring, frozen in winter, at this time covered with snow, were not distinguishable in any way from the rest of the plain. Scarcely did a few barns united into hamlets, and lines of barriers for folding cattle form a *point d'appui*, or an obstacle, on this dreary field of battle. A gray sky, dissolving at times into a thick snow, added its dreariness to that of the country, a dreariness which seized eye and heart, as soon as day-light, which comes very late in this season, had rendered objects perceptible.

The Russians were drawn up in two lines, very near to each other, their front covered by three hundred pieces of cannon planted on the salient points of the ground. In rear, two close columns, appuying, like two flying buttresses, this double line of battle, seemed designed to support it and to prevent its bending under the shock of the French. A strong reserve of artillery was placed at some distance. The cavalry was partly in rear, partly on the wings. The Cossacks, in general scattered, kept on this occasion with the body of the army. It was evident that, to the energy and dexterity of the French, the Russians had designed to oppose on this open ground a compact mass, defended in front by a numerous artillery, strongly supported in rear, in short a real wall, pouring forth a shower of fire. Napoleon, on horseback by day-break, had stationed himself in the cemetery, to the right of Eylau. There, scarcely protected by a few trees, he had a perfect view of the position of the Russians, who, already in battle, had opened their fire by a cannonade which became brisker every moment. It might be foreseen that cannon would be the weapon of that terrible fight.

Owing to the position of Eylau, which stretched itself out facing the Russians, Napoleon could give the less depth to his line of battle, and consequently the less scope to the balls of the artillery. Two of marshal Soult's divisions were placed at Eylau, Legrand's division in advance and a little to the left, Leval's division, partly on the left of the town, upon an eminence topped by a mill, partly on the right at the cemetery itself. The third division of marshal Soult's, St. Hilaire's division, was established still further to the right, at a considerable distance from the cemetery, in the village of Rothenen, which formed the prolongation of the position of Eylau. In the interval between the village of Rothenen and the town of Eylau, an interval left vacant for the purpose of making the rest of the army debouch there, was posted, a little in rear, Augereau's corps,

drawn up in two lines, and formed of Desjardins' and Heudelet's divisions. Augereau, tormented with fever, his eyes red and swollen, but forgetting his complaints at the sound of the cannon, had mounted his horse to put himself at the head of his troops. Further in rear of that same *débouché* came the infantry and cavalry of the imperial guard, the divisions of cuirassiers and dragoons, both ready to present themselves to the enemy by the same outlet, and meanwhile somewhat sheltered from the cannon by a hollow of the ground. Lastly, at the extreme right of this field of battle, beyond and in advance of Rothenen, at the hamlet of Serpallen, the corps of marshal Davout was to enter into action in such a manner as to fall upon the flank of the Russians.

Thus Napoleon was in open order, and, his line having the advantage of being covered on the left by the buildings of Eylau, on the right by those of Rothenen, the combat of artillery, by which he designed to demolish the kind of wall opposed to him by the Russians, would be much less formidable for him than for them. He had caused all the cannon of the army to be removed from the corps, and placed in order of battle. To these he had added the forty pieces belonging to the guard, and he was thus about to reply to the formidable artillery of the Russians by an artillery far inferior in number, but far superior in skill.

The Russians had commenced the firing. The French had answered it immediately by a violent cannonade at half cannon-shot. The earth shook under this tremendous detonation. The French artillerymen, not only more expert, but firing at a living mass, which served them for a butt, made dreadful havoc. Our balls swept down whole files. Those of the Russians, on the contrary, directed with less precision, and striking against buildings, inflicted less mischief upon us than that sustained by the enemy. The town of Eylau and the village of Rothenen were soon set on fire. The glare of the conflagration added its horrors to the horrors of the carnage. Though there fell far fewer French than Russians, still there fell a great many, especially in the ranks of the imperial guard, motionless in the cemetery. The projectiles, passing over the head of Napoleon, and sometimes very close to him, penetrated the walls of the church, or broke branches from the trees at the foot of which he had placed himself to direct the battle.

This cannonade lasted for a long time, and both armies bore it with heroic tranquillity, never stirring, and merely closing their ranks as fast as the cannon made gaps in them. The Russians seemed first to feel a sort of impatience.* Desirous to accelerate the result by the taking of Eylau, they moved off to carry the position of the mill, situated on the left of the town. Part of their right formed in column, and came to attack us. Leval's division, composed of Ferey's and Viviers' brigades, gallantly repulsed

* An expression of Napoleon's, in an account which he gave himself of the battle.

it, and by their firmness left the Russians no hope of success, if they renewed their efforts.

As for Napoleon, he attempted nothing decisive, for he would not endanger, by sending it forward, the corps of marshal Soult, which had done so well to keep Eylau under such a tremendous cannonade; nor would he risk either St. Hilaire's division or Augereau's corps against the centre of the enemy; it would have been exposing them to dash themselves against a burning rock. He waited for acting till the presence of marshal Davout's corps, which was coming on the right, should begin to be felt on the flank of the Russians.

This lieutenant, punctual as he was intrepid, had actually arrived at the village of Serpallen. Friant's division marched at the head. It debouched the first, encountered the Cossacks, whom it had soon driven back, and occupied the village of Serpallen with some companies of light infantry. No sooner was it established in the village and in the grounds on the right, than one of the masses of cavalry posted on the wings of the Russian army detached itself, and advanced towards it. General Friant, availing himself with intelligence and coolness of the advantages afforded by the accidents of the locality, drew up the three regiments of which his division was then composed behind the long and solid wooden barrier, which served for folding cattle. Sheltered behind this natural entrenchment, he kept up a fire within point-blank range upon the Russian squadrons, and forced them to retire. They fell back, but soon returned, accompanied by a column of nine or ten thousand infantry. It was one of the two close columns, which served for flying buttresses to the Russian line of battle, and which now bore to the left of that line, to retake Serpallen. General Friant had not more than 5,000 men to oppose to it. Still, sheltered behind the wooden barrier with which he had covered himself, and able to deploy without apprehension of being charged by the cavalry, he saluted the Russians with a fire so continuous and so well-directed, as to occasion them considerable loss. Their squadrons having shown an intention to turn him, he formed the 33rd into square on his right, and stopped them by the imperturbable bearing of his foot-soldiers. As he could not make use of his cavalry, which consisted of some horse chasseurs, he made amends for it by a swarm of tirailleurs, who kept up such a fire upon the flanks of the Russians, as to oblige them to retire towards the heights in rear of Serpallen, between Serpallen and Klein-Sausgarten. On retiring to these heights, the Russians covered themselves by a numerous artillery, the downward fire of which was unfortunately very destructive. Morand's division had arrived in its turn on the field of battle. Marshal Davout, taking the first brigade, that of general Ricard, went and placed it beyond and on the left of Serpallen; he then posted the second, composed of the 51st and the 61st, on the right of the villages, so as to support either Ricard's brigade or Friant's division. The latter had proceeded to the right of Serpallen, towards Klein-Sausgarten.

At this very moment, Gudin's division was accelerating its speed to get into line. Thus the Russians had been obliged by the movement of our right to draw back their left from Serpallen towards Klein-Sausgarten.

The expected effect on the flank of the enemy's army was therefore produced. Napoleon, from the position which he occupied, had distinctly seen the Russian reserves directed towards the corps of marshal Davout. The hour for acting had arrived; for, unless he interfered, the Russians might fall in mass upon marshal Davout and crush him. Napoleon immediately gave his orders. He directed St. Hilaire's division, which was at Rothenen, to push forward and to give a hand to Morand's division about Serpallen. He commanded the two divisions of Augereau's corps, Desjardins' and Heudelet's, to debouch by the interval between Rothenen and Eylau, to connect themselves with St. Hilaire's division, and to form all together an oblique line from the cemetery of Eylau to Serpallen. The result expected from this movement was to overturn the Russians, by throwing their right upon their centre, and thus break down, beginning at its extremity, the long wall which he had before him.

It was ten in the morning. General St. Hilaire moved off, left Rothenen, and deployed obliquely in the plain, under a terrible fire of artillery, his right at Serpallen, his left towards the cemetery. Augereau moved nearly at the same time, not without a melancholy foreboding of the fate reserved for his *corps d'armée*, which he saw exposed to the danger of being dashed in pieces against the centre of the Russians, solidly appuyed upon several hillocks. While general Corbineau was delivering the orders of the Emperor to him, a ball pierced the side of that gallant officer, the senior of an heroic family. Marshal Augereau marched immediately. The two divisions of Desjardins and Heudelet, debouched between Rothenen and the cemetery, in close columns, then, having cleared the defile, formed in order of battle, the first brigade of each division deployed, the second in square. While they were advancing, a squall of wind and snow, beating all at once into the faces of the soldiers, prevented them from seeing the field of battle. The two divisions, enveloped in this kind of cloud, mistook their direction, and bore a little to the left, leaving on their right a considerable space between them and St. Hilaire's division. The Russians, but little incommoded by the snow, which they had at their backs, seeing Augereau's two divisions advancing towards the hillocks on which they appuyed their centre, suddenly unmasked a battery of 72 pieces, which they kept in reserve. So thick was the grape poured forth by this formidable battery, that in a quarter of an hour half of Augereau's corps was swept down. General Desjardins, commanding the first division, was killed; general Heudelet, commanding the second, received a wound that was nearly mortal. The staff of the two divisions was soon *hors de combat*. While they were sustaining this tremendous fire, being obliged to re-form while marching, so much were their ranks thinned, the

Russian cavalry, throwing itself into the space which separated them from Morand's division, rushed upon them *en masse*. Those brave divisions, however, resisted, but they were obliged to fall back towards the cemetery of Eylau, giving ground without breaking, under the repeated assaults of numerous squadrons. The snow having suddenly ceased, they could then perceive the melancholy spectacle. Out of six or seven thousand combatants, about four thousand killed or wounded strewed the ground. Augereau, wounded himself, but more affected by the disaster of his *corps d'armée* than by his personal danger, was carried into the cemetery of Eylau, to the feet of Napoleon, to whom he complained, not without bitterness, of not having been timely succoured. Silent grief pervaded every face in the imperial staff. Napoleon, calm and firm, imposing on others the impassibility which he imposed on himself, addressed a few soothing words to Augereau, then sent him to the rear, and took his measures for repairing the mischief. Despatching, in the first place, the chasseurs of his guard and some squadrons of dragoons which were at hand, to drive back the enemy's cavalry, he sent for Murat, and ordered him to make a decisive effort on the line of infantry which formed the centre of the Russian army, and which, taking advantage of Augereau's disaster, began to press forward. At the first summons, Murat came up at a gallop. "Well," said Napoleon, "*are you going to let those fellows eat us up?*" He then ordered that heroic chief of his cavalry to collect the chasseurs, the dragoons, the cuirassiers, and to fall upon the Russians with eighty squadrons, to try what effect the shock of such a mass of horse, charging furiously, would have on an infantry reputed not to be shaken. The cavalry of the guard was brought forward, ready to add its shock to that of the cavalry of the army. The moment was critical, for, if the Russian infantry were not stopped, it would go and attack the cemetery, the centre of the position, and Napoleon had only the six foot battalions of the imperial guard to defend it.

Murat galloped off, collected his squadrons, made them pass between the cemetery and Rothenen, through the same débouché by which Augereau's corps had already marched to almost certain destruction. General Grouchy's dragoons charged first, to sweep the ground, and to clear it of the enemy's cavalry. That brave officer, whose horse fell with him, put himself, on rising, at the head of the second brigade, and effected his purpose of dispersing the groups of cavalry which preceded the Russian infantry. But, for overturning the latter, nothing short of the heavy iron-clad squadrons of general d'Hautpoul was required. That officer, who, distinguished himself by consummate skill in the art of managing a numerous cavalry, came forward with twenty-four squadrons of cuirassiers, followed by the whole mass of the dragoons. These cuirassiers, ranged in several lines, started off, and threw themselves upon the Russian bayonets. The first lines, stopped by the fire, could not penetrate, and, falling back to right and left, went to form afresh behind those who followed them, in order to charge anew.

At length, one of them, rushing on with more violence, broke the enemy's infantry at one point, and opened a breach, through which cuirassiers and dragoons strove which should penetrate first. As a river, which has begun to break down a dike, soon carries it away entirely, so the masses of the squadrons, having once penetrated the infantry of the Russians, finished in a few moments the overthrow of their first line. Our horse then dispersed to slaughter. A horrible fray ensued between them and the Russian foot soldiers. They went, and came, and struck on all sides those obstinate antagonists. While the first line of infantry was thus overturned and cut in pieces, the second fell back to a wood that bounded the field of battle. A last reserve of artillery had been left there. The Russians placed it in battery and fired confusedly at their own soldiers and at ours, not caring whether they slaughtered friends or foes, if they only got rid of our formidable horse. General d'Hautpoul was mortally wounded by a rifle ball. While our cavalry was thus engaged with the second line of the Russian infantry, some parties of the first rallied and renewed their fire. At this sight the horse grenadiers of the guard, headed by general Lepic, one of the heroes of the army, came forward in their turn to second Murat's efforts. Dashing off at a gallop, they charged the groups of infantry which they perceived to be still on their legs, and, crossing the ground in all directions, completed the destruction of the centre of the Russian army, the wrecks of which at last fled for refuge to the patches of wood which had served them for an asylum.

During this scene of confusion, a fragment of that vast line of infantry had advanced to that same cemetery. Three or four thousand Russian grenadiers, marching straight forward with the blind courage of braver and more intelligent troops, came to throw themselves on the church of Eylau, and threatened the cemetery occupied by the imperial staff. The foot guard, motionless till then, had endured the cannonade without firing a piece. With joy it beheld an occasion for fighting arrive. A battalion was called for: two disputed the honour of marching. The first in order, led by general Dorsenne, obtained the advantage of measuring its strength with the Russian grenadiers, went up to them without firing a shot, attacked them with the bayonet, and threw one upon another, while Murat despatched against them two battalions of chasseurs under general Bruyère. The unfortunate Russian grenadiers, hemmed in between the bayonets of the grenadiers of the guard and the swords of our chasseurs, were almost all taken or killed, before the face of Napoleon, and only a few paces from him.

This cavalry action, the most extraordinary perhaps, of any in our great wars, had for its result to overthrow the centre of the Russians, and to drive it back to a considerable distance. It would have been requisite to have at hand a reserve of infantry, in order to complete the defeat of troops which, after being laid upon the ground, rose again to fire. But Napoleon durst not venture to dispose of marshal Soult's corps, reduced to half of its effective, and necessary for

keeping Eylau. Augereau's corps was almost destroyed. The six battalions of the foot guard were alone left for reserve, and amidst the so various chances of that day, still far from its close, it was a resource which it behoved Napoleon to preserve with the utmost care. On the left, marshal Ney, marching for several days side by side with the Prussians, might reach the field of battle before them or they before him, and eight or ten thousand men, arriving unexpectedly, might bring to one of the two armies a reinforcement which would perhaps be decisive. On the right, marshal Davout was engaged in an obstinate combat with the left of the Russians, the result of which was yet unknown.

Napoleon, motionless in the cemetery, in which were heaped the bodies of a great number of his officers, graver than usual, but commanding his countenance as well as his soul, having his guard behind him, and before him the chasseurs, the dragoons, the cuirassiers, formed and ready to devote themselves afresh—Napoleon awaited the event before taking a definitive determination. Never had he or his soldiers been engaged in so hotly contested a fight.

But the time for defeat had not yet arrived, and Fortune, frowning for a moment on that extraordinary man, still treated him as a favourite. At that juncture, general St. Hilaire with his division, marshal Davout with his corps, justified the confidence which Napoleon had placed in them. St. Hilaire's division, received, like Augereau's corps and at the same moment, with a murderous fire of grape and musketry, had suffered cruelly. Blinded also by the snow, it had not perceived a mass of cavalry hurrying towards it at a gallop, and a battalion of the 10th light had been overturned under the horses' heels. Morand's division, the extreme left of Davout, uncovered from the accident which had befallen the 10th light, had been obliged to fall back two or three hundred paces. But Davout and Morand had soon moved it forward again. During this interval, general Friant was maintaining an heroic struggle at Klein-Sausgarten, and, seconded by Gudin's division, it definitively occupied that advanced position on the flank of the Russians. He had even pushed detachments to the village of Kuschitten, situated on their rear. It was the moment when, it being nearly dark, and the Russian army almost half destroyed, it seemed that the battle must terminate in our favour.

But the event which Napoleon dreaded had occurred. General Lestocq, perseveringly pursued by marshal Ney, appeared on that field of carnage, with seven or eight thousand Prussians, eager to revenge themselves for the disdain of the Russians. General Lestocq, only an hour or two ahead of marshal Ney's corps, had merely time to strike one blow before he was struck himself. He debouched upon the field of battle at Schmoditten, passed behind the double line of the Russians, now broken by the fire of our artillery, by the swords of our horse, and presented himself at Kuschitten in front of Friant's division, which, passing beyond Klein-Sausgarten, had already driven back the left of the enemy upon its centre. The

village of Kuschitten was occupied by four companies of the 108th, and by the 51st, which had been detached from Morand's division to go to the support of Friant's division. The Prussians rallying the Russians around them, rushed impetuously on the 51st, and on the four companies of the 108th, without being able to break them, though they obliged them to fall back to a considerable distance, in rear of Kuschitten. The Prussians after this first advantage, pushed on beyond Kuschitten, in order to recover the positions of the morning. They marched, deployed in two lines. The Russian reserves, being rallied, formed two close columns on their wings. A numerous artillery preceded them. In this manner they advanced across the rear of the field of battle, to regain the lost ground, and to beat back marshal Davout upon Klein-Sausgarten, and from Klein-Sausgarten to Serpallen. But generals Friant and Gudin, having marshal Davout at their head, hastened up. Friant's entire division, and the 12th 21st, and 25th regiments, belonging to Gudin's division, placed themselves foremost, covered by the whole of the artillery of the third corps. To no purpose did the Russians and Prussians exert themselves to overcome that formidable obstacle: they were unsuccessful. The French, appuyed on woods, marshes, and hillocks, here deployed in line, there dispersed as tirailleurs, opposed an invincible obstinacy to this last effort of the allies. Marshal Davout, passing through the ranks till dark, kept up the firmness of his soldiers, saying, "Cowards will be sent to die in Siberia; the brave will die here like men of honour." The Prussians and the rallied Russians desisted from the attack; marshal Davout remained firm in that position of Klein-Sausgarten, where he threatened the rear of the enemy.

The two armies were exhausted. That day so sombre was every moment becoming more sombre still, and about to terminate in a tremendous night. More than 30,000 Russians, struck by the balls and the swords of the French, strewed the ground, some dead, others wounded more or less severely. Many of the soldiers began to abandon their colours.* General Benningsen, surrounded by his lieutenants, were deliberating whether to resume the offensive, and try the effect of one more effort. But, out of an army of 80,000 men, not more than 40,000 were left in a state to fight, the Prussians included. If he were worsted in this desperate engagement, he would not have wherewithal to cover his retreat. However, he was still hesitating, when intelligence was brought him of a last and important incident. Marshal Ney, who had closely followed the Prussians, arriving in the evening on our left, as marshal Davout had arrived in the morning on our right, debouched at length near Althof.

Thus Napoleon's combinations, retarded by time, had nevertheless brought upon the two flanks of the Russian army the forces that were to decide the victory. The order for retreat could no longer

* The very expression of Platho, the narrator.

be deferred ; for marshal Davout, having maintained himself at Klein-Sausgarten would not have much to do to meet marshal Ney, who had advanced to Schmoditten, and the junction of these two marshals would have exposed the Russians to the risk of being enveloped. The order for retreating was instantly given by general Benningsen ; but, to ensure the retreat, he purposed to curb marshal Ney by attempting to take from him the village of Schmoditten. The Russians marched upon that village, under favour of the night and in profound silence, in hopes of surprising the troops of marshal Ney, which had arrived late on the field of battle, when it was difficult to recognize one another. But the latter were on their guard. General Marchand, with the 6th light and the 39th of the line, allowing the Russians to approach, then receiving them with a point-blank fire, stopped them short. He then rushed upon them with the bayonet, and obliged them to renounce all serious attack. From that moment they definitively commenced their retreat.

Napoleon, discerning the real state of things by the direction of marshal Davout's and marshal Ney's fires, knew that he was master of the field of battle ; nevertheless, he was not sure that he should not have a second battle to fight, either that night or on the morrow. He occupied that slightly rising plain beyond Eylau, having his cavalry and his guard before him and at the centre, on his left, in advance of Eylau, Legrand's and Leval's two divisions of marshal Soult's corps, on the right, and St. Hilaire's division, which connected itself with the corps of marshal Davout, pushed beyond Klein-Sausgarten ; the French army thus forming an oblique line on the ground which the Russians had possessed in the morning. Considerably beyond, on the left, marshal Ney, detached, found himself on the rear of the position which the enemy was quitting in the utmost haste.

Napoleon, certain of being victorious, but grieved to the bottom of his heart, had remained amidst his troops, and ordered them to kindle fires, and not leave the ranks, even to go in quest of provisions. A small quantity of bread and brandy was distributed among the soldiers, and, though there was not enough for all, yet no complaints were heard. Less joyous than at Austerlitz and at Jena, they were full of confidence, proud of themselves, ready to renew that dreadful struggle, if the Russians had the courage and the strength to do so. Whoever had given them at this moment bread and brandy which they were in want of, would have found them in as high spirits as usual. Two artillerymen of marshal Davout's corps, having been absent from their company during this engagement and arrived too late to be present at the battle, their comrades assembled in the evening at the bivouac, tried them, and not liking their reasons, inflicted upon them, on that frozen and blood-stained ground, the burlesque punishment which the soldiers call the *savate*.*

* We borrow these particulars from the military and manuscript memoirs of marshal Davout.

There was no great abundance of any thing but ammunition. The service of the artillery, performed with extraordinary activity, had already replaced the ammunition consumed. With not less zeal was the service of the medical and surgical department performed. A great number of wounded had been picked up; to others relief was administered on the spot, till they could be removed in their turn. Napoleon, overwhelmed with fatigue, was still afoot and superintending the attentions that were paid to his soldiers.

In the rear of the army so firm a countenance was not everywhere presented. Many stragglers, excluded from the effective in the morning, in consequence of the rapidity of the marches, had heard the din of that tremendous battle, had caught some hurrahs of the Cossacks, and fallen back, circulating bad news along the roads. The brave collected to range themselves beside their comrades, the others dispersed in the various routes which the army had traversed.

Daybreak next morning threw a light upon that frightful field of battle, and Napoleon himself was moved to such a degree as to betray his feelings in the bulletin which he published. On that icy plain thousands of dead and dying, cruelly mangled, thousands of prostrate horses, an infinite quantity of dismounted cannon, broken carriages, scattered projectiles, burning hamlets, *all this standing out from a ground of snow*,* exhibited a thrilling and terrible spectacle. "This spectacle," exclaimed Napoleon, "is fit to excite in princes a love of peace and a horror of war!" A singular reflection from his lips, and sincere at the moment when he suffered it to escape them!

One singularity struck all eyes. From a propensity for returning to the things of past times, and also from economy, an attempt had been made to introduce the white uniform again into the army. The experiment had been made with some regiments, but the sight of blood on the white dress decided the question. Napoleon, filled with disgust and horror, declared that he would have none but blue uniforms, whatever might be the cost.

The sight of this field of battle abandoned by the enemy gave the army an assurance of its victory. The Russians had retired leaving upon the ground 7,000 dead and more than 5,000 wounded, whom the generous conqueror lost no time in removing after his own. Besides the 12,000 dead or dying left at Eylau, they took with them about 15,000 wounded more or less severely. They had consequently 26 or 27 thousand men *hors de combat*. We had taken three or four thousand prisoners, 24 pieces of cannon, 16 colours. Their total loss then amounted to 30,000 men. The French had about 10,000 men *hors de combat*, 3,000 of whom were killed and 7,000 wounded; †

* An expression of Napoleon's in one of his bulletins.

† It is seldom that one can state the losses sustained in a battle with such accuracy as one is enabled to do for the battle of Eylau. I undertook a careful examination, in order to arrive at precision, and here follows the truth, at least as nearly as it is possible to attain it in such a matter. The inspector of the

a loss far inferior to that of the Russian army, and which is accounted for by the position of our troops posted in extended order, and by the dexterity of our artillerymen and of our soldiers. Thus, on that fatal day nearly 40,000 men had perished by fire and sword. It is the population of a large town cut off in a day. Melancholy consequence of the passions of nations!—terrible passions, which we ought to take pains to direct properly, not strive to extinguish!

So early as the morning of the 9th, Napoleon had sent forward his cuirassiers and his dragoons in pursuit of the Russians, to drive them towards Königsberg, and to throw them for the whole winter beyond the Pregel. Marshal Ney, who had not had much to do in the battle of Eylau, was charged to support Murat. Marshals Davout and Soult were to follow at a little distance. Napoleon himself remained at Eylau, engaged in healing the wounds of his brave army, in procuring it supplies, and in setting every thing to rights on its rear. This was of greater importance than a pursuit, an operation which his lieutenants were perfectly capable of executing themselves.

On marching, the French acquired a still more complete conviction than before of the disaster sustained by the Russians. As they advanced, they found the small towns and villages of East Prussia hospitals certified the same evening, at Eylau, the existence of 4,500 wounded, and next day, after going his rounds in the adjacent villages, he increased the total amount to 7,094. His report has been preserved. The reports of the different corps make the number of men more or less severely wounded amount to not fewer than 13 or 14 thousand. This difference is explained by the manner in which the authors of those reports understand the word wounded. The chiefs of corps include even the slightest contusions, each of them naturally striving to make the most of the sufferings of his men. But half the men set down as wounded, never thought of applying for any attendance, and this is proved by the report of the director of the hospitals. A month afterwards a curious controversy was kept up by letter between Napoleon and M. Daru, who could not find more than 6,000 wounded in the hospitals of the Visutla. This appeared disputable to Napoleon, who conceived that there must be more, especially if there were included in this number the wounded of the battle of Eylau and those of the actions which preceded it, after the breaking-up of the cantonments. However, after minute examination, there were never found more than six thousand and some hundred, and fewer than six thousand for Eylau itself, which, taking account of the deaths that supervened, agrees exactly with the statement of 7,094 furnished by the director of the hospitals. We think, therefore, that we are near the truth in computing the losses of the battle of Eylau at 3,000 killed and 7,000 wounded. Napoleon, speaking in the bulletin of 2,000 killed and five or six thousand wounded, had, as we may see, not warped the truth much in comparison with what the Russians had done. One may even assert that, in the evening after the battle, he was founded in supposing that there were not more.

As for the losses of the Russians, I have adopted their own amounts and those which were certified by the French. We found 7,000 dead, and in the surrounding places 5,000 wounded. They must have carried away a much greater number. Both, a German, says that they carried to Königsberg 14,900 wounded, who almost all died from the cold. He admits, moreover, that they had 7,000 killed, and left 5,000 wounded on the field of battle. Add three or four thousand prisoners, and you arrive at a total loss of 30,000 men, which can scarcely be disputed. General Benningsen, always very inaccurate, admitted in his statement a loss of 20,000 men.

full of wounded; they learned the disorder, the confusion, the deplorable state, in short, of the fugitive army. The Russians, nevertheless, in comparing this battle with that of Austerlitz, were proud of the difference. They admitted their defeat, but they made themselves amends for this avowal, by adding that the French had paid dearly for the victory.

The pursuers did not stop till they reached the banks of the Frisching, a small river which runs from the line of the lakes to the sea, and Murat pushed his squadrons as far as Königsberg. The Russians, who had fled in the utmost haste, some beyond the Pregel, the others to Königsberg itself, showed a disposition to defend themselves there, and had planted a numerous artillery upon the walls. The terrified inhabitants asked themselves if they were to be exposed to the fate of Lübeck. Luckily for them, Napoleon resolved to put an end to his offensive operations. He had sent Murat's horse to the gates of Königsberg, but he had no intention of conducting his army itself thither. It would have required nothing less than that entire army to attempt, with any hope of success, an attack by main force on a large city, provided with some works, and defended by all that were left of the Russian and Prussian troops. An attack, even if successful, on that wealthy city would not be worth the risks that must be incurred, if the attempt should miscarry. Napoleon, having pushed his corps to the banks of the Frisching, was content to leave them there for a few days, to be fully certified of his victory, and then purposed to retire, and resume his cantonments. He had not, indeed, obtained the immense result with the prospect of which he at first flattered himself, and which would certainly not have escaped him, if an intercepted despatch had not revealed his designs to the Russians; but he had led them fighting for fifty leagues; had destroyed 9,000 of them in a series of rear-guard actions; and, finding them at Eylau formed into a compact mass, covered by artillery, resolved to desperation, 80,000 strong, including the Prussians, in a plain where no manœuvring was possible, he had attacked them with 54,000, destroyed them with cannon-balls, and parried all the accidents of the engagement with imperturbable coolness, while his lieutenants were exerting themselves to rejoin him. The Russians on that day had had all their advantages, solidity, immoveableness in fire; he had not had all his upon a ground where it was not possible for him to manœuvre; but to their tenacity he had opposed invincible courage, a moral force above the horrors of the most frightful slaughter. The spirit of the soldiers was displayed on that day as strongly as his own. Assuredly, he had reason to be proud of this test. Besides, for the 12 or 13 thousand men whom he had lost during those eight days, he had destroyed 36,000 of the enemy. But he must have been sensible at that moment of all the power of climate, soil, distance, for, though possessing more than 300,000 men in Germany, he had not been able to collect more than 54,000 on the ground of the decisive action. After such a victory, he could not

fail to make serious reflections, to take more account of the elements and fortune, and to attempt less in future on the invincible nature of things. These reflections he did make, and they induced, as we shall presently learn, conduct the most soberly calculated and the most admirably provident. Would to Heaven that they had remained for ever engraved on his memory!

Though victorious and safe for several months from any enterprise against his cantonments, still he had one thing to fear, namely, the lying reports of the Russians, the effect of those reports on Austria, on France, on Italy, on Spain, in short, on all Europe, which, seeing his progress twice stopped in three months, either by the mud or by the climate, would be led to believe him less irresistible, less fatally successful,—would regard as doubtful a victory, nevertheless the most incontestable, the most cruelly efficacious, and might be tempted to disbelieve his fortune.

He resolved therefore to show here the character which he had displayed during the battle of Eylau itself, and, certain of his strength, to wait till Europe, more enlightened, should be equally sensible of it. After passing a few days on the Frisching, as the enemy kept close within his lines, he resolved to return, and re-occupy his cantonments. The weather was still cold, but the temperature never fell more than two or three degrees below freezing. He availed himself of it to remove his wounded in sledges. More than 6,000 endured, without suffering much, this singular journey of forty or fifty leagues to the Vistula. The extreme care taken to seek them all up in the neighbouring villages furnished opportunity for ascertaining their real number. It agreed with that which we have mentioned above. When every thing was removed—wounded, sick, prisoners, artillery taken from the enemy—Napoleon commenced, on the 17th of February, his retrograde movement, marshal Ney with the sixth corps, Murat with the cavalry, forming the rear-guard, the other corps retaining their accustomed position in the order of march, marshal Davout on the right, marshal Soult in the centre, marshal Augereau on the left; lastly, marshal Bernadotte, who had rejoined, forming the extreme left along the Frische Haff.

Napoleon, having ascended the Alle, nearly to the lakes from which it issues, and from which the Passarge likewise issues, changed his direction, and, instead of taking the route to Warsaw, took that of Thorn, Marienburg, and Elbing, purposing thenceforward to appuy himself upon the Lower Vistula. Recent events had modified his ideas respecting the choice of his base of operation. His motives for this change were these.

The position between the branches of the Ukra, the Narew, and the Bug, which he had at first adopted, was a consequence of the occupation of Warsaw. It had the advantage of covering that capital, and, if the enemy proceeded along the coast, of allowing him to be more easily outwinged, turned, thrown back to the sea, a plan which Napoleon had just attempted, and which he would cer-

tainly have executed, but for the taking of his despatches. But, this manœuvre once unmasked, it was not probable that the Russians, forewarned, would expose themselves a second time to a danger which they had escaped by a sort of miracle. Thus the position chosen in advance of Warsaw no longer possessed the same advantage, and it had a serious inconvenience, that of obliging the army to extend itself beyond measure, in order to cover at once Warsaw and the siege of Dantzic—a siege which became an urgent operation, to which it was necessary to devote the leisure of winter. In fact, in placing himself at Warsaw, Napoleon was obliged to leave Bernadotte's corps at a great distance, with little chance of rallying it to the main body of the army; and if he marched forward, he should be obliged to leave likewise the fifth corps, that of Lannes, to guard Warsaw. Of course, he would have to act with two corps deficient. The distance of Bernadotte's corps would become in future a subject of the greater regret, since it would very soon be necessary to unite with him new forces, in order to second and cover the siege of Dantzic.

Napoleon therefore resolved to keep at a distance from Warsaw, to commit the guard of that capital to the fifth corps, the Poles, the Bavarians—the submission of the fortresses in Silesia having rendered the latter disposable—and to establish himself, with the greater part of his troops, in advance of the Lower Vistula, behind the Passarge, having Thorn on his right, Elbing on his left, Dantzic on his rear, his centre at Osterode, his advanced posts between the Passarge and the Alle. In this position he covered himself the siege of Dantzic, without needing to detach any part of his forces for this purpose. If, in fact, the Russians, designing to relieve Dantzic, were to come and seek a battle, he could oppose to them all his collected corps, including Bernadotte's, and even part of Lefebvre's troops, which there would be nothing to prevent his calling in to him, in case of emergency, as he had done in 1796, when he raised the siege of Mantua to run after the Austrians. His only deficiency on a day of battle would be that of the fifth corps, which, in whatever way he operated, was indispensable upon the Narew, in order to defend Warsaw. This new position, moreover, would furnish occasion for scientific combinations, fertile in great results, combinations unknown to the enemy, whereas he was acquainted with all those having Warsaw for base. Cantoned behind the Passarge, Napoleon would be but fifteen leagues from Königsberg. Supposing that the Russians, encouraged by the apparent loneliness in which Warsaw was left, should advance upon that capital, one might run behind them to Königsberg, get possession of that city, then, dropping down by a movement to the right, on their rear, throw them upon the Narew and the Vistula, into the marshes of the interior, with as much certainty of destroying them as in the case of the movement towards the sea. If, on the contrary, they attacked the cantonments on the Passarge in front, one would have, as we have just observed, in addition to the natural strength of those canton-

ments, the entire mass of the army to oppose to them. The position, then was excellent for the siege of Dantzic, excellent for the future operations; for it would give rise to new combinations, the secret of which was not revealed.

It is assuredly an imposing and instructive sight to see that impetuous general, who, as his detractors allege, was fit only for offensive war, carried at a bound from the Rhine to the Vistula, pausing all at once before the difficulties of localities and of seasons, shutting himself up in a narrow space, carrying on cold, slow, methodical war there, disputing petty streams foot by foot, after passing the largest rivers without stopping, confining himself to covering a siege, and placed at so vast a distance from his empire, in presence of Europe, which this new mode of proceeding astonished, and in which doubt began to gain ground, retaining unutterable firmness, not seduced even by the desire of striking a signal blow, and knowing how to defer that blow till the moment when the nature of things rendered it sure and possible: it is, we say, worthy of interest, astonishment, admiration; it is a fine subject for study and reflection for any one who can appreciate the combinations of great men, and who takes delight in meditating upon them.

Napoleon proceeded then to place himself between the Passarge and the Lower Vistula, marshal Bernadotte's corps on the left, on the Passarge, between Braunsberg and Spanden; marshal Soult's corps in the centre, between Liebstadt and Mohrunge; marshal Davout's corps to the right, between Allenstein and Hohenstein, at the point where the Alle and the Passarge approach nearest to one another; marshal Ney's corps as advanced guard, between the Passarge and the Alle at Guttstadt; the head-quarters and the guard at Osterode, in a central position, where Napoleon could assemble all his forces in a few hours. He drew general Oudinot to Osterode, with the grenadiers and voltigeurs, forming an infantry reserve of six or seven thousand men. He spread the cavalry on his rear, between Osterode and the Vistula, from Thorn to Elbing, a country abounding in all kinds of forage.

In the enumeration of the corps cantoned behind the Passarge, we have not mentioned Augereau's. Napoleon had pronounced its dissolution. Augereau had left the army, disconcerted at what had befallen him in the battle of Eylau, erroneously imputing his check to the jealousy of his comrades, who, as he said, had not chosen to support him, alleging that he was fatigued, ill, worn out. The Emperor sent him back to France, with testimonies of satisfaction, which were of a nature to cheer him. But, apprehensive lest there might lurk in the seventh corps, half destroyed, a leaven of the discouragement manifested by its chief, he pronounced its dissolution, after lavishing rewards upon it. He divided the regiments between marshals Davout, Soult, and Ney. Of the 12,000 men composing the seventh corps, there had been 7,000 present at Eylau, and two-thirds of those 7,000 had been put *hors de combat*. The survivors,

added to those who had lagged behind, furnished the different corps of the army with a reinforcement of seven or eight thousand men.

Napoleon placed the fifth corps on the Omulew, at some distance from Warsaw. Lannes continuing ill, he had sent for the first of his generals, Massena, who had not been able to agree with Joseph at Naples, with regret to deprive Italy of him, but with great satisfaction to have him in Poland. He gave him the command of the fifth corps. The sieges in Silesia advancing, thanks to general Vandamme's energy and fertility of mind, Schweidnitz being taken, and Neisse and Glatz alone remaining to be reduced, Napoleon took advantage of circumstances to bring to the Vistula Deroy's Bavarian division, six or seven thousand strong, and very good troops, which was cantoned at Pultusk, between the position of the fifth corps on the Omulew and Warsaw. The Polish battalions of Kalisch and Posen had been sent to Dantzic. Napoleon assembled those of Warsaw, organized by prince Poniatowski, at Neidenburg, so as to keep up the communication between the head-quarters and the troops encamped on the Omulew. They were there under the command of general Zayonscheck. He also required that a cavalry corps of one or two thousand Poles should be organized, in order to run after the Cossacks. These different Polish troops, destined to connect the position of the grand army on the Passarge with that of Massena on the Narew, were not capable, it is true, of stopping any Russian army that might have taken the offensive, but they were sufficient to prevent the Cossacks from penetrating between Osterode and Warsaw, and to exercise an active vigilance in that extensive space. Concentrated thus behind the Passarge and in advance of the Lower Vistula, covering in an inassailable position the siege of Dantzic, which was at length about to begin; able, by a threat against Königsberg, to stop any offensive movement upon Warsaw, Napoleon was in a situation not to fear any thing. Re-joined by the laggards left behind and by Bernadotte's corps, reinforced by Oudinot's grenadiers and voltigeurs, he could, in forty-eight hours, assemble 80,000 men on one of the points of the Passarge. This situation was very imposing, especially if we compare it with that of the Russians, who could not have brought 50,000 men into line. But it is a remark worthy of being repeated, though already made by us, that an army of 300,000 men, spread from the Rhine to the Vistula, administered with a skill never equalled by any captain, was incapable of furnishing more than 80,000 combatants on the same field of battle. There were 80 or 90 thousand men capable of acting offensively between the Vistula and the Passarge, 24,000 on the Narew, from Ostrolenka to Warsaw, including the Poles and the Bavarians, 22,000 under Lefebvre before Dantzic and Colberg, 28,000 under Mortier, Italians, Dutch, and French, spread from Bremen and Hamburg to Stralsund and Stettin, 15,000 in Silesia as well Bavarians as Wirtembergers, 30,000 in the fortresses from Posen to Erfurt and Mayence, 7 or 8

thousand employed in parks, 15,000 wounded of all epochs, 60 and some thousand sick and marauders, lastly, 30 to 40 thousand recruits on march, which gave nearly 330,000 men to the grand army, 270,000 of whom were French, and about 60,000 auxiliaries, Italians, Dutch, Germans, and Poles.

What will appear singular is the enormous number of 60,000 sick or marauders; a number, it is true, merely approximative,* difficult to be fixed, but worthy of the attention of statesmen, who study the secret springs of the power of nations. Of these 60,000 absent men designated as sick, not half were in the hospitals. The others were gone a-plundering. We have already said that many soldiers were absent from the ranks at the battle of Eylau, owing to the rapidity of the marches, and that, the impressions of this dreadful battle spreading to a distance, cowards and hangers-on had run off as fast as their legs would carry them, crying that the French were beaten. Since then, they had been joined by a great number of men, who, on pretext of illness or slight wounds, applied for admission to the hospitals, but took good care not to go into them, as they should be detained, watched, and even receive a great deal more attendance than they liked. They had passed the Vistula, lived in the villages on the right and left of the high road, so as to escape that general superintendence which kept in order all the parts of the army. In this manner, they lived at the expense of the country, which they did not spare, some of them downright cowards, for every army, however heroic, always has a certain quantity of them in its ranks; the others very brave, on the contrary, but plunderers by nature, fond of liberty and disorder, and ready to return to the ranks as soon as they should learn the resumption of the operations. Napoleon, apprized of this state of things by the difference between the number of men reputed to be in the hospitals, and the number of those whom M. Daru's expenses proved to be really there, turned his serious attention to this abuse. He employed for its repression the police of the Polish authorities, and then the gendarmerie d'élite attached to the guard, as the only body of men sufficiently respected to enforce obedience. Still this leprosy attached to large armies could never be completely destroyed on the line of operation. And yet the army in question was the army of the camp of Boulogne, the steadiest, the best disciplined, the bravest, that ever existed. In the campaign of Austerlitz, the marauders had scarcely shown themselves. But the rapidity of the movements, the distance, the climate, the season, lastly the slaughter, relaxing the ties of discipline, those vermin, deplorable effect of wretchedness in a great body, began to multiply. Napoleon provided against the evil for this time by immense forecast, and by the victories which he soon gained. But defeats can in a few days aggravate an evil of this kind to such a degree as to produce the dissolution of armies. Thus in the very successes of that glorious

* The Emperor could never fix it exactly, owing to the continual fluctuation of the effective of the corps.

and terrible campaign of 1807, appeared many of the symptoms of a most fatal and even memorable campaign, that of 1812.

The return into cantonments was marked by some movements on the part of the Russians. Their ranks were exceedingly thinned. They had not 50,000 men capable of acting left. General Benningsen, however, quite proud of not having lost all to the very last man at Eylau, and according to custom proclaiming himself conqueror, was desirous to give his boasts the appearance of truth. He therefore left Königsberg, as soon as he learned that the French army was retiring upon the Passarge. He showed strong columns along that river, especially in its upper course, towards Guttstadt, facing the position of marshal Ney. He went to the wrong person; for that intrepid marshal, deprived of the honour of fighting at Eylau, and impatient to make himself amends, gave a vigorous reception to the corps that came within his reach, and inflicted on them a considerable loss. At the same moment, the corps of marshal Bernadotte, seeking to establish itself on the Lower Passarge, and being obliged for that purpose to occupy Braunsberg, made itself master of that town, where it took prisoners 2,000 Prussians. It was Dupont's division which had the merit of this brilliant expedition. The Russians having, nevertheless, continued to bestir themselves, and manifesting an intention to proceed to the Upper Passarge. Napoleon, in the first days of March, resolved to make an offensive demonstration on the Lower Passarge, so as to alarm general Benningsen for the safety of Königsberg. It was with regret that Napoleon decided on such a movement, for it was revealing to the Russians the risk which they ran in ascending upon our right to threaten Warsaw. Well knowing that an unmasked manœuvre is a lost resource, Napoleon would have chosen not to act at all, or to act in a decisive manner by marching for Königsberg with all his forces. But, on the one hand, it was necessary to oblige the enemy to keep quiet, in order to be so himself in his winter-quarters; on the other, he had neither sufficient provisions nor ammunition to attempt an operation of any duration. Napoleon, therefore, made up his mind to a mere demonstration on the Lower Passarge, executed on the 3rd of March by the corps of marshals Soult and Bernadotte, who passed that river, while marshal Ney, at Guttstadt, was roughly pushing the enemy's corps proceeding to the Upper Passarge. The Russians lost in these simultaneous movements about 2,000 men; and, on seeing their line of retreat upon Königsberg endangered, they hastened to retire and to restore tranquillity to our cantonments.

Such were the last acts of that winter campaign. The cold, which had long delayed its coming, began to be severe: the thermometer had fallen to eight and ten degrees below the freezing-point. There was going to be in March the weather that might have been expected in December and January.

It was with the utmost reluctance that Napoleon had given orders for the last operations. Writing to marshal Soult, he says, "It is

certainly one of the inconveniences that I have felt from the present movements that they enlighten the Russians respecting their position. But they pressed me too much on my right. Being resolved to let the bad season pass, and to organize the supplies, I am not otherwise vexed at this lesson given to the enemy. With the spirit of presumption with which I see him animated, we need but to have patience to see him make capital blunders.”—(*Osterode, March 6th.*)

If Napoleon had then had provisions and means of conveyance to carry along with him sufficient to subsist the army for a few days, he would have put an end to the war immediately, having to do with an enemy ill-advised enough to come and throw himself upon his quarters. Thus the whole question consisted, according to his notions, in such a supply of provisions, as would enable him to recruit his soldiers, exhausted by privations, and to assemble them for some days without being liable to see them die of hunger or to leave half of them behind, as was the case at Eylau.

The towns on the coast, especially Elbing, would be able to furnish him with provisions for the first moments of his establishment, but such resources were not sufficient for him. He purposed, therefore, to bring large quantities, either from Warsaw down the Vistula, or from Bromberg by the Nackel canal, and which should then be carried by land from the Vistula to the different cantonments of the army on the Passarge. To this end, he gave the most precise orders for collecting the necessary supplies in the first instance at Bromberg and Warsaw, for next creating the means of transport for completing the journey from the Vistula to the banks of the Passarge. His intention was to begin with serving out to his soldiers the entire ration for each day, and then to form at Osterode, the centre of his quarters, a general magazine containing some millions of rations of bread, rice, wine, spirits. For this purpose he meant to turn to account the zeal of the Poles, who had hitherto rendered him few military services, and from whom he wished to derive some administrative services at least. As he had M. de Talleyrand at Warsaw, he charged him to arrange with the provisional government which directed the affairs of Poland. He wrote him therefore the following letter, sending him full powers for concluding the bargains, whatever the prices might be:—

“Osterode, 12th March, 10 at night.

“I received your letter of the 10th at three this afternoon. I have 300,000 rations of biscuit at Warsaw. It takes eight days to come from Warsaw to Osterode: work miracles, but despatch 50,000 rations to me every day. Endeavour also to send me 2,000 quarts of spirits per day. At this moment the fate of Europe and the most extensive schemes depend upon supplies of provisions. To beat the Russians, if I have bread, is mere child's play. I have millions; I do not refuse to give some of them. All that you do will be rightly done, but, on the receipt of this letter, there must be sent off to me by land, by way of Mława and Takroczin, 50,000

rations of biscuit and 2,000 quarts. It is a matter of 80 waggons per day, which must be paid for handsomely. If the patriotism of the Poles cannot make this effort, they are not good for much. The importance of what I am desiring of you is greater than all the negotiations in the world. Send for the *ordonnateur*, general Lemarrois, and the most influential persons of the government. Give money; I shall approve whatever you do. Biscuit and brandy—that is all we want. Those 300,000 rations of biscuit and those 18 or 20 thousand quarts of brandy, which may reach us in a few days—these are the things to foil the combinations of all the powers.”

M. de Talleyrand assembled the members of the Polish government, to endeavour to obtain the supplies and waggons which were wanted. Provisions were not scarce in Poland, for, by furnishing the Jews with ready money, you would be sure to obtain them. But to organize the means of conveyance was a very difficult task. It was intended to hire them in the country, paying liberally for them; but it was finally decided to buy carts and horses, and thus relays were established from the banks of the Vistula to those of the Passarge. The provisions were sent down the Vistula in boats; being then landed at Warsaw, Plock, Thorn, Marienwerder, they were carried to Osterode, the centre of the cantonments, either in the caissons of the regiments, or in the carriages of the country, or in those which had been purchased and horsed for the purpose. Oxen were bought up throughout all Silesia, and driven on foot to Warsaw. Wines and spirits were sought on the north coast, whither commerce brings them in considerable quantity and of superior quality. They were to be obtained at Berlin, at Stettin, at Elbing, and were despatched by water to Thorn: Napoleon had been particularly solicitous to procure two or three hundred thousand bottles of wine, to cheer the hearts of his soldiers. He had near him a valuable resource of this kind, but it was shut up in the fortress of Dantzic, where there were several millions of bottles of excellent wines, that is to say, sufficient to supply the army for some months. This was no weak stimulus to reduce that fortress.

These assiduous attentions paid to the supply of the army could not produce an immediate effect; but, meanwhile, the soldiers were living on the Nogath, on Elbing, on the very districts which they occupied, and, their industry making up for what was deficient, they had contrived to procure necessaries. Considerable quantities of hidden provisions had been discovered, and these enabled them to wait for the regular arrivals from the Vistula. They were lodged in the villages, and had ceased to bivouack, which was a great relief for troops that had bivouacked for five successive months, from October to February. At the advanced posts they lived in hovels, the materials for which and for fuel were furnished in abundance by the forests of the country. Some wine, some spirits, found at Elbing, and distributed with order, restored to our

soldiers some of their gaiety. After the first days, they began to like the situation better than that on the Narew; for the country was finer, and they hoped, on the return of the mild season, to compensate themselves for present privations, and to put an end, by a day of battle, to the terrible struggle in which they were engaged.

The provisional regiments destined to bring the recruits began to arrive on the Vistula. Several of them, already gone to the theatre of war, had been reviewed, dissolved, and distributed among the regiments to which they belonged. The soldiers thus saw their ranks filled up, heard talk of numerous reinforcements which were preparing on the rear of the army, and relied more than ever on that supreme vigilance which provided for all their wants. The cavalry continued to be the object of the most attentive care. Napoleon had formed foot detachments of all the dismounted horse, and had sent them into Silesia in quest of horses, in which that province abounded.

Immense works were in progress on the Passarge and on the Vistula, in order to secure the position of the army. All the bridges over the Passarge had been destroyed, two excepted; one for the use of marshal Bernadotte's corps at Braunsberg, the other for the use of marshal Soult's corps at Spanden. Vast *têtes-de-pont* were added to each of them, to afford facility for debouching beyond, Napoleon repeating incessantly to his lieutenants, that a line was not easy to defend, unless one were able to cross it in its turn, to take the offensive against any one who should attack it.* Two bridges over the Vistula, one at Marienburg, the other at Marienwerder, ensured the communication with the troops of marshal Lefebvre, charged with the siege of Dantzic. Napoleon, therefore, could either go to them or make them come to him, and everywhere present a compact mass to the enemy. Marshal Lefebvre was approaching Dantzic, while awaiting the heavy artillery drawn from the fortresses of Silesia, to commence this important siege, which was to be the occupation and the glory of the winter. The works of the Sierock, Praga, and Modlin, destined to consolidate the position of Warsaw, were likewise prosecuted.

It was at the little village of Osterode that Napoleon directed all these operations. His soldiers, having bread, potatoes, meat, brandy, straw to shelter themselves, wood for fuel, were not badly off; but the officers, who could procure no better food and lodging than the soldier, even with their pay punctually paid, were exposed to many privations. Napoleon meant to set them an example of resignation by remaining among them. The officers of each corps, sent to Osterode, could not say that they had found him more comfortably

* "Neither a river nor any line whatever," he wrote to Bernadotte (6 March, Osterode), "can be defended unless they have offensive points; for, when you have only defended yourself, you have run risks without gaining any thing. But when you can combine defence with an offensive movement, you cause the enemy to run more risks than he makes the attacked body incur. Let then the works at the *têtes-de-pont* of Spanden and Braunsberg proceed day and night."

settled than the lowest of them. Accordingly, in answering his brother Joseph, who complained of the hardships endured by the army of Naples, he laughed at his complaints, accused him of weakness of mind, and drew the following picture:—

“The officers of the staff have not undressed for these two months and some not for four months past; I have myself been a fortnight without taking off my boots. We are amidst snow and mud, without wine, without brandy, without bread, eating potatoes and meat, making long marches and counter-marches, without any kind of comforts, fighting in general with the bayonet and under grape, the wounded having to be carried away in sledges, exposed to the air, for fifty leagues.”

He is adverting here to the march which followed the battle of Eylau, for at Osterode they were better off.

“It is, therefore, a silly joke, to compare the places where we are with the fine country of Naples, where you have wine, bread, sheets to your beds, society, and even that of women. After destroying the Prussian monarchy, we are fighting against the rest of Prussia, against the Russians, the Calmucks, the Cossacks, and those northern tribes which of old overran the Roman empire. We are waging war in all its energy and its horror. Amidst all these excessive fatigues, every body has been more or less ill; for my part, I was never better, and I have grown fat.”—(*Osterode*, March 1.)

The situation of which Napoleon draws this sketch was already much improved at Osterode, especially for the soldiers. But, if we suffered, the Russians suffered far more, and were in extreme distress. Their battalions, which, at the commencement of the operations, numbered 500 men, were now reduced to 300, 200, 150. Ten had just been taken at once, which fell short of the last number. If the Russians were to attempt to cope with Napoleon, it would be on condition of sacrificing their army; in consequence, they could no longer show themselves in the open field. Word had been sent to Petersburg, in the name of all the generals, that, if the forces which were left were not doubled at least, they could not thenceforth do any thing but run away from the French. For the rest, all the Russian officers, filled with admiration of our army, sensible that in fact they were fighting much more for England or Prussia than for Russia, longed for peace and called loudly for it.

Their troops, not supplied, like those of Napoleon by a superior forecast, were dying of hunger. Weary of war, they had ceased to fight with our men. They met in marauding, almost without attacking one another. They seemed to have instinctively agreed not to add to the hardships of their situation. Sometimes it happened that unfortunate Cossacks, driven by hunger, and expressing themselves by signs, came to beg bread of our soldiers, giving them to understand, that for several days they had not had any thing to eat; and our men, always disposed to pity, gave them potatoes, of which they had a great abundance. Singular sight, this return to humanity even amidst the cruelties of war!

Napoleon knew that, while suffering great hardships, he had subjected the enemy to much greater. But he had to combat the false reports accredited at Warsaw, at Berlin, and above all at Paris. His prodigious glory alone awed minds, always independent in France, always malevolent in Europe, and he could already anticipate that, on the first serious reverse, he should see one after another desert him. Never, in consequence, had he such efforts to make, such energy of character to exert, in order to control the public opinion. Young auditors sent from Paris to carry to headquarters the despatches of the different ministries, unaccustomed to the scenes that met their view, and officers, either discontented or more deeply impressed than usual with the horrors of that war, sent to France letters full of exaggerations. "Concert with M. Daru," said Napoleon to M. Maret in one of his letters, "about sending back the auditors, who are useless here, who are wasting their time, and who, unused to the events of war, *write nothing but stupid absurdities to Paris*. In future, I will have the papers brought by officers of the staff." As for the accounts relative to the battle of Eylau, emanating from certain officers, and which Fouché mentioned to him as the source of the false reports circulated in Paris, Napoleon replied that nothing of the sort was to be believed. "My officers," said he, "know as much about what is passing in my army *as the loungers parading in the garden of the Tuileries know about what is under deliberation in the cabinet* (April 13). *Besides, the human mind is pleased with exaggeration*. The sombre pictures drawn for you of our situation have for their authors *Paris babblers, who are adepts at painting*. Never was the position of France either greater or more glorious. As for Eylau, I have said and repeated that the Bulletin had exaggerated the loss; and what are two or three thousand men killed in a great battle? *When I take back my army to France and to the Rhine, it will be seen that not many will be missing at roll-call*. At the time of the expedition to Egypt, the correspondence of the army, being intercepted by the British cabinet, was printed and led to the expedition of the English, which was silly, which ought to have failed, but which succeeded *because it was decreed by fate that it should succeed*. Then, too, it was said that we were destitute of every thing in Egypt, the richest country in the world; it was said that the army was destroyed, and I brought back eight-ninths of it to Toulon! The Russians claim the victory: so they did after Pultusk, after Austerlitz. They were pursued, on the contrary, at the point of the sword, till they were under the guns of Königsberg. They had fifteen or sixteen generals killed. Their loss was immense. *We made a downright butchery of it*."

There had been printed some fragments of letters from major-general Berthier, making mention of the dangers to which Napoleon had been exposed. "They are publishing," he wrote to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, "that I command my advanced posts. . . what absurdities! I begged you not to allow any thing but the Bulletins to be inserted in the *Moniteur*. If this is not attended to,

you will prevent me from writing at all, and then you will be more uneasy. . . . Berthier writes amidst a field of battle, wearied, and not expecting that his letters will be printed."—(*Osterode*, March 5.)

Thus Napoleon had no desire that his own personal courage should be noticed, for that very courage became a danger. It was acknowledging too plainly that this military monarchy, without past, without future, was at the mercy of a cannon-ball.

The transports caused in France by the wonders of Austerlitz and Jena, were succeeded by a sort of uneasiness. Paris was dull and deserted, for the emperor and the chiefs of the army, who constituted a great part of the high society of that reign, were absent. Trade suffered. Napoleon enjoined his sisters and the princes Cambacérès and Lebrun to give entertainments. He wished to fill up in this way the void created by his absence. He ordered a survey to be made of the moveables of the crown at Fontainebleau, Versailles, Compiègne, St. Cloud, and several millions taken from his personal savings to be expended on stuffs in the manufactories of Lyons, Rouen, and St. Quentin. He directed the sums laid out to be proportioned not to the wants of the imperial residences but to the wants of the different branches of trade. Though he generally made a point of checking the fondness of the empress and his sisters for expense, on this occasion he recommended prodigality to them. He desired that the Sinking Fund, that is to say the treasury of the army, should devote a million per month to be lent to the principal manufactures, on deposit of goods, and he demanded a *projet* for converting that accidental measure into a permanent institution, having for its object, he said, not the creation of a chest for the assistance of bankrupts, but of a provident chest destined to uphold manufacturers employing a great number of hands, whom they would be obliged to discharge, if they were not furnished with facilities for paying them.

Lastly, he devised an extraordinary medium for procuring capitals for commerce, and for making at the same time a notable improvement in the administration of the finances. At that time, still less than at the present day, was the sum total of the taxes rigidly levied within the year. Thus the bills of the receivers-general, representatives of the taxes, were not due, for a part at least, till three or four months after the turn of the year, that is to say till March, April, or May, in the following year. It was necessary, therefore, to discount them, a business undertaken by a class of agents who carried on a very active stock-jobbing. It was the floating debt of the time, which was met with the bills of the receivers-general, as it is now met with the *bons royaux*. This discount required a capital of 80 millions on the part of the Paris capitalists. Napoleon's idea was to determine that, for 1808, for example, that portion of the bills which should not be due till 1809 should be applied to the service of 1809 itself, and the same in future, so that the service of each year should have for its use only those bills which fell due in that same year. The deficit, answering to the portion of the bills carried back to 1809, would remain to be provided for. This was a sum of 80

millions to be raised. Napoleon proposed to furnish it by a loan which the treasury of the State should obtain from the treasury of the army at a moderate rate. "By this means," he wrote, "my bills would fall due all within twelve months; the public treasury would save five or six millions in expenses of negotiation; our manufactures and our commerce would make an immense gain, since there would be 80 millions idle, which, as they could not find employment at the treasury would be placed in commerce."—(Note to prince Cambacérès, *Osterode*, April 1.)

He gave orders for making in Paris itself a considerable quantity of shoes, boots, harness, and gun-carriages, to give employment to the workmen of the capital. The articles made in Paris were of better quality than those made elsewhere. The only question was, how to transport them to Poland. Napoleon devised for this an expedient as simple as it was ingenious. At this period a company of contractors was charged with the transports of the army, and furnished at a fixed rate the caissons which carried the bread, the baggage, every thing in short that follows the troops, even the most lightly equipped. Napoleon had been struck, amidst the quagmires of Pultusk and Golymin, with the little zeal of those drivers enrolled by private industry, with their want of courage in danger, and, as he had determined to organize the artillery-drivers militarily, so he resolved likewise to organize the baggage-drivers militarily; thinking that, the danger being nearly equal for all those who concur in the different services of an army, it was necessary to connect them all by the bond of honour, and to treat them as soldiers, in order to impose on them the duties of soldiers. He had therefore given orders for forming successively in Paris *battalions of the train* charged with the driving of the equipages, for constructing caissons, for purchasing draught horses, and, when the personal and material establishment of these battalions should be organized, for despatching them to the Vistula. Instead of coming empty, these new military equipages were to bring the articles of equipment manufactured in Paris. These articles might arrive in time on the Vistula, for the journey took two months, and it was possible that the war might last five or six. Napoleon purposed by the whole of these measures to remedy the temporary stagnation of commerce, and to make the war consumption compensate for the deficiency of the peace consumption. The one, in fact, consumes not less than the other; and, when money is not scarce, a skilful administration can furnish workmen with the employment that peace would supply, and afford them the means of earning a livelihood even amidst the difficulties of the war.

Such is the multitude of objects to which he directed his attention in the village of Osterode, living in a sort of barn, whence he awed Europe and governed his empire. A more suitable abode was at length found for him, at Finkensteen; it was a country house, belonging to one of the *employés* of the crown of Prussia, and spacious enough to accommodate himself with his staff and his

military household. There, as at Osterode, he was in the centre of his cantonments, and had it in his power to repair to any quarter where his presence might be necessary. The portfolios of the several ministries were sent to him every week, and he turned his attention to the most important as well as the most trivial matters. The theatres themselves, at this distance, did not escape his active superintendence. There had been composed in his honour music and verses which he deemed bad. By his order, others were composed, in which he was less praised, but in which elevated sentiments were expressed in suitable language. He directed that the authors should be thanked and rewarded, adding these noble words: *The best way to praise me is to write things which excite heroic sentiments in the nation, in youth, and in the army.* He read the public papers attentively, followed the meetings of the French Academy, desired that the tendencies of the minds of writers should be corrected, and that an eye should be kept upon the orations delivered before the Academy. He considered the attacks made by the *Journal de l'Empire* and the *Mercure de France* upon the philosophers as mischievous. "It is necessary," said he, "to have discreet men at the head of those journals. Those two journals affect religion even to bigotry. Instead of attacking the excesses of the exclusive system of some philosophers, they attack philosophy and human knowledge. Instead of keeping the productions of the age within bounds by sound criticism, they discourage, depreciate, and debase them. I am not adverting to political opinions: one need not be very shrewd to perceive that if they durst launch into them, they would not be much sounder than those of the *Courrier Français*."

The French Academy had held a meeting for the reception of cardinal Maury, recalled to France and replaced in the chair which he had formerly occupied. The abbé Sicard, in receiving cardinal Maury, had expressed himself in unbecoming terms of Mirabeau. The person received had spoken no better of him, and this academical meeting had furnished occasion for a philippic against the revolution and the revolutionists. Napoleon, disagreeably affected, wrote to Fouché, the minister: "I recommend to you, let there be no reaction in the public opinion. Let Mirabeau be mentioned in terms of praise. There are many things in that meeting of the Academy which do not please me. When shall we grow wiser! When shall we be animated with genuine Christian charity, and when will our actions not have for their object to humble any body! When shall we abstain from awaking recollections which go to the heart of so many persons!"—(*Finkenstein*, May 20.)

At another time, he learned from the correspondence of all kinds, which he paid for liberally and read with care, that intestine quarrels divided the administration of the Opera, and that there was a disposition to persecute a machinist, on account of a change of decoration which had failed: "I will not have wrangling any-

where," he wrote to M. Fouché. "I will not suffer M—— to be the victim of a fortuitous accident; my custom is to support the unfortunate: whether actresses ascend into the clouds or ascend not, I will not allow that to be made a handle for intriguing."—(April 12.)

At the same time, he showed extreme solicitude about the institutions for education, particularly about that of Ecouen, where the daughters of poor legionaries were to be educated. He wished them, he wrote to M. de Lacepède, to be trained up into women, simple, chaste, worthy of being united to men who should have served him faithfully either in the army or in the civil administration. To render them such, it was requisite, according to him, that they should be brought up in sentiments of solid piety. "I have attached," said he, "but a secondary importance to the religious institutions for the school of Fontainebleau. The object of that is to train young officers; but, as for Ecouen, it is a totally different affair. It is there proposed to train up women, wives, mothers of families. *Make believers of them, not reasoners. The weakness of the brain of women, the mobility of their ideas, their destination in the social order, the necessity for inspiring them with a perpetual resignation and a mild and easy charity*—all this renders the yoke of religion indispensable for them. I am desirous that they may leave it not agreeable women, but virtuous women, *that their agreeable qualities may be of the heart, not of the mind.*" In consequence, he recommended that they should be taught history and literature, that they should be spared the study of the ancient languages and too abstruse sciences; that they should also learn sufficient of natural philosophy to be able to dispel the popular ignorance around them, somewhat of ordinary medicine, of botany, of dancing, *but not that of the Opera*, the art of ciphering, and all sorts of needle-work. Their apartments, he added, must be furnished by their own handiwork. They must make their chemises, their stockings, their dresses, their caps, and be able, in case of need, to make clothes for their infants. I want to make these young girls useful women, certain that I shall thereby make them agreeable women. If I were to allow any one to set about making them agreeable women, I should soon have them turned into female coxcombs (*petites maitresses*). —(*Finkenstein*, May 15.)

Amidst this prodigious activity, sometimes changing from beneficent vigilance to jealous mistrust, which cannot fail to happen with a new and absolute master, Napoleon turned his attention to the police, knew what persons entered Paris and what left it. He was informed that madame de Staël had returned thither, that she had already visited at several country-houses in the environs, and made more than one hostile speech: Alleging that, if he did not interfere, she would compromise good citizens, whom he should afterwards be obliged to treat with severity, he had ordered her, notwithstanding many contrary solicitations, to be expelled from Paris. As he distrusted Fouché, the minister, who was disposed to spare influential persons, he had enjoined him to make her set off

without delay, and had recommended to the archchancellor Cambacérès to see to the execution of this order. (March 26.) At the same moment he was informed that the police had sent away from Paris an old Conventionalist, named Ricord. For the latter nobody solicited, no great personage claimed indulgence; all were hurried away by the reaction, and there was neither favour nor humanity for those who were called *revolutionists*. "Why," wrote Napoleon to Fouché, "why send Ricord the Conventionalist away from Paris? If he is a dangerous man, he ought not to have been suffered to return, contrary to the laws of the year VIII. But since he has been permitted to come back, he must be left there. What he did formerly is of little consequence. He conducted himself in the time of the Convention like a man anxious to make his fortune; he joined in the cry of the time. He is now in easy circumstances, and will not involve himself in any scrapes, for the sake of a subsistence. Let him then be tolerated in Paris, unless there are strong reasons to prevent his residing there." (March 6.)

By the same pains that he took to inquire about every thing, he learned from MM. Monge and Laplace, that a man of science whom he particularly honoured and cherished, M. Berthollet, was in some pecuniary embarrassment. "I am informed," he wrote to him, "that you are in need of 150,000 francs. I shall give my treasurer an order to place that sum at your disposal, very glad to find this occasion to be useful to you, and to give you a proof of my esteem."—(*Finkenstein*, May 1.)

He then addressed further advice to his brothers Louis and Joseph on the manner of reigning, the one in Holland, the other in Naples. He accused Louis of favouring, from the vanity of an upstart king, the party of the old government, the Orange party; of creating marshals without having an army; of instituting an order, which he gave to all comers; to Frenchmen who were unknown to him, to Dutchmen who had never rendered him any service. He reproached Joseph with being weak, careless, more engaged with ostentatious reforms than with the subjection of the Calabrias; with preceding the suppression of the monks, a measure which he highly approved, by a preamble that seemed to be drawn up by philosophers, not by statesmen. "Such a preamble," he said, ought to be written in the style of an enlightened pontiff, who suppresses the monks because they are unserviceable to religion, burdensome to the Church. I conceive a bad opinion of a government whose *papers are directed by the mania of fine writing*."—(April 14.) "You live too much," said he, "with literary and scientific men. They are coquettes with whom one must keep up a commerce of gallantry, but whom one must never think of making one's wife or one's minister." He reproached him with creating illusions respecting his situation at Naples, with flattering himself that he was beloved, when he had reigned but a year at most. "Ask yourself," said he, "what would become of you if there were no longer thirty thousand French in Naples. When you have reigned twenty years, and have made

yourself *feared and esteemed*, then you may venture to believe that your throne is consolidated." He then drew for him the following sketch of the situation of the French in Poland. "At Naples, you are eating green peas, and perhaps seeking the shade already: we, on the contrary, are still in the month of January. I have had the trenches opened before Dantzic. One hundred pieces of cannon, two hundred thousand pounds of gunpowder, are beginning to be collected there. Our works are 60 fathoms from the place, which has a garrison of six thousand Russians and twenty thousand Prussians, commanded by marshal Kalkreuth. I hope to take it in a fortnight . . . For the rest, give yourself no uneasiness."—(*Finkenstein*, April 19.)

Such were, amidst the snows of Poland, the various occupations of that extraordinary genius, embracing every thing, superintending every thing, aspiring to govern not only his soldiers and his agents, but minds themselves: wanting not only to act but to think for every body: most frequently disposed to good, but sometimes, in his incessant activity, suffering himself to be drawn into evil, as it happens to him who can do any thing, and who finds no obstacle to his own impulsions; at one time preventing reactions, persecutions, at another in the bosom of immense glory, so keenly sensitive to the sting of an enemy's tongue as to descend from his greatness to persecute a woman, on the same day that he defended a member of the Convention against the reacting spirit of the moment! Let us rejoice that we have at last become subject to the law, to the law equal for all, and which does not expose us to the peril of being dependent on the good or evil movements of even the greatest and the most generous of souls. Yes, the law is better than any human will, whatever it may be! Let us be just, however, to that will, which found means to accomplish such prodigious things, which accomplished them by our hands, which employed its fertile energy in reorganizing French society, in reforming Europe, in carrying our power and our principles over the whole world, and which, if, after all that it did with us, it has not left us the power that passes away, has at least left us the glory that is permanent—and glory sometimes brings back power.

BOOK XXVII.

FRIEDLAND AND TILSIT.

Events in the East during the Winter of 1807—Sultan Selim, frightened by the Threats of Russia, restores the Hospodars, Ipsilanti, and Maruzzi—The Russians nevertheless continue their March to the Turkish Frontier—The Porte, on learning the Violation of its Territory, at the instigation of general Sebastiani, sends the Russian Minister, M. d'Italinski, his Passports—The English, in concert with the Russians, demand the return of M. d'Italinski, the Expulsion of general Sebastiani, and an immediate Declaration of War against France—Resistance of the Porte and Retreat of Mr. Arbuthnot, the English Minister on board the English Fleet at Tenedos—Admiral Duckworth, with a Squadron of seven Sail of the Line and two Frigates, forces the Dardanelles, without sustaining any Damage, and destroys a Turkish Naval Division at Cape Nagara—The Turkish Government, divided, is on the point of yielding—General Sebastiani encourages Sultan Selim, and persuades him to feign a Negotiation, to gain Time for arming Constantinople—The Counsel of the French Ambassador is followed, and Constantinople armed in a few Days with the Assistance of the French Officers—Parleys succeed between the Porte and the British Squadron lying at the Prince's Islands—These Parleys terminate in a Refusal to comply with the Demands of the British Legation—Admiral Duckworth proceeds to Constantinople, finds the City armed with three hundred Pieces of Cannon, and determines to regain the Dardanelles—He passes through them again, but with considerable damage to his squadron—Great Effect produced in Europe by this Event, in favour of the Policy of Napoleon—Though victorious, Napoleon, impressed with the difficulties which Nature opposes to him in Poland, reverts to the Idea of a great continental Alliance—He makes fresh Efforts to discover the Secret of the Policy of Austria—The Court of Vienna, in answer to his Questions, offers its Mediation with the belligerent Powers—Napoleon regards this Offer as a Mode of intermeddling in the Quarrel, and of preparing for War—He calls out immediately a third Conscription, draws new Forces from France and Italy, creates with extraordinary Promptness an Army of Reserve of one hundred thousand Men, and gives Austria an Intimation of these Measures—Flourishing State of the French Army on the Lower Vistula and the Passarge—Winter, long delayed, is severely felt—Napoleon avails himself of this Period of Inaction to undertake the Siege of Dantzic—Marshal Lefebvre charged with the Command of the Troops, general Chasseloup with the Direction of the Engineering Operations—Long and difficult Works of that memorable Siege—The two Sovereigns of Prussia and Russia resolve to send a strong Force to relieve Dantzic—Napoleon, on his Part, disposes his Corps in such a Manner as to be able to reinforce marshal Lefebvre on a sudden—Brilliant Action fought under the Walls of Dantzic—Last Works of Approach—The French ready to make the Assault—The Place surrenders—Immense Resources in Corn and Wine found in the City of Dantzic—Marshal Lefebvre created Duke of Dantzic—The Return of Spring decides Napoleon to resume the Offensive—The Commencement of the Operations fixed for the 10th of June, 1807—The Russians anticipate the French, and on the 5th of June make a general Attack on the Cantonments of the Passarge—Marshal Ney, having two-thirds of the Russian Army upon him, opposes them with heroic Intre-

pidity between Guttstadt and Deppen—That Marshal gives Napoleon time to concentrate the whole French Army on Deppen—Napoleon, in his turn, takes a vigorous Offensive, and follows up the Russians closely—General Benningsen retires precipitately towards the Pregel, descending the Alle—Napoleon marches in such a manner as to interpose between the Russians and Königsberg—The Head of the French Army finds the Russian Army encamped at Heilsberg—Sanguinary Action on the 10th of June—Napoleon, arriving in the Evening at Heilsberg with the bulk of his Forces, prepares for a decisive Engagement on the following day, when the Russians decamp—He continues to manœuvre in such a manner as to cut them off from Königsberg—He sends his Left, composed of marshals Soult and Davout, towards Königsberg, and with the Corps of marshals Lannes, Mortier, Ney, Bernadotte, and the Guard, follows the Russian Army along the Alle—General Benningsen, alarmed for the Fate of Königsberg, hastens to pass the Alle at Friedland, with the intention of proceeding to the Relief of the Capital—Napoleon surprises him on the Morning of the 14th, at the Moment when he is passing the Alle—Memorable Battle of Friedland—The Russians, overwhelmed, retire towards the Niemen, abandoning Königsberg—Königsberg taken—Armistice offered by the Russians and accepted by Napoleon—Removal of the French Head-quarters to Tilsit—Interview between Alexander and Napoleon, on a Raft placed in the middle of the Niemen—Napoleon invites Alexander to cross the Niemen, and to take up his Abode at Tilsit—An Intimacy speedily ensues between the two Monarchs—Napoleon gains an Ascendency over the Mind of Alexander, and induces him to concur in vast Designs, tending to force all Europe to take Arms against England, if she will not consent to an equitable Peace.—The Partition of the Turkish Empire is to be the Price of Alexander's Compliance—Dispute about Constantinople—Alexander finally adheres to all Napoleon's Plans, and appears to feel the warmest Friendship for him—Napoleon, out of Consideration for Alexander, consents to restore to the King of Prussia part of his Dominions—The King of Prussia repairs to Tilsit—His Part between Alexander and Napoleon—The Queen of Prussia also goes to Tilsit, to endeavour to obtain from Napoleon some Concessions favourable to Prussia—Napoleon, respectful towards that unfortunate Queen, but inflexible—Conclusion of the Negotiations—Patent and Secret Treaties of Tilsit—Secret Convention still unknown to Europe—Napoleon and Alexander, agreed upon all Points, part with extraordinary Tokens of Affection, and a Promise to meet again soon—Return of Napoleon to France, after an Absence of nearly a Year—His Glory after Tilsit—Character of his Policy at this Period.

BOOK XXVII.

FRIEDLAND AND TILSIT.

WHILE Napoleon, cantoned on the Lower Vistula, was waiting, amidst the snows of Poland for the return of spring to allow him to resume the offensive, and employing the interval of this apparent inaction in laying siege to Dantzic, in recruiting his army, in governing his vast empire, the East, having recently interfered in the quarrel of the West, afforded useful assistance to his arms and procured signal success for his policy.

We have already made the reader acquainted with sultan Selim, the nobleness of his character, the high qualities of his mind. We have also shown the embarrassment of his situation between Russia and England, whom he disliked, and France, to whom he was attached from taste, instinct, foresight, for he well knew that she, even in the days of her greatest ambition, would never covet Constantinople. We have yet to relate what had occurred while the French army was fighting in December the battle of Pultusk, and in February that of Eylau.

Sultan Selim, as we have seen, had begun by deposing the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, Maruzzi and Ipsilanti, notoriously devoted to the policy of Russia. But, M. d'Italinski having soon threatened him with an immediate rupture unless he replaced them in their post, he had yielded to the menaces of this representative of Russia, and made up his mind to commit the government of the provinces of the Danube to two professed enemies of his empire. Russia appealed, in order to extort this concession, to the treaty of Cainardgé, which conferred on her a sort of right to intervene in the government of Moldavia and Wallachia. No sooner had sultan Selim, impelled much more by the will of his ministers than by his own, complied with the demand, than he wrote to Napoleon, to solicit his indulgence, to assure him that the act to which he had suffered himself to be urged, was not a desertion of the alliance of France, but a measure of prudence commanded by the alarming disorganization of the Turkish forces. Napoleon replied immediately, and, far from discouraging him by expressions of displeasure, he had pitied, soothed, cheered, and offered him the two-fold succour of the French army of Dalmatia, which might be sent through Bosnia to the Lower Danube, and of the French fleet at Cadiz, which was ready to sail from Spain for the Dardanelles. That fleet, protected by the straits, as soon as it had passed the Bosphorus, would presently be mistress of the Black Sea, and afford

a great support there to the Turks. Meanwhile, till this succour should arrive, Napoleon had ordered several officers, both engineers and artillery, to be despatched from Dalmatia, to assist the Turks in the defence of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. General Sebastiani, employing with skill the means placed at his disposal, had never ceased stimulating the sultan and the divan, to induce them to declare war against the Russians. He expatiated to them on the prodigious success of Napoleon in the plains of the North, his bold march beyond the Vistula, his grand project for reconstituting Poland, and promised, in his name, if the Porte would take arms, to obtain for it the revocation of the treaties which placed it in the dependence of Russia, perhaps even the restitution of the Crimea.

Sultan Selim would willingly have followed the advice of general Sebastiani, but his ministers were divided; one half of them, sold to the Russians and the English, openly betrayed him; the other half trembled to think of the impotence into which the Ottoman empire had fallen. Though that empire still numbered more than 300,000 soldiers, mostly barbarians, some half-trained, and a fleet of about twenty ships of respectable appearance, these forces, as badly organized as they were commanded, could scarcely be opposed to the Russians and the English, unless many French officers, admitted into the ranks of the Turkish army, should come and communicate at length European knowledge to the troops, who were brave, it is true, but whose fanaticism, cooled by time, could not make up as formerly for the want of the resources of military science.

While the Porte was involved in these perplexities, the Russians had put an end to its uncertainty by crossing the Dniester, even after the restoration of the hospodars. That invincible attraction which draws them toward Constantinople had silenced in them all the considerations of prudence. It was, in truth, an egregious blunder, when they had the French army upon their hands, and scarcely 200,000 men to oppose to it, to employ 50,000 of that number against the Turks. But, amidst the convulsions of this age, the idea of seizing any occasion to take what they pleased was then the predominant idea of all governments. The Russians therefore said to themselves that the time was perhaps come for them to take possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. The English, on their part, were not sorry to find a pretext for reappearing in Egypt. If they were not yet agreed upon the immediate partition of the Turkish empire—a subject on which it seemed very difficult for them to come to an agreement—they concurred at least in withdrawing the Porte from the influence of France, and of withdrawing it from that influence by force. The Russians were to cross the Dniester and the English to pass the Dardanelles. At the same time a squadron was to attack Alexandria.

This explains why the Russians had passed the Dniester, even after the restoration of the hospodars. They had marched in three

corps, one proceeding towards Choczin, another to Bender, and the third to Yassi. Their design was to advance upon Bucharest, to give the hand to the revolted Servians. Their active forces amounted to 40,000 men, and to 50,000 including the reserves left in rear.

While the Russians were acting on their side, the English Admiralty had ordered rear-admiral Louis to proceed with three ships to the Dardanelles, to pass through them without committing any hostile act, which might be done, as the Turks at that time granted a free passage to the armed ships of England and Russia, merely to reconnoitre the localities, to receive on board the families of the English merchants who should not choose to stay at Constantinople during the events with which it was threatened, and then to return to Tenedos, and wait for two divisions—the one under admiral Sir Sidney Smith, drawn from the seas of the Levant, the other under admiral Duckworth from Gibraltar. The three divisions, amounting to eight ships of the line, several frigates, cutters, and bomb-vessels, were to be placed under the command of admiral Duckworth, and to act on the requisition of Mr. Arbuthnot, the ambassador of England at Constantinople.

When this display of force came to the knowledge of the Turks, either through the march of the Russians beyond the Dniester, or by the appearance of rear-admiral Louis at the Dardanelles, they considered war as inevitable, and they met it, some with enthusiasm, others with terror. Though Russia strongly protested her inoffensive intentions, and declared that her troops should come and occupy pacifically the Danubian provinces, in order to ensure the execution of treaties, the Porte was not to be deceived, and sent M. d'Italinski his passports. The two straits were immediately closed against the military flag of all the powers. The pachas placed in the frontier provinces were ordered to collect troops; and Mustapha Baraictar, at the head of 80,000 men, was charged to punish the Russians for their contempt of the Turkish army—a contempt carried to such a length as to lead them to invade the empire with fewer than 50,000 men.

M. d'Italinski being gone, there was left at Constantinople Mr. Arbuthnot, the English minister, whom there was no ground for dismissing, since no hostility had been committed by the British forces. He assumed in his turn a most threatening attitude, insisted on the recall of M. d'Italinski, the expulsion of general Sebastiani, the immediate adoption of a policy hostile to France, the renewal of the treaties which bound the Porte to Russia and England, lastly, the free passage of the straits for the British flag. It was impossible to carry exigency in things, arrogance in language, to a greater length. The ambassador even declared that, if his conditions were not accepted forthwith, he should soon follow M. d'Italinski, and that he should go on board the English squadron lying at that moment at Tenedos, and bring it back by main force beneath the walls of Constantinople. This threat threw the divan into the greatest consternation.

Little reliance could be placed on the fortifications of the Dardanelles, which had long been neglected; and, the Dardanelles once passed, people trembled at the idea of an English squadron, master of the sea of Marmora, battering with its guns the Seraglio, St. Sophia, and the arsenal of Constantinople.

Thus the disposition to yield was general. But the able ambassador who then represented France at Constantinople, and who had the advantage of being both a diplomatist and a soldier, upheld the sinking courage of the Turks. He pointed out to them all the mischiefs attached under this circumstance to a pusillanimous conduct. He set before their eyes the coincidence of the designs of England and Russia, the concert of their efforts for invading the Ottoman territory by land and sea, the speedy junction of a Russian army and a British fleet under the walls of the capital, the danger of a total partition of the empire, or at least a partial dismemberment, by the simultaneous occupation of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Egypt. He laid great stress on the name of Napoleon, his victories, his presence on the Vistula, and the advantages which would be found in his alliance. He announced the sending very shortly of considerable succours, and promised the restoration of the ancient Ottoman power, if the Turks would but display for a moment the courage of bygone times. These exhortations, reaching the sultan and the different members of the government, sometimes through direct, sometimes through indirect but well-chosen channels, seconded moreover by the evidence of the danger, by the tidings successively arriving of the triumphal progress of Napoleon, produced the effect that was to be expected, and the divan, after numerous alternations of exaltation and depression, put an end to this negotiation by refusing to accede to the demands of Mr. Arbuthnot, and by manifesting a firm resolution to allow him to depart.

The English minister left Constantinople on the 29th of January, and embarked in the *Endymion*, to be carried on board the squadron lying off Tenedos, outside the Dardanelles. For a fortnight, Mr. Arbuthnot never ceased threatening the Porte with the thunders of the British squadron, and thus employed in corresponding the time which admiral Duckworth passed in waiting for a favourable wind. General Sebastiani, on his part, after working up the Porte to an energetic resolution, had a much more difficult task to perform, that of rousing it from its apathy, conquering its negligence, inducing it at length to raise some batteries, either on the straits or at Constantinople. This was not an easy matter, with an incapable government, which had long since fallen into a kind of imbecility, and was paralyzed at this moment by the fear of the English ships much more than by that of the Russian arms. However, by employing alternate urgency with the sultan and his ministers, assisted by his aides-de-camp, Messrs. de Lascours and de Coigny, he obtained a commencement of arming, which, though very imperfect, was nevertheless sufficient to excite some apprehen-

sions in the English admiral, who wrote to his government that the operation, though not impracticable, would be more difficult than it was imagined in London.

At length, all the correspondence between Mr. Arbuthnot and the Reis-Effendi having proved ineffectual, a south wind long wished for having sprung up, admiral Duckworth made sail on the morning of the 19th of February for the castles of the Dardanelles.

There is not a position in the world so well known even to the persons least versed in geographical knowledge as that of Constantinople, situated amidst the sea of Marmora, an enclosed sea, to which there is no penetrating but by forcing the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus. When, in coming from the Mediterranean, you have ascended the strait of the Dardanelles for fifteen leagues, a strait which, from the closeness of its shores, and its continual current, resembles a large river, you enter the sea of Marmora, about twenty leagues wide and thirty long, and you find seated on a beautiful promontory, washed on one side by the sea of Marmora itself, on the other by the river of the Fresh Waters, the renowned city, which under the Greeks was Byzantium, under the Romans Constantinople, under the Turks Stamboul, the metropolis of Islamism. Beheld from the sea, it presents an amphitheatre of mosques and Moorish palaces, among which are distinguished the domes of St. Sophia, and, quite at the extremity of the promontory which it occupies, you perceive the Seraglio, where the descendants of Mahomet, plunged into voluptuousness, slumber over the danger of a bombardment, since their imbecile incapacity is no longer competent to the defence of the Dardanelles, those two doors of their empire, which it is nevertheless so easy to shut.

When you have cleared the Dardanelles, traversed the sea of Marmora, and passed the promontory on which Constantinople is seated, you arrive at a second strait, narrower, more formidable, seven leagues only in length, and the shores of which are so near to each other, that a squadron must infallibly perish, if it were well defended. This strait is that of the Bosphorus, which leads to the Black Sea. The Dardanelles are for the Ottoman empire the door opened towards England, the Bosphorus the door opened towards Russia. But, if the Russians have against them the narrow dimensions of the Bosphorus, the English have against them the current setting incessantly from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. It was against this current, which it is impossible to overcome without a favourable south wind, that the English began to beat up on the 19th of February, 1807. Admiral Duckworth having under his command the two rear-admirals, Louis and sir Sidney Smith, with seven ships of the line, two frigates, and several cutters and bomb-vessels, sailed in column up the strait of the Dardanelles. He had on the preceding day lost one of his ships, the *Ajax*, which had been consumed by fire. By the aid of the wind, he had soon cleared the first part of the channel, which runs from west to east, and which is of

such width that the possessors have never thought of defending it. From the cape called that of the Barbers, to Sestos and Abydos, the canal turns northward, and it becomes so narrow in that part that it is extremely dangerous to defy its cross-fires. It then turns eastward again, forming an elbow, upon which are formidable batteries. These batteries rake ships fore and aft, so that a squadron daring enough to force the passage, cannonaded on the right and on the left by the batteries of Europe and Asia, is met also by the fire of the batteries of Sestos for the space of above a league. It is at the entrance and at the outlet of this narrow passage that the castles called the Dardanelles are situated. They are constructed of ancient masonry, mounted with heavy, unmanageable artillery, which threw enormous stone balls, formerly the terror of the Christian navies.

The English squadron, in spite of the efforts of general Sebastiani to excite the Turks to defend the Dardanelles, had no great perils to encounter. Not one of its masts was shattered: it got off with a few torn sails and about sixty men killed or wounded. Having arrived at Cape Nagara, at the entrance of the sea of Marmora, it found a Turkish division at anchor: it consisted of one ship of 64 guns, four small frigates, and two cutters. This division could not have been placed in a worse or more useless position. To have been of any service, it must have been well posted, well directed, and have added its action to that of the land-batteries. But, inactive during the passage, and confined after the passage to an anchorage without defence, it was a prey offered to the English to compensate them for the fire which they had just endured, without being able to return it. Sir Sidney Smith was ordered to destroy it, which was no difficult business, for the crews were for the most part on shore. In a few moments the Turkish vessels were obliged to make for the shore. The English followed them in their boats, and not being sure that they should be able to bring them off on their return, they preferred burning them immediately, which they did, with the exception of one cutter that had been left by them at the anchorage. This second operation, however, cost them about thirty men.

On the morning of the 21st of February, they appeared before the city of Constantinople, terrified to see an enemy's squadron whose fire nothing could keep off or counteract. Part of the population insisted trembling on compliance with the demands of the English. The other part, indignant, raised shouts of fury. The women of the Seraglio, exposed first to admiral Duckworth's fire, disturbed the imperial palace by their lamentations. Alternate fits of weakness and courage recommenced in the bosom of the Divan. Sultan Selim was for resisting; but the clamours with which he was assailed, the counsels of some dishonest ministers, alleging, in order to persuade him to yield, a destitution of resources of which they were themselves the guilty authors, contributed to shake his heart, more noble than energetic. Meanwhile, the ambassador of France hastened to Selim, strove to make him, his ministers, all

about him, blush at the idea of surrendering to a squadron which had not a soldier to land, and which might burn a few houses, and shatter the roofs of some edifices, but which would at last be obliged to retire, after useless and hateful ravages. His advice was to resist the English, to gain time by means of a feigned negotiation, to send the women, the court, all who trembled, all who shouted, to Adrianople, then to employ the energetic portion of the population in raising batteries on Seraglio Point, and, this done, to treat with the British fleet, with the muzzles of their guns pointed at it.

For the rest, the pretensions of the English were of a nature to second by their harshness and arrogance the counsels of M. Sebastiani. Mr. Arbuthnot, to whom the admiral was subordinate in all that related to politics, had determined to send a preliminary summons to the Porte, demanding the expulsion of the French legation, an immediate declaration of war against France, the delivery of the whole Turkish fleet, lastly, the occupation of the forts of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by the English and the Russians. To comply with such demands would be placing the empire, its navy, the keys of its capital, at the discretion of its enemies by land and sea. While awaiting the answer, the English went and anchored off the Princes' Islands, near the coast of Asia, at some distance from Constantinople.

General Sebastiani did not fail to represent to the sultan and his ministers how disgraceful and dangerous it would be to submit to such conditions. Luckily, just at that moment arrived a courier from the banks of the Vistula, bringing a fresh letter from Napoleon, full of warm exhortations for the sultan. "Generous Selim," said he, "prove thyself worthy of the descendants of Mahomet! The hour is come to release thyself from the treaties which oppress thee. I am near thee, engaged in reconstituting Poland, thy friend and thine ally. One of my armies is ready to descend the Danube, and to take the Russians in flank, while thou shalt attack them in front. One of my squadrons is about to sail from Toulon, to guard thy capital and the Black Sea. Courage, then, for never wilt thou find such an occasion for raising thine empire and shedding glory on thy memory!"—These exhortations, though not new, could not come more seasonably. The heart of Selim, cheered by the words of Napoleon and by the urgent importunities of general Sebastiani, was filled with the noblest sentiments. He spoke energetically to his ministers. He assembled the divan and the ulemas, communicated to them the propositions of the English, fired all souls with indignation, and it was unanimously resolved to resist the English fleet, whatever it might attempt, but to follow the able counsels of general Sebastiani, that is to say, to endeavour to gain time by parleys, and to employ the time so gained in throwing up formidable batteries around Constantinople.

The first thing that was done was to reply to Mr. Arbuthnot, that, without examining the grounds of his propositions, they could not listen to them till the English squadron had taken a less threat-

ening position, for it was not befitting the dignity of the Porte to deliberate under the enemy's guns. It took at least a day to go from Constantinople to the Princes' Islands, and to return from them. It required, therefore, but a small number of communications to gain the few days that were needed. When the answer of the Porte arrived, Mr. Arbuthnot had been suddenly taken ill, but his influence continued to preponderate in the English squadron. The admirals were sensible, like himself, that to bombard Constantinople would be a barbarous enterprize, that, having no land troops, they should be obliged, if the Turks were determined to resist, to retire after committing useless ravages; that, in order to get away, they should moreover be obliged to force the Dardanelles again, with a perhaps damaged squadron and under batteries probably better defended the second time than the first. They deemed it, therefore, wiser to obtain, by intimidation and without proceeding to a bombardment, all or part of their demands. The delivery of the Turkish fleet was the trophy of which they were most tenacious. In consequence, admiral Duckworth, supplying the place of Mr. Arbuthnot, who was ill, replied to the Turks that he was ready to agree to a fit place for negotiating, and desired that it might be immediately fixed, in order that he might send one of his officers thither. The Porte was in no hurry to answer this communication, and on the day after the next, it proposed Kadikoi, the ancient Chalcedon, below Scutari, opposite to Constantinople. In the state of exasperation in which the Turks then were, the place was neither the safest nor the most suitable for the English officer ordered to repair thither. Admiral Duckworth remarked this, and desired that some other place might be chosen, threatening to act immediately if the Turks did not make haste to open the negotiations.

A few days had been gained by means of these illusory parleys, and they had been employed at Constantinople in the most active and judicious manner. Several officers of artillery and engineers, detached from the army of Dalmatia, had just arrived. General Sebastiani, seconded by them, encamped himself among the Turks. The whole legation had followed him. The young linguists, hastening to the works, served for interpreters. With the concurrence of the population and of our officers, formidable batteries rose, as by enchantment, on Seraglio Point, and in that part of the city bordering the sea of Marmora. Nearly three hundred pieces of cannon, drawn by the enthusiastic populace, who at that moment regarded the French as saviours, were placed in battery. Sultan Selim, whom the sight of these preparations so promptly executed filled with joy, desired that a tent should be pitched for him beside that of the French ambassador, and required each of his ministers to come and establish himself in one of the batteries. Constantinople assumed from hour to hour a more imposing aspect, and the English saw new embrasures opened, and the muzzles of cannon protruding from them.

After seven or eight days thus employed, the fear which at first

withheld the English, that of a useless, perhaps, dangerous devastation, followed by a second passage of the Dardanelles more difficult than the first—that fear became every day more founded. Perceiving that he gained nothing by waiting, admiral Duckworth sent a final summons, in which, having taken care to reduce his demands and to increase his threats, he merely required that the Turkish fleet should be delivered up to him, and declared that he should proceed to Constantinople unless a place fit for negotiation were immediately pointed out to him. This time, every thing being nearly completed at Constantinople, the answer given to the English admiral was that, in the state of people's minds, they knew not a place safe enough for them to venture to guarantee the lives of the negotiators who might be sent thither.

After such an answer, there was nothing further to do but to commence the cannonade. But admiral Duckworth had only seven ships of the line and two frigates: he beheld a frightful mass of artillery pointed at him, and he was informed, moreover, that, through the exertions of the French, the passes of the Dardanelles were bristling with cannon. It was therefore certain that he should commit a barbarity on Constantinople alike without aim and without excuse, and arrive with a disabled squadron before a strait which it had become much more dangerous to pass through. In consequence, after staying eleven days in the sea of Marmora, he weighed anchor on the 2nd of March, appeared in line of battle under the walls of Constantinople, stood in nearly to within gun-shot, and, perceiving that he did not intimidate the Turks, who were prepared to defend themselves, he went and anchored at the entrance of the Dardanelles, intending to pass through on the following day.

If mortification and confusion reigned on board the English squadron, boundless was the joy that burst forth in Constantinople at the sight of the enemy's sails disappearing at the horizon in the direction of the Dardanelles. French and Turks congratulated themselves on this happy result of a moment of courage, and in the enthusiasm of success, the Turkish squadron, which had been speedily equipped, determined to sail in pursuit of the English. General Sebastiani strove, but in vain, to prevent this imprudence, which might furnish admiral Duckworth with an occasion to mark his retreat with the destruction of the Turkish fleet. But the people raised such shouts, and the crews were so animated, that the government, not capable of withstanding the outburst of courage any more than that of cowardice, was obliged to consent to the departure of the squadron. The capitan-pacha weighed anchor, while the English, in haste to retreat, fled, without being aware of it, from the triumph that was running after them.

Next day, the 3rd of March, the English squadron entered the narrow and dangerous part of the strait of the Dardanelles. The small number of French officers whom it had been possible to send to the strait had there awakened the zeal of the Turks as successfully as at Constantinople. The batteries were repaired and better served.

Unluckily, the heavy artillery, mounted on wretched carriages, was in the hands of inexperienced pointers. A certain number of large marble balls, more than two feet in diameter, and which, if well directed, would have been very dangerous, were nevertheless discharged at the English squadron. The English were but an hour and a half in clearing the narrow part of the canal, from Cape Nagara to the Barbers' Cape, thanks to a north wind which was very favourable to their progress. They behaved with the usual intrepidity of their navy, but sustained this time serious damage. Several of their ships were perforated by those prodigious projectiles, which would have sunk them, if they had been hollow and charged with powder, like those now used. Most of the ships of the squadron, on leaving the strait, were in a state that required speedy repairs. This second passage cost the English two hundred men, killed and wounded, an inconsiderable loss if compared with the slaughter in great land battles, but not unimportant, when compared with what takes place in sea-fights. While the English squadron was leaving the strait, admiral Siniavin was arriving at Tenedos, with a Russian division of six ships. He used the strongest importunities to prevail on admiral Duckworth to recommence the operation. After the check which had just been sustained, a fresh attempt would have been extravagant; for six Russian ships would not have materially changed the situation or lessened the difficulty.

Such was the end of that enterprise, which miscarried through the inadequacy of the means employed and scruples of humanity not usual at that time with English policy. England appeared singularly affected with this result. In Napoleon it excited a very natural joy, for, independently of the moral effect produced in Europe by the affair of Constantinople, an effect entirely in his favour, the quarrel with the Turks became one of the most useful diversions for his arms.

Europe was at this moment deeply moved by the terrible battle of Eylau, which led to comments extremely diverse in spirit. Some rejoiced that a foe had at last been found capable of making head against the French; others, in much greater number, were affrighted at the condition upon which that foe had been able to resist them for a moment—a terrible condition, for it had obliged him to give them an army to slaughter, by throwing it in their way, like a physical obstacle, to destroy. For the first time, it is true, the success obtained by the French had not been so decisive as usual, especially in appearance; but the Russian army had nevertheless lost in that sanguinary fight one-third of its effective; and, if general Benning-sen, to cloak his defeat, did attempt some presumptuous demonstrations in face of our winter-quarters, it was impossible for him to venture upon any thing of consequence, or to oppose one of the sieges undertaken before his eyes. Napoleon, who began to be joined by his reinforcements, had for overwhelming him one hundred thousand men present under arms, not including the French troops or allies who, protected by the grand army, were carrying on

the siege of Dantzic on the left, and completing the conquest of the fortresses of Silesia on the right. The only difficulty which prevented Napoleon from putting an end to this campaign, already very long, was, as we have seen, that of transport. Had there been a hard frost, he could have taken with him upon sledges sufficient to subsist the army during an offensive operation: but the alternations of frost and thaw rendered it impossible to carry a supply for a few days. He was therefore obliged to wait for a change of season, and M. de Talleyrand, left at Warsaw, resorted to solicitations, money, promises, even threats, to ensure the transport of indispensable provisions from the Vistula to the Passarge.

In this situation, which might be prolonged for months, there was room for negotiations. Since Napoleon had been made sensible of the force of natural obstacles, and especially since he had observed Poland more closely, that intoxication which had carried him to the Vistula was somewhat dispelled. He had discovered that the Russians, little to be dreaded by French soldiers, if one went not to seek them beyond the Danube and the Elbe, when assisted by the climate, became an enemy whom it was difficult and took long to conquer. Struck at first by the enthusiasm which burst forth at Posen, Napoleon had conceived that the Poles might be able to furnish him with a hundred thousand men; but he had soon seen the country-people indifferent to a change of government, which left them slaves of the soil under all masters, escaping from the horrors of war by flight into Austrian Poland; the population of the towns enthusiastic, and ready to devote itself without reserve, but the nobility, with more forecast, making conditions, which could not be accepted without imprudence; the officers who had served in the French armies living on bad terms with the nobles who had not quitted their mansions; both adding by their susceptibilities to the difficulties of the military organization of the country, lastly, the levies, which were to amount to 100,000 men, reduced to 15,000 young soldiers, organized into twenty battalions, destined at a future day to cover themselves with glory under the gallant Poniatowski, but at this moment almost strangers to military habits, and provoking the ridicule of our soldiers. Napoleon had seen all this, and he was less ardent to reconstitute Poland, less disposed, since he was better acquainted with it, to convulse the continent for its re-establishment. Without doubting his own power, he had a more just conception of the obstacles which Nature can oppose to the most heroic army, and a less favourable opinion of the work which had drawn him into the plains of the North. He was, therefore, rather more inclined to listen to pacific proposals, without departing on that account from any of his pretensions, because he was sure, on the return of spring, to demolish all the armies that might be brought against him. In a negotiation which should lead to peace he saw nothing but a saving of time and blood; for as to dangers, he deemed himself capable of surmounting all, whatever they might be.

Since the battle of Eylau, several flags of truce had passed to and

fro between Königsberg and Osterode. Under the first impression of that battle, Napoleon had sent word by general Bertrand to king Frederick William that he was ready to restore his dominions, but only as far as the Elbe, which would entail upon that prince the loss of the provinces in Westphalia, Saxony, and Franconia, that is to say, nearly a fourth of the Prussian monarchy, but which would at least ensure to him the restitution of the other three-fourths. Napoleon added that, filled with esteem for the monarch who reigned over Prussia, he would rather grant this restitution to himself than to the intervention of Russia. The unfortunate Frederick William, though the sacrifice was great, though his soldiers had behaved honourably at Eylau, and though he found himself somewhat raised in the estimation of his allies, indulged in no illusion; and that battle of Eylau, which the Russians called almost a victory, was in his eyes but a sanguinary defeat, differing from Jena and from Austerlitz only in having cost the French more blood, and having led, owing to the season, to less decisive results. He was persuaded that in spring the French would put a speedy and disastrous end to the war. But the queen, but the war party, excited by the late military events, by the influence of Russia, to which the Prussian court was unfortunately too near at Königsberg, did not appreciate the situation with so sound a judgment as the king, and, in dictating an evasive answer, to the friendly message which general Bertrand was commissioned to deliver, prevented any advantage from being derived from the momentarily pacific disposition of Napoleon.

Thus the obstinacy of the struggle with Russia had for an instant brought back Napoleon towards Prussia. Happy had it been, if, reconciling himself completely with her, restoring to her not only her provinces beyond the Elbe, but her provinces on this side of it, he had sought to attach her definitively by this act equally generous and politic. But, again finding king Frederick William, weak, wavering, controlled, he was anew convinced that Prussia was not to be relied on; and from that day he never thought of her but to despise, to maltreat, and to lessen her. Not quite so much intoxicated, however, as after Jena, he was anew led to believe that, in order to sway the continent and to exclude English influence from it, in order to *conquer the sea on the land*, he needed not only victories but a great alliance. He had believed this after Marengo and Hohenlinden; he had believed it after Austerlitz and before Jena; after Jena, without believing it the less, he had ceased for a moment to think of it; but he believed it again after Pultusk and Eylau; and, meditating incessantly on his situation amidst the difficulties of this war, he considered what alliance he could obtain. Setting aside Prussia, there were left Russia, with which he was battling, and Austria, which, under the appearance of neutrality, was preparing armaments upon his rear. Though the court of Russia, excited by the suggestions of England, and by the boasting of general Benningsen, appeared more animated than ever, yet its generals, its officers, its soldiers, who

bore the burden of this frightful war, who found themselves reduced one-half by the battles of Czarnowo, Pultusk, Golymin, and Eylau, who, thanks to a barbarous administration, lived on a few potatoes scratched from under the snow with the points of their bayonets, entertained very different sentiments; and held a very different language from the courtiers of Petersburg. Filled with admiration of the French army, feeling towards it none of those national antipathies arising sometimes from neighbourhood or even from a common origin, they asked themselves why they were expected to spill their blood for the benefit of the English who were in no hurry to support them, and for the Prussians who were not capable of defending themselves.

The idea that France and Russia, at the distance which parts them from one another, had no ground for quarrel, occurred to the minds of such of the Russian officers as reasoned, and was repeated in all their conversations. Several of our officers, taken prisoners and exchanged, had heard the strongest language on this subject from the lips of even the bravest of the Russian generals, prince Bagration, who commanded the Russian advanced guards and rear-guards by turns, the advanced guards when attacking, the rear-guards when retreating.

These particulars, reported to Napoleon, furnished him with subject for reflection. He said to himself, even amidst the horrors of the present war, that it was perhaps with Russia that he ought to seek a reconciliation, in order to close the ports and the cabinets of the continent against England. But, if that alliance could be conceived, it was not between two battles, when one was obliged to communicate with the advanced posts by means of a trumpet, that one could find means to prepare and conclude it. This actual impossibility forced him to revert to Austria. Calling to mind what the archduke Ferdinand had said to him at Würzburg, he was anew led to think of an alliance with the court of Vienna, in spite of the armaments with which she threatened him; especially when he considered that he had now the power to restore to her what half a century before would have filled her with joy—Silesia, that Northern Lombardy, which she had so keenly regretted, which she had made so many efforts to recover, and for the sake of which she had been for thirty years the ally of France. Removed from the bivouac of Osterode to the mansion of Finkenstein, and there, sometimes making the round of his cantonments, and riding so much as thirty leagues a day, sometimes corresponding with his agents in Poland for the supply of the army, or with his ministers in Paris for the administration of the empire, lastly, sometimes, in the long nights of the North, ruminating upon plans of general policy, after weighing all the alliances, he had ended by reducing himself to two, and concluding that he must choose between that of Russia and that of Austria. In correspondence with M. de Talleyrand, who remained at Warsaw, and who there directed the foreign affairs, he wrote to him: "*All this must end in a system with Rus-*

sia or in a system with Austria. Think well of this; fix your ideas; and oblige Austria to come to a definitive explanation with us."

But Austria covered herself with an impenetrable veil. While general Andreossy, our ambassador at Vienna, was daily reporting acts tending to produce uneasiness, such as levies of men, purchases of horses, the formation of magazines, general baron de Vincent, on the contrary, sent to Warsaw by the court of Austria, was incessantly affirming, with every appearance of frankness, that Austria, exhausted, was incapable of making war; that she was resolved not to break the peace, unless she were subjected to treatment impossible to be borne; that, if she was taking some precautions, they must not be regarded as preparations hostile or threatening for France, but as measures of prudence commanded by a terrible war, which embraced the entire circle of her frontiers, and particularly by the state of the Gallicias, which were much agitated by the rising in Poland. M. de Talleyrand had suffered himself to be persuaded that he ought instantly to denounce general Andreossy to Napoleon as a dangerous agent, observing and judging wrongly of what was passing around him, and capable, if he were listened to, of embroiling the two courts by means of incorrect and malevolent reports.

Napoleon, though, like every other man, he was apt to believe what pleased him, though he was fain to think that Austria could not raise herself after the blows which she had received at Austerlitz and Ulm, that she never durst break her word given to him personally at the bivouac of Urschitz—Napoleon, enlightened by danger, put more faith in the reports of general Andreossy than in those of baron de Vincent.—“Yes,” he wrote to M. de Talleyrand, “general Andreossy is opinionated, an indifferent observer, probably exaggerating what he sees; but you are credulous, as inclined to allow yourself to be seduced, as you are clever at seducing others. One need but flatter in order to deceive you. M. de Vincent cozens while coaxing you. Austria fears us, but she hates us; she is arming to take advantage of any reverse. If we gain a great victory in spring, she will behave like M. de Haugwitz, the day after Austerlitz, and you will have been right. If the war is merely doubtful, we shall find her in arms upon our rear. Meanwhile we must oblige her to speak out. It is, in fact, a great fault in her not to come to an understanding with us at once, and not to take advantage of a moment when we are masters of Prussia to recover through our means what Frederick formerly wrested from her. She can, if she pleases, indemnify herself in a day for all that she has lost in half a century, and re-make the fortune of the house of Austria, so much diminished at one time by Prussia, at another by France. But she must explain herself. Does she want indemnities for what she has lost? I offer her Silesia. Does the state of the East alarm her? I am ready to satisfy her respecting the fate of the Lower Danube, by disposing of Moldavia and Wallachia as she pleases. Is our presence in Dalmatia a subject of umbrage? I am quite disposed to make sacrifices on that point by means of an exchange of territory.

Or lastly, is it for war that she is preparing, to try for the last time the power of her arms, taking advantage of the union of the whole continent against us? Be it so—I accept this new adversary. But let her not hope to surprise me. None but women and children can believe that I shall go and penetrate into the deserts of Russia without having taken my precautions. Austria will not find me unprepared. In Saxony, in Bavaria, in Italy, she will meet with armies ready to oppose her. She will see me by a rearward march drop down upon her with my whole weight, crush her, treat her worse than any of the powers that I have ever conquered. I will make a terrible, a striking example of her treachery, of which the present fate of Prussia cannot convey an idea. Let her speak out then, that I may know what I have to depend upon in regard to her dispositions.”

Napoleon recommended to M. de Talleyrand not to leave M. de Vincent any rest, but to make incessant attempts to sound the depths of the policy of Austria. M. de Talleyrand, stimulated by the Emperor, divided his time between exhortations to the Polish government to furnish provisions and waggons, and interviews with M. de Vincent, to draw from him in a hundred different conversations the secret of his court.

That secret he sought in the most insignificant expressions of the Austrian envoy, in the slightest movements of his countenance. Sometimes he was free and easy with him, and strove to provoke his candour by unbounded communicativeness. Sometimes he endeavoured to surprise and agitate him by laying abruptly before him, with feigned anger, accounts of the armaments received from Vienna. M. de Vincent, whether from art or sincerity, always repeated his story, that people at Vienna neither would nor could make war, that they were content to guard themselves without thinking of attacking any body. However, when M. de Talleyrand, proceeding further, talked sometimes of Silesia, sometimes of the provinces of the Danube, sometimes of Dalmatia, as the price of an alliance, the Austrian minister replied that he had no instructions respecting affairs of such importance, and begged leave to refer to his court, which he did by communicating immediately to M. de Stadion the overtures of M. de Talleyrand.

M. de Stadion then directed the foreign affairs of Austria in a spirit still more hostile to France than the Cobenzels had done, but we must do him the justice to admit, without concealing so many hostile sentiments under the mask of cordiality. For the rest, though full of hatred, he could control himself, and maintained a suitable reserve. The secret of M. de Stadion and of his court was easy to penetrate, if one would set aside appearances that pleased, and confine one's self to the ground of things which had nothing pleasing in it. Austria was arming to take advantage of our reverses, which in her was but very natural, and it was a great error to suppose that one could conciliate that vindictive power with

brilliant offers. She was animated, in fact, by a hatred which would have prevented her from justly appreciating solid and real advantages, if they had been offered her, and much more insufficient advantages, such as a portion of Silesia, of Moldavia, or of Dalmatia—advantages far inferior to all that she had lost during the last fifteen years. Still she would have accepted them, no doubt, insufficient as they were, if she had imagined that, in the then state of the world, any thing could be given in a solid and durable manner. But, amidst the continual changes of the European States, she conceived that there was nothing stable, and she was not disposed to take, in compensation for hereditary provinces, anciently belonging to her house, provinces given by the policy of the moment, liable to be as lightly withdrawn as they were given, and which, besides, would have to be purchased by a war with her usual allies, for the advantage of him whom she accused of being the author of all her calamities. Thus, on the part of Napoleon, there was nothing that could attract or excite confidence. Her refusal of all offers coming from him was certain beforehand. But, pressed with questions, she could not shut herself up either in absolute silence, or in a general refusal to listen to any proposal. She therefore bethought her of an expedient, which would furnish her for the moment with a suitable answer, and ensure to her afterwards the means of profiting by events, whatever they might be. In consequence, she conceived the idea of offering France her mediation with the belligerent courts. Nothing could be better calculated for the present or for the future. For the present, it proved that she was desirous of peace, by labouring for it herself. For the future, she would labour sincerely for this peace, and she would take care to direct its conditions in a spirit conformable to her policy, if Napoleon were victorious. If, on the contrary, Napoleon were vanquished, or only half victorious, she would pass from a modest mediation to an imposed mediation. She would moderate or crush him, according to circumstances. She would reserve for herself, in short, the means of entering into the quarrel at pleasure, and, having once entered into it, of conducting herself as Fortune might suggest.

M. de Stadion charged the baron de Vincent to reply to M. de Talleyrand that the court of Vienna was deeply sensible to the offers of the Emperor of the French, but, advantageous as were these offers, it could not accept them, for they would lead to a war either with the Germans, who were its countrymen, or the Russians who were its allies; and that, as for war, it deprecated it for any cause or with any person, for it declared itself incapable of maintaining it—an admission not dangerous at a moment when Austria was making the most imposing military preparations—that it was desirous of peace, peace alone, which it preferred to the most valuable acquisitions; that, as a proof of this love of peace, it offered to interpose to negotiate it, and that, if France assented, it would undertake to bring into it the cabinets of Berlin, Petersburg, and London; that M. de Bud-

berg, minister of the Emperor Alexander, having been consulted on the subject, had already accepted the good offices of the court of Vienna, and that in London, another cabinet having taken the direction of affairs [that of Castlereagh and Canning] there was a chance of meeting with pacific dispositions in these new representatives of the English policy, for they would probably be delighted to render themselves popular in England, by giving peace on their accession to office. M. de Stadion directed the Austrian envoy to add that the court of Vienna would deem itself happy, if the all-powerful Emperor of the French should regard this offer as a pledge of the sentiments of disinterestedness and concord which animated the Emperor of Austria.

The all-powerful Emperor of the French had not less perspicacity than power, and when this answer was sent from Warsaw to Finkenstein, he was not deceived by it. He seized its meaning with as much promptness as he would have discovered the movements of an enemy's army on the field of battle. "This," he immediately replied to M. de Talleyrand, "is a first step of Austria, a commencement of intervention in events. Resolved not to intermeddle at all in the struggle kept up by France, Prussia, Russia, and England, she would not even risk compromising herself by transmitting the words of the one to the others. To offer herself as mediator is to prepare herself for war, is to secure for herself a decent means of taking part in it, means which she has need of, after the declarations from cabinet to cabinet, after the oaths from sovereign to sovereign, by which she has promised to refrain from it for ever. This circumstance," added Napoleon, "is unfortunate, for it forebodes the presence of an Austrian army on the Oder and on the Elbe, while we are on the Vistula. But it is impossible to refuse this mediation. It would be a contradiction to our usual language, which has always represented us as disposed to peace. It would above all expose us to the risk of accelerating the determinations of Austria by a peremptory refusal, which would affront her, and oblige her to take an immediate resolution. We must, therefore, gain time, and answer, that the offer of mediation is too indirect for us to accept it positively; but that, in all cases, the good offices of the court of Vienna will always be received with gratitude and confidence."

M. de Talleyrand, directed by Napoleon, gave the prescribed answer to M. de Vincent, and manifested a certain disposition to accept the mediation of Austria, but seemed at the same time to doubt whether the offer of this mediation was serious. M. de Vincent affirmed, on the contrary, that this offer was perfectly serious, and for the rest declared that he would refer the matter to his court. He wrote accordingly to M. de Stadion, who, on his part, gave a prompt reply. In a very few days, in fact, the court of Vienna intimated that it was ready to proceed from mere parleys to a formal proposal; that it was certain to get the mediation accepted in Petersburg and London; that it should moreover

address that same day the positive offer both to France and Prussia, and to Russia and England; and that she awaited the precise expression of the intentions of the Emperor Napoleon on the subject.

This answer, so prompt and so plain, supported by armaments of which there could be no further doubt, appeared to Napoleon an extremely serious act, the drift of which it was impossible to dissemble, to which unfortunately no other reply could be given than by an acceptance, but against the consequences of which it was necessary to provide by means of immediate and imposing precautions. He wrote in this spirit to M. de Talleyrand, and sent him from Finkenstein a draft of the note which will be found below. He intimated to him at the same time that he was about to add to that note new preparations, more formidable than ever, and of which it was necessary to inform Austria immediately, that she might know in what manner her intervention, friendly or hostile, diplomatic or warlike, would be received.

The answer to the offer of mediation was as follows:

“The undersigned minister of foreign affairs has submitted to his Majesty, the Emperor and King, the note delivered to him by M. the baron de Vincent.

“The Emperor accepts for himself and his allies the amicable intervention of the emperor Francis II. for the re-establishment of peace, so necessary to all the nations. He has but one fear, namely, that the power which hitherto appears to have made a system of founding its power and its greatness on the divisions of the continent, will strive to draw from this step new subjects of animosity and new pretexts for dissensions. However, any way that can encourage a hope of the cessation of bloodshed, and at length bring consolation among so many families, ought not to be neglected by France, which, as all Europe knows, was dragged in spite of herself into the last war.

“The Emperor Napoleon finds, moreover, in this circumstance a natural and signal occasion to testify to the sovereign of Austria the confidence with which he inspires him, and the desire which he has to see those bonds knitted more closely between the two nations, which in other times constituted their common prosperity, and which at this day can more than any thing else consolidate their tranquillity and their well-being.”

These parleys had occupied the whole month of March. The weather had become severe. The frost, which had been looked for in vain during the winter, came on in spring. The military operations were obliged to be again deferred. Napoleon resolved to avail himself of this delay to give his forces an immense development, and as formidable in appearance as it would be in reality. His intention was, without draining Italy or France too much, to increase his active army by at least one-third, and to form on the Elbe an army of reserve of 100,000 men, in order to be strong enough to crush both the Russians and the Prussians on the very opening of the campaign, and to be able, in case of neces-

sity, to turn against Austria, if she decided to take part in the war.

To attain this two-fold result, he resolved to call out a new conscription, that of 1808, though it was only March 1807. He had already called out that of 1807 in 1806, and that of 1806 in 1805, in order to procure the young conscripts an apprenticeship of twelve or fifteen months, and to keep his dépôts always full. The general effective of the French army, which had been raised from 502,000 men to 580,000 by the conscription of 1807, would be increased by that of 1808 to about 650,000, exclusively of the allies. Owing to the skill with which he managed his resources, Napoleon would find in this increase of effective the means of supplying all his wants and of meeting all events.

But there was some difficulty, after calling in November 1806 for the conscription of 1807, to call in March 1807 for that of 1808. It was making two calls in five months, and raising 150,000 men at once. Napoleon himself drew up the decree, sent it immediately to Cambacérès, the archchancellor, who supplied his place at the head of the government, and to M. Lacuée, who was charged with the calls, telling them both that he knew and foresaw the objections to which such measures were liable to give rise, but that they must not stop a moment for them; for a single objection raised in the Council of State, or in the Senate, would weaken him in Europe, and bring Austria upon him; and then it would not be two conscriptions, but three or four, that they would be obliged to decree, perhaps to no purpose, and be vanquished at last. "Things," he thus wrote, "must not be considered in a narrow point of view, but in a wide point of view; they must be considered especially in all their political bearings. A conscription announced and resolved upon, without hesitation, which perhaps I shall not call for, which certainly I shall not send to the active army, for I am not going to wage war with boys, will cause Austria to drop her arms. The least hesitation, on the contrary, would induce her to resume them, and to use them against us. No objection, I repeat, but an immediate and punctual execution of the decree which I send you—that is the way to have peace—to have a speedy, a magnificent peace."

Having despatched this decree to Paris, Napoleon sent it to M. de Talleyrand at Warsaw, desiring him to communicate it to M. de Vincent, with an express recommendation to make him acquainted with the new display of forces which was preparing in France, and to lay before him a statement of the expenses which would thence result for all the belligerent powers and for Austria in particular: to declare to him without circumlocution that the Emperor had divined the drift of the mediation, that he accepted that mediation, but with a knowledge of what it signified; that to offer peace was well, but that peace ought to be offered *with a white truncheon in the hand*; that the armaments of Austria, henceforth

impossible to be denied, were a very unsuitable accompaniment to an offer of mediation; that, for the rest, he explained himself with this frankness to prevent calamities, to save Austria herself from them; that if she chose to send Austrian officers to France and Italy, an engagement should be given to show them the dépôts, the camps of reserve, the divisions on march, and they should see that, independently of the 300,000 French already present in Germany, a second army of 100,000 men was preparing to cross the Rhine, to check any hostile movement on the part of the court of Vienna.

These communications came very seasonably. M. de Vincent could not conceal his emotion when informed of the new increase of our forces, and protested a thousand times more, in the name of his government, that its intentions were most pacific. The movements of troops which were complained of were, he said, but symptoms of a reorganization undertaken by the archduke Charles, in order to render the Austrian army less expensive, and to introduce into it various improvements borrowed from the French armies. If any corps seemed to approach the frontiers of Poland, they were there only by way of precaution respecting the Gallicias, extremely agitated by what was passing in their neighbourhood. The offer of mediation ought to be regarded only as a proof of a desire to put an end to a war which was desolating the world; and it must be recognized not as a longing to intermeddle in that war, but as a frank and sincere wish to put a stop to it. For the rest, the Emperor would soon be enabled to judge of this matter by the results, and to assure himself of the sincerity of Austria by her persisting in remaining neuter.

The intimations sent by Napoleon to Paris arrived not less opportunely than his communications at Vienna. Though his star still shone in all its splendour, though the marvels of Austerlitz and Jena had not yet lost any of their spell, though people were impressed as deeply as they ought to have been with that grand and prodigious spectacle of a French army wintering quietly on the Vistula, certain detractors, extremely obsequious in the presence of Napoleon, gladly reviling him in his absence, made, in very subdued tones, some bitter observations on the sanguinary carnage of Eylau, and of the difficulties on the war carried to such a distance; and little persuasion would have been needed to induce minds, always ready in France to seize the weak side of things, to substitute censure for the continued admiration of which Napoleon had never ceased to be the object since he held in his hand the destinies of France. The prudent Cambacérès perceived these symptoms, and, dreading every thing that was likely to injure the imperial government, he would fain have disarmed censure by sparing the country new burdens. M. Lacuée, judging of the situation from a less elevated point of view, seeing only the material sufferings of the population, feared that two demands of 80,000 men, renewed so soon after one another, the one in November 1806, the other in March 1807, especially after those which had preceded

in 1805—demands which called men to the army without giving back one of them—would produce a mischievous effect, by depriving agriculture of hands, families of their supporters. Messrs. Cambacérés and Lacuée were therefore both of them disposed to offer some objections, and to desire that these calls might be deferred for a certain time. The sentiment which actuated them was honest and prudent, and well had it been for Napoleon if many men had then possessed the courage to pour into his ear, before it burst forth, the cry of forlorn mothers—a cry which was not yet threatening, but which sometimes, on the news of a great slaughter, like that of Eylau, would be raised faintly in the heart. However, while telling Napoleon the truth, by way of giving him a profitable lesson for the future, the best thing to be done at that moment was to obey his commands; for there was nothing more serviceable, even to the cause of peace, than the new display of forces which he had just decreed. Thus the objections of the archchancellor and M. Lacuée, sent in writing to the head-quarters, but soon smothered by subsequent letters despatched from them one after another, produced no postponement of the presentation, adoption, and execution of the decree calling out the conscription of 1808.

Napoleon lost no time in making that use of these new resources which suited his vast designs. Since he entered Poland, he had, as we have seen, drawn from France seven regiments of infantry; from Paris the 15th light, the 58th of the line, the first regiment of the fusiliers of the guard, and a municipal regiment; from Brest the 15th of the line; from St. Lo the 34th; from Boulogne the 19th. He had drawn from Italy five regiments of mounted chasseurs and four regiments of cuirassiers. Most of these corps had recently reached Germany. The 19th, 15th, and 58th of the line, and the 15th light, were approaching Berlin, and going to co-operate in the siege of Dantzic. The 1st regiment of the fusiliers of the guard, and the regiment of the municipal guard were on march. The four regiments of cuirassiers from Italy were already on the Vistula, under the command of an officer of the most distinguished merit, general d'Espagne. Two of the five regiments of mounted chasseurs, the 19th and 23rd had joined general Lefebvre below Dantzic. The 15th was remounting in Hanover. The two others were coming with the utmost expedition.

The provisional or marching regiments had already passed through Germany to the number of twelve of infantry and four of cavalry. They had been reviewed on the Vistula, dissolved, and sent to the corps on the Passarge—a sight always very gratifying to the army, which thus saw the gaps made in its ranks filled up, and heard talk every day of the numerous reinforcements that were coming to second it. Whereas, in the first days of its establishment on the Passarge, it could not have presented more than 75 or 80 thousand men on one spot, it was now able to oppose 100,000 to any sudden attack. The provisions, brought from all quarters to the Vistula, and carried from the Vistula to the different can-

tonments by means of waggons organized on the spot, were sufficient for the daily ration, and began to form the reserve stores for unforeseen movements. The army, well warmed, well fed, was in high spirits. The heavy cavalry and the cavalry of the line had been taken to the Lower Vistula, to benefit by the forage which was found in great quantity towards the mouths of that river. The regiments of light cavalry, left in observation on the front of the camps, went by turns to enjoy rest and abundance on the banks of the Vistula. Napoleon, who had determined to increase the cavalry from 54,000 men to 60,000, then to 70,000, had just given orders for raising the number of the horse to 80,000. The campaign had already consumed 16,000 horses for three or four thousand horse-soldiers put *hors de combat*. Besides the horses taken from the Prussian and Hessian armies, Napoleon had purchased 17,000 in Germany, and now he ordered 12,000 to be bought in France for the supply of the dépôts. The works of Praga, Modlin, and Sierock, quite finished, being constructed of timber, were as solid as masonry. The cantonments on the Passarge were provided with strong *têtes de pont*, which afforded facilities for repulsing an enemy, or for attacking him, if necessary. The situation was not only safe but good, as much so, at least, as the country and the season permitted.

The corps on march, thanks to the dépôts of infantry and cavalry, established on the route, in which they deposited fatigued men and horses and took in exchange those previously left by other corps—the corps on march numbered at the end of their route the same effective as at their departure. The regiments of cuirassiers from Naples had arrived entire upon the Vistula. For the troops that came from Italy, Parma, Milan, Augsburg, for those that came from France, Mayence, Würzburg, Erfurt, for both, Willenberg, Potsdam, Berlin, Cüstrin, Posen, Thorn, Warsaw, were the stations where they found whatever they needed, provisions, arms, articles of clothing, made everywhere, in Paris as well as in Berlin, in the conquered capital, as well as in the conquering capital; for Napoleon wished to afford subsistence to the population of both. It was by these continual attentions that he had supplied with necessaries, kept up at its effective at distances from four to five hundred leagues—a regular army of 400,000 men, a chimerical number, when given us by antiquity, unless in reference to emigrant populations, never recorded in modern histories, and first reached and exceeded, at the time of which we are treating.

Taking advantage of the presence of numerous conscripts in the dépôts, Napoleon set about bringing fresh troops from Italy and France, with the two-fold intention, as we have said, to augment considerably the active army of the Vistula and to create an army of reserve on the Elbe. Having it in his power to draw ready-trained conscripts from the dépôts, he ordered marshal Kellermann to increase the number of the provisional regiments of infantry to twenty and that of the provisional regiments of cavalry to ten. But into these regiments were to be admitted only such conscripts

as were perfectly trained and disciplined. He devised another combination for rendering serviceable those conscripts whose military education had scarcely commenced, that was to organize battalions called garrison battalions, composed of men not yet trained, not even clothed; to send them to Erfurt, Cassel, Magdeburg, Hameln, Cüstrin, where they would have time to get trained, and thus render the old troops left in the fortresses disposable. He fixed the effective of these battalions at about ten or twelve thousand men.

After directing his attention to the provisional regiments destined for recruiting the corps established on the Vistula, Napoleon resolved to add to the seven regiments of infantry and the nine regiments of cavalry already drawn from France and Italy, some others, which was possible by having recourse to numerous combinations of which he alone was capable. There was in garrison at Braunau a superb regiment, the 3rd of the line, comprising three war battalions and 3,400 men present under arms. Napoleon ordered it off to Berlin, supplied its place at Braunau by the 7th of the line, borrowed from the garrison of Alexandria, and replaced the 7th in Alexandria by two regiments from Naples, beaten at St. Euphemia, and needing to be re-organized. Resolving to leave none but dragoon regiments in Italy, he sent for the 14th of mounted chasseurs, which was still there, and which would increase the number of cavalry regiments brought from Italy to ten. He ordered a second regiment of the fusiliers of the guard to be formed in Paris, which might be done, since there were two conscriptions, that of 1807 and that of 1808, to choose out of. He detached from the camp of St. Lo the 5th light, which was not actually indispensable there. He directed a regiment of dragoons of the guard, encamped at that moment at Meudon, to be despatched from Paris to the Rhine; it was afterwards to be mounted at Potsdam. He gave the same order relative to the 26th chasseurs, which was at Saumur, and which the profound tranquillity of the Vendée rendered disposable. He commanded a battalion of seamen of the guard, very serviceable for the navigation of the Vistula, to be marched off. There were consequently three French regiments of infantry, three French regiments of cavalry, besides a battalion of seamen, which he drew from France and Italy, and which were to concur either in completing the existing corps, or to constitute a new corps for marshal Lannes. That marshal, having been taken ill at Warsaw, had been succeeded in the command of the fifth corps by Massena, and was beginning to recover. When the siege of Dantzic was over, Napoleon purposed to form, with part of the troops which had been engaged in it and the new regiments brought from France, a corps of reserve, which he intended to give to Lannes, and to attach to the active army. The 8th corps, under marshal Mortier, composed of Dutch, Italians, and French, dispersed from the Hanseatic towns to Stralsund, from Stralsund to Colberg, had hitherto been destined to overawe Germany. The Dutch division guarded the Hanseatic towns; one of the French divisions kept in

check the Swedes before Stralsund. The other was at Stettin, ready to concur in the blockade of Stralsund or in the siege of Dantzic. The Italian division blockaded Colberg. The sieges once ended, Napoleon had resolved to collect in the 8th corps all the troops that were French and to unite it with the active army. He would thus have, besides the corps of marshals Ney, Davout, Soult, Bernadotte, Murat, on the Passarge, two new corps under Mortier and Lannes, placed between the Vistula and the Oder, and connecting themselves with the second army which he purposed to organize in Germany.

He created the elements of this second army in the following manner. There were in Silesia part of the Bavarians and all the Wirtembergers, finishing, under prince Jerome and general Vandamme, the sieges in Silesia. There were, on the coast of the Baltic, the Dutch, then belonging to Mortier's corps, the Italians, also belonging to it, the one established, as we have just said, in the Hanseatic towns, the others before Colberg. They were good auxiliaries, hitherto faithful, and beginning to learn something of war in our school. Napoleon thought to augment the number of these auxiliaries, and to unite with them for a support 40,000 French, good veteran troops, so as to form on the Elbe an army of more than 100,000 men.

In the first place, he demanded of the Confederation of the Rhine, grounding himself on the suspicious armaments of Austria, a new portion of the contingent which he had a right to require, and which, as it would amount to 20,000 men, would produce about 15,000. It was giving displeasure to the German governments, our allies, but the present war, if it were complicated by the intervention of Austria, would put their recent aggrandizement in such jeopardy that he was authorized to demand of them such an effort. For the rest, it was the people, much more than the governments, whom this measure would dissatisfy, and that consideration alone rendered such a requisition matter of regret. Napoleon thought also of demanding of the new kingdom of Italy two of its regiments of infantry and two of its regiments of cavalry. It was not in Italy that the Italian soldiers were likely to find occasion to learn war, but in the North, in the school of the grand army; and, if the Germans could, up to a certain point, complain of being made subservient to interests which were not theirs, the Italians had no complaint of that kind to raise, for the interests of France were certainly those of Italy, and, in teaching them to fight, we were teaching them to defend on some future day their national independence.

Napoleon conceived another idea, which at the moment had all the appearance of a jeer; that was to demand troops from Spain. The day before the battle of Jena, the prince of the Peace, always engaged in some treachery, open or concealed, had published a proclamation calling the Spanish nation to arms, upon the strange pretext that the independence of Spain was threatened. In Spain, in France, in Europe, people asked by whom that independence could

be threatened. The answer was easy to give. The prince of the Peace had believed, like all the adversaries of France, in the superiority of the Prussian army; he had expected the destruction by that army of what was called the common enemy. But, the victory of Jena having undeceived him, he had the hardihood to say that his proclamation was designed to raise the Spanish nation, for the purpose of sending it to the assistance of Napoleon, in case he should stand in need of it. The falsehood was too gross to mislead. Napoleon only smiled, and deferred this quarrel till another time. There were, however, along the Pyrenees some thousands of Spaniards, good troops, who had nothing to do there, if they were not destined to act against France. There were also some thousands of Spaniards at Leghorn, to guard that port of the kingdom of Etruria, and who were more likely to deliver it up to the English than to defend it. Napoleon, affecting to take the explanation which the prince of the Peace gave of his proclamation in a serious light, thanked him for his zeal, and requested him to furnish a fresh proof of it by assisting him with twelve or fifteen thousand men, who were absolutely useless either at the Pyrenees or at Leghorn. Napoleon added that he meant to put into their hands Hanover, an English possession, as a pledge for the restitution of the Spanish colonies. Indeed, there needed not reasons so artfully arranged for the meanness of the Spanish government of that period. No sooner had Napoleon's despatch reached Madrid than orders to march were sent to the Spanish troops. Nine or ten thousand men started from the Pyrenees, four or five thousand from Leghorn. Napoleon sent to all quarters the necessary instructions for receiving them, either in France or in the countries dependent on his arms, in the most friendly and hospitable manner, and desired that they might be abundantly supplied with provisions, clothing, and even money.

He was, therefore, about to have on the Elbe, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Dutch, to the number of 60,000 men at least. The Bavarians and the Wirtembergers, united with the new contingent required from the Confederation of the Rhine, might form about 30,000 men; the Dutch, increased by some troops, 15,000; the Spaniards 15,000; the Italians seven or eight thousand. In order to make very good troops of these auxiliaries, it would be sufficient to join with them a certain quantity of French. Napoleon devised a method of procuring 40,000 of the better sort, likewise to be drawn from Italy and France. He had taken the precaution a long time beforehand to give orders for the army of Italy to be put on the war footing. Five divisions of infantry were quite organized in Frioul and Lombardy. Napoleon resolved to call from Brescia and Verona the two divisions of Molitor and Boudet, excellent divisions, and which afterwards proved at Essling and Wagram what they were capable of. They formed an effective of fifteen or sixteen thousand men, almost all veteran soldiers of Italy, recruited with some conscripts of the last levies. These divisions received orders to pass the Alps and proceed by Augsburg, the one to Mag-

deburg, the other to Berlin. Six weeks were sufficient for this journey.

Napoleon thus weakened Italy, but Italy was at the moment of far less importance than Germany. Well covered on his rear while he should be in Poland, certain of being able to throw himself, by Silesia or Saxony, upon Bohemia, and to lay Austria prostrate by a single blow of the back of his sword, he was always sure to disengage Italy, if she were temporarily overrun. He calculated, therefore, very ably, in preferring to make himself strong in Germany rather than in Italy. It was, however, not without compensation, that he weakened the latter country, for he had directed 20,000 conscripts, taken from the classes of 1807 and 1808, to be sent thither, and he ordered moreover the companies of élite to be extracted from the dépôt battalions, to form two new active divisions in Lombardy, which his forecast had rendered easy by keeping the dépôts of Italy, like those of France, always full and well exercised. He should therefore soon have, as before, 60,000 men on the Adige, 72,000 with Marmont's corps, 90,000 by drawing a strong detachment from Naples towards Milan.

But 15,000 French were not sufficient on the Elbe to serve for a link and appui to 60,000 auxiliaries, whom he was about to collect there. Napoleon thought to draw from France another valuable resource. He had formed at Boulogne, St. Lo, Pontivy, and Napoleonville, four camps, composed of a certain number of the oldest regiments, of such as had need to rest and recruit themselves, and had abundantly supplied them with all that they needed in men and *matériel*. These regiments formed a force of nearly 36,000 men. They were to be seconded, as we have seen, by some detachments of national guards, of which 6,000 men were at St. Omer, 3,000 at Cherbourg, 3,000 between Oleron and Bordeaux, by 10,000 seamen of the Boulogne flotilla, by 3,000 workmen, regimented at Antwerp, 8,000 at Brest, 3,000 at Lorient, 4,000 at Rochefort, by 12,000 coast-guards, and by 3,000 of the gendarmerie, which might at any time be assembled at one point by calling together that militia for twenty-five leagues round. This would be a force of nearly 90,000 men along the coast, capable of presenting 25 or 30 thousand men on any point of it that might be attacked. Napoleon designed to supply the place of the regular troops of the camps of Boulogne, St. Lo, Pontivy, Napoleonville, by a new creation. He gave orders for the formation of five legions, composed of officers taken out of the army, and of conscripts drawn from the last two conscriptions, commanded by five senators, each six battalions and 6,000 men strong, the five comprising 30 battalions and 30,000 men. They were to receive their education while stationed on the coast of the Ocean. The permanent state of war since '92, had bred up such a quantity of officers that skeletons were never wanting for the creation of new corps. The elements of these five legions could not be brought together, it is true, in less than four or five months, that is to say, before the end of May or

the beginning of June. But the troops of the camps were not yet going to leave the coast. If in May or June the English were not seen standing for the coast of France, if, on the contrary, they were seen sailing for the coast of Germany, 25,000 veteran soldiers of the camps were to follow the movements of the English squadrons, proceeding simultaneously with them along the shores of the Channel, the North Sea, the Baltic, by Normandy, Picardy, Holland, Hanover, Mecklenburg, and to join in Germany the two divisions of Boudet and Molitor. They had orders to perform this march as speedily as possible, should the conduct of Austria render it necessary; and they had orders, in any case, to leave behind them the five new legions, whose presence might be useful, even before their organization was completed.

By means of this combination, Napoleon was about to have with Boudet's and Molitor's divisions, with the 25,000 men drawn from Normandy and Bretagne, with the 60 or 70 thousand auxiliaries, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Dutch, a second army of more than 100,000 men on the Elbe, independently of the two corps of marshals Mortier and Lannes, whose part it was to connect the army of reserve with the grand active army of the Vistula. Endowed with an admirable talent for moving his masses, he could, by doubling his tail back to his head, or his head back to his tail, his left upon his right, or his right upon his left, carry the bulk of his forces, either forward towards the Niemen, or backward towards the Elbe, or to the right upon Austria, or to the left upon the coast. With all that he had brought together, with all that he was to bring together by and by, he should number not fewer than 440,000 men in Germany, 360,000 of whom were French, and 80,000 allies. Never had such means been collected with that power, with that vigour, with that promptness.

Of all these reinforcements, none had yet arrived but the new regiments drawn from France and Italy, the provisional regiments, which came daily to recruit the ranks of the grand army, the Bavarians and Wirtembergers acting in Silesia, the Dutch on the Baltic, and the troops of Mortier spread before Stralsund, Colberg, and Dantzic. Orders were despatched for Boudet's and Molitor's divisions, for the Italian, German, Spanish, and French troops.

Marshal Brune, who was at the camp of Boulogne, as commander-in-chief, and who was still recommended by the remembrance of his conduct at the Helder, was called to Berlin, to be put at the head of the second army assembled in Germany.

Meanwhile the sieges continued. Before we relate the vicissitudes of the most important of all these sieges, that which filled the winter with memorable incidents, we must mention a circumstance which had well-nigh seriously endangered the safety of our rear. Marshal Mortier, commanding the 8th corps, and having under his orders four divisions, one Dutch, one Italian, two French, had placed the Dutch division near the mouth of the Elbe, left Grand-

jean's French division before Stralsund, posted Dupas' French division at Stettin, and sent the Italian division before Colberg, to repress the incommodious partisans thrown by the garrison of that place between the Vistula and the Oder. We should add that, of the six regiments composing the two French divisions, four had been taken, the 2nd light to be sent toward Dantzic, the 12th light to be sent to Thorn, the 22nd and 65th of the line to reinforce the army on the Passarge. The 58th light, arriving from Paris, had been given to marshal Mortier in compensation, and several other regiments coming from France were destined for him. He had therefore not been able to leave general Grandjean more than two French regiments, the 4th light and the 58th of the line. He had taken with him the 72nd, in order to support the Italians before Colberg.

This was the moment that the Swedes chose for an enterprize upon our rear. They still occupied Stralsund, an important seaport of Swedish Pomerania, which was the place where they usually landed in Germany. This place would have been worth the trouble of a siege, if Dantzic had not deserved the preference before any other conquest of that kind. The king of Sweden, whose disordered reason was destined to cost his family the throne, and his country Pomerania and Finland—the king of Sweden had purposed to start from Stralsund, with an army composed of Russians, English, Swedes, and, like another Gustavus Adolphus, to make a brilliant incursion upon the continent of Germany. But Napoleon, absolute master of that continent, had obliged the Swedish troops to shut themselves up in Stralsund, where they were blockaded, as it were, in a *tête de pont*. The king of Sweden, extremely vehement with friends as well as foes, was sorely displeased with Russia, and still more with England, which sent him not a soldier, and doled out the subsidies with extraordinary parsimony. Thus, shut up in his own territories, since he was no longer permitted to travel on the continent, he lived at Stockholm, dull, secluded, leaving general Essen at Stralsund with a corps of 15,000 good troops. General Essen, apprized of what was passing before him, could not withstand the temptation to force the line of the blockade, which the French defended with too small a force. In the first days of April, he marched out at the head of 15,000 Swedes, against general Grandjean, who had scarcely five or six thousand men, half of whom at most were French, to oppose to them. General Grandjean, after defending himself bravely before the place, found himself threatened with having his wings turned, and was obliged to retire, first upon Anklam, and then upon Uckeründe and Stettin. He made an orderly retreat, seconded by the valour of the French and Dutch, lost few men on the field of battle, but a great quantity of military effects, and some solitary detachments, which could not be picked up, especially in the islands of Usedom and Wollin, which close the Great Haff.

This surprise produced a certain alarm on the rear of the army, especially in Berlin, where a hostile population, deeply mortified, eagerly watching events, sought food for its hopes in every unforeseen circumstance. But the fortune of France, then so brilliant, could leave her adversaries only short joys. At that moment, several regiments coming from France, among others the 15th of the line, and several provisional marching regiments, arrived on the Elbe and the Oder. General Clarke, who governed at Berlin with wisdom and firmness, immediately despatched the 15th of the line to reinforce general Grandjean at Stettin. He added to it a provisional regiment and several squadrons of cavalry in the great depôt at Potsdam which were disposable. Marshal Mortier, on his part, marched back at the head of the 72nd and of several Italian detachments drawn from Colberg. These troops, united with Grandjean's division, were sufficient to punish the Swedes for their attempt. Marshal Mortier formed with them two divisions under general Grandjean and Dupas, put the 72nd, the 15th of the line, and the Dutch in the first, the 4th light, the 58th of the line, and some Italians, in the second, left the provisional regiments to cover his left and his rear, and marched to the enemy with that calm resolution which characterized him. He drove the Swedes from position to position, forced them to fall back on the Peene, passed that river in spite of them, and drove them into Stralsund, with the loss of some hundred killed and 2,000 prisoners. The incursion of the Swedes, commenced in the first days of April, was finished on the 18th. General Essen, apprehensive lest all Pomerania should soon be wrested from him, was disposed to save it by an armistice. A flag of truce, sent by him to marshal Mortier, came and offered to neutralize that province by suspending all kinds of hostilities. As it was impossible for us to besiege Stralsund, nothing could be more convenient to us than to close an inlet by which the English might have been able to penetrate into Germany, and at the same time to render the troops, which must otherwise have been left in Swedish Pomerania, disposable for the siege of Dantzic. Marshal Mortier, knowing the intentions of Napoleon on this point, consented to an armistice, in virtue of which the Swedes promised to observe an absolute neutrality, not to open Swedish Pomerania to any enemy of France, and not to afford any succour either to Colberg or to Dantzic. A resumption of hostilities was to be preceded by ten days' notice. The armistice was sent to Napoleon for his approbation.

Napoleon could not reason in any other way than his lieutenant, for the motive which had caused him to reduce the troops placed before Stralsund to the smallest possible number must dispose him to the acceptance of an armistice, which annulled Stralsund without diverting any part of our forces for the purpose of blockading it. He therefore accepted the proposed armistice on condition that the notice to be given before the resumption of hostilities should be extended from ten days to a month.

General Essen signed the armistice with this modification, and sent it to Stockholm to obtain the royal ratification. In the mean time, marshal Mortier was to remain on the Peene with his forces, and then to march them to Stettin, Colberg, and Dantzic, leaving, however, the Dutch to observe the neutralized province.

For the rest, if the Swedes had served us by adopting this armistice, they had likewise served themselves, for the French forces were accumulating in Berlin. The 3rd of the line, drawn from Braunau, and 3,400 strong, four or five provisional regiments on march from the Rhine to the Elbe, the 15th chasseurs remounting in Hanover, lastly the 19th of the line, coming from the camp of Boulogne, would soon have been advancing upon Swedish Pomerania. The Swedes would have paid with their total destruction for the time which they would have caused our troops to lose.

During these transactions, Dantzic was invested, and the operations of the siege had commenced. Napoleon had at first intended only to blockade the place. The war being prolonged, he resolved to employ the winter in reducing it. Dantzic was worth the trouble. It commands, in fact, the Lower Vistula, the fertile plains traversed by that river towards its mouth, comprehends a spacious harbour, and contains the riches of the commerce of the North. Master of Dantzic, Napoleon could not be shaken in his position on the Lower Vistula; he deprived the allies of the means of turning his left; and he obtained possession of immense stores of corn and wine, sufficient to supply the army for above a year. It was impossible, therefore, to make a better use of the winter than in effecting such a conquest. But it required a long siege, as well on account of the works of the place as of the strong garrison charged to defend it. If, at the commencement of the campaign, Napoleon could have suddenly set about such a siege, it is to be presumed that the defences of Dantzic, which were of earth and in the most neglected state, would have yielded to an unforeseen attack. But Napoleon had not then either disposable troops or heavy artillery, and he had been obliged to blockade Dantzic with German and some Polish auxiliaries, supported by a single French regiment, the 2nd light. The king of Prussia, forewarned, had therefore had time to put into a state of defence a place which was the last bulwark of his kingdom, the principal depôt of his wealth; and, as long as it continued in his hands, a serious danger for Napoleon. He had put into it a garrison of 18,000 men, 14,000 of whom were Prussians, and 4,000 Russians. He had given it for governor the celebrated marshal Kalkreuth, at that moment unemployed and grumbling at Königsberg, and well qualified for such a command. It was not to be apprehended that this old warrior, who had just condemned to death the commandant of Stettin for having surrendered the post committed to his keeping, would make a faint resistance to the French. No sooner did he arrive than marshal Kalkreuth finished burning the rich suburbs of Dantzic, which his predecessor had begun to consign to the flames, set about repairing the works,

rousing the spirit of the garrison, and intimidating every one who was disposed to surrender.

Thus Dantzic, in March 1807, was no longer a ruined and neglected place, which it would be possible to take by surprise. Not only had it an excellent governor, a strong garrison, extensive and solid works, but its site was very difficult of approach. Like all great rivers, the Vistula has its Delta. A little below Mewe, about fifteen leagues from the Baltic, it divides into two arms, which embrace a rich and fertile tract, called the isle of Nogath. One of these arms, the right, which goes by the name of Nogath, throws itself into the gulf called the Frische Haff; the left, retaining the name of Vistula, proceeds directly north to within a league of the sea, there meets all at once with a bank of sand, turns off to the west, and, after running along this bank of sand for seven or eight leagues, again turns northward, and at last falls into the Baltic. It is at the mouth of the latter arm of the Vistula, in a flat country, extremely fertile, frequently overflowed, and at the foot of some sandy heights, that the city of Dantzic is situated, at the distance of several thousand paces from the sea.

The long sand-bank, at which the Vistula turns off to run westward, is called the *Nehrung*. At one end, it terminates before Dantzic, running the other way for twenty leagues, forming one of the banks of the Frische Haff as far as Königsberg, with the exception of a cut at Pillau, a natural channel formed by the waters of the Nogath, the Passarge, and the Pregel, in order to discharge themselves from the Frische Haff into the Baltic. It is by Pillau, in fact, that you pass out of the Frische Haff into the Baltic, and that shipping proceeds to and from the important city of Königsberg.

You may then, provided you clear the narrow pass of the Pillau, communicate by land from Königsberg to Dantzic, by following the sand-bank of the *Nehrung*, a league broad at most, and generally much less, twenty-five long, without a tree, except near Dantzic, and presenting only a few fishermen's huts.

Dantzic, seated on the left arm of the Vistula, the one which has retained that name, is 2,300 fathoms, or about a league, from the sea. The fort of *Weichselmünde*, regularly built, closes the mouth of the Vistula. To shorten the distance from the place to the sea, a canal, called the canal of Laaken, has been dug. The ground between the river and the canal forms an island, called the *Holm*. Numerous redoubts, established in this island, command the river and the canal, which are the two outlets toward the sea. Lastly, the place itself, seated on the bank of the Vistula, traversed by a little river, the *Motlau*, encompassed by their united waters, shut in by a bastioned enclosure of twenty fronts, is most difficult of access, surrounded by an inundation not artificial but natural, which a besieger cannot get rid of at pleasure by draining, and against which the very inhabitants have the greatest difficulty to defend themselves at certain times of the day and of the year. Dantzic, thus surrounded, on the north, the east, and the south, by inun-

dated grounds, would be inaccessible but for the sandy heights which command it, and which terminate in rapid slopes to the foot of the walls on the western side. In consequence, these heights have not failed to be secured for the advantage of defence, and they have been crowned by a series of works forming a second enclosure. It is from these heights that Dantzic has generally been attacked. In fact, the double enclosure which occupies their summit being once taken, the city may be overwhelmed with a downward fire, to which it is scarcely possible for it to make any resistance. This double enclosure, however, renders the attack of the place extremely difficult. The works of Dantzic are of earth, and present turfed slopes instead of scarps of masonry. But at the foot of these slopes were then standing strong palisades of enormous dimension (they were fifteen inches in diameter), very close together and deeply planted in the ground. A ball might sometimes splinter them, sometimes break off their heads, but not knock them down. On the slopes in rear enormous logs suspended by ropes were at the moment of an assault to be made to roll from top to bottom upon the besiegers. Then again, at all the re-entering angles of the enclosure (re-entering *places d'armes*) had been erected blockhouses of rough timber: these were covered with earth and rendered almost impenetrable to ball and bomb. The timber of the plains of the North, for which the city of Dantzic is the great mart, had been lavishly employed in all forms for the purpose of fortifying it, and occasion was soon afforded for discovering its defensive properties, which were not appreciated as they were after that memorable siege. Lastly, ammunition in immense quantity, provisions sufficient to subsist the population and the troops for above a year, continual communications with the city of Königsberg, either by sea or by the *Nehrung*, communications which gave the besieged garrison the assurance that it should be relieved, and that it could retire whenever it pleased, added to the chances of the defence and to the difficulties of the attack.

Marshal Lefebvre, appointed to the command of the troops which were to be employed in the siege, possessed none of the qualifications requisite for such an operation. There was not in the whole army a soldier more ignorant or more brave. To all the questions of art raised by the engineers he saw but one solution, which was to proceed to the assault at the head of his grenadiers. If Napoleon had selected him in spite of his deficiency, it was because, as we have elsewhere said, he was desirous to give employment to senators; it was because he had no mind to leave in Paris an old soldier, submissive and attached, but who frequently let his tongue run when he was not checked; it was, lastly, because he wished, without entrusting him with a *corps d'armée*, to afford him an opportunity of earning a high reward. The brave Lefebvre, who redeemed his ignorance by a certain natural intelligence, could form a just estimate of himself, and was absolutely frightened when he learned what a task Napoleon had committed to him. Napoleon had cheered him by promising to

send him all the resources that he should need, and to guide him himself from his camp at Finkenstein. "Take courage," said he, "why should not you, too, when you get back to France, have something to talk of in the hall of the Senate?"

Overcome by these gracious words, the marshal had cheerfully obeyed. Napoleon had given him for assistants two officers of the highest merit, Chasseloup the engineer, and the general of artillery Lariboissière, knowing that it is by means of engineers and artillery that the walls of fortresses are overthrown. It is true that they are apt to differ in opinion, for one is charged to determine the attacks, the other to execute them by means of cannon, and their provinces trench too closely upon one another for them not to disagree. It is for the general commanding in chief to reconcile them. But Napoleon was thirty or forty leagues from Dantzic: he could always resolve difficulties by his daily correspondence, or send one of his aides-de-camp, general Savary or general Bertrand, to put an end in his name to the disputes which marshal Lefebvre was incapable of comprehending and deciding. This he did several times during the siege.

Napoleon had resolved to commence the first operations with the auxiliaries and one or two French regiments borrowed from the corps of marshal Mortier; then, while the troops brought from France should be passing near the Vistula, to keep them for a time under the walls of Dantzic to reinforce the besieging troops. Marshal Lefebvre had, therefore, to begin with five or six thousand Poles of the new levy, scarcely trained; 2,500 of the legion of the North, composed of Poles, and German and Russian deserters, having spirit but not solidity, for want of a sufficient organization; 2,200 Baden troops, unaccustomed to fire and to the fatigues of the trenches; 5,000 Saxons, good soldiers, but who, having sided with the Prussians at Jena, could not yet conceive any great affection for us; lastly, 3,000 French, namely, the 2nd light, the 23rd and 19th regiments of mounted chasseurs, which had arrived from Italy, and 600 of the corps of engineers, incomparable troops, who, making up for all deficiencies in this famous siege, covered themselves with glory. It was, as we see, with 18,000 men at most, only 3,000 of whom were French, that we were about to undertake the regular attack of a place containing a garrison of 18,000 men.

The heavy artillery, of which at least one hundred pieces were required, with immense supplies of powder and projectiles, could be obtained only from the arsenals of Silesia. Water carriage being interrupted, it had to be drawn with great labour, along wretched roads, from the Oder to the Vistula. It was expected so early as March. But the first thing to be done, before battering the place could be thought of, was to invest it closely, in order to deprive the garrison of reinforcements and of the encouragements which it was receiving from Königsberg. To accomplish this, it would be necessary, on the one hand, to cut it off from the fort of Weichselmünde, and, on the other, to intercept the Nehrung, that long sand-bank,

extending, as we have said, from Königsberg to Dantzic, with a single cut at Pillau.

We had arrived by the sandy heights which command Dantzic on the west, and we perceived before us the outer enclosure constructed on these heights, at our feet the city, on the left the Vistula, throwing itself into the Baltic, amidst the works of the fort of Weichselmünde, on the right the vast tract of land overflowed by the Motlau, in front, stretching further than the eye could reach, the Nehrung, washed on one side by the sea, on the other by the Vistula, and sinking at the horizon towards the Frische Haff. It was a circuit of seven or eight leagues, which it was impossible to encompass with 18,000 men. It is true that, by occupying certain points, the investment might be sufficient. Thus, by placing ourselves on the Vistula, between the fort of Weichselmünde and Dantzic, we should intercept the communications by sea. By establishing ourselves on the Nehrung, we should intercept the communications by land. But to possess ourselves of the principal points only, we must first crown the heights, then descend on the left, carry the works of the fort of Weichselmünde on both banks of the Vistula, and, in default of this operation, at least bar the river, penetrate into the isle of Holm, and take the canal of Laaken. We must then, after descending on the left, descend on the right also into the inundated plain, cross it upon the dikes, pass the Vistula above Dantzic, as we had passed it below, enter upon the Nehrung, entrench ourselves there, and cut off the land route as well as that by sea. These first difficulties overcome, we might open the trenches before the enclosure. But for this purpose we should have needed eight or ten thousand more good troops, and we had them not. By the advice therefore of Chasseloup, commanding the engineers, it was decided to choose from among the various preliminary operations that which appeared most urgent and least difficult. To cross the Vistula below Dantzic, between the fort of Weichselmünde and the place, to penetrate into the isle of Holm, under the fire of well-armed redoubts, and in spite of the sallies which might be made either from Weichselmünde or from Dantzic, was too perilous. It was resolved therefore to cross above Dantzic, a league or two higher up, at a place called Neufahr, to form a small camp there, in this manner to intercept the Nehrung, then, in proportion as means should be found, to reinforce this camp, to bring it nearer to Dantzic, in order that it might give a hand to the troops which should by and by be charged to cross the Vistula, between the place and the fort of Weichselmünde.

This operation was intrusted to general Schramm, with a corps of about 3,000 men, composed of a battalion of the 2nd light, some hundred Saxon grenadiers, a Polish detachment, infantry and cavalry, and a squadron of the 19th chasseurs. On the morning of the 19th of March, the troops, having got as high as Neufahr, two leagues above Dantzic, were embarked in boats which had been procured, crossed the Vistula, which is not so broad after it has

divided into several arms, and in this operation took advantage of an island situated near the opposite bank. General Schramm, having reached the Nehrung in consequence of this passage, divided his little corps into three columns; one on the left, to fall upon the enemy's troops which defended the position towards Dantzic; one on the right to repulse those which might come from the Königsberg side; and a third, to act by way of reserve. At the head of each of these columns he had placed a detachment of French, which would set them an example.

No sooner had they landed than general Schramm's troops, hurried on by the battalion of the 2nd light, turned to the left, went to meet the Prussians, and upset them in spite of the most vehement fire. While the principal column, taking the left, pushed them towards Dantzic, the second remained in observation on the Königsberg road. The third, kept in reserve, served to reinforce the first. The enemy, having tried to take advantage of the obstacles of the ground to renew his resistance—for the Nehrung, as it approaches Dantzic, has both hills and woods—the first column, assisted by the third, again repulsed him, and killed and took some men. The Saxons vied on this occasion with the French. Both drove back the enemy to the glacis of the fort of Weichselmünde, from which the troops that defended the Nehrung had come.

The affair seemed to be over, when, about seven o'clock in the evening, a column of three or four thousand Prussians was seen debouching from Dantzic, and ascending the Vistula, with drums beating and colours flying. The 2nd light, by a well-directed and well-sustained fire, stopped that column, then charged it with the bayonet, and drove it back upon Dantzic, whither it ran to shut itself up. This day, which put us in possession of a passage over the Vistula above Dantzic and of a position which intercepted the Nehrung, cost the enemy two or three hundred men put *hors de combat*, and five or six hundred made prisoners. Captain Girod, of the engineers, appointed to direct the expedition, distinguished himself by his intelligence and his coolness. The operation being finished, he had trees felled, epaulements thrown up, a bridge of boats established over the Vistula, with the accompaniment of a strong *tête de pont*. Behind this shelter the troops lodged, and they were guarded by means of posts of cavalry, which, on one side, pushed on to beneath the glacis of the fort of Weichselmünde, and, on the other, ran along the Nehrung, in the direction of Königsberg.

On the following days, general Schramm, who commanded this detachment, endeavoured to descend as far as Heubude, in order to press the place more closely, and to gain possession of a sluice, which had the greatest influence upon the inundation. But this sluice, surrounded by water, was not accessible on any side. General Schramm was obliged to relinquish the design of taking it, and to confine himself to bringing down the bridge of boats to Heubude. However, this post of the Upper Vistula, after its removal to Heubude, had six leagues to go in order to communicate with the head-quarters,

across the inundated lands and along the dikes. In attempting to cut off the communications of the besieged, he therefore ran the risk of losing his own communications.

On the 26th of March, the enemy attempted two sorties; one from the place, directed by the Schidlitz and Oliva gates upon our advanced posts, with the intention of completing the burning of the suburbs; the other from the outworks of the fort of Weichselmünde, and directed upon the left of the head-quarters by Langenfurth. Both were briskly repulsed. A Polish cavalry officer, captain Sokolniki, distinguished himself there by his intrepidity and skill. A celebrated Prussian partisan, the baron de Kakow, was taken there.

Our troops, in driving back the enemy to the foot of the works, approached nearer to the place than they had yet done, so that one could study its configuration. General Chasseloup formed the plan of the attacks with the perspicacity of an equally scientific and practised engineer. The outer enclosure, constructed on the margin of the heights, presented two works, connected with each other, but distinct and separated by a small valley, at the further end of which is the suburb of Schidlitz. The first of these works, that on the right (the right of the besieging army) is called the Bischoffsberg; the second, that of the left, is called Hagelsberg. It was the latter which general Chasseloup chose for the object of the principal attack, reserving the option of directing a false attack upon the Bischoffsberg. The motives which decided him were the following:*

The works of the Hagelsberg appeared less carefully constructed than those of the Bischoffsberg. The Hagelsberg was narrow, inconvenient for the deploying of troops, whether the besieged had to make sorties or to repulse an assault; whereas the Bischoffsberg, spacious and well distributed, admitted of three or four thousand men being drawn up in order of battle, and thrown in a mass upon the besieger. The Hagelsberg could be battered from behind by the Stolzenberg, one of the outer positions; the Bischoffsberg could not be from any side. The Hagelsberg was reached over ground undulated, but unbroken. To approach the Bischoffsberg, you came to a deep ravine, in which it would not be easy to make paths, and into which also you ran the risk of being flung, if you attempted to cross it in proceeding to the assault. Not only was the Hagelsberg easier to take than the Bischoffsberg, but the position when taken was better. You commanded the place from both alike, and could overwhelm it with your fire. But, if that fire was not sufficient to reduce it, and it were necessary to descend from

* We have thought it right to relate with some detail the siege of Dantzic, because it is a fine model of a regular siege, and perhaps the most remarkable of our age, because examples of regular sieges, so frequent and so perfect under Louis XIV., have become very rare in our days, because that of Dantzic had the signal honour to be covered by Napoleon at the head of 200,000 men, because, finally, it is the indispensable episode which connects the winter campaign with the summer campaign in the glorious war in Poland.

the heights to force the second enclosure, you found, on descending from the bastion of Heilige Leichnam to the bastion of St. Elizabeth, a salient front, and which, not being flanked on any side, could present but few difficulties to the besieger. In descending from the Bischoffsberg, on the contrary, from the bastion of St. Elizabeth to the bastion of St. Gertrude, you found on all sides a re-entering flank, and exposed moreover to the fire of several very elevated platforms (*cavaliers*). Lastly, a reason deduced from the general situation ought to decide the attack on the Hagelsberg. This attack would bring our principal forces nearer to the Lower Vistula, and it was, in fact, by the Lower Vistula that the besiegers must think of investing the place, by drawing from this point the detached corps of general Schramm, by giving a hand to him for passing into the isle of Holm, and by thus cutting off Dantzic from the fort of Weichselmünde. These reasons were convincing, and convinced Napoleon himself. General Kirgener, placed under general Chasseloup, had conceived the idea of fixing the point of attack still more to the left, towards the Oliva gate, in the low ground between the Hagelsberg and the Vistula, opposite to the isle of Holm. This idea was not adopted; for it would have been necessary, in the first place, to carry the outer enclosure, while exposed on the right to the fire of the Hagelsberg. Such a mode of operating was not admissible.

General Chasseloup, called for several days to Thorn, to trace the plan of some defensive works there, left at his departure the plan of the attacks, and orders for the commencement of the operations.

There was no longer any reason for delay, for marshal Lefebvre had received the reinforcements which had been promised him. The 44th of the line, drawn from Augereau's corps, arrived at that moment from the banks of the Vistula; it was only a thousand men, but of the very best. The 19th, which had set out from France two months before, arrived also from Stettin, with a convoy of artillery, which it escorted. This was sufficient, while expecting the other regiments announced, for commencing the operations, and for setting an example to the auxiliary troops.

Without being versed in that fine science which immortalized Vauban, every one knows with what precaution fortresses must be approached. You must burrow under ground, open trenches, throw up the rubbish proceeding from those trenches on the side next to the enemy, and advance under the fire of the heavy artillery. In this manner you produce lines which are called *parallels*, because they are parallel to the front which you are attacking. These are then armed with batteries, for replying to the fire of the besieged. Having traced the first parallel, you approach, working under ground, by *zigzags*, to the distance at which you intend to form the second parallel, which you arm with batteries like the first. You arrive successively at the third, from which you leap upon the

border of the ditch, which is called the *covered way*. You then descend into that ditch with fresh precautions, break down with breaching batteries the walls, called *scarps*, fill the ditch with their rubbish, and lastly mount upon that rubbish to the assault. Sorties of the enemy to disturb these difficult operations, combats of heavy artillery, mines which blow into the air besiegers and besieged, add animated, and frequently terrible, scenes to this subterranean warfare, in which science vies with heroism for attacking or defending large cities, whose wealth, geographical situation, or military strength, render them worthy of such efforts.

To such complicated means one is obliged to resort, when a fortress cannot be taken by surprise. This was the case here, for the causes already assigned; and, in the night between the 1st and 2nd of April, the trenches were opened facing the Hagelsberg, which was the point of attack fixed upon. Our troops had taken a position on the Zigankenberg. They sought, as usual, to conceal this first operation from the enemy, and by daybreak our soldiers were covered by an epaulement of earth for an extent of two hundred fathoms. The besieged kept up a very brisk fire upon them, but could not prevent them from completing the work in the course of the day. In the night between the 2nd and 3rd of April, they got beyond the first parallel by the transverse trenches, called zig-zags, and thus gained ground. While part of our men were thus employed, an attempt was made to carry a work that was soon to annoy our operations.

This was the redoubt known by the name of Kalk-Schanze, situated on our left on the very margin of the Vistula, and consequently on the low ground through which the river runs. Though lower than the point which we were crowning with our works, it enfladed our trenches—a sufficient motive for striving to get rid of it. Soldiers of the legion of the North, daring fellows, as we have said, but not very steady, threw themselves boldly into the work, and made themselves masters of it. During the same night, the enemy made a sortie upon our first trenches and upon the redoubt which had just been taken. He was at first repulsed, but retook the redoubt, and drove out the soldiers of the legion of the North and the Baden men. No sooner was he established there, than he filled the ditches with the water of the Vistula, surrounded the scarps of earth with strong palisades, and rendered himself almost impregnable there.

We were therefore obliged to continue our works, notwithstanding the proximity of so inconvenient a neighbour, against whom it became necessary for us to protect ourselves by traverses, a sort of epaulements of earth, opposed to the flank fire, which circumstance, occasioning an increase of labour, was likely to prolong the operations of the siege.

During the following nights and days, from the 4th to the 7th of April, the works of approach were prosecuted under the fire of the

place, to which we could not reply, our heavy artillery not having yet arrived. We had only field artillery, placed in some redoubts, to play upon the enemy in case of sortie. The works were attended with more difficulties than occur in most regular sieges. The soil in which they were carried on consisted of a fine, loose, incompact sand, which sunk down when struck by balls, and which the wind, that had become violent on the approach of the equinox, drove into the faces of our men. The weather was bad, alternately snowy and rainy. Lastly, we had no stanch labourers but the French, and these were not numerous, and worn out with fatigue.

In the night between the 7th and 8th a parallel was opened against the Bischoffsberg, with the two-fold intention of diverting the enemy by a false attack, and establishing batteries which should take the Hagelsberg from behind, and could even fire upon the city.

In the following days the works, as well for the real as for the false attack, were continued. The besieged, on their part, had undertaken works of counter-approach, with a view to gain possession of a hillock which would give them the command of our trenches. In the night between the 10th and 11th, general Chasseloup, who had returned to the camp, made the necessary dispositions for destroying the works directed against ours. At ten o'clock at night, four companies of the 44th of the line, with 120 soldiers of the legion of the North, commanded by Rogniat, *chef de bataillon*, crossed a kind of ravine, which separated the left of our first parallel from the position occupied by the Prussians, fell upon them, overturned them, took thirteen, and obliged the others to scamper off, throwing away their muskets. The soldiers of the legion of the North were immediately set to work to fill with the shovel the trenches begun by the besieged. Now this destruction of the enemy's works took place within forty fathoms of the fortress, and under a murderous fire of grape and ball. Our labourers of the legion of the North, having withstood it for some time, at length ran away one after another, so that the Prussians could return to the abandoned work before it was completely destroyed. At one in the morning, general Chasseloup and marshal Lefebvre, having perceived the return of the enemy, resolved to drive him out again. Four hundred men of the 44th, sent against the work, found there a strong detachment of Prussian grenadiers, attacked them with the bayonet, killed or wounded about fifty, and took about the same number, with a considerable quantity of muskets and tools. A company of Saxons remained till daylight to fill the trenches of the besieged, but when it was light, though seconded by our tirailleurs, they could hold out no longer against the fire of the place, and were obliged to retire.

The Prussians reoccupied the work in the course of the 12th, and threw up in the utmost haste a sort of palisaded redoubt on the hillock to which they attached so much value. It was not possible

to leave them thus quietly settled on the left of our trenches. It was decided that in the following night this position should be taken from them for the third time, and that no time should be lost in connecting it with the second parallel which had that day been opened. At nine in the evening of the 12th, Rogniat, *chef de bataillon*, and general Puthod, at the head of 300 Saxon Bevilacqua grenadiers, a company of carabineers of the legion of the North, and a company of grenadiers of the 44th, commanded by the *chef de bataillon*, Jacquemard, resolutely attacked the work. The enemy made a very vigorous resistance. Covered by the palisades, he kept up such a fire of musketry as for a moment staggered our troops. But the grenadiers of the 44th marched right up to the palisades, while the Saxon Bevilacqua grenadiers, led by a brave drummer, finding a way that turned the work on the left, got into it and decided the success. We remained masters of the redoubt, and made haste to connect it with the second parallel.

On the return of daylight, however, the enemy, resolved to dispute with us to the last a position which would enable him to stop our works, if he could succeed in retaining it, made a sortie in great force, and directed a strong column upon the point so warmly contested. All the guns of the place supported his efforts. He fell upon the redoubt in which the Saxons still were, overwhelmed them by numbers, notwithstanding the most courageous resistance on their part, and having reconquered the work, marched resolutely to our trenches, with the intention to take and to destroy them. He had already entered, when marshal Lefebvre, who, on the first noise of this sally, had speedily collected a battalion of the 44th, fell upon the Prussians sword in hand, and, amidst a shower of balls, drove them out of the trenches, and followed them with the bayonet to the glacis of the Hagelsberg. Having arrived there, he was obliged to retire under a shower of grape. In this action the Prussians lost about 300 men. It cost us fifteen officers and about 100 men, Saxons and French.

From that moment that hillock on the left was relinquished to us by the enemy. It was definitively connected with our trenches, and we then debouched by new traverses beyond the second parallel. The troops worked in like manner at that which had been marked out before the Bischoffsberg, and the object of which we have already specified.

These three days' fighting had greatly retarded the operations of the siege, inasmuch as, our trenches being continually threatened, we were obliged to reserve our best troops to guard them. The following days were employed in finishing the second parallel, in enlarging it, and forming *places d'armes*, for lodging the troops who were to guard it, in preparing the sites of batteries, while awaiting the arrival of the heavy cannon; and the same pains were bestowed on the parallel of the false attack undertaken before the Bischoffsberg. Two regiments had arrived agreeably to the orders of Napoleon,

who was extremely attentive to the operations of this great siege. It was, on the one hand, the regiment of the municipal guard of Paris, and, on the other the 12th light, temporarily detached from Thorn and sent to Dantzic. At the same time, Napoleon had ordered marshal Mortier, who had just finished the affair of the armistice with the Swedes, to march his troops by way of Stettin to Dantzic; and he was collecting, in the isle of Nogath, the elements of the infantry reserve which marshal Lannes was to command. He was therefore in hopes of being soon strongly appuyed.

The besieging army being provided with two new French regiments, it was fitting to complete the investment of the place, and to continue the operations projected on the Vistula by bringing general Schramm from the height of Heubude to that of the isle of Holm, which became the more urgent, since the enemy was daily communicating by the fort of Weichselmünde with the sea, whence he received succours in money and ammunition. In consequence, on the 15th of April, general Gardanne, who had taken the command of the troops placed in the Nehrung, descended the course of the Vistula with those troops and some reinforcements which had been sent him, and went and established himself along the canal of Laaken, between Dantzic and the fort of Weichselmünde, at the distance of 700 fathoms from the glacis of that fort. He was posted in such a manner as to intercept the navigation of the canal, and subsequently that of the Vistula itself, when the troops at the head-quarters should come and join their fires with his by descending on their left to the bank of the river, which was not at first much opposed, unless by the redoubts on the isle of Holm; but marshal Kalkreuth, having soon perceived the importance of the enterprize, resolved to make the greatest efforts to maintain his communications with the sea. On the 16th of April, three thousand Russians and two thousand Prussians sallied simultaneously, the first from the fort of Weichselmünde, the second from Dantzic, to attack our troops, who had not had time to establish themselves solidly in the Nehrung and at the mouth of the canal. An extremely sharp action took place near Weichselmünde with the Russians, and luckily just before the Prussians had debouched from Dantzic. They were driven back to the glacis of the fort, after sustaining considerable loss. No sooner had our troops finished with them than they were obliged to begin again with the Prussians, but that affair was neither difficult nor long, for our auxiliaries, having the 2nd light at their head, behaved gallantly. The enemy lost in the whole five or six hundred men, killed or prisoners. We lost about 200.

After this action, our establishment on the Lower Vistula and in the Nehrung appeared safe. Pains were nevertheless taken to consolidate it. A double epaulement of earth was thrown up to protect at it once against the fort and against Dantzic, and it was extended far enough for it to join the river on one side, and on the other the woods which cover this part of the Nehrung. Vast abattis ren-

dered these woods almost inaccessible. A strong blockhouse was placed in the centre of our entrenchments. To these precautions was added a guard of sloops on the canal and the river, for preventing enemy's craft from ascending or descending the Vistula. While these works were going forward on the right bank, the troops from the head-quarters on the left bank, descending from the heights to the margin of the Vistula, had thrown up redoubts there, in order to cross their fires with those of the troops established in the Nehrung. They secured themselves on this side by a gabion work two hundred fathoms in length. A brave officer, named Tardiville, having quartered himself with about a hundred men, in a house on the bank of the Vistula, maintained himself there, in spite of the enemy's projectiles, with such obstinacy that this house was named after him while the siege lasted. The isle of Holm was still left to be conquered before the investment was complete and definitive. Still, however, it was not without difficulty that enemy's vessels got up to Dantzic. Several barks, indeed, had been taken, and a cutter having attempted to ascend the Vistula, had been stopped by the fire from the two shores. The soldiers, led by an officer of engineers named Lesecq, had leaped from the top of the entrenchments, placed themselves, uncovered, on the bank of the river, and, overwhelming the enemy's vessel with their musketry, had obliged her to sheer off. Captain Lesecq had his sword carried away by a shot, without sustaining any injury himself.

It was the 20th of April. The French had been six weeks before the place, and it was twenty days since the trenches were opened. The heavy artillery had just arrived, part from Breslau, part from Stettin, part from Thorn and Warsaw. Nothing ran short but ammunition. Still there was sufficient for opening the fire of the batteries of the first and second parallel. Every arrangement had been made for commencing on the 20th, when a tremendous equinoxial tempest, bringing a heavy fall of snow along with it, filled the trenches and interrupted the operations in them. It took two days to clear them out, and our soldiers, bivouacking in the open air in that rude climate, rendered still more rude by the lateness of winter, suffered very severely. At length, in the night of the 23rd, fifty-eight pieces, mortars, howitzers, twenty-four and twelve-pounders, fired at once, and continued to batter the place the whole of the 24th. The enemy's artillery, which had reserved its means to oppose ours, replied briskly and with tolerable precision. But, after some hours of this fight with great guns, directed with superior skill by general Lariboissière, a great number of the enemy's embrasures were demolished, many of his pieces dismounted, and a fierce conflagration, kindled by the shells thrown in the false attack, raged in the interior of the city. Columns of smoke were seen rising above the highest edifices, melancholy evidences of the ravages which we had caused. Marshal Kalkreuth, nevertheless, succeeded in extinguishing the fire by means of the abundance of water with which the city was provided. He appeared to be un-

shaken. Next day, the 25th, marshal Lefebvre, to sound his disposition, sent him word that he was going to fire red-hot balls. He made no reply. The fire of all our pieces then recommenced with still greater energy, and occasioned a new conflagration, which was again extinguished by the united efforts of the garrison and the inhabitants. The violent fire of our artillery, drawing upon it the enemy's projectiles, had produced a diversion serviceable to our works, which, having become more easy, advanced more rapidly. Thanks to the ardour of the engineer troops, digging out the sand amidst balls which demolished the head of the shafts, and carried away gabions and sandbags, the zigzags were carried to the third parallel, opened at length in the night between the 25th and 26th, by *flying sap*.

In the night between the 26th and 27th, great part of that parallel was traced, still by favour of the combat of the two artilleries. Unluckily, we had not a sufficient quantity of pieces or of ammunition. We fired scarcely two thousand shot a day, while the enemy fired three thousand. We had many iron guns which burst in the hands of our artillerymen, and did as much mischief as the enemy's projectiles. Our soldiers, however, made amends for inferiority of number by accuracy of aim. On the 27th, the enemy resolved to resume the offensive by means of sorties. Taking advantage of the works of the third parallel being yet unfinished, he resolved to destroy them, and suddenly suspended his fire about seven o'clock in the evening. This circumstance led to the presumption of an enterprize on the part of the besieged. Companies of the 12th light, recently arrived, were placed on the right and left, behind the epaulements, which concealed them. Six hundred Prussian grenadiers, followed by two hundred labourers, advanced upon the parallel, still imperfect and of easy access. A sentinel, lying on the ground upon his belly, having perceived them, retired to let them enter. The companies of the 12th light then rushed suddenly upon them, attacked them with the bayonet in the ditch, and fought them hand to hand. The combat was sanguinary, but they were driven out, leaving 120 killed or wounded on the spot. A certain number were taken, and the rest driven at the point of the bayonet to the glacis of the place.

Marshal Kalkreuth solicited a suspension of arms, for the purpose of taking away the dead and wounded. With the advice of the directors of the artillery and engineers, who wished for this suspension of arms, in order to make some reconnaissances, it was granted by marshal Lefebvre. Generals Lariboisière and Chasseloup hastened immediately under the walls of the place, to seek positions whence the works of the besieged might be more effectually battered. These reconnaissances being finished, they fell to work again, and set about establishing new batteries at the points which they had chosen, taking care to connect them by branches with our trenches.

In the night between the 28th and 29th, the enemy attempted

another sortie with a column of 2,000 men, divided into three detachments. He marched as he had done two days before on our third parallel, the works of which he seemed desirous to interrupt at any rate. As soon as the first detachment appeared, two companies of the 19th of the line fell upon it with the bayonet, and pushed it to the glacis of the Hagelsberg, but, received there with a very brisk fire from the covered way, and enveloped by the second detachment, which they had not perceived, they lost about forty men. They were, nevertheless, timely succoured and extricated. The enemy, driven back, left us 70 killed and 130 prisoners.

These violent efforts directed against our third parallel did not prevent us from completing its works, lengthening it on the right and left, and arming it with batteries. New convoys recently arrived had permitted eighty pieces of large calibre to be placed in battery. From that moment the fire of the artillery redoubled, and we debouched at length from the third parallel on two sides, in order to get upon the salients of the Hagelsberg. This work was composed of two bastions, between which there was a half-moon. The French proceeded towards the salient of the left bastion and towards the salient of the half-moon. The works of approach then became extremely destructive. The enemy, who had saved the greatest resources of his artillery for the conclusion of the siege, directed the best part of it against our works. Our soldiers of the engineers saw their shafts destroyed, and the loose sand which they had thrown out dashed back into the trenches by the shock of the numerous projectiles. Their firmness in labouring on amidst all these dangers was unconquerable. Our infantry, on their part, had to endure excessive fatigue; for the nearer we approached the place, the more necessary it became to commit the guard of the trenches to tried soldiers. Out of forty-eight hours, they passed twenty-four either in working or in protecting those who were at work. We advanced therefore at that moment very slowly. Marshal Lefebvre, who began to lose patience, found fault with every body, with the engineers, whose combinations he did not comprehend, with the artillery, whose efforts he did not appreciate, and particularly with the auxiliaries, who did him much less service than the French. The Saxons fought well, but showed little willingness, especially for labour. The Baden soldiers were not good for work or fight. The Poles of the new levy had zeal but no habit of war. The soldiers of the legion of the North, very prompt in attack, dispersed on the slightest resistance. As all these auxiliaries were inclined to desertion, care was taken to supply them from the magazines of the head-quarters, that they might not have to run about in the neighbouring villages; so that it was necessary to provide them with better fare than the French, though they were far from doing such good service. Marshal Lefebvre spoke of them in the most abusive terms, saying incessantly that they could do nothing but eat, called all the arguments of the engineers gibberish, declaring

that he would do more than they with the breasts of his grenadiers, and absolutely insisting on putting an end to the siege by means of a general assault.

The design was rash; for we were still at a distance from the works of the place, and, if we were to leap into the ditch, we should meet with those formidable palisades, which at Dantzic served instead of scarps of masonry. The engineers, as it is usual in sieges, could not agree with the artillery. They accounted for the slowness of their progress by the loose nature of the soil, by the insufficient protection which they received from the artillery, by the too small number of good labourers. The artillery replied that it had too few guns, too little ammunition, to equal the fire of the enemy, and that it could do no better. In consequence, the marshal, to settle all differences, proposed to put an end to the business by an assault, even before the works of approach were finished. The engineers, who lost many men, replied that, if the artillery would by a ricochet battery throw down one length of the palisades, they would cheerfully lead our infantry to the assault of the Hagelsberg. As, however, the Russians had in 1724 lost 5,000 men before Dantzic, in an enterprize of this kind, undertaken from impatience, they durst not risk so rash a proceeding without submitting the matter to the Emperor.

Luckily, he was about thirty leagues off, and they could have his answer in forty-eight hours. He would even have gone himself to give it in person, if the presence of the king of Prussia and of the emperor of Russia at the head-quarters of Bartenstein had not made him apprehensive of some enterprize on their part against his winter-quarters. As soon as he had received marshal Lefebvre's letter, he lost no time in moderating the ardour of the old soldier by addressing to him a strong reprimand. He reproved him severely for his impatience, his contempt for science which he did not possess, his bad language respecting the auxiliaries. "You can do nothing," said he, "but find fault, abuse our allies, and change your opinion at the pleasure of the first comer. You wanted troops; I sent you them; I am preparing more for you, and you, *like an ingrate*, continue to complain without thinking even of thanking me. You treat our allies, especially the Poles and the Baden troops, without any delicacy. They are not used to fire, but they will get accustomed to it. Do you imagine that we were as brave in '92 as we are now, after fifteen years of war? Have some indulgence, then, old soldier as you are, for the young soldiers, who are starting in the career, and have not yet your coolness amidst danger. The prince of Baden, whom you have with you [that prince had put himself at the head of the Badeners and was present at the siege of Dantzic] has chosen to leave the pleasures of the court for the purpose of leading his troops into fire. Pay him respect, and give him credit for a zeal which his equals rarely imitate. The breasts of your grenadiers, which you are for bringing in everywhere, will not throw down walls. You must allow your engineers to act, and

listen to the advice of general Chasseloup, who is a man of science, and from whom you ought not to take your confidence at the suggestion of the first *petty caviller* pretending to judge of what he is incapable of comprehending. Reserve the courage of your grenadiers for the moment when science shall tell you that it may be usefully employed, and in the mean time learn patience. It is not worth while, for the sake of a few days, which, besides, I know not how to employ just now, to get some thousand men killed, whose lives it is possible to spare. Show the calmness, the consistency, the steadiness, which befit your age. Your glory is in the taking of Dantzic; take that place, and you shall be satisfied with me."

Nothing more was needed to pacify the marshal. He was content, therefore, to allow the operations of the siege to be continued according to all the rules of the art. Though the camp of the *Nehrung* had been removed to the Lower Vistula, and the passage of the canal and the river barred, the investment could not be rendered complete without the reduction of the isle of Holm, and it was only by the reduction of that island, too, that it was possible to nullify a number of redoubts, the *Kalk-Schanze* in particular, which took our trenches at the back, annoyed them by its fire, and retarded our progress, on account of the cross-trenches which it was necessary to add to our works. Though we had not all the troops that we might have desired for pushing the siege briskly, still we had sufficient for making an attempt on the isle of Holm. The night between the 6th and 7th of May was devoted to this enterprise. Orders were given to general Gardanne to concur in it on his part, by proceeding to the canal of Laaken and endeavouring to pass it on rafts. Eight hundred men, descending from the left of the head-quarters to the bank of the Vistula, were to cross that river at twice and to make the principal attack. At ten o'clock at night, twelve barks were brought opposite to the village of Schellmühl, unperceived by the enemy. At one in the morning, these barks, carrying detachments of the regiment of the Paris guard, of the 2nd and 12th light, and 50 soldiers of the engineers, started from the left bank, and reached the isle of Holm. The enemy directed a few rounds of grape at the craft. Our troops leaped ashore in spite of the fire. The grenadiers of the Paris guard ran to the nearest redoubt without firing a shot, and took it from the Russians who defended it. At the same instant, 100 men of the 2nd light and 100 men of the 12th, likewise ran to two other redoubts, the one constructed at the point of the island, the other at a building called the White House. They received a first discharge, but marched so fast that in a few minutes the redoubts were carried and the Russians taken. Our troops fell with the same rapidity upon the other works, and in half an hour had made themselves masters of half the island and taken 500 prisoners. While this operation was so promptly executed, the barks employed in the passage of the Vistula brought a second column, composed of Baden troops and soldiers of the legion of the North, which turned to the right,

and proceeded towards that part of the island which faces the city of Dantzic. These troops, inspired by the example which the French had just set them, threw themselves boldly upon the enemy's posts, surprised and disarmed them, and took in an instant 200 men and 200 artillery-horses. General Gardanne had on his part crossed the canal of Laaken and landed in the island. This important conquest was thus fully secured.

This was a favourable occasion for an attempt to gain possession of the Kalk-Schanze, that annoying redoubt which had been taken and lost at the commencement of the siege. This redoubt, surrounded by water, and open at the gorge on the side nearest to the isle of Holm, owed its principal strength to the support which it received from that island. At the very moment when our two columns were reducing the isle of Holm, a detachment of Saxons and soldiers of the legion of the North, led by the *chef de bataillon* Roumette, entered the ditches of the redoubt, with the water up to their arm-pits, threw itself upon the palisades, cleared them, and, in spite of a brisk fire of musketry, remained masters of the work, in which were taken 180 Prussians, four officers, and several pieces of cannon.

This series of *coups-de-main*, which gave us 600 prisoners and 17 pieces of cannon, and cost the enemy 600 killed or wounded, gained us above all the possession of the isle of Holm, which completed the investment of Dantzic, and put an end to the fire so mischievous to our trenches. Owing to the rapidity of the execution, our loss had been very trifling.

Our works of approach had reached the salient of the half-moon. A circular trench, embracing that salient and turning it both on the right and left, had been opened. The moment for the assault of the *covered way* had arrived. That name is given to the inner side of the ditch along which the besieged move about and defend themselves, under shelter of a range of small palisades. In the night between the 7th and 8th, a detachment of the 19th of the line and of the 12th light, preceded by about fifty men of the engineers, armed with hatchets and shovels, under the direction of Barthelemy and Beaulieu, officers of engineers, and Bertrand, *chef de bataillon* of infantry, debouched from the two extremities of the circular trench, and advanced briskly along the covered way. This detachment was greeted with a shower of balls. The soldiers of the engineers, marching at the head, fell upon the palisades with their hatchets, and cut down some of them. Our foot-soldiers, pushing on after them into the covered way, traversed it amidst the grape poured down from the walls of the place. They then proceeded to the strong blockhouses which had been constructed in the re-entering angles of the enclosure; but they found themselves exposed to so brisk a fire of musketry that they were obliged to return to the salient of the half-moon. The covered way nevertheless remained in their possession. The miners had meanwhile run about everywhere to satisfy themselves that no mines had been commenced, and, as usual, dis-

posed in such a manner as to blow up the ground conquered by the besiegers. A sergeant of engineers actually discovered a shaft of a mine in the salient of the half-moon. He leaped in, sword in hand, found twelve Prussians at work upon the branches of the mine, and, taking advantage of the fright produced by his sudden appearance, made all of them prisoners. He then overturned the whole work. The name of this brave man, which is worthy of being preserved, was Chopot.

The assault of the covered way, always one of the most sanguinary operations of a regular siege, cost us 17 killed and 76 wounded—a rather large loss considering the small number of men employed on so contracted a space. Masters of the covered way of the half-moon, we were established on the margin of the ditch. It would be necessary to descend into it, then to overthrow the range of strong palisades which occupied the bottom of it, next to carry by assault the turfed slopes which supplied the place of scarps of masonry. These were not easy undertakings. It was requisite, moreover, to execute at the salient of the left bastion the same operation that we had just executed at the salient of the half-moon, that we might not be taken in flank by the guns of that bastion, when we should attack the half-moon itself.

We established ourselves, then, on the ditch, covering ourselves there with the usual precautions, and continued to proceed towards the left, in order to approach the salient of the bastion. The 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th of May were employed in this work, which had become extremely dangerous, for at this short distance the enemy's balls overturned the saps, penetrated into the trenches, swept off the men, and frequently caused the epaulements which they had laboriously raised, to fall down upon them. The effect of the musketry at that distance was not less terrible than that of the artillery. The sand which the soldiers threw out sunk down every moment, and they were obliged to begin the same works several times over. Lastly, the nights, having become very short in May—for every body knows that the nearer you approach to the pole, the longer the nights are in winter, the shorter in summer—left us scarcely four hours to work out of the twenty-four. Marshal Lefebvre, growing more and more impatient, was incessantly asking when they would render the assault practicable, by throwing down the line of palisades which fenced the bottom of the ditch. The engineers told him that it was the province of the artillery to destroy it by ricochet shot. The artillery, apprehensive that the ground was undermined, replied that there was not room for its batteries. The difficulty which we met with here was a proof of the defensive properties of wood; for if, on reaching the edge of the ditch, we had had a wall of masonry facing us instead of a line of palisades, we should have established a breaching battery, demolished that wall in forty-eight hours, filled the ditch with the rubbish, and mounted to the assault. But the balls broke off the head of some of the palisades, in many cases scarcely splintered

them, and knocked down none. The decisive moment approached: impatience was extreme. It was almost that moment of a siege when the besieged make the last efforts of resistance, and when the besiegers, to put an end to the matter, are disposed to hazard the most daring attempts.

But all at once a rumour was circulated among the besieged as well as besiegers, that a Russian army was coming to the relief of Dantzic. That relief, indeed, had been long promised, and there was reason to be astonished that it had not yet arrived. The sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, who were then together at their headquarters, knew in what danger Dantzic was. They were well aware how important it was for them to prevent its fall, for, while they retained that place, they held Napoleon's left in check, they rendered his establishment on the Vistula precarious, they obliged him to deprive himself of 25,000 men employed either in a blockade or a siege; lastly, they closed against him the most extensive mart for supplies that existed in the North. If they were sooner or later to resume the offensive, it was worth while to make haste on account of so important a motive. For relieving Dantzic they had two direct courses: either to attack Napoleon on the Passarge, in order to take from him the positions under shelter of which he covered the siege; or to send a considerable corps, either by land, following the *Nehrung*, or by sea, embarking their troops at Königsberg, and landing them at the fort of Weichselmünde. There was, it is true, a third course, but not dependent on themselves, namely, a landing of 25,000 English, a hundred times promised, a hundred times announced, never executed. It is certain that, if the English had kept their word to their allies, and if, instead of retaining part of their forces in England, as a check upon the camp of Boulogne, sending another to Alexandria to lay hands on Egypt, and a third to the banks of La Plata, to possess itself of the Spanish colonies, they had thrown an army either into Stralsund or into Dantzic, when we had scarcely three or four French regiments dispersed in Pomerania, they might have changed the course of events, or at least have caused us great embarrassment. Napoleon, in fact, would have been forced to detach 20,000 men from the grand army, and, if he had been attacked at the same moment on the Passarge, he would have been deprived of a considerable portion of his forces for making head against the principal Russian army.

But the English had no intention of coming to the assistance of their allies. It was too frightful a thing for them to set foot on the Continent. It suited them better to employ their troops in taking colonies. Besides, a change of ministry, to the causes and the effects of which we shall presently advert, rendered all resolutions in London uncertain. The only succour sent to Dantzic was that of three cutters, laden with ammunition, and commanded by intrepid officers, who had orders to ascend the Vistula and penetrate to the place at any rate.

Thus it was from Prussian and Russian troops alone that any

efficacious succour could be expected for Dantzic. The two sovereigns, having met at Bartenstein, deliberated on the subject with their generals, and had the greatest difficulty to agree. One reason, the want of provisions, opposed a plan which would have been most suitable, and consisted in resuming active operations immediately. The ground was not yet sufficiently fecundated by the sun to furnish food for men and horses. The allies had few magazines, they could at most supply the men with corn and butcher's meat, and as for the horses, they had nothing to give them but the straw which thatched the cottages of the peasants in Old Prussia. They thought, therefore, of waiting till the grass was high enough to feed the horses. It was the same reason that detained Napoleon on the Passarge. But he had no important fortress to save; every day, on the contrary, brought him strength, and enabled him to take a fresh step towards the walls of Dantzic.

In this situation, the two allied sovereigns resorted to the means of the most slender succour, and resolved to send about ten thousand men, half by the tongue of land called the Nehrung, half by sea and the fort of Weichselmünde. The plan was to force the line of investment, to take the French camp on the Nehrung, by debouching upon that camp either from the fort of Weichselmünde, or from the Nehrung itself by the Königsberg road, then to penetrate into the isle of Holm, to re-establish the communications with Dantzic, to enter the place, and, if all these operations should prove successful, to make a general sortie against the besieging corps, for the purpose of destroying its works and obliging it to raise the siege. It would have required for this much more than ten thousand men, and above all that they should have had able commanders.

A Prussian and Russian corps composed in great part of cavalry, under the command of colonel Bülow, was to be conveyed in sloops through the pass of Pillau, to land on the point of the Nehrung, and to proceed over that narrow sand-bank for the twenty leagues that separate Pillau from Dantzic. Eight thousand men, mostly Russians, were embarked in transports, at Pillau, and escorted by English ships of war to the fort of Weichselmünde. They were commanded by general Kamenski, the son of that old general, who had for a moment commanded the Russian army at the commencement of the winter campaign. Arriving on the 12th of May at the mouth of the Vistula, they were landed on the outer mole, under the protection of the guns of Weichselmünde. At this same time, demonstrations had taken place against all our winter-quarters. Before Massena, a feint had been made of passing the Bug, as if it were the intention to act at the other extremity of the theatre of the war. Numerous patrols were sent out facing our cantonments on the Passarge. Lastly, the corps destined to march along the Nehrung moved rapidly towards the detached posts which we had at the extremity of that sand-bank, and obliged them to fall back.

The assembling at Pillau of two corps, which were to go by different ways to the relief of Dantzic, had been noted. Reports ema-

nating from the besieged fortress had confirmed the news from Pillau, and this was sufficient to throw marshal Lefebvre into the greatest uneasiness. He had lost no time in recurring to the Emperor, in calling to him general Oudinot, who was in the isle of Nogath, with the division of the grenadiers which was to form part of the corps of reserve destined for marshal Lannes. He had at the same time written to all quarters, applying for assistance to the commanders of the troops placed in his vicinity.

But Napoleon, whom twenty-four hours sufficed for sending a courier from Finkenstein to Dantzic, had provided beforehand for every thing. He reprimanded marshal Lefebvre, but mildly, for this manner of acting. He cheered him with the intelligence of speedy succours, which, long prepared, could not fail to arrive in time. Napoleon was under little concern about the puerile demonstrations made on his right, for he could too well distinguish in war between a feint and a real design, for it to be possible to deceive him. He had, moreover, soon learned to a certainty that one large detachment only would be despatched for Dantzic, either by the *Nehrung* or by sea, and he had proportioned his precautions to the seriousness of the danger.

Marshal Mortier, having become entirely disposable by the definite conclusion of the armistice with the Swedes, had received orders to hasten his march, and to send off a portion of his troops before him to Dantzic. In consequence of this order, the 72nd of the line had arrived at the camp of marshal Lefebvre, at the moment of his greatest agitation. The reserve of marshal Lannes, prepared in the isle of Nogath, began to be formed, and, meanwhile, the fine division of Oudinot's grenadiers, which was the nucleus of it, had been placed between Marienwerder and Dirschau, two or three marches from Dantzic. The 3rd of the line, drawn from Braunau, 3,400 strong, was also stationed in the isle of Nogath. The resources, therefore, were quite sufficient. Napoleon ordered one of general Oudinot's brigades to proceed to Furstenwerder, to throw a bridge across there, and to hold itself in readiness to pass the arm of the Vistula which separates the isle of Nogath from the *Nehrung*. The cavalry being dispersed in the pasture grounds of the Lower Vistula, in the environs of Elbing, he ordered general Beaumont to take a thousand dragoons, to proceed to Furstenwerder, to allow the enemy's corps coming over the *Nehrung* to file away, to cut it off when it should have passed Furstenwerder, and make as many prisoners of it as possible. Lastly, he enjoined marshal Lannes to march with Oudinot's grenadiers to Dantzic, not to fatigue the troops while there by employing them in the labours of the siege, but to keep them in reserve, in order to throw them upon the Russians as soon as they should attempt to land in the environs of Weichselmünde.

These dispositions, prescribed in time, thanks to a foresight which did every thing opportunely, brought around Dantzic more troops than were needed to dispel the danger. The Russians had begun

to land on the 12th of May. From the sandy heights which we occupied, they were seen distinctly on the moles of the fort of Weichselmünde. They were not all landed, and assembled in advance of Weichselmünde till the evening of the 14th. Repeated advices sent meanwhile to marshal Lannes, caused him to accelerate his march, and, on the 14th he arrived under the walls of Dantzic, with Oudinot's grenadiers, excepting the two battalions left at Furstenwerder. The 72nd was already at the camp. Marshal Mortier, with the rest of his corps, was one march behind.

Marshal Lefebvre, made easy by these reinforcements, had sent the regiments of the municipal guard of Paris to general Gardanne, who commanded the camp of the Lower Vistula in the Nehrung, and waited, before he despatched further succours to him, for the design of the Russians to be clearly indicated; for they could debouch from the fort of Weichselmünde, or on the right bank to attack general Gardanne's camp, or on the left bank to attack the head-quarters.

On the 15th of May, at three in the morning, the Russians, to the number of seven or eight thousand, sallied from the fort of Weichselmünde, and marched to attack our positions on the Nehrung. These positions commenced at the point of the isle of Holm, the same at which the canal of Laaken joins the Vistula, extended under the form of a palisaded epaulement to the wood which covers this part of the Nehrung, were protected in that part by numerous abattis, and terminated at the sand-hills along the sea. General Schramm, now under the command of general Gardanne, defended that line with a battalion of the 2nd light, a detachment of the regiment of the Paris guard, a Saxon battalion, part of the 19th chasseurs, and some Polish horse under captain Sokolniki, whom we have already seen distinguishing himself at this siege. General Gardanne kept in rear with the rest of his forces, either to be ready to succour the troops defending the entrenchments, or to oppose a sortie from the place. Marshal Lefebvre, perceiving from the heights of the Zigankenbergl the movement of the Russians, had sent him in the morning a battalion of the 12th light. Shortly afterwards, marshal Lannes had set out himself, with four battalions of Oudinot's division, and marched upon the dikes which ran through the flat country situated on our right, the engineers not having yet been able to construct a bridge towards our left, to communicate directly with the camp of the Nehrung by the Lower Vistula.

The Russians advanced in three columns, one directed along the Vistula facing our redoubts, the second against the wood and the abattis which defended the approach to it, the third composed of cavalry, and destined to keep along the sea-shore. A fourth had remained in reserve, to assist any of the three that might waver. The English cutters arriving at the same time were, for their part, to ascend the Vistula, to destroy the bridges which were supposed to exist, to take our works from behind, and to second the move-

ment of the Russians by the fire of sixty pieces of large calibre. But the wind was not favourable for the execution of this plan, and the cutters were forced to remain at the mouth of the Vistula.

The Russian columns marched with vigour to the attack of our positions. Our soldiers, placed behind entrenchments of earth, coolly waited for them, and fired upon them when very close. The Russians were not staggered; they approached to the very foot of the redoubts, but could not get into them. On every repulsed attempt, our soldiers leaped from the entrenchments, and pursued the assailants with the bayonet. The column which had proceeded to the abattis, having a less solid obstacle to overcome, endeavoured to penetrate into the woods, and to establish itself there. It was stopped, like the first, but it returned to the charge, and engaged in a series of hand to hand fights with our troops. The conflict at this point was long and obstinate. The column of cavalry ordered to march along the shore remained in observation before our detachments of cavalry without making any serious movement. The action lasted for several hours, and, our troops employed in the defence of the works numbering no more than 2,000 men against seven or eight thousand, for general Gardanne was obliged with the rest to take care of the *debouchés* of the place, our troops were exhausted, and must at length have succumbed under these repeated attacks, if a battalion of the Paris guard, sent by general Gardanne, and the battalion of the 12th light, which had come from the head-quarters, had not brought them decisive succours. These brave battalions, directed by general Schramm, fell upon the Russians and repulsed them. All the troops, animated by this example, rushed upon them, and drove them back to the glacis of the fort of Weichselmünde.

Meanwhile, general Kamenski had orders to make the utmost efforts to relieve Dantzic. He would not, therefore, shut himself up in the fort till he had made a last attempt. Joining with the troops which had just been fighting the reserve which had not yet been engaged, he again advanced upon our entrenchments, so violently, so ineffectually attacked. But it was too late. Marshal Lannes and general Oudinot had brought general Schramm the reinforcement of four battalions of grenadiers. One of these four battalions was sufficient to put an end to the fight. General Oudinot, at the head of this battalion, rallying around him the mass of our troops, then bringing them forward, overturned the Russians, and drove them with the bayonet at their loins to the glacis of the fort of Weichselmünde, where he forced them to shut themselves up definitively. This action might well be, and it was, the last.

The Russians left 2,000 men on the field of battle, most of them dead or wounded, some prisoners. Our loss was about 300 men *hors de combat*. General Oudinot had a horse killed by a cannon-ball, which, passing between him and marshal Lannes, missed very little of killing the latter. The moment had not yet arrived when

the illustrious marshal was to sink under so many repeated exploits. Fate, before it struck him, still reserved for him some brilliant days.

Thenceforward, marshal Lefebvre could not entertain any uneasiness, nor marshal Kalkreuth any hope. Meanwhile, the commanders of the cutters sent from England to succour Dantzic were anxious to execute their instructions. The place being chiefly in want of ammunition, the captain of the *Dauntless* was desirous to take advantage of a stiff breeze from the north to ascend the Vistula. But no sooner had he passed the fort of Weichselmünde, and approached our redoubts, than he was assailed by a violent fire of artillery. The troops, leaving the entrenchments, joined the fire of musketry to that of the cannon, and reduced the cutter to such a state, that very soon she would not answer the helm, and struck upon a sand-bank, where she was obliged to haul down her colours. She contained a great quantity of powder and despatches for marshal Kalkreuth.

The place, therefore, was absolutely left to itself. Unfortunately, the operations of the siege became every moment more difficult. The troops were lodged on the margin of the ditch; they had already attempted to descend into it; but the nature of that soil, falling down incessantly, and the immense quantity of artillery which the enemy had at his disposal, and which enabled him to overwhelm our trenches with his bombs, rendered the operations as slow as they were perilous. It was necessary, however, cost what it might, to get to the bottom of the ditch, and proceed, hatchet in hand, to cut an opening in the palisades, wide enough to admit our columns of attack. The men began, therefore, to descend into the ditch, making use of the blinded passages, that is to say advancing under a frame-work covered with earth and fascines. Several times the enemy's bombs broke through these blinds and crushed the men whom they sheltered. But nothing could daunt our engineer troops. Out of six hundred men of that arm, nearly three hundred had fallen. Half of the officers were either killed or wounded. Among the obstacles that we had to conquer was the blockhouse in the re-entering angle which the half-moon formed with the bastion. It was resolved to blow up by mining this work, which withstood even cannon-balls. A mine which had not been carried near enough to the blockhouse exploded, and covered it with earth, but rendered it still more difficult to destroy. The men then established themselves on the funnel of the mine, cleared, under the enemy's fire, the ground about the blockhouse, which they set on fire and thus at last got rid of it.

When they had reached the bottom of the ditch, several soldiers of the engineers tried to go under the very fire of the place to cut the palisades. It took them half an hour to destroy three. Thus the operation could not fail to be very long and very sanguinary. It was now the 18th of May, and forty-eight days since the trenches were opened. There was no fault to be found with the engineer

corps, which displayed admirable devotedness. Some detractors laid the blame of the slowness of the siege on general Chasseloup. General Kirgener, who was sub-director of the works, and who had conceived different ideas respecting the choice of the point of attack, was incessantly repeating to marshal Lefebvre that the Hagelsberg had been ill chosen, and that this was the only cause of the delays that we had experienced. This he repeated so often that marshal Lefebvre at last believed him, and wrote, on the 18th of May, to the Emperor, complaining of general Chasseloup, and attributing the long resistance of the place to the wrong choice of the point of attack, alleging that the Bischoffsberg would have presented far fewer difficulties.

Complaints at this moment would have availed nothing, had they been as well founded as they were the reverse. But Napoleon, who never ceased to watch the siege attentively, did not make the marshal wait long for an answer. "I really conceived," he thus wrote to him, "that you had more *character and opinion*. Is it at the end of a siege that a man ought to suffer himself to be persuaded by inferiors that the point of attack must be changed, to discourage the army by it, and to discredit your own judgment? The Hagelsberg is judiciously chosen. It is by the Hagelsberg that Dantzic has always been attacked. Give your confidence to Chasseloup, who is the most skilful, the most experienced, of your engineers; take his advice alone and that of M. de Lariboisière, *and drive away all petty cavillers.*"

Marshal Lefebvre was, therefore, obliged to persist in the first choice, and to wait the slow but sure effects of an art, of which he was wholly ignorant. The troops of the engineers, unsparing of themselves, had got, on one side, to the bottom of the ditch of the half-moon, and, on the other, to the bottom of the ditch of the bastion, being forced, on account of the narrow space in which they operated, to work under the bombs, and themselves to defend the works against the sorties of the place. Lastly, facing the left bastion, which was attacked at the same time as the half-moon, they had, sometimes with fires of fascines, sometimes with powder-bags, sometimes also with the hatchet, destroyed the palisades for the space of ninety feet. This was sufficient to afford a passage for the columns of assault. That moment was impatiently awaited by the troops. The night of the 21st of May was fixed for the assault. Several columns, to the number of 4,000 men, were brought into the ditch, led successively to the foot of the slope of earth which rose behind the palisades, that they might previously see the work that was to be scaled, and learn how to climb it. Filled with ardour at the sight, they demanded with loud cries permission to rush to the assault. Three enormous logs, suspended by ropes at the top of the earth slopes, were ready to roll down upon the assailants. A brave soldier, whose name history ought to record, François Vallé, a chasseur of the 12th light, who several times assisted the working engineers to demolish the palisades,

offered to go and cut the ropes which supported these logs and thus effect their fall before the assault. Seizing a hatchet, he climbed the turfed scarps, cut the ropes, and it was not till he was just finishing that he was struck by a ball; but, we may add, the wound was not mortal.

At length the hour of the assault drew near, when, all at once, the troops learned to their great regret that marshal Kalkreuth had desired to capitulate.

Colonel Lacoste, in fact, had gone with a flag of truce to deliver to marshal Kalkreuth the letters addressed to him which had been found on board the English cutter recently taken. He arrived very opportunely to afford Frederick's lieutenant an honourable opportunity for proposing a capitulation, which had become necessary. The marshal entered into conversation with the colonel, acknowledged the necessity for surrendering, but claimed for the garrison of Dantzic the conditions which the garrison of Mayence had formerly obtained from him, that is to say, liberty to march out without being prisoners of war, without laying down arms, and merely engaging not to serve against France before the expiration of a year. Marshal Lefebvre signed these conditions, for he was sorely afraid of seeing the siege prolonged; but he required time to consult Napoleon. The latter was not in such a hurry, for he held the Russians in check on the Passarge, and he would gladly have sacrificed a few more days to take prisoners a whole *corps d'armée*, making no account of the engagement entered into by the enemy's troops not to serve for a year. He expressed, therefore, a certain regret, but consented to the proposed capitulation, ordering marshal Lefebvre to tell M. de Kalkreuth, that it was out of consideration for him, for his age, for his glorious services, and for his courteous manner of treating the French, that such favourable conditions were granted. The capitulation was signed and executed on the 26th.

On the morning of the 26th, marshal Lefebvre made his entry into the fortress. He had proposed to marshal Lannes and marshal Mortier, who had arrived a few days before, to enter with him; but they would not dispute with him an honour which belonged to him, and which he had earned, if not by his skill at least by his bravery and by his perseverance in living for two months in those formidable trenches. He made his entry, therefore, at the head of a detachment of all the troops which had concurred in the siege. The engineers naturally marched first. This distinction was due to them on all accounts, for, out of six hundred men, about half had been put *hors de combat*. Accordingly, Napoleon immediately published the following order of the day:

“ Finkenstein, May 26, 1807.

“ The fortress of Dantzic has capitulated, and our troops entered it to-day at noon.

“ His Majesty expresses his satisfaction to the besieging troops, The sappers have covered themselves with glory.”

This memorable siege had been long, since the place had held out for fifty-one days after the trenches were opened. Various causes

contributed to the length of this resistance. The configuration of the place, its vast extent, the strength of the besieged garrison, nearly equal to that of the besieging army, the tardy arrival and the insufficiency of the heavy artillery, which permitted the enemy to reserve his fire for the moment of the last approaches, the small number of good labourers proportioned to the small number of good troops, the nature of the soil, slipping down incessantly under the projectiles, the defensive qualities of the timber, which could not be battered in breach, but which required to be demolished with pick-axe and hatchet, lastly, the terrible weather, variable as at the equinox, passing from frost to torrents of rain—all these causes, we say, contributed to prolong this siege, which was alike honourable to the besieged and to the besiegers. Marshal Kalkreuth took away with him but a small portion of his originally strong garrison. Out of 18,320 men, only 7,120 marched from Dantzic.* There had been 2,700 killed, 3,400 wounded, 800 prisoners, 4,300 deserters. Frederick's old pupil had on this occasion proved himself worthy of that great school of war in which he had been brought up.

Marshal Lefebvre by his bravery, general Chasseloup by his skill, Napoleon by his vast foresight, the engineer troops by their incredible devotedness, had obtained for the army this important conquest. Though there had been a deficiency of heavy artillery, it was a downright miracle, at such a prodigious distance from the Rhine, in such a season, to have been able to draw the *matériel* necessary for so great a siege from Silesia, Prussia, and Upper Poland. It would, no doubt, have been easy for Napoleon, by detaching one of his *corps d'armée* from the Passarge or the Vistula, to put an end much sooner to the resistance of Dantzic. But he would have obtained this acceleration only at the price of a great imprudence; for, according to all probabilities, Napoleon would be attacked during the siege by the Russian and Prussian armies, and, if he had been, the 20,000 men detached to Dantzic would have considerably weakened him. We cannot then too much admire the art with which he chose that position of the Passarge, where he covered the siege of Dantzic, and at the same time faced the allied armies which might every moment present themselves—the art in particular, with which he took advantage of so many regiments on march, as well troops returning from Stralsund, as infantry reserve, prepared on the Lower Vistula, to keep up around Dantzic a force sufficient for the operations of the siege—finally, the art with which he awaited a result that he might have endangered by endeavouring to hasten it, and that, besides, he would have had no interest in hastening, for, not intending to act offensively till June, his not completing the conquest of Dantzic till May was of very little consequence.

It was not sufficient to have taken Dantzic, it was necessary to be master of the mouth of the Vistula and the sea approaches, that is to say, the fort of Weichselmünde, which, well-defended, would have required a regular attack and occasioned a great loss of time.

* These numbers are taken from statements found in the place.

But the moral effect of the reduction of Dantzic produced the surrender of the fort of Weichselmünde forty-eight hours afterwards. Half of the garrison having deserted, the other half surrendered the fort, desiring to capitulate on the same terms as the garrison of Dantzic. The route of the *Nehrung* as far as Pillau served both for returning to Königsberg. Besides the advantage of securing a base of operation on the Vistula that was not to be shaken, Napoleon acquired in the city of Dantzic immense supplies. With great wealth Dantzic contained 300,000 quintals of corn, and above all several million bottles of wine of the best quality, which, in this dreary climate, would be to the army a subject of joy and a source of health. Napoleon immediately sent his aide-de-camp, Rapp, on whose devotedness he had perfect reliance, to take the command of Dantzic, and to prevent the misapplication of valuable things. He immediately followed him in person, and went to pass two days at Dantzic, wishing to judge from his own observation of the importance of that place, of the works which would be required to render it impregnable, lastly, of the resources which might be derived from it for the subsistence of the army.

He ordered 18,000 quintals of wheat to be conveyed immediately to Elbing, to supply the exhausted magazines of that city, which had already furnished 80,000 quintals of corn. He sent off a million bottles of wine to the quarters on the *Passarge*. He inspected all the works of the siege, approved all that had been done, highly praised general Chasseloup and the attack by the *Hagelsberg*, distributed signal rewards among the officers of the army, and promised himself to compensate them soon by magnificent donations for all the booty that he had wisely and nobly withdrawn from them in entrusting general Rapp with the government of Dantzic. He resolved to create marshal Lefebvre duke of Dantzic and to add a superb endowment to the title. He wrote to M. Mollien, desiring him to purchase, with the funds of the army treasury, an estate with a mansion producing a nett income of 100,000 livres, to form the apanage of the new duke. He likewise recommended to M. Mollien to buy about twenty mansions which had belonged to ancient families, and as many as possible situated in the West, for presents to the generals who freely spilt their blood for him, striving thus to renew the aristocracy of France, as he was renewing the dynasties of Europe by the strokes of his sword, transformed in his hand into a sort of magic wand, from which dropped glory, wealth, and crowns.

He gave the necessary orders for the immediate repair of the works of Dantzic. He placed there by way of garrison the 44th and 49th of the line, which had suffered severely during the siege. He desired that all the provisional regiments, which should not have time to reach the army before the resumption of offensive operations, should be assembled there. He assigned to the legion of the North, whose zeal and fatigues had been extreme, and whose fidelity was undoubted, the custody of the fort of Weichselmünde.

He directed part of the German troops to be distributed in the Nehrung. He ordered the Saxons, who were good soldiers, but who needed to serve in our ranks that they might become attached to us, to join Lannes' corps, which had already returned to the Vistula, and the Poles, whom he wished to inure to war, to join Mortier's corps, likewise destined to proceed to the Vistula. The Italians were left to blockade Colberg, the rest of the Poles to blockade the little citadel of Graudenz, points of little importance which we had yet to take.

Napoleon, on his return to Finkenstein, made all his dispositions for recommencing offensive operations in the first days of the month of June. The crafty negotiations of Austria had terminated only in rendering a solution by arms inevitable. The offer of mediation made by that court, accepted with mistrust and regret but with a good grace by Napoleon, had been immediately transmitted to England, Prussia, and Russia. The new English cabinet, though its policy was far from inclining to peace, could not at its outset proclaim too marked a preference for war. Mr. Canning, as minister for foreign affairs, replied, that Great Britain cheerfully accepted the mediation of Austria, and would follow in this negotiation the example of the allied courts, Prussia and Russia. The answer of the latter was the least amicable of the three. The emperor Alexander had repaired to the head-quarters of his army, at Bartenstein, on the Alle. He had there been joined by the king of Prussia, who had come from Königsberg to converse with him. The imperial guard, which had lately left Petersburg, and numerous recruits drawn from the remotest provinces of the empire, had brought the Russian army a reinforcement of 30,000 men and repaired the losses of Pultusk and Eylau. The ridiculous exaggerations of general Benningsen, pushed beyond the limit that a wish to raise the courage of one's soldiers, one's country, and one's sovereign, allows, had deceived the young czar. He almost imagined that he had been conqueror at Eylau, and he was tempted to try once more the fortune of arms. The king of Prussia, on the contrary, whom particular relations with Napoleon, kept up through the medium of Duroc, had enlightened respecting the somewhat more favourable dispositions of the conqueror of Jena, appeared inclined to treat, on condition that the greater part of his kingdom should be restored to him. He had not deceived himself in regard to the successes obtained by the coalition. He had seen the principal fortress in his dominions taken before the face of the Russian army, powerless to prevent it, and he could not persuade himself that the allies would soon be able to force Napoleon back to the Vistula and the Oder.*

* It is very difficult to know precisely what passed between these two sovereigns, living in a continual *l'éc-a-l'éc*, and not communicating their secret disposition to those about them. But what passed at head-quarters became known from communications of the court of Prussia to several petty German courts, and besides, the assertion which I make here is derived from statements made by the queen of Prussia herself to one of the most respectable diplomatists of the time.

He was, therefore, in favour of peace. But the emperor Alexander, infatuated by his pretended advantages, to which, however, the reduction of Dantzic gave a signal contradiction, affirmed to king Frederick William that very shortly his whole patrimony would be restored to him without the reservation of a single province, that the independence of Germany would be re-established, and that for this purpose it would be sufficient to gain a single battle, that one victory would decide Austria, and that they should thus ensure the ruin of Napoleon and the liberation of Europe. Frederick William, therefore, allowed himself to be led away by new suggestions, very like those which had already seduced him at Potsdam, and the mediation of Austria was refused in reality, though accepted in appearance. The allies replied that they should be delighted to see peace restored to Europe, and restored through the good offices of Austria, but they wished first to know on what bases Napoleon intended to treat with them. This evasive answer left no doubt of the continuation of the war, and it gave great displeasure to Austria, who thus lost the means of entering into the quarrel in order to terminate it as she pleased, either by the concurrence of her arms, if Napoleon sustained reverses, or by a peace of which she should be arbitress, if he continued successful. Nevertheless, she would not relinquish the mediation in such a manner as to appear beaten; she communicated the answers which she had received to Napoleon, and begged him to clear up the doubts which seemed to prevent the belligerent powers from opening the negotiations. It was M. de Vincent who was charged with the series of these parleys. He could only carry them on in writing, for while he had remained at Warsaw M. de Talleyrand had joined Napoleon at Finkensteen.

This conclusion pleased Napoleon, who had viewed the mediation of Austria with great apprehension. Still persisting in not taking upon himself the refusal of peace, he replied that he was ready to adopt the medium of concessions, provided there were granted to his allies Spain, Holland, the Porte, restitutions equivalent to those which he was disposed to make. He added that, as soon as a place should be fixed upon for the meeting of a congress, he would send his plenipotentiaries thither without delay.

But the mediation had miscarried, for it would take several months to bring such parleys to any termination whatever, and he hoped in a few days of fine weather to finish the war.

Every thing was ready, in fact, on both sides, for resuming hostilities with the greatest energy. The two sovereigns, living together at Bartenstein, had contracted the most solemn engagements towards each other, and promised not to lay down their arms till the cause of Europe was avenged, and the whole of the Prussian dominions restored. They had signed at Bartenstein a convention by which they bound themselves to act only in concert and not to treat with the enemy but by common consent. The proposed aim of their efforts was not, they said, the abasement of France, but the emancipation of the powers, great and small, abased by France. They

were going to fight in order to bring about the evacuation of Germany, Holland, even Italy, if Austria joined them, to establish, in default of the ancient German confederation, a new federative constitution, which should ensure the independence of all the German States and a reasonable influence to Austria and Prussia in Germany. For the rest, the extent of the projected reparations was to depend on the success of the coalition. Other conventions had been signed, as well with Sweden as with England. The latter, more interested in the war than any other, and hitherto profiting by the efforts of the powers without making any herself, had promised subsidies and land troops. Her avarice in regard to subsidies had indisposed the king of Sweden to such a degree as to disgust that prince with the crusade which he had always meditated against France. Still, with the assistance of Russia, there had been wrung from England a million sterling for Prussia, a yearly allowance for the Swedes employed in Pomerania, and an engagement to send a corps of 20,000 English to Stralsund. Prussia had promised on her part to send to Stralsund eight or ten thousand Prussians, who, united with the 20,000 English and 15,000 Swedes, would form on the rear of Napoleon a respectable army, and the more to be feared by him as it would cover itself with the veil of the armistice signed with marshal Mortier.

These conventions communicated to Austria had no influence upon her. Besides, the taking of Dantzic which attested the impotence of the Russians, was sufficient, with all that was known at Vienna concerning the relative situation of the belligerent armies, to confine that court to its system of expectant politics.

Alexander and Frederick William were, therefore, left to struggle on against the French with the wrecks of the Prussian forces, consisting of about 30,000 men, mostly prisoners who had escaped from our custody, with the Russian army recruited, with the Swedes and a promised corps of English in Pomerania. General Benningsen's troops were still suffering severe distress, and, while Napoleon contrived to obtain from an enemy's country the most abundant resources, the Russian administration, amidst a friendly country, with considerable means of navigation, knew not how to find wherewithal to appease the painful cravings of her army. That unfortunate army suffered, complained, but on seeing its young sovereign at Bartenstein, it mingled cries of attachment with its cries of pain, and deceived him while promising by its acclamations more than it could perform for the policy and the glory of the Moscovite empire. Though ignorant, it could form a just estimate of the uselessness of that war, but it was desirous to march forward, were it only to conquer provisions. Accordingly, the two sovereigns, repairing, the one to Tilsit the other to Königsberg, whither they went to await the result of the campaign, had left orders to their generals to take the offensive as soon as possible.

General Benningsen had posted himself on the upper course of

the Alle, at Heilsberg, where, in imitation of Napoleon, he had created an entrenched camp, formed some very ill-stocked magazines, and prepared his ground to fight a defensive battle, if Napoleon entered first into action. He could assemble under his hand about 100,000 men. Besides this principal mass, he had at his left a corps of 18,000 men on the Narew, placed at first under the command of general Essen, and afterwards under that of general Tolstoy. He had on his right about 20,000 men composed of Kamenski's division, returned from Weichselmünde, and of the Prussian corps of Lestocq; he had, lastly, some dépôts at Königsberg, making a total of 140,000 men scattered from Warsaw to Königsberg, 100,000 of whom were assembled on the Alle, opposite to our cantonments on the Passarge. General Labanof was bringing a reinforcement of 30,000 men, troops drawn from the interior of the empire. But these troops were not likely to be on the theatre of war before the resumption of the operations.

Though this army could present itself with confidence before any enemy, whoever he might be, it could not fight with any chance of success against the French army of Austerlitz and Jena, to which, besides, it had become greatly inferior in number, since Napoleon had had time to extract from France and Italy new forces, of which we have already given a long renumeration. Napoleon, in fact, was about to reap the fruit of his incessant attentions and his admirable forecast. His army, rested, fed, recruited, was able to face all his enemies, either then declared, or ready to declare themselves on the first event. On his rear, marshal Brune, with 15,000 Dutch, collected in the Hanseatic towns, with 14,000 Spaniards despatched from Leghorn, Perpignan, and Bayonne, and on march towards the Elbe, with the 15,000 Wirtembergers recently employed in reducing the fortresses in Silesia, with the 16,000 French in Boudet's and Molitor's divisions, which had entered Germany, with 10,000 men of the garrison battalions occupying Hameln, Magdeburg, Spandau, Cüstrin, Stettin, with the new contingent of the Confederation of the Rhine—marshal Brune had an army of about 80,000 men. This army could, in case of need, be reinforced by 25,000 veteran soldiers, drawn from the coasts of France, which would make it amount to 100 or 110 thousand men.

The fatigued French troops, and the allied troops on which the least dependence was placed, guarded Dantzic or continued the blockade of Colberg and Graudenz. Two new corps compensated on the Vistula the dissolution of Augereau's corps; these were, as we have seen, that of marshal Mortier and that of marshal Lannes. The corps of marshal Mortier was composed of the 4th light, of the 45th and 58th of the line, of the Paris municipal regiment, forming Dupas' division, and of part of the Polish regiments recently levied. The corps of Lannes was composed of Oudinot's famous grenadiers and voltiguers, of the 2nd and 12th light, of the 3rd and 72nd of the line, forming Verdier's division. The Saxons were to con-

stitute the third division of Lannes' corps. These two corps were upon the different arms of the Lower Vistula, one at Dirschau, the other at Marienburg. That of Mortier could furnish eleven or twelve thousand men present under fire, that of Lannes 15,000. Their nominal effective was much more considerable.

Beyond the Vistula and facing the enemy, Napoleon possessed five corps, besides the guard and the cavalry reserve.

Massena, occupying both the Narew and the Omulew, having his right near Warsaw, his centre at Ostrolenka, his left at Neidenburg, guarded the extremity of our line with 36,000 men, 24,000 of whom were ready to fight. Among the number were 6,000 Bavarians.

The corps of Poles recently levied, that of Zayonschek, five or six thousand strong, in great part cavalry, nominally belonging to Mortier's corps, filled the interval between Massena and the cantonments on the Passarge and sent out continual patrols either in the forests or in the marshes of the country.

Lastly came the old corps of marshals Ney, Davout, Soult, and Bernadotte, cantoned all four behind the Passarge.

We have already described the Passarge and the Alle, rising near one another, and the numerous lakes of the country, the first running to our left perpendicularly to the sea, the second right before us perpendicularly to the Pregel, thus forming both of them an angle, one side of which we occupied, and the Russians the other. Each of the two armies was ranged in a different manner on the sides of this angle. We bordered the Passarge longitudinally, that is for about twenty leagues from Hohenstein to Braunschweig. The Russians, on the contrary, in order to face us, were concentrated on the upper course of the Alle, near Heilsberg.

Marshal Ney, established at the top of this angle, which was rather irregular, like all those of Nature's making, held at once the Alle and the Passarge by Guttstadt and Deppen, with his corps of 25,000 men, furnishing 17,000 combatants, incomparable troops, and worthy of their commander. At the same height, but somewhat in rear, marshal Davout was, like marshal Ney, between the Alle and the Passarge, between Allenstein and Hohenstein, flanking marshal Ney, preventing the enemy from turning the army and coming by Osterode to open a passage toward the Vistula. His corps, a model of discipline and bearing, made in the image of him who commanded it, could bring into action 30,000 out of 40,000 men. He it was among all the marshals whose troops always presented the greatest number of men fit for fighting, thanks to his vigilance and his vigour. Marshal Soult, placed on the left of marshal Ney, guarded at Liebstadt the middle of the course of the Passarge, having entrenched posts at the bridges of Pittelmen and Lomitten. He had an effective of 43,000 men and thirty or thirty-one thousand present under arms. Marshal Bernadotte defended the Lower Passarge, from Spanden to Braunschweig, with 36,000 men, 24,000 of whom were ready to march.

Dupont's fine division occupied the shore of the sea or Frische Haff.

Lastly, between the Passarge and the Vistula, in a tract interspersed with lakes and marshes, were situated the head-quarters of Finkenstein, where Napoleon was encamped amidst his guard, mustering eight or nine thousand combatants, out of an effective of 12,000 men. A little further in rear, and to the left, was spread Murat's cavalry, comprehending all the cavalry of the army, with the exception of the hussars and chasseurs left to each corps as the means of guarding itself. Out of 30,000 horse, it contained 20,000 ready to mount.

Such were the forces of Napoleon. From the Rhine to the Passarge, from Bohemia to the Baltic, in troops on march, or which had already reached the theatre of war, in troops guarding his rear or ready to take the offensive, invalid soldiers, wounded or sick, French or allies, he numbered more than 400,000 men. If we take into account those only that were about to enter into action, and exclude the corps of Massena destined to guard the Narew, we may say that he had at hand six corps, those of marshals Ney, Davout, Soult, Bernadotte, Lannes, Mortier, besides the cavalry and the guard, which composed an effective of 225,000 men,* 160,000 of whom were real combatants. Such is the difficulty of the offensive! The further you advance, the more fatigue, dispersion, the necessity for guarding yourself, diminish the strength of armies. Let us suppose these 400,000 men falling back to the Rhine, not in consequence of defeat, but from a calculation of prudence, every man excepting the sick would have furnished a combatant. On the Vistula, on the contrary, less than half could fight. Let us suppose them to be two hundred leagues further off, not more than a fourth could have presented themselves before the enemy. And yet he who conducted these masses was the greatest organizer that ever existed. Let us be thankful to the nature of things which has decreed that attack should be more difficult than defence!

But the 160,000 men whom Napoleon had at his disposal, after he had sufficiently covered his flanks and his rear, were all in rank. If the same method of counting had been applied to the Russian army, most assuredly there would not have been 140,000 men. Napoleon's soldiers were perfectly rested, abundantly fed, suitably

	Effective.	Present under arms.
Ney.....	25,000	17,000
Davout.....	40,000	30,000
Soult.....	43,000	31 or 32,000
Bernadotte.....	36,000	24,000
Murat.....	30,000	20,000
Guard.....	12,000	8 or 9,000
Lannes	20,000	15,000
Mortier.....	15,000	10,000
	<hr/> 221,000	<hr/> 155,000

Reckoning Zayonschek's Poles, 5,000 for seven or eight thousand, we shall have 160,000 combatants out of a total effective of 226,000 men.

clothed for war, that is to say, dressed and shod, well provided with arms and ammunition. The cavalry in particular, recomposed in the plains of the Lower Vistula, mounted with the finest horses of Germany, having resumed its exercises for two months past, presented a superb spectacle. Napoleon, wishing to see it all together in one plain, had gone to Elbing to review it. Eighteen thousand horse, an enormous mass, moved by a single chief, prince Murat, had, after manœuvring before him for a whole day, dazzled his eyes, though so accustomed to large armies, to such a degree, that, writing an hour afterwards to his ministers, he could not help extolling the fine sight which he had just beheld in the plains of Elbing.

From a forecast for which he had great reason to applaud himself, Napoleon had given orders that, after the 1st of May, all the corps should leave the villages in which they were cantoned, and encamp in divisions, within reach of one another, in well-chosen situations, and behind good field-works. This was the right way to prevent being surprised; for the examples of armies attacked unawares in their winter-quarters have all been furnished by troops, which had spread themselves for the sake of lodging and provisions. An army vigorously attacked in this position may, before it has time to rally, lose in number half its force, in territory, provinces, and kingdoms. The precaution of encamping, though infinitely prudent, he had great difficulty to obtain from officers and soldiers, for it obliged them to leave good cantonments, where each had comfortably established himself, and thenceforward expect from magazines alone those provisions which they found more surely on the spot. Napoleon, nevertheless, required it, and, in ten or fifteen days, all the corps were encamped in hovels, covered by earth-works or by immense abattis, manœuvring every day, and, having recovered, in consequence of their assemblage in mass, the energy of the military spirit, an energy which is infinitely fluctuating, which rises or sinks, not only from victory or defeat, but by activity or rest, by all the circumstances, in short, which stretch or relax the human mind like a spring.

Nature, so dreary in this climate during winter, but which is nowhere destitute of beauty, especially when the returning sun brings back to it light and life—Nature herself invited the men to motion. Rich pastures afforded food for the horses, and allowed all the means of transport to be devoted to the subsistence of the men. The two armies were in presence, within cannon-shot, sometimes manœuvring before each other's face, reciprocally serving for a sight to one another, but abstaining from firing, certain that this peaceful activity would change soon enough to a sanguinary conflict. On both sides a speedy resumption of the operations was expected, and they kept on their guard for fear of being surprised. One day even, towards Braunsberg, a post occupied by Dupont's division, there was heard at night-fall a confused sound of voices, which seemed to denote the presence of a numerous corps. The officers ran up, con-

ceiving that the attack of the cantonments had at length commenced, and that the Russians were taking the initiative. But, on approaching the place whence the noise proceeded, they perceived a multitude of wild swans sporting in the Passarge, on the banks of which they dwell in countless flocks.*

Meanwhile, Napoleon, having returned from Dantzic and Elbing, and having all his means collected between the Vistula and the Passarge, resolved to set himself in motion on the 10th of June, to march to the Alle, to descend its course, to separate the Russians from Königsberg, to take that city before their faces, and to throw them back upon the Niemen. He had given orders that, by the 10th, each *corps d'armée* should be supplied with bread and biscuit for fourteen days, four in the soldiers' knapsacks, ten in the caissons. But, while he was preparing to recommence hostilities, the Russians, determined to be beforehand with him, anticipated by five days the movement of the French army.

It might have been expected that they would have defied all the risks of the offensive, when the salvation of Dantzic was at stake. But now, when no pressing interest urged them to haste, to venture to attack Napoleon in long studied, carefully defended positions, merely because the fine season had arrived, was a proceeding conceivable only of a general acting without reflection, obeying vague instincts rather than an enlightened reason. One ought to have been as sure, as one was uncertain, of the due execution of the operations, in then opposing the Russian troops to the French troops, that there would not have been any good plan of offensive against Napoleon, established as he was upon the Passarge. To attack by sea, to attempt to take Braunsberg on the Lower Passarge, and then to dash against the Lower Vistula and Dantzic which we occupied, would be but a series of follies. To attack on the opposite side, that is to say to ascend the Alle, to pass between the sources of the Alle and those of the Passarge, to turn our right to slip between marshal Ney and Massena's corps, in the space guarded by the Poles, was all that Napoleon himself desired; for, in this case, he should ascend by his left, get between the Russians and Königsberg, cut them off from their base of operation, and throw them into the inextricable difficulties of the interior of Poland. In taking the offensive, then, there were but dangers to incur, without a single advantageous result to obtain. To wait for Napoleon on the Pregel, the right to Königsberg, the left to Wehlau, to defend that line stoutly, then, that line being lost, to fall back in good order upon the Niemen, to entice the French into the recesses of the empire, avoiding great battles, opposing to them the most formidable of obstacles, that of distance, and refusing them the advantage of signal victories—such would have been the only rational conduct on the part of the Russian general and, as subsequent experience has unfortunately for us demonstrated, the only wise course.

* These particulars are derived from general Dupont's military Memoirs, still manuscript, and replete with the highest interest.

But general Benningsen, who had promised his sovereign to draw the most brilliant consequences from the battle of Eylau, and soon to gain for him an ample compensation for the loss of Dantzic, could no further prolong the inaction observed during the siege of that place, and thought himself obliged to take the initiative. Accordingly, he had formed the plan of falling upon marshal Ney, whose very advanced position was more favourable to surprise than any other. Napoleon, in fact, desirous of keeping not only the Passarge up to its sources, but the Alle itself in the upper part of its course, so as to occupy the apex of the angle described by those two rivers, had placed marshal Ney at Guttstadt on the Alle. The latter must have appeared in the air to any one not acquainted with the precautions taken to remedy the apparent inconvenience of such a situation. But all the means of a prompt concentration were secured and prepared beforehand. Marshal Ney had his retreat indicated upon Deppen, marshal Davout upon Osterode, marshal Soult upon Liebstadt and Mohrungen, marshal Bernadotte upon Preuss-Holland. If the enemy persisted, they were all to make one march further, to join themselves at Saalfeld with the guard, with Lannes, with Mortier, with Murat, in a labyrinth of lakes and forests, the outlets of which were known to none but Napoleon, and where he had prepared a disaster for the imprudent adversary who should come thither in quest of him.

Without having dived into any of these combinations, general Benningsen resolved to surprise marshal Ney's corps, and made such dispositions as at first sight seemed calculated to succeed. He directed the greater part of his forces upon marshal Ney, confining himself to mere demonstrations against the other marshals. Three columns, and even four, reckoning the imperial guard, accompanied by all the cavalry, were to ascend the Alle, to attack marshal Ney in front by Alikirch, on the left by Wolfsdorf, on the right by Guttstadt, while Platow, hetman of the Cossacks, filling with his horsemen the space which separated us from the Narew, and with the light infantry forcing the Alle above Guttstadt, was to endeavour to slip between Ney's corps and Davout's. Meanwhile, the imperial guard, under the grand-duke Constantine, was to place itself in reserve behind the three columns destined to attack marshal Ney, and to proceed to the assistance of any of them that might need it. A column composed of two divisions, under the command of lieutenant-general Doctorow, had orders to come from Olbersdorf to Lomitten, to attack the bridges of marshal Soult, and to prevent him from assisting marshal Ney. Another Russian column, under generals Kamenski and Rembow, was directed to make a strong demonstration on the bridge of Spanden, which marshal Bernadotte was guarding, so that the whole course of the Passarge would be threatened at once. The Prussian general Lestocq was even directed to show himself before Braunsberg, in order to increase the uncertainty of the French respecting the general plan upon which all these attacks were arranged.

It remained to be seen whether the dispositions of the Russian general, apparently well calculated, would be executed with the precision requisite for giving success to such complicated operations, and whether they would not find the French so prepared, so resolute, that it would be impossible to surprise them and to force them in their position. The movements of these numerous columns, concealed by the forests and the lakes of that dreary country, escaped our generals, who had no idea that the Russians were ready, but who, knowing that they were ready themselves, and expecting to march every moment, felt neither surprise nor fear at sight of the preparations of the enemy.

Here we may perceive that forecast is all-powerful in war. This formidable attack, directed against marshal Ney, would infallibly have succeeded, if our troops, scattered in the villages, had been surprised and obliged to run to the rear to rally. But this was not the case, and, thanks to the orders of Napoleon, disagreeable orders to all the corps, and which he had been obliged to render absolute in order to enforce their execution, the troops were encamped by divisions, covered by earth-works and by abattis, established in such a manner that they could defend themselves for a long time, and succour one another before they were obliged to give way.

On the morning of the 5th of June, by daybreak, the Russian advanced-guard, led by prince Bagration, advanced rapidly upon the position of Altkirch, one of those occupied by marshal Ney with a division, and neglected all the petty French posts scattered in the woods, intending to take by turning them. Our troops which, in consequence of the encampment, slept ready for battle, pleased rather than astonished at sight of the enemy, full of composure, exercised every day in firing, opened a murderous fire upon the Russians, which quickly brought them to a stand. The 39th, placed in advance at Altkirch, did not retire till it had strewn the foot of the entrenchments with slain. Meanwhile, the attacks made upon Wolfsdorf on the left, upon Guttstadt on the right, and further still to the right upon Bergfried, were vigorously executed, but luckily without any unity, and in such a manner as to allow marshal Ney time to effect his retreat. Hastening to the head of his troops, he perceived that the principal effort of the Russian army was concentrated upon him, and that it was time for him to take the road to Deppen, assigned by the foresight of Napoleon as his line of retreat. He had one of his divisions in advance of Guttstadt at Krossen, the other in rear at Glottau. He united them, taking time, however, to collect his artillery, his baggage, his detached posts in the woods, all which he took away with him, excepting two or three hundred men, left at the furthest extremity of the forest of Amt-Guttstadt. He followed the road from Guttstadt to Deppen, through Quetz and Ankendorf, slowly traversing the narrow space comprised between the Alle and the Passarge, halting with extraordinary coolness to give fire with two ranks, sometimes charging with the bayonet the infantry which pressed him too

closely, or forming in square, pouring volleys, within point-blank range upon the innumerable Russian cavalry, in short, filling the enemy with an admiration which they expressed themselves a few days afterwards.* He was unwilling to give up entirely the space of four or five leagues, which separates the Alle at this place from the Passarge, and he halted at Ankendorf. He had had to do with 15,000 infantry and 15,000, cavalry; and, if the two columns of prince Bagration and lieutenant-general Sacken had acted together, if the imperial guard had joined them, opposed to 60,000 men, he could scarcely have failed to experience a terrible disaster. He had lost twelve or fifteen hundred killed or wounded, but more than 3,000 Russians had fallen. At three o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy desisted of himself, without any motive, as it frequently happens when a firm and consistent mind does not direct the movements of great masses.

On the same day, the hetman Platow had passed the Alle at Bergfried, and inundated with his Cossacks the marshy and woody tract which separated the grand army from the posts of marshal Massena. But it was not at all probable that he would venture to attack marshal Davout's 30,000 men. The latter, hearing the distant thunder of the cannon, hastily collected his troops between the Alle and the Passarge, and took the road to Alt-Ranten, which permitted him to succour marshal Ney, at the same time that he was approaching Osterode. By a lucky stratagem of war, he sent one of his officers in the direction of the enemy, with despatches announcing his speedy arrival at the head of 50,000 men to support marshal Ney. On the opposite side, to the left of Ney's corps, the attacks projected against marshals Soult and Bernadotte were executed conformably to the plan agreed upon. Lieutenant-general Doctorow, marching with two divisions by Wormditt and Olbersdorf, over the *têtes de pont* which marshal Soult was guarding, found, in advance of the Passarge, numerous abattis, and behind those abattis brave tirailleurs, who kept up a constant and well-directed fire. He was obliged to fight for several successive hours in order to overcome the obstacles which

* Plotow gives the following account of the retreat of marshal Ney to Deppen.

"The French, consummate masters in the art of war, resolved on that day this very difficult problem, to execute a retreat that is become indispensable, in the face of an enemy who is much stronger and urgently pressing, and to render it as little prejudicial as possible. They extricated themselves from the situation with the utmost skill. The calmness and order, and, at the same time, the rapidity, shown by Ney's corps, in assembling at the signal of three cannon-shot; the coolness and attentive circumspection with which it executed its retreat, during which it opposed a resistance renewed at every step, and knew how to avail itself in a masterly manner of every position—all this proved the talent of the captain who commanded the French, and the habit of war carried by them to perfection, as strongly as the finest dispositions and the most scientific execution of an offensive operation could have done. For attacking with success, as well as for opposing a regular resistance in a retreat, there are required rare qualities, virtues difficult to practise, and yet it is necessary that all these should be combined in the same person to form the great captain."

defended the approaches of the bridge of Lomitten. No sooner had he carried one part of the abattis than companies of reserve, falling upon his troops, drove them out at the point of the bayonet. Detachments of Russian cavalry, having crossed some fords of the Passarge, were obliged by our mounted chasseurs to fall back. The course of the Passarge was everywhere left in the possession of the valiant troops of marshal Soult: merely the half-burned abattis, in advance of the bridge of Lomitten, had been finally relinquished to the Russians. General Doctorow desisted towards nightfall, exhausted with fatigue, despairing of overcoming such obstacles, defended by such soldiers. The Russians, attacking uncovered our troops who were well sheltered, had more than 2,000 men put *hors de combat*, and we had not lost above 1,000. Generals Ferey and Viviers of Carra-St. Cyr's division, with the 47th and 56th of the line, and the 24th light, had covered themselves with glory at the bridge of Lomitten.

An action nearly similar had taken place at the bridge of Spanden, which belonged to marshal Bernadotte. An entrenchment of earth covered the bridge. The 27th light guarded this post, having in rear the two brigades of Villate's division. At the very commencement of the action, marshal Bernadotte received a wound in the neck, which obliged him to relinquish the command to his chief of the staff, general Maison, one of the most intelligent and energetic officers in the army. The Russians, here united with the Prussians, cannonaded the *tête de pont* for a long time, and when they conceived that they had daunted the troops which defended it, they advanced to scale it. The soldiers of the 27th light had received orders to lie down on the ground that they might not be perceived. They allowed the assailants to come to the foot of the entrenchment, and then, by a point-blank discharge, swept down three hundred and wounded several hundred more. The Russians and Prussians, struck with terror, dispersed, and retired in disorder. The 17th dragoons, then debouching from the *tête de pont*, rushed upon them at a gallop and cut down a great number.

The attack was not pushed beyond this point. It had cost the enemy not fewer than six or seven hundred men. Our loss was insignificant.

This vigorous manner of receiving the Russians all along the Passarge excited in them a surprise easy to be conceived, and produced a commencement of hesitation in plans, adopted with too little reflection to be prosecuted with perseverance. The Russian and Prussian column of generals Kamenski and Rembow, beaten at Spanden, awaited ulterior orders, before engaging in fresh enterprises. General Doctorow, stopped at the bridge of Lomitten, ascended the Passarge to approach the main body of the Russian army. General Benningsen, surrounded at Quetz by the greater number of his troops, not having been able to take marshal Ney's corps, but having obliged him to fall back, and not yet aware of all the obstacles which he should have to encounter, resolved to make

a new effort on the following day against that same corps, the object of his most violent attacks.

Six or seven hours after these simultaneous attempts on the line of the Passarge, Napoleon received intelligence of them at Finkenstein, for he was scarcely twelve leagues from the most distant of his lieutenants, and he had taken care to regulate his means of correspondence in such a manner as to be informed of the most trivial incident with extreme promptness. He was anticipated by six days only, since his orders had been given for the 10th of June. He was not therefore taken at unawares. His resolutions were formed for all cases: no hesitation, consequently no loss of time, could retard his dispositions. He approved the conduct of marshal Ney, gave him the praise which he deserved, and enjoined him to retire in good order upon Deppen, and, if he could not defend the Passarge at Deppen, to fall back through the labyrinth of the lakes, first to Liebenmühl, then to Saalfeld. He ordered marshal Davout to unite his three divisions immediately on the left flank of marshal Ney, directing his course to Osterode, which was already done, as we have seen. He enjoined marshal Soult to persist in defending the Passarge, and to retire upon Mohrungen, and from Mohrungen to Saalfeld, if he was forced in his position or one of his neighbours was forced in his. The same instructions were sent to the corps of marshal Bernadotte, with indication of the route from Preuss-Holland to Saalfeld, as the line of retreat.

While Napoleon was bringing back to Saalfeld his lieutenants placed in front, he was calling to the same point his lieutenants placed in rear. He ordered marshal Lannes to march from Marienburg to Christburg and Saalfeld, marshal Mortier, who was at Dirschau, to follow the same route, and both to take with them as large a quantity of provisions as they could. The light cavalry was to assemble at Elbing, the heavy cavalry at Christburg, and to proceed towards Saalfeld. The three divisions of dragoons, encamped on the right at Bischoffswerder, Strasburg, and Soldau, had orders to rally around Davout's corps by Osterode. All were to take their provisions along with them by means of conveyances previously provided. It would take forty-eight hours before these different concentrations were effected, and 160,000 men were assembled between Saalfeld and Osterode. Napoleon, moreover, made his guard march from Finkenstein for Saalfeld, and prepared to leave Finkenstein himself on the following day, the 6th, when the movements of the enemy should be more decided, and his designs more clearly indicated. He sent his household to Dantzic, as well as M. de Talleyrand, who was quite unfit for the fatigues and dangers of the head-quarters.

On the 6th, in fact, the Russian columns charged to prosecute the attack commenced on the corps of marshal Ney were more concentrated, in consequence of the offensive movement which they had made on the preceding day, and marshal Ney was about to have upon his hands 30,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry. After

the losses sustained on the preceding day, he could oppose but 15,000 men to the enemy. But he had provided beforehand for every contingency. He had sent on his wounded and his baggage beyond Deppen, that the road might be free, and that his *corps d'armée* might not meet with any obstacle on its passage. Instead of decamping in haste, marshal Ney boldly waited for the enemy, the brigades of which his two divisions were composed being ranged *en échelons*, each extending beyond the other. Each *échelon*, before it retired, delivered its fire, frequently even charging with the bayonet, and leaving the next *échelon* to repress the Russians. On open ground, with troops less steady, such a retreat would have ended in a rout. But, owing to a skilful choice of positions, owing also to extraordinary firmness in the men, marshal Ney could take several hours to traverse the space of less than two leagues. Every moment he beheld a multitude of horse rushing *en masse* upon his bayonets, but all their efforts were foiled by his unyielding squares. Having arrived near a small lake, the enemy committed the blunder of dividing, in order that one part might pass on the right of the lake, the other part on the left. The intrepid marshal, seizing the opportune moment, with equal resolution and presence of mind, halted, resumed the offensive against the divided enemy, charged him with vigour, repulsed him to some distance, and thus obtained time to regain quietly the bridge of Deppen, behind which he should be protected from all attack. On reaching that spot, he placed his artillery advantageously, in advance of the Passarge, and as soon as the enemy attempted to show himself, he riddled him with balls.

This action, which cost us some hundred men, but the enemy twice or thrice as many, heightened the admiration excited in both armies by the intrepidity of marshal Ney. On our left, along the Lower Passarge, the Russian columns remained motionless, awaiting the result of the action going on between Guttstadt and Deppen. On our right, marshal Davout's corps, on march since the preceding day, had proceeded without accident to the flank of marshal Ney, in order to support him or to gain Osterode.

With such lieutenants, with such soldiers, the combinations of Napoleon had, besides their merit of conception, the advantage of an almost infallible execution. In the evening of the 6th, Napoleon, having directed all that were behind to Saalfeld, repaired thither himself, to judge of events from personal observation, to rally his lieutenants there if they were repulsed, or to direct upon any one of them the mass of his troops if they had maintained their ground, in order to take the offensive, in his turn, with an overwhelming superiority of forces. On his arrival at Saalfeld, he learned that the greatest tranquillity had prevailed during the day, that, on the Upper Passarge, the intrepid Ney had effected the most successful retreat toward Deppen, and that marshal Davout was already on march upon the right flank of marshal Ney towards Alt-Ramten. Things could not be going on better. Next day, the 7th, Napoleon resolved to go himself to Deppen, to the advanced posts, and left

orders for all the corps marching to Saalfeld to follow him to Deppen. In the evening of the 7th, he went to Alt-Reichau, and, having again learned that all still continued quiet, he proceeded to Deppen, congratulated marshal Ney and likewise his troops on their gallant conduct, saw the Russian army motionless as an army whose undecided commander is puzzled what course to pursue, and ordered a strong demonstration, in order to judge of his real intentions. The Russians repulsed it in such a manner as to prove that they were more disposed to fall back than to persist in their offensive march.

General Benningsen, in fact, perceiving the futility of the efforts directed against marshal Ney's corps, the little success gained on the other points of the Passarge, and above all the rapid concentration of the French army, was soon aware that a more decided movement upon Warsaw, with Napoleon on his right flank, could not lead to any thing but disaster. He determined therefore to pause. Having passed the 7th at Guttstadt in a perplexity natural under such serious circumstances, he determined at last to recross the Alle and proceed to Heilsberg, for the purpose of occupying the defensive position which he had long since prepared there by means of good field-works. On the 7th, at night, he prescribed to his army a first retrograde movement to Quetz. On the 8th, apprized of the march of most of the French corps for Deppen, he was confirmed in his resolution to retreat, and enjoined all his divisions to descend the Alle and to proceed to Heilsberg. That part of his troops, which had advanced further between Guttstadt and Deppen was to slip away instantaneously, by recrossing the Alle forthwith and gaining Heilsberg by the right bank. Four bridges were thrown over the Alle to facilitate this passage. Prince Bagration was charged to cover this retreat with his division and with the Cossacks. The other columns which had not proceeded so far in that direction were merely to regain the position of Heilsberg by way of Launau, and by the left bank. The most distant of the Russian columns, that of general Kamenski, which, in conjunction with the Prussians, had attacked the *tête de pont* of Spanden, was ordered to retire by Mehlsack, so that it would have to traverse the base of the triangle formed by Spanden, Heilsberg, and Guttstadt. It left the Prussian infantry with general Lestocq, and took their cavalry only along with it. General Lestocq was to fall back in rear to cover Königsberg, with great danger of being cut off from the Russian army; for, following the sea-coast while general Benningsen followed the course of the Alle, he should be from 15 to 18 leagues distant from the latter.

In the night of the 8th, the Russian army was in full retreat. On the 9th, it finished crossing the Passarge about Guttstadt, when the French came up. A considerable portion of our troops was in fact collected around Deppen. Lannes, starting from Marienburg, the guard from Finkenstein, Murat from Christburg, and all arriving at Deppen in the evening of the 8th, formed, with marshal Ney's corps, a mass of fifty to sixty thousand men. They

pressed the enemy closely. Murat's cavalry, swimming across the Alle, dashed after prince Bagration. The Cossacks showed more mettle than usual, kept close together about the Russian infantry, and sustained, bravely, for partisans, the fire of our light artillery.

Meanwhile, marshal Soult, crossing by Napoleon's order the Passarge at Elditten, fell in with general Kamenski's corps near Wolfsdorf, overturned one of its detachments, and took a great number of prisoners. Marshal Davout, rectified in his direction, since the army, instead of retiring, was marching forward, drew near Guttstadt. Napoleon would have there at hand the corps of marshals Davout, Ney, Lannes, Soult, besides the guard and Murat, who never quitted him, and likewise marshal Mortier, who was one march behind. This formed a force of 126,000 men,* exclusively of Bernadotte's corps, which remained on the Lower Passarge, and which it was necessary to leave there for two or three days to watch the conduct of the Prussians. But, the Prussians, once thrust upon the rear by our forward march, Napoleon could draw in to him the corps of marshal Bernadotte, and thus have at his disposal 150,000 combatants, being deprived of Massena's corps alone, which was indispensable upon the Narew. General Benningsen, on the contrary, separated like Napoleon from the corps left on the Narew (18,000 men) and doomed, in descending the Alle, to separate himself from Lestocq (18,000 men), would have to face Napoleon with the central mass of his forces only, that is to say, with about 100,000 men, weakened by six or seven thousand killed and wounded left at the foot of our entrenchments.

The plan of Napoleon was soon decided upon, for that plan was the very consequence of all that he had foreseen, willed, and prepared for four months past. In fact since, by the skilful disposition of his cantonnments between the Passarge and the Lower Vistula, by the strong occupation of Braunsberg, Elbing, and Marienburg, and by the taking of Dantzic, he had rendered himself invincible on his left and toward the sea, he had left no other course for the Russians but to attack his right, that is to say, to ascend the Alle, in order to threaten Warsaw. Thenceforward his manœuvre was ready chalked out. He must, in his turn, push forward, turn the enemy's right, separate him from Königsberg, throw him back upon the Pregel, and without stopping occupy by a detachment, that valuable dépôt, Königsberg, where the Russians had shut up their last resources, and whither the English had sent the succours promised to the coalition. The more Russians he should find en-

* Davout	30,000
Ney	15,000
Lannes	15,000
Soult	30,000
The Guard	8,000
Murat	18,000
Mortier	10,000
	<hr/>
	126,000

tangled on the upper course of the Alle, the greater must be the result of that manœuvre. They had indeed just stopped abruptly for the purpose of re-descending the Alle by the right bank. But Napoleon was about to descend it after them by the left bank, with nearly a certainty of beating them in speed, of arriving as soon as they at the conflux of the Alle and the Pregel, and of inflicting upon them by the way some great disaster, if they attempted to pass that river before him, in order to march to the rescue of Königsberg.

Views so long and so deeply reflected upon must very quickly transmute themselves into formal dispositions, and without the loss of a single moment for deliberation. So early as the 9th, Napoleon ordered marshal Davout to join the right of the army immediately, marshal Ney to rest for a day at Guttstadt from his severe combats, and then to rejoin marshal Soult, who was a little to the left, near Launau, to march along the Alle to Heilsberg, preceded and followed by Murat's cavalry, marshal Lannes, to accompany marshal Soult, lastly marshal Mortier to quicken his pace and form his junction with the bulk of the army. He himself, with the guard, followed this movement, and prescribed to marshal Bernadotte's corps, commanded temporarily by general Victor, to concentrate itself on the Lower Passarge, for the purpose of proceeding beyond it, as soon as the designs of the enemy on our left should be more clearly indicated.

Accordingly, on the 10th of June, the army marched on the right bank of the Alle for Heilsberg. It was obliged to cross a defile, near a village called Beverniken. Here it found a strong rear-guard, which was soon repulsed, and debouched from it in sight of the positions occupied by the Russian army.

After so many presumptuous demonstrations, the enemy's general could not but feel a temptation not to run away so swiftly, but to stop and fight, especially in a position where a great many precautions had been taken to render the chances of a great battle less disadvantageous. But it was far from wise, for time became precious, if he wished not to be cut off from Königsberg. Pride, nevertheless, drowning the voice of reason, general Benningsen resolved to wait before Heilsberg for the French army.

Heilsberg is situated on the heights between which runs the river Alle. Numerous redoubts had been erected on those heights. They were occupied by the Russian army, parted in two by the Alle. This very serious inconvenience was redeemed by four bridges constructed in well-sheltered nooks, and allowing troops to be moved from one shore to the other. As, according to all indications, the French would come along the left bank, the greater part of the Russian troops had been concentrated on that side. In the redoubts of the right bank, general Benningsen had left only the imperial guard and Bagration's division, fatigued with the actions fought on the preceding days. Batteries had been disposed to fire from one bank to the other. On the left bank, by which we were to attack,

was seen the bulk of the enemy's army, under the protection of three redoubts bristling with artillery. General Kamenski, who had joined on the 10th, defended these redoubts. Behind, and a little above, the Russian infantry was drawn up in two lines. The first and third battalion of each regiment, entirely deployed, composed the first line. The second battalion, formed in column behind the former, and in their intervals, composed the second. Twelve battalions, placed a little further off, were destined for a reserve. On the prolongation of this line of battle, and forming a hook to the right behind, was the whole of the Russian cavalry, reinforced by the Prussian cavalry, and constituting a mass of squadrons beyond all the usual proportions. Lastly, still further on the right, towards Konegen, the Cossacks were on the watch. Detachments of light infantry occupied some patches of wood, sprinkled here and there in front of the position. Thus the French coming to Heilsberg had to sustain in flank the fire of the redoubts of the right bank, in front the fire of the redoubts of the left bank, besides the attacks of a numerous infantry and the charges of a still more numerous cavalry. But, impelled by the ardour of success, persuaded that the enemy was thinking only of flight, and eager to wrest from him some trophies before he had time to escape, they took no account either of number or of positions. This spirit was universal among the soldiers as well as the generals. Napoleon not being yet on the spot to repress their ardour, prince Murat and marshal Soult, on debouching upon Heilsberg, attacked the Russians before they were followed by the rest of the army. Prince Bagration, placed at first on the right bank, was rapidly transferred to the left bank, to defend the defile of Beverniken, and general Benningsen had ordered general Ouwaroff to support him with twenty-five squadrons. Marshal Soult, having forced the defile, had taken care to place 36 pieces of cannon in battery, which had greatly facilitated the deploying of his troops. Carra-St. Cyr's division first advanced in column by brigades, and flung back the Russian infantry beyond a ravine, descending from the village of Lawden to the Alle. Under favour of this movement, Murat's cavalry was enabled to deploy; but, harassed by fatigue, not being yet entirely assembled, and attacked at the moment when it was forming by the twenty-five squadrons of general Ouwaroff, it lost ground, ran to the rear to form anew, again charged, and regained the advantage. Carra-St. Cyr's division bordered the ravine beyond which it had flung the Russians. Cannonaded in front by the redoubts of the left bank, in flank by those of the right bank, it had suffered severely. St. Hilaire's division came to supply its place in the fire, passing in close columns through the intervals of our line of battle. That brave division of St. Hilaire's passed the ravine, drove back the Russians, and followed them to the foot of the three redoubts which covered their centre, while Murat's cavalry fell upon the cavalry of prince Bagration, cut it in pieces, and killed general Koring. During these transactions, Legrand's division, the third of marshal Soult's,

had arrived and taken position on our left, before the village of Lawden. It had driven the enemy's tirailleurs from the patches of wood situated between the two armies, and it too had reached the foot of the redoubts which constituted the strength of the Russians. General Legrand then detached the 26th light to attack that of the three redoubts which was within his reach. That gallant regiment dashed off at a run, carried the redoubt in spite of general Kamenski's troops, and kept possession of it, after an obstinate fight. But the officer who commanded the enemy's artillery, having had his guns drawn off at a gallop, quickly removed them to the rear, to a spot which commanded the redoubt, and covered the 26th with grape, which made prodigious havoc. At the same moment, the Russian general Warneck, perceiving the bad plight of the 26th, rushed upon it at the head of the Kaluga regiment, and retook the redoubt. The 55th, which formed the left of St. Hilaire's division, and was next neighbour to the 26th, came to its assistance, but could not mend matters. It was obliged to rejoin its division after losing its eagle. Our soldiers remained thus exposed to the fire of a numerous and powerful artillery without flinching. General Beningsen then resolved to employ his immense cavalry, and had several charges made upon Legrand's and St. Hilaire's divisions. They sustained those charges with admirable coolness, and gave the French cavalry time to form behind them, and in its turn to charge the Russian squadrons. Marshal Soult, placed in the middle of one of the squares, in which were mixed pell-mell French and Russians, foot soldiers and dismounted horse, kept all to their duty by the energy of his attitude. Napoleon, who was still at a distance from the theatre of this action, as soon as he heard the guns, had given general Savary the young fusiliers of the guard, to go to the assistance of the corps which had rashly engaged. General Savary, hastening up, took position between St. Hilaire's and Legrand's divisions. Formed into square, he sustained for a long time the charges of the Russian cavalry, which a terrible fire from the redoubts would have rendered dangerous, if our troops had been less firm and not had such excellent officers. The brave general Roussel, who was sword in hand amidst the fusiliers of the guard, had his head carried off by a cannon ball. This imprudent action, in which 30,000 unsheltered French were opposed to 20,000 Russians protected by redoubts, was kept up till the night was far advanced. At length marshal Lannes appeared at the extreme right, strove to learn something of the enemy's position, but would not attempt any enterprize without orders from the Emperor. The booming of the guns soon ceased; the night was rainy, and each, stretching himself on the ground, sought to get a little rest. The Russians, more numerous and closer than we, had sustained a loss far superior to ours. They numbered 3,000 killed, and seven or eight thousand wounded. We had 2,000 killed, and 5,000 wounded.

Napoleon, arriving late, because he had not supposed that the enemy would pause so soon to resist him, was highly pleased with

the energy of his troops, but far less with their eagerness for fighting, and resolved to wait till the morrow to give battle with his collected forces, if the Russians should persist in defending the position of Heilsberg, or to pursue them to the utmost if they should decamp. He bivouacked with his soldiers on the field of carnage, where lay 18,000 Russians and French, dead, dying, and wounded.

General Benningsen, a prey to acute pain and to great perplexities,* passed the night at the bivouac, wrapped in his cloak. It requires a strong mind to defy at once physical pain and moral pain. General Benningsen was capable of enduring both. Divided between the satisfaction of having made head against the French, and the fear of having them all upon his hands on the morrow, he waited for daylight before he decided what course to pursue. Our troops, on their part, were astir by four o'clock in the morning, picking up the wounded, and exchanging musket-shots with the enemy's advanced posts. Our *corps d'armée* successively took their positions. Marshal Lannes had placed himself the evening before on the left of marshal Soult; the corps of marshal Davout began to show itself on the left of Marshal Lannes, towards Grossendorf; the guard, foot and horse, deployed on the heights in rear; and every thing denoted a decisive attack with formidable masses. This sight, and particularly the appearance of the corps of marshal Davout, which turned at Grossendorf the Russian army, and which even seemed to be taking the direction of Königsberg, determined general Benningsen to retreat. He was unwilling to lose at once a day and a battle, and to run the risk of arriving perhaps too late, perhaps half destroyed, to the relief of Königsberg. General Kamenski was to start first, in order to gain in time the Königsberg road, and to join the Prussians, with whom he was accustomed to fight. Having withdrawn from Heilsberg all that could be removed, general Benningsen marched himself with his army by the right bank of the Alle, in the course of the 11th. He proceeded in four columns for Bartenstein, the first post beyond Heilsberg. His head-quarters had long been fixed there. Napoleon spent part of the day in observing that position, and, if he did not exert his usual promptness in attacking, it was because he had no great inclination to give battle on such ground, and had no doubt that, by pushing forward his left, he should oblige the Russian army to decamp by a mere demonstration. Things having turned out as he had foreseen, he entered Heilsberg the same evening, and established himself there with his guard. He found in the town considerable magazines, many Russian wounded, to whom he desired the same attention to be paid as to the wounded French, and whose number attested that the enemy's army had lost on the preceding day from ten to eleven thousand men.

The battle of Heilsberg could not make any change in the plans

* Plottho, the Russian historian, says that general Benningsen was afflicted with the stone.

of Napoleon. What he had to do was still to tend to turn the Russians, to cut them off from Königsberg, and to take advantage of the first false movement they should make to get at that important place, which was the base of their operation. They had not presented themselves to him this time in a situation that permitted him to crush them, but the favourable opportunity for which he was waiting could not fail to occur soon. For its failure there could have been required nothing less than that general Benningsen, in the difficult position in which he was placed, should not commit a fault.

In order the better to attain his aim, Napoleon somewhat modified his march. On passing Heilsberg, indeed on passing Launau, the Alle turns to the right, making a thousand windings, and forming a very long route, if you choose to follow its course—a route which, moreover, carries you away from the sea and from Königsberg. General Benningsen, standing in need of the Alle to appuy himself upon it, was certainly obliged to follow its windings. Napoleon, on the contrary, who wanted only to find his enemy deprived of appui, and who had especial occasion to take an intermediate position between Königsberg and the Alle, whence he could send a detachment to Königsberg, without being at too great a distance from that detachment, could leave the banks of the Alle without inconvenience, nay, even with advantage. In consequence, he resolved to strike into an intermediate route, which he had travelled in the preceding winter, that from Landsberg to Eylau, which runs in a direct line to the Pregel. On coming into this road, beyond Eylau, that is to say at Domnau, you find yourself two marches from Königsberg on the left, and on the right one march only from the Alle and the town of Friedland, because the Alle, turning westward again after numerous windings, is nearer at Friedland to Königsberg than in any part of its course. It was there that, with good luck and skill, one must have the best chances of taking Königsberg with one hand, and striking the Russian army with the other.

With this idea, Napoleon despatched Murat with part of the cavalry to Landsberg. He sent after him the corps of marshals Soult and Davout, destined to form the left wing of the army, and to extend themselves to Königsberg, or to fall back upon the centre, if they were wanted for fighting a battle. Napoleon left upon the Alle the rest of his cavalry, composed of chasseurs, hussars, and dragoons, for the purpose of beating the banks of that river and closely pursuing the enemy. He sent through Landsberg for Eylau the corps of Lannes, which he had at hand, that of Ney, which had stopped a day at Guttstadt to rest itself, that of Mortier, still one march behindland, and made them advance each by a different track, to avoid encumbering, but so as to be able to collect them in a few hours. Lastly, the Prussians, retreating towards Königsberg, no longer deserving any attention, Bernadotte's corps, left provisionally on the Lower Passarge, had orders to rejoin the army immediately by Mehlsack and Eylau.

These dispositions, and many others relative to the magazines, the ovens, the hospitals which he purposed to organize at Heilsberg, to the rich supplies of Dantzic, which he never ceased to watch over, to the navigation of the Frische Haff, of which he took care to possess himself, by closing the pass of Pillau, and by making the seamen of the guard cruise there in shipping of the country—these dispositions detained Napoleon at Heilsberg the whole of the 12th. During this interval, his corps were marching, and it would be easy for him to overtake them on horseback in a few hours.

On the morning of the 13th, Napoleon himself repaired to Eylau. It was no longer that vast snow-clad, dull and dreary-looking plain, which had been drenched with so much blood on the 8th of February; it was a fertile and smiling country, covered with green woods and beautiful lakes, and studded with numerous villages. The cavalry and the artillery discovered with astonishment that, in the great battle of Eylau, they had galloped on the surface of the lakes then completely frozen. The indications collected respecting the march of general Benningsen were as uncertain as the plans of that general. On the one hand, the light cavalry had followed the main body of the Russian army along the Alle, had seen it between Bartenstein and Schippenbeil; on the other, it had been imagined that detachments of the enemy had been perceived going towards Königsberg, and designing, according to all appearances, to join general Lestocq, in order to defend that city. From the whole of these indications it could not but be concluded that the Russian army was inclined to proceed to Königsberg, that for this purpose it would quit the Alle, and that in this movement the French would meet with it at Domnau. Napoleon then pushed marshal Soult and Murat with half the cavalry upon Kreuzburg, and ordered them to march to Königsberg and make a sudden attack on it. He sent after them marshal Davout, who was to take an intermediate position, so as to join in a few hours either marshal Soult or the main body of the army according to circumstances. He immediately despatched marshal Lannes from Eylau for Domnau, joined with him part of the cavalry and of Grouchy's dragoons, with orders to send parties as far as Friedland, to learn what the enemy was about, to ascertain if he was or was not quitting the Alle, if he was or was not going to the assistance of Königsberg. Marshal Mortier, who had arrived at Eylau, was sent off immediately for Domnau, and would arrive there a few hours after marshal Lannes. Marshal Ney, with his corps, general Victor, with Bernadotte's, were at that moment entering Eylau. Before he would direct them either upon Domnau or after marshals Lannes and Mortier, or upon Königsberg after marshals Davout and Soult, Napoleon waited till further reports of the cavalry should throw a light on the real march of the enemy.

In the evening of the 13th, the reconnaissances of the day left no further doubt that general Benningsen had descended the Alle, and appeared to be taking the road to Friedland, either to continue his march along the Alle, or to leave there the banks of that river, in

order to gain Königsberg. It was at Friedland, in fact, that he was likely to be tempted to quit the Alle, because it is the point where that river approaches nearest to Königsberg. Napoleon hesitated not a moment longer. He despatched towards Lannes and Mortier all that part of the cavalry which had not followed Murat, and gave the command of it to general Grouchy. He enjoined Lannes and Mortier to proceed to Friedland, to make themselves masters of that town if they could, and of the bridges of the Alle. He ordered Ney and Victor to advance upon Domnau, to follow Lannes and Mortier at a greater or less distance from Friedland according to circumstances. He then marched off his guard, and resolved to start himself on horseback at daybreak, to be on the morrow, the 14th of June, at the head of his assembled troops. That day, the 14th of June, the anniversary of the battle of Marengo, reminding him of the most glorious day of his life, filled him with a secret and joyful presentiment. He had not ceased to believe in his good fortune, and that belief was still well founded.

Lannes, arriving at Domnau a few hours before marshal Mortier, had forthwith sent the 9th hussars on reconnoissance to Friedland. That regiment had penetrated into Friedland, but, presently attacked by more than thirty enemy's squadrons, which brought with them a great quantity of light artillery, it had been very roughly handled and obliged to flee to Georgenau, an intermediate post between Domnau and Friedland. On this intelligence, Lannes despatched the light horse and the Saxon cuirassiers to the assistance of the 9th hussars, then set himself in march for Friedland, to fling back the enemy's cavalry beyond the Alle, and to close the outlet by which it seemed to be the intention of the Russian army to proceed to the succour of Königsberg. He arrived there about one in the morning of the 14th, and, perceiving, as he thought, a considerable quantity of troops amidst the darkness of the night, he stopped at Posthenen, after dislodging a detachment of the enemy that was guarding that village. He was not strong enough to occupy the town of Friedland itself—a very fortunate circumstance, for, by occupying it he would have prevented an egregious blunder of general Benning's, and snatched from Napoleon one of his most splendid triumphs.

At this moment, in fact, the whole Russian army was approaching Friedland, preceded by thirty-three squadrons, eighteen of them belonging to the imperial guard, by the infantry of that guard, and by twenty pieces of light artillery. The main body of the army was to enter in a few hours. General Benning, aware that there was no time to be lost if he would save Königsberg, or at least save himself behind the Pregel, had marched the whole night between the 11th and the 12th, in order to reach Bartenstein, given a few hours' rest there to his soldiers, resumed his march for Schippenbeil, arrived there on the 13th, and, learning that the French had appeared at Domnau, had hastened to reach Friedland, the point where the Alle, as we have just observed, approaches nearer to Königsberg

than in any other part of its course. He had taken care to send before him a strong advanced guard of cavalry.

Lannes, established at Posthenen, could not appreciate before daylight the importance of the event that was preparing. In a country so near the pole, twilight, in the month of June, commences at two in the morning. It was quite light by three o'clock. Marshal Lannes soon distinguished the nature of the ground, the troops which occupied it, and those which were crossing the bridges of the Alle, for the purpose of disputing with us the road to Königsberg.

The course of the Alle, near the spot where the two armies were about to meet, exhibits numerous windings. We arrived by woody hills, beyond which the ground gradually sinks to the bank of the Alle. The ground at this season is covered with rye of great height. The Alle was seen on our right, pursuing its way through the plain in many meanders, then turning round Friedland, coming to our left, and thus forming an elbow open on our side, and the further end of which was occupied by the town of Friedland. It was by the bridges of Friedland, placed in this elbow of the Alle, that the Russians came to deploy in the plain opposite to us. They were seen distinctly hurrying across the bridges, passing through the town, debouching from the suburbs, and drawing up in line of battle facing the heights. A rivulet called the Mill Stream, running towards Friedland, there formed a small pond, then threw itself into the Alle, after dividing that plain into two unequal halves. The half situated on our left was the less extensive of the two. It was that on which Friedland was seated, between the Mill Stream and the Alle, at the very corner of the elbow which we have just described.

Marshal Lannes, in his haste to march, had brought with him only Oudinot's voltigeurs and grenadiers, the 9th hussars, Grouchy's dragoons, and two regiments of Saxon cavalry. He could not oppose more than 10,000 men* to the enemy's advanced guard, which, successively reinforced, was treble that number, and was soon to be followed by the whole Russian army. Fortunately, the soil afforded numerous resources to the skill and courage of the illustrious marshal. In the centre of the position which it was necessary to occupy in order to bar the way against the Russians, was a village, that of Posthenen, through which ran the Mill Stream to pursue its course to Friedland. Somewhat in rear rose a plateau, from which the plain of the Alle might be battered. Lannes placed his artillery there and several battalions of grenadiers to protect it. On the right, a thick wood, that of Sortlack, protruded in a salient, and divided into two the space comprized between the village of Posthenen and the banks of the Alle. There Lannes posted two battalions of voltigeurs, which, dispersed as tirailleurs, would be able

* Oudinot, 7,000 ; Grouchy, 1,800 ; 9th hussars, light horse, and Saxon cuirassiers, 1,200 : total 10,000.

to stop for a long time troops not numerous and not very resolute. The 9th hussars, Grouchy's dragoons, the Saxon cavalry, amounted to 3,000 horse ready to fall upon any column which should attempt to penetrate that curtain of tirailleurs. On the left of Posthenen, the line of woody heights extended, gradually lowering to the village of Heinrichsdorf, through which ran the high road from Friedland to Königsberg. This point was of great importance, for the Russians, desirous to reach Königsberg, would of course obstinately dispute the road thither. Besides, this part of the field of battle being more open, was naturally more difficult to defend. Lannes, who had not yet troops sufficient to establish himself there, had placed on his left, taking advantage of the woods and heights, the rest of his battalions, thus approaching the houses of Heinrichsdorf without being able to occupy them.

The fire, commenced at three in the morning, became all at once extremely brisk. Our artillery, placed on the plateau of Posthenen, under the protection of Oudinot's grenadiers, kept the Russians at a distance, and made considerable havoc among them. On the right, our voltigeurs, scattered on the skirt of the wood of Sortlack, stopped their infantry by an incessant tirailleur fire; and the Saxon horse, directed by general Grouchy, had made several successful charges against their cavalry. The Russians having become threatening towards Heinrichsdorf, general Grouchy, moving from the right to the left, galloped thither, to dispute with them the Königsberg road, the important point for the possession of which torrents of blood were about to be spilt.

Though, in these first moments, marshal Lannes had but 10,000 men to oppose twenty-five or thirty thousand, he maintained his ground, thanks to great skill and energy and also to the able concurrence of general Oudinot, commanding the grenadiers, and of general Grouchy, commanding the cavalry. But the enemy reinforced himself from hour to hour, and general Benningsen, on arriving at Friedland, had suddenly formed the resolution to give battle—a very rash resolution, for it would have been much wiser for him to continue to descend the Alle to the junction of that river with the Pregel, and to take a position behind the latter, with his left to Wehlau, his right to Königsberg. It would have taken him, it is true, another day to reach Königsberg; but he would not have risked a battle against an army superior in number, in quality, better officered, and in a very unfavourable situation for him, since he had a river at his back, and he was very likely to be pushed into the elbow of the Alle, with all that vigour of impulsion of which the French army was capable. But, after losing a great deal of time in gaining Königsberg, general Benningsen was extremely impatient to get thither, stimulated, it is said, by the emperor Alexander, who had promised his friend, Frederick William, to save the last remnant of the Prussian monarchy. He was moreover convinced that the route by Friedland was infinitely shorter, and lastly he conceived that he should there fall in with a detached, unsupported

corps of the French army, and that it might be possible for him to crush that corps before he returned to Königsberg. He persuaded himself that this was an unlooked-for favour offered him by Fortune, of which it behoved him to avail himself, and he resolved not to let it slip out of his hands.

In consequence, he lost no time in having three bridges thrown over the Alle, one above and two below Friedland, in order to accelerate the passage of his troops and also to furnish them with means of retreat. He lined with artillery the right bank, by which he arrived, and which commanded the left bank. Then, nearly his whole army having debouched, he disposed it in the following manner:—In the plain around Heinrichsdorf, on the right for him, on the left for us, he placed four divisions of infantry, under lieutenant-general Gortschakoff, and the better part of the cavalry under general Ouwarroff. The infantry was formed in two lines. In the first were two battalions of each regiment deployed, and a third drawn up in close column behind the two others, closing the interval which separated them. In the second, the field of battle gradually narrowing the further it extended into the angle of the Alle, a single battalion was deployed and two were formed in close column. The cavalry, ranged on the side and a little in advance, flanked the infantry. On the left (the right of the French) two Russian divisions, of which the imperial guard formed part, increased by all the detachments of chasseurs occupied the portion of the ground comprised between the Mill Stream and the Alle. They were drawn up in two lines but very near each other, on account of the want of room. Prince Bagration commanded them. The cavalry of the guard was there, under general Kollogribow. Four flying bridges had been thrown across the Mill Stream, that it might interrupt the communications between the two wings as little as possible. The fourth Russian division had been left on the other side of the Alle, on the ground commanding the left bank, to collect the army in case of disaster, or to come and decide the victory, if it obtained any commencement of success. The Russians had more than 200 pieces of cannon upon their front, besides those which were either in reserve or in battery on the right bank. Their army, reduced to 80 or 82 thousand men after Heilsberg, separated at this time from Kamenski's corps and from some detachments sent to Wehlau to guard the bridges of the Alle, still amounted to 72 or 75 thousand men.

General Benningsen caused the mass of the Russian army to be moved forward in the order just described, so that, on getting out of the elbow of the Alle, it might deploy, extend its fires, and avail itself of the advantages of number which it possessed at the beginning of the battle.

The situation of Lannes was perilous, for he had the whole Russian army upon his hands. Fortunately, the time which had elapsed had procured him some reinforcements. General Nansouty's division of heavy cavalry, composed of 3,500 cuirassiers and cara-

bineers, Dupas' division, which was the first of Mortier's corps, and numbered 6,000 foot-soldiers, lastly, Verdier's division, which contained 7,000 and was the second of Lannes' corps, marched off successively, had come with all possible expedition. It was a force 26 or 27,000 men,* to fight 75,000. It was seven in the morning, and the Russians, preceded by a swarm of Cossacks, who extended their rides quite to our rear, advanced towards Heinrichsdorf, where they already had infantry and cannon. Lannes, appreciating the importance of that post, sent thither the brigade of Albert's grenadiers, and ordered general Grouchy to secure possession of it at any rate. General Grouchy, who had just been reinforced by the cuirassiers, proceeded immediately to the village. Without stopping to consider the difficulty, he despatched the brigade of Milet's dragoons to attack Heinrichsdorf, while Carrié's brigade turned the village, and the cuirassiers marched to support this movement. Milet's brigade passed through Heinrichsdorf at a gallop, drove out the Russian foot-soldiers at the point of the sword, while Carrié's brigade, going round it, took or dispersed those who had saved themselves by flight. Four pieces of cannon were taken. At this moment, the enemy's cavalry, coming to the assistance of the infantry expelled from Heinrichsdorf, rushed upon our dragoons and drove them back. But Nansouty's cuirassiers charged it in their turn, and threw it upon the Russian infantry, which in this fray was obliged to withhold its fire. Thus we remained masters of Heinrichsdorf, in which the grenadiers of Albert's brigade were established.

During these occurrences, Dupas' division entered into line. Marshal Mortier, whose horse was killed by a cannon-ball, the moment he appeared on the field of battle, placed that division between Heinrichsdorf and Posthenen, and opened on the Russians a fire of artillery which, poured upon deep masses, made prodigious havoc in their ranks. The arrival of Dupas' division rendered disposable those battalions of grenadiers which had at first been drawn up to the left of Posthenen. Lannes drew them nearer to him, and could oppose their closer ranks to the attacks of the Russians, either before Posthenen or before the wood of Sortlack. General Oudinot, who commanded them, taking advantage of all the accidents of ground, sometimes from clumps of wood scattered here and there, sometimes from pools of water, produced by the rains of the preceding days, sometimes from above the corn, disputed the ground with equal skill and energy. By turns he hid or exhibited his soldiers, dispersed them as *tirailleurs*, or exposed them in a mass, bristling with bayonets, to all the efforts of the Russians. Those brave grenadiers, notwith-

* Oudinot.....	7,000
Verdier.....	7,000
Lannes' Cavalry.....	1,200
Dupas.....	6,000
Nansouty.....	3,500
Grouchy.....	1,800

 26,500

standing their inferiority in number, kept up the fight, supported by their general, when, luckily for them, Verdier's division arrived. Marshal Lannes divided it into two moveable columns, to be sent alternately to the right, to the centre, to the left, wherever the danger was most pressing. It was the skirt of the wood of Sortlack and the village of the same name, situated on the Alle, that were the most furiously disputed. In the end the Russians remained masters of the village, the French of the skirts of the wood. When the Russians attempted to penetrate into that wood, Lannes, making a brigade of Verdier's division sally from it on a sudden, drove them back to a distance. Terrified by these startling appearances, fearing that Napoleon was lying concealed with his army in this mysterious wood, they durst no longer venture to approach it.

The enemy, unable to force our right between Posthenen and Sortlack, made a vigorous attempt on our left in the plain of Heinrichsdorf, which presented few obstacles. The nature of the ground having induced them to direct the greater part of their cavalry to that side, they had there more than 12,000 horse to oppose to general Grouchy's five or six thousand. The latter, studying to compensate inferiority of number by skilful dispositions, deployed in the plain a long line of cuirassiers, and on the flank of that line, behind the village of Heinrichsdorf, he placed in reserve the dragoons, the brigade of the carabineers, and the light artillery. These dispositions completed, he put himself at the head of the deployed line of his cuirassiers, advanced upon the Russian cavalry as if going to charge it, then, suddenly facing about, he affected to retire at a trot before the mass of the enemy's squadrons. In this manner, he enticed them to follow him, till, having passed Heinrichsdorf, they offered their flank to the troops concealed behind that village. Then halting and wheeling round, he led back his cuirassiers upon the Russian cavalry, charged it, overturned it, obliged it to pass back under Heinrichsdorf, whence burst a shower of grape, and from which the dragoons and carabineers in ambush rushed upon it and finished by throwing it into disorder. But the encounters of troops on horseback are never so destructive as to prevent the repetition of them. The Russian cavalry, therefore, returned to the charge, and general Grouchy, practising each time the same manœuvre, drew it beyond Heinrichsdorf, and caused it to be taken in flank and rear in the way that we have already seen, as soon as it was past the village. After several encounters, the plain of Heinrichsdorf remained in our hands, covered with dead men and horses, dismounted riders, and glistening cuirasses.

Thus, on the one hand, the resistance which the Russian infantry met with at the skirts of the wood of Sortlack, and on the other the flank attacks to which their cavalry was exposed, when it passed the village of Heinrichsdorf, kept them at the foot of our positions, and Lannes was enabled to prolong till noon this conflict of 26,000 men against 75,000. But it was high time for Napoleon to arrive with the rest of his army.

Lannes, anxious to apprise him of what was passing, had sent to him almost all his aides-de-camp, one after another, ordering them to get back to him without loss of time if they killed their horses. They found him coming at a gallop to Friedland, and full of a joy that was expressed in his countenance. "This is the 14th of June," he repeated to those whom he met; "it is the anniversary of Marengo; it is a lucky day for us!" Napoleon, outstripping his troops through the speed of his horse, had successively passed the long files of the guard, of Ney's corps, of Bernadotte's corps, all marching for Posthenen. He had saluted in passing Dupont's fine division, which, from Ulm to Braunsberg, had never ceased to distinguish itself, though never in his presence, and he had declared that it would give him great pleasure to see it fight for once.

The presence of Napoleon at Posthenen fired his soldiers and his generals with fresh ardour. Lannes, Mortier, Oudinot, who had been there since morning, and Ney, who had just arrived, surrounded him with the most lively joy. The brave Oudinot, hastening up with his coat perforated by balls, and his horse covered with blood, exclaimed to the Emperor: "Make haste, Sire, my grenadiers are knocked up; but, give me a reinforcement, and I will drive all the Russians into the water." Napoleon, surveying with his glass that plain, where the Russians, backed in the elbow of the Alle, were endeavouring in vain to deploy, soon appreciated their perilous situation and the unique occasion offered him by Fortune, swayed, it must be confessed, by his genius; for the fault which the Russians were committing had been inspired, as it were, by him, when he pushed them from the other side of the Alle, and thus forced them to pass it before him, in going to the relief of Königsberg. The day was far advanced, and it would take several hours to collect all the French troops. Some of Napoleon's lieutenants were, therefore, of opinion that they ought to defer fighting a decisive battle till the morrow. "No, no," replied Napoleon, "one does not catch an enemy twice in such a scrape." He immediately made his dispositions for the attack. They were worthy of his marvellous perspicacity.

To drive the Russians into the Alle was the aim which every individual, down to the meanest soldier, assigned to the battle. But how to set about it, how to ensure that result, and how to render it as great as possible, was the question. At the furthest extremity of this elbow of the Alle, in which the Russian army was ingulphed, there was a decisive point to occupy, namely, the little town of Friedland itself, situated on our right, between the Mill Stream and the Alle. There were the four bridges, the sole retreat of the Russian army, and Napoleon purposed to direct his utmost efforts against that point. He destined for Ney's corps the difficult and glorious task of plunging into that gulf, of carrying Friedland at any rate, in spite of the desperate resistance which the Russians would not fail to make, of wresting the bridges from them, and

thus barring against them the only way of safety. But at the same time he resolved, while acting vigorously on his right, to suspend all efforts on his left, to amuse the Russian army on that side with a feigned fight, and not to push it briskly on the left till, the bridges being taken on the right, he should be sure, by pushing it, to fling it into a receptacle without an outlet.

Surrounded by his lieutenants, he explained to them, with that energy and that precision of language which were usual with him, the part which each of them had to act in that battle. Grasping the arm of marshal Ney, and pointing to Friedland, the bridges, the Russians crowded together in front, "Yonder is the goal," said he; "march to it without looking about you; break into that thick mass, whatever it costs you; enter Friedland, take the bridges, and give yourself no concern about what may happen on your right, on your left, or on your rear. The army and I shall be there to attend to that."

Ney, boiling with ardour, proud of the formidable task assigned to him, set out at a gallop to arrange his troops before the wood of Sortlack. Struck with his martial attitude, Napoleon, addressing marshal Mortier, said, "That man is a lion!"*

On the same ground, Napoleon had his dispositions written down from his dictation, that each of his generals might have them bodily present to his mind, and not be liable to deviate from them. He ranged, then, marshal Ney's corps on the right, so that Lannes, bringing back Verdier's division upon Posthenen, could present two strong lines with that and the grenadiers. He placed Bernadotte's corps (temporarily Victor's) between Ney and Lannes, a little in advance of Posthenen, and partly hidden by the inequalities of the ground. Dupont's fine division formed the head of this corps. On the plateau behind Posthenen, Napoleon established the imperial guard, the infantry in three close columns, the cavalry in two lines. Between Posthenen and Heinrichsdorf was the corps of marshal Mortier, posted as in the morning, but more concentrated, and augmented by the young fusiliers of the imperial guard. A battalion of the 4th light infantry and the regiment of the municipal guard of Paris, had taken the place of the grenadiers of the Albert brigade in Heinrichsdorf. Dombrowski's Polish division had joined Dupas' division, and guarded the artillery. Napoleon left to general Grouchy the duty of which he had already so ably acquitted himself, that of defending the plain of Heinrichsdorf. To the dragoons and the cuirassiers commanded by that general he added the light cavalry of generals Beaumont and Colbert, to assist him to rid himself of the Cossacks. Lastly, having two more divisions of dragoons to dispose of, he placed that of general Latour Maubourg, reinforced by the Dutch cuirassiers, behind the corps of marshal Ney, and that of general La Houssaye, reinforced

* I got these particulars from marshal Mortier, with whom I had the honour to be acquainted, and who has often related them to me himself.

by the Saxon cuirassiers, behind Victor's corps. The French in this imposing order amounted to no fewer than 80,000 men.* The

* Nothing is more difficult than to compute, with strict accuracy, the force of an army on a day of battle. One rarely has authentic statements, and when one can procure such, it is still more rarely that such statements agree with reality. M. Derode, in an excellent paper on the battle of Friedland, has made use of a statement extracted from the work of general Mathieu Dumas, a statement which, though derived from the dépôt of war, is incorrect in several particulars. In the offices of the ministry in Paris were drawn up statements, with which the facts occurring on the Vistula did not always correspond. There exist in the Louvre, in the rich dépôt of the papers of Napoleon, memorandum books, kept by himself, which he always had at hand, and which, renewed month by month, contained an accurate description of each of the corps acting under his command. The leaves of these books have writing on one side only, and on the other are sometimes given in red ink the changes that happened in the course of the month. It is in these little books, but on condition of not taking even them for absolute ground-work, and on condition of incessantly modifying their data, by the appreciation of the circumstances of the moment—it is in these little books, we say, that one may look for the approximative truth. I have not found those for the months of May, June, and July, 1807; I have therefore been obliged to resort to those for the months of March and August, though that for March is too incomplete, for the army had not then received all the reinforcements which arrived in May and June, and though that of the month of August is too complete, on the contrary, for at that period, a considerable portion of forces, on march during the events of June, had joined. But, by using these statements, by comparing them, by rectifying them above all by Napoleon's correspondence, and by enlightening one's self, in regard to the battle of Friedland, by a note in his own hand-writing, which gives the strength of several of the corps that figure in that battle, one arrives at the following computation, which I believe to be very near the truth. I will add that this approximation to the truth is sufficient; for, to judge of a great event like Friedland or Austerlitz, it is of little importance to ascertain whether there were 80 or 82 thousand men who fought. Two or three thousand combatants more or less, make no change either in the character of the event or in the combinations which decided it. If the historian ought not to spare any pains to arrive at the absolute truth, it is because he ought to make a constant habit of it, in order that he may never suffer the scrupulous regard for truth to be relaxed in him; but the important point is the character, not the minute detail of things.

The most probable computation then of the force of the French army in the battle of Friedland is as follows:—

The guard, though increased to 9,000 men, had not in its ranks either the seamen or the dragoons, and had sustained a considerable loss in fusiliers. It numbered of men present, at most	7,500
The note in the hand-writing of Napoleon mentioned above, computes Oudinot's grenadiers at, men present	7,000
Verdier's division at	8,000
The Saxon infantry at	4,000
The ninth hussars at	400
The Saxon cuirassiers at	600
The Saxon light-horse at	200

Making for the whole corps of Lannes a total of 20,200

But the Saxons had been left at Heilsberg, excepting, however, three battalions, which, according to some accounts, were at Friedland. Verdier's division had sustained considerable loss at Heilsberg, and lastly, the troops had marched very fast. I think, therefore, that we shall be about the mark, if we set down Lannes' corps as follows:—

Carried forward . . . 7,500

order was repeated to the left not to advance, but merely to keep back the Russians till the success of the right was decided. Napo-

	Brought forward	7,500
Oudinot	7,000	
Verdier	6,500	
Saxons	1,200	
Cavalry	1,200	
	<hr/>	
	15,900	

(The artillery is included in the divisions of infantry.)

Lannes	15,900
Marshal Ney's corps amounted to 16 or 17 thousand men present under arms at the moment of taking the field, which is proved by a letter from Marshal Ney to Napoleon. He had lost not fewer than from 2,000 to 2,500 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the battles of Guttstadt and Deppen. Taking marches into account, it amounted then at most to	14,000
Marshal Mortier, according to the note of Napoleon's already mentioned had in Dupas' division.....	6,400
In Dombrowski's division	4,000
He had a detachment of Dutch horse, the designation of which is uncertain in the note referred to	1,500

When we know from marshal Lefebvre's letters how the Poles behaved, and how steadily they followed the colours, we cannot set down marshal Mortier's corps at more than 10,000

The corps of marshal Bernadotte, commanded by general Victor, had in March, without the division of dragoons, about 22,000 men present under arms. It was afterwards recruited but had left behind several posts, and if it amounted to 25,000 men it could not have taken to Friedland above 22,000

The cavalry comprehended general Nansouty's cuirassiers, from whom must be deducted the losses on march, at Heilsberg, &c.....	3,500
General Grouchy's dragoons.....	1,800
General La Houssaye's dragoons	1,800
General Latour-Maubourg's dragoons, forming six regiments.....	2,400
The light cavalry of generals Beaumont and Colbert...	2,000
	<hr/>
	11,500

Thus we find for the total of the army 80,900

I think, therefore, we may say that the French army was about 80,000 men, at the battle of Friedland, 25,000 of whom, as we shall see, never fired a shot. There were further the corps of marshal Davout, which had not fought, and which amounted to 29 or 30 thousand men, at the opening of the campaign, to 28,000, if we allow for those left behind on march; marshal Soult's, which had lost about 5,000 men at Heilsberg, and could scarcely exceed 27,000; lastly, Murat, with about 10,000 men, which would make the total of the army in action at the moment.

At Friedland	80,000
Before Königsberg, or on march for that city	{ Davout.. 28,000
	{ Soult... 27,000
	{ Murat... 10,000

Total 145,000

This total of 145,000 men in action would correspond well both with the forces existing on the 5th of June, and with the probable losses sustained in the

leon required that before the troops recommenced firing, they should wait for the signal from a battery of twenty pieces of cannon placed above Posthenen.

The Russian general, struck by this deployment, discovered the mistake which he had committed in supposing that he had to do with but the single corps of marshal Lannes; he was surprised, and naturally hesitated. His hesitation had produced a sort of slackening in the action. Scarcely did occasional discharges of artillery indicate the continuance of the battle. Napoleon, who desired that all his troops should have got into line, rested for at least an hour, and, being abundantly supplied with ammunition, was in no hurry to begin, and resisted the impatience of his generals, well knowing that, as at this season, in this country, it was light till ten in the evening, he should have time to subject the Russian army to the disaster that he was preparing for it. At length, the fit moment appearing to him to have arrived, he gave the signal. The twenty pieces of cannon of the battery of Posthenen fired at once; the artillery of the army answered them along the whole line, and at this impatiently awaited signal, marshal Ney moved off his *corps d'armée*.

From the wood of Sortlack issued Marchand's division, advancing the first to the right, Bisson's division the second to the left. Both were preceded by a swarm of tirailleurs, who, as they approached the enemy, fell back and returned into the ranks. These troops marched resolutely up to the Russians, and took from them the village of Sortlack, so long disputed. Their cavalry, in order to stop our offensive movement, made a charge on Marchand's division. But Latour-Maubourg's dragoons and the Dutch cuirassiers, passing through the intervals of our battalions, charged that cavalry in their turn, drove it back upon its infantry, and, pushing the Russians against the Alle, precipitated a great number into the deeply embanked bed of that river. Some saved themselves by swimming, many were drowned.* His right once appuyed on the Alle, marshal Ney slackened its march, and pushed forward his left, formed by Bisson's division, in such a manner as to thrust back the Russians into the narrow space comprised between the Mill Stream and the Alle. When arrived at this point, the fire of the enemy's artillery redoubled. The French had to sustain not only the fire of the batteries in front, but also the fire of those on the right bank of the

various fights since the 5th of June. Reckoning these losses at 12 or 15 thousand men, killed, wounded, prisoners, or laggards, we shall again find the 160,000 men composing the army at the opening of the campaign. Though these numbers are taken from the only documents worthy of credit, documents rectified, modified, by a correspondence of each day, we consider them as approximate, and nothing more. And, if we have entered into these details, it is to convey an idea of the difficulty of arriving at strict accuracy in matters of this kind. But, we repeat it, if the historian, in order never to relax in his duty, ought to aspire to the strict truth, posterity, in reading him, judging from his efforts, can feel satisfied, in regard to numbers and details; of the general truth. It is this general truth which is of importance to him, which is sufficient for him, for it is that which constitutes the real character of things and of events.

* Two thousand, says Marshal Ney, in his report.

Alle, and it was impossible to get rid of the latter by taking them, as they were separated from them by the deep bed of the river. Our columns, battered at once in front and flank by the balls, endured with admirable coolness this terrible convergence of fires. Marshal Ney, galloping from one end of the line to the other, kept up the courage of his soldiers by his heroic bearing. Meanwhile, whole files were swept away, and the fire became so severe that the very bravest of the troops could no longer endure it. At this sight, the cavalry of the Russian guard, commanded by general Kollögrihow, dashed off at a gallop, to try to throw into disorder the infantry of Bisson's division, which appeared to waver. Staggered for the first time, that valiant infantry gave ground, and two or three battalions threw themselves in rear. General Bisson, who from his stature, overlooked the lines of his soldiers, strove in vain to detain them. They retired, grouping themselves around their officers. The situation soon became most critical. Luckily, general Dupont, placed at some distance on the left of Ney's corps, perceived this commencement of disorder, and, without waiting for directions to march, moved off his division, passing in front of it, reminding it of Ulm, Dirnstein, and Halle, and taking it to encounter the Russians. It advanced in the finest attitude under the fire of that tremendous artillery, while Latour-Maubourg's dragoons, returning to the charge, fell upon the Russian cavalry, which had scattered in pursuit of our foot-soldiers, and succeeded in the attempt to drive it back. Dupont's division, continuing its movement on that open ground, and, supporting its left on the Mill Stream, brought the Russian infantry to a stand. By its presence it filled Ney's soldiers with confidence and joy. Bisson's battalions formed anew, and our whole line, re-invigorated, began to march forward again. It was necessary to reply to the formidable artillery of the enemy, and Ney's artillery was so very inferior in number that it could scarcely stand in battery before that of the Russians. Napoleon ordered general Victor to collect all the guns of his divisions, and to range them in mass on the front of Ney. The skilful and intrepid general Senarmont commanded that artillery. He moved it off at full trot, joined it to that of marshal Ney, took it some hundred paces ahead of our infantry, and daringly placing himself in face of the Russians, opened upon them a fire terrible from the number of the pieces and the accuracy of aim. Directing one of his batteries against the right bank, he soon silenced those which the enemy had on that side. Then, pushing forward his line of artillery, he gradually approached to within grape-shot range, and firing upon the deep masses crowding together as they fell back into the elbow of the Alle, he made frightful havoc among them. Our line of infantry followed this movement, and advanced under the protection of general Senarmont's numerous guns. The Russians, thrust further and further back into this gulf, felt a sort of despair, and made an effort to extricate themselves. Their imperial guard, appressed upon the Mill Stream, issued from that retreat, and marched, with bayonet

fixed, upon Dupont's division, also placed along the rivulet. The latter, without waiting for the imperial guard, went to meet it, repulsed it with the bayonet, and forced it back to the ravine. Thus driven, some of the Russians threw themselves beyond the ravine, the others upon the suburbs of Friedland. General Dupont, with part of his division, crossed the Mill Stream, drove before him all that he met, found himself on the rear of the right wing of the Russians, engaged with our left in the plain of Heinrichsdorf, turned Friedland, and attacked it by the Königsberg road; while Ney, continuing to march straight forward, entered by the Eylau road. A terrible conflict ensued at the gates of the town. The assailants pressed the Russians in all quarters, they forced their way into the streets in pursuit of them, they drove them upon the bridges of the Alle, which general Senarmont's artillery, left outside, enfiladed with its shot. The Russians rushed upon the bridges to seek refuge in the ranks of the fourteenth division, left in reserve on the other side of the Alle, by general Benningsen. That unfortunate general, full of grief, had hurried to this division, with the intention of taking it to the bank of the river to the assistance of his endangered army. Scarcely had some wrecks of his left wing passed the bridges, when those bridges were destroyed, set on fire by the French and by the Russians themselves, in their anxiety to stop us. Ney and Dupont, having performed their task, met in the heart of Friedland in flames, and congratulated one another on this glorious success.

Napoleon, placed in the centre of the divisions which he kept in reserve, had never ceased to watch this grand sight. While he was contemplating it attentively, a ball passed at the height of the bayonets, and a soldier, from an instinctive movement, stooped his head. "If that ball were destined for you," said Napoleon, smiling, "though you were to burrow a hundred feet under ground, it would be sure to find you there." Thus he wished to give currency to that useful belief that Fate strikes the brave and the coward without distinction, and that the coward who seeks a hiding-place disgraces himself to no purpose.

On seeing that Friedland was occupied and the bridges of the Alle destroyed, Napoleon at length pushed forward his left upon the right wing of the Russian army, deprived of all means of retreat, and having behind it a river without bridges. General Gortschakoff, who commanded that wing, perceived the danger with which he was threatened, and, thinking to dispel the storm, made an attack on the French line, extending from Posthnen to Heinrichsdorf, formed by the corps of marshal Lannes, by that of Mortier, and by general Grouchy's cavalry. But Lannes, with his grenadiers, made head against the Russians. Marshal Mortier, with the 15th and the fusiliers of the guard opposed to them an iron barrier. Mortier's artillery, in particular, directed by colonel Balbois and an excellent Dutch officer, M. Vanbriennen, made incalculable havoc among them. At length, Napoleon, anxious to take advantage of the rest of the day, carried forward his whole

line. Infantry, cavalry, artillery, started all at once. General Gortschakoff, while he found himself thus pressed, was informed that Friedland was in the possession of the French. In hopes of retaking it, he despatched a column of infantry to the gates of the town. That column penetrated into it, and for a moment drove back Dupont's and Ney's soldiers; but these repulsed in their turn the Russian column. A new fight took place in that unfortunate town, and the possession of it was disputed by the light of the flames that were consuming it. The French finally remained masters, and drove Gortschakoff's corps into that plain without thoroughfare which had served it for field of battle. Gortschakoff's infantry, defended itself with intrepidity, and threw itself into the Alle rather than surrender. Part of the Russian soldiers were fortunate enough to find fordable passages, and contrived to escape. Another drowned itself in the river. The whole of the artillery was left in our hands. A column, the furthest on the right (right of the Russians), fled, and descended the Alle, under general Lambert, with a portion of the cavalry. The darkness of the night and the inevitable disorder of victory, facilitated its retreat, and enabled it to escape from our hands.

It was half-past ten at night. The victory was complete on the left and on the right. Napoleon, in his vast career had not gained a more splendid one. He had for trophies 80 pieces of cannon, few prisoners, it is true, for the Russians chose rather to drown themselves than to surrender, but 25,000 men, killed, wounded, or drowned, covered with their bodies both banks of the Alle. The right bank, to which great numbers of them had dragged themselves, exhibited almost as frightful a scene of carnage as the left bank. Several columns of fire, rising from Friedland and the neighbouring villages, threw a sinister light over that place, a theatre of anguish for some, of joy for others. On our side we had to regret upward of seven or eight thousand men, killed or wounded. Out of about 80,000 French, 25,000 had not fired a shot. The Russian army, deprived of 25,000 combatants, weakened, moreover, by a great number of men who had lost their way, was thenceforward incapable of keeping the field. Napoleon had owed this glorious triumph as much to the general conception of the campaign as to the plan itself of the battle. In taking for several months past the Passarge for base, in thus securing to himself beforehand and in all cases the means of separating the Russians from Königsberg, in marching from Guttstadt to Friedland in such a manner as constantly to outwing them, he had obliged them to commit a great imprudence in order to reach Königsberg, and had deserved from fortune the lucky chance of finding them at Friedland backed upon the river Alle. Always disposing his masses with consummate skill, he had contrived, while sending sixty and odd thousand men to Königsberg, to bring forward 80,000 at Friedland. And, as we have just seen, there was no need for so many to overwhelm the Russian army.

Napoleon slept on the field of battle, surrounded by his soldiers, joyous on this occasion, as at Austerlitz and Jena, shouting, *Vive l'Empereur!* though they had nothing to eat but a piece of bread brought in their knapsacks, and contenting themselves with the noblest of the acquisitions of victory—glory. The Russian army, cut in two, descended the Alle in a clear, transparent night, with soul steeped in despair, though it had done all its duty. Fortunately for it, Napoleon had at hand only half his cavalry. If he had had the other half and Murat himself, the entire Russian corps descending the Alle under general Lambert would have been taken.

So rapid was the march of the Russians, that on the following day they were at Wehlau on the Pregel. They cut down all the bridges, and, on the morning of the 16th, they established themselves a little beyond the Pregel, at Petersdorf, intending not to retire to the Niemen till the detached corps of generals Kamenski and Lestocq, incapable of defending Königsberg against the French army, had joined them, for the purpose of effecting their retreat together.

On the day after the battle of Friedland, Napoleon lost not a moment in deriving from his victory all the results possible. Having, according to custom, visited the field of battle, shown a warm interest for the wounded, informed his soldiers what rewards his high fortune permitted him to promise and to give, he had set out for the Pregel, preceded by all his cavalry, which ran in pursuit of the Russians while descending both banks of the Alle. But the Russians had twelve hours' start, for it had been impossible to deny a night's rest to soldiers who had marched the whole of the preceding night in order to reach the field of battle, and who had afterwards fought all day, from two in the morning till ten at night. The Russians, having thus the advantage of some hours, and retiring with the celerity of an army which cannot find safety but in flight, we could not flatter ourselves that we should reach the Pregel before them. When we arrived there, all the bridges were broken down. Napoleon lost no time in re-establishing them, and making the dispositions necessary for enabling us to secure between the Pregel and Niemen, all the prizes which we had not had time to take between Friedland and Wehlau.

While he was occupied with the Russian army at Friedland, marshals Soult and Davout, preceded by Murat, had marched for Königsberg. Marshal Soult, falling in with the rear-guard of general Lestocq, had taken from it an entire battalion, and had surrounded and taken, near Königsberg itself, a column of twelve or fifteen hundred men, which had not retired in time from the environs of Braunsberg. He had appeared on the 14th under the walls of Königsberg, too well defended for it to be possible to take it by a sudden attack. Davout and Murat, having for their part received orders to return to Friedland, in case the battle should have lasted more than one day, had both left marshal Soult and proceeded to the right for Wehlau. Having received fresh tidings by the way, and learned the victory of Friedland and the retreat of

the Russians, they had directed their march to Tapiau on the Pregel, an intermediate point between Königsberg and Wehlau. Having collected the means of passing the Pregel, they had crossed it, in order to intercept as many of the Russian troops as they could on their flight.

On the news of the battle of Friedland, the Prussian and Russian detachments guarding Königsberg no longer hesitated to quit that place, which was not in a condition to sustain a siege like Dantzic. The court of Prussia had already fled to the small frontier town of Memel, the last of the kingdom founded by the great Frederick. Generals Kamenski and Lestocq therefore retired, abandoning the immense stores, as well as the sick and wounded of the two armies, collected at Königsberg. A battalion, left to stipulate the capitulation, delivered it to marshal Soult, who could enter immediately. In Königsberg were found corn, wine, 100,000 muskets, sent by England, and still on board the vessels which had brought them, lastly, a considerable number of wounded, who had been there ever since Eylau. Of these, the surrounding villages contained several thousand.

Generals Lestocq and Kamenski, bringing their troops in the greatest haste by the Königsberg road to Tilsit, threw themselves into the forest of Baum, before marshal Davout and prince Murat had intercepted the route from Tapiau to Labiau. Still, they did not join general Benningsen without leaving 3,000 prisoners in the hands of marshal Davout.

Napoleon, having arrived at Wehlau, continued to follow up the Russian army without intermission, and to lay snares for its detached corps with a view to take such as should be behind. He kept marshal Soult at Königsberg, to establish himself there, and to commence immediately the attack of Pillau. That little fort taken, the garrison of Königsberg was to give the hand by the Nehrung to the garrison of Dantzic, and moreover to close against the English the Frische Haff, the navigation of which was at this moment performed by the seamen of the guard. He sent his aide-de-camp, Savary, to take the command of the citadel of Königsberg, as he had sent Rapp to Dantzic, with the intention of preventing waste of the stores taken from the enemy, and of creating a new dépôt. He directed marshal Davout upon Labiau, the point where the whole inland navigation of these provinces terminates at the Baltic, and gave him a corps of some thousand horse under general Grouchy to pick up the Russian detachments left behind. He sent off Murat, with the bulk of the cavalry, upon the direct road from Wehlau to Tilsit, and despatched after him the corps of Mortier, Lannes, Victor, and Ney. Davout's corps was, in case of emergency, to rejoin the army by a single march. Napoleon was, therefore, strong enough to crush the Russians, if they had the presumption to stop again to fight. On the right, he threw out 2,000 light horse, hussars and chasseurs, to ascend the Pregel, and to bar the road against all who should retire on that side, wounded, sick, stragglers, convoys.

These skilful dispositions occasioned the capture of several thousand

more prisoners and of divers convoys of provisions, but they could not procure us another battle with the Russians. In haste to take refuge behind the Niemen, they arrived there on the 18th, finished crossing on the 19th, and destroyed all the means of passage for a considerable distance. On the 19th, our scouts, after pursuing some parties of Calmucks armed with bows, which highly amused our soldiers, unaccustomed to that kind of enemy, pushed on to the Niemen, and saw the Russian army on the other side of the river, encamped behind that bulwark of the empire which it had been so impatient to reach.

There was destined to end the daring march of the French army, which, setting out from the camp of Boulogne, in September, 1805, had traversed the continent in its greatest width, and conquered in twenty months all the armies of Europe. The new Alexander was about to pause at last, not on account of the fatigue of his soldiers, ready to follow him whithersoever he should wish to lead them, but on account of the exhaustion of his enemies, incapable of further resistance, and obliged to beg that peace which, a few days before, they had had the imprudence to refuse.

The king of Prussia had left at Memel the queen, his consort, the afflicted instigator of that fatal war, to rejoin the emperor Alexander on the banks of the Niemen. The modest Frederick William, though not sharing the silly illusions which the battle of Eylau had excited in his young ally, had nevertheless, yielded to his persuasions to refuse peace, and he now foresaw that he should have to pay for that refusal with the greater part of his dominions. Alexander was dispirited, as on the day after Austerlitz. He was angry on account of recent events with general Benningsen, who had promised what he could not perform, and he felt that he had no further strength to continue the war. His army, too, cried out loudly for peace. It was not dissatisfied with itself, for it was aware that it had behaved well at Heilsberg and Friedland; but it considered itself incapable of coping with the army of Napoleon, collected entire since the taking of Königsberg, reinforced by Massena, who had just repulsed Tolstoy's corps at Dürzewo, and able to oppose 170,000 men to the 70,000 Russian and Prussian soldiers who were still left. They asked for whom the war was carried on; was it for the Prussians, who could not defend their own country? Was it for the English, who, after so frequently announcing succours, sent none, and thought only of conquering colonies? The contempt expressed for the Prussians was unjust, for they had conducted themselves gallantly of late, and had done all that could be expected from their small number. The Prussians, in their turn, complained of the barbarism, the ignorance, the devastating ferocity of the Russian soldiers. The two agreed in nothing but in regard to the English. These, indeed, by landing either at Stralsund or at Dantzic, might have brought useful succours, and perhaps have changed, or at least slackened the course of events. But they had shown no activity except in sending expeditions to the Spanish colonies; and about the very subsidies,

which, in default of armies, constituted their sole co-operation, they had haggled till they had cooled the king of Sweden and disgusted him with the war. It is a relief under misfortune to be able to complain, and at this moment, Russians and Prussians inveighed vehemently against the British cabinet. The Russian officers, in particular, loudly declared that it was for the English, for their paltry ambition, that brave men were set together by the ears, though they had no reason to hate or even to be jealous of each other, since, after all, Russia and France had nothing to envy one another.

The two vanquished monarchs shared the animosity of their soldiers against England, and felt still more than they the necessity of separating from her, and obtaining peace immediately. The king of Prussia, who would have wished for it earlier, and who foresaw how dearly he should pay for having retarded it, was of opinion, without complaining, that they ought to solicit it of Napoleon, and left the business of negotiating it to the emperor Alexander. He hoped that his friend who alone had insisted on that fatal prolongation of the war, would defend him in the negotiations better than on the field of battle. It was therefore agreed that they should propose an armistice, and that, having obtained this armistice, the emperor Alexander should seek to obtain an interview with Napoleon. It was known by experience how extremely sensible he was to the attentions of hostile sovereigns, how accommodating on the morrow of his victories; and the recollection of what the emperor Francis had obtained from him at the bivouac of Urschitz encouraged hopes of a peace less disadvantageous than might be feared, if not for Russia, which had nothing but consideration to lose, at least for Prussia, which was wholly in the hands of the conqueror.

In consequence, on the 19th of June, prince Bagration transmitted to Murat, at the advanced posts, a letter written to him by the general-in-chief Benningsen, in which the latter, deploring the miseries of war, offered an armistice as the means of putting an end to them. This letter, delivered to Napoleon, who at that moment arrived at Tilsit, was very favourably received; for, as we have said, he began to find how much distance aggravated the difficulties of military operations. It was nearly a year that he had been far away from the centre of his empire, and he felt an urgent desire to return thither, to assemble in particular the Legislative Body, the meeting of which he had deferred, not choosing to call it together in his absence. Lastly, in listening to the language held by the Russian army, he was led to think that he should perhaps find in Russia that ally whom he needed for closing the continent against England for ever.

He returned therefore an amicable answer, saying that, after so many efforts, fatigues, victories, he desired nothing but a safe and honourable peace, and, if this armistice could be the means of effecting that, he was ready to consent to it. Upon this answer, prince Labanoff repaired to Tilsit, had an interview with Napoleon, repre-

sented to him the dispositions that were manifested by all about Alexander; and after having received the assurance that, on the part of the French, the wish for peace was not less strong, though less commanded by necessity, he agreed to an armistice. Napoleon required that the Prussian fortresses in Pomerania and Poland, which still held out, such as Colberg, Pillau, Graudenz, should be given up to him. But for this the consent of the king of Prussia would be necessary, and he was then absent from the Russian headquarters. Some resistance was, indeed, apprehended on his part, when it should be proposed to him to give up fortresses, the last remaining in his hands. A separate armistice was in consequence stipulated between the French and Russian armies, which was signed on the 22nd of June by prince Labanoff and the prince of Neufchatel, and carried to the head-quarters of Alexander, who ratified it immediately.

Marshal Kalkreuth then came forward to treat on behalf of the Prussian army. Napoleon received him with many civilities, told him that he was the distinguished and still more the courteous officer, who alone, of all the officers of his nation had treated the French prisoners humanely; that, on this account, he received and granted a suspension of arms, without insisting on the delivery of the Prussian fortresses. It was a pledge that he was generous to leave in the hands of Prussia, and which could not give uneasiness to the French army, too solidly established on the Vistula by Warsaw, Thorn, and Dantzic, on the Pregel by Königsberg and Wehlau, to have any thing to fear from such points as Colberg, Pillau, and Graudenz. The armistice was therefore signed with marshal Kalkreuth, as it had been with prince Labanoff. The demarcation which separated the belligerent armies was the Niemen as far as Grodno, and then, turning backward on the right, the Bober as far as its influx into the Narew, and lastly the Narew as far as Pultusk and Warsaw.

Napoleon, never relaxing his usual vigilance, organized himself behind this line, as if he was soon to continue the war and carry it into the heart of the Russian empire. He drew Massena's corps nearer to him, and established it at Bialistock. He united Dombrowski's and Zayonschek's Poles into a single corps of 10,000 men, which was to connect Massena with marshal Ney. He placed the latter at Gumbinnen on the Pregel. He collected at Tilsit marshals Mortier, Lannes, Bernadotte, Davout, the cavalry, and the guard. He left marshal Soult at Königsberg. He ordered an entrenched camp to be prepared at Wehlau, to concentrate himself there in case of need, with his whole army. He gave orders at Dantzic and Königsberg for withdrawing part of the immense stores found in those places and sending them off to the Niemen. Lastly, he enjoined general Clarke, at Berlin, and marshal Kellermann, at Mayence, to continue to direct the marching regiments to the Vistula, just as if the war was not interrupted. Of the various measures which he adopted for augmenting his forces in spring, he suspended

but one, namely, the calling out of the second portion of the conscription of 1808. He was desirous that this news, accompanying that of his triumphs, should be an additional reason for France to rejoice and to applaud his victories.

In this imposing attitude, Napoleon awaited the opening of the negotiations, and invited M. de Talleyrand who had gone to Dantzic to seek a little safety and quiet, to come immediately to Tilsit to lend him the aid of his shrewdness and patient ingenuity. According to his custom, Napoleon addressed to his army a proclamation impressed with the two-fold greatness of his soul and of the circumstances. It was as follows:

“Soldiers,

“On the 5th of June we were attacked in our cantonments by the Russian army. The enemy had mistaken the causes of our inactivity. He perceived too late that our repose was that of the lion: he repents of having disturbed it.

“In the battles of Guttstadt and Heilsberg, and in that ever memorable one of Friedland, in a campaign of ten days, in short, we have taken 120 pieces of cannon, seven colours, killed, wounded, or made prisoners, 60,000 Russians, taken from the enemy's army all its magazines, its hospitals, its *ambulances*, the fortress of Königsberg, the 300 vessels which were in that port, laden with all kds of military stores, 160,000 muskets which England was sending to arm our enemies.

“From the banks of the Vistula, we have come with the speed of the eagle to those of the Niemen. You celebrated at Austerlitz the anniversary of the coronation; this year, you have worthily celebrated that of the battle of Marengo, which put an end to the war of the second coalition.

“Frenchmen, you have been worthy of yourselves and of me. You will return to France covered with laurels, and, after obtaining a glorious peace, which carries with it the guarantee of its duration. It is high time for our country to live in quiet, screened from the malignant influence of England. My bounties shall prove to you my gratitude, and the full extent of the love that I feel for you.

“*At the Imperial Camp of Tilsit, June 22nd, 1807.*”

The two vanquished sovereigns were in a still greater hurry than Napoleon to open the negotiations. Prince Labanoff, one of those Russians who wished most sincerely for harmony between France and Russia, returned on the 24th to Tilsit, to obtain an audience of Napoleon. It was immediately granted. That Russian noble expressed the strong desire felt by his master to put an end to the war, his excessive disgust for the English alliance, his extreme impatience to see the great man of the age, and to come to a frank and cordial explanation with him. Napoleon desired nothing better than to meet that young sovereign of whom he had heard so much, whose understanding, grace, and seduction, which were highly extolled, excited in him great curiosity and little fear, for when he entered into communication with men he was more certain to win

than to be won. Napoleon accepted the interview for the following day, the 25th of June.

He determined that a certain pomp should mark this meeting of the two most powerful princes in the world, to confer about terminating their sanguinary quarrel. He had a large raft moored by general Lariboissière of the artillery in the middle of the Niemen, equidistant from and within sight of both banks of the river. Upon one part of this raft a pavilion was constructed with all the rich stuffs to be procured in the little town of Tilsit, for the reception of the two monarchs. On the 25th, at one o'clock in the afternoon, Napoleon embarked on the river, accompanied by the grand-duke of Berg, the prince of Neufchatel, marshals Bessière and Duroc, and Caulaincourt, grand-equerrey. At the same instant, Alexander quitted the other bank, accompanied by the grand-duke Constantine, generals Benningsen and Ouwaroff, prince Labanoff, and count Lieven. The two boats reached the raft at the same time, and the first movement of Napoleon and Alexander on meeting was to embrace one another. This testimony of a frank reconciliation, perceived by the numerous spectators who lined the river, for the Niemen at this place is not wider than the Seine, excited vehement applause. The two armies, in fact, were ranged along the Niemen; the half-savage people of these parts had joined them; and the witnesses of this extraordinary scene, little versed in the secrets of politics, seeing their masters embrace, imagined that peace was concluded, and a stop thenceforward put to the spilling of their blood.

After this first demonstration, Alexander and Napoleon entered the pavilion which had been prepared for their reception.* “Why

* It is very difficult to ascertain precisely what passed in the long conversations which Napoleon and Alexander had together at Tilsit. All Europe has rung with controverted statements relative to this subject, and not only have chimerical conversations been invented, but there have been published a quantity of treaties under the designation of secret articles of Tilsit, which are absolute forgeries. The English in particular, to justify their subsequent conduct towards Denmark, have put forth a great many secret articles of Tilsit, as they are called, some devised after the event by collectors of treaties, others really communicated at the time to the cabinet of London by diplomatic spies, who, on this occasion, ill-earned the money that was lavished upon them. Thanks to the authentic and official documents, which I have been enabled to consult, I shall make known for the first time the real stipulations of Tilsit, both public and secret: I shall furnish, in particular, the substance of the conversations of Napoleon and Alexander. For this purpose, I shall have recourse to a very curious collection, probably doomed to remain secret for a long time, but from which I can without indiscretion extract what relates to Tilsit. I allude to the private correspondence of Messrs. de Savary and de Caulaincourt with Napoleon, and the correspondence of Napoleon with them. General Savary remained some months at Petersburg as envoy-extraordinary; M. de Caulaincourt resided there several years in quality of ambassador. The devotedness of the one, the veracity of the other, forbid any doubt of the pains which they took to acquaint Napoleon with the whole truth, and I must say that the tone of sincerity which pervades that correspondence is honourable to both. Fearful of substituting their judgment for that of Napoleon, and anxious to enable him to judge for himself, they were accustomed to annex to their despatches minutes, in question and answer, of their private conversations with Alexander.

are we at war?" they asked one another in commencing this conversation. Napoleon, in fact, was warring with Russia only as an ally of England; and Russia, on her part, though justly uneasy about the continental domination of France, was serving the interests of England much more than her own in persevering in this contest with such animosity as she had done. "If your grudge is against England and against her alone," said Alexander to Napoleon, "we shall easily agree, for I have as much reason to complain of her as you have." He then enumerated his grievances against Great Britain, the avarice, the selfishness, which she had manifested, the false promises with which she had lured him, the deserted state in which she had left him, with the resentment excited by a disastrous war which he had been obliged to wage single-handed. Napoleon seeking to discover what were the sentiments of the speaker which he ought to flatter, soon perceived that two were then predominant: in the first place, deep spleen against allies,

The one and the other had interviews with him almost every day *tête-à-tête*, in the greatest familiarity, and in reporting word for word what he said, they have drawn, without pretending to do so, a most interesting and certainly a most faithful portrait of him. Many people, and many Russians, in particular, in order to excuse this intimacy of Alexander's with Napoleon, place it to the account of policy, and, making him more profound than he was, say that he was deceiving Napoleon. This singular excuse would not even be attempted, if such persons had read the correspondence in question. Alexander was dissembling, but he was impressionable, and in these conversations we find him incessantly throwing off all restraint, and saying whatever he thought. It is certain that he attached himself for some time, not to the person of Napoleon, who always excited in him a certain apprehension, but to his policy, and that he served it very actively. He had conceived a very natural ambition which Napoleon suffered to spring up, which he flattered for a while, and which he ended with deceiving. Then it was that Alexander detached himself from France, detached himself before he avowed it, which constituted for a moment that falseness which the Russians place to his credit, but which scarcely was such, so easy was it to discern in his language and in his involuntary movements the change of his dispositions. I should be anticipating the history of later times, were I to mention here what was that ambition of Alexander's which Napoleon flattered, and which at last he would not gratify. What I ought to explain at this moment is how the long series of conversations between Alexander and Messrs. de Savary and de Caulaincourt could enable me to clear up the mystery of Tilsit. It was in the following manner that I arrived at this elucidation. Alexander, full of the recollections of Tilsit, was incessantly relating to Messrs. de Savary and de Caulaincourt all that had been said and done in that celebrated interview, and frequently repeated the conversations of Napoleon, the expressions, by turns profound and poignant, which dropped from his lips, and particularly the promises which he said he had received. All this, faithfully transcribed, on the very same day, was transmitted to Napoleon, who sometimes disputed, at other times visibly admitted, as not capable of being disputed, what they reported to him. It is from the contradictory reproductions of these recollections that I have derived the particulars which I am about to furnish, and the authenticity of which cannot be questioned. I have obtained, moreover, from a foreign source, equally authentic and official, the communication of very curious despatches containing the private conversations of the queen of Prussia, on her return from Tilsit, with an old diplomatist, worthy of her confidence, of her friendship. It is with the assistance of these different materials that I have composed the sketch which I am about to submit to the reader, and which I believe to be the only true one among all those that pretend to describe the memorable scenes of Tilsit.

burdensome like Prussia, or selfish like England; and in the next, a very sensitive and deeply mortified pride. He took pains therefore to prove to young Alexander that he had been duped by his allies, that, moreover, he had conducted himself with nobleness and courage. He strove to persuade him that Russia was wrong to persist in patronising ungrateful and jealous neighbours, like the Germans, or in serving the interests of greedy traders, like the English. He attributed this mistake to generous sentiments carried to excess, to misconceptions to which ministers, incompetent or bribed, had given rise. Lastly, he highly extolled the bravery of the Russian soldiers, and told the emperor Alexander that, if they were to unite the two armies which had fought so valiantly against one another at Austerlitz, at Eylau, at Friedland, but which in those battles had both behaved like real giants fighting blindfold, they might divide the world between them, for its own peace and welfare. He then insinuated, but very cautiously, that, by waging war with France, Russia was spending her strength without any possible compensation; whereas, if she would unite with France in subjecting the West and East, on land and on sea, she would gain as much glory and certainly more profit. Without explaining himself further, he seemed to take it upon him to make the fortune of his young antagonist much more satisfactorily than they who had led him into a career in which he had hitherto met with nothing but defeats. Alexander, it is true, was under engagements to Prussia, and it was requisite that his honour should get out of that situation unstained. The Emperor, therefore, gave him to understand that he would restore to him so much of the Prussian States as would be required to release him honourably from his engagements to his allies, after which the Russian cabinet would be at liberty to follow a new policy, the only true, the only profitable policy, resembling in all respects that of the great Catherine.

This conversation, which had lasted above an hour, and which had touched upon all questions without investigating them thoroughly, had deeply moved Alexander. Napoleon had opened to him new prospects, which is always a pleasing thing to a sickle, and especially to a discontented, mind. Besides, more than once Alexander, amidst his defeats, feeling keenly the inconveniences of that furious war into which he had been led against France, and the advantages of a system of union with her, had said to himself something like what Napoleon had just been saying to him, but not with that clearness, that force, and above all that seduction of a conqueror, who presents himself to the conquered with hands full of presents, with mouth full of caressing words. Alexander was seduced—Napoleon clearly perceived it, and promised himself soon to render the seduction complete.

After flattering the monarch, he resolved to flatter the man. "You and I," said he, "shall understand each other better, if we treat directly, than by employing our ministers, who frequently deceive or misunderstand us, and we shall advance business more in an hour than our negotiators in several days. Between you and

me," he added, "there must be no third person." It was impossible to flatter Alexander in a more sensible manner, than by attributing to him a superiority over those around him, similar to that which Napoleon had a right to attribute to himself over all his servants. In consequence, Napoleon proposed to him to leave the hamlet where he was living, and to establish himself in the little town of Tilsit, which should be neutralized to receive him, and where they might treat of business themselves, in person, at any hour. This proposal was eagerly accepted, and it was agreed that M. de Labanoff should go that day to Tilsit to make the necessary arrangements. They had still to talk of that unfortunate king of Prussia, who was at Alexander's head-quarters, awaiting what should be done with him and his kingdom. Alexander offered to bring him to that same raft on the Niemen to introduce him to Napoleon, who should address a few soothing words to him. It was necessary, in fact, that Alexander, before he passed from one system of politics to another, should, if he meant not to dishonour himself, have saved some portion of the crown of his ally. Napoleon, who had already taken his determination on this point, and who was well aware that he must grant certain concessions to save the honour of Alexander, consented to receive the king of Prussia on the following day. The two sovereigns then left the pavilion, and, passing from serious affairs to testimonies of courtesy, complimented the persons of their respective suites. Napoleon treated the grand-duke Constantine and general Benningsen in a flattering manner. Alexander congratulated Murat and Berthier on being the worthy lieutenants of the greatest captain of modern times. Parting with fresh demonstrations of friendship, the two emperors again embarked, in sight and amidst the applause of the numerous spectators assembled on the banks of the Niemen.

Prince Labanoff came in the afternoon to the French headquarters, to settle every thing relative to the removal of the emperor Alexander to Tilsit. It was agreed that the town of Tilsit should be neutralized; that the emperor Alexander should occupy one half, the emperor Napoleon the other; that the Russian imperial guard should pass to the left bank to do duty about its sovereign, and that this change of abode should take place the very next day, after the presentation of the king of Prussia to Napoleon.

Accordingly, on the next day, the 26th of June, the two emperors, conveyed, as on the preceding day, to the middle of the Niemen, observing the same etiquette, repaired to the pavilion where their first interview had taken place. Alexander brought the king of Prussia. That prince had not received any grace from Nature, and misfortune, grief, could not be supposed to have conferred any. He was an honest man, sensible, modest, and awkward. He did not humble himself before the conqueror; he was sad, dignified and stiff. The conversation could not be long, for he was the prince vanquished by Napoleon, the *protégé* of Alexander, and if there appeared to be a disposition to restore to him part of his dominions, which was probable, but not certain, from the conver-

sation of the preceding day, it was the policy of Napoleon which granted that restitution for the honour of Alexander; but nothing was done for him, nothing was expected of him, so that there were no explanations to give him. The interview, consequently, could not but be short, and so it really was. The king of Prussia, however, appeared to make a particular point of proving that he had not wronged Napoleon, and that if, after having long been the ally of France, he had become her enemy, it was by the effect of circumstances, and not in consequence of any breach of engagement for which an honest man ought to blush. Napoleon, on his part, affirmed that he had nothing to reproach himself with, and too generous, and too sensible to wound an humbled prince, he merely said to him that the cabinet of Berlin, often warned to beware of the intrigues of England, had committed the fault of not listening to this friendly counsel, and that to this cause alone were to be ascribed the disasters of Prussia. For the rest, Napoleon added that France, victorious, did not pretend to draw the very last consequences from her victories, and that in a few days they should probably be so fortunate as to come to an understanding relative to the conditions of an honourable and solid peace.

The three sovereigns parted, after an interview which had lasted scarcely half an hour. It was decided that the king of Prussia also should come to Tilsit to reside with his ally the emperor of Russia.

At five o'clock the same day Alexander crossed the Niemen. Napoleon went to the bank of the river to meet him, conducted him to the quarters destined for him, and received him at dinner with the highest honours and the most delicate attentions. From that day it was settled that the emperor Alexander, not having his household with him, should take all his meals with the Emperor Napoleon. They passed the evening together, conversed for a long time in a confidential manner, and their nascent intimacy was manifested on both sides by a familiarity at once dignified and graceful.

Next day, the 27th, they mounted their horses to review the French imperial guard. These old soldiers of the Revolution, by turns soldiers of the Republic, of the Empire, and always heroic servants of France, showed themselves with pride to the sovereign whom they had vanquished. They had not to display to him the lofty stature, the regular and measured march, of the soldiers of the North; but they exhibited that freedom of movement, that assurance of attitude, and that intelligence of look, which accounted for their victories and their superiority over all the armies of Europe. Alexander complimented them highly. They answered his flatteries with repeated shouts of "*Vive Alexandre! vive Napoleon!*"

It was forty-eight hours since the two emperors first met, and they were already on such intimate terms that they could speak out freely. Napoleon then laid before the astonished eyes of Alexander the designs in which he would fain associate him—designs suggested to him by recent circumstances.

It was an extraordinary situation, that of Napoleon at this

moment. While showing conspicuously the greatness of his genius, the prodigious height of his fortune, it revealed at the same time the weak sides of his policy, an extravagant and variable policy, like the passions which produced it.

We have often adverted to the alliances of France at that period; we have often said that, for realizing the alarming phenomenon, happily impossible, of universal monarchy, Napoleon should have done nothing less than strive to number in Europe other than enemies, publicly or secretly leagued against him, and that he should have endeavoured to make himself a friend there—at least one. We have said that Spain, our most ancient and most natural ally, was completely disorganized, and, till her entire regeneration, destined to be a burden to those who should unite themselves with her; that Italy was yet to create; that England, uneasy about the possession of India, alarmed to see us established at the Texel, at Antwerp, at Brest, at Cadiz, at Toulon, at Genoa, at Naples, at Venice, at Trieste, at Corfu, as proprietors or sovereigns, was irreconcilable with us; that Austria would be implacable so long as we had not restored or made her forget Italy; that Russia was jealous of us on the continent, as of England on the Ocean; that Prussia alone, the natural rival of Austria, a neighbour threatened by Russia, a Protestant, innovating power, enriched by the possessions of the Church, was the only one whose political interests and moral principles were not absolutely incompatible with ours, and that in her was to be sought that strong and sincere friend by whose means all coalitions would be rendered either impracticable or incomplete. But we have seen that Prussia, placed between the two parties which then divided the world, wavering and hesitating, had committed faults of weakness, Napoleon faults of strength; that a deplorable rupture had ensued; that Napoleon had gained the immense military glory, had the immense political misfortune to destroy in a fortnight a monarchy which was our only possible ally in Europe; lastly, that the Russians coming to the assistance of the Prussians in Poland, as they had done to the assistance of the Austrians in Galicia, he had crushed them at Friedland as at Austerlitz.

Conqueror of the entire continent, surrounded by powers successively beaten, the one ten days before at Friedland, the other eight months before at Jena, the third eighteen months before at Austerlitz, Napoleon found himself at liberty to choose, not between sincere friends, but between officious, submissive, obsequious friends. If, by a concatenation of things, almost impossible to break, the moment for attempting a Russian alliance had not then arrived for him, he would have been able at this moment, to control Fate in some measure, to return suddenly into the ways of sound policy, never to leave them again, and he would there have found, with less apparent power, more real strength, and perhaps an everlasting duration, if not for his dynasty, at least for the greatness of France, which he loved as much as his dynasty. For this he must have conducted himself as a generous conqueror, and by an unexpected

act, but by no means odd though unexpected, have raised prostrate Prussia, recomposed her stronger, more extensive than ever, saying to her, You have done wrong, you have not been candid with me; I have punished you for it; let us forget your defeat and my victory; I am aggrandizing instead of diminishing you. that you may be for ever my ally. Assuredly Frederick William, who had an aversion for war, who daily reproached himself for having suffered others to drag him into it, and who subsequently, in 1813, when Napoleon, half vanquished, presented a prey easy to devour, still hesitated to avail himself of the turn of Fortune, and who took up arms only because his people took them up in spite of him,—this king, loaded with benefits after Jena and Friedland, forced to gratitude, would never have formed part of a coalition, and Napoleon, having only Austria and Russia to fight, would not have been overwhelmed. If Napoleon desired a crown in Germany for one of his brothers—an unlucky and unwise desire—he had Hesse, which Prussia would have been too happy to relinquish to him. He would have held the fate of Hanover in suspense, ready to give it to England as the price of peace, or to Prussia as the price of a close alliance. And as for the emperor Alexander, having nothing to take from him, nothing to restore to him, Napoleon would have left him without a single grievance, by reconstituting Prussia on the morrow of the joint defeat of the Russians and the Prussians. He would have constrained her to admire the conqueror, to sign the peace without saying a word, without any more talk about Italy, or Holland, or Germany, the ordinary pretexts at that period for disputes between France and Russia.

What we are imagining here was no doubt a Utopia, not of generosity, for Napoleon was perfectly capable of that unexpected, that dazzling generosity which sometimes springs from a great heart eager after glory, but a Utopia with reference to the combinations of the moment. At that time, indeed, the course of events which leads men, even the most powerful, conducted Napoleon to other resolutions. In regard to alliances, he had, though only in the middle of his reign, already tried all sorts of them. No sooner had he arrived at the consulship, the period of good, wise, profound thoughts, because they were the first that the sight of things inspired him with long before the corruption which springs from prolonged power, he had turned towards Prussia, and made her his ally. For a moment under Paul I., but as an expedient, he had thought of uniting himself with Russia. For a moment again, during the peace of Amiens, he had conceived the idea of uniting himself with England, seduced by the advantage of joining the naval powers to the land power, but only in a transient manner, and Prussia had not ceased to be still his intimate confidante, his accomplice in all the affairs of Europe. Having fallen out with Prussia so seriously as to declare war against her, feeling his loneliness, he made Austria overtures, which would have done little honour to his penetration, if the need to have an ally, even amidst his victories, had

not justified him in seeking not the most likely. Presently, apprized of the treacherous armaments of Austria, intoxicated by Jena, he imagined that he could dispense with every body. Transported into Poland, and surprised after Eylau at the obstacles which Nature can throw in the way of heroism and genius, he had once more thought of alliance with Prussia. But, offended at the answers of that power, answers less eager than he had right to expect of her, and having again proved victorious as ever at Friedland, finally desiring to put an end to a distant war, he had been necessarily led, in turning incessantly in the circle of his thoughts to that which had not yet had its day to that which was favoured by so many present circumstances, to the thought of an alliance with Russia. Alienated definitively from Prussia, which had not the skill to seize a moment of returning kindness for her, irritated to the highest degree at the crafty conduct of Austria, finding Russia disgusted with allies who had so ill seconded her, conceiving that there would be more sincerity in Russia than in Prussia, because there would be less ambiguity of position, lastly, seduced by novelty, which always misleads to a certain degree even the strongest minds, Napoleon thought to make Alexander an ally, a friend, by acquiring an ascendancy over him, by filling his head with ambitious ideas, by placing before his dazzled eyes spells which it was easy to create, to keep up for some time, but not to perpetuate, unless they were renewed by the most dangerous satisfactions. The East naturally presented itself as a resource for procuring young Alexander satisfactions, easy enough to imagine, much less so to realize, but which had all at once been facilitated by an accidental and recent circumstance; so true it is that, when the moment for an event has arrived, every thing seems to favour it, even the most unlooked for accidents.

Napoleon had enlisted the Turks in his quarrel by exciting them to dispute the provinces of the Danube with the conquerors of the Crimea, Egypt with the possessors of India. He had promised to assist them by land against the Russians, by sea against the English, and he had begun by aiding them with his officers to defend the Dardanelles. Lastly, he had engaged not to sign a peace without rendering it common and advantageous to the Ottoman empire. But the unfortunate Selim, hated by the ulemas, whose power he wanted to reduce, by the janissaries, whom he wanted to subject to the European discipline, had expiated his wise and generous designs by a frightful downfall. The ulemas had long manifested a profound defiance of him. The janissaries saw with a sort of frenzy the new troops known by the name of *nizam-djedid*. Both only awaited an opportunity to gratify their resentment. The sultan having required the janissaries keeping garison in the castles of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles to take the costume of the *nizam-djedid*, a revolt broke out among them, and spread with the swiftness of lightning among the companies of janissaries that were either at Constantinople or in the towns near the capital. All thronged to Constanti-

nople, assembled riotously in the square of the At-Meidan (the ancient Hippodrome) with their camp-kettles reversed, the usual sign of revolt, denoting that they refused the food of a master who had become odious to them. The ulemas assembling on their part, declared that a prince who had reigned seven years without having posterity, under whom the pilgrimage to Mecca had been interrupted, was unworthy to reign. The janissaries remaining assembled for several days, had successively demanded, obtained, and in some instances taken without their being given to them, the heads of the ministers of the Porte accused of favouring the new system; and, at length, the revolt becoming more alarming, the mufti had proclaimed the deposition of Selim and the elevation of Mustapha to the throne. The unfortunate Selim, confined in an apartment of the Seraglio, had reason to hope, it is true, for the assistance of his army commanded by a devoted subject, the grand-vizier Baraictar. But this assistance would involve serious dangers, for it was to be feared that the appearance of the grand-vizier at the head of faithful soldiers would cause the dethroned sultan to be murdered before he could be rescued. Such was the intelligence which Napoleon received at his head-quarters at Tilsit on the 24th of June. According to all probability, the new Turkish government would be inimical to France, merely because the overturned government had been her friend. It was certain, besides, that the anarchy which was undermining this unfortunate empire classed it with Spain among those allies, from whom more trouble than service was to be expected, especially when such an ally, placed at the distance which separates Constantinople from Paris, could not be counselled without difficulty or assisted without delay. Napoleon, in whom revolutions of ideas were wrought with the vivacity natural to his genius, all at once viewed the events in the East in a new light. The statesmen of Europe had long considered the Turkish empire as on the eve of dismemberment, and it was in this view that Napoleon had intended to seize beforehand the share of France by taking possession of Egypt. He had for a moment given up this idea, when, in 1802, he thought to reconcile France with all the powers. He reverted to it with vehemence on observing what was passing at Constantinople, and said to himself that since it was impossible to keep that empire alive, the best thing that could be done was to benefit by what it had left for the better arrangement of the affairs of Europe, and particularly for the humiliation of England. He had with him, vanquished but still formidable, the sovereign whose young head it was easy to turn by showing him the mouths of the Danube, the Bosphorus, Constantinople, and he thought that, with some of these Turkish spoils, which sooner or later must devolve to Russia, he might obtain, not only peace, which at the moment was no longer doubtful, but a close, an intimate alliance, by means of which he should conquer England, and accomplish these revolutions on the thrones of the West which he meditated.

Having the emperor Alexander daily at his side, either at re-

views, or in long rides on the banks of the Niemen, or in his writing cabinet, where the map of the world was spread out, and where he often shut himself up with him after dinner, he mastered the mind of that prince to such a degree as to upset it completely by placing before him, in an almost uninterrupted conversation of several days the following views.

A dispensation of Providence, said he to Alexander, has just set me at liberty in regard to the Porte. My ally and my friend, Sultan Selim, has been hurled from the throne into confinement. I did think that one might make something of those Turks, restore to them some energy, teach them to make use of their natural courage: 'tis an illusion. It is time to put an end to an empire which can no longer hold together, and to prevent its spoils from contributing to increase the power of England.

Napoleon thereupon unfolded to Alexander the new projects which he had just conceived. If Alexander desired to be the ally of France, her solid and sincere ally, nothing was more easy, nothing would be more advantageous for himself and for his empire. But this alliance must be entire, without reserve, followed by a complete devotedness to the mutual interests of the two powers. In the first place, this alliance was the only one that was suitable for Russia. What, in fact, was France accused of? of wanting to rule Italy, Holland, perhaps Spain; of wanting to create on the Rhine a system which would overthrow the old preponderance of Austria in Germany, and stop the rising preponderance there of Prussia. But need Russia care about Italy, Spain, Holland? Germany herself, was she not at once jealous of Russia and her secret enemy? Was it not doing Russia a service to weaken the principal German powers? What, on the contrary, was England accused of? of wanting to rule the seas which are the property of every body; to oppress neutral flags, to which the flag of Russia belonged; to possess herself of the commerce of nations; to fleece them by making them pay for colonial produce whatever price she pleased; to set foot wherever she could upon the continent, in Portugal, in Denmark, in Sweden; to take or to threaten the dominant points of the globe, the Cape, Malta, Gibraltar, the Sound, in order to impose her laws on the whole trading world. At this very moment, instead of assisting her allies, was she not endeavouring to conquer Egypt? And recently, if she had possessed herself of the Dardanelles, what would she have done with them? Now, about these English cravings one cannot say as about the longings imputed to France—what do they concern Russia? It was the opinion of the great Catherine and of Paul I. that they deeply concerned Russia, since both of them declared war against Great Britain on account of the rights of the neutral flag. The English oppressed the commerce of nations to such a degree that they had monopolized that of St. Petersburg, all the capitals of which they held, and this became in their hands a dangerous source of influence over Russia, for by merely withholding ready money, they could instigate to murmuring and to the

murdering of emperors. A French army, led by a great captain, could, strictly speaking, come to the Vistula, to the Niemen: would it get to the Neva? An English fleet, on the contrary, after forcing the Sound, could burn Cronstadt, threaten Petersburg, after forcing the Bosphorus, destroy Sevastapol and Odessa. An English fleet could shut up the Russians in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, keep them prisoners in those seas as in a lake. But France and Russia, not touching at any point, having the same enemies, the English on the sea, the Germans on land, having, moreover, a common and pressing object of solicitude, the Turkish empire, ought to be upon good terms, to concert together, and if they chose to do that, they were powerful enough to rule the world between them.

To these grand views Napoleon attached a system of means still more seductive than the general ideas which he had just developed. He was accused of being fond of war for the sake of war. That was not the case, and he would instantly prove it.—Be my mediator, said he to Alexander, with the cabinet of London. That character befits your position as the former ally of England and the future ally of France. I have done thinking of Malta. Let Great Britain keep that island in compensation for what I have acquired since the rupture of the peace of Amiens. But let her in her turn give up the colonies of Spain and of Holland, and at that price I will restore Hanover to her. Are not these conditions just, perfectly equitable? Can I accept others? Can I desert my allies? And, when I sacrifice my conquests on the continent, such a conquest as Hanover, to recover the distant possessions of my allies, is it possible to dispute my probity and my moderation?

Alexander admitted that these conditions were perfectly just, and that France could not accept others. Napoleon, continuing, brought that prince to acknowledge that, if England persisted after such proposals, she ought to be forced to submit, as it was not right that the world should be for ever disturbed by her; and he proved to him that they had the means of reducing her by a mere declaration.—If, said he, England refuses peace on these conditions, proclaim yourself the ally of France; declare that you will join your forces with hers to ensure a maritime peace. Let England know that, besides war with France, she will have war with the whole Continent, with Russia, with Prussia, with Denmark, with Sweden, and with Portugal, which must obey when we signify our will to them, with Austria herself, who will be obliged to speak out in the same spirit, if we declare to her that she shall have war with us, in case she does not choose to have war with England on the conditions signified by us. England then, exposed to a universal war, if she will not conclude an equitable peace—England will lay down her arms.—All this, added Napoleon, ought to be communicated to each cabinet, and precise and short terms fixed for deciding. If England does not yield, we will act in concert, and we shall find sufficient indemnities to compensate us for this continuation of the

war. Two very important countries, one of them in particular for Russia, will perhaps resist. These are Portugal and Sweden, whose maritime position places them under the influence of Great Britain. Relative to Portugal, said Napoleon, I will settle with Spain. You will take Finland, as a compensation for the war which you will have been obliged to wage with Sweden. The king of Sweden, it is true, is your brother-in-law and your ally; let him follow the changes of your policy, or let him take the consequences of his ill-will. Sweden, repeated Napoleon several times, may be a relation, an ally of the moment, but *she is a geographical enemy*.^{*} Petersburg is too near the frontiers of Finland. *The fair Russians of Petersburg must not again hear from their palaces the cannon of the Swedes.*

Napoleon, after assigning Finland to Alexander, as the price of the war against England, held forth to him something still more alluring in the East. "You are to act as mediator with England for me," said he to Alexander, "and as armed mediator who imposes peace. I will act the same part for you with the Porte. I will signify my mediation to her; if she refuses to treat on such conditions as satisfy you in the state of anarchy into which she is fallen, I will unite with you against the Turks, as you will have united with me against the English, and then we shall make a suitable partition of the Ottoman empire."

Here it was especially that the field of hypotheses became immense, and that the imagination of the two sovereigns strayed into infinite combinations. The first wish of Russia was to obtain at once, whatever might result from the negotiation with the Porte, some portion of the provinces of the Danube. Napoleon assented, in return for the assistance which Russia was to lend him in the affairs of the West. However, as it was probable that the Turks would not give up any thing, war would ensue, and after the war the partition. But what partition? Russia might have, besides Bessarabia, Moldavia, Wallachia, Bulgaria, as far as the Balkans. Napoleon would naturally wish for the maritime provinces, such as Albania, Thessaly, Morea, Candia. Some indemnities for Austria would be found in Bosnia and Servia, either ceded to her in full property, or made the apanage of an archduke; and thus they would endeavour to console her for those convulsions of the world, from each of which she would come forth lessened and her rivals aggrandized.

Figure to yourself the young czar, humbled the day before, coming to the camp of Napoleon to solicit peace, feeling of course no uneasiness about his own dominions, the distance of which saved them from the coveting of the conqueror, but expecting to lose a large portion of the territory of his ally the king of Prussia, and to retire disgraced from this war—figure him to yourself, suddenly transported into a sort of world at once imaginary and real, imaginary by its grandeur, real by its possibility, finding himself

^{*} These are the very expressions of Napoleon, repeated by Alexander, in relating to M. de Caulaincourt what had passed at Tilsit.

immediately after a signal defeat, in the way to conquer Finland and part of the Turkish empire, and to acquire, by a disastrous war, more than was formerly acquired by a successful war, as if the honour of having been vanquished by Napoleon was almost equivalent to a victory, and ought to produce the fruits of one—figure to yourself this young monarch, eager after glory, seeking it everywhere for seven years past, sometimes in the precocious civilisation of his empire, sometimes in the creation of a new European equilibrium, and meeting only with unparalleled defeats, then all at once finding that glory so earnestly sought, in a system of alliance with his conqueror, an alliance which was to give him a share in the sway of the world, below but by the side of the great man who was pleased to divide it with him, worth to Russia the brilliant conquests promised by Catherine to her successors, which, since Catherine's time, had fled into the realm of chimeras—figure him to yourself, we say, passing from such deep dejection to such high hopes, and you will comprehend without difficulty his agitation, his intoxication, his sudden friendship for Napoleon—a friendship which assumed the form of an affection enthusiastic and assuredly sincere, at least in these first moments.

Alexander, who, as we have already said, was mild, humane, intelligent, but fickle as his father, rushed eagerly into the new track opened for him by his wily seducer. Never did he once leave Napoleon without expressing his unbounded admiration. What a great man! he said incessantly to those who approached him; what a genius! what extensive views! what a captain! what a statesman! had I but known him sooner, how many faults he might have spared me! what great things we might have accomplished together! His ministers who rejoined him, his generals who were about him, perceived the influence exercised over him, and they were not sorry for it; for they saw him getting out of a deplorable scrape with advantage and honour, judging at least from the satisfaction that beamed from his countenance.

Meanwhile, the unfortunate king of Prussia had come to Tilsit, bringing with him his misfortunes, his affliction, his homely reason, and his modest good sense. Those intoxicating secrets which enraptured Alexander, were not adapted for him. Alexander represented his intimacy with Napoleon as the means of obtaining larger restitutions in favour of Prussia. But he concealed from him the new alliance that was preparing, or intrusted him with only the smallest part of the secret. It would have appeared strange, in fact, that one of the two conquered sovereigns should obtain such fine acquisitions when the other was going to lose half his kingdom. Frederick William, treated with infinite respect by Napoleon, was nevertheless left by himself. On horseback, at the head of troops, he had not the brilliant gracefulness of Alexander, the quiet ascendancy of Napoleon. He remained in general behind, lonely as the unfortunate, making his crowned companions wait when they mounted or alighted from their horses, an object, in short, of little interest and even of less esteem than he deserved; for the French believed, from

the gossip of the imperial court, that Napoleon had been betrayed by Prussia, and the Russians incessantly repeated that she had fought ill. As for Alexander, all attentions were for him. When he returned from long excursions, Napoleon detained him, lent him even furniture, and his linen, and would not let him lose time in going to his quarters to change his dress. A superb dressing-case of gold, used by Napoleon, having appeared to please him, was instantly offered and accepted. After dinner, which the three sovereigns took together, and always at Napoleon's, they separated early, and the two emperors went and shut themselves up together—a privacy from which Frederick William was excluded, and which was always charged to the same account—the efforts making by Alexander with Napoleon to recover the greater part of the Prussian monarchy.

That, however, was not the subject discussed in those long *tête-à-têtes*, but that immense system by which they were to hold joint rule over Europe. The possible, the probable partition of the Turkish empire was the continual topic of conversation. A first partition had been discussed, as we have seen, but it seemed incomplete. Russia was to have the banks of the Danube as far as the Balkans. Napoleon the maritime provinces, such as Albania and the Morea. The inland provinces, as Bosnia and Servia, were allotted to Austria. The Porte retained Roumelia, that is the country south of the Balkans, Constantinople, Asia Minor, Egypt. Thus, according to this plan, Constantinople, the key of the seas, and in the imagination of men the real capital of the East,—Constantinople, so positively promised to the descendants of Peter the Great by the universal opinion, an opinion formed from the hopes of the Russians and the fears of Europe.—Constantinople, with St. Sophia's, was left to the barbarians of Asia!

Alexander reverted to this point several times, and a more complete partition, which should have given Napoleon not only the Morea, but also the islands of the Archipelago, Candia, Syria, Egypt, but Constantinople to the Russians, would have pleased him better. Napoleon, however, who thought that he had done enough, nay, more than enough, to attach the young emperor to himself, would never go so far. To give up Constantinople, no matter to whom, so it were a declared enemy of England, and thus let any one, during his lifetime make the most brilliant acquisition that it was possible to imagine, could not suit Napoleon. He could, indeed, as in obedience to a natural tendency of things, and to resolve many European difficulties, lastly to gain a powerful alliance against England,—he could certainly permit the torrent of Russian ambition to dash against the foot of the Balkans, especially in the desire of diverting that torrent from the Vistula; but he would not suffer it to pass those tutelary mountains. He would not suffer the most striking work of modern times to be accomplished by any one before his face, or at his side. He was too jealous of the greatness of France, too jealous of occupying alone the imagination of mankind, to consent to such an encroachment upon his own glory.

Thus, notwithstanding his strong desire to seduce his new friend,

he never could be persuaded to any other partition than that which should take from the Porte the provinces of the Danube, too loosely attached to the empire, and Greece, already too much awakened to submit long to the yoke of the Turks.

One day the two emperors, on returning from a long ride, shut themselves up in the writing cabinet, where numerous maps were spread out. Napoleon, apparently continuing a conversation briskly began with Alexander, desired M. de Meneval to bring him the map of Turkey, unfolded it, then resumed the conversation, and, suddenly clapping his finger on Constantinople, exclaimed several times, regardless of being heard by his secretary, in whom he had absolute confidence: "Constantinople! Constantinople! never! 'tis the empire of the world!"*

However, Finland, the Danubian provinces, as the price of the concurrence of Russia in the projects of France, held out a prospect sufficiently brilliant to enchant Alexander, for his reign would equal that of the great Catherine, if he obtained these extensive territories. It was in consequence agreed that France and Russia should form from that moment a close alliance, at once defensive and offensive, should have in future only the same friends, the same enemies, should on all occasions direct their joint land and sea forces towards the same object. The number of men and ships to be employed in each particular case, was to be settled afterwards by a special convention. Russia was immediately to offer her mediation to the British cabinet for the re-establishment of peace with France, and, if that mediation on the conditions fixed by Napoleon were not accepted, she bound herself to declare war against Great Britain. Immediately afterwards, they were to force all Europe, Austria included, to concur in that war. If Sweden and Portugal, as it was easy to foresee, should resist, a Russian army was to occupy Finland, a French army Portugal. As for the Turks, Napoleon engaged to offer them his mediation for restoring peace between them and Russia; and if they refused this mediation, it was stipulated that the war of Russia against them should be common to France, and that the powers should afterwards do what they thought fit with the Ottoman empire, with the proviso that dismemberment was to extend no further than the Balkans and the gulf of Salonichi.

These resolutions once adopted in substance, Napoleon undertook to draw up with his own hand the treaties, patent and secret, which were to include them. It was requisite, however, that they should come to an understanding about that unfortunate Prussia which Napoleon had promised not utterly to destroy, and for the honour of Alexander to allow it to subsist, at least in part. There were two fundamental conditions which Napoleon had laid down, and

* I have these particulars from M. de Meneval himself, an eye-witness, and their accuracy is guaranteed, not only by the veracity of that respectable witness, but also by the correspondence of Messrs. de Savary and de Caulaincourt, which proves that, notwithstanding all the efforts of Alexander, the limit of the Balkans was never passed.

from which he would not depart: that is, to take, for the purpose of various combinations, all the German provinces which Prussia possessed on the left of the Elbe, and likewise the Polish provinces which she had acquired by the various partitions of Poland. This was not less than half of the Prussian States, in territory and population. With the provinces of Westphalia, Brunswick, Magdeburg, Thuringia, anciently or recently acquired by Prussia, Napoleon purposed, by uniting them with the grand-duchy of Hesse, to compose a German kingdom, which he should call the kingdom of Westphalia, for his brother Jerome, in order to introduce a member of his family into the Confederation of the Rhine. He had already crowned two of his brothers, the one who reigned in Italy, the other in Holland. He should thus establish a third in Germany. As for Hanover, which had belonged for a moment to Prussia, Napoleon intended to keep it as a pledge of peace with England. With respect to Poland, his idea was to commence its restoration by means of the provinces of Posen and Warsaw, which he should constitute into an independent State, in order to repay the services of the Poles, who had been of little assistance to him hitherto, but might be of greater, when they should combine the advantage of organization with their natural courage; in order, likewise, to abolish by its overthrow the principal and most censurable of the works of the great Frederick—the partition of Poland. Napoleon knew not how much time would subsequently permit him to take from Austria, by exchanges or by force of the Polish provinces retained by that power; and, meanwhile, he revived the kingdom of Poland by the creation of a Polish State of considerable extent and of real importance. To facilitate this restoration still more, he conceived the idea of reverting to another combination of the past, that was, to give Poland to Saxony. Thus, in destroying one of the great monarchies of Germany, Prussia, he designed to substitute for it two new allied monarchies, Westphalia, composed of many fragments, in behalf of his youngest brother, Saxony, so aggrandized to be doubled, and both destined, according to all probability to remain faithfully attached to him. He intended in this manner to re-form a new German equilibrium, and to replace by two alliances the strong alliance of Prussia which he had lost. He assigned, therefore, for limits to the Confederation of the Rhine, the Inn in regard to Austria, the Elbe in regard to Prussia, the Vistula in regard to Russia.

Russia had not many objections to raise against such combinations, especially when once she had determined to associate herself with the policy of France. Excepting the sacrifices imposed on Prussia, excepting the restoration of the kingdom of Poland, she cared but little about these creations, about these dismemberments of German States. But the sacrifices imposed on Prussia were embarrassing for the emperor Alexander, especially when he recollected the oaths sworn over the tomb of the great Frederick, and the demonstrations of chivalrous devotedness lavished on the queen of Prussia. From nine millions and a half of inhabitants, the Prussian monarchy was reduced to five millions. From a revenue of 120 mil-

lions francs, it was reduced to 69. Alexander could not therefore consent to such a lessening of his ally without some objections. He submitted them to Napoleon, and was listened to but coolly. Napoleon replied, that it was out of consideration for him that he left Prussia so many provinces, that, but for the desire to please him, he would have reduced her to a third-rate power. He would even have taken Silesia from her, he said, and either given it to Saxony, for the purpose of transferring to the latter all the consequence which Prussia had possessed, or to Austria in exchange for the Gallicias.

This double combination would certainly have been the better of the two. The determination to sacrifice Prussia once taken, it had been better to destroy her entirely than but half. In all cases it is a bad system to overthrow old States, in order to create new ones; for old States are apt to revive, new ones apt to die, unless you act decidedly in a manner consistent with the progress of things. The progress of things had brought with it the gradual aggrandizement of Prussia, the gradual destruction of Poland and Saxony. All that might be done in this spirit would have a chance of lasting, all that might be done in the contrary spirit had little chance. To give consistence to the new work, it was requisite that Prussia should at once be made so weak, Saxony and Poland so strong, that the former should have few means of recovering, and the two others numerous means of upholding themselves. Not reconstituting Prussia in her integrity—a reconstruction which would have been preferable to any other—Napoleon had done better to destroy her completely. He thought so himself, and so he told the emperor Alexander. He went so far as to offer him part of the spoils of the house of Brandenburg, if he would countenance his plans for the more complete re-establishment of Poland. But Alexander refused, for it was evidently impossible for him to accept the spoils of Prussia. It was bad enough not to defend her more strenuously, and to become the interested ally of the conqueror who despoiled her. Independently of the fate inflicted on Prussia, Alexander could not view with pleasure the restoration of Poland. But Napoleon strove to prove to him that, towards the West, Russia ought to stop at the Niemen, that, in passing it, to approach the Vistula, as she had done in the last partition of Poland, she incurred the suspicion and odium of Europe, acquired subjects, long, perhaps even for ever, refractory, and for the sake of doubtful conquests, rendered herself dependent on neighbouring powers, always ready to foment insurrection in her territories; that it was requisite to seek her aggrandizement in other quarters; that she would find it in the North towards Finland, in the East towards Turkey; that, in the latter direction in particular, there was opening for her the track of real greatness, of greatness without limits, since India itself was in perspective; that, in seeking to aggrandize herself on that side, she would find on the continent friends, allies, France in particular, and that she would have no adversary but England, whose power, reduced to that of her ships,

could never dispute with her the banks of the Danube. The reasons of Napoleon were strong, and had they been bad, his auditor was not in a position to contradict them. He had to choose: either to have no share anywhere, not to aggrandize himself in any quarter, without preventing the revival of Poland, the downfall of Prussia; or to aggrandize himself extensively in the direction pointed out by Napoleon. Alexander hesitated not. Besides, he was so seduced, so fascinated, that there was no need of force to decide him. But what puzzled him was how to render his misfortune endurable to Frederick William, who, seeing the two emperors so intimate, might flatter himself that he was the motive of that intimacy, and that he should reap benefit from it. Alexander undertook, embarrassing as was the task, to break the matter to him, and having communicated to Frederick William the resolutions which concerned him, leaving to him the business of arranging with the supreme arbiter, who fixed the boundaries of every power. Frederick William received Alexander's communication very coldly, and promised to confer with Napoleon on the subject. The luckless king of Prussia, to whom Fortune was then so unfavourable, but whom she afterwards compensated, was not capable of negotiating his own business himself. He was neither adroit nor imposing; and if his spirit, heaving off the load of calamity, indulged in some involuntary movements, they were movements of testiness, not well befitting a king without dominions and without army. The town of Memel, where the queen of Prussia passed her nights and her days in weeping, and general Lestocq's ten or fifteen thousand men were all that he had left. That prince had a long explanation with Napoleon, and, at the first interview, he took great pains to prove to him that he had not deserved his misfortune, for the origin of his quarrel with France dated from the violation of the territory of Anspach; and he affirmed most pertinaciously that, in passing through the province of Anspach, Napoleon had violated the Prussian sovereignty. At the point to which things had now arrived this question was of little importance; but on that subject Napoleon entertained a conviction as strong as that of the king. In passing through that province of Anspach, he had acted with perfect sincerity, and he was as anxious to set himself right on this point as if he had not been the stronger. The two monarchs grew warm, and the king of Prussia, in his despair, was hurried into transports of passion, to be lamented for the sake of his dignity, far from serviceable to his cause, perplexing for Napoleon. Annoyed by his complaints, Napoleon referred him to his ally, Alexander, who had induced him to continue the war, when, on the morrow of Eylau, peace would have been possible and advantageous for Prussia. "For the rest," said he, "the emperor Alexander has the means of indemnifying you,—namely, to sacrifice to you his relations, the princes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, whose dominions will furnish a fine compensation for Prussia towards the North and towards the Baltic; he can also give up to you the king of Sweden, from whom you may take Stralsund and

that portion of Pomerania which he makes such bad use of. Let the emperor Alexander consent for you to these acquisitions, not equal to the territories that are taken from you, but better situated, and, for my part, I shall make no objections." Napoleon had good reason for referring Frederick William to Alexander, who could, in fact, have obtained those compensations for Prussia. But Alexander was already in trouble enough caused by the grief of his Prussian allies, without raising up complaints, reproaches, dismayed faces, in his own family. Frederick William would never have even ventured to mention such a thing, and regarded the offer as an evasion. He was, therefore, obliged to make up his mind to the sacrifice of half his kingdom. It was possible, however, to afford him some petty consolations which had considerably soothed his grief. Old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, Silesia were still left him: the provinces on the left of the Elbe were taken from him, and, in taking these extensive portions of his dominions, it was necessary to avoid separating from him too much those that were left him. It was, in fact, by successive encroachments on Poland that Frederick had connected together Old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia. The question was what portions of Poland should be left to Prussia, for the purpose of binding those provinces properly together. Lastly, and above all, it was necessary to decide whether, in assigning to Prussia the frontier of the Elbe in Germany, the fortress of Magdeburg, seated on the Elbe, a more important place than Mayence, or Strasbourg on the Rhine, should be granted to her. Napoleon consented that the boundaries of Poland should be so traced as to connect together as much as possible Old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Silesia; but, in conceding the Lower Vistula to Frederick William, he insisted on taking Dantzic from him, and constituting it a free city, like Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg. With regard to Magdeburg, he was inflexible. Mayence, Magdeburg, formed the entrepôts of his power in the north; it was not possible for him to part with them. He was therefore peremptory in his resolutions relative to Dantzic and Magdeburg.

The king of Prussia made up his mind to the loss of Dantzic, but he was loth to relinquish Magdeburg; for, situated in the heart of Germany, it was an important *point d'appui*, and the key of the Elbe, which had become his frontier. He urged not this motive, but a reason of ancient affection. In fact, the inhabitants of the duchy of Magdeburg, lying both on the right and on the left of the Elbe, were among the oldest and most loyal subjects of the monarchy. He gained nothing, however, by this new argument. As he was very urgent, sometimes with Napoleon, sometimes with Alexander, the latter conceived the idea of shaking Napoleon by inviting the queen of Prussia to Tilsit, to try the power of her understanding, her beauty, and her misfortune on the conqueror of Europe. The calumnious reports to which the admiration of Alexander for this princess had given rise, had prevented her from going

to Tilsit. Recourse was, nevertheless, had to her intervention as a last expedient, not for coarsely touching Napoleon, but for working upon his most delicate feelings by the presence of a queen, beautiful, accomplished, and unfortunate.

It was late to try such a resource, for the ideas of Napoleon were definitively fixed, and, for the rest, it was not at all probable that, at any time whatever, Napoleon would have sacrificed part of his designs under the influence of a woman, how interesting soever she might be.

Frederick William, therefore, invited the queen to come to Tilsit. She decided to comply, and the negotiation which had already lasted about twelve days, was spun out to give that princess time to make the trip. She arrived at Tilsit on the 6th of July. An hour after her arrival, Napoleon anticipated her, by calling to pay her a visit. The queen of Prussia was then thirty-two years old. Her beauty, formerly brilliant, appeared to be slightly affected by age, but she was still one of the finest women of her time. With a superior understanding she combined a certain habit of business, from taking an indiscreet part in it, perfect nobleness of character and dignity of attitude. However, too strong a desire to produce an effect on the great man, on whom she was dependent, was a drawback upon her success. She spoke of the greatness of Napoleon, of his genius, of the misfortune of having mistaken him, in terms not simple enough to touch him. But the energy of character and strength of mind of that princess were soon displayed in that conversation to such a degree as to embarrass Napoleon himself, who, while paying her the utmost attentions and respect, took good care not to drop a single word that could be binding upon him.

She came to dine with Napoleon, who received her at the door of his imperial residence. During dinner, she strove to conquer him to draw from him at least one word from which she could derive hope, especially respecting Magdeburg. Napoleon, on his part, always respectful, courteous, but evasive, disappointed her by a resistance which resembled a continual flight. She divined the tactics of her mighty adversary, and bitterly lamented that he would not, at parting, leave in her soul a recollection which permitted her to join with admiration for the great man's genius inviolable attachment for the generous conqueror. Perhaps, if Napoleon, less pre-occupied with plans for aggrandizing ungrateful royalties, or for creating ephemeral royalties, had yielded on this occasion and conceded not only what was solicited of him, but what he could further have granted without prejudice to his other projects—perhaps he might have attached to himself the warm heart of that queen, and the honest heart of her husband. But to the solicitations of the princess he opposed an invincible respect. He had fixed with his immutable will all that related to Prussia, to Poland, to Westphalia; he had consented to a demarcation between Poland and Pomerania, which, following the banks of the Netze and the canal of Bromberg, ran and joined the Vistula below Bromberg. He made one concession

in regard to Magdeburg, namely that, in case Hanover should remain in the possession of France, either because peace was not concluded with England, or because she concluded it without restoring Hanover, there should be ceded back to Prussia, on the left of the Elbe and in the environs of Magdeburg, a territory of three or four hundred thousand souls, including the restitution of the fortress itself.

He would not grant any thing more. M. de Talleyrand had orders to confer with Messrs. de Kourakin and de Labanoff, and to settle all disputed points on the 7th, so that the queen, sent for to Tilsit to soften the lot of Prussia, only accelerated the result, which it was the intention to prevent, by the very embarrassment which she occasioned Napoleon, through the success that she had well-nigh obtained by her solicitations, at once delicate and persevering. The Russian and Prussian negotiators, finding themselves summoned peremptorily to consent or to refuse, at length yielded. The treaty, concluded on the 7th, was signed on the 8th, and assumed the title, which has become famous, of **TREATY OF TILSIT**.

There are three sorts of stipulations:

A patent treaty between France and Russia, and another between France and Prussia;

Secret articles added to this double treaty;

Lastly, an occult treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and Russia, which the two parties engaged to envelop in absolute secrecy till both should agree to publish it.

The two patent treaties between France, Russia, and Prussia, contained the following stipulations:

Restitution to the king of Prussia, *in consideration of the emperor of Russia*, of Old Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg, Upper and Lower Silesia;

Cession to France of all the provinces to the left of the Elbe, for the purpose of composing with them and the grand duchy of Hesse a kingdom of Westphalia, in behalf of the youngest of Napoleon's brothers, prince Jerome Bonaparte;

Cession of the duchies of Posen and Warsaw, for the purpose of forming a Polish state, which, under the title of grand-duchy of Warsaw, was to be assigned to Saxony, with a military road across Silesia, affording passage from Germany to Poland.

Acknowledgment by Russia and by Prussia of Louis Bonaparte as king of Holland, of Joseph Bonaparte as king of Naples, of Jerome Bonaparte as king of Westphalia; acknowledgment of the Confederation of the Rhine, and in general of all the States created by Napoleon;

Re-establishment in their sovereignties of the princes of Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, but occupation of their territories by the French troops, for the execution of the continental blockade;

Lastly, mediation of Russia, for re-establishing peace between France and England;

Mediation of France to re-establish peace between the Porte and Russia.

The secret articles contained the following stipulations:

Restitution to the French of the mouths of the Cattaro;

Cession of the Seven Islands, which were thenceforward to belong to France, in full sovereignty;

Promise in regard to Joseph, already recognized as king of Naples in the patent treaty, to acknowledge him as also king of the Two Sicilies, when the Bourbons of Naples should be indemnified either by means of the Balearic Islands or Candia;

Promise, in case of the incorporation of Hanover with the kingdom of Westphalia, to restore to Prussia on the left of the Elbe a territory containing three or four hundred thousand inhabitants;

Lastly, annuities for life, settled on the dispossessed heads of the houses of Hesse, Brunswick, and Nassau Orange.

The occult treaty, the most important of all those signed at the moment, and which the parties engaged to envelop in inviolable secrecy, contained an engagement on the part of Russia and France to make common cause in all circumstances, to unite their forces by land and sea in any war which they should have to carry on; to take arms against England if she would not subscribe to the conditions which we have recapitulated; against the Porte, if the latter should not accept the mediation of France, and in this last case to *withdraw*, so said the text, *the European provinces from the vexations of the Porte, excepting Constantinople and Roumelia*. The two powers engaged to summon jointly Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, Austria herself, to concur in the projects of France and Russia, that is to say, to shut their ports against England, and to declare war against her.*

The signature given by the Russians necessarily deciding that of the Prussians, produced strong emotion in the latter. The queen of Prussia determined to set out immediately. After dining as usual at Napoleon's on the 8th, after addressing to him some complaints full of pride, and some to Alexander full of bitterness, she withdrew, attended by Duroc, who had never ceased to feel a warm attachment to her, and threw herself into her carriage, sobbing. She set out immediately for Memel, whither she went to mourn her imprudence, her political passions, the mischievous influence which they had exercised on public affairs, the fatal confidence which she had placed in the fidelity of chiefs of empires, in their word and in their friendship. Fortune was to change for her country and her husband; but this hapless princess was not destined to witness that change.

Alexander, having got rid of his unfortunate friends, whose sorrows annoyed him, gave himself up wholly to enthusiasm for his new projects. He was conquered, but his armies were honoured; and instead of sustaining losses in consequence of a war in which he had met with nothing but disasters, he left Tilsit with the hope of speedily realising the great designs of Catherine. The thing depended on himself, for he could turn to peace or war the mediation

* I am not giving the text, but a strictly accurate analysis of the treaty, the precise words of which have continued unknown to this day.

of Russia with the cabinet of Great Britain, and the mediation of France with the Divan. One was to procure him Finland, the other the whole or part of the Danubian provinces. He was delighted with his new ally. They promised to be inviolably attached to one another, to conceal nothing from each other, to meet again soon, to continue those direct relations which had already borne such excellent fruit. Alexander durst not propose to Napoleon to come to see, in the recesses of the North, the capital of an empire yet too young to deserve his notice : but he would go to Paris, visit the capital of the most civilised empire in the world, where was exhibited the spectacle of the best government succeeding the most frightful anarchy, and where he hoped, he said, to learn by attending the meetings of the Council of State, the great art of reigning, which the Emperor of the French practised in so superior a manner.

On the 9th of July, the very day after the signature of the treaties, the solemn exchange of the ratifications and the parting of the two sovereigns took place, Napoleon, wearing the grand cordon of St. Andrew, went to the house occupied by Alexander. He was received by that prince, who wore the grand cordon of the Legion of Honour, and who had about him his guard under arms. The two emperors having exchanged the ratifications, mounted their horses and showed themselves to their troops. Napoleon desired that the soldier reputed to be the bravest of the Russian Imperial Guard should be ordered to step out of the ranks, and gave him with his own hand the cross of the Legion of Honour. Then, after conversing for a considerable time with Alexander, he accompanied him towards the Niemen. They embraced each other for the last time, amidst the applause of all the spectators, and parted. Napoleon remained on the bank of the Niemen till he had seen his new friend land on the other bank. Not till then did he retire, and after taking leave of his soldiers, who by their heroism had rendered such wonders possible, he set out for Königsberg, where he arrived on the following day, the 10th of July.

In that city he arranged all the details of the evacuation of Prussia, and directed prince Berthier to make them the subject of a convention which should be signed with M. de Kalkreuth. The banks of the Niemen were to be evacuated by the 24th of July, those of the Pregel by the 25th, those of the Passarge by the 20th of August, those of the Vistula by the 5th of September, those of the Oder by the 1st of October, those of the Elbe by the 1st of November, on the condition, however, that the contributions owing by Prussia, both ordinary and extraordinary, should be wholly paid either in specie or in bills accepted by the intendant of the army. The amount was five or six hundred millions, imposed on the Hanseatic towns, on the German States, on the dispossessed princes, on Hanover, and lastly on Prussia properly so called. That sum comprised both what the French or allied troops had consumed in kind, and what was to be paid them in money. The treasury of the army, begun at Auster-

litz, would therefore receive considerable augmentation and sufficient resources for rewarding the attachment of heroic soldiers to the most magnificent of all masters.

Napoleon divided the army into four commands, under marshals Davout, Soult, Massena, and Brune. Marshal Davout, with the third corps, the Saxons, the Poles, and several divisions of dragoons and light cavalry, was to form the first command, and to occupy Poland till it should be evacuated. Marshal Soult, with the fourth corps, the infantry reserve which had belonged to marshal Lannes, part of the dragoons and of the light cavalry, was to form the second command, to occupy old Prussia from Königsberg to Dantzic, and to take upon him all the details of the evacuation. Marshal Massena, with the fifth corps, with the troops of marshals Ney and Mortier, with the Bavarian division of Wrede, was to form the third command, and to occupy Silesia till the general evacuation. Lastly, marshal Brune, forming the fourth command, with all the troops left on the rear, was charged to watch the coasts of the Baltic, and, if the English should appear there, to receive them as he had formerly done at the Helder. The guard and Victor's, formerly Bernadotte's corps, were marched for Berlin.

Napoleon left Königsberg on the 13th of July, and proceeded straight to Dresden, to pass a few days there with his new ally the king of Saxony, created grand-duke of Warsaw, and to agree with him what constitution to give to the Poles. That good and wise prince, far from ambitious, but flattered, as well as all his subjects, with the greatness conferred on his family, received Napoleon with transports of delight and gratitude. Napoleon left him to return to Paris, where he was impatiently expected, and which had not seen him for nearly a year. He arrived there on the 27th of July, at six in the morning.

Never had greater lustre surrounded the person and the name of Napoleon; never had greater apparent power been acquired for his imperial sceptre. From the strait of Gibraltar to the Vistula, from the mountains of Bohemia to the North Sea, from the Alps to the Adriatic, he ruled either directly or indirectly, either personally or by princes who were some of them his creatures, the others his dependants. Beyond were allies or subjugated enemies, England alone excepted. Thus almost the whole continent was under his sway; for Russia, after resisting him for a moment had warmly adopted his designs, and Austria found herself forced to suffer them to be accomplished, and even threatened with being compelled to concur in them. England, in short, secured from this vast domination by the Ocean, was about to be placed between the acceptance of peace and a war with the whole world.

Such was the external appearance of that gigantic power: it had in it enough to dazzle the world, and it did actually dazzle it; but the reality was less solid than brilliant. A moment's cool reflection would have sufficed to convince one's self of this. Napoleon diverted from his struggle with England by the third coalition, drawn from the shores of the Ocean to those of the Danube, had

punished the house of Austria by taking from it, in consequence of the campaign of Austerlitz, the Venetian States, the Tyrol, Suabia, and had thus completed the territory of Italy, aggrandized our allies of South Germany, removed the Austrian frontiers from ours. So far, so good—for, to finish the territorial emancipation of Italy, to secure friends in Germany, to place new spaces between Austria and France, was assuredly consistent with sound policy. But in the intoxication produced by the prodigious campaign of 1805, to change arbitrarily the face of Europe, and instead of being content to modify the past, which is the greatest triumph given to the hand of man, instead of keeping up for our profit the old rivalry of Prussia and Austria by advantages granted to the one over the other—to wrest the Germanic sceptre from Austria without giving it to Prussia; to convert their antagonism into a common hatred of France; to create, by the title of Confederation of the Rhine, a pretended French Germany, composed of French princes, to whom their subjects had a natural antipathy, of German princes unthankful for our gifts, and after rendering by this unjust displacement of the boundary of the Rhine, war with Prussia inevitable, war impolitic as it was glorious, to suffer one's self to be carried by the torrent of victory to the banks of the Vistula, and on arriving there to attempt the restoration of Poland, having on one's rear Prussia, vanquished but fuming, Austria secretly implacable—all this, admirable as a military work, was, as a political work, imprudent, extravagant, chimerical.

With the aid of his genius, Napoleon upheld himself at these perilous extremities, triumphed over all obstacles, distances, climate, mud, cold—and completed on the Niemen the defeat of the continental powers. But, at the bottom, he was anxious to put an end to this daring expedition, and his whole conduct at Tilsit betokened that situation. Having estranged for ever the heart of Prussia, which he had not the good idea to attach to himself for ever by a signal act of generosity, enlightened respecting the sentiments of Austria, feeling how victorious soever he might be, the necessity for making himself an alliance, he accepted that of Russia, which presented itself at the moment, and conceived a new system of policy founded on a single principle—the concurrence of two ambitions, Russian and French, to do whatever they pleased in the world—a mischievous concurrence, for it behoved France not to allow Russia to do every thing, and above all not to allow herself to do every thing. After having aggravated by the treaty of Tilsit the deep ranklings of Germany by creating in her bosom a French royalty which must cost us in men, money, animosities to overcome vain counsels, all that those of Naples and Holland already cost us; after having half reconstituted Prussia, instead of restoring or destroying her entirely; after having, in like manner, half reconstituted Poland, and done every thing in an incomplete manner,

because, at these distances time pressed, the strength began to fail, Napoleon made irreconcilable enemies, impotent or doubtful friends, raised, in short, an immense edifice, in which every thing was new from bottom to top, an edifice run up so rapidly that the foundation had not had time to settle, the mortar to harden.

But, if every thing is censurable in our opinion in the political work of Tilsit, brilliant as it may appear, all is admirable, on the contrary, in the conduct of the military operations. That army of the camp of Boulogne, which, carried with incredible despatch from the strait of Calais to the sources of the Danube, enveloped the Austrians at Ulm, drove back the Russians upon Vienna, finished by crushing both at Austerlitz, having then rested some months in Franconia, soon recommenced its victorious march, entered Saxony, surprised the Prussian army in retreat, broke it up by a single stroke at Jena, pursued it without intermission, turned it, took it to the last man on the shores of the Baltic; that army which, diverted from north to east, ran to meet the Russians, hurled them into the Pregel, then exhibited the unheard of spectacle of a French army quietly encamped on the Vistula, then suddenly disturbed in its quarters left them to punish the Russians, reached them at Eylau, fought, though perishing with cold and hunger, a bloody battle with them, returned after that battle to its quarters, and there, encamped again upon snow in such a manner that its repose alone covered a great siege, fed, recruited during a long winter at distances which baffle all administration, resumed its arms in spring, and, this time, Nature assisting genius, placed itself between the Russians and their base of operation, compelled them, in order to regain Königsberg, to cross the river before its face, flung them into it at Friedland, and thus terminated by a splendid victory, and on the banks of the Niemen, the longest, the most daring expedition, not through defenceless Persia or India, like the army of Alexander, but through Europe, swarming with soldiers as well disciplined as brave—this is unparalleled in the history of ages, this is worthy of the everlasting admiration of men, this combines all qualities, celerity and slowness, daring and prudence, the art of fighting and the art of marching, the genius of war and that of administration, and these things, so diverse, so rarely united, always opportune, always at the moment when they were needed to ensure success. Every one will ask himself how it was possible to display so much prudence in war, so little in politics. The answer will be easy,—in war Napoleon was guided by his genius, in politics by his passions.

We shall add, in conclusion, that the edifice so hastily constructed might have stood for some time, had not new weights, accumulated on its already overlaid foundations, occasioned its downfall. The fortune of France, though endangered at Tilsit, was not, therefore, inevitably ruined, and her glory was immense.

The only authorised Edition.

HISTORY

OF THE

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

FORMING A SEQUEL TO

"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

BY

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HISTORY
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THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
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FRANCE
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NAPOLÉON.

BOOK XXVIII.

FONTAINEBLEAU.

THE peace of Tilsit had caused profound and universal joy in France. Under the conqueror of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Friedland, people could not be afraid of war; yet they had felt a moment's uneasiness on seeing him venture so far in such a rancorous struggle; and moreover a secret instinct said plainly to some, indistinctly to all, that, in his career as in every other, a man must know where to stop; that, after successes, there might come reverses; that Fortune, prone to be fickle, ought not to be pushed to extremity; and that Napoleon would be the only one of the three or four heroes of humanity, whom she would not have doomed to expiate her favours, if he ventured to abuse them. In all human things there is a limit, which must not be overstepped, and, according to an impression which was then general, Napoleon was approaching that limit, which the mind discerns more easily than the passions choose to recognise it.

They felt, besides, the want of peace and of its soothing enjoyments. Napoleon had, it is true, procured for France internal security, and to such a degree had he procured it for her, that during an absence of nearly a year, and at a distance of 400 or 500 leagues, no disturbance whatever had broken out.

A brief anxiety, produced by the carnage of Eylau, by the dearth of provisions during the winter, by the timid language held in the drawing-rooms of certain discontented persons, had been the only agitation that marked the crisis through which the

country had just passed. But, though the people no longer dreaded the horrors of '93, and indulged an entire confidence, still it was on condition that Napoleon should live, and that he should cease to expose his precious person in the field; it was with the desire of enjoying, without any mixture of uneasiness, the immense prosperity which he had conferred on France. Those who were indebted to him for high situations aspired to enjoy them; the classes that live by agriculture, industry, and commerce—that is to say, nearly the whole of the nation, wished at length to profit by the consequences of the revolution and the vast extent of markets opened to France; for, if the seas were closed against us, the entire Continent offered itself to our activity, to the exclusion of British industry. The seas themselves would, it was hoped, be opened afresh in consequence of the negotiations of Tilsit. The two greatest powers of the Continent, enlightened respecting the conformity of their present interests, the uselessness of their contest, had, in fact, been seen embracing each other, in a manner, on the banks of the Niemen, in the person of their sovereigns, and joining to shut out England from the shores of Europe, and to turn the efforts of all nations against her; and people flattered themselves that this power, alarmed at her loneliness in 1807, as in 1802, would accept peace on moderate conditions. It was not to be supposed that the mediation of the Russian cabinet, which had just been offered her, rendering easy to her pride a pacification claimed by her interests, could be rejected. On the Continent people enjoyed peace; they had a glimpse of peace on the seas; and they were happy at once in what they possessed and what they hoped for. The army, upon which rested more particularly the burden of the war, was not, however, so eager after peace as the rest of the nation. Its principal leaders, it is true, who had already seen so many distant countries and bloody battles, who were covered with glory, whom Napoleon was about to load with wealth, wished, like the nation itself, to enjoy all that they had acquired. A great number of old soldiers, assured of their share in the munificence of Napoleon, were of the same way of thinking. But the young generals, the young officers, the young soldiers, and these formed a great part of the army, desired nothing better than to see fresh occasions of glory and fortune springing up. At any rate, after a severe campaign, an interval of rest was not displeasing to them; and we may say, that the peace of Tilsit was hailed by the unanimous acclamations of the nation and of the army, of France and of Europe, of the victors and of the vanquished. Excepting England, who found the Continent once more united against her; excepting Austria, who had for a moment hoped for the ruin of her controller; there was not a person but applauded this peace, following suddenly upon the greatest bustle of warfare that has occurred in modern times.

Napoleon was awaited with impatience; for, besides the reasons

which people had to take no pleasure in observing his absences, always occasioned by war, they were glad to know that he was near them, watching over the peace of the whole world, and endeavouring to draw from his inexhaustible genius new sources of prosperity. The cannon of the Invalides, which proclaimed his arrival at the palace of St. Cloud, pealed in all hearts as the signal of the happiest event ; and at night a general illumination, not commanded either by the police of Paris, or by the threats of the mob, and which was displayed in the windows of the citizens as well as on the fronts of the public edifices, attested a feeling of joy, genuine, spontaneous, universal.

My reason, tempered by time, enlightened by experience, is well aware of all the dangers concealed beneath this immeasurable greatness,—dangers, moreover, which it is easy to appreciate after the event. Still, though devoted to the modest worship of good sense, let me be allowed a moment of enthusiasm for so many wonders, which did not last, but which might have lasted, and to relate them with an entire forgetfulness of the calamities which followed. In order to retrace with a more just feeling those times so different from ours, I will not turn my eyes to those calamitous days which have since succeeded, until they arrive.

A vulgar sign, but a true one, of the disposition of minds, is the rate of the public funds in the great modern States which make use of credit, and which, in a vast market, called Exchange, permit the sale and purchase of the titles of loans which they have contracted with the capitalists of all nations. The 5 per cent. stock (signifying, as everybody knows, an interest of 5 allowed for a nominal capital of 100), which Napoleon had found at 12 francs on the 18th Brumaire, and which afterwards rose to 60, got up, after the battle of Austerlitz, to 70, and then passed that point to reach 90, a height at that time unprecedented in France. The disposition to confidence was even so strong, that the price of this stock rose still higher, and towards the end of July, 1807, reached 92 and 93. Previously to the time of the assignats, when a fondness for financial speculations did not exist, —when the public funds had not yet made the fortune of great speculators, and had, on the contrary, brought ruin on the legitimate creditors of the State,—when the value of money was such that it was easy to find in solid depositories an interest of 6 or 7 per cent.,—it required immense confidence in the established government to cause the titles of the perpetual debt to be accepted at an interest of 5 per cent.

On the morning of the 27th of July, Napoleon arrived at the palace of St. Cloud, where he was accustomed to pass the summer. With the princesses of his family, eager to see him again, were assembled the grand dignitaries, the ministers, and the principal members of the bodies of the State. Confidence and joy beamed from his face. "There," said he, "you are sure of continental peace; and, as for maritime peace, we shall soon obtain that by the

voluntary or the forced concurrence of all the continental powers. I have reason to believe the alliance that I have just concluded with Russia to be solid. A less powerful alliance would have sufficed to enable me to control Europe, to deprive England of all resource. With that of Russia, which victory has given me, which policy will preserve to me, I shall put an end to all resistances. Let us enjoy our greatness, and now turn traders and manufacturers." Addressing himself particularly to his ministers, Napoleon said to them:—"I have had enough of the trade of general, I shall now resume with you that of *first minister*, and recommence my *great reviews of affairs*, which it is time to substitute for my *great reviews of armies*." He detained at St. Cloud prince Cambacérès, whom he admitted to his family dinner, and with whom he conversed upon his plans; for his ardent head, incessantly at work, never finished one operation without beginning another.

On the following day, he employed himself in giving orders, which embraced Europe from Corfu to Königsberg. His first idea was to secure immediately the consequences of the Russian alliance which he had just concluded at Tilsit. By that alliance, purchased at the price of sanguinary victories and infinite hopes excited in Russian ambition, it behoved him to profit, before time or inevitable miscalculations should come to cool its first ardours. He had promised himself to force Sweden, to persuade Denmark, to draw off Portugal by means of Spain, and in this manner to decide all the States bordering on the European seas to declare against England. He had even proposed to himself to coerce Austria, in order to bring her into similar resolutions. England would thus find herself encompassed by a girdle of hostilities, from Kronstadt to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Trieste, unless she accepted the conditions of peace which Russia was commissioned to offer her. During his journey from Dresden to Paris, Napoleon had already given orders, and the very day after his arrival at Paris, he gave further directions for the immediate execution of this vast system. His first care was to send to St. Petersburg an agent who should continue with Alexander the work of seduction commenced at Tilsit. Most assuredly he could not find an ambassador so seductive as he was himself. It was requisite, nevertheless, to find one who was able to please, to win confidence, and to smooth the difficulties that may arise even in the most sincere alliance. This choice required some reflection. Till he should fix upon one who combined the desired qualifications, Napoleon sent an officer, usually employed, and fit for every thing—for war, for diplomacy, for police, who could be by turns supple and arrogant, and was very capable of insinuating himself into the mind of the young monarch, whom he had already contrived to please. This was general Savary, whose talents, courage, unscrupulous and unbounded devotedness, we have elsewhere had occasion to notice. General Savary, despatched in 1805 to the

Russian head-quarters, had found Alexander full of pride on the day before the battle of Austerlitz, dismayed on the morrow,—had not abused the change of fortune, had, on the contrary, skilfully spared the vanquished prince, and, availing himself of the ascendancy which weaknesses give over another whose secret one has detected, had acquired a sort of influence sufficient for a temporary mission. In this first moment, when the point was to ascertain whether Alexander was sincere, whether he would have the courage to defy the resentment of his nation, which had not passed so speedily as he had done from the sorrows of Friedland to the illusions of Tilsit, general Savary was fitted by his shrewdness to penetrate into the young prince, to intimidate him by his boldness, and, if need were, to reply by a completely military insolence to the insolences that he might meet with at St. Petersburg. General Savary had another advantage, of which the malicious pride of Napoleon disdained not to avail itself. The war with Russia had commenced on account of the death of the duke of Enghien: Napoleon was not sorry to send to that power the man who had figured most in that catastrophe. He thus galled the Russian aristocracy, which was inimical to France, without hurting the prince, who, from his versatility, had forgotten the cause of the war as quickly as the war itself.

Napoleon gave general Savary, without any apparent title, extensive powers and plenty of money, that he might live in suitable style at St. Petersburg. General Savary was to protest to the young emperor the sincerity of France, to urge him to come to an explanation with England, and to bring matters with her to a speedy result—either peace or war—and, if it should be war, to take immediate possession of Finland—an enterprise which, while it flattered Moscovite ambition, would have the effect of definitively engaging Russia in the politics of France. The general, in short, was to apply all the resources of his mind to cultivate and give stability to the alliance concluded at Tilsit.

Having paid this attention to the relations with Russia, Napoleon directed it to the other cabinets called upon to concur in his system. He scarcely expected sensible conduct from Sweden, then governed by an extravagant king. Though that power had a two-fold interest in not waiting till she should be forced—the interest of contributing to the triumph of the neutrals and that of sparing a Russian invasion—Napoleon nevertheless thought that he should soon be obliged to employ force against her. This would be a very easy matter, with an army of 420,000 men, commanding the Continent from the Rhine to the Niemen. He went, therefore, no further than making some dispositions for the immediate invasion of Swedish Pomerania, the only possession which her ancient and her recent follies had allowed Sweden to retain on the soil of Germany. With this view, Napoleon made various changes in the distribution of his forces in Poland and

Prussia. He purposed not to evacuate Poland till the new Saxon royalty, which he had just re-established there, should be firmly settled; and Prussia not till the war contributions, as well ordinary as extraordinary, should be completely paid up. In consequence, marshal Davout, with his corps, with the Polish troops of the new levy, with the greater part of the dragoons, had orders to occupy that part of Poland destined, under the title of grand-duchy of Warsaw, for the king of Saxony. One division was to be stationed at Thorn, another at Warsaw, a third at Posen. The dragoons were to find forage on the banks of the Vistula. This was denominated the first command. Marshal Soult, with his *corps d'armée* and almost all the reserve cavalry, was commissioned to occupy old Prussia, from the Pregel to the Vistula, from the Vistula to the Oder, with orders to retire successively, according to the payment of the contributions. The heavy and the light cavalry were to live in the island of Nogath, amidst the abundance afforded by the Delta of the Vistula. Into the bosom of this second command, Napoleon introduced another, in some measure exceptional, like the place which required its presence—that was Dantzic. There he placed Oudinot's grenadiers, and likewise Verdier's division, which had formed the corps of marshal Lannes; and these were destined to occupy that rich town, as well as the territory which it had recovered, together with the quality of a free city. Verdier's division was not intended to remain there, but the grenadiers had orders to stay till the complete settlement of European affairs. The third command, embracing Silesia, which was committed to marshal Mortier, whom Napoleon was glad to place in the provinces where there was abundance of wealth to save from the disorders of war, and who had quitted his *corps d'armée*, recently dissolved by the reunion of the Poles and the Saxons in the duchy of Warsaw. This marshal had under his command the fifth and sixth corps, which marshals Massena and Ney had lately left. These two and marshal Lannes had obtained permission to go to France, to rest themselves from the fatigues of war. The fifth corps was cantoned in the environs of Breslau, in Upper Silesia; the sixth around Glogau, in Lower Silesia. The first corps, transferred to general Victor, since the wound of the prince of Ponte Corvo, had orders to occupy Berlin, accompanying in its retrograde movement the imperial guard, which was returning to France, to be there treated with magnificent festivities. Lastly, the troops which had formed the army of observation, in the rear of Napoleon, were rapidly moved towards the coast. The Italians, part of the Bavarians, the Baden troops, the Hessians, the two fine French divisions of Boudet and Molitor, were marched, with the park of artillery which had been employed in the siege of Dantzic, towards Swedish Pomerania. Napoleon increased this park with all the artillery and ammunition, which the fine season allowed to be collected, and ordered them to be placed opposite to Stralsund, for the purpose of wrest-

ing that spot from the king of Sweden, in case that prince, adhering to his character, should single-handed resume hostilities, when all besides had laid down their arms.

Marshal Brune, who had been placed at the head of the army of observation, received the direct command of these troops, forming a total of 38,000 men, provided with an immense *matériel*. Chasseloup, the engineer who had so ably directed the siege of Dantzig, was charged with the direction of that of Stralsund also, if it should be necessary to undertake it.

Marshal Bernadotte, prince of Ponte Corvo, who had gone to Hamburg to recover from his wound, had the command of the troops destined to guard the Hanseatic towns and Hanover. The Dutch were drawn towards Holland and marched upon the Ems: the Spaniards occupied Hamburg. These latter had traversed, some Italy, others France, to proceed through Germany towards the coast of the North Sea. They formed a corps of 14,000 men, under the command of the marquis de la Romana. They were fine soldiers, with dark complexion, spare limbs, shivering with cold on the dreary and frozen shores of the Northern Ocean, exhibiting a singular contrast with our northern allies, and reminding one, by the strange diversity of nations subject to the same yoke, of the times of Roman greatness. Followed by a great number of women, children, horses, mules, and asses, laden with baggage, ill-dressed, but in an original manner, lively, animated, noisy, acquainted with no language but their own, living exclusively by themselves, exercising little, and spending great part of the day in dancing to the sound of the guitar, with the women who accompanied them, they attracted the stupid curiosity of the grave inhabitants of Hamburg, whose papers communicated these details to Europe, astonished at so many extraordinary scenes. The corps of marshal Mortier having been dissolved, as we have related, the French division of Dupas, which had formed part of it, was marched towards the Hanseatic towns, to be ready to fly to the assistance of our allies, Dutch or Spaniards, in case an enemy should pay them a visit. That enemy could not be any other than the English, who, for a year past, had kept promising in vain a continental expedition, and who might possibly, as it frequently happens after long hesitation, act when the time for action was past. The troops of marshal Brune, charged to station themselves before Stralsund, and those of marshal the prince of Ponte Corvo, commissioned to observe Hanover and Holland, were to be joined, in case of need, by Dupas' division at first, and afterwards by the whole first corps concentrated at that moment around Berlin. Any attempt of the English could not but miscarry against such a combination of forces.

Thus every thing was ready, if the Russian mediation should not succeed, to drive the Swedes from Pomerania into Stralsund, from Stralsund into the island of Rügen, from the island of

Rügen into the sea, and to throw the English themselves into it in case of their landing on the Continent. These measures were intended also to have the effect of obliging Denmark to complete by her adhesion the continental coalition against England. Every thing was easy in reference to the course to be pursued towards the Swedes. They had behaved in a manner so hostile, so arrogant, that nothing more needed be done than to summon them, and then drive them into Stralsund. The Danes, on the contrary, had scrupulously observed the neutrality, had conducted themselves with such moderation, inclining in heart towards the cause of France, which was their own, but not daring to speak out, that it would not be right to treat them as roughly as the Swedes. Napoleon charged M. de Talleyrand to write immediately to the cabinet of Copenhagen, to represent to it that it was time to come to a decision; that the cause of France was its own; that if France was at war with England, it was on account of the question of the neutrals, and the question of the neutrals was a question of existence for all the naval powers, especially for the smallest, habitually least spared by British supremacy. M. de Talleyrand had orders to be friendly, but pressing. He was ordered also to offer Denmark the finest troops of France, and the concurrence of a formidable artillery, capable of keeping at a distance the best armed English ships.

It was by frightening England with this combination of forces, and by proceeding with the utmost rigour against her commerce, that Napoleon thought to second in a useful manner the Russian mediation. While he was taking the military measures that we have been detailing, he had caused English merchandise to be seized at Leipzig, where there was a considerable quantity. Dissatisfied with the manner in which his orders had been executed in the Hanseatic towns, he directed the English factory at Hamburg to be seized, bills and goods to a large amount to be confiscated, and the letters of British commerce to be intercepted at all the post-offices, and more than 100,000 of them were burned. King Louis, on the throne of Holland, was incessantly aggravating him by his inconsiderate measures, by his vanity, by the projected reduction of the Dutch army and navy (notwithstanding which he purposed to institute a royal guard, to appoint marshals, to go to the expense of a coronation),—King Louis united with all his plans, devised to please his new subjects, a tolerance in regard to English commerce, which became downright treason against the policy of France. Napoleon, out of all patience, wrote to him that, unless there was a change of conduct, he should proceed to the last extremities, and have the ports of Holland guarded by French troops and custom-house officers. This threat had some success, and the prohibitions issued against English commerce in Holland were somewhat more strictly executed.

Napoleon required that all the goods seized should be sold, and the produce paid into the chest of the war contributions, to in-

crease the wealth of that chest, the application of which, at once noble, ingenious, and beneficial, we shall presently notice. He gave orders that Hanover, to which he granted no indulgence, because it was an English province, that Hesse, that the Prussian provinces in Franconia, lastly, that Prussia itself, should pay up their contributions before the army retired. It may be said with truth that the vanquished had not been treated very severely, especially when we recollect what occurred in the 17th century, during the wars of Louis XIV., in the 18th, during the wars of the great Frederick, and in our own times, when France was invaded in 1814 and 1815. Napoleon had added to the ordinary contribution, half of which at most had been paid, an extraordinary contribution, which was far from overwhelming, and which amounted to precisely the cost of the war that had been raised against him. By means of this contribution he caused all that was taken from the houses of the inhabitants to be paid for. He charged M. Daru, his able and upright representative for the financial affairs of the army, to treat with Prussia relative to the mode of discharging the contributions that were still due, declaring that, notwithstanding his desire to recall the French troops, in order to move them to the coasts of Europe, he would not evacuate a province or even a place of Prussia before the integral payment of the sums which had been promised him. He hoped in this manner, all the expenses of the campaign being paid, and by adding to the contributions of Germany the remnants of the contribution levied upon Austria, to reserve about 300 millions, a sum worth at that time double what it would be worth now, and which in his skilful hands was to become a magical means of beneficence and of creations of all kinds.

While Napoleon was taking his measures for the North, he took them likewise for the accomplishment of his system in the South. During the campaign in Prussia, Spain had given him just causes for distrust, and the proclamation of the Prince of the Peace, in which he called the whole Spanish population to arms, upon pretext of resisting an unknown enemy, was not to be accounted for, unless by absolute treachery. And such in fact it was; for, at that very moment, on the eve of the battle of Jena, the Prince of the Peace had begun secret relations with England. Though unacquainted with these details, Napoleon was not to be deceived; but he resolved to dissemble till he should have recovered the full liberty of his movements. The ignoble favourite, who governed the queen of Spain, and through the queen, the king and the monarchy, had believed, like all Europe, in the invincibility of the Prussian army. But on the morrow of the victory of Jena, he had thrown himself at the feet of the conqueror. Ever since that time, there was no sort of flattery but he employed to appease the wrath, dissembled but easy to be guessed, of Napoleon. There was but one kind of obedience

which he did not add to his meannesses—that was to govern Spain well, to raise her navy again, to defend her colonies, to render her at length a useful ally—a kind of expiation, which, in the eyes of Napoleon, would have been sufficient, which would even have stifled the first feelings of his anger.

On his return to Paris, Napoleon began to direct his attention to this the most important portion of the coast of Europe; and he conceived that it behoved him to take some resolution in regard to that backsliding of Spain, which was always ready to transform itself into treason. But, though his mind was never at rest, though it flew incessantly from one object to another, like his eagle flying from capital to capital, he thought that he ought not yet to take up that important question, being unwilling to complicate the present situation, and to throw obstacles in the way of a general pacification, which he ardently desired, which he had little hope of, and which, if it were accomplished, would render the regeneration of the Spanish monarchy much less necessary to him. If, on the contrary, England, under the guidance of the weak and violent heirs of Mr. Pitt, was bent on continuing the war in spite of her lonely condition, he then proposed to turn his serious attention to the state of Spain,* and to take a decisive

* I shall soon have to handle a most important subject, the invasion of Spain, and the moment is approaching when I shall have to relate the tragic catastrophe of the Spanish Bourbons, the origin of an atrocious and calamitous war for both countries. I announce beforehand that, furnished with the only authentic documents that exist, which are very numerous, frequently contradictory, and reconcileable only by means of great efforts of criticism, I think myself capable of giving the entire secret, which is yet unknown, of the unfortunate events of that period, and that on many points I shall disagree with the works which have appeared on the same subject. I am not alluding to the thousand rhapsodies, published by historians, who had neither mission, nor information, nor concern about truth. I speak of historians worthy of being taken into consideration, of those who have been permitted by exception to make researches in the dépôts of foreign affairs and war, or of those who, like M. de Torreno, having occupied the highest posts, had not only a knowledge of things, but the means of informing themselves concerning them. I shall have to contradict the assertions of both, for there is nothing relative to the business of Spain in the dépôt of the Foreign Office, Beauharnais, the ambassador, having never possessed the secret of his government; and in the dépôt of war there is only the detail of the military operations, and even that frequently incomplete. Lastly, as for the Spanish historians, they could not be acquainted with the secret of resolutions which were all taken at Paris. The whole is to be found in the private papers of Napoleon deposited in the Louvre, which comprehend both the French documents and the Spanish documents carried off from Madrid. In these documents, frequently contradictory, as I have just observed, one cannot come at the truth but by dint of comparisons, approximations, and the exercise of critical judgment. It will be evident from the various notes, which, contrary to my custom, I shall be obliged to place at the foot of the pages of this book, what efforts I have been forced to make, even with the authentic documents, to arrive at the truth. But from this very moment, I declare that all the historians who have represented the origin of Napoleon's designs upon Spain as dating so far back as Tilsit are mistaken; that all those who have supposed that Napoleon assured himself at Tilsit of the consent of Alexander to what he projected respecting Madrid, and that he was in haste to sign the peace of the North, in order to return the sooner to the affairs of the South, are equally mistaken. At Tilsit Napoleon settled nothing but a general alliance, which guaranteed the adhesion of Russia to all that he should do on his part, on con-

resolution on that point. For the moment, he thought of one thing only—to obtain from her the utmost strictness against British commerce, and the submission of Portugal to his vast designs.

Spain had at Paris, besides an ordinary ambassador, M. de Masserano, an absolutely useless official agent, charged solely with the honorary functions of his station, M. Yzquierdo, a secret agent of the Prince of the Peace, who was invested with the entire confidence of that prince, and with whom had been negotiated the financial convention, concluded in 1806 between the Spanish Treasury and the French Treasury. He alone was charged with real business, and he was well fitted for it by his astuteness, and by his acquaintance with all the secrets of the court of Spain. The unfortunate sovereigns of the Escorial, conceiving that these two agents were not sufficient to soothe the wrath of Napoleon, bethought them of sending to him a third, who, with the title of ambassador extraordinary, should come to congratulate him on his victories, and to express a joy at his successes which they were far from feeling. For this ostentatious and puerile part was selected one of the highest grandees of Spain, the duke de Frias, and permission to send him to Paris was solicited. So much homage was not required for disarming Napoleon. A little more activity against the common enemy would have appeased him with much greater certainty than the most magnificent embassies. Napoleon, unwilling to give unnecessary uneasiness to that court, which was conscious of its offences, received the duke de Frias with great distinction, listened to the congratulations on his triumphs, then said to the new ambassador, repeated to the old one, and informed the most active of the three, M. Yzquierdo, that he accepted the congratulations which were addressed to him upon his triumphs and upon the restoration of the continental peace, but that he must make the continental peace produce a maritime peace; but this result, so desirable for Spain and for her colonies, could be attained only by intimidating the common enemy by a concurrence of energetic efforts, and by an absolute interdiction of her commerce; that it was necessary to second France, and, in this view, to require of Portugal an immediate and entire adhesion to the continental system: as for himself, he was resolved to insist not on a sham exclusion of the English from Oporto and Lisbon, but a complete exclusion, followed up by an immediate declaration of war and the seizure of all British goods;

dition that Russia should be suffered to do what she pleased on hers. At this period, he did not at all consider it urgent to interfere in the affairs of Spain; he was full of resentment on account of the proclamation of the Prince of the Peace, promised himself to express his sentiments upon it some day, and to secure himself, but thinking at his return of nothing but imposing peace upon England, by threatening her with complete exclusion from the Continent, and of making use of the cabinet of Madrid to bring the cabinet of Lisbon into his projects. We shall soon see how and through whom arose the temptation to intermeddle in the affairs of Spain. I correct that error at present: I shall correct others as the order of facts and the progress of my narrative require it.

that, if Portugal would not consent to this at once, Spain must prepare her troops, for he was already preparing his, and they must forthwith take possession of Portugal, not for a week or a fortnight, as had been done in 1801, but for the whole time of the war, perhaps for ever, according to circumstances. The three envoys of Spain bowed to this declaration, which they were to transmit without delay to their cabinet.

Napoleon, at the same time, sent for M. de Lima, the ambassador of Portugal, and signified to him that if, in the time strictly necessary for writing to Lisbon and receiving an answer, he were not promised the exclusion of the English, the seizure of their commerce, persons, and effects, and a declaration of war, M. de Lima must take his passports and expect to see a French army march from Bayonne to Salamanca, from Salamanca to Lisbon. Such were the determinations of a policy agreed upon among the great powers, and indispensable for the re-establishment of peace in Europe. Napoleon, in his contest with the English, insisted on severities against both their property and their persons, because he knew that a feigned exclusion was already secretly arranged between the courts of London and Lisbon; and it was necessary that the latter should wholly compromise itself, if one wished to arrive at a serious result. The course of events proved that he had guessed rightly. Besides, having seen the English, on the rupture of the peace of Amiens, make seizures from us to the amount of more than one hundred millions, and capture a great number of commercial men sailing upon the faith of treaties, he sought everywhere to secure pledges, both in men and merchandise.

M. de Lima promised to write immediately to his court, and failed not to do so. But Napoleon, not satisfied with a mere declaration of his will, and clearly foreseeing that this declaration would not be efficacious unless it were followed up by an armed demonstration, made his dispositions for having in a few days a corps of 25,000 men at Bayonne, quite ready to recommence the expedition of 1801 against Portugal. It will no doubt be recollected that, some months before, while availing himself of the inaction of winter to carry on the siege of Dantzic, and to prepare on his rear an army of observation, to secure him against any attempt of Austria and of England, he had conceived the idea of rendering the camps formed on the coasts disposable, and replacing them by five legions of reserve, of six battalions each, the organisation of which was to be consigned to five old generals, who had become senators. Four months had since elapsed, and he wrote immediately to the senators charged with this organisation, to learn if he could already dispose of two battalions out of the six in each of these legions. Trusting, till their arrival, to the terror which the speedy return of the grand army must strike into the English, having no fear that the expeditions against the Continent, with which they were said to have been so long occupied, would be

directed against the coasts of France, having all his precautions taken on those of Holland, Hanover, Pomerania, old Prussia, he hesitated not to strip those of Normandy and Bretagne, and ordered the assemblage at Bayonne of the troops distributed among the camps of St. Lo, Pontivy, and Napoleon-Vendée. Each of these camps, formed of third battalions and some complete regiments, contributed a good division, and, with the depôts of dragoons collected at Versailles and St. Germain, and with detachments of artillery drawn from Rennes, Toulouse, and Bayonne, would compose an excellent army of about 25,000 men. This army had orders to concentrate itself forthwith at Bayonne. For the command of it Napoleon selected general Junot, who was acquainted with Portugal, where he had been ambassador, who was a good officer, entirely devoted to his master, and, as governor of Paris, had no other fault but indulging there too freely in his pleasures. He was said to have formed a connexion with one of the princesses of the imperial family, which caused some scandal, so that several circumstances united to recommend this choice. These measures were taken ostensibly, and in such a manner that Spain and Portugal could not be ignorant how serious the consequences of a refusal would be to them. At the same time the necessary orders were given for the two battalions of each of the legions of reserve to hold themselves in readiness to replace on the coast the troops that were about to be withdrawn from it.

It was in the same spirit that Napoleon directed his attention at this moment to the affairs of Italy. There, as elsewhere, redoubled severity against English commerce was his first care, always with the intention of rendering the cabinet of London more sensible to the overtures of Russia. The queen of Etruria, daughter, as the reader knows, of the sovereigns of Spain, placed by Napoleon on the throne of Tuscany, who had become, by the death of her husband, regent for her son* of that petty kingdom, governed it with the carelessness of a woman and a Spaniard, and with very little fidelity to the common cause. The English carried on commerce at Leghorn as freely as in any port of their own country. Napoleon had collected all the depôts of the army of Naples in the Legations. With his accustomed vigilance, he kept them constantly supplied with conscripts and *matériel*. He ordered prince Eugène to draft from them a division of 4000 men, to march across the Apennines upon Pisa, to fall suddenly upon the English commerce at Leghorn, to carry off both men and goods, and then to declare to the queen of Etruria that he was come to secure that important port against any hostile attempt, an attempt both possible and probable, since the Spanish garrison had gone to join the corps of la Romana in Hanover. While prescribing this expedition, he sent orders for detachments of troops to march under general Lemarrois into the provinces of Urbino, Macerata, and Fermo, to occupy the

* Afterwards prince of Lucca and Parma.

coast, to drive the English from it, and to prepare safe harbours for the French flag, which was soon to make its appearance in those seas. Napoleon had, in fact, just recovered the mouths of the Cattaro, Corfu and the Ionian Islands. He purposed to take advantage of circumstances for conquering Sicily and to cover the surface of the Mediterranean with his ships. He recommended at the same time to general Lemarrois to observe the spirit of those provinces, and if a disposition, evinced in general by the provinces of the Holy See to escape from the government of priests and to place themselves under the lay government of prince Eugène, should manifest itself among these, not to oppose either contradiction or obstacle to that disposition.

At that moment, the quarrel with the Holy See, the origin of which we have elsewhere noticed, but neglected to record its daily vicissitudes, was every instant making fresh progress. The Pope who, having come to Paris to anoint Napoleon, had carried back, together with many moral and religious satisfactions, the temporal mortification of not having recovered the Legations; who had since seen his independence rendered nominal by the successive extension of the French power in Italy; had conceived a resentment which he was unable to dissemble. Instead of coming to an understanding with an omnipotent sovereign, against whom powers even of the first order could then effect nothing, who, moreover, was a well-wisher to religion, and never ceased to confer benefits on it, who had no idea to possess himself of the sovereignty of Rome, and merely required him to behave like a good neighbour in regard to the new French States founded in Italy—the Pope committed the error of yielding to mischievous suggestions, which had the stronger influence over his mind, since they accorded with his secret sentiments. Animated by similar dispositions, he had opposed Napoleon in all the arrangements relative to the kingdom of Italy. He had insisted on reserving there all the rights of the Papacy, which are much greater in Italy than in France, and would not admit of an equal Concordat in the two countries. At Parma, at Placentia, there were the like demands, and the like disagreements. To these were added other annoyances of a still more personal kind. Prince Jerome Bonaparte, during his naval campaigns in America, had contracted marriage with a very handsome person, of good family, but at an age which rendered that alliance null, and without the concurrence of her parents, a defect which made it still more null. Napoleon, who purposed, in marrying that prince with a German princess, to found a new kingdom in Westphalia, had refused to acknowledge a marriage, null in the eye of the civil law as in that of the religious law, and in the highest degree contrary to his political designs. He had applied to the Pope, soliciting its annulment, which the Pope had formally refused. Lastly, the city of Rome, in still more open hostility, which no religious scruple could justify—the city

of Rome had become the refuge of all the enemies of king Joseph. The Pope had not only protested against the French royalty established in Naples, in his quality of ancient lord paramount of the crown of the Two Sicilies ; but he had received, almost allured to him, the cardinals who had refused their oath to king Joseph. He had, moreover, given an asylum to all the robbers who infested the roads of the kingdom of Naples, and who, still covered with the blood of Frenchmen, took refuge without any disguise in the suburbs of Rome. Never was it possible to obtain justice or the delivery of any of them.

Napoleon, during his journey from Tilsit to Paris, wrote from Dresden to prince Eugene, who voluntarily made himself the advocate of the court of Rome, recapitulating his grievances against that court, commissioning him to inform the Vatican of them, and to give the Pontiff to understand that his patience, seldom very great, was this time at an end, and that, without touching his spiritual authority, he should not hesitate, if necessary, to strip him of his temporal authority. Such were then the relations with the court of Rome, and these relations account sufficiently for the facility with which Napoleon adopted the measures we have just described respecting that part of the coast of the Adriatic dependent on the Holy See.

The treaty of Tilsit stipulated the restitution of the Mouths of the Cattaro, as well as the cession of Corfu and all the Ionian Islands. No possession had been more coveted by Napoleon, none so highly gratified his imagination, so prompt and so vast. He beheld in it the complement of his Illyrian provinces, the dominion of the Adriatic, an approach towards the provinces of Turkey in Europe which were destined for him, in case there should be a partition of the Ottoman empire, lastly, an additional means of making himself master of the Mediterranean, where he resolved to reign in an absolute manner, in compensation for the relinquishment of the Ocean, in spite of himself, to England.

It will be recollected that the Russians, after the peace of Presburg, had taken advantage of the moment when the Austrian garrison was about to be replaced by a French garrison, to get possession of the forts of the Cattaro. To prevent the English from doing the same this time, Napoleon had given orders from Tilsit itself to general Marmont, that the French troops should be assembled under the walls of Cattaro, at the moment when the Russians were retiring from it. These orders had been executed point by point ; and our troops, having entered Cattaro, strongly occupied that important maritime position.

But Corfu and the Ionian Islands interested him still more than the mouths of the Cattaro. He enjoined his brother Joseph to march secretly towards Tarento, and in such a manner as not to excite any suspicion in the English, the 5th Italian of the line, the 6th French of the line, some companies of artillery, artificers, ammunition, officers of the staff, and general Caesar Berthier,

appointed to the command of the garrison, and to form with them several convoys, to be transported in feluccas from Tarento to Corfu. The distance being but a few leagues, forty-eight hours would be sufficient to convey in several trips the 4000 men composing the expedition. Admiral Siniavin, commander of the Russian forces in the Archipelago, was commissioned to deliver up the Ionian Islands to the French. He performed the operation with extreme and undissembled displeasure; for the Russian navy, directed in general, either by English officers or by Russians educated in England, was much more hostile to the French than the army itself, which had just fought at Eylau and at Friedland. The admiral, nevertheless, obeyed, and delivered over to the French troops those fine positions which he had been appointed to guard. But his vexation had a double motive, for, besides the surrender of Corfu and the Seven Islands, which was painful to him, he would presently find himself in the middle of the Mediterranean, being prevented from returning to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles, in consequence of the rupture with the Turks, and forced to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar, the Channel, the Sound, through the English fleets, which, according to the state of the negotiations commenced, might either suffer him to proceed or stop him. Napoleon had foreseen all these complications, and had sent word to the Russian admirals, that they would find in the ports of the Mediterranean, as well in those of Italy and France as of Spain and Portugal, safe harbours to put into, provisions, stores, and means of refitting. He wrote to Venice, Naples, Toulon, Cadiz, even to Lisbon, to his maritime prefects, admirals, and consuls, and recommended to them, wherever the Russian ships should make their appearance, to receive them cordially and to supply them with every thing they might need. At Cadiz, in particular, where he was represented by admiral Rosily, who commanded the French fleet lying in that port ever since Trafalgar, and where it was most probable that the Russians would seek an asylum, Napoleon enjoined the French admiral to prepare supplies that were not to be expected from the Spanish administration, accustomed to leave its own sailors to starve, and authorised him, if need were, to give his signature, in order to obtain the necessary funds from the Spanish bankers.

The Russian naval forces, apprised by their own government and by ours, retired in two divisions in different directions. The division which had on board the garrison of Cattaro steered for Venice, where it landed the Russian troops, whom Eugene received with the greatest cordiality. The division which conveyed the troops from Corfu, landed them at Manfredonia, in the kingdom of Naples, and then steered under admiral Siniavin for the Straits. This admiral, who had not yet entered into the views of his sovereign, had no inclination to put into a French port or one dependent on French influence, and flattered himself that he

should reach the seas of the North, before the negotiations between his court and that of England should have terminated in a rupture.

The intention of Napoleon was not to stop at the precautions which he had already taken for the provinces of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. The corps of 4000 men which he had sent to Corfu appeared to him insufficient. He was well aware that the English would not fail to make great efforts, in case the war should be prolonged, to wrest from him the Ionian Islands, which were of such importance as to counterbalance that of Malta. He therefore ordered the French 14th light, and several other detachments, to be sent thither, so as to increase the French and Italian forces to seven or eight thousand men, exclusive of some Arnauts and Greeks, enrolled under French officers, for guarding the small islands. Five thousand men were to reside at Corfu itself, and 1500 at St. Maura. Five hundred were to guard the port of Parga, on the continent of Epire. As for Zante and Cephalonia, Napoleon resolved to keep only mere French detachments there, to support and control the Arnauts. He directed prince Eugene and king Joseph to despatch from Ancona and Tarento, by means of small Italian vessels, and in all favourable winds, corn, biscuit, powder, projectiles, muskets, cannon, gun-carriages, and to continue to send stores of these kinds without interruption, till there should be collected at Corfu an immense stock of things necessary for a long defence, so that they might not be liable, as at Malta, to lose through famine a position which the enemy could not take from us by force. Not relying upon the solvency of the Treasury of Naples, he despatched sums in gold from the chest at Turin, in order to keep the troops constantly paid up, and to pay the workmen employed in constructing fortifications. Admirable instructions to general Caesar Berthier (brother of the major-general), providing for all cases, and pointing out the conduct to be pursued under all imaginable circumstances, accompanied the resources which we have just enumerated.

General Marmont had already constructed fine roads in the provinces of Illyria, which he governed with great intelligence and zeal. He had orders to continue them to Ragusa and Cattaro, to push reconnaissances as far as Butrinto, a point of the coast of Epire facing Corfu, and to prepare the means for expeditiously leading a division thither. Napoleon caused application to be made to the Porte to give up Butrinto to him, that he might be able to use more freely that position, from which it was easy to send supplies to Corfu: and it was granted to him without difficulty. Lastly, he claimed, and obtained also, the establishment of relays of Tatars from Cattaro to Butrinto, that general Marmont might be speedily apprised of any appearance of the enemy, and might hasten up with ten or twelve thousand men—a force sufficient to throw the English into the sea, if they should attempt a landing.

To these means Napoleon added those which the concurrence of the navy was capable of affording. He sent from Toulon, Captain Chaunay-Duclos, with the frigates *La Pomone* and *La Pauline*, and the corvette *La Victorieuse*, to form at Corfu the commencement of a navy. He directed moreover that two large brigs should be put on the stocks in the port of Corfu, that they should be equipped with the assistance of the sailors of the country and some detachments of French troops. This infant navy, composed of frigates and brigs, was to cruise incessantly between Italy and Epire, between Corfu and the other islands, so as that the passage should be always open to our merchantmen and closed to those of the enemy.

In addressing these multiplied instructions to king Joseph, to prince Eugene, to general Marmont, not only with the imperious accent with which he always accompanied his orders, but with the impassioned accent which he always imparted to them, when his orders were connected with any of the grand designs which occupied his mind, Napoleon wrote thus:—"These measures belong to a system of projects which you cannot be acquainted with. Know only that in the state of the world, the loss of Corfu would be the greatest misfortune that could befall the Empire."

Indeed, few persons in Europe were acquainted with these projects. M. de Talleyrand, Napoleon's negotiator at Tilsit, had himself but a very incomplete idea of them. They were known to none but to Alexander and Napoleon, who, in their long conversations on the bank of the Niemen, had engaged to join in the partition of the Turkish empire—a partition in which the one sought the satisfaction of French greatness, the other the consummation of the ruin of the Ottoman empire, which Asiatic effeminacy could no longer defend against European energy. Napoleon was far from desiring to hasten this result: Alexander, on the contrary, longed for it most eagerly—and this constituted the peril of their alliance. But, in the foresight of events, Napoleon was disposed to lay his hand on the Turkish provinces situated within his reach, and moreover, whether this necessity should occur or not, he intended to make himself master of the Mediterranean. He conceived that, when master of that sea, the shortest communication between the East and the West, he might console himself for being but the second upon the Ocean. Napoleon, therefore, was resolved, the very day after the signature of the peace of Tilsit, to recover Sicily, which he considered as his own, ever since he had taken Naples for one of his brothers, and he hoped to keep it, either through the relinquishment of it by the English, if the Russians should succeed in negotiating peace, or by the force of his arms, should the war continue. Accordingly, as soon as winter was over, he had begun to send orders to his minister of the marine to despatch squadrons in the direction of Toulon, and thus to prepare a great expedition against Sicily.

These orders, the fulfilment of which was thwarted by circumstances and the inadequacy of the resources, were repeated with increased force after the signature of the continental peace. On the very day that this peace was signed at Tilsit, Napoleon wrote to four persons at once, to prince Eugene, to king Joseph, to the king of Holland, to the minister of the marine, that, the continental war being at an end, he must turn his attention towards the sea, and think at length of deriving some benefit from the immense extent of coast at his disposal. England had undoubtedly the advantage of her insular position, the hitherto immovable foundation of her maritime greatness; but the possession of all the European coasts from Kronstadt to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Naples, from Naples to Venice, was likewise a means of maritime power, and a formidable means, if one had the art and the time to make use of it. Napoleon had said in Berlin, in exultation over his victories, "*The sea must be ruled by the land.*" He had just realised so much of this idea as it was possible to realise, by obtaining at Tilsit the voluntary or forced union of all the powers of the Continent against England; and it was requisite for him to hasten to take advantage of this union, before the continental domination of France should become still more intolerable to the world than the maritime domination of England.

Twenty-two months had elapsed since that fatal battle of Trafalgar, in which our flag had displayed a sublime heroism amidst an immense disaster. Those twenty-two months had been employed with some activity, and here and there some glory, with that at least which is due to the courage that reverses cannot depress. Admiral Decrès, continuing to place at the service of the impetuous will of Napoleon profound experience and a superior mind, could not always succeed in persuading him that in the navy, with good-will, with courage, with money, with genius itself, it is not possible to make amends for time and long training. He had proposed to Napoleon to substitute for the system of great naval battles that of small and very distant squadrons. By this system, you have the advantage of risking less at once, of acquiring, while cruising, that experience which you want, of doing great mischief to the enemy's commerce, and of having a chance of at length falling in with your adversary, inferior in numerical force; for the sea, from its very immensity, is the field of chance. Such a system was assuredly worth trying, and for us it would have had incontestable advantages over the other, if the numerical disproportion of our forces to those of the English had not been so great, and if our distant settlements had not been so utterly ruined, so destitute of all resource.

Conformably to the plan of M. Decrès, several squadrons had been prepared at Brest, Rochefort, and Cadiz, for the purpose of running out, towards the end of 1805, by taking advantage of the autumnal gales. One division of four frigates had sailed in order to cruise in the track of the Indian Ocean, to destroy the English

commerce there, and to support the island of Bourbon and the Isle of France by the produce of their prizes, since they could no longer support themselves by trade. These frigates, arriving without accident, did, in fact, procure tolerably abundant resources for our two islands. Captain L'Hermitte, with one ship of the line, the *Regulus*, two frigates, the *Cybele* and the *Président*, two brigs, the *Surveillant* and the *Diligent*, had sailed from Port Lorient on the 30th of October, 1805, and steered for the Canaries. Running down the coast of Africa, from north to south, for many hundred leagues, for the purpose of seizing the English vessels engaged in the slave-trade, he took or destroyed a great number ; for the English Admiralty, not foreseeing the visit of a French squadron in that quarter, had not taken any precaution. Having cruised during the months of December, January, February, and March, committed great ravages, made rich captures, this division, excepting the *Surveillant* brig, which had been sent to France, with intelligence of its proceedings, would fain have put into some port to refit the ships, to repair the rigging, to rest the crews, and to procure fresh provisions. Not daring to return to France during the summer, not disposed to go to our West India islands, which were always closely watched, and having but few ports either French or allied to choose from, it was caught by the trade winds, which carried it towards the coast of America, and in April it reached San Salvador, a port of Brazil, where it had a chance of obtaining provisions, and selling to advantage the blacks taken from the English traders. Having put in there for twenty-two days, it again sailed to cruise off Rio Janeiro, was frequently pursued by English ships going to India, bore away for the latitude of the West Indies, continued to make prizes, and was at length overtaken on the 19th of August by a tremendous hurricane, one of the most terrible that had been experienced in those seas for a quarter of a century. It was dispersed. The *Regulus*, having lost sight of her frigates and looked for them in vain, reached Brest on the 3rd of October, 1806, after having been nearly a year at sea. The *Cybele* frigate, dismasted, had steered for the United States. The *Président*, separated from the division, had been taken. Captain L'Hermitte had destroyed twenty-six of the enemy's vessels, taken 570 prisoners, destroyed goods worth more than five millions, and brought back considerable sums, far exceeding the expenses of the cruise. The slave-trade was ruined for that year on the coast of Africa, and the English insurance companies cried out furiously against the Admiralty. But our large squadrons were not destined to be so fortunate.

Cadiz presented nothing but wrecks, which required to be reunited and re-organised before a division could be formed out of them. Rochefort contained the division of admiral Allemand, who was resting in that port, after the difficult cruise which he had made in consequence of having missed admiral Villeneuve,

purposing to enter a port of France during the equinoctial gales, which drove off the enemy.

Brest alone afforded resources for equipping a very strong division. Of the twenty-one ships collected in the great harbour, six, the fittest for a long voyage, had been selected, and despatched, under the command of rear-admiral Willaumez, on the 13th of December, 1805, to the American seas. This division was composed of the *Foudroyant*, an 80-gun ship, the *Vétéran*, the *Cassard*, the *Impétueux*, the *Patriote*, and the *Eole* of 74 guns, and two frigates, the *Valeureuse* and the *Comète*. It carried provisions for seven months. On the news of its sailing, more than thirty English ships had started in pursuit of it, for the purpose of seeking it in all the seas. It had first cruised off St. Helena, in the months of February and March, 1806, taken several prizes there, and then, having sick on board, and being in want of fresh provisions, it had gone to San Salvador, from the same motives which had led Captain L'Hermitte to that port. After a rest of seventeen days, it had sailed to cruise again, and in June had touched at Madeira, with the intention of getting into the wind of the Antilles and there falling in with the great Jamaica convoys. At Martinique it had found but a small quantity of provisions, the colony having scarcely sufficient for its own consumption, few means of refitting, for the almost continual state of war for fifteen years had permitted scarcely any naval stores to be sent thither; and it went to lie in ambush in the passes of the Antilles, in the hope of making some rich capture, equivalent to the expense of so large an armament. On the 28th of July, the ships of the squadron were sailing apart, with the intention of taking a convoy which had been descried, when, the wind freshening, the distance which separated them began rapidly to increase. Next morning, the 29th, at day-break, the admiral had lost sight of the *Vétéran*, on board of which was prince Jerome Bonaparte, and of the *Valeureuse* frigate. In the hope of meeting with these two ships, he stood to the northward along the coast of America, and proceeded to cruise thirty-eight leagues to eastward of New York; but, not falling in with either the *Vétéran* or the *Valeureuse*, he steered for the rendezvous previously agreed upon for such ships as should part company, in latitude 29° N. and longitude 67° W. Here he was joined by the *Valeureuse*, but not by the *Vétéran*, which had that moment sailed for the bank of Newfoundland, and he remained in that quarter till the 18th of August. During these vicissitudes, the English divisions had missed him, as he had himself missed the Jamaica convoy, which passed within forty leagues of his squadron. Such are the hazards of the sea! Having waited at the rendezvous beyond the time assigned for his ships, admiral Willaumez, who had intended to proceed to Newfoundland, assembled his captains, held a council of war with them, and, having ascertained that they had a great number of sick, scarcely any water, wood, or provisions, he resolved to

touch at Porto Rico, then to sail northward to the bank of Newfoundland, destroy the English fisheries there, and return to Europe. But scarcely was this resolution adopted, when, in the night of the 18th of August, 1806, the same hurricane which had dispersed L'Hermite's division, overtook the squadron of admiral Willaumez, and for three successive days tossed it about upon the waves till it was on the point of perishing. The *Foudroyant* and the *Impétueux*, the only ships of the squadron which had not been separated by the tempest, lost all their masts, repaired themselves at sea as well they could, and purposed to proceed in company, when fresh gales parted them also. Perceiving amidst the tempest, the lights of several enemy's ships, they sought safety wherever they could. The *Foudroyant*, the admiral's ship, took refuge at the Havannah; the *Impétueux*, having lost her masts, one tier of guns thrown overboard, and part of her powder, suffered herself to drive at the mercy of the hurricane into the bay of Chesapeake, where she ran aground, pursued by two enemy's ships. The crew, seeing their ship lost, sought refuge on shore, where they were protected by the American neutrality, and assembled on board the *Cybele*, Captain L'Hermite's frigate, which had likewise taken shelter in the Chesapeake. While the *Foudroyant* and the *Impétueux* were thus struggling against ill fortune, the *Eole*, completely dismasted, exposed to the winds and the enemy, had also fled into the Chesapeake. There, towed by American vessels, she was got aground sufficiently high to be safe from the English. The *Patriote*, having lost her top-masts, her mizen-mast, and all her sails, had likewise reached the Chesapeake, and cast anchor at Annapolis. The *Valeureuse* frigate had fled to the Delaware. The *Cassard*, after being long buffeted by the waves, having lost the bar of her helm, having had fourteen stanchions stove in, had well nigh been upset. As, however, she made no water in her hold, she was righted and repaired at sea. Her sails were in tolerably good condition, and she had still provisions for seventy-eight days. Upon the strength of these circumstances, it was thought that she had no need to go to Porto Rico, and she sailed for Europe, reaching Brest on the 13th of October. The *Vétéran*, captain Jerome, which had been long separated from the squadron, after roving for some time on the coast of North America, had returned to Europe; but the blockade of Lorient had obliged her to take refuge in the bay of Concarneau, where she was scarcely safe.

Thus, of the six ships which sailed from Brest, the *Foudroyant* had taken refuge at the Havannah; the *Impétueux* was destroyed; the *Patriote* and the *Eole* had ascended the Chesapeake in a deplorable state, and without much chance of getting out again; the *Cassard* was saved; the *Vétéran* had got to an anchorage at Concarneau, from which it was difficult to extricate her. As for the frigates of the expedition, the *Valeureuse* was in the Delaware; the *Comète* had taken shelter in an American port. A few prizes

taken from the enemy formed a slender compensation for such disasters.

About the same time three frigates, the *Syrène*, the *Revanche*, and the *Guerrière*, had been despatched from Lorient for the northern seas, under the command of a brave Flemish seaman, captain Leduc. The three frigates directed by this intrepid navigator had not experienced the same disasters as the large division of Willaumez, but had met with terrible seas and undergone great hardships. Captain Leduc, sailing from Lorient in March, 1806, steered for the Azores, where he picked up some prizes, was separated for a moment from the *Guerrière*, then, coming back towards the west coast of Ireland, had borne away for the point of Iceland, which he came in sight of on the 24th of May, and for the point of Spitzbergen, which he had descried on the 12th of June. In those latitudes he had met with frightful weather, and lost sight of the *Guerrière*. Diseases soon broke out: he numbered so many as forty dead, 160 sick, 180 convalescent, out 700 or 800 men, who composed the crews of his two frigates. Continuing to cruise, sometimes off the coast of Greenland, sometimes off that of Iceland, now and then taking prizes, he had returned in September to St. Malo, and, being unable to land there, he put into the little roadstead of Brehat. Notwithstanding these crosses and the severities of the weather, endured by captain Leduc with extraordinary fortitude, he had taken fourteen English vessels and one Russian, made 270 prisoners, and destroyed nearly three millions' worth of property. Unfortunately he had lost ninety-five men. This cruise might be considered as advantageous, though the weather was so extremely unfavourable. It did the highest honour to captain Leduc, the commander.

In September, 1806, rear-admiral Cormao, the same who had behaved so nobly at Trafalgar, sailed from Toulon with the ships the *Borée* and the *Annibal*, the *Uranie* frigate, and the *Succès*, to fetch from Genoa the ship *Le Genoïs*, built in that port. Having crossed the gulf, he returned to Toulon, opening that sea to French and Italian commerce. He repeated this trip more than once, and always succeeded in driving off the enemy's cruisers.

At the same time captain Soleil, sailing from Rochefort with four frigates and a brig belonging to Allemand's division, experienced a sanguinary disaster. The English had adopted a new system of blockade; it consisted in not keeping so close to the coast, in order to tempt our blockaded vessels to slip out, and thus to procure for themselves the means of cutting them off, before they had time to turn back. This stratagem completely succeeded in the case of captain Soleil. The custom then was to start at night, in order to pass the enemy's cruisers unperceived. The English not being in sight, owing to the distance at which they kept, captain Soleil slipped out at night on the

24th of September, 1806, met with none of them in his way, perceived them next morning, the 25th, in the offing, crowded all sail to outstrip them in speed, cleared the space of 100 miles without being overtaken, but on the 26th was surrounded by Sir Samuel Hood's whole squadron, composed of seven ships of the line and several frigates, and maintained for several hours an heroic fight with five of the enemy's ships. Excepting the *Themis*, which contrived to escape with two brigs, the whole French division was taken or destroyed.

About the same time with these encounters, to which the too great numerical superiority of the enemy gave sooner or later an unfortunate termination, there were others, in which the courage of our seamen showed that, ship to ship, when circumstances were not too unfavourable, we were capable of facing the English, and even of beating them. On the 24th of April in the same year, captain Bourayne, proceeding to the Cape with *la Canonnière* frigate, had fallen in with an English convoy, and dashed into the midst of it to make prizes, when a 74-gun ship, charged to escort this convoy, all at once made her appearance. Captain Bourayne at first wished to decline an unequal combat with this adversary; but, finding himself pressed too closely, he gallantly accepted battle, and profiting by the circumstance that the swell of the sea prevented the enemy's ship from using her lower-deck guns, he had taken an advantageous position, and in a few moments brought down her main-mast, completely cut up her rigging, and obliged her to sheer off. Some stout merchantmen having sought to interfere in the fight, he bore down upon them, presently spoiled their stomach, and continued his route to the Cape, being yet unaware of its conquest by the English. These latter, in order to entrap French or Dutch vessels, had not struck the Dutch colours. No sooner had captain Bourayne cast anchor, than, at a signal, all the Dutch colours were hauled down, replaced by English, and a shower of bombs and balls poured upon the *Canonnière*. The undaunted captain Bourayne cut his cable, sacrificed his anchors, and, crowding sail, escaped all dangers. He arrived safe and sound at the Isle of France, where he was destined to signalise himself by fresh naval adventures not less bold, not less glorious.

Another circumstance of this kind, which occurred on our own coast likewise, proved all that could be expected from the ardour and intrepid courage of our seamen. The *flute la Salamandre*, having sailed from St. Malo with a cargo of ship-timber for Brest, being pursued by a large corvette of 24-guns, two brigs, and a cutter, ran herself aground near the mouth of Erquy, and the crew defended themselves as well as they could with small arms. Soon perceiving the impossibility of prolonging this defence, they got away in a boat and on the wreck of the mast, succeeded in reaching the land, proceeded to the battery called St. Michel, directed its fire upon the English corvette, which had

approached too near to the coast, crippled her so that she could not be worked, and thus forced her to run aground. They then dashed into the water, and, seconded by a few soldiers who had run to the shore, took possession of the corvette in spite of the remnant of the English crew, part of whom were *hors de combat*, and part had run away.

Such were the actions, unimportant but gallant, by which our sailors signalled themselves against a power usually superior to us in number and training, and still more superior at a moment when all our forces were exclusively directed to the war on land. Thus, at the conclusion of 1806, the able and unfortunate minister Decrès, having nothing but disasters to relate to a master who was receiving only favourable news from all quarters, was entirely discouraged and not less disgusted with the system of cruises than with the system of great battles. Being obliged to acquaint Napoleon with the reverses which we had sustained in this new system of warfare as well as in the old one, he gave him sound reasons which ought to have convinced him that all kinds of naval warfare were alike dangerous in the then state of things. In the first place, the numerical disproportion was so great, according to him, that the English could blockade our ports with several strong squadrons, and keep at the same time numerous divisions to run after our cruisers the moment they were descried; which proved that, even without pretending to fight general battles, very considerable forces were still required for carrying on war with petty divisions. In the next place, our *matériel* was too defective in comparison with that of the enemy; and, though our sailors, never inferior in courage, were far behind in experience, the *matériel* which they employed was much more in fault than their skill. Their ships withstood the tempest much less vigorously than they withstood it themselves. In the hurricane of the 19th of August, which had destroyed Willaumez's division, and sadly shattered L'Hermitte's, the English had borne its fury better than we had done, because their rigging was not only better managed, but also because it was of far superior quality. More numerous, better equipped, they were always certain that among them, enough would always escape the dangers of the sea to oblige our ships, some to surrender, others to run aground, and others to run away. But the inferiority of number and that of *matériel* were not, according to admiral Decrès, the only causes of our disasters. The ships of Willaumez's division, on leaving the port of Brest, where they were selected with care from a considerable squadron, were not inferior in quality to good English ships. But ten months' continuance at sea, without finding any harbour to put into, well supplied with provisions and spare articles, had put them out of condition either to escape by their sailing from a stronger squadron, or to withstand a storm, or to prosecute their cruise without a fresh stock of provisions, which exposed them to the danger of being discovered by the enemy.

Admiral Decrès therefore wrote to Napoleon on the 23rd of October, 1806, "After ten months' continuance at sea, the yards and topmasts break, the rigging gets relaxed, and wears the more, because one cannot follow up its gradual repair while out at sea; the lower masts *give*, the ships become loose; and there is no example of vessels having continued at sea for so long a time, without taking occasion to repair themselves afresh, and quietly, in some port." Unfortunately, we had no longer any ports, or those which we had were scantily supplied with stores. We possessed, it is true, an excellent one, incomparable for its advantages in the Indian Ocean: this was that of the Isle of France, which, at the time of the American war, had served the bailli Suffrein for the base of operations during his brilliant campaign in India. But amidst the disorders of the Revolution and the difficulties of the continental war, the government had not been able to supply it with naval stores. The Cape of Good Hope, which belonged to allies, could not be provisioned like a national port, and, besides, it had just been taken. On the coast of Brazil, we had nothing but a neutral and almost hostile port, as it was Portuguese—that of San Salvador. Lastly, in the West Indies, we were masters of the magnificent road of Fort Royal, one of the safest and most capacious in the world; but Martinique was utterly destitute of naval stores, and as to provisions, it rather needed that our squadrons should leave part of their biscuit for the troops of the garrison, than have to renew the stock consumed at sea. With four well-stored places to resort to, one in the West Indies, one on the coast of Brazil, one at the Cape of Good Hope, one in India, we might have kept advantageously at sea. But, deprived of these resources, we could but appear as fugitives, always hurried, always dreading an encounter, having not only the chances of inferior number against us, but all those of inferior and inadequate equipment. Such were the consequences of long domestic convulsions and of foreign wars, unparalleled for their magnitude, their duration, and their rancour.

Napoleon, whom it was not easy to discourage, and who thought that, notwithstanding many unfortunate accidents, these last expeditions had done great damage to the enemy's commerce, resolved to send out fresh cruisers in 1807; but this was strongly opposed by M. Decrès, who said that the coast of Africa, ravaged in 1806 by captain L'Hermitte, was this year provided with considerable means of defence, in consequence of the vehement complaints of English commerce; that we possessed no place of resort either at the Isle of France, which was destitute of stores, or at the Cape, which was taken, or at San Salvador, which was exhausted, or at Martinique, which had scarcely necessaries for itself. To consolidate, meanwhile, the continental peace, to occupy the English cruisers with squadrons fitted out in our ports, and to take advantage of certain moments for sending succours to the colonies in frigates, appeared to him to be the only allowable activity

—an activity that could do little harm for the present and advantageous for the future. Napoleon, who, between Eylau and Friedland, had had to create new armies to overawe Europe on his rear, had admitted the negative system of M. Decrès, and the operations of our navy in 1807 were confined to some succours despatched to the East and West Indies.

Our colonies, though exposed to many hardships, received, nevertheless, frequent relief. Producing nothing but sugar, coffee, some spices, a few dyeing materials, and no provisions, no clothing, their prosperity consisted in selling their natural productions to advantage, in order to procure in exchange the means of clothing and subsisting themselves. At the period of which we are treating, it was difficult to forward these commodities, and provisions arrived with still greater difficulty, on account of the English cruisers. In this state of distress, the severity of the exclusive system was relaxed in favour of our colonies. They were allowed that commerce with neutrals, which, in time of peace, is reserved for nationals alone. The North Americans came to fetch their sugar and their coffee, and gave them in return corn and cattle. But as people are more eager to sell their own commodities than to buy those of another, the Americans brought provisions to a greater amount than that of the sugar and coffee which they exported. On account of the difficulty of selling colonial produce again in Europe, they frequently insisted on being paid in cash for their corn and their cattle, which began to render ready money very scarce. Moreover, paying no custom-house duties at their departure, because they went in ballast, they occasioned a considerable diminution of the local revenues, which consisted almost solely in the produce of the customs, and, in consequence, nearly all the budgets of our settlements exhibited a deficit. This state, still endurable at the period in question, was likely to be soon aggravated: if peace were not restored, and the maritime contest should assume a character of increased rancour, the measures for crippling commerce would be more strictly enforced, on the part both of France and of England. Thus far, however, the despatch of frigates to India, and that of brigs to our Antilles, furnished tolerably abundant resources in specie, provisions, and goods adapted for clothing. The *Semillante* and *Piémontaise* frigates had performed prodigies at the Isle of France in 1806, and captured between them property to the amount of nearly eight millions. They had powerfully seconded the brave general Decaen, who, from that magnificent position, devoured with his eyes the peninsula of India, and demanded 10,000 men only to throw the whole of it into insurrection. Guadeloupe and Martinique had been supplied with Negroes by the cruisers, and several thousand of them had been received; so that the labouring population there had been increased in spite of the war. But the blockades being daily rendered stricter by the enemy, naval stores were wanting for the equipment of cruisers, and our colonies demanded

articles of consumption, at least for the troops, specie to pay for the American provisions, armed vessels to continue the cruises, lastly, recruits to fill the vacancies which took place in our garrisons: thus, at the Isle of France, which would have required 3000 or 4000 men, they were reduced to 1600. At Martinique, where there had been 4700, and which needed 5000 at least, there were left 3000 at most. At Guadeloupe there were scarcely 2000 left. These garrisons, it is true, seconded by inhabitants full of energy and patriotism, were sufficient to repel any force which the English squadrons could transport to so remote a distance. At St. Domingo, terrible convulsions and the destruction of a fine French army were followed by scenes equally ridiculous and atrocious. Dessalines, a Negro, aping the Emperor Napoleon, as Toussaint Louverture had endeavoured to imitate the First Consul Bonaparte, was seen placing an imperial crown upon his black head, soon sinking beneath the daggers of the Negro Christophe and the Mulatto Pethion; then these two new competitors contending, like the generals of Alexander, for the power of Toussaint Louverture, drenching with their blood that soil which they would not water with their sweat, and leaving it sterile—for blood, let people say what they will, never fertilises the earth. After these sanguinary and burlesque scenes, we lost the French part of the island; we were confined to the Spanish part, where we occupied the town of Santo Domingo with 1800 men, the relics of an army equally unfortunate and heroic. General Ferrand conducted himself there with ability and vigour, profiting by the divisions of the Blacks and the Mulattoes to maintain his ground, and, by the safety enjoyed under the protection of our bayonets, drawing to him numerous colonists, French and Spanish, black and white, masters and slaves.

Such was the state of our navy and of our maritime establishment, on the return of Napoleon from his long campaign in the North. Encouraged by his prodigious triumphs to attempt everything, persuaded that, at the head of the continental powers, he should obtain peace, or that he should conquer England by a combination of overwhelming forces, he was full of ardour. Accustomed, moreover, to find in his genius inexhaustible resources for conquering men and the elements, he was far from sharing in the discouragement of admiral Decrès. He discovered in the future new and as yet untried resources against the English. In the first place, all the inlets had not till then been closed against British commerce. By Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and the Hanseatic towns, by Portugal, which was hostile, by Spain, which was negligently watched, by Austria, which it had been necessary to treat with more delicacy, many doors had been left at least ajar; and English commodities, being sold cheap (which they might well be at that period), had found means to penetrate to the Continent. Now, on the contrary, every avenue was to be closed, and an immense injury was preparing for the manufac-

tures of England. Napoleon, moreover, was about to be at liberty to increase his naval force, either with the resources of the French budget, daily becoming more wealthy, or with the produce of conquest, or with the timber and the hands of the whole coast of Europe. His numerous armies being, besides, disposable, he had conceived a vast system, the successive development of which we shall see hereafter, and which would have so multiplied the chances of a great expedition directed against London, Ireland, or India, that this expedition, once eluding the vigilance of the Admiralty, might perhaps have at last succeeded, or that British obstinacy might in the end have yielded to the threat of an ever imminent danger. Napoleon, in fact, was not much in favour of great naval battles, which, for the rest, he had accepted on certain occasions, merely to avoid recoiling in too manifest a manner from the enemy. Neither was he more in favour of cruises, which the want of safe and well-stored places of resort rendered too perilous. But his design was, uniting the Russian, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian navies—having armed fleets at the Texel, Flushing, Boulogne, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Cadiz, Toulon, Genoa, Tarento, and Venice—keeping numerous camps, full of invincible troops near these fleets—his design was to oblige England to maintain before those ports naval forces inadequate to blockade all, and starting unawares from one that might be ill watched, to transport an army either to Egypt, to India, or even to London, and, while waiting for the realisation of this chance, to exhaust the English nation of men, timber, money, perseverance, and courage. We shall see, in fact, that, if he had not exhausted himself in a thousand enterprises foreign to this great object, if he had not wearied out the goodwill or the patience of his allies, certainly the means were so vast, so well conceived, that they would in the end have triumphed over England.

But before arriving at this immense development, which two or three years would have sufficed for attaining, Napoleon began by issuing orders for redoubled activity in the building of ships throughout the empire, and then by trying in the Mediterranean that system of expeditions, ever ready and ever threatening, by making an attempt on Sicily, in order to add that island to the kingdom of Naples, already given to his brother Joseph.

Informing his brother Louis that the Dutch army was about to return, and thenceforward to absorb a smaller portion of his resources, he enjoined him to put the Texel fleet into good condition and to collect there at least nine ships of the line fully equipped. At Antwerp and Flushing he had already obtained astonishing results. Five ships, some of eighty, the others of seventy-four guns, built at Antwerp, had descended without accident to Flushing, crossed the shoals of the Scheldt, and were equipping in the latter port. Three others, nearly finished, on the stocks at Antwerp, would increase the Scheldt squadron to eight. Dutch,

Flemish, Picard sailors were collected from all the coasts to man them. Napoleon ordered the three ships finished to be launched, and fresh keels to be laid down upon the stocks which had become vacant, and the number of those stocks to be increased: for it was his intention that Antwerp should become the port for building, not only for Flushing but for Brest, on account of the timber of Germany and the North, floated down by the rivers into the whole of the Netherlands. He purposed to reserve the timber at Brest for the repair of the squadrons which were always equipping at that great port. He promised himself, on his return to Paris, to review the old Boulogne flotilla and to organise it upon a different plan. He urged the building of frigates at Dunkirk, Havre, Cherbourg, and St. Malo. At Brest, where, ever since the squadron of Willaumez sailed, there had remained twelve ships armed, five of which were bad and seven good, Napoleon ordered the five bad to be put out of service, and the seven good to be equipped in the best possible manner, reserving the sailors who had become disposable for the new ships which were preparing to be built. He directed that a ship, the building of which was just finished, should be added at Lorient to a division of two ships already there. He consented that the *Vétéran*, which had taken refuge at Concarneau, and was obstinately blockaded by the English, should be disarmed and the crew conveyed to Lorient to man a ship lately built. We had at Rochefort a fine division of five ships, equally well equipped and commanded. The commander was one of those men whom the sailors in their familiar language, call *sea-wolves*, the brave admiral Allemand, deprived of his frigates by the disaster of captain Soleil, but impatient nevertheless to sail, and always stopped by an English squadron, which, for eight or ten months, had not lost sight of the Isle of Aix. Napoleon gave orders for launching a ship that was finished, for refitting another that might be rendered serviceable, and for increasing this division to seven. Wherever ships were launched, he had other keels laid immediately upon the stocks. His financial resources, old and new, enabled him, as we shall presently see, to make these immense efforts. At Cadiz he had an excellent division of five ships, relics of Trafalgar, well organised, well manned, and commanded by admiral Rosily. Napoleon would have wished to add to them some Spanish ships; but when he cast his eyes upon the Peninsula, he could not suppress a mingled feeling of pity, anger, and indignation, when thinking that, at Ferrol and Cadiz, Spain was not able to equip one division; that, at Carthagena alone, she had six ships, which had been equipped several years before, the hulls of which were in a filthy state from lying in the port, with rigging hanging loose, and provisions insufficient for the shortest campaign; for the crews had consumed those on board, having none on shore. He said to himself that he must come to the point and insist that Spain, for her own sake, for the sake of her allies, should govern herself differently; and mean-

while he addressed almost threatening representations to the cabinet of Madrid, to induce it to attach a few ships to those of admiral Rosily, and recommended to the latter to hold himself in readiness to weigh anchor at the first signal. At Toulon there were three ships, two belonging to Toulon and one to Genoa. In conjunction with several frigates, they made some successful sorties. Napoleon desired that the *Commerce de la Ville de Paris* and the *Robuste* should be launched at Toulon, and the *Breslau* at Genoa, that they should be equipped by dismantling either bad or inferior ships; that fresh ships should be laid down on the stocks where they were built, and that there should be six ships ready in that port. He sent engineers to Spezzia, to examine that position, which the continual study of the map had revealed to him. He enjoined his brother Joseph, after obtaining information concerning the ports of Naples and Castellamare, to commence there the building of two ships, and to proceed soon to the building of four. Recollecting that a French ship had found an asylum at Ancona, he thought that he might make use of that port, and ordered two ships to be built there, for the purpose of employing the timber and the workmen of the Roman State, caring but little about the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, whom he already treated as though it no longer existed. Lastly, at Venice there were five ships building. He ordered three more to be put upon the stocks on account of the Treasury of Italy and two on account of the Treasury of France, and directed canals to be cut, for taking the resuscitated navy of Venice from their arsenal to the Adriatic Sea. The same Italian provinces which were to furnish the timber and the workmen for these operations, were also to furnish sailors, always very plentiful on their coasts. With these numerous new ships, with sailors to be found on the coasts of Europe, with an addition of young French soldiers and officers, the number of whom Napoleon never had difficulty to augment, he might hope to double or treble the naval forces of the empire before a year had elapsed. These ships, insufficient at first to match English ships, would be sufficient in a short time to carry troops, and would be so immediately to necessitate fresh blockades and to doom England to ruinous expenses.

While these immense armaments were in preparation, Napoleon intended forthwith to send succours to the colonies, and to assemble by the same operation forty sail in the Mediterranean. For this purpose he directed that the divisions of Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort should take on board 3100 men, and a great quantity of stores; that they should land 1200 at Martinique, 600 at Guadaloupe, 500 at St. Domingo, 300 at Cayenne, 100 at Senegal, and 400 at the Isle of France, and on their return to Europe, proceed through the Straits of Gibraltar to Toulon. The junction at Toulon of seven ships from Brest, three from Lorient, seven from Rochefort, six from Cadiz, and six from Toulon, would compose, with frigates, a total of forty sail, twenty-nine of them

of the line, a force superior to any that the English, even if timely apprised, could bring into that sea under two or three months, and capable of throwing fifteen or eighteen thousand men into Sicily, and as many as one pleased into the Ionian Islands.

Admiral Decrès, who applied himself with honourable courage to oppose Napoleon's projects when the magnitude of them was not proportionate to the means, did not fail to impugn this scheme of junctions preceded by a voyage to the West Indies. He thought that to make the revictualling of the colonies dependant on the success of two or three great expeditions was an imprudent thing; for these great expeditions of several ships of the line and frigates, to carry a few hundred men to the colonies, incurred dangers which were not in proportion to the importance of the object; that it would be better to despatch single frigates, each carrying a certain quantity of stores and two or three hundred men; that if we lost one, the loss was inconsiderable; so the others arrived, the colonies would be always sure of receiving a portion of the succours which were destined for them. As for junctions in the Mediterranean, he maintained that the divisions ordered to pass through the Straits, in spite of the English squadron at Gibraltar, would have to run immense risks; that, to escape them, they ought to be left at liberty to take advantage of the first favourable gale; that, therefore, no other instruction ought to be given them but to pass the Straits, leaving them to seize the first favourable circumstance, without complicating their mission by a voyage to the West Indies and a return to Europe. Lastly, he thought that it would be sufficient to send into the Mediterranean the Cadiz division placed so near to the goal, and perhaps that of Rochefort; but that we ought not to deprive ourselves of all the forces we had in the ocean, by despatching the Lorient and the Brest divisions also to Toulon.

Napoleon, who suffered his ideas to be modified by experienced men, when those men furnished him with good reasons, received favourably the observations of M. Decrès. In consequence, he decided that, from the ports of Dunkirk, Havre, Cherbourg, Nantes, Rochefort, Bordeaux, in which there were many frigates, single vessels should sail for the colonies; that the naval divisions ordered to proceed to the Mediterranean should have that sole direction; and, as for the number, he proposed to call two at least to Toulon, that of Rochefort and that of Cadiz, which would form, with the Toulon division, a squadron of seventeen or eighteen sail of the line, besides seven or eight frigates, a force sufficient to make him absolute master of the Mediterranean, and to execute there all that he meditated relative to Sardinia, Sicily, and the Ionian Islands. In consequence, admiral Allemand at Rochefort, admiral Rosily at Cadiz, had orders to seize the first propitious occasion for weighing anchor, passing the Straits, making any manœuvre which their experience and the circumstances of the sea should suggest. The court of Spain was required to equip a few

ships at Cadiz, and to issue immediate orders that the Carthagena division, commanded by admiral Salcedo, should be supplied with the provisions necessary for a short expedition, and dispatched to Toulon.

Such were the measures ordered by Napoleon in execution of the treaty of Tilsit, to intimidate England by an immense concurrence of means, to dispose her to peace, and if she were bent upon war, to force Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Portugal, Austria, to close their ports against the productions of Manchester and Birmingham, to prepare, with the junction of all the naval forces of the continent, expeditions, the ever threatening possibility of which would sooner or later weary out the perseverance or exhaust the finances of the English nation, without taking into account that the success of a single one would be sufficient to strike her to the heart. But the attention of Napoleon was not wholly engrossed by foreign affairs. He was anxious at length to direct it to the administration, the finances, public works, legislation, to every thing that could conduce to the internal prosperity of France, which he had as much at heart as his glory.

Before he turned it to those points, he was obliged to make some indispensable changes in the high civil and military offices. M. de Talleyrand was the principal, if not the sole, cause of these changes. That able representative of Napoleon to all Europe, who was indolent, addicted to pleasure, never in haste to act or to bestir himself, and whose physical infirmities increased his fondness for indulgence, had been severely tried by the campaigns of Prussia and Poland. To live in the cold climate of those distant regions, to scamper over the snow after an indefatigable conqueror, through bands of Cossacks, to sleep most frequently under thatch, and, when favoured by the fortune of war, to live in a wooden house, decorated with the title of the castle of Finkenstein, harmonised no better with his taste than with his energy. He was tired, therefore, of the ministry for foreign affairs, and wished to resign, not the direction of those affairs, which were his favourite occupation, but to direct them under a different title from that of minister. His pride had been much hurt at his not becoming grand dignitary like M. de Cambacérès and M. Lebrun; and the principality of Benevento, which had been conferred on him in compensation, had only postponed, not satisfied, his longing. An occasion offered for increasing the number of the grand dignitaries; this was the indefinite number of the princes of the imperial family, who were at the same time grand dignitaries and foreign sovereigns. There were three in this predicament: Louis Bonaparte, who was king of Holland and constable; Eugene de Beauharnais, who was viceroy of Italy and arch-chancellor of State; Joseph, who was king of Naples and grand elector. M. de Talleyrand had insinuated to the emperor that they ought to have deputies appointed, with the titles of vice-constable, vice-grand elector, vice-chancellor

of State, and that if, indeed, their by no means active functions scarcely required a double titular, still the high offices destined to reward signal services could not be multiplied too much. M. de Talleyrand would have wished to become vice-grand elector, and leaving to a minister for foreign affairs the vulgar duty of opening and sending off despatches, continue himself to direct the principal negociations. While with the army, he had not neglected any opportunity of talking to the emperor on this subject, never ceasing to extol the advantages of these new creations, and alleging, in regard to himself in particular, his age, his infirmities, his fatigues, and his need of rest. By dint of perseverance, he had obtained a sort of promise, which Napoleon permitted to be wrung from him against his will; for he never intended that the grand dignitaries should perform any active functions, seeing that, partaking in some measure in the inviolability of the sovereign, they were not expected to be responsible. On the contrary, Napoleon held it to be essential that he should possess the power of removing persons invested with active functions, and he especially disliked to place in a position of demi-inviolability a personage whom he distrusted, and whom he deemed it prudent to keep constantly under his all-powerful hand.

As soon as he had returned to Paris, at the moment when every one came to receive the reward for his services during the late war, M. de Talleyrand went to St. Cloud to remind Napoleon of his promises. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès was present. Napoleon betrayed a strong feeling of displeasure. "I cannot comprehend," said he, sharply, to M. de Talleyrand, "your impatience to become a grand dignitary, and to quit a post in which you have acquired importance, and from which I am aware you have reaped great advantages" (alluding to the contributions said to have been levied from the German princes, at the time of the secularizations). "You ought to know that I will not suffer any one to be at the same time grand dignitary and minister; that the foreign affairs cannot then be reserved for you, and thus you will lose an eminent post, for which you are qualified, to gain a title which will be no more than a satisfaction granted to your vanity."

"I am worn out," replied M. de Talleyrand, with apparent phlegm, and with the indifference of a man who had not understood the Emperor's cutting allusions, "I have need of rest."

"Be it so," rejoined Napoleon, "you shall be grand dignitary; but not you alone." Then addressing prince Cambacérès, "Berthier," said he, "has rendered me as much service as any person whatever; it would be unjust not to make him grand dignitary, too. Draw up a decree by which M. de Talleyrand shall be raised to the dignity of vice grand-elect, Berthier to that of vice-constable, and bring it to me to sign." M. de Talleyrand retired, and the Emperor expressed more at length to prince Cambacérès all the dissatisfaction that he felt. It was in this manner that M.

de Talleyrand quitted the ministry for foreign affairs, and, with great prejudice to himself and to public business, withdrew from the person of the Emperor.

The decree was signed on the 14th of August, 1807. It was necessary to appoint successors to prince de Talleyrand and prince Berthier; the one as minister of foreign affairs, the other as minister of war. Napoleon had at hand M. de Champagny, minister of the interior, a mild, honest, industrious man, initiated by his embassy at Vienna in the ways, but not in the secrets, of diplomacy, and unfortunately not capable of withstanding Napoleon, whom, it is true, nobody would then have been capable of restraining, such was the overpowering influence of success and circumstances. M. de Champagny was therefore appointed minister for foreign affairs, and succeeded in the ministry of the interior by M. Crétet, a well-informed and laborious member of the Council of State, and at the moment governor of the Bank of France. He was preferred to count Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, whose double talent of writing and speaking seemed to render him indispensably necessary in the Council of State and in the Legislative Body, and whose character appeared unsuitable to the post of minister of the interior. M. Jaubert, another member of the Council of State, succeeded M. Crétet, as governor of the Bank.

Napoleon, in raising prince Berthier to the dignity of vice-constable, had no intention to deprive himself of his services as major-general of the grand army, a post in which none could equal him, and in which he therefore continued him. But he selected for his successor as minister of war, general Clarke, whose administrative talents he had recently put to the test, in the post of governor of Berlin—talents more specious than solid—but who, assuming the appearance of anxious docility and close application to business, had misled Napoleon. There was, however, sufficient ground for this choice, for the military men fit for active war were all employed; and among those who were better suited to the cabinet than to the field of battle, general Clarke appeared to be the one who had most of the spirit of order, and of that comprehension of details which administrative matters require. M. Dejean continued in the post of minister of the *matériel* of war. General Hullin, whose attachment and personal courage Napoleon had had more than one occasion to appreciate, succeeded to the command of Paris, in place of Junot, appointed to head the army of Portugal.

About this time France sustained a serious loss in the person of the minister of public worship (*ministre des cultes*), count de Portalis, a learned lawyer, an ingenious and brilliant writer, an able co-operator in the two most meritorious works of Napoleon, the Civil Code and the Concordat, having in his relations with the clergy had the skill to preserve a due medium between weakness

and rigour, esteemed by the French Church, and exercising a useful influence over it and over Napoleon: a personage, in short, much to be regretted at a moment when we were on the point of an open rupture with the court of Rome, and as much to be regretted in the administration of the *cultes*, as Talleyrand in the direction of the foreign affairs. That laborious man, struck with a sort of blindness, had had the art to supply the want of the sense of which he was deprived by a prodigious memory; and it once happened that, being summoned to write from Napoleon's dictation, he re-produced from memory his ideas, with their vivid expression, which he had made believe to take down in writing. M. de Portalis had become dear to Napoleon, by whom he was deeply regretted. His successor, as *ministre des cultes*, was another lawyer—another author of the Civil Code, M. Bigot de Préameneu, a man of no very brilliant understanding, but discreet, and religious without weakness.

It was requisite to compensate M. Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, who had approached the ministry of the interior without arriving at it. M. Regnault was one of the members of the Council of State most employed by Napoleon, on account of his intimate acquaintance with matters of business, and his facility of expounding them in perspicuous and eloquent reports. As there was then no other disputation, but that of a councillor of State discussing a subject in opposition to a member of the Tribunate, before the mute Legislative Body, and adducing reasons agreed upon against arguments likewise agreed upon, nothing more was wanted for these contests, arranged beforehand in preparatory conferences, and resembling those of free assemblies as much as the manœuvres of a review resemble war, than fluency, variety, and brilliancy. Only it was requisite that this talent should be ready and indefatigable, under a master, prompt in conceiving and in executing, desiring, when he turned his attention to a subject, to go through with it at the moment that it suggested itself, in order to proceed immediately to another. M. Regnault was the first of orators for such a part; and it may be said that all the eloquence of the time was his alone. Napoleon, appreciating his services, resolved to compensate him with the title of minister of State, a title without definition, which gave the rank of minister without conferring the power, and with a place at court, to which was attached a very handsome salary; that of Secretary of State to the imperial family. M. Defermon, for his services in the section of the finances, M. Lacuée, for those which he rendered in the direction of the conscription, obtained also the quality of ministers of State.

These appointments being decided upon with the arch-chancellor, the only person whom he consulted on such occasions, Napoleon bestowed on legislation, the internal administration, the finances, and the public works, an attention which he had never

refused them during the war, but which, given at a distance, hastily, amid the pealing of cannon, was sufficient for superintending, not for creating.

The first point to which Napoleon turned his thoughts was the introduction into the imperial constitution of a modification which appeared necessary to him, though in itself of very little importance—that was, the suppression of the Tribunalate. This body had ceased to be any more than a mere shadow, since it had been reduced to the number of fifty members, deprived of tribune, divided into three sections, those of legislation, internal administration, and finances. It discussed with the corresponding sections of the Council of State, in particular conferences, the *projets de lois* which were to be proposed by the government. We have explained elsewhere how this business was managed. The lapse of time had made no change in the proceedings; all that it had brought with it was a little more calmness and silence. After conferences held at the arch-chancellor's, a member of the Tribunalate and a member of the Council of State went each of them to deliver a speech before the Legislative Body, either in a contrary sense, or in the same sense, according as there had been agreement or divergence. The Legislative Body then voted, without speaking a word, and by an immense majority, the *projets* (bills) presented, excepting in some very rare cases, which concerned material interests, the only interests on which members ventured to differ in opinion from the government; also excepting in some still more rare cases, in which the propositions in question wounded the sentiments of men attached to the revolution,—sentiments dormant, not extinguished, in their hearts. At such times, minorities of forty or fifty voices proved that liberty was deferred, not destroyed, in France. Thus internal affairs were carried on silently and speedily, with the general approbation, founded on the persuasion that these affairs were perfectly conducted, the Emperor having most frequently devised, the Council of State thoroughly examined, the Tribunalate contradicted in their speech, the measures adopted. As for foreign affairs, which it would then have been high time to discuss boldly, in order to stop him whom the impetuosity of his genius was soon to plunge into an abyss, they were reserved exclusively for the Emperor and the Senate, in very unequal proportions, as may well be imagined. Napoleon decided at will upon peace and war, in a manner more absolute than the emperors of ancient Rome, the sultans of Constantinople, or the czars of Russia; for he had neither prætorians nor janissaries, neither Strelitzes, nor Ulemas, nor aristocracy. He had but soldiers, equally submissive and heroic, but a salaried clergy, excluded from public affairs, but an aristocracy which he created, with titles begotten by his imagination, and with a fortune derived from his vast conquests. From time to time he communicated in confidence to the Senate diplomatic negotiations, when they had terminated in war. The Senate, which, since 1805, had

in the absence of the Legislative Body, received the attribution of voting levies of men, paid for those confidences with two or three conscriptions, which the Emperor paid for in his turn with magnificent bulletins, with blackened and tattered colours, with treaties of peace, unfortunately too far from durable; and the country, dazzled with all this glory, delighted with its tranquillity, finding internal affairs conducted with superior ability, the external affairs raised to an unparalleled height, wished that this state of things might last for a long time to come; and now and then only, on seeing the French army wintering on the Vistula, and battles fought near the Niemen, began to fear that all this greatness might find an end in its very excess.

A slight agitation was manifested in this government only when one-fifth of the Legislative Body was to go out. Then some intrigues were formed about the Senate, which was required to choose the members of the deliberative bodies from the lists presented by electoral colleges formed for life. Applications to the principal senators were resorted to, and men solicited a seat in the Legislative Body, mute, but having a salary attached to it, as they would solicit a place in the finances. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès superintended the elections, in order to admit none but adherents; and for this very little picking and choosing was required. The worst that could happen was, that at the end of each list there might slip in a few creatures of the opposition in the Senate, timid and not numerous adversaries, whom Sieyès had deserted and forgotten, who repaid by forgetting him in their turn, and who found fault with Napoleon, not for the rash enterprises which were to bring ruin upon France, but for the Concordat, for the Civil Code, and for many other equally excellent creations.

Such were the forms of that heroic despotism which sprang from the Revolution. It was of little consequence to change them, for the ground-work must have remained the same. Certain details might no doubt have been rectified in the organization of those dependent and submissive bodies. This might have been done, and Napoleon had so designed in regard to the Tribunalate. The Tribunalate, confined to criticism on words in the private conferences, annoying to the Council of State, to which it was nothing but the obscure rival, had a false position, a position unworthy of its title. The Legislative Body, though not desiring more importance than it had, and by no means disposed to use the liberty of speaking, in case that were restored to it, was sometimes confused at its mute condition, which exposed it to ridicule. There was one very simple thing to be done, and which could scarcely have been prejudicial to the liberty of the time--this was to unite the Tribunalate to the Legislative Body, by blending together attributions and persons. This Napoleon, after conferring with the arch-chancellor, resolved to do. In consequence, he decided that the Tribunalate should be suppressed, that its attri-

butions should be transferred to the Legislative Body, thus put again in possession of the liberty of speech; that, at the opening of every session, there should be formed in the bosom of the Legislative Body, and by ballot, three commissions, of seven members each, destined, like the suppressed commissions of the Tribunal, to attend, the first to legislation, the second to internal administration, the third to finances; that these sections should continue to discuss with the corresponding sections of the Council of State, and in private conferences, the *projets de lois* submitted by the government; that when they should find themselves agreed with the Council of State, a member of that Council should come and explain from the tribune of the Legislative Body the motives which the government had had for proposing the *projet* in question; and that the president of the commission should give, on his part, the motives which it had for approving it; but that, in case of disapproval, all the members of the commission should be admitted to produce publicly the reasons on which their opposition was founded; and that, lastly, the Legislative Body should continue to vote, without any other debate, on the measures submitted to its approbation. It was further determined that, to avoid changing the present state of things in the session that was about to open, and all the business of which was already prepared, the *senatus-consulte*, containing the new arrangements, should not be promulgated till the day on which that session should close.

In fact, the Legislative Body, recovering the faculty of speech, since twenty-one of its members, elected annually by ballot, were called to the discussion of the matters under consideration, the suppression of the Tribunal merely put out of sight a body which had long been deprived of life. The Legislative Body was sensible of this restitution of speech, not that it was ready to make use of it, but because it would relieve it from a ridicule which had become annoying. At any rate, there was one word suppressed, a word which had had some importance: it was that of Tribunal. This was enough to displease certain constant friends of the Revolution, and to please Napoleon; who was not afraid, in order to get rid of a word which the recollections of 1802 rendered disagreeable, to restore to the Legislative Body prerogatives of some value. It is true that a precaution was taken against these new prerogatives, namely, to fix at forty years the age at which a member could sit in the Legislative Body—a paltry precaution, which would not have prevented an assembly from being enterprising, if the spirit of liberty could have then awakened, and which caused the political education of public men to begin too late.

After getting rid of this troublesome shadow of the Tribunal, it still remained to be considered what was to become of the persons, whom Napoleon, from natural kindliness of disposition, as much as from policy, never liked to ruffle. He therefore resolved that the members of the Tribunal should go with their preroga-

tives and seek an asylum in the bosom of the Legislative Body, where they were to find a title and appointments. Still Napoleon was unwilling to render the Legislative Body, then limited to 300 members, too numerous by pouring into it the whole *Tribunate*. He therefore opened this asylum to the most obscure members only of the body. As for those who had displayed intelligence and application to business, he destined them for high employments. He first placed in the Senate M. Fabre de l'Aude, who had presided over the *Tribunate* with distinction, and M. Curée, who had commenced his career by the manifestation of an ardent republicanism, but who had finished it with a motion for restoring monarchy by instituting the Empire. As for the other members of the *Tribunate* distinguished by their merit, Napoleon ordered the ministers of the interior and of justice to propose them to him for the vacant places of prefects, first presidents, and *procureurs-généraux*. Lastly, he reserved some others to make them figure in a new magistracy, which was to be the complement of our financial institutions—the Court of Accounts, the creation of which we shall presently relate.

There was another measure which Napoleon was not less impatient to take, and which he considered as much more urgent than the suppression of the *Tribunate*: this was the purification of the magistracy. The government of the Consulate, at the moment of its installation, had brought an excellent spirit into its selections; but, in haste to establish itself, it had chosen in haste the members of all the administrations, and, if it had erred less than the governments which preceded it, still it had erred too much not to be obliged to reform some of its first nominations. In all the classes of functions it had amended several of them, and these changes of persons had been the more approveable and approved, since it was never political influence that dictated them, but the knowledge acquired of the merit of each. In the magistracy nothing of the kind could be effected, on account of the irremovability established by the constitution of M. Sieyès; and certain selections made in the year VIII., in ignorance of the individuals, in the hurry of a re-organization, had become in time a permanent scandal. There had, indeed, been attributed to the Court of Cassation a disciplinary jurisdiction over the magistracy; but this jurisdiction, sufficient in ordinary times, was not so in regard to an establishment of magistrates nominated in mass, on the eve of an immense convulsion, and among whom wretches, unworthy of the rank which they occupied, had slipped in. While decency and application prevailed among almost all the agents of the government placed under an active superintendence, the magistracy alone sometimes set pernicious examples. Against such it was requisite to provide; and Napoleon, who deemed himself called in 1807 to lend a finishing hand to the re-organization of France, had decided to put a stop to such disorder. He had asked the opinion of the arch-chancellor, supreme judge on the

like matters. That mind, equally fertile and wise, had found on this occasion, as on many others, an ingenious expedient, founded, moreover, on solid reasons. The constitution of the year VIII., though it declared the members of the judicial order irremovable, nevertheless subjected them to a condition common to all the members of the government, namely, that they should appear in the lists of eligible persons. It had not, therefore, ensured to them the perpetuity of their offices excepting conditionally, and when they should deserve all their life the public esteem. This precaution having been done away, along with the lists of eligible persons, since abolished, we must supply its place, said prince Cambacérès; and he proposed two measures, the one permanent, the other temporary. The first consisted in not considering the nominations in the magistracy as definitive and conferring irremovability till after the expiration of five years, and according to the experience had of the morality and the capacity of the magistrates chosen. The second consisted in forming a commission of ten members, and charging this commission to review the whole of the magistracy, and to point out such of its members as had proved themselves unworthy to administer justice. This ingenious and cheering combination was adopted by Napoleon, and converted into a *senatus-consulte*, which was to be laid before the Senate. At any other time, this measure would have been considered as a violation of the Constitution. At this period, succeeding immense convulsions, in presence of an acknowledged necessity, and with the intervention of a body whose elevation ensured impartiality, it appeared no more than what it really was, a reparative and necessary act. This purification, soon carried into effect with justice and discretion, was more approved in its execution than in its principle.

While engaged upon these constitutional and administrative measures, Napoleon directed his attention to the finances also. There was no department of the administration with which he had reason to be so well satisfied as with this; for abundance prevailed at the Treasury, and order was completely re-established there. We have seen the budget, fixed at first at 500 millions in 1802, soon swelling by the definitive liquidation of the public debt, by the development given to public works of general utility, by the successive re-establishment of the services of the Church in the smallest communes in France, by the creation of a vast system of instruction, by the extension of ship-building; lastly, by the institution of monarchy and the creation of a civil list, to about 600 millions, and on the breaking out of the war to 700 millions (820, including the expense of collection). In 1806, Napoleon, on his return from Prussia, had declared to the Legislative Body, with the intention that Europe should be apprised of it, that 600 millions were sufficient for peace, 700 millions for war, and that, without recurring to loans, a system to which at that time France had an antipathy, he should obtain

that sum by the re-establishment of the natural collections, which the French Revolution had abolished, instead of confining itself to the reform of them. In consequence, he had re-established, under the name of *droits réunis*, the taxes upon liquors, and, instead of the tolls at the barriers, a tax upon salt. These imposts soon justified his foresight and firmness; for the *droits réunis*, after producing 20 millions in the first year, yielded 48 in the year 1806, and promised 76 in the year 1807. The salt-tax, which had produced from six to seven millions in 1806, brought in 29 millions in 1807, and encouraged a hope of much more in the following years. The old taxes had likewise shown considerable improvement. The registration had increased from 160 millions to 180; the customs from 40 millions in 1806 to 66 in 1807; for if maritime commerce was prohibited, the commerce with the Continent was prodigiously increasing.

Hence the ordinary revenues, which Napoleon in 1806 had estimated at 700 millions, rose far higher in 1807, and might be computed approximatively at 740 millions, made up in the following manner: 315 millions arising from the direct contributions (tax on land, buildings, doors and windows, rent, &c.); 180 from registration (duty on stamps, legacies, changes of property, with the addition of the produce of the forests); 80 produced by the *droits réunis*, 50 by the customs, 30 by salt, five by salt and tobacco beyond the Alps, five by the salt-works of the East, 12 by the lottery, 10 by the posts, one by powder and saltpetre, 10 by instalments due from purchasers of national domains, six by various receipts, 36 by the Italian subsidy, representing the cost of the French army employed in guarding Italy. This total sum of 740 millions, increased by special items to the amount of 30 millions, that is to say, by the additional *centimes* to the direct contributions for the departmental expenses, and the tolls established on certain rivers for the maintenance of the navigation, would make altogether 770 millions. Some of these items, such as the produce of the registration, of the *droits réunis*, of the customs, might rise or fall, but the total amount must reach and exceed successively the mean revenue of 740 millions, 770 with the special items.

It is true that the expenditure had surpassed not less than the receipts the limits specified in the law of the finances. Napoleon, in 1806, had estimated at 700 millions the budget of the state of war, at that time the most usual state; which, with 30 millions of special items, must carry the total expenditure to 730 millions. We know already that it would be 760 millions for that same year 1806. It was afterwards known that it amounted even to 770. It had therefore exceeded the estimated sum by 40 millions. In 1807, the history of which year we are at this moment relating, the expenditure, computed at 720 millions, 750 with the special items, threatened to be much more considerable. It was subsequently fixed at 778 millions. The cause of these augmenta-

tions may easily be guessed; for the expense of the war (for the two ministries, of the *personnel* and of the *matériel*), estimated at 300 millions, had amounted to 340. Even this sum is far from revealing the whole extent of it: for, independently of the expenses charged to the State, the countries occupied by our troops furnished part of the provisions, and the Treasury of the army, into which the war contributions were paid, had defrayed part of the expenses of the *matériel* and of the pay. The supplements drawn from this treasury amounted to not less than 40 or 50 millions for 1806, and to at least 140 or 150 for 1807. But, the current receipts of the year furnishing already 740 millions (770 with the special items), and the Treasury of the army being capable of furnishing some supplements without being impoverished, we are authorised to assert that Napoleon had attained his aim, to make the receipts balance the expenses, even during a state of war, without having recourse to loans.

For the rest, the total expenditure of 770 millions for 1806, of 778 for 1807, was not yet wholly revealed; for French account ability, though then in progress, had not yet arrived at the perfection which at present enables us, a few months after the turn of the year, to ascertain and to fix the expenditure of it. It took not less than two or three years to arrive at such a liquidation. Napoleon then estimated the expenses of the year at 720 millions, 750 including the services paid out of the special items; and, excepting a few extra sums for the maintenance of the army, that estimate was correct. In this total of 720 millions, the public debt would require 104 millions (54 of 5 per cent. *rentes perpétuelles*, 17 of life annuities, 24 of ecclesiastical pensions, 5 of civil pensions, 4 of the debt of Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, and Placentia); the civil list 28 (including the princes); the service of foreign affairs 8; the administration of justice 22; the expenses of the interior and of the public works 54 (not including the works in the departments, paid for out of the 30 millions of special items); the salaries of the clergy 12; the general police 1; the finances 36 (including 10 millions for the sinking fund); the administration of the Treasury 18, including 10 millions paid for discount; the navy 106; war 324; lastly, a reserve of 10, destined for unforeseen expenses—total 720 millions, 750 with the expenses of the departments.

This total of the expenses forming 750 millions, compared with the produce of the receipts forming 770 millions, left in hand a balance of 20 millions. Napoleon immediately resolved to restore the benefit of it to the country, by the abolition of the 10 war *centimes* imposed in 1804, in place of the voluntary donations voted by the departments for the building of the Boulogne flotilla. It was a considerable relief upon the direct contributions, the heaviest of all at that period, and the third of the kind granted since the 18th Brumaire. Napoleon ordered that, when the law of finances was presented to the Legislative Body, which was

about to be assembled after a prorogation of a year, this important improvement in the condition of the tax-payers should be immediately proposed to him, and that thus the termination of part of the burdens of the war should be proclaimed, before the termination of the war itself.

His ardent mind, fond of diving into the future, had already inquired what would be the state of the finances of the country in a few years; and he had ascertained that, in fifteen years, the rapid extinction of the life-annuities and ecclesiastical pensions, that the equally rapid redemption of the *rentes perpétuelles*, provided with a sinking fund, to which the sale, daily more advantageous, of the national property gave a very powerful operation, would reduce the public debt from 104 millions to 74. But, long before this result, for which he should be obliged to wait several years, the restoration of peace might reduce the public expenses far below 720 millions, causing the revenue to rise much higher, and afford abundant means for either alleviations or useful creations. But for the faults which we shall soon have to record, these fair prospects would have been realised, and the finances of France would have been saved with her greatness.

With the favourable state of the finances was combined, ever since the preceding year, a completely new facility in the service of the Treasury. It will be recollected that various causes, one of them permanent, the other accidental, had rendered this service extremely difficult, and given the Treasury the appearance of a rich man in embarrassments, who, either from want of order, or from the difficulty of recovering his revenues, cannot provide for his current expenses. The permanent cause arose from the system of *obligations* and *bills at sight*, which the receivers-general subscribed, and which, payable at their chest, month by month, were the medium by which the produce of the taxes reached the Treasury. The *obligations*, representing the amount of the direct contributions, were drawn only at distant dates, and one fourth, at least, was not payable till four, five, or six months after the year to which they belonged. The *bills at sight*, representing the indirect contributions, and drawn at indefinite periods, subsequently to the actual receipt of the tax, kept back the produce of these contributions from the State for fifty or sixty days after they had been paid into the chests of the receivers-general. These latter had, therefore, the benefit of the funds, which constituted part of their emoluments. But what occasioned much more serious inconvenience than the excessive emoluments allowed to the receivers, was the necessity, under which the Treasury found itself, to realise its revenues at seasonable times, to get those *obligations* and *bills at sight* discounted, sometimes by the Bank, sometimes by great capitalists, who made it pay as high a discount as 12 and 15 per cent., and had even, like M. Ouvrard, turned its paper to strange purposes. The sums which were thus carried back beyond the twelve months of the year were computed at

124 millions. Nevertheless, as the expense was not paid, any more than the tax, in those twelve months, the service of the Treasury might have been carried on almost without discount, if other causes, wholly accidental, had not supervened to complicate the ordinary situation. On the one hand, the anterior budgets of 1805, 1804, and 1803, had left arrears, for which endeavours were made to provide with the current resources; and, on the other hand, the extraordinary financial adventure of the United Merchants, who, by blending the affairs of France and Spain, had deprived the State of a sum of 141 millions, had thrown the Treasury into a double embarrassment. It had found itself obliged to meet an anterior deficit of 60 to 70 millions, and a debit of 141 millions, created by the United Merchants. It had, it is true, solid assets, but difficult to be realised, in pledge for this debit. It had, therefore, been necessary, in addition to the annual discount of 124 millions' worth of *obligations*, not due till in the following year, to meet a deficit of about 200 millions. This accounts for the financial distress of 1805 and 1806, even amidst the prodigious successes of the campaign which was terminated by the victory of Austerlitz.

But the arrival of Napoleon in January, 1806, returning victorious, and his hands full of metals taken from Austria, had revived confidence, and afforded a first relief, for which there was great need. Credit soon recovered itself; the interest of twelve and fifteen per cent. fell to nine and even to six per cent. on the discount of the assets of the Treasury.

Other means had been pursued for removing the difficulties of the moment, and rendering their recurrence impossible. In the first place, the national domains, which constituted the endowments of the Senate, the Legion of Honour, and the University, were withdrawn from them; annuities were allotted to them in compensation, and the domains transferred to the sinking fund, that might effect a gradual sale of them, which it did with prudence and advantage. These domains were valued at 60 millions, and upon this pledge rescriptions to that amount had been created, bearing an interest of six and seven per cent., according to the time they had to run, and payable successively by the said fund, in the course of five years. These rescriptions, on account of the interest which they yielded, the security of the pledge, and the confidence inspired by the fund which was surety for them, had acquired the credit of the best assets, and had never ceased to be negotiable at a rate nearly approaching to par. They had thus furnished a medium for discharging the arrear of the budgets of 1803, 1804, and 1805. The domains given in pledge acquiring in time a more considerable value, the amount of these rescriptions might be increased to 70 and even 80 millions, in order to defray the charges successively revealed by the liquidation of anterior assets.

After this arrear had been provided for, great pains were taken

for the recovery of the 141 millions constituting the debit of the United Merchants. M. Mollien, who had become minister of the Treasury on the removal of M. de Marbois, and was incessantly stimulated by Napoleon, had displayed remarkable zeal and ability in the realisation of the assets composing this debit. In the first place, immoveable property belonging to the sieurs Ouvrard and Vanlerbergh, worth 10 or 11 millions, had been seized. M. Vanlerbergh's warehouses had next been taken possession of; and, as the Emperor was much pleased with his activity, he had continued to him the supply of the provisions for the army and navy; and, by paying only in part for his supplies, means had been secured for soon recovering a sum of about 40 millions. Messrs. Ouvrard, Desprez, and Vanlerbergh had further advanced, in different payments, or in effects upon Holland, a sum of 30 millions. Lastly, Spain, acknowledging herself personally a debtor to the total amount of 60 millions, had paid in assignations upon Mexico for 36 millions of piastres, and promising to pay directly 24 millions in the course of 1806, at the rate of two millions per month—Spain was the worst debtor of all; for, of the 24 millions payable by monthly instalments in 1806, she had paid but 14 millions in August, 1807, after showing an evident ill-will before Jena, and after Jena a deplorable exhaustion. It was by means of loans in Holland that she discharged, in August, 1807, 14 of the 24 millions due in 1806. As for the 36 millions of piastres to be received in the counting-houses of Mexico, Vera Cruz, the Caraccas, the Havannah, and Buenos Ayres, M. Mollien devised a very ingenious expedient for recovering that amount; this was to transfer them to the Dutch house of Hope, which made them over to the English house of Baring; and, on account of the scarcity of the precious metals in England, the latter obtained permission to bring them over from the Spanish ports in English frigates. France guaranteed only the delivery in harbour to English boats, at the rate of 3 fr. 75 cent., the rate at which she took them. The profit of 1 fr. 25 cent., relinquished to those who risked the difficulties of the operation, was, therefore, not at her cost, but at that of Spain, which thus paid by an enormous discount for the distance of the sources of her wealth, and the weakness of her flag, obliged to leave to that of England the transport of the metals of America. The houses of Baring and Hope afterwards remitted to the French Treasury, by transfers of assets, the amount of the ceded piastres. The bargain had been made on these conditions for more than 25 millions, part of which had just arrived. The surplus had been applied to the payment, in the United States, or in the Spanish colonies, of debts contracted by our ships, and especially those of admiral Willaumez, which had sought refuge, some in the port of the Havannah and others in the Delaware and the Chesapeake.

It was by the aid of these various combinations, that in August, 1807, the French treasury had found means to recover 100

millions of the 141 composing the enormous debit of the United Merchants. The payment of the balance of 41 millions was secured within about 4 or 5 millions and at very short intervals.

The Treasury, deeply in debt in the winter of 1806, soon relieved by the metallic succours which Napoleon had brought from abroad, by the revival of confidence, by the integral payment of the arrear of the budgets, by the almost total recovery of the debit of the United Merchants, had had to provide in 1807 for only a small part of that debit, and for the 124 millions of *obligations* usually recoverable in the following year, which was an easy matter, as we have already observed, the payment of the expenses being deferred nearly as long as that of the taxes. The Emperor, therefore, had been able to demand and to obtain that the pay of the grand army, which amounted to 4 or 5 millions per month, and from the immediate payment of which he had dispensed the French Treasury, should gradually accumulate at Erfurt, at Mayence, at Paris, and there form a depot of specie to the amount of more than 40 millions, an excessive precaution, which proves how prudent in war was that man so imprudent in politics.*

But a new institution, which was the necessary complement of our financial organization, facilitated in 1806 the operations of the Treasury, and in the course of 1807 caused an abundance previously unknown to prevail there. According to the system proposed to the First Consul by M. Gaudin, on the morrow of the 18th Brumaire, a system pursued till 1807, the receivers-general signed, as we have said, for the profit of the Treasury, bills of exchange, with the title of *obligations* or *bills at sight*, falling due month by month. Such was the method employed for getting in the public revenue. The Treasury thus had the certainty of a fixed term for payments, and left as emoluments to the receivers-general the profits thence resulting; for the taxes always came in before these *obligations* or *bills at sight* were due. It was no doubt a great improvement, in reference to the time at

* The details which I am here recording may appear trivial, but to me they seem indispensable for conveying a notion of the course of our finances, of the administrative ability of Napoleon and his agents, and of the singular times in which they lived. These details, and in particular those which are about to follow concerning the creation of the new system of the Treasury, are extracted, not from official publications, which had become extremely rare at this period, left, moreover, very incomplete, and, above all, perfectly silent respecting the means of execution, but from the archives of the Treasury itself. With the authorization of Messrs. Human and Dumon, the ministers of the finances, I have availed myself of these archives in the composition of a considerable work, for which, long as it may be, I have been compensated by the information which I have obtained respecting the progress of our financial administration. I have also been much enlightened as to what concerns this period, by the perusal of the unpublished and highly important memoirs of Count Mollien. I guarantee, therefore, the perfect accuracy of the details which have preceded and are about to follow, in regard to the facts themselves and in regard to the figures: only I have given the round sums, and, for amounts varying from day to day, the mean sums, which best expressed the durable truth of things.

which this system was devised; for it ensured fixed terms for the payment of the taxes. In 1807 there was one step more left to be taken—that was to oblige the receivers to hand over their funds to the Treasury the very moment that they received them. But to suppress all at once this system of bills of exchange, and to substitute for it the more natural system of an immediate payment, under the form of an account current between the Treasury and the receivers-general, would have been too abrupt a change, and perhaps a dangerous one. The experience and the inventive spirit of M. Mollien suggested to him one of the happiest of transitions.

M. Mollien, as the reader no doubt recollects, was director of the sinking fund, when Napoleon, satisfied with the manner in which he had directed that fund, called him in 1806 to the ministry of the Treasury, as successor to M. de Marbois, dismissed in consequence of the affair of the United Merchants. Mollien was a shrewd, ingenious talker, full of the doctrines of the economists, very clever at business, though he expounded it in affected language, timid, susceptible, easily agitated in the presence of Napoleon, who disliked long dissertations, but soon finding in himself the independence of an honest man and the firmness of a convinced mind. Napoleon sometimes treated the theories of M. Mollien with the freedom of omnipotence and of genius, and then left that able minister to act, knowing how conscientious, how zealous, and above all how well qualified he was to reform the mechanism of the Treasury, where still reigned old practices, protected by obstinate interests.

When the negotiation of the assets of the Treasury was taken from M. Desprez, the representative of the company of United Merchants, a committee of receivers-general had been charged to supply his place. This committee existed for some time, and its service consisted in discounting the *obligations* and *bills at sight*, acting on account of the receivers-general. The funds employed by this committee came to it from the receivers-general themselves, who always received the amount of the taxes before the time, when the maturity of the *obligations* and the *bills at sight* obliged them to pay it in. M. Mollien struck with the remark, that the money with which this committee discounted the assets of the Treasury, was the money of the Treasury itself, conceived the idea of requiring its immediate payment by means of a combination which, without depriving the receivers of the use of the funds by which they made a profit, should lead them to pay over the produce of the taxes to the chests of the Treasury directly and without intermediate agent. To accomplish this he created a chest called *caisse de service*, a title borrowed for its very object, to which the receivers-general were to send, the moment they received them, all the funds obtained from the tax-payers, for which an interest of 5 per cent. was to be allowed. This chest, in order to acquit itself towards them, was afterwards to give them back their *obliga-*

tions and *bills at sight*, when they became due. To induce the receivers-general to pay the sums collected into this chest, he addressed to them a circular, in which he said that, if on the one hand the funds were not owing till their *obligations* became due, on the other, they were but depositaries of those funds and had no right to employ them in private speculations; that the *caisse de service*, instituted to receive them, would be the most natural and the safest depositary, and would pay them a reasonable interest, that of 5 per cent. He added that their account current with this chest would be submitted every month to the inspection of the Emperor, whom every body knew to be attentive, and full of memory and justice. This was enough to stimulate the zeal of those who were well disposed. With the others M. Mollien took a different course. Relieved by the abundance of money which he began to enjoy from the necessity of recurring so frequently to the discount of the *obligations* and *bills at sight*, he suffered not one of those papers to be seen on the *Place*, and if, in certain pressing emergencies, he was obliged to apply to the Bank of France to discount a few millions in paper, it was on condition that it should keep those assets in its portfolio. Thenceforward the receivers-general who employed the funds arising from the taxes in jobbing upon *obligations* and *bills at sight*, had no other resource than the *caisse de service* itself, and they sent those funds to it. Some from zeal, from emulation to distinguish themselves in the eyes of the Emperor himself—others, from the impossibility of finding elsewhere an employment for their capitals, since the *obligations* had ceased to appear on the *Place*, paid the realized produce of the taxes into the *caisse de service* for the sake of the interest of 5 per cent., and the chest acquitted itself towards them by giving them back their *obligations* whenever they became due. The operation of discount was thus naturally suppressed, and succeeded by an immediate payment to the Treasury on condition of an interest of 5 per cent. for the time to run between the period of payment and the period when the *obligations* and the *bills at sight* would become due.

Instituted at the conclusion of 1806, at the moment of the departure of Napoleon for Prussia, the *caisse de service* was disgorging funds in 1807 at the moment of his return. M. Mollien, whose ingenious and skilful combinations on this occasion cannot be too much admired, did not stop at directing the funds of the receivers-general towards the *caisse de service*; he went further. It was not the receivers only who had recourse to the *obligations* and the *bills at sight*, for the employment of funds at their temporary disposal; it was also individuals, who sought to place them there for a short term (as is done at the present day by the French capitalists, who look out for bills of the Treasury, or by the English capitalists who buy Exchequer Bills); it was also public establishments which had capitals to place out, such as the Mont-

de-Piété, the Bank, the sinking fund, &c. These different capitalists applied to the bankers usually jobbing in *obligations* and *bills at sight*, in order to procure some. M. Mollien authorized the *caisse de service*, by the decree of institution, to issue bills on itself, bearing an interest of 5 per cent. and at a fixed term. Instead of giving *obligations* or *bills at sight* to private individuals, it gave them the bills upon itself, and it had soon issued to the amount of 18 millions, which put it in possession of a like sum in cash. It concluded, moreover, a particular treaty with the Mont-de-Piété, which usually needed from 15 to 18 millions' worth of *obligations* for the employment of its funds. Instead of giving it obligations, notes of the *caisse de service* were delivered to it, with a guarantee of the reserve of 18 millions' worth of obligations, kept at the Treasury in a special portfolio. In this manner the *obligations* and *bills at sight* were withdrawn from circulation, and the notes of the *caisse de service* were taken by the public in their stead. In July, 1807, this chest had existed a year, and it had already received 45 millions from the receivers-general (half on their own account, half on account of capitalists in the country), 18 millions from the public, and 18 millions from the Mont-de-Piété, that is to say, a sum total of 80 millions.

It may be conceived what facility the creation of the new chest must have given to the service of the Treasury, which, relieved from the arrear of the budgets by the creation of the 70 millions' worth of rescriptions, reimbursed for the greatest part of the debit of the United Merchants, found besides, in this floating loan of 80 millions, resources which dispensed it from recurring to the discount of *obligations* and *bills at sight*. This loan had in reality always existed, since capitals had always sought a temporary location in the good paper of the Treasury. But the Treasury had not been their intermediary. Speculators, placed between it and the public, drew away the capitals to themselves, and then made their customers beg, pray, frequently wait, and pay at an exorbitant rate the discount of the *obligations* and *bills at sight*. Sometimes even these speculators were no other than its own receivers, who lent it the funds from the taxes, and not only fleeced it without shame, but likewise contracted the mischievous habits of jobbing. The *caisse de service*, having become the intermediary, also became master of that permanent loan, of the rate at which it was contracted, and liberated itself from the receivers, whom it reduced to mere depositaries of the public money, and left them nothing more of the part of bankers than the business of moving the funds of the Treasury from one point to another. The sudden and extraordinary reduction in the expenses of negociation for 1806 and 1807 furnished the material proof of all these advantages. For the service of 1806, which, on account of the change in the calendar, comprehended not only the twelve months of 1806 but the last three months of 1805, the amount of the expense of negociation rose to the exorbitant sum of from

27 to 28 millions.* For the first four months it had been 14 millions (equal to $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions per month, or 40 millions per year.) For the seven following months it had been nearly 9 millions (being on an average no more than 1200 thousand francs per month, and 14 or 15 millions per annum.) Lastly, for the last four months it had been 4 million 300 thousand francs (which would be equal to, at most, 12 millions per year.) This expense was reduced in 1807 to 9 or 10 millions, a considerable saving, which left to the capitalists only legitimate profits, and by no means to be grudged, if we consider in particular how it was to be divided. Of these 9 millions the Bank received 1400 thousand francs, the sinking fund 1500 thousand, the Mont-de-Piété 1350 thousand, the receivers-general and private individuals, for their perquisites and expenses, 5 millions. What a change, if we look back to the preceding years, when the receivers-general made enormous profits by the sums which they retained, if we go back especially to the times of the ancient monarchy, when the farmers-general paid the court, the ministers, the *employés*, and amassed immense fortunes besides during a lease of a few years!

The *caisse de service*, in addition to these different advantages, of emancipating the Treasury, of producing great savings, of bringing the receivers into better habits, was attended with this consequence, to put a stop, in the general circulation of paper, to false movements, which resolved themselves, for the State and for the country itself, either into banking expenses, or the useless displacing of cash; when, for instance, the Treasury was not yet in direct and daily communication with its receivers, by means of an account current with them, and it had need of money somewhere, ignorant as it was of this, it got *obligations* discounted at Paris, and despatched the amount to the spot, where frequently there were abundant funds in the chest of the receiver-general. The receiver-general, on his part, interested in ridding himself of unprofitable funds, sought to transmit them to Paris or to other points, and loaded the public conveyances with specie; whereas, if the account current had existed, merely writing would have spared the Treasury the sending of cash to the departments, and the departments the sending of it to Paris.

M. Mollien had not confined himself to the creation of a *caisse de service* in the centre of the Empire; he had instituted a similar one in the departments beyond the Alps. There, still more than in Old France, prevailed the pernicious contradiction of stagnant capitals in the hands of the receivers, with urgent wants for which it was necessary to provide by the transmission

* 27,369,022 fr. for 465 days, divided as follows:—
 for 130 days, 14,385,680 fr.
 for 197 days, 8,609,872
 for 138 days, 4,373,470

TOTAL 27,369,022

of specie. To put an end to this serious inconvenience, M. Mollien established, not at Turin, but at Alexandria, in the circuit of the great fortresses erected by Napoleon, a transfer chest (*caisse de virements*) into which all the receivers of Liguria, Piedmont, and all French Italy, were to pay their funds, and which, in its turn, forwarded them to the places where they were needed, to Milan in particular, where the French army had to be paid. This chest, placed under the direction of an able agent, M. Dauchy, had soon produced the same advantages as that which had been instituted in Paris, that is to say, rendered the service easy, the sources abundant, the transmission of specie useless; and in truth it was worth while to introduce such order into this portion of the finances of the Empire: for French Italy (by this name we mean that which was converted into departments, and not that which was constituted under Prince Eugene into an allied but independent State) yielded at this period so much as 40 millions, 18 of which were expended on the local administration, justice, the police, the roads; and 22 millions remained, either for the construction of fortresses, or to contribute to the maintenance of 120,000 men, who barred the routes of Lombardy against the Austrians.

Napoleon, while making war in the North, had watched attentively the course and progress of these new financial creations, and, at his return, on the very day that the ministers had come to hail in him the fortunate conqueror of the Continent, he had congratulated M. Mollien, with a sort of effusion of heart. Never satisfied with doing good by halves, he proposed to render what he called the emancipation of the Treasury more complete. The new *caisse de service*, owing to the floating loan of 80 millions which has just been adverted to, was almost dispensed from discounting *obligations* and *bills at sight*, save in certain pressing emergencies, when it applied to the Bank. But Napoleon resolved to ensure its resources in a definitive manner, with the aid of a combination, the idea of which he had conceived while bivouacking amidst the snows of Poland. The sum of the *obligations* and *bills at sight*, not due till the following year, and which it was consequently necessary to discount, amounted to about 124 millions. It is true that, if the money was not received, neither was the expense paid till the next year. But Napoleon proposed to have, as far as possible, the expenditure paid during the same year, and for this end to realize the revenues of the State within the same interval of time. Conformably to this design, which he had conceived in Poland, he directed that the *obligations* of 1807, which would not fall due till 1808, should be left for the service of 1808; that those of 1808, which would not be due till 1809, should be left in like manner for 1809; so that to the service of each year should be attached only the paper becoming due in the twelve months of its duration. But to accomplish this, it would be requisite to furnish 1807 with an equi-

valent for the 124 millions' worth of paper transferred to the following years. Napoleon resolved to make a loan for the *caisse de service* of 124 millions, which would settle the matter, thanks to the resources which he had at his disposal. After various combinations, he fixed on the idea of making the Treasury of the army furnish 84 of the 124 millions, and those establishments which were in the habit of placing their funds in assets of the Treasury supply the remaining 40. The new chest would thenceforward find itself in extraordinary abundance, having 84 millions coming to it all at once from the army, and having no more than 40 millions to apply to the public for, instead of 80, which it had borrowed of it in 1807. It would be dispensed in future from discounting the *obligations* and *bills at sight*, since the service of each year would thenceforward have at its disposal nothing but paper falling due in that same year. Napoleon decided, moreover, that the 124 millions' worth of *obligations* and *bills at sight* transferred from one year to another, should be shut up in a portfolio and not taken out till the following year, at the moment of replacing them by an equal sum in new paper. It would then become easy to suppress them as useless, for their only function would consist in remaining in deposit in the portfolio, or in affording the receivers-general by paper at prolonged dates those profits from interest which it had been thought proper to grant them. The same results might be obtained by regulating the account of interest kept between the Treasury and the receivers-general, so as to indemnify the latter. This, in fact, was done afterwards. The *caisse de service*, instituted upon the same principles, is called central chest of the Treasury. The receivers-general have an account current with this chest. They are debited, that is to say, made debtors for all that they have received during the ten days. In like manner they are credited, or made creditors for all that they have paid into the chest during the same days. The interest, which runs against them when they are debtors, runs for them when they are creditors. The interest account is then balanced every three months, and at the end of the year besides they are allowed, for the mass of the direct contributions formerly represented by the *obligations*, an improvement of interest which indemnifies them if the receipts have not taken place in the twelve months, which rewards them if they have managed to effect them in that interval of time, and which finally interests them in the speedy and easy collection of the public money.

This fine operation completed the re-organisation of the finances, by the good constitution of the Treasury. It was agreed that it should not be definitively carried into execution till 1808, as well on account of the debit of the United Merchants, which could not be entirely discharged before that period, as on account of the collection of the foreign contributions, which it was impossible to effect sooner. The loan of 124 millions was to be applicable to the service of 1808, which, owing to this sum of 124 millions,

would cause all the *obligations and bills at sight* falling due after the 31st December, 1808, to stand over for the service of 1809; so that the service of 1809 was to be the first that should have at its disposal nothing but paper becoming due in the twelve months of its duration.*

This loan granted to the Treasury of the State by the Treasury of the army was not to be temporary, but definitive, by means of a profound combination, which revealed still more clearly the use that Napoleon intended to make of the produce of victory. He surmised that, after he had paid the extraordinary war expenses of 1805, 1806, and 1807, he should have left about 300 millions, which were already in part deposited, and the whole of which was to be deposited in the chest of the sinking fund. He purposed to draw from this Treasury, as from a wonderful spring, not only wealth for his generals, his officers, his soldiers, but the prosperity of the empire. If to this sum be added from 12 to 15 millions, which he had the art to save every year out of the 25 millions of the civil list, besides a number of domains in Poland, Prussia, Hanover, and Westphalia, we shall have an idea of the immense resources which he had reserved, in order to ensure at once private fortunes and the public fortune. But in the desire to derive from them a double benefit, he should take good care not to reward his generals, his officers, his soldiers, with sums of money; for the sums would soon be consumed by those whom he designed to enrich, and who, sensible that they were continually exposed to death, meant to enjoy life while it was left them. It was sufficient, therefore, for him that the Treasury of the grand army was rich in revenues, and he was not solicitous that it should be so in ready money. In consequence, he decided that, for the 84 millions which he was about to pay into the *caisse de service*, the State should furnish the Treasury of the army with an equivalent sum in inscriptions of 5 per cent. *rentes*. Fully resolved not to have recourse to the public for contracting loans, he had thus in the Treasury of the army a capitalist always at hand to lend the State at a reasonable interest, without either any jobbing or any depreciation of assets; and moreover he could complete with assignments in *rentes* the military fortunes which he had already commenced with assignments in lands.

Upon this principle it was that he finished regulating the budgets of 1806 and 1807, which were not yet definitively liquidated. The war contributions imposed on conquered countries served to defray the extraordinary expenses of subsistence, *matériel*, and remounts of the army; and Napoleon left nothing to the account of the Treasury but the annual and ordinary pay. But this charge alone of pay would make the budget of 1806 amount to 770 millions, and that of 1807 to 778, and, as we

* The definitive decree, ordering the loan of 84 millions, was not signed till the 6th of March, 1808.

have seen, the ordinary resources of the taxes had not yet attained that standard. Napoleon thought that the produce of victory ought to serve not only to enrich his soldiery, but also to relieve the finances and to keep them in equilibrium. He resolved, therefore, that the chest of the army should make provision for those excesses of expense which the taxes could not cover, as far as the payment of 33 millions for 1806 and 27 millions for 1807. Thanks to this assistance, the fourteen months' pay, the payment of which had been deferred, and the amount of which had been gradually accumulated in specie in the provident chests established in Paris, Mayence, and Erfurt, would be liquidated. If we add this supplement to those which the chest of the contributions had already furnished for the extraordinary expenses of the war, we shall come at the sums of 80 millions for 1806, and 150 millions for 1807; which would make the total expenses of the army amount to 372 millions for 1806, and to 43 millions for 1807, to say nothing of many other local consumptions escaping all computation. It is this that explains how, out of the 60 millions imposed on Austria in 1805, and the 570 imposed on Germany in 1806 and 1807, there should be left in the Treasury of the army no more than about 20 millions of the first contribution and 280 of the second. But this kind of service was not the only one that the Treasury of the army was to render to the budgets of 1806 and 1807. The Treasury had counted as receipts for the services for the two years upon assets not susceptible of being immediately realized, such as the 10 millions' worth of property given up by the United Merchants, 6 millions of the price of the salt works of the East, 8 millions of old accounts of purchasers of national property, the whole amounting to 24 millions. Napoleon consented that the Treasury should pay with these assets what it owed to the army for the settlement of the pay. These assets, of more or less remote date, but certain realization, suited the Treasury of the army, which had no need of money but of revenues, and did not suit the Treasury of the State, which wanted immediate resources.

Napoleon completed the fine financial measures of this year by the establishment of the new system of accounts by double entry (*en partie double*), which put the finishing hand to the introduction into our finances of that admirable clearness which has ever since reigned in them.

The new *caisse de service* having created for the receivers-general the duty, the interest, the necessity, of paying in their funds to the Treasury, at the very moment when they received them, without any further than the inevitable delay of the local collection, of the centralization in the chief town of the department, and of forwarding money for expenses either to Paris or to the places where they occurred, had furnished the means of observing more accurately the facts of which the receipt and the paying in of the taxes are composed. M. Mollien had formerly been employed in the department of the farms, in which were not

followed in the keeping of accounts the vague and antiquated forms of the ancient Treasury, but the simple, practical, and sure forms of commerce, had introduced them at the sinking fund when he was director of it, and at the *caisse de service* since he had induced its institution. He had made use at that chest of book-keeping by *double entry*, which consists in keeping a day-book of all the operations of receipt and expenditure at the very moment when they take place; in extracting from this day-book the facts concerning each particular debtor and creditor with whom you have done business on the same day; in opening with each of them a particular account which places, facing one another, what they owe and what is owing to them; lastly, in entering the substance of all these particular accounts in a general account, which is but a daily and accurate analysis of the transactions of a trader with all others, and gives him natural contradictors in all those who are named in his books, who, on their part, have been obliged to keep similar books, and to keep them correctly upon pain of fabrication. M. Mollien, observing, by the aid of such accounts, the proceedings of the *caisse de service* and the situation of the receivers towards it, being enabled at any moment to satisfy himself about their punctuality in paying in, and also to ascertain every moment what resources or engagements it had, naturally asked himself why this system of accounts should not become that of the Treasury itself, its sole and obligatory system. The receivers-general at that time sent in to the general office of accounts declarations containing a summary of their receipts and of their payments, at distant intervals of time, and without annexing to them a daily journal of their operations. Neither did the sub-receivers, who handed the funds to them, the paymasters, who received them from their hands, in order to apply them to the expenses of the State, and who were both their natural contradictors, send in any journal of their operations. All of them furnished nothing more than general results collected later, and too late to enable the general office of accounts, by comparing them, to settle the account of each. Thus the receivers-general could place themselves in debit without the Treasury knowing it, and, what is worse, without being aware of it themselves. When, it is true, there was any one of them who collected thirty or forty millions in the course of the year, it was easy for him to retain annually two or three hundred thousand francs out of such a sum, and by thus gaining four or five years without settling his account, to accumulate three or four debits, and to get one or several millions in arrear with the Treasury. There were some who owed 12, 15, 18 hundred thousand francs, and who employed them either in embarking in hazardous speculations, or in entering into foolish expenses, or even, considering themselves rich before they were so, in purchasing properties which involved them in ruin, because they were disproportionate to their real fortune. A rigid investigation proves that many of

them were in these various situations. The receivers-general, who did not deceive the Treasury, or who, in deceiving it, did not deceive themselves, were those who, without saying so, made use for their own benefit of the daily, strict, contradictory system of accounts employed by commerce under the denomination of book-keeping *by double entry*, and which M. Mollien had recently introduced both at the sinking fund and at the *caisse de service*. This circumstance, being soon ascertained by the inspectors of the Treasury, was sufficient to serve for a decisive lesson both to the minister and to Napoleon himself, always informed of what was passing in the administration. M. Mollien, not venturing to change suddenly the system of accounts of the Empire, nor to extinguish a light, however faint it might be, till he had first caused another to be lit up, conceived the idea of creating a second office of accounts, by the side of the old one, and concurrently with it. He instituted for himself an office of accounts, directed by an experienced accountant,* placed under him book-keepers selected from various commercial houses, and a number of young men belonging to old financial families, some of them even sons of those farmers-general whom the Revolution had sent to the guillotine. In this office he had the accounts with several receivers kept by *double entry*; these, having no intention to conceal the truth from the Treasury, sought, on the contrary, the best means of discovering it. Some others, who, without any ill intention, had no reasons for disliking the new system of book-keeping but its novelty and their ignorance, took young men, obtained from the office instituted in Paris, to teach them how to make use of it. Lastly, those of whom there was any suspicion were overawed. It took but a very short time to discover that many of the receivers were debtors, some from blindness to their situation, others from engaging in false speculations, or indulging in extravagant luxury. There were some who had at last come to regard their debits standing over for a series of years, from one year to another, as a capital belonging to them, and who had bought estates in proportion to the fortune which they fancied they possessed, but which was not theirs. Several were obliged to give up the secret of their connexion with the wealthy speculators of Paris; and thus it was discovered that their funds—that is to say, the funds of the State—had been employed in jobbing in the *obligations and bills at sight*, which jobbing cost the Treasury 25 millions in expenses of negotiation instead of 10. The receiver-general of La Meurthe alone was constituted debtor to the Treasury to the amount of 1,700,000 francs. The mystery once unveiled, there was no need to hesitate longer, and it became necessary to change the system of accounts. The thing was easy, since Government possessed the means of substituting everywhere the new method for the old one. Napoleon, who always gave force to good innovations by rejecting bad ones, had, since his return, closely watched

* M. de Saint-Didier.

the course of this financial experiment; and he authorised M. Mollien to draw up a decree for rendering the new system obligatory throughout the whole Empire, from the 1st of January, 1808. The relations of each accountable person with the *caisse de service*, accurately described and rendered obligatory, furnished the model for this decree. Every receiver-general, or private individual, every paymaster, every depositary, in short, of the public money, charged to receive or to pay it in, was thenceforward required to keep a day-book of his operations, and to send it every ten days to the Treasury, which, on comparing these different journals with each other, has since been enabled to ascertain exactly the incoming and outgoing of assets, so as not to pay, not to require, any interest but what it owes, or but what is due to it. The dispositions of this decree are the same as those practised at the present day; and they have rendered the French system of accounts the surest, the most accurate, and the clearest in Europe. They have permitted the accounts of each year to be closed ten months after the end of the year to which they belong, that is to say, on the 1st of the November following. Owing to this reform, the agents of the Treasury, checked the one by the other, and, with the aid of the daily and direct testimony of their accounts, flooded, as it were, with light, could not have either means or temptation to deceive, and were even secured from the danger of getting into debt with the State. Napoleon and M. Mollien, agreeing on this point, as on all others, were of opinion that receivers detected in a fault should not be punished unless in case of evident dishonesty; but that involuntary inaccuracies or dilatoriness, the consequence of old habits, should be pardoned; for the vicious method had been the seducer and accomplice of faulty receivers, and was, indeed, more faulty than they. In consequence three receivers-general only were dismissed; the others were brought back to better habits, but not deprived of their places.

Napoleon, delighted with this excellent order, resolved to reward the minister who had established it, and whom he had besides powerfully seconded by his approbation, and by the force which he had lent him against interested resistances. Not always approving his ideas in regard to political economy, though he approved all his ideas in regard to financial accounts, he had one day in the Council of State directed some keen shafts against innovators. M. Mollien conceived that those shafts were aimed at him, and complained in a letter, which, though respectful, betrayed the mortification which he had felt. Napoleon hastened to answer him in terms full of nobleness and cordiality, and to express his high esteem for him, and his regret that he had been misunderstood. He then sent him one of those high decorations which he conferred on his servants, and a considerable sum of money to purchase an estate, where that minister is now passing the closing years of a useful and justly honoured life.

A single institution was still wanting, in order to leave the

administration of France nothing more to desire. In the central office of accounts had been collected, as in a focus in which the rays of light concentrate themselves in order to diffuse greater lustre, all the means of control and mathematical verification. But this office had only a purely administrative authority. Its decisions respecting accountable persons were insufficient in certain cases to constrain or to liberate them, and, in regard to the country, they were of no other moral value than that of a testimony borne by the administrators of the Treasury concerning themselves and concerning their subordinates. There was yet left to be created a more exalted jurisdiction, that is to say, a magistracy settling all accounts, discharging validly the accountable agents, releasing their persons and their property pledged to the State, affirming, after an investigation made out of the office of the finances, the accuracy of the accounts delivered, and giving to their annual settlement the form and the solemnity of an *arrêt* of a supreme court. Napoleon had often thought of this, and, on his return from Tilsit, he realized that grand idea.

There had formerly existed in France, under the title of Chambers of Accounts, tribunals exercising an active superintendence over the accountable agents, supplying in a certain degree the place of that which an ill-organized Treasury could not then exercise, having the powers of a criminal jurisdiction over them, charged to punish acts of extortion, but liable also to be dispossessed of those powers by an arbitrary government, and having been so sometimes, when proceeding against wealthy agents, having high protectors because they had been in a high degree corrupters. This was the first model which needed improving and adapting to the institutions, the manners, and the regularity of the new times. Ever since the abolition of the Chamber of Accounts in 1789, buried with the parliaments in one common ruin, there had been only a commission of accounts, independent indeed of the Treasury, but destitute of character, not sufficiently numerous, and having left an immense number of accounts in arrear. Napoleon, indulging his fondness for unity, and conforming to the character of the new French administration, centralized in all its parts, resolved to have but a single Court of Accounts, which should have equal rank with the Council of State and the Court of Cassation, and should come immediately after those two great Lodges. It was to judge directly, individually, and every year, the receivers-general, and the paymasters, that is to say, the agents of the receipt and of the expenditure. No criminal proceeding against them was attributed to it, for this would have been encroaching upon other jurisdictions, but it was invested with authority to declare them every year acquitted towards the State for their annual conduct, and to liberate their property, that is, to decide questions of mortgage. They were at length charged to keep books of observations respecting the faithful execution of the laws of finances—observations trans-

mitted every year to the head of the State by the prince arch-treasurer of the Empire. Warm discussion took place before Napoleon and in the Council of State, whether the new Court of Accounts should judge or not judge the *ordonnateurs*, that is to say, whether it should be limited to certifying that the agents of the receipts had collected the moneys legally voted, and had rendered a faithful account of it; that the agents of the expenditure had paid the expenses legally authorized; or if it should go so far as to decide whether the *ordonnateurs*, that is to say, the ministers, had administered well or ill, had for instance, bought well or ill the corn destined for the support of the army, the horses destined to remount the cavalry; whether they had been, in short, or had not been, intelligent, economical, and skilful dispensers of the public money. To go so far would have been giving to magistrates, who ought to be irremovable that they may be independent, the means, and with the means holding out the temptation, to obstruct the operations of the government itself. By permitting them to rise from the judgment of accounts to the judgment of the supreme agents of power, the government would have abdicated its authority, in favour of a jurisdiction irremovable, and consequently invincible in its errors. It was therefore resolved that the new Court of Accounts should judge only accountable agents, never *ordonnateurs*, and, for the greater security, it was settled that its decisions, so far from being without appeal, might be referred to the Council of State, the sovereign jurisdiction, at once impartial and imbued with the spirit of government, besides irremovable, and easy to bring back, if it could go out of the way.

The organization of the new Court still remained to be settled. It was proposed to proportion the number of its members to the extent of its duties. In the first place, in order that the investigation which it was to undertake should be real and not a mere assent to the papers drawn up in the office of finances, there was instituted a first class of magistrates called councillors referendary, having no deliberative voice, as numerous as the multiplicity of the accounts required, and charged to verify each of those accounts, having the accountable papers before them. They were to lay the result of their labours before the high magistracy of master-councillors, who alone should have deliberative voices, and should be divided into three chambers of seven members each, six councillors and one vice-president. It was settled that, according to the importance of the questions, the three chambers were to unite into a single assembly, under the presidency of a first president, who, with a *procureur-général*, was to be at the head of the company, to give it an impulsion and direction. This respectable body, which has since rendered such great services to the State, was to rank immediately after the Court of Cassation, and to receive the same appointments. At its very outset a difficult task was assigned to it, which it alone could perform, that of settling all the

accounts in arrear, the number of which amounted to not fewer than 2300, which dated back to the creation of assignats, and the examination of which the last commission of accounts had never been able to finish. This examination was difficult, for it was necessary to distinguish between the honest accountable agents, who had suffered by the continual fluctuations of the paper-money, and the fraudulent agents, who had profited by them. It was not only difficult but urgent,—urgent for the State, which had to claim considerable sums, and for the families of the accountable agents deceased or dismissed, who had to get rid of the legal mortgage laid upon all their property. The new Court was invested with the power of arbitrating in regard to the accounts in arrear, but was limited for the new accounts to the rigorous application of the laws. It soon acquitted itself of this arbitration, with as much justice as it afterwards exhibited in the pure and simple application of the finance laws, of which it is the keeper, as the Court of Cassation is keeper of the civil and criminal laws of our country.

This institution, which was destined to have such useful and such durable results for the whole administration, had moreover the secondary advantage of furnishing honourable and lucrative places for the most distinguished members of the Tribunal, for whom Napoleon was anxious to provide in a suitable manner; for in his conceptions all these things were strongly and intimately connected. He composed, therefore, the new Court of Accounts with the members of the commission of accounts, which had just been suppressed, and with the members of the Tribunal, likewise recently suppressed. Messrs. Jard-Panvilliers, Delpierre, and Brière de Surgy, the two former members of the Tribunal, the third a member of the commission of accounts, were appointed vice-presidents of the new Court. The important post of president still remained to be filled. This afforded opportunity for making amends to a respectable man for the temporary severities to which he had been exposed. This man was M. de Marbois, removed in 1806 from the post of minister of the Treasury, for want of shrewdness and firmness in the transactions with the United Merchants. Napoleon had been wrong to expect those qualities of him, and to punish him because he had them not. This wrong he repaired by putting him into his proper place, that of first president of the Court of Accounts; for M. de Marbois was much better fitted for the first magistrate of the finance than its active and circumspect administrator.

To the attention paid to the system of the accounts of the Empire, Napoleon added a not less active concern for the great works of public utility. Consulting on this subject with M. Cr  tet, minister of the interior, with Messrs. Regnault and de Montalivet, members of the Council of State, with the ministers of finances and of the public Treasury, he took numerous resolutions, which had for their object either to give greater activity to the works

already begun, or to order new ones. The restoration of peace, the supposed approaching diminution of the public expenses, the faculty of recurring to the Treasury of the army, either for contracting loans at a moderate rate, without having recourse to credit, permitted Napoleon to follow the inspirations of his creative genius. Thirteen thousand four hundred leagues of high roads, forming the vast net-work of the communications of the Empire, had been either repaired or kept up at the expense of the public Treasury. Two monumental routes, those of the Simplon and Mont Cenis, had just been finished. Napoleon ordered funds to be allotted for at length setting about that of Mont Genève. He opened the necessary credits for trebling the work-shops of the high road from Lyons to the foot of Mont Cenis, for doubling those of the road from Savona to Alexandria, destined to connect Liguria with Piedmont, for trebling those of the high road from Mayence to Paris, one of those to which he attached the greatest importance. He decreed, moreover, the opening of a route not less useful in his estimation, that from Paris to Wesel. Four of the bridges previously decreed were finished. Ten were building, particularly those of Roanne and Tours on the Loire, of Strasburg on the Rhine, and of Avignon on the Rhone. He ordered that of Sèvres on the Seine; the completion of that of St. Cloud, partly of wood, on the same river; that of the Scrivia, between Tortona and Alexandria; lastly, that of the Gironde, before Bordeaux, which is become one of the grandest monuments in Europe.

The canals, then the only known medium of obtaining for land conveyance the facility and low price of conveyance by sea, had not ceased to engage the attention of Napoleon. Ten great canals, destined to unite together all the parts of the Empire, the Scheldt with the Meuse, the Meuse with the Rhine,* the Rhine with the Saone and the Rhone,† the Scheldt with the Somme, the Somme with the Oise and the Seine,‡ the Seine with the Saone and the Rhone,§ the Seine with the Loire, the Loire with the Cher, the Sea to the north of Bretagne with the Sea to the south; some so natural, so ancient, that they had been projected, and even undertaken in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; some entirely planned by Napoleon; all, either continued or commenced by him, were in full progress. That called the canal of the North, which was to form the communication between the Scheldt and the Meuse, the Meuse and the Rhine, and to emancipate the Netherlands from Holland, conceived by Napoleon, possible for him only, on account of the incorporation of the countries traversed by this canal with France, was definitively resolved upon and marked out. The works recently prescribed were begun. The tunnel of St. Quentin, the principal difficulty of the canal which was to unite the Scheldt with the Somme, the Somme with

* Canal of the North.

† The Napoleon Canal, from the canal of the Rhone to the Rhine.

‡ Canal of St. Quentin.

§ Canal of Burgundy.

the Seine, was completed, and promised the speedy opening of the navigation from Paris to Antwerp. The canal of the Oureq, four-fifths finished, would soon bring to Paris the waters of the Marne. Until the waters of the Beuvronne could be brought into the basin of Villette, Napoleon resolved to introduce them immediately into the quarters of St. Denis and St. Martin. The canal of Burgundy, a plan and creation of the eighteenth century, had been long relinquished. Napoleon had caused that part of it from Dijon to St. Jean de Losne to be continued. Out of twenty-two locks, comprehended in this part, eleven, executed during his reign, had just been finished. The navigation from Dijon to the Saone would therefore soon be rendered practicable. From the Yonne to Tonnerre, eighteen locks were required, and these were in progress. But the important point of the work consisted in crossing the heights which separate the basin of the Seine from that of the Saone. The means hitherto proposed appeared inadequate. Napoleon ordered this great line of navigation to be resumed, at first by surveys, and as soon as possible by operations upon the soil. After he had investigated the difficulties presented by the canal from the Rhone to the Rhine, the construction of which he had much at heart, and to which he had permitted his name to be given, he assigned to it further funds. The canal of Beaucaire was finished. He had the state of that of the South, the everlasting glory of Riquet examined, purposing to continue it to Bordeaux. He caused that of Berry, tending to prolong the navigation of the Cher from Montluçon to the Loire, to be resumed. He gave orders for fresh works upon that of La Rochelle, indispensable to that great naval establishment, and on those of Ille-et-Rance, and of the Blavet, from Nantes to Brest, destined to cross the peninsula of Bretagne in all directions, to render it navigable at all points, and to facilitate the transit of stores to our great military ports.

To this artificial navigation of canals, he justly conceived that there ought to be added the natural navigation of streams and rivers, and that for this purpose their courses required to be improved. He ordered surveys to be made of eighteen rivers, upon which, it is true, certain works were already undertaken. Always consistent in his conceptions, he passed from canals and rivers to ports. He assigned fresh funds to that of Savona, which was one of the terminations of the Alexandria road. It is well known what wonders were accomplishing at Antwerp, where vast basins, scooped out as by enchantment, already contained three-deckers, which they had received from the stocks established within the compass of that great city, and which they transmitted by the Scheldt to Flushing. In arrangement with Holland for obtaining the cession of Flushing, Napoleon gave orders for works there, for the purpose of facilitating the entry into, the departure from, and the anchoring in that port, and for placing ships there out of the reach of the enemy. He allotted funds for lengthening the piers

of Dunkirk and Calais. At Cherbourg, the great pier, destined to form a harbour, was above the water, and had been crowned by a battery called the Napoleon Battery. New funds were granted for the continuation of this superb undertaking, the work of Louis XVI., though it commemorated one of the glories of the ancient monarchy. Lastly, Napoleon prescribed a new examination of the whole system of the fortresses of the Empire. He resolved to devote to them not less a sum than 12 millions a year, and he distributed it among them according to their importance, which he appreciated and fixed, classing them in the following manner: Alexandria, Mayence, Wesel, Strasburg, Kehl, &c.

But never did he turn his attention to great works without thinking of Paris—Paris, his residence, the centre of his government, the city of his predilection, the capital which was an epitome of the greatness, of the moral pre-eminence, of France over all nations. He had promised himself before the conclusion of his reign to cover it with monuments of art and of public utility, to render it not less salubrious than magnificent. Already, thanks to him, thirty fountains, instead of pouring forth water for a few hours, were running day and night. The forwardness of the canal of the Ourcy admitted even of an addition to this abundance, and allowed the water to be kept running without intermission, in the other fountains, old and new. At this moment were raised by the hands of several thousand labourers, the two triumphal arches of the Carrousel and l'Etoile, the Column in the Place Vendôme, the façade of the Legislative Body, the Church of La Madeleine, then the Temple of Glory, and the Pantheon. The Bridge of Austerlitz; thrown over the Seine at the entry of that river into Paris, was finished. The bridge of Jena, spanning the Seine at its exit, was in progress, and the capital of the empire was thus about to be enclosed between two immortal memorials. Napoleon had enjoined the administration of the Bank to build an hotel for that great establishment. He had decreed the palace of the new Exchange, and directed a site to be sought for it. The great Rue Impériale, resolved upon in 1806, was soon to be commenced. For monuments of art these were sufficient, and it was requisite that he should direct his attention to monuments of public utility. Napoleon in one of his councils, decided that long covered galleries should be erected in the principal markets to shelter buyers and sellers from the inclemency of the weather; that instead of the forty slaughter-houses, in which cattle for the consumption of Paris were killed, and which were equally unwholesome and dangerous, there should be erected four large buildings for the purpose at the four principal extremities of Paris; that the cupola of the Halle aux Blés should be rebuilt; lastly, that vast magazines, capable of containing several million quintals of grain, should be erected towards the arsenal, near the creek of the canal of St. Martin, at the point where all the navigable routes terminate. He had bestowed assiduous pains, and expended considerable sums

on the supplying of Paris with provisions, but he thought that it was not sufficient to lay out 20 millions of francs for corn, as he had done at a preceding period ; that it was necessary to have besides a place in which it could be deposited; and to this idea are owing the granaries (*greniers d'abondance*) existing at this day near the Place of the Bastille.

For all these works, spread from the centre to the circumference of the Empire, the budget of the interior rose instantaneously from 30 odd millions to 56. The reserve funds placed in the budget by way of resource, and lastly supplementary sums which one knew where to find, were to meet these excesses of the regular expenses, not with interested views of local utility, and not overstepping the bounds of discretion, notwithstanding the creative ardour of the head of the State. Napoleon was nevertheless desirous to ease the Treasury, or rather to furnish it with the means of providing continually for fresh undertakings, and he devised various combinations for attaining this end. In the first place, the abolition of the ten war *centimes*, recently granted, appeared to him an occasion by which it would be right to profit. It would be sufficient to keep back a small part of that benefit in some of the departments, for instance three or four *centimes*, to create considerable resources. Napoleon thought that certain works, though having a high character of general utility, such as the canal of Burgundy, the canal of Berry, and the road from Bordeaux to Lyons, presented at the same time an evident character of particular and local utility; that the departments would cheerfully make sacrifices to accelerate their completion; and that in their concurrence there might be found more considerable means of execution, along with greater distributive justice. This was not a vain hope, for several departments had already voluntarily taxed themselves, in order to contribute to these vast works of general and particular utility. But these votes had the inconvenience of being temporary, subject to the deliberations of general councils, and on such a groundwork one could scarcely found durable undertakings. Napoleon therefore resolved to present a law, by virtue of which the participation of the departments in certain works should be equitably adjusted, and the *centimes* judged necessary imposed for a specific number of years. Thirty-two departments were in this predicament. The longest duration of the *centimes* was to be for twenty-one years, the shortest for three, the mean for twelve; the maximum of the *centimes* imposed 6, the minimum 2½. Thus the departments of the Cote-d'Or and the Yonne, with the arrondissement of Bar, were to contribute to the canal of Burgundy; those of the Allier and the Cher to the canal of Berry; those of the Rhone, the Loire, Puy de Dome, la Corrèze, the Dordogne, and the Gironde, to the high road from Bordeaux to Lyons. It would be too long to enumerate the others. In general, the proportion to be contributed by the State and the department was fixed at a half each. This impost was,

after all, but a reduction of the land-tax: and the source of immense advantages to the localities on which it was laid.

An annual subsidy being thus ensured by the law which imposed the *centimes*, it was possible to contract loans, because one had the means of serving their interests. Recourse was had to the usual lender, the Treasury of the army, which, according to the intentions of Napoleon, was to seek to procure for itself solid revenues by the advantageous employment of its capitals. This Treasury immediately lent the prefect of the Seine eight millions for the works in Paris. Other cities, as well as several departments, had recourse to this beneficent dispensation of the wealth acquired by victory. Always extracting from every idea whatever of utility it comprehended, Napoleon thought to carry the employment of this kind of resource much further. Three of those canals which we have enumerated above, those from the the Scheldt to the Rhine, from the Rhine to the Rhone, from the Rhone to the Seine, appeared to him more worthy of fixing his attention, and of becoming the object of his all-powerful activity. Besides these three canals, and almost in their vicinity, there were three others, finished, or nearly so, and capable of yielding speedy revenues; these were the canals of St. Quentin, Orleans, and the South. Napoleon resolved to finish them immediately, then to sell them to capitalists in shares which ought to bring in 6 or 7 per cent.; making sure of finding a purchaser for all those which the public would not take. This purchaser, as it may easily be guessed, was again the Treasury of the army.—These sums, said he to the minister of the interior, you will employ in pushing forward the execution of the three canals, the completion of which is of such importance to the prosperity of the Empire; and when these three are completed, I shall sell them to a purchaser, who will take them too; and thus shifting from work to work a capital of three or four hundred millions accruing from moneys annually furnished by the State and the departments, we shall in a few years change the face of the country.

His plan was, after setting all these enterprises in motion, after getting voted in a short session, besides the budget, the legislative measures which he needed for the execution of his projects, to give before winter a few days to Italy, wishing to extend to her also the benefit of his creative looks. He purposed at his return to resolve the questions left undecided, that in spring the works might commence all over the Empire. He therefore ordered the minister of the interior to subject all these ideas to a thorough examination, that they might be realised as speedily as possible. "If we do not make haste," said he to him, "we shall die before we have seen the navigation opened on those three great canals. Wars, silly people, will come, and those canals will be left unfinished. Every thing is possible in France at this moment, when one has more need to seek the way to employ money than money itself. . . . I have funds destined to reward the

generals and the officers of the grand army. Those funds might as well be given them in canal shares as in *rentes* on the State, or in money. I should be obliged to give them money, if something of that sort were not soon settled. I have made the glory of my reign consist in changing the face of the territory of my Empire. The execution of these great public works is as necessary to the interest of my people as to my own satisfaction."

Napoleon, moreover, was deeply intent on the extinction of beggary. To accomplish its abolition, he resolved to create departmental houses, where mendicants should be furnished with work and food, and in which also they should be forcibly confined, when found begging in the public places or on the high roads. He required that houses of this kind should be opened shortly in all the departments. "I attach," he wrote in the letter to the minister of the interior quoted above, "a great importance and a great idea of glory to the suppression of mendicity. Funds are not wanting, but every thing seems to me to proceed slowly, and meanwhile the years are flying away. We ought not to pass through this world without leaving traces that recommend our memory to posterity. I am about to be absent for a month. Contrive to be ready on my return on all these questions, to have examined them all in detail, that I may be able, by a general decree, to give a finishing stroke to mendicity. Before the 15th of December, you must have found either in the reserved fourths or in the funds of the communes the resources necessary for the maintenance of sixty or a hundred houses for the extirpation of mendicity; let the sites for them be fixed upon, and the general regulations matured. Don't ask me again for three or four months for collecting information. You have young auditors, intelligent prefects, clever engineers of the *ponts et chaussées*—make all these run about and don't go to sleep over the ordinary office business. The winter evenings are long; fill your portfolios, that, during the evenings of those three months, we may be able to discuss the means of arriving at those great results."

In this extreme ardour, which impelled him to hasten, nay, to hurry, the accomplishment of good, he paid the like attention to the Bank of France, which he purposed to make one of the principal instruments of the public prosperity. He had required in 1806, that this great establishment should change its constitution and take the monarchical form, instead of the republican form which it before had,—a result obtained by giving it a governor and three regents appointed by the minister of the finances. He desired, moreover, that the capital of the Bank should be proportioned to the part which he destined for it, and that, instead of 45,000 shares, it should issue 90,000, which would raise its capital from 45 to 90 millions. These shares had not yet been issued, because the Bank was afraid that it should not find employment for the funds which they would produce, especially as Napoleon had judged it more expedient to cause the service of the Trea-

sury to be executed by the Treasury itself, and had devoted to this service a sum of 84 millions, more than half of which was already paid in. The result of this excellent measure was, however, to leave without employment the capitals accustomed to be invested in *obligations* and *bills at sight*. Napoleon was delighted at the embarrassment which he thus occasioned to certain capitalists, for, he said, it would reduce them to the necessity of seeking in commerce, in industry, in the great public works, investments which the paper of the Treasury no longer offered them. The Bank, which was usually engaged in the discount of that paper, and which could no longer procure any, hesitated to issue its 45,000 new shares. Napoleon forced it to issue them, promising soon to furnish it and all capitalists with employment for their money by the multiplication of undertakings of all sorts. In his figurative language, he said to the Bank of France, "With the propensity which exists in our country to centralize every thing in Paris, to centralize there payments as well as the government itself, the Bank ought to become there the greatest of commercial agents; it ought to be truly worthy of its name, and to become for Paris what the Thames, which conveys every thing to London, is for London." He insisted, therefore, on the issue of the 45,000 new shares, which, for the rest, were disposed of with advantage; for, issued at 1200 francs (1000 francs representing the capital of the share, 200 francs representing old accumulated bonuses), they were negotiated at 1400 francs. The three public effects of the time were the 5 per cent. *rentes*, the Bank shares, and the rescriptions on the national domains, devised to liquidate the arrear. The 5 per cent., at the time of which we are treating (August, 1807), sold at 93 francs, the Bank shares at 1425, the rescriptions at 92. The rate of the latter had become almost invariable.

Napoleon required that the interest should be reduced to 5 per cent. at the Bank, a measure which it most cheerfully adopted. He ordered that the interest of securities should be reduced, for some from 6 to 5, for the others from 5 to 4. At last he carried the impatience to do good so far as to desire to fix the interest allowed by the *caisse de service* to capitals at 3 and $3\frac{1}{2}$. Having no need of money, pouring it into that chest in abundance, he maintained that only such funds ought to be kept as could be content with that remuneration; that all the others ought to be sent back to commerce; and that thus the reduction of interest ought to be forced by all the means that were at the disposal of the government. But M. Mollien stopped him by proving to him that such a result was premature; for the money promised to the chest was not wholly paid in, and it was still in need of the resources by which it was usually supplied. The success of such a measure would have been infallible in the following year, had not new enterprises abroad intervened to divert the capitalists as well as the soldiery of France from their better, more useful, and more sure employment.

The aspect, if not alarming, at least sad, which the war had assumed during the winter of 1807 [1806?], added to the severity of the season and to the absence of the imperial court, had slackened for a moment the activity of business, particularly in Paris. But the restoration of continental peace, and the hope of maritime peace, had again encouraged the highest flights of imagination, and in all parts people began to fall to work in the manufactories, and in commercial houses to plan speculations which embraced the whole extent of the Continent. Though the productions of Great Britain still found their way beyond the coast of Europe by inlets unknown to Napoleon, they yet had difficulty to penetrate and still greater to circulate; cotton threads and stuffs, which, thanks to the prohibitory laws then issued in France, had been fabricated with profit, in great quantity, and with a commencement of perfection, superseded the English productions of the same kind, passed the Rhine in the train of our armies, and spread themselves in Spain, Italy, and Germany. Our silks, unrivalled at all times, filled the markets of Europe, which caused general satisfaction at Lyons. Our cloths, which had the advantage of raw material, since the English were shut out from the Spanish wools, of which we had a superabundance, drove the English woollens out of all the fairs of the Continent; for they had the superiority not only in quality but in beauty. Besides, it was not our productions alone that gained by the exclusion of English goods. Saxony, the most industrious of the German provinces, already sent charcoal by the Elbe to Hamburg, cloths made of the fine Saxon wools to markets to which they had never penetrated, and the metals of the Erzgebirge to all quarters where the metals of America were deficient. Our iron and that of Germany also profited greatly by the exclusion of English and Swedish iron, and was perceptibly improved.

Napoleon strove to encourage by the power of Fashion, a fickle, fantastic power, which shares with the sacred power of conscience the privilege of escaping from material power, but which, nevertheless, cheerfully obeys glory—Napoleon strove then by the power of Fashion to gain a preference for the use of articles manufactured from materials of continental origin. He wished, for example, that the linens and lawn, composed of flax and hemp, should be preferred to the muslin made of cotton. He also wished silks to be preferred to plain cloth, which must occasion a return towards the luxury of the *ancien régime*, towards that time when men, instead of dressing in the modest stuff called black cloth, wore stuffs as rich as those used for the dresses of the other sex. And he encouraged this return to luxury, as well as a return to nobility, to titles, to dotations, for reasons peculiar to himself, serious reasons which always guided him in things apparently the most frivolous.

Excepting our maritime branches of industry, which he sought to compensate for their inactivity by immense naval creations, our other industries found, therefore, a powerful cause of develop-

ment in that extraordinary situation which Napoleon had procured for France. But, what is singular enough, the greatest of mechanical forces, that of steam, which, from its expansive power, animates at this day every branch of human industry, which gives motion to so many machines, which propels so many vessels, which is, with peace, the principal cause of the prosperity of the inferior classes, and of the luxury of the superior classes—the force of steam was developing itself by his side, without him. Those machines, then called fire-machines, from their most obvious phenomenon, rudely constructed, consuming an excessive quantity of fuel, were employed only in coal-mines, on account of the cheapness of fuel in works of that kind. The Society for the encouragement of industry offered a prize as a reward for those who should render its application more practical and more economical; and, two thousand leagues from our shores, Fulton, scarcely listened to by Napoleon in 1803, because he wanted, for crossing the sea, not an untried but a tried agent, was obliged to go and make the experiment with a vessel moved by what was then called the fire-machine. He had performed the double trip from New York to Albany and from Albany to New York in four days, and had scarcely attracted the notice of the world, the face of which he was to change thirty years later. This is not the first time that a great invention, due to second-rate but special geniuses, has passed before the eyes of superior geniuses, without exciting their attention. Gunpowder, which, destroying the empire of physical strength in war, contributed so powerfully to a revolution in all the European manners, was not only odious to the heroic Bayard, but excited the disdain of Machiavel, that most profound judge of human things, that author, so admired by Napoleon, of the treatise on war, and was considered by him as an ephemeral invention and of no consequence.

Thinking that a good legislation is, with capitals and markets, the greatest benefit that can be conferred on commerce, Napoleon had ordered the arch-chancellor Cambacérés to get a commercial code prepared. This code had, in fact, just been drawn up. The groundwork of it had been borrowed from the most celebrated maritime nations, and the simple and analytical form from French intelligence, which shone more than ever in this respect in the digesting of the laws, because, conceived on a vast and uniform plan, and their composition carefully revised in the Council of State, they were never retouched by the Legislative Body, which adopted or rejected them without amendment. This code, completely prepared at the moment of Napoleon's return, was to be presented, with the other measures, of which we have just been treating, to the Legislative Body, in the short session for which preparations were making.

It was time that Napoleon should at length confer on his glorious soldiers the rewards which he had promised them, and which they had so richly deserved during the last two campaigns. But it

was in the very form of these rewards that he particularly displayed his organising and mighty genius. He was sure, in fact, to take good care not to fling to them the spoils of the vanquished, that they might consume them in an orgie. He purposed, with what he should give them, to found great families, which should surround the throne, concur in defending it, contribute to the splendour of French society, without injuring public liberty, and, above all, without incurring any violation of the principles of equality proclaimed by the French revolution. Experience has proved that an aristocracy is not prejudicial to the liberty of a country; for the English aristocracy has contributed not less than the other classes of the nation to the liberty of Great Britain. Reason, moreover, tells us that an aristocracy may be compatible with the principle of equality on two conditions: in the first place, that the members who compose it should have no exclusive rights, and should be subject in all things to the general law; secondly, that the purely honorary distinctions granted to one class should be accessible to all the citizens of the same State who have earned them by their services or their talents. So much as this was but reasonable in the wishes of the French revolution, and this it was that Napoleon purposed to maintain invariably. But in our opinion, in modern societies, in which envy has risen against aristocratic institutions, what a sensible government had best do is to leave the laws of human nature to act, without in any way interfering with them. They lead back the free man to God, and, next to God, to another worship, that of ancestors. Whatever we may do or not do, the great warrior, the great magistrate, the illustrious man of science, will bequeath to their descendants a consideration which will cause them to be distinguished from the multitude, and which, when they have merit, will spare them the most serious of the difficulties that merit meets with in this world, that of attracting the first notice of the public.

The laws have no need to interfere in order that it should be thus, for it is not written laws, it is Nature, that produces the aristocracy in all countries and especially in republics. Nature had created the aristocracy of Venice long before it thought of attributing exclusive rights to itself by laws. It is a thing in which one ought not to intermeddle, whatever inclination one may have to do so. Time makes aristocracies everywhere: all that one has to do is to avoid the ridicule of making them one's self, and at most to prevent their being tempted hereafter to arrogate to themselves exclusive privileges.

If, however, there was a sovereign in the world who could escape the ridicule or the odium sometimes excited by the establishment of aristocratic institutions, it was he who dared and could re-establish monarchy on the morrow of the Republic, the difference of ranks (not that of rights) on the morrow of a brutal equality; who, in his vast imagination, figured to himself a society great as his genius and his soul; and who had immortal names

and treasures for the creating of mighty families; who could call them Rivoli, Castiglione, Montebello, Elchingen, Auerstädt, and give them an annual revenue of not less than a million. He was therefore excusable, for he would not violate the true principles of the French revolution, and he thought, on the contrary, to consecrate them in a striking manner, by making, after the image of his own fortune, a duke, a prince, out of a child of the plough. Finally, a last consideration here presented itself, to disarm the most austere reason, that was to procure for himself the innocent and inoffensive means of exciting and rewarding eminent services.*

Napoleon availed himself, therefore, of the glory of Tilsit, and of the spell with which he was surrounded at this moment, to accomplish the plan which he had long meditated of instituting a nobility. Already, in 1806, when he had given crowns to his brothers, to his sisters, to his adopted son, principalities to several of his servants, that of Ponte Corvo to marshal Bernadotte, that of Benevento to M. de Talleyrand, that of Neufchatel to major-general Berthier, he had announced that a posterior statute should prescribe the system of the succession for the families in favour of whom there should be created principalities, duchies, and other distinctions destined to be hereditary. In consequence he enacted by a *senatus consulte* that the titles conferred by him as well as the revenues attached to those titles should be transmitted hereditarily in a direct line from male to male, contrariwise to the system of succession admitted by the Civil Code. He further enacted that the dignitaries of the Empire of all degrees might transmit to their eldest son a title, which should be that of duke, count, or baron, according to the dignity of the father, on condition of having given proof of a certain revenue, at least one third of which must remain attached to the title conferred on the descendants. These same personages had also the right of constituting for their younger sons titles always inferior to those which should have been granted to the eldest, and always on condition of setting aside out of their fortune a part which should be the hereditary accompaniment of those titles. Such was the origin of the *majorats*. The grand dignitaries, as the grand-electors, the constables, the arch-chancellors, the arch-treasurers, were to have the title of *highness*. Their eldest sons were to have the title of *dukes*, if their father had instituted in their favour a *majorat* with a revenue of 200,000 livres. The ministers, the senators, the councillors of State, the presidents of the Legislative Body, the archbishops, were authorised to take the title of *count* and to transmit that title to their sons or nephews, on condition of a *majorat* with a revenue of 30,000 livres. Lastly, the presidents of the electoral colleges for life, the first presidents *procureurs généraux*, and bishops, the *maires* of the thirty-seven

* These lines were written in 1846, under the monarchy. I wrote them because I believed them to be true in all times. I shall not alter them, therefore, though times are changed.

good cities of the Empire, were authorised to take the title of barons, and to transmit it to their eldest sons on condition of a *majorat* with a revenue of 15,000 livres. The plain members of the Legion of Honour might call themselves chevaliers, and transmit that title on condition of a *majorat* with a revenue of 3000 livres. Another statute was to determine the conditions to which these portions of the fortune of the families thus placed under an exceptional government were to be subject.

Here, again, it was the Senate that received the commission to stamp a legal character on this new imperial creation by means of a *senatus-consulte*, which most expressly stipulated that these titles should not confer any particular right, or form any exception to the common law, or give any exemption from the charges or duties imposed on other citizens. There was nothing exceptional but the system of the substitutions imposed on the ennobled families, which acquired their new greatness by sacrificing for themselves the equal sharing of inheritances.

These dispositions being decreed, Napoleon distributed among his companions in arms part of the treasures amassed by his genius. While waiting till he had decreed to Lannes, Massena, Davout, Berthier, Ney, and others, the titles which he purposed to borrow from the great events of his reign, he resolved to ensure their opulence to them immediately. He gave them estates situated in Poland, in Germany, in Italy, with power to sell them, and to invest the produce in France, besides sums in ready money to buy and furnish hotels. This was only a first gift, for these assignments were afterwards doubled, trebled, and even quadrupled, some of them. Marshal Lannes received a revenue of 328,000 francs, and a million in ready money; marshal Davout a revenue of 410,000 francs, and 300,000 francs in money; marshal Massena a revenue of 183,000 francs, and 200,000 francs in money (he was afterwards one of the most richly endowed); major-general Berthier a revenue of 405,000 francs, and 500,000 francs in money; marshal Ney a revenue of 229,000 francs, and 300,000 francs in money; marshal Mortier a revenue of 198,000 francs, and 200,000 francs in money; marshal Soult a revenue of 305,000 francs, and 300,000 francs in money; marshal Augereau a revenue of 172,000 francs, and 200,000 francs in money; marshal Bernadotte a revenue of 291,000 francs, and 200,000 francs in money. Generals Sebastiani, Victor, Rapp, Junot, Bertrand, Lemarrois, Caulaincourt, Savary, Mouton, Monecy, Friand, St. Hilaire, Oudinot, Lauriston, Gudin, Marchand, Marmont, Dupont, Legrand, Suchet, Lariboissière, Loison, Reille, Nansouty, Songy, Chasseloup, and others, received, some a revenue of 150, others 100, 80, 50 thousand francs, and almost all 100,000 francs in money. The civilians also had their share in these largesses. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès and the arch-treasurer Lebrun obtained each a revenue of 200,000 francs. Messrs. Mollien, Fouché, Decrès, Gaudin, Daru, obtained each

40 or 50 thousand. All, civil and military, were only provided for *ad interim* by these magnificent gifts, and were so in Poland, in Westphalia, in Hanover, which must interest them in upholding the greatness of the Empire. Napoleon had reserved for himself in Poland domains to the amount of 20 millions, in Hanover of 30, in Westphalia a capital represented by a revenue of 5 or 6 millions, independently of 30 millions in capital, and of an income of 1,250,000 francs in Italy, already reserved in 1805. He had, therefore, wherewithal to enrich the brave men who served him and to fulfil the fair promises which he had addressed to several of them. "Pillage not," said he; "I will give you more than you would take; and what I shall give you, amassed by my foresight, will not cost your honour or the nations we have conquered any thing." And he said truly, for the domains which he distributed were imperial domains in Italy, royal or grand-ducal in Prussia, in Hanover, in Westphalia. But these domains, won by victory, might be lost by defeat; and, fortunately for them, those who were so magnificently endowed were mostly to receive in France, either on the *rentes* or the canals, other assignments, less exposed to the risk of events than lands situated abroad.

The French generals were not the only participators in these largesses, for the Polish generals Zayonsheck and Dombrowski, old servants of France, obtained each a million.

After the generals, the officers and soldiers also received marks of his liberality. Napoleon ordered all of them to be paid, besides the pay in arrear, considerable gratuities, in order to procure for them immediately a few pleasures, which they had well earned. Eighteen millions were distributed under this form, 6 millions among the officers, 12 among the soldiers. The wounded had a treble sum. Those who had been fortunate enough to be present at the four great battles of the late war, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, and Friedland, obtained twice as much as the others. To these gratuities of the moment were added permanent assignments of 500 francs for the soldiers who had lost a limb, and of 1000, 2000, 4000, 5000, 10,000, in favour of those officers who had distinguished themselves, from the rank of sub-officer to that of colonel. For the officers, as for the generals, this was but a first remuneration, followed subsequently by others more considerable, and independent of the salaries of the Legion of Honour, as well as the retiring pensions legally due at the end of the military career.

This glorious conqueror, therefore, designed that everybody should participate in his prosperity as in his glory. As for himself, simple, frugal, magnificent for others only, repressing the slightest misapplication of the public money, unmerciful for any expense which seemed to him unnecessary in his palace or in the State, he was prodigal only with noble views, and towards all who had contributed to the greatness of France or to his own. The slanderers of his glory and of ours have alleged that, in despoiling

the vanquished, in glutting the greediness of his soldiers, he had taken from the one the means of exalting the bravery of the others. We must leave such calumnies to foreigners, or to parties associated with foreigners. These treasures were taken not from the people, but from emperors, kings, princes, convents, leagued against France ever since 1792. As for the vanquished people, they were spared as much as the war allowed them to be, much more than they had been spared in any times and in any country, much more than we have been ourselves. And, as for those heroic soldiers, whose value Napoleon is said to have stimulated with money, they had no more idea that, in running to Austerlitz, to Jena, to Eylau, to Friedland, they should meet with Fortune by the way, than they expected it in running to Marengo, to Rivoli, and at an earlier period to Valmy or to Jemmapes. After flying to the defence of their country in 1792, they now dashed on to glory, impelled by the passion for great things, a passion which the French revolution had begotten in them, and which Napoleon had inflamed to the highest degree. If, on the morrow of a long perseverance in defying cold, hunger, death, they found competence, it was a surprise of Fortune's which they enjoyed, as a soldier enjoys a little gold found on a field of battle; and these gratifications which had been contrived for them, they were ready to leave afresh, to expend again that life which they considered as not their own, and which they hastened to use as a loan made to them by Napoleon, till he should demand from them the sacrifice of it.

Napoleon took other measures as wise as they were humane. He ordered, according to his custom in every interval of peace, several reviews of the army, one after another, to withdraw from the ranks soldiers who were worn out or mutilated, and fit for no other service than to stimulate the young soldiers by their military stories. He caused their pension to be settled and their places in the ranks to be filled up by conscripts, repeating incessantly that the Treasury of the army was not rich enough to pay for all old services, neither was the budget of the State to pay soldiers who could not serve actively. Thinking of civil merits as well as of military merits, he demanded and obtained a modification of the law of civil pensions, a law which, ever since 1789, had varied as much under the influence of popular caprice as rewards varied before that period under the influence of royal caprice. At the time of the Constituent Assembly, the limit adopted for the very highest civil pension was 10,000 francs, in the time of the Convention 3000, in the time of the Consulate 6000. Napoleon wished that limit to be fixed at 20,000, proposing to himself not to approach, not to come up to it, unless in favour of signals of service. It was the death of M. Portalis, leaving a widow without fortune, which suggested this idea, attended with little danger to the finances of a State, and useful for the development of talents. He granted a pension of 6000 francs and a sum of 24,000 francs

to Mademoiselle Dillon, sister of the first officer murdered in our popular disturbances. The mother of the empress, Madame de la Pagerie, having died at Martinique, he ordered the negroes and the negresses who had served her to be set at liberty, a dowry to be given to a young woman who had nursed her, and in short placed in comfort all who had had the honour to approach her.

The Church, as well as all the servants of the State, had a share in the munificence of the conqueror. On the proposal of prince Cambacérès, who had acted *ad interim* as minister of the *cultes*, during the interval between the death of M. Portalis and the appointment of M. Bigot de Préameneu, he decided that the number of the chapels of ease (*succursales*) should be increased from 24 to 30 thousand, in order to extend the benefit of divine service to all the communes in the Empire. Perceiving, moreover, that the career of the priesthood was in less request than formerly, he granted 2400 exhibitions for the small seminaries. He wished to make known to the Church that if there were some differences of a purely temporal nature with its head, in regard to spirituals he was always equally disposed to serve and to protect him. At this moment he was engaged with the execution of the law of 1806, which authorised him to create a university out of the foundation of that great establishment. But this idea was not yet mature either with him or around him. For the present, he was content with increasing the number of the exhibitions in the lyceums.

While he was thinking so much about others, he nevertheless lent himself to a measure which seemed to interest his personal glory alone. He consented, agreeably to a wish, excited by sincere attachment in some, by adulation in others, to change the title of the Civic Code, and to call it the Napoleon Code. Assuredly if ever title was merited, it was this; for that Code was as much the work of Napoleon as the victory of Austerlitz and Jena. At Austerlitz, at Jena, he had had soldiers, who had lent him their arms, as he had lawyers who lent him their knowledge in the digesting of that Code; but to the force of his will, to the soundness of his judgment, was owing the completion of that great work. And if Justinian, who, according to an expression in the exposition of his motives, "fought by his generals, thought by his ministers," had a right to give his name to the code of the Roman laws, Napoleon had a greater right to give his to the code of the French laws. Besides, the memory of a great man protects good laws, and good laws protect the memory of a great man. Nothing, therefore, was more just than this measure, and it was conceived, proposed, and cordially adopted, almost without leaving Napoleon the trouble of wishing, or asking for it. At the same time, Napoleon wrote to his brothers and to the princes under his influence, to persuade them to introduce into their States this code of justice and civil equality. He had prescribed its adoption throughout all Italy. He enjoined his brother Louis

to adopt it in Holland, and his brother Jerome to adopt it in Westphalia. He invited the king of Saxony, grand duke of Warsaw, to put it in force in restored Poland. It was already studied in Germany, and in spite of the repugnance which that country must then have felt to receive any thing coming from France, all hearts there were attracted by the equity of a code, which, besides its precision, its clearness, its consistency, had the advantage of re-establishing justice in families, and putting an end to feudal tyranny in them. At Hamburg, the Civil Code had been called for by the wish of the population. It began to be acted upon in Dantzic. It was announced that the same would be the case at Bremen and in the Hanseatic cities. The prince primate, in his principality of Francfort, the king of Bavaria, in his aggrandised monarchy, had enjoined the study of it, in order to introduce it into the minds of their subjects before introducing it into practice. The grand duke of Baden had just admitted it into his duchy. Thus France indemnified humanity for the blood spilt in war, and made some compensation for the injury done to the present generation by an immense benefit ensured to future generations.

All sorts of glory would be in vain dispensed by Providence to a nation, if that nation had the keen regret to conceive that the glory of letters, of the arts and sciences, was refused it; and, if the Romans had had no other merit than that of conquering the world, of civilising after they had conquered it, of giving it immortal laws, which, adapted to our manners, still live in our codes; if they had but this eminent merit; if they had not numbered among their great men Horace, Virgil, Cicero, Tacitus, done nothing to charm mankind, after having done every thing to domineer over it, they would have left the Greeks the honour of being its delight, and they would occupy in the annals of the human mind a lower place than that small nation. But the genius of government and war never exists without the genius of letters, and of the arts and sciences, because it is impossible to act without thinking, and to think without speaking, writing, and painting.

France, which has shed so much generous blood on all the battle-fields of Europe,—France has also had this double glory, and while she won the victories of the Downs and of Rocroy, she created the Cid and Athalie, she had Condé and Bossuet to celebrate Condé. Napoleon in his immense desire to be great, but to be so with France and through France, would also have been glad that she should have under his government all sorts of crowns, those of intelligence as well as those of power, and not renounce the glory of producing men of letters, men of science, painters, as he produced heroes. But the will can do every thing among men, except changing the times, and the times have a greater influence over the genius of nations than all the will of governments. Charlemagne, great as he was, smitten as he showed

himself to be with the noblest studies, could not fertilise a barbarous age. St. Louis XIV. while admiring genius sometimes without comprehending it, sometimes mal-treating it, had only to allow it to act in order to have around him the finest spectacle that the human mind ever exhibited, for never did it produce works so grand and so perfect. Napoleon would have had the time, which he wanted through his own fault, which would have restored the French nation that youth of intellect which produces a Cid and an Athalie; and he would certainly have refused it a liberty which creates Ciceros and Sallusts when it exists, Tacituses when it has ceased to exist.

France, from 1789 to 1814, eminent in the sciences, fancying that she was so in the arts of design, even flattered herself that she was eminent in letters. In these sciences, three *savants*, illustrious for their vast and noble works, ensured a durable glory to the period in which they lived. M. Lagrange, by pushing the Algebraic sciences beyond their former limits, gave a new power to abstract calculation. M. de Laplace, applying this power to the universe, did the only thing which, after Galileo, Descartes, Kepler, Copernicus, and Newton, was left to be accomplished; this was to calculate with a precision till then unknown the movements of the celestial bodies, and to display in its sublime totality the system of the world. Lastly, M. Cuvier, applying cool and patient observation to the wrecks with which our planet is covered, studying, comparing together, the relics of the animals and plants, buried in the ground, discovered the succession of time in that of those beings; and in creating the ingenious science of *comparative anatomy*, rendered positive that fine history of the earth which Buffon had conjectured by an effort of genius, and left conjectural for want of facts sufficiently observed at the period in which he lived.

In the arts of design a reaction, estimable for the intention, had taken place against the tastes of the eighteenth century. During that effeminate and philosophic age, Boucher, the adored painter of the Regency, had, with light hand, sketched upon the canvas licentious courtesans, remarkable not for beauty but for a certain lascivious gracefulness. Greuze, with chaster inspirations, had opposed to them charming virgins, painted with a soft and delicate pencil. But the art, debased by Boucher, had not been raised again by Greuze to the dignity of style, which, in default of genius, Poussin had preserved to it. It has been granted but once to a nation to display to the world the genius of a Michael Angelo and a Raphael; but all, when they practise the arts, ought to aspire at least to correctness, to nobleness of design, and can attain it by severe study. This it was that David, the celebrated painter, accomplished. Disgusted with the character of the art, at the time of his youth, he went to Rome, was smitten there by the touching, picturesque, and sublime beauty of the masters of the Italian school, and, his passion for the beautiful increasing gradually, he had raised himself to a level with the

Italians of the fifteenth century, with the ancients themselves; and, instead of the courtesans of Boucher, or the modest young females of Greuze, he had sketched on canvas antique statues, elegant but stiff, destitute of life, even of colour; and in acquiring a better style of drawing had lost that facility and brilliancy of pencil which still distinguished Boucher and Greuze. It was a school of imitation, grave, noble, and without genius. One painter, however, M. Gros, escaped from the imitation of antique basso-relievos by painting battles. Faulty in design, mediocre in composition, but excited by the spectacle of the time, and hurried away by a certain natural passion, he flung upon the canvas images which will live probably from a certain force of execution and a certain brilliancy of colour. It is the style which ensures the duration of works of the mind; it is that which ensures the duration of works of art, because it is not the only sign of inspiration, but the loftiest, the most constant. Another painter, M. Prudhon, by imitating Correggio, from a natural taste for grace, exhibited some appearance of originality at a time when an artist, if he did not paint Leonidas and Brutuses, was obliged to paint the grenadiers of the imperial guard. But neither M. Gros nor M. Prudhon, to whom the succeeding age has done more justice, excited so much enthusiasm as David, Girodet, Gerard. France imagined that she possessed in them nearly equals to the great masters of Italy—singular and honourable illusion of a nation captivated with all sorts of glory, aspiring to possess them all, and applauding even mediocrity in the hope of calling forth genius!

In literature France was still further from real superiority. But, an exquisite judge in this matter, she did not deceive herself. A sort of inertness, by no means usual, had then seized the national genius. In the seventeenth century France, arrayed in all the brilliancy of youth and glory, had been seen excelling in the highest degree in the tragic representation of the passions of man, and in the comic representation of his oddities, giving lustre to the pulpit by a grave, energetic, sublime eloquence, unknown to the world, which has never heard it, which will never hear it, again. She had been seen in the eighteenth century suddenly changing her taste, her genius, her creed, forsaking art for polemics, attacking the altar, the throne, all the social institutions, acrimonious, vehement, immortal too in the literature which occupies itself in depicting the human heart. She had thus been seen varying to infinity the productions of her understanding, never exhausted like that spring at which the ancients represented genius slaking its thirst and which poured forth upon the world a perpetual stream. But all at once, after an immense revolution, the most humane in its object, the most terrible in its means, the most vast in its consequences, the genius of France, which had desired, called, and produced it, appeared surprised, agitated, terrified at its own works, and as it were exhausted. French literature subsequently to the Revolution of 1789, notwithstanding the influ-

ence of Napoleon, remained null and devoid of inspiration. Tragedy, which had already declined much, when Voltaire depicted in his "Zaire" the conflicts of religion and love, crept along, sometimes applying to Greece sometimes to England, sometimes to Sophocles sometimes to Shakspeare, for inspirations, for which it is better to look to Nature, which never come when they are sought, for genius truly inspired has no need of extraneous excitement. Its own plenitude is sufficient for it. M. Chenier imitated, in a pure and noble style, the Greek tragedy; M. Ducis, in an incorrect and touching style, the English tragedy. Comedy, of which M. Picard was then the most renowned continuator in France, depicted without depth but with some humour undecided characters, the great characters having been drawn for ever by Molière and by one or two of his disciples. The pulpit having lost its authority, the tribune was mute. There was no other eloquence but that of M. Regnault, expounding, in a brilliant and easy style, the petty affairs of the time, and that of M. Fontanes, expressing sometimes at the head of the bodies of the State, and in a correct, elegant, and noble style, grand from the greatness of the events rather than from that of the historian, the admiration of France for the prodigies of the imperial reign. History, in short, wanted liberty, wanted experience, and had not yet contracted that taste for research by which it has since been distinguished.

French literature did not recover a genuine originality, a touching eloquence, till M. de Chateaubriand, celebrating the days of yore, addressed himself, as we have elsewhere observed, to that true melancholy of the human heart, which always regrets the past, whatever it may be, how unworthy soever of regret, solely because it no longer exists. The age, however, had an immortal writer, immortal as Cæsar: this was the sovereign himself, a great writer, because he was a great genius, an inspired orator in his proclamations, the bard of his own exploits in his bulletins, a powerful demonstrator in a multitude of notes which emanated from him, in articles inserted in the *Moniteur*, in letters written to his agents, which will, no doubt, appear some day, and which will astonish the world as much as it has been astonished by his actions. High-coloured when he painted, clear, precise, vehement, imperious when he demonstrated, he was always simple as befitted the serious part assigned to him by Providence, but sometimes rather declamatory, from the remnant of a habit peculiar to all the children of the French revolution. Singular destiny of that prodigious man to be the greatest writer of his time, while he was its greatest captain, its greatest legislator, its greatest administrator. The nation having, on a day of fatigue, relinquished to him the trouble of willing, ordering, thinking for all, had, in some measure, by the same privilege, conceded to him the gift of speaking, of writing, better than all.

Already at that period, in that restless agitation of an anti-

quoted literature, which seeks inspirations everywhere, a double literary tendency became observable. Some were for going back to the seventeenth century and to antiquity, as to the source of all beauty; others proposed to solicit from England, from Germany, the secret of stronger emotions—puny efforts of the spirit of imitation, which changes its object, without attaining the originality that is refused it! Napoleon, from a natural taste for the purely beautiful, and from an instinct of nationality, repulsed these new attempts, extolled Racine, Bossuet, Molière, and the ancients along with them, and strove to make classic studies flourish in the University. At length, seeking to act powerfully on the public mind, he devised a means, in his opinion the most efficacious, for producing good works, which was to give reputation, to give it justly, greatly, with authority. In a free country, thousands of writers engaged in criticism, enlightened or ignorant, just or passionate, honest or base, discuss the works of mind, and then, after a vain clamour, are succeeded by Time, which decides in at once the mildest and the surest manner, by taking no notice of certain works, by continuing to speak of certain others. But, in granting to literature the freedom of discussion, Napoleon was not resolved to permit it entire even for that; and, as for Time, he was too impatient to await its decisions. He conceived, therefore, the idea of applying to each class of the Institute for thoroughly digested reports on the progress of literature and the arts and sciences since 1789, specifying the good or bad tendencies, the distinguished or indifferent works, and awarding praise or censure with strict impartiality. The reports were to be discussed by each of the classes, that they might have the authority of an *arrêt*, presented by one of the eminent men of the time, and read before the Emperor in the Council of State, thus judging from the throne, and encouraging the works of French genius by this solemn attention.

In consequence, M. Chenier came to read before Napoleon, and in a meeting of the Council of State, a simple, firm, dignified report on the progress of literature since 1789. When the reading was finished, Napoleon answered M. Chenier in these beautiful words:

“Gentlemen deputies of the second class of the Institute, if the French language is become a universal language, it is to the men of genius who have sat or who still sit among you that we are indebted for this.

“I attach a value to the success of your labours; they tend to enlighten my people, and are necessary to the glory of my crown. I have heard with satisfaction the report that you have just made to me. You may rely on my protection.”

When governments will interfere in the works of the human mind, it is in this lofty style that they ought to do so; and, moreover, to this manner of distributing glory by a decision of the public authority Napoleon added a munificence, numerous in-

stances of which we have already cited, and the most efficacious of all encouragements, the approbation of genius. In other sittings, he heard M. Cuvier make a report on the progress of the sciences, M. Dacier on that of historical researches, and successively the representatives of all the classes on the subjects which concerned them. Desirous of giving to the arts of design a not less signal mark of attention, he went himself with the Empress, and part of his court, to the *studio* of David the painter, to inspect the picture of the Coronation, and, after viewing it, to address to him the most flattering expressions.

Such were the occupations of Napoleon after his return from Tilsit; such is also the spectacle which France exhibited during his reign, either from the effect of circumstances, or from the personal influence which he exercised over her. Most of the resolutions which he had just taken could not dispense with the concurrence of the legislative power. It was more than a year since it had met, and he was impatient to assemble it, as much to present to it the finance laws, the code of commerce, the laws relative to the public works, as to make a European manifestation before the bodies of the State. He had resolved to open the session of the Legislative Body on the 16th of August, the day following the 15th, fixed for the celebration of the festival of St. Napoleon. The 15th was a real festival for Paris and for all France. The people were still filled with the joy which the peace had occasioned; for, signed at Tilsit on the 8th of July, known at Paris on the 15th, it was scarcely a month that they had enjoyed it. To this joy for the continental peace was added the hope of a maritime peace. The presence of Napoleon at Paris had already exercised its usual influence. Fresh bustle prevailed everywhere. Money was plentiful. Those on whom Napoleon had just conferred wealth were building elegant hotels, and bespeaking costly furniture to adorn them. Their wives spent money in handfuls on the dealers in articles of luxury. It was announced that the court would make a long stay at Fontainebleau, whither all the high society of Paris would be invited, and where would be given festivities of which the winter had been deprived. In short, the national glory, which deeply touched all hearts, contributed likewise to all these joys by heightening them. The evening of the 15th of August was as dazzling as a bright day. The whole population of Paris was at night under the windows of the palace, intoxicated with enthusiasm, loudly desiring to see the glorious sovereign, who had conferred so many benefits, real or apparent, on France, and, above all, who had rendered her so great. It must be acknowledged, for the honour of human nature, that what most attracts it is glory. Had Napoleon not been Emperor and King, the people would still have desired to see in his person the greatest man of modern times. He showed himself several times holding the Empress by the hand, scarcely discerned amidst a brilliant group, but cheered and applauded as

though he had been distinctly perceived. He wished to be himself a closer witness of the popular enthusiasm, and went out disguised, with his faithful Duroc, to take a walk in the garden of the Tuileries. By favour of the night and of his disguise, he could enjoy the sentiments which he inspired without being known, and amidst all the groups he heard his name pronounced with gratitude and love. He stopped in the garden to listen to a little boy who was shouting with transport *Vive l'Empereur!* He caught up the child in his arms, asked why he shouted in that manner, and received for answer that his father and mother taught him to love and bless the emperor. They were Bretons, who, being obliged to flee from the horrors of civil war, had found in Paris peace and competence in an humble employment. Napoleon conversed with them, and they knew not till next day before how powerful a witness they had poured forth the simple effusions of their hearts.

On the following day, the 16th, Napoleon repaired to the Legislative Body, surrounded by his marshals, followed by an immense concourse of people, and found the Council of State and the Tribunate assembled, with the members of the Legislative Body. M. de Talleyrand, in quality of vice-grand-elect, presented the members of the Legislative Body recently elected to be sworn; and then the Emperor, in a clear and penetrating voice, delivered the following speech:—

“Gentlemen deputies of the departments to the Legislative Body, messieurs the Tribunes and the members of my Council of State, since your last session, new wars, new triumphs, new treaties of peace, have changed the political face of Europe.

“If the house of Brandenburg, which first conspired against our independence, still reigns, it is indebted for this to the sincere friendship with which the powerful emperor of the North has inspired me.

“A French prince will reign on the Elbe; he will understand how to reconcile the interests of his new subjects with his first and most sacred duties.

“The house of Saxony has recovered, after fifty years, the independence which it had lost.

“The people of the duchy of Warsaw, and of the city of Dantzic, have recovered their country and their rights.

“All nations rejoice with one accord to see the mischievous influence which England exercised over the Continent destroyed for ever.

“France is united with the people of Germany by the laws of the Confederation of the Rhine; to those of Spain, Holland, Switzerland, and the Italies, by the laws of our federative system. Our new relations with Russia are cemented by the reciprocal esteem of these two great nations.

"In all that I have done, I have had in view solely the prosperity of my people, more dear in my eyes than my own glory.

"I am desirous for maritime peace. No resentment shall ever influence my determinations. I can never have any against a nation, the puppet and victim of the parties which tear it in pieces, deluded respecting the situation of its own affairs as well as that of its neighbours.

"But whatever be the issue which the decrees of Providence have allotted to the maritime war, my people shall find me ever the same, and I shall ever find my people worthy of me. Frenchmen, your conduct in these last times, when your Emperor was more than five hundred leagues away, has heightened my esteem, and the opinion which I had formed of your character. I have felt proud of being the first among you. If, during these ten months of absence and dangers, I have been present to your thoughts, the marks of attachment which you have given me have constantly excited my warmest emotions. All my anxieties, all that could have relation even to the preservation of my person, touched me only from the interest which you took in them, and for the importance of which they might be for your future destinies. You are a good and a great people.

"I have contemplated various dispositions for simplifying and improving our institutions.

"The nation has experienced the happiest effects from the institution of the Legion of Honour. I have created several imperial titles to give new lustre to the principal of my subjects, to honour eminent services by eminent rewards, and also to prevent the revival of any feudal title incompatible with our constitutions.

"The accounts of my ministers of the finances and of the public Treasury will acquaint you with the prosperous state of our finances. My people will experience a considerable relief in regard to the land-tax.

"My minister of the interior will inform you of the public works which have been commenced or finished; but what remains to be done is of far greater importance; for I intend that, in all parts of my Empire, even in the smallest hamlet, the prosperity of the citizens and the value of land shall be augmented by the effect of the general system of improvement which I have conceived.

"Messieurs the deputies of the departments, your assistance will be necessary for me to arrive at this great result, and I have a right to rely firmly upon it."

This speech was heard with warm emotion, and applauded with transport. Napoleon returned to the Tuileries, accompanied by the same concourse, and greeted with the same shouts.

On the next and succeeding days were brought forward the

various laws which fixed the budget of 1807 at 720 millions in receipts and expenditure, which demanded for 1808 mere provisional credits, conformably to the custom of the time; which, for this same year 1808, remitted to the country 20 millions on the land-tax;* which regulated the concurrence of the departments in the great works of general utility, instituted a Court of Accounts, and lastly were to compose the commercial code. The measures concerning the institution of the new titles, the purification of the magistracy, the union of the Tribunate to the Legislative Body, were reserved for the Senate. After the presentation of all these laws came the report of the minister of the interior on the state of the Empire. When that minister had, in a picture for which Napoleon had furnished the substance and almost the form, finished the sketch of the flourishing state of France, of the progress of her manufactures and commerce, of the impulsion given to all the works, of the simultaneous construction of canals, roads, bridges, and public monuments, over the whole surface of the territory, of the regularity, order, abundance, prevailing in the finances, of the efforts made to diffuse instruction, to extend to every commune the benefit of public worship, in short of so many useful creations, the course of which a war of giants had not interrupted, for which it had even procured the means, thanks to the tribute levied from the conquered kings, M. de Fontanes, president of the Legislative Body, replied in the following speech, which he had been enabled to prepare beforehand, for the sentiments that were expressed in it filled all hearts:—

“Monsieur the minister of the interior, messieurs the councillors of State,

“The picture set before our eyes seems to present the image of one of those pacific kings, exclusively engaged in the internal administration in the heart of their dominions; and yet all these useful labours, all these wise projects, which are designed to improve upon them, were ordered and conceived amidst the din of arms on the furthest confines of conquered Prussia, and on the frontiers of threatened Russia. If it be true that, at the distance of five hundred leagues from the capital, amid the cares and the fatigues of war, a hero prepared so many benefits, how is he about to increase them by returning among us! The public welfare will wholly engage him, and his glory will be the more touching for it.

“We are far from refusing to heroism that homage which in all times it obtains. Philosophy more than once insulted military enthusiasm: let us now dare to avenge it.

“War, that ancient, and unfortunately necessary disease, which has ravaged all societies; that scourge, the effects of which it is

* I have said in another place 15 millions; it was nevertheless 20 millions; but the new *centimes* imposed for the concurrence of the departments in the public works reduced these 20 millions to 15.

so easy to deplore, and so difficult to extirpate the cause—war itself is not without utility for nations. It imparts new energy to old societies; it draws together great nations which have long been enemies, which learn to esteem each other on the field of battle; it stirs and fertilizes minds by extraordinary spectacles; above all it instructs present and future ages, when it produces one of those rare geniuses formed to change everything.

“But, for war to have such advantages, it must not be too prolonged, or irreparable evils are the consequence. The fields and the workshops are depopulated, the schools in which minds and manners are formed become deserted, barbarism approaches, and the generations ravaged in their flower see the hopes of the human race perish along with themselves.

“The Legislative Body and the French nation bless the great prince who puts an end to war before it can subject us to such disastrous influences, and when it brings us, on the contrary, so many new means of strength, wealth, and population. War, which exhausts every thing, has renovated our finances and our armies. The vanquished nations give us subsidies, and France finds soldiers worthy of her among the allied nations.

“Our eyes have beheld the most extraordinary things. A few years have been sufficient for renewing the face of the world. A man has traversed Europe, taking away and giving diadems. He displaces, he contracts, he extends, the boundaries of empires: all are borne away by his ascendancy. Well! this man, covered with so much glory, promises us still greater: peaceable and disarmed, he will prove that this invincible force, which, as it runs, overturns thrones and empires, is beneath that truly royal wisdom, which preserves them by peace, which enriches them by agriculture and industry, adorns them with master-pieces of art, and founds them everlastingly on the two-fold support of morality and the laws.”

The labours of the Legislative Body commenced immediately, and were prosecuted with the calmness and celerity natural in discussions which were purely formal; for the serious investigation of the proposed laws had taken place elsewhere, that is to say, in the conferences between the Tribune and the Council of State. During this short session, which kept him in Paris and deferred his departure for Fontainebleau, Napoleon celebrated the marriage of the princess Catherine of Wurtemberg with his brother Jerome. This young princess, endowed with the noblest qualities, beautiful and striking in person, proud as her father, but gentle and devoted to all her duties, and destined to become some day a pattern for wives in adversity, arrived at the *chateau* of Raincy, near Paris, on the 20th of August, rather uneasy about the situation that awaited her in a court, the splendour and power of which nobody in Europe denied, but which was represented as the abode of brutal force, and to which she was not to be

accompanied by any of the servants whom she had had around her from her infancy. Napoleon received her on the 21st on the first step of the palace of the Tuileries. She was going to bow to him, when he caught her in his arms, and then presented her to the Empress, to his whole court, and to the deputies of the new kingdom of Westphalia, convoked to Paris to be present at this union. On the following day, the young couple were civilly married by the arch-chancellor Cambacères, and the day afterwards they received in the chapel of the Tuileries the nuptial benediction of the prince-primate, who, always alike attached to the Emperor from inclination and from gratitude, had come to consecrate in person the new German royalty, founded in the north of the Confederation, of which he was chancellor and president.

The festivities held on occasion of this marriage lasted several days, and during this time Napoleon prepared for the departure of the young couple for Westphalia. Their kingdom, composed principally of the territories of the grand-duke of Hesse, dethroned on account of his perfidies, was to have Cassel for its capital. It comprehended, besides electoral Hesse, Westphalia and the provinces separated from Prussia, on the left of the Elbe. Magdeburg was its principal fortress. It had likewise hopes of being enriched by part of Hanover. The title of kingdom of Westphalia was suited to its geographical situation, to its extent, to its part in the Confederation of the Rhine. It had, moreover, a sort of consequence, and did not remind one, as the title of Kingdom of Hesse would have done, of the dispossession of a great German family. Napoleon had charged three councillors of State, Messrs. Simeon, Beugnot, and Jollivet, to go, under the title of provisional regency, and to commence the administrative organization of this kingdom, so that prince Jerome should, on his arrival, find a sort of government instituted, and, after his arrival, wise councillors capable of guiding his inexperience. Napoleon then dispatched him with the following instructions:—

“My brother, I think you ought to go to Stuttgart, as you have been invited thither by the king of Wurtemberg. You will proceed thence to Cassel, with all the pomp with which the hopes of your people will induce them to surround you. You will convoke the deputies of the towns, the ministers of all religions, the deputies of the States now existing, taking care that there shall be half not noble, half noble; and before this assembly, so composed, you will receive the constitution and swear to maintain it, and immediately afterwards you will receive the oath of those deputies of the people. The three members of the regency shall be charged with the delivery of the country to you. They will form a privy council, which shall remain with you, so long as you have need of it. Appoint at first only half of your councillors of State; that number will be sufficient for commencing business. Take care that the majority be composed of non-nobles, but with-

out letting any one perceive this habitual caution to keep up a majority of the third estate in all offices. I except from this some places at court, to which upon the same principles the highest names must be called. But, in your ministries, in your councils, if possible in your courts of appeal, in your administrations, the greater part of the persons whom you employ should not be nobles. This conduct will go to the heart of Germany and perhaps mortify the other class. It is sufficient not to use any affectation in this conduct. Take care never to enter into discussions, nor to let it be understood, that you attach such importance to the advancement of the third estate. The avowed principle is to select talents wherever they are to be found. I have here marked out for you the general principles of your conduct. I have given orders to the major-general to deliver up to you the command of the French troops which are in your kingdom. Remember that you are French, and guard against their suffering any wrong. By degrees, and according as they become unnecessary, you will send back the governors and the commandants of arms. My opinion is that you should not be in a hurry, and that you should listen with prudence and circumspection to the complaints of the towns, which are only anxious to rid themselves of the embarrassments occasioned by the war. Remember that the army remained six months in Bavaria, and that those good people bore this burden with patience. Before the month of January, you ought to have divided your kingdom into departments, to have appointed prefects in them, and to have commenced your administration. What is of particular consequence to me is, that you delay not in the least the introduction of the Napoleon Code. The constitution establishes it irrevocably on the 1st of January. If you defer putting it in force this would become a question of public right, for if successions should chance to open, you would be embarrassed by a thousand claims. Objections will not fail to be made; oppose them with a firm will. The members of the regency, who are not in favour of what was done in France during the revolution, will make remonstrances: give them for answer that this does not concern them. But call to your aid their intelligence and experience, from which you may derive great advantage. Above all, write to me very often. . .

“You will find annexed the constitution of your kingdom. That constitution contains the conditions on which I renounce all my rights of conquest and my acquired rights to your country. You ought to follow it punctually. The happiness of your people is of importance to me, not only for the influence which it may have upon your glory and mine, but also under the point of view of the general system of Europe. Listen not to those who tell you that your people, accustomed to servitude, will receive your benefits unthankfully. They are more enlightened in the kingdom of Westphalia than some persons would fain persuade you; and your throne will never be firmly founded but on the confidence

and the love of the population. What the people of Germany desire with impatience is, that individuals who are not noble, and possess talents, should have an equal right to your consideration and to office ; that every species of bondage, and all intermediate restrictions between the sovereign and the lowest class, should be entirely abolished. The benefits of the Napoleon Code, the publicity of law proceedings, the institution of juries, will be so many distinguishing characteristics of your monarchy; and, if I must tell you my whole mind, I reckon more upon their effects for the extension and consolidation of that monarchy than upon the result of the greatest victories. Your people must enjoy a liberty, an equality, a prosperity, unknown to the other people of Germany; and this liberal government must produce, in one way or another, changes the most salutary to the system of the Confederation and to the power of your monarchy. This mode of governing will be a stronger barrier to separate you from Prussia than the Elbe, than fortresses, than the protection of France. What people would be willing to return under the arbitrary Prussian government, after it has tasted the benefits of a wise and liberal administration ? The people of Germany, those of France, Italy, Spain, desire equality and require liberal ideas. It is now several years that I have directed the affairs of Europe, and I have had occasion to convince myself, that the grumbling of the privileged persons was contrary to the general opinion. Be a constitutional king. If the reason and the intelligence of your times were not sufficient, in your position good policy would enjoin it."

The session of the Legislative Body, though there were numerous *projets* to be converted into laws, could not last long, thanks, as we have observed, to the previous conferences, which rendered public discussion nearly useless, and a matter of mere form. The second half of the month of August and the first half of September were sufficient. The business of this session being finished, the *senatus-consulte*, which suppressed the Tribunate, and transferred its attributes and its members to the Legislative Body, was brought to the two assemblies. It was accompanied by an address, which bestowed due praise on the labours and services of the suppressed body. The president of that body, on receiving this communication, delivered a speech on his part, thanking the sovereign, who acknowledged the merits of the members of the Tribunate and opened to them a new career. After these vain formalities, the session was closed, and a legal character was imparted to the last works of the imperial government.

At length, on the 22nd of September, the court set out for Fontainebleau, where it was to pass the autumn amidst festivities and pompous pageantry. Napoleon purposed to exhibit there a complete image of the manners of the old court. Many foreign princes had been invited thither, such as the prince-primate who had come to Paris on occasion of the marriage of the king and queen of Westphalia, the archduke Ferdinand, late sovereign of Tuscany

and of Salzburg, now of Wurzburg, who had come in the hope of restoring good harmony between France and Austria; prince William, brother of the king of Prussia, despatched to Paris to obtain a mitigation of the charges imposed upon his country, and a multitude of other great personages, French and foreign. In the day-time the company pursued the sport of coursing the deer of the forest. Napoleon had prescribed a dress indispensable for the chace, and had imposed the necessity of wearing it on both men and women. He disdained not to appear in it himself, excusing in his own eyes these puerilities by the opinion that etiquette in courts, and particularly in new courts, contributes to respect. In the evening the first actors in Paris came to perform before him the masterpieces of Corneille, Racine, Molière; for he admitted to the honour of his presence none but the great productions, immortal titles of the nation, and, as if to complete this resurrection of the ancient manners, he cast on certain ladies of the court, renowned for their beauty, glances which distressed the empress Josephine, and caused observations to be made respecting him less serious than those of which he was usually the object.

While Napoleon, mingling some recreations with a great deal of business, awaited at Fontainebleau the result of the negotiations commenced by Russia with England, the stipulations of Tilsit occupied cabinets and produced in the world their natural consequences. Portugal, obliged to come to a decision, solicited permission of the court of London to comply with the requisitions of Napoleon, at least in such a manner as to do the least possible injury to British commerce, and to spare the English, as well as the Portuguese, the presence of a French army in Lisbon. The court of Spain, anxious in the highest degree about the consequences which its perfidious conduct last year might produce, alarmed at the thoughts which omnipotence and leisure might suggest to Napoleon, despatched to him, as we have seen, in addition to her ordinary ambassador, M. de Massaredo, an ambassador extraordinary, M. de Frias, besides a secret envoy, M. Yzquierdo. Neither of the former had found means to penetrate the frightful mystery of his coming. Austria, bitterly regretting not having acted in the interval between the battles of Eylau and Friedland, extremely uneasy at the signs of intelligence which began to be perceived between the emperors of France and Russia, said to herself that their alliance, so natural when France was engaged with England on the sea, with Germany on the land, and so formidable at all times to Europe, was perhaps at this moment absolutely concluded, and that the provinces of the Danube, then occupied by the Russians, would, in all probability, be the price of the new union. If such were the case, it would crown all the disasters which had overtaken her during the present century: for, despoiled in the course of fifteen years of the Netherlands, of Italy, of the Tyrol, of Suabia, forced back behind the Iun, behind the Styrian and Julian Alps, after so many misfortunes,

only one greater could befall her, to see Russia established on the Lower Danube, cutting her off from the Black Sea, and enveloping her in the East as France enveloped her in the West. Hence, in all the courts where the representatives of Austria met with ours, they were seen restless, suspicious, seeking by all possible means to ferret out the secret of Tilsit, here offering to pay for it with money, there striving to discover it in an unguarded moment, and at length, on the refusal of our diplomatists to betray it, demanding it with a ridiculous indiscretion. And while they were everywhere endeavouring to penetrate the projects of the new alliance without succeeding, they gave out at Constantinople that they were completely discovered, telling the Turks that France had deserted, betrayed them, and given them up to Russia; that they ought to turn their arms against the French, continue the hostilities against the Russians, and reconcile themselves with the English; who, they added, would not be the only people to support them. Prussia, overwhelmed by her calamity, concerned herself but little about the secret conditions stipulated at Tilsit, and caring still less what should befall the balance of Europe in the East, since it was already destroyed for her in the West, thinking only of obtaining the evacuation of her territory and a reduction of the war-contributions imposed upon it: for, in the exhausted state in which she found herself, every sum given to France was a resource withdrawn from her for reconstituting her army and for some day retrieving her reverses.

In Russia the spectacle was totally different: there the sovereign, who had sought in the French alliance prospects of greatness suited to indemnify him for his recent mishaps, was seen making continual efforts to lead the court, the aristocracy, the people, into his views. But, having been exposed alone at Tilsit to the seductions of Napoleon, he could not persuade them to pass so quickly as himself from the horrors of war to the enchantments of a new alliance. He therefore strove now to persuade every body that, in terminating by a reconciliation with France, things had taken the best possible turn; that his late ministers, in embroiling him with that power, had led him into a fatal track, from which he had extricated himself with equal good fortune and skill; that, in all this, he had committed but one error, that of having believed in the valour of the Prussian army and in the integrity of England, but he had soon dispelled this double illusion; that there were but two armies in Europe which deserved to be mentioned, the Russian army and the French army; that it was useless to make them fight in order to serve the cause of a perfidious and selfish power like Great Britain; and that it was better to unite them in one common aim of peace and greatness; of peace, if the cabinet of London would at length desist from its maritime pretensions; of greatness, if it did oblige Europe to lead the same life of torment and sacrifices; that, in this case, every one must take care of himself and his own interests; and that it was time for Russia to think of hers. Having arrived at

this point of his explanations, Alexander, not daring to reveal all the hopes which Napoleon had permitted him to conceive, nor above all to avow the occult treaty which they had promised themselves to keep profoundly secret, assumed an air of mystery but of satisfaction, leaving all to be guessed that he durst not venture to tell, though strongly tempted to do so, and speaking, for instance, of Turkey, declaring openly that he was about to sign an armistice with her, but should take care not to evacuate the provinces of the Danube, where he should stay for a long time, and that no difficulty would be met with at Paris on the subject of this prolonged occupation.

These demi-confidential intimations had rather excited an indiscreet and mischievous curiosity than gained over those to whom they were imparted to the ideas of the emperor Alexander. He was, for the rest, warmly seconded by M. de Romanzow, who was acquainted with every thing, who had served Catherine, and inherited her oriental ambition. The minister, like the sovereign, repeated that they must have patience, and leave events to unfold themselves, and that they should soon have a satisfactory explanation to give of the change of politics effected at Tilsit.

But the emperor was not always listened to and obeyed. The public, ignorant of the secrets of the imperial diplomacy, galled by the late defeats, exhibited a sorrowful aspect, and an especial ill-will towards the French. The *grande*es in particular called to mind the fickleness of Russian politics under Paul, and, beginning to believe that this fickleness would be the same under Alexander, were fearful that the intimacy with France would soon lead to a war with England, which alarmed them on account of their revenues, always threatened when British commerce ceased to purchase their productions. Hence general Savary, on his arrival at St. Petersburg soon after the signature of the peace, had met with the coldest reception, excepting from the emperor Alexander and two or three families composing the intimate society of that prince. The catastrophe of Vincennes, of which people were reminded by the appearance of general Savary, was assuredly not likely to reconcile with him hearts which politics estranged; but the true cause of this general estrangement was in the remembrance of recent hostilities and of great defeats, without any event which could console the national self-love. The emperor, fully aware of this situation, endeavoured to render general Savary's stay at St. Petersburg endurable, nay even agreeable to him, paid him all sorts of attentions, admitted him to his presence almost every day; invited him frequently to his table, and, in fear of the reports which he might despatch to Napoleon, begged him to have patience, saying that every thing would change when the late impressions were effaced, and when France should have done something for the just ambition of Russia. He knew not how far general Savary might be initiated in the secret of Tilsit, and strove to discover this, to have the pleasure, if the

general was acquainted with that secret, of conversing with him on the fondest subject of his thoughts. The French envoy was but partially informed, and even had orders to appear to know less than he did; for Napoleon had no wish that the young emperor, incessantly talking over the subjects which had engaged him at Tilsit, should at last confirm himself in his own desires, and take mere eventualities for certain and speedy realities. General Savary replied, therefore, with extreme reserve to the insinuations of the emperor, with warm gratitude for his kind attentions, appeared satisfied, not at all vexed, at the disagreeable reception given him by Russian society, and full of confidence in a speedy change of dispositions. He had, besides, to defend him, sufficient understanding, plenty of assurance, and the immensity of the national glory, which permitted Frenchmen to hold their heads high everywhere.

The example of the emperor Alexander, and the strong expression of his will, had opened to general Savary some of the most important houses in St. Petersburg, but most of the great families continued to exclude him; for Alexander, though master of power, was, nevertheless, not master of high society, placed under a different influence from his. Having owed to a tragic catastrophe the anticipated possession of the sceptre of the czars, this prince strove to compensate his mother, who had descended before the time to the station of dowager, by leaving to her the exterior of supreme power. This princess, virtuous but haughty, consoled herself for having lost with Paul half of the empire, by the ostentatious display of imperial splendour, with which her son desired that she should be surrounded. As for himself, he had no court. Disliking the empress, his wife, a cold and grave beauty, he hastened after his repasts to leave the palace, to employ himself in business with the statesmen his confidants, or to pursue his pleasures in the society of a Russian lady, of whom he was enamoured. The court assembled at his mother's. There were to be seen the courtiers fond of living in the society of the sovereign, having favours to obtain or thanks to pay for favours obtained. All came to solicit or to thank the empress-mother, as if she were the sole author of the acts of the imperial power. Alexander himself made his appearance there with the assiduity of a respectful, submissive son, who had not yet inherited the paternal sceptre. The empress-mother, who fondly loved that son, would neither hold nor suffer any language that could displease him, but did not disguise her own sentiments in manifesting a visible aversion to the French. She had therefore received general Savary with cold politeness. He had not shown any emotion, but had adroitly hinted to the son that none of these circumstances had escaped him. For a moment Alexander could not contain himself, and, apprehensive lest, under this affected respect for his mother, a foreigner, an aide-de-camp of Napoleon's, should not recognise the real master of the empire, he grasped the general's hand, and

said, "There is no sovereign here but myself; I respect my mother, but everybody shall obey, be assured of it; and, at all events, whoever needs it, shall be reminded of the nature and the extent of my authority." General Savary, content with having brought the emperor to such a confidential communication by piquing his imperial pride, went no further, satisfied respecting his dispositions and his zeal to maintain the new alliance. For the rest, the court of the empress-mother showed, not more politeness, for it had never ceased to show that, but more cordiality. "Let us wait," said the emperor Alexander incessantly to general Savary, "and see what England will do. Let us know what course she will pursue; I will then break out, and when I have declared myself, nobody shall resist."

An explanation of the conduct which England intended to adopt was in fact awaited with keen impatience. The patent treaty of Tilsit had been published. Every one plainly perceived that it did not tell all, and that the new alliance with France inferred other secret stipulations. But at any rate, according to the patent arrangements of that treaty, and without going any further, it was known that Russia would act as mediatrix for France with England, and France as mediatrix of Russia with the Porte. The result of this double mediation was therefore looked for.

Faithful to his engagements, no sooner had the emperor Alexander arrived at St. Petersburg, than he addressed a note to the British cabinet, expressing a wish for the restoration of general peace, and offering his mediation with a view to bring about a reconciliation between France and England. This note had been received by the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, and by the minister for foreign affairs in London, with a coldness which left little hope of an accommodation. The new English ministers, in fact, disciples of Mr. Pitt, but of inferior abilities, were not inclined to peace. Their origin, their party connexions, their accession to the ministry, are sufficient of themselves to explain the policy which they adopted in this decisive circumstance.

It will, no doubt, be recollected that when in 1806 [May, 1804] Mr. Pitt resumed the direction of the counsels of George III., after maintaining, jointly with Mr. Fox, a strong contest with the Addington administration, he had either the weakness or the treachery to resume it without Mr. Fox, on the one hand, without his old friends, such as Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham, on the other. He had come back to office with men who had then but little political importance, Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh. This conduct towards his friends, old or recent, had much weakened him in parliament, and had rendered his second administration by no means brilliant. The battle of Austerlitz proved mortal to him. No sooner was Mr. Pitt dead than his feeble colleagues, Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh, deeming themselves incapable of making head against such men as Lord Grenville and

Mr. Windham, old and distinguished colleagues deserted by Pitt, and Mr. Fox, his old and illustrious rival—they retreated from before them in all haste, and lord Grenville and Mr. Windham had re-entered the administration along with Mr. Fox. The wise Mr. Addington, by the name of lord Sidmouth, the celebrated Mr. Grey, by the name of lord Howick, formed part of this cabinet, which was a double compromise between persons and opinion. Mr. Sheridan himself had joined it in becoming treasurer of the navy. The re-appearance of Mr. Fox in power, as short as that of Mr. Pitt had been, and terminating in like manner in his death, had not lasted long enough, as we have elsewhere said, to bring about the restoration of peace. After the fruitless negociations of lord Yarmouth and lord Lauderdale in Paris, Napoleon had taken possession of Prussia and Poland. The administration, which was called Fox-Grenville, had maintained its ground after the death of Mr. Fox, thanks to the powerful men of which it was still composed, and of the system of compromise which it had continued to follow. At home, the Catholics were conciliated; abroad the war was kept up, but with a sort of prudence, by the grants of subsidies to the continental powers, and by not risking the English troops, unless in expeditions of demonstrated advantage to Great Britain. The old colleagues of Mr. Pitt, blended with the old friends of Mr. Fox, no longer affected to wage against France a war of principle but of interest. They neglected what was likely to call to mind the crusade against the French revolution, and occupied themselves exclusively in extending the conquests of England in all the seas. Urged by Prussia and Russia to send troops either to Stralsund or to Dantzic, to effect a diversion on the rear of Napoleon, they had always delayed, sometimes upon pretext of Ireland, which required troops to guard it, at others upon pretext of the Boulogne flotilla, which had been kept constantly armed; and they had meanwhile sent out distant expeditions, projected for the sole interest of England. Thus they had taken the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch. From the Cape of Good Hope they had proceeded to the shores of the La Plata, and attempted a *coup de main* against Monte Video and Buenos Ayres. The supineness of the Spanish government, and the cowardice of its commandants, had permitted the English to penetrate into Buenos Ayres, and to possess themselves of that metropolis of South America. But M. Liniers, a Frenchman, who, after the American war, had passed into the service of Spain, had rallied the Spanish troops and population, and driven the English out of Buenos Ayres, after reducing them to a capitulation mortifying for their glory. At Monte Video, likewise, after having entered and evacuated it, the English had been obliged to withdraw from the city, and they occupied some islands at the mouth of the La Plata. The Mediterranean also had become the theatre of their ambitious expeditions. They had, it will be recollected, forced the Dardanelles, without any result

for themselves, and effected a landing in Egypt, which had been followed by their retreat. By all these enterprises the English had gained the Cape, the island of Curaçoa, and the animadversion of their allies, who said that they were deserted.

Such was the state of the Grenville ministry, when, in March, 1807, a question unexpectedly arose, which put the moderate principles of that administration in opposition with the religious principles of old George III. Once before that devout prince had carried his infatuation against the Catholics of Ireland to such a length as to part from Mr. Pitt rather than grant a commencement of emancipation. The same cause was destined to separate the colleagues and successors of Mr. Pitt. The Irish rendered good service in the army, and, at a moment when the contest with France assumed a new character of implacability, it was politic to satisfy those brave soldiers by permitting them to attain the same rank as the English officers, and thus to attach the Catholics to England by a first act of justice. A bill to this effect was therefore proposed by ministers, and owing to the obscurity of that bill, an obscurity purposely imparted to it by the ministers who had drawn it up, George III., misapprehending its object, consented that it should be presented; but no sooner was it brought in than the enemies of the cabinet, who were no other than the secondary personages by whom Mr. Pitt had surrounded himself at the time of his last administration, had by secret intrigues awakened the scruples of the old king, and caused such explanations to be laid before him as gave the bill an import which at first he had not suspected. George III. had then desired that it should be withdrawn. Lord Grenville and lord Howick, resigned themselves with difficulty to this humiliating step, declaring that the concessions now refused to the Irish must be granted to them sooner or later, to which George III. replied by demanding a promise that nothing of the kind should be in future proposed. In consequence of this royal requisition, Lord Grenville, Lord Howick, and their colleagues, resigned in March, 1807. The weak remnant of the ministers who had surrounded Mr. Pitt then returned to office, under the presidency of the old duke of Portland, a veteran Whig, who had no longer any political importance on account of his great age, and who was introduced merely to give the cabinet some appearance of political coalition. Mr. Canning, lord Castlereagh, Mr. Perceval, the principal members of this administration, justly acquired the denomination of the king's creatures, availing themselves of the royal weakness to substitute themselves for the most considerable and the most capable men in England. Violent discussions in both houses of Parliament had well nigh left them in a minority; they had dared to threaten Parliament with a dissolution, and had finished by dissolving it, strong in the support of George III. The elections had taken place in June, 1807, amidst cries of "Down with the Papists!" a cry which always finds many echoes in England. Seconded by the popular fanaticism, which was

carried to such a length that it might have been supposed that the Pope had actually landed in Ireland, ministers of no consideration, champions of a detestable cause, had obtained a considerable majority. Such were the men who at this moment governed England.

These new comers, for whom Fortune destined at a later period the unmerited honour of reaping the fruits of the efforts of Mr. Pitt, naturally desired to distinguish themselves from their predecessors, and those predecessors, having sought to temper the policy of Mr. Pitt, could do no other than seek to exaggerate it. They had at once given the promise, for which they were most bitterly reproached, not to propose any measure in favour of the Catholics; and as to foreign politics, they affected great zeal for the allies of England, unworthily deserted, they alleged, by lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and lord Howick.

Without loss of time they had promised expeditions to the Continent; so that, entering into the ministry in March, they might have been able in April, May and June to afford useful aid to the belligerent powers, since Dantzic had not surrendered before the 26th of May; but they had done nothing, either from incapacity or from being occupied by domestic affairs, an occupation which must have been urgent, for they had then to dissolve Parliament, and to convoke a new one. Be this as it may, after they had assembled a considerable fleet in the Downs and collected at that point numerous troops for embarkation, their co-operation in the continental war was limited to the despatch of an English division to Stralsund. The news of the battle of Friedland and the peace of Tilsit had filled them with alarm for their country and still greater for themselves; for, after reprehending with extreme severity the inaction of their predecessors, they had rendered themselves liable to be much more justly reproached for their inertness during the three decisive months of April, May, and June, 1807. It was therefore necessary, at any rate, to attempt some enterprise which should strike the public opinion, which should avert the reproach of inactivity, which, useful or useless, humane or barbarous, should be sufficiently specious, sufficiently dazzling to occupy discontented and alarmed minds.

In this situation, they resolved upon an enterprise which has long made the world ring as an outrage against humanity, an enterprise not only odious, but very ill-judged in regard to British interest. This enterprise was no other than the famous expedition against Denmark, projected for compelling her by violence to declare herself in favour of England. Paltry imitators of Mr. Pitt, the English ministers determined to inflict on Copenhagen a repetition of the signal blow by means of which England had in 1801 dissolved the coalition of the neutrals. But when the Addington administration had struck Copenhagen in 1801, it was to break up a coalition, of which Denmark publicly formed a part; it was an act of war opposed to an act of war; it was a rash

operation but clever in its temerity, cruel in its means but necessary. In 1807, on the contrary, there was neither pretext, nor justice, nor skill, in attacking Denmark. That State, scrupulously neutral, had taken extreme care to maintain her neutrality. She had, from an unfortunate habit of using greater precaution against France than against England, placed her whole army along Holstein, incurring, as had been the case at Lübeck, the risk of a collision with the French troops rather than suffer the line of her frontiers to be violated. Her diplomacy had acted in the same manner as her army, and had always manifested a jealous susceptibility in regard to France. At the very moment, she had not, as the English ministers falsely asserted, just been engaged in treating with Russia and France, and stipulating her adhesion to the new continental coalition. So far from it, she had just protested once more her desire to maintain her neutrality, though Napoleon had caused an intimation to be made to her with delicacy, but with firmness, that, when England should have explained herself respecting the Russian mediation, Denmark would at length be obliged to come to a decision, and to declare for or against the oppressors of the seas. If on this occasion the English ministers had acted judiciously, they would have left to Napoleon the odious part of compelling Denmark to speak out, and sent a fleet into the Cattegat; then, in case of the approach of the French, they should have gone to the assistance of Copenhagen, and, in assisting that capital, they would have become the legitimate masters of the Danish fleet, the two Belts, and the Sound. At a period when Europe, already weary of suffering by the quarrel between France and England, was disposed to judge severely either of the two powers which should aggravate the evils of the war, this friendly conduct and assistance afforded to Denmark would have been the only line of conduct to pursue. The contrary conduct gave Denmark to Napoleon, spared him the embarrassment of himself exercising a tyrannical constraint, and the carrying off of a few crazy hulls of ships by the English was but a fruitless act of pillage, the more impolitic and odious since it was not to be accomplished but by the abominable means of bombarding a population of women, children, and old men.

Supposing that enlightened ministers, placed in a simple position, had then directed the politics of England, the choice would not have been doubtful, and their conduct, which would have consisted in aiding Denmark in her resistance against Napoleon, would certainly have prevailed. But Mr. Canning, lord Castlereagh, Perceval, were, with more or less of oratorical talent, sorry politicians, and ministers more intent on their own interest than on that of the country. They imagined that the repetition of the blow of 1801 was actually necessary; and in this they proved themselves puny imitators of Pitt's policy, and every imitator is a corrupter, for every imitator corrupts what he imitates by exaggerating it.

No sooner had the news of the peace of Tilsit arrived than the English cabinet, falsely pretending to have obtained from secret communications the knowledge of a stipulation, tending, as it alleged, to subject Denmark to the continental coalition, resolved to send a powerful expedition to Copenhagen for the purpose of securing the Danish fleet, upon the pretext that to deprive Napoleon of the maritime resources of Denmark was, on the part of England, only an act of legitimate defence. This resolution being adopted, the English cabinet immediately issued the necessary orders. The troops and the fleet were all ready in the Downs, and had nothing to do but to set sail. Ever since the check before Constantinople, the Admiralty had in its counsels made it a rule that every naval expedition ought to be accompanied by land forces. Conformably to this notion, 20,000 men had been assembled in the Downs; these, added to the English troops sent to Stralsund, would form an army of twenty-seven or twenty-eight thousand men under the walls of Copenhagen. The proceedings were to be worthy of the object. Taking advantage of the circumstance that Denmark had all her troops, not in the islands of Seeland and Fünen, but on the frontiers of Holstein, it was resolved to throw a naval division into the two Belts, to intercept those passages, and thus to prevent the Danish army from coming to the succour of Copenhagen, then to land 20,000 men around that capital, to invest it, to summon it, and if it refused to surrender, to bombard and even to destroy it. This plan of attack, founded on the default of preparation towards the sea, and on the assemblage of all the Danish forces on the land side, was a complete demonstration of the good faith of Denmark and of the base ill faith of the British cabinet. Sir Home Popham, deeply compromised in the failure of the attempt on Buenos Ayres, and extremely impatient to retrieve his reputation, had greatly contributed to the conception of the plan, and also contributed greatly to its execution.

It was under these circumstances that the offer of the Russian mediation and the proposal to treat for a reconciliation with France arrived in London. There they were far too deeply engaged in a system of implacable hostilities, too strongly enticed by the hope of a signally prosperous expedition, to listen to any pacific proposal. It was decided, therefore, to return an evasive answer, hypocritically calculated, which, without precluding any ulterior reconciliation, would for the moment leave the ministers at liberty to prosecute the enterprise commenced. In consequence, in a note, which was a parody of the former language of Pitt, they declared, like him, that they were quite ready for peace, but that it had always been prevented by the bad faith of France, and that, not disposed, after so many fruitless negotiations, to fall into a new snare, they requested to be informed on what bases Russia, on becoming mediatrix, was commissioned to treat. It was a shuffling answer, but of which posterior acts were soon to furnish a cruelly negative interpretation.

Admiral Gambier, commanding the English fleet, and lieutenant-general Cathcart, commanding the land-forces, set sail in several divisions towards the end of July. The expedition, starting from several ports in the Channel, was composed of 25 sail of the line, 40 frigates, and 377 transports. It carried about 20,000 men, and was to find seven or eight thousand returning from Stralsund. The ships of war preceded the fleet of transports, in order to surround the island of Seeland, and to prevent the return of the Danish troops towards Copenhagen. This fleet was on the 1st of August in the Cattegat, on the 3rd at the entrance of the Sound. Before proceeding up the Sound, admiral Gambier had detached commodore Keats with a division of frigates and brigs, and a few seventy-fours, drawing but little water, to secure the two Belts, and to station a squadron there, with orders not to suffer a single man to pass from the Continent to the island of Fünen, or from the island of Fünen to that of Seeland. This precaution taken, the fleet passed the Sound without resistance, because Denmark knew nothing, and Sweden knew every thing. It came to an anchor in the road of Elsineur, near the fortress of Kronenborg, which continued silent, and it despatched an English agent to address a summons to the prince-royal of Denmark, then regent of the kingdom. The agent chosen was worthy of the mission. It was Mr. Jackson, who had formerly been chargé d'affaires in France, before the arrival of Lord Whitworth in Paris, but who could not be left there, on account of the bad spirit which he manifested on all occasions. He did not meet with the prince-royal in Copenhagen, and went in quest of him to Kiel, where the royal family was residing at the moment. Being introduced to the regent, he alleged a pretended secret stipulation, by virtue of which Denmark, it was said, was voluntarily or by force to join a continental coalition against England. As a reason for acting, he assigned the necessity in which the British cabinet found itself to take precautions lest the naval forces of Denmark and the passage of the Sound should fall into the power of the French; and in consequence he demanded in the name of his government, that the fortress of Kronenborg, which commands the Sound, the port of Copenhagen, and lastly the fleet itself, should be delivered up to the English army, promising that the whole should be held in deposit for the account of Denmark, which should be put again in possession of all that was to be taken from her, when the danger should be over. Mr. Jackson gave an assurance that Denmark should not lose any thing, that the English would conduct themselves in his country as auxiliaries and friends, that the British troops would pay for all that they should consume.—"And with what," replied the indignant prince, "would you pay for our lost honour, if we were to accede to this infamous proposal?" The prince continued, and contrasting with this perfidious aggression the upright conduct of Denmark, which had taken no precautions against the English, which had taken all

against the French, and now found that her confidence was abused to surprise her. Mr. Jackson replied to this just indignation with an insolent familiarity, saying that war was war, and that one must submit to its necessities and yield to the stronger when one is the weaker party. The prince dismissed the English agent with very harsh words, declaring that he should immediately return to Copenhagen to perform there his duties of Danish prince and citizen. He accordingly repaired thither, made known by a proclamation the dangers with which the country was threatened, addressed a patriotic appeal to the population, and prescribed all the measures which time and the unexpected investment of the island of Seeland allowed to be taken—an investment which had already become so close that the prince had himself found the greatest difficulty to cross the two Belts. Unfortunately, the means of defence were far from corresponding with the wants of Copenhagen, for there were scarcely 5000 troops in the city, 3000 of the line, and 2000 well organised militia. To these was added a civic guard of three or four thousand citizens and students. All the old ships were moored, as in 1801, outside the passages, so as to cover the city towards the sea with floating batteries. The fleet, the object of the predilection and the pride of the Danes, was carefully removed to the interior of the basin; and, lastly, on the land side works were hastily thrown up, for it was known that the English had brought with them a great land force, and the heavy artillery, with which the Danish arsenals were abundantly provided, was mounted in battery in all quarters. But if such means were sufficient to prevent the taking of the city by assault, they were far from sufficient against the danger of a bombardment. It would have been requisite to keep the enemy at such a distance as should render any bombardment impossible, or to have had out-works, which Denmark, relying upon the insular position of her capital, had never thought of erecting, or an army of the line, which her good faith had induced her to place on the frontier of her territory. Be this as it may, the prince, after making the dispositions adapted to the urgency of circumstances, left a brave officer, general Peymann, to command the city of Copenhagen, with orders to defend himself to the last extremity. As there was in the island of Seeland itself, and consequently within the Belts, a pretty numerous population, capable of furnishing some thousand militia, he ordered general Castenskiöld to assemble this militia in all haste, and to introduce it, if possible, into Copenhagen, before the investment of that city. As for himself, he left the place and hastened in person to Holstein to collect the army scattered on the frontier, and lead it to the relief of the capital, if he could succeed in crossing the Belts.

Meanwhile the English envoy, having returned to the fleet, directed the English legation to leave Copenhagen, and gave admiral Gambier, as well as general Cathcart, the signal for the fearful execution prepared against a city, whose whole crime con-

sisted in the possession of a fleet which the English ministers wanted to capture in order to place themselves on higher ground in parliament. The parleys with the Danish government, the necessity for awaiting the arrival of the transport fleet, which sailed later than the ships of war, the tarrying for a favourable wind, had retarded admiral Gambier's operations till the 15th of August. On the 16th he stood in shore at a point of the coast called Webeck, a few leagues to the north of Copenhagen, and there landed about 20,000 men, mostly Germans in the service of England. The division of troops from Stralsund was to land to the south towards Kiøge. Encouraged by the presence in the Belts of commodore Keats' division of light vessels, they commenced in security their criminal enterprise. The English well knew that they should not be able even with thirty thousand men to carry by assault a place defended by eight or nine thousand men, five thousand of whom were regular troops, and a population of very brave seamen. But they reckoned upon the means of destruction which they had at their disposal, thanks to the immense quantity of heavy artillery brought in their ships. To make the more sure of success, they had even brought with them colonel Congreve, who was to make trial, for the first time, of his formidable rockets. In consequence, their operations did not consist in regular works of approach, but in the solid and well-protected establishment of a few batteries for red-hot shot. Around Copenhagen there was a sort of lake, of oblong form, which embraced nearly all that portion of inclosure on the land side. They took a position behind this lake, and there entrenched themselves. Covered in this manner, on the side next to the city, against sallies of the besieged, they sought to cover themselves on the side next the country also by a second line of countervallation, in order to keep in awe the militia of Seeland, assembled under general Castenskiold, or the regular troops themselves, if any of them should find means to cross the Belts. Having solidly established themselves, they began to construct their batteries for red-hot shot, and refrained from making use of them till they should be completely armed and in a state for opening a destructive fire. While they were thus engaged, their fleet had approached the side next the sea, and brisk skirmishes took place on the two elements, between the besieged and the besiegers. A Danish flotilla, hastily equipped, contested with the English flotilla, and with advantage, the narrow passages by which it is possible to approach Copenhagen; while the troops of the line, shut up in the city, made frequent sorties against general Cathcart's troops. Having unfortunately the option of only two points of attack, the two extremities of the lake which separated them from the enemy, the Danes found, when they attempted sorties, the English forces drawn to those two points, and were not sufficiently numerous to force the lines of the besiegers. They were obliged every time to fall back, after killing a few men, and having lost many

more than they had killed, on account of the disadvantage of position.

The English, to make sure of success, awaited the arrival of their second division, which was before Stralsund. The Swedes having, at their instigation, resumed hostilities, marshal Brune proceeded to lay siege to that place with 38,000 men and all the siege artillery, the use of which was restored to the French army by the reduction of Dantzic, and by the cessation of hostilities before Colberg, Marienberg, and Graudenz. Marshal Brune was accompanied by general Chasseloup, of the engineers, the same who had contributed so much to the taking of Dantzic. That able officer, possessing this time all the means, which had been but successively accumulated before the fortress of Dantzic, purposed to make the siege of Stralsund a model of precision, vigour, and promptitude. He had planned three attacks, but with the intention of rendering only one of the three serious,—that which, directed towards the Kneiper gate to the north, might carry destruction to the Swedish fleet. Having opened the trenches at all points at once, in spite of the fire of the place, he had in a few days established and armed his batteries, and commenced an attack so tremendous that the hostile general, though he had 15,000 Swedes and seven or eight thousand English, either in the fortress or in the isle of Rügen, found himself compelled to send a flag of truce, and to surrender Stralsund on the 21st of August.

During this siege, conducted by the French with a bravery and skill worthy of admiration, general Cathcart had been joined, agreeably to his orders, by the division of English troops which had been directed to co-operate with the Swedes. He had just disembarked it at Kiøge, and from that moment he had so closely shut up the city of Copenhagen within a double line of counter-vallation that he had it in his power to destroy that unfortunate city, without having any thing to fear from the effects of its despair. Nothing is more legitimate than a siege. Nothing is more barbarous than a bombardment, when one of those imperious necessities of war which justify all things does not render it excusable. And what necessity for justifying the atrocious proceeding prepared by the English, but that of pillaging a fleet and an arsenal reputed to be very rich.

Nevertheless, on the 1st of September, general Cathcart, having in battery sixty-eight pieces of artillery, forty-eight of which were mortars and howitzers, summoned Copenhagen in a language the feigned humanity of which could not deceive. He required that the port, the arsenal, and the fleet, should be delivered up to him, threatening, in case of refusal, to burn the city, and adding to his summons pressing entreaties that he might be spared the employment of the means which, he said, were repugnant to his heart. General Peymann, having replied in the negative, a tremendous fire of howitzers, bombs, and Congreve rockets, burst

over the hapless capital of Denmark. The barbarous authors of this enterprise had not even the excuse of their own danger, for they were so covered as not to lose a single man. After continuing this cruelty the whole night of the 2nd of September, and part of the next day, the English general suspended the fire to see whether the place would surrender. Fires had broken out in various quarters; hundreds of unfortunate creatures had perished; several large buildings were in flames; the able population, employed in pouring the waters of the Baltic on the burning quarters, was exhausted with fatigue. General Peymann, with a heart rent by this spectacle, maintained a gloomy silence, waiting, before he surrendered, for humanity to silence honour. Insensible to all these calamities, the English recommenced their fire in the evening of the 3rd, keeping it up all night and the whole of the next day, excepting a short interruption, and persisting in this barbarity till the morning of the 5th. Nearly 2000 persons, men, women, children, and aged people, had perished. Half the city was in flames; the fine churches were in ruins; the arsenal was on fire. General Peymann, unable to withstand any longer the horrible scenes which he had before his eyes, yielded at length to the threats of total destruction which the English general repeated, and surrendered Copenhagen to its barbarous conquerors. The capitulation was signed on the 7th. It gave up to the English the castle of Kronenborg, the city of Copenhagen, and the arsenal, with the faculty of occupying them for six weeks, the time judged necessary for equipping the Danish fleet and carrying it off to England. This fleet was given up to admiral Gambier, upon condition that it should be restored at a peace.

This capitulation being signed, the English entered Copenhagen and their seamen rushed to the arsenal. No spectacle since their entry into Toulon, was comparable to that which they exhibited on this occasion. Before the face of a population overwhelmed with grief, which beheld its habitations ravaged, which numbered in its bosom thousands of victims dead or dying, which, besides its private sorrows, deeply felt the public misfortunes, for the loss of the Danish navy seemed to every one the ruin of his own existence—before the face of this afflicted population, coming ashore in great numbers, they rushed to the arsenal with unheard-of brutality. The English custom of granting to sailors a great part of the value of prizes, in adding to their animosity against all European navies the stimulant of personal greediness, officers and men displayed extraordinary ardour and activity to get afloat every vessel in Copenhagen that was in a state to put to sea. There were found sixteen sail of the line, and about a score brigs and frigates capable of serving, with the rigging stowed away in store-houses kept in very good order. In a few days these forty and odd vessels were rigged, equipped, and warped out of the basins. The destructive zeal of the English sailors did not stop at this robbery. There were two ships building—they they demolished. All the

timber and naval stores in the arsenal were carried on board the Danish squadron or the English squadron. They took away the very tools of the workmen, and destroyed whatever they could not carry off. Half of the English crews was then put on board the Danish ships to navigate them, and the entire expedition, the conquering as well as the conquered fleet, worked through the passages, taking care to receive on board in haste the army which it had landed, and which did not think itself safe in a city that it had drenched with blood, and on the approach of the French, who were coming in all haste to avenge such an atrocity. Passing Webeck, Kronenborg, and all the points of the coast, this immense naval armament picked up the English troops, and then made sail for the coast of England.

It would be impossible to express the sensation produced in Europe by the unheard-of act, which, not the English nation, which severely censured that act, but the administration of Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh, had authorised. The indignation was general among the friends of France, who, at that time, were not numerous, for she had too much success to have many friends, as well as among her most decided enemies. There was not a nation more highly esteemed than the Danish nation. Discreet, modest, laborious, attentive to her own commerce, without seeking to injure that of another, making a point of scrupulously maintaining her neutrality amidst a war of bitter animosity, and though inoffensive, yet capable, as in 1801, of devoting herself heroically for the principle of that neutrality which formed her whole policy, she was, like the Swiss, like the Dutch, one of those nations which make up for numerical weakness by moral strength and know how to command universal respect. The surprise of which she had just been the victim, furnished still more striking evidence of her good faith; for she suffered for having taken no precaution against England, and for having taken too much against France. Hence there was but one sentiment, but one cry, throughout all Europe. Before, it was said that nobody could rest quietly beside the redoubtable conqueror begotten by the French Revolution. Now it was said that England was quite as tyrannical at sea as Napoleon on land; that she was as perfidious as he was violent; and that, between the two, there was neither security nor repose for any nation. Such was the language of our enemies, such the language of Berlin and Vienna. But, among our friends and among impartial men, it was acknowledged that good reason for endeavouring to unite all nations against an intolerable maritime despotism—a despotism which, once established, would be invincible, would suffer no flag but the English flag, no traffic but in English produce, and end in fixing at pleasure the price of English commodities, whether exotic or manufactured. It was necessary therefore to join, in order to make head against England, to wrest from her the sceptre of the seas, and to compel her to restore

to the world that peace, of which, on her account, it had been deprived for fifteen years.

It is certain that there was nothing, excepting peace, which Napoleon wished for more than such an event. He should not hereafter have to resort to violence with Denmark, which, on the contrary, would throw itself into his arms, assist him to close the Sound, and furnish him with what was of more value than a few old ships, with excellent sailors, fit to man the innumerable vessels which France had on the stocks. He could push the Russian armies upon Sweden, and push the armies of Spain upon Portugal; he could even require at Vienna the exclusion of the English from the shores of the Adriatic; lastly, he could demand everything at St. Petersburg; for, after what had passed at Copenhagen, Alexander could not meet with any further resistance to his policy in the opinion of the Russians. Had Napoleon at this moment profited by the fault of England, without committing an equal one, he would have been in a unique position; he would have become as morally strong through the wrongs of his enemy, as he was materially through his own armies. In fact, the trouble of his system of conquering the sea by land was saved, for the violence done to the continental powers to oblige them to concur in his designs would be thenceforward explained and justified. If he closed the ports of the Hanseatic towns, of Holland, of France, of Portugal, of Spain, of Italy; if he doomed the people to shift without sugar and coffee, and to substitute for those productions of the tropics, costly and very imperfect European imitations; if he did violence to all tastes, after having done violence to all interests; he had a complete and signal excuse in the crime of Copenhagen. But, we repeat it, he ought to have left England to sin alone and not himself have sinned so grievously,—a difficult thing, for, in a rancorous contest, faults link themselves together, and it is rarely the case that the faults of the one are not speedily balanced or surpassed by the faults of the other.

Napoleon was well aware of the advantage which the conduct of England gave him, and if he lost a hope of accommodation, a hope which was but slender in his estimation, he all at once saw a concurrence of means, a union of efforts, preparing for him, which would promise him a peace, the conditions of which would compensate the delay. He failed not, therefore, to excite the journals of France and all those that he could command out of France, against the abominable act which had roused the indignation of Europe. From Fontainebleau itself, from amidst the pleasures of that residence, his armies, his fleets, were all prepared for a conflict still more vast and more terrible than that which for so many years had appalled the world.

For the rest, Napoleon had no effort to make in order to impart to the opinion of Europe that impulsions which it suited him to give to it. In England itself the misdeed committed against the

city of Copenhagen was censured with extreme severity. In that great and moral country, there were, notwithstanding an unworthy administration, notwithstanding a debased parliament, notwithstanding the passion of the people for the success of the national navy, there were enlightened, honest, impartial men, who condemned the unparalleled act perpetrated against an inoffensive and disarmed power. Lord Grenville, Messrs. Windham, Addington, Grey, Sheridan, and others, spoke out with vehemence against this odious act, which, according to them, was but an iniquitous and mischievous parody of that of 1801; for, in 1801, Denmark formed part of a coalition hostile to England, and the means employed for reducing her were the most legitimate of all,—a naval battle. In 1807, on the contrary, that same Denmark was at peace, wholly occupied in defending her neutrality against France, disarmed in regard to England, and the method employed to reduce her was the atrocious bombardment of an inoffensive population. The result was, instead of dissolving a coalition of neutrals, to link Denmark and France more closely together, to spare the latter the odium of a general constraint exercised upon the Continent, to take upon itself that odium, to close the Sound against itself; for the Danes closed it on their side, and the Swedes were soon forced to close it on theirs. Lastly, to balance such deplorable consequences, there was nothing to allege but the pillage of an arsenal, the carrying away of a fleet which was very old, and only four ships of which were worth the expense of repair. Such were the animadversions directed with deserved vehemence against Mr. Canning, who replied to them with an intrepidity in falsehood, which is not of a nature to honour his memory, redeemed, it is true, by his posterior conduct. For his only excuse, he repeated incessantly that ministers had obtained the secret of the negotiations of Tilsit, and that this secret justified the Copenhagen expedition. His adversaries justly replied by desiring to be informed, not who was the author of this revelation, whom the feigned generosity of the British cabinet refused to name, but of the mere substance of what he had revealed. Now, on this point, the cabinet returned but very confused and perplexed answers, and could not furnish any other: for, it was true that, at Tilsit (as the British cabinet knew but very vaguely) Russia and France had promised to unite their efforts to force the Continent into a coalition against England, this was only after an offer of peace on moderate conditions; it was moreover unknown to the cabinet of Copenhagen, which was not an accomplice in that design. In the conduct pursued towards Denmark, there was then iniquity in a moral point of view, and silliness in a political point of view; for the true means of having that neutral power on one's side, of having her fleet, her sailors, and the Sound, would have been to assist her and to leave to Napoleon the trouble of doing her violence.

In spite, however, of the reprobation bestowed by all honest

men in England on the Copenhagen expedition, a parliament subservient to the anti-Catholic prejudices of the Crown, and to the extravagant policy of Pitt, decided in favour of the ministers, but not without betraying the embarrassment which it felt. It adopted in fact the form of an adjournment, declaring that it would take the act into consideration at a future time, when the ministers should have it in their power to say what they could not divulge at the moment. But all idea of peace was for ever abandoned. The British cabinet, not disguising from itself the mischievous impressions produced in Europe by its late violences, endeavoured to recover its credit with the two principal courts of the Continent, those of Vienna and St. Petersburg. It sent lord Pembroke to Vienna, general Wilson to St. Petersburg, to convey some of those proposals which one chooses rather to communicate orally than in writing. These proposals were the following.

From the apparent satisfaction which the emperor Alexander seemed to have brought back from a war, marked nevertheless by reverses; from the demi-confidential communications which he had made, and which all led to the inference that great results would be seen to spring from the alliance with France; from his persisting to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia; it was evident to men endowed with any sagacity that France, in order to bring Russia into her views, had promised her great advantages in the East, and that she had singularly flattered her ambition in regard to that quarter. The British cabinet decided, therefore, without hesitation, on the sacrifices which circumstances appeared to command, and, though it incessantly affected to defend the integrity of the Ottoman empire, it conceived that it would be better to give itself Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, than to leave them to be given her by Napoleon. In consequence, general Wilson, bold and clever as a soldier and a diplomatist, a personage at that time of too little importance for ministers to be afraid of disavowing him in case of need, was charged to convey to St. Petersburg a message of the most alluring kind for the emperor Alexander. He had no ostensible powers, but Mr. Canning, in conversation with M. d'Alopeus, the Russian minister, assured him that credit might be given to what general Wilson should say. Lord Pembroke, envoy extraordinary to Austria, notwithstanding the presence of Mr. Adair, was directed to demonstrate to the court of Vienna the necessity for being on good terms with Russia, and consequently for making up its mind to all the sacrifices which this line of policy might entail. The real drift of this was nothing less than to dispose Austria to see with calmness Moldavia and Wallachia become the property of the Russians.

Lord Gower, ambassador in Russia, and general Wilson, who had been sent to second him, strove to persuade the Russian cabinet not to take amiss what had been done at Copenhagen; that ministers had merely endeavoured to deprive the common

enemy of Europe of the means of doing mischief; that it ought to rejoice instead of being irritated at it; that England relied upon Russia to bring back Denmark to a more just appreciation of the late events; and that, as for the fleet, it would subsequently be given back to her if she would join the good cause; that, for the rest, without pretending to set itself up for judge of the new line of policy adopted by Russia, the British cabinet was certain that she would soon return to her old system, as the only good one; that it would not seek to involve her again in war with France, at a moment when she had such need of rest to recruit herself; that it should even see with pleasure any aggrandisement of her territory and her power; for there was but one mischievous sort of aggrandisement which must by all means be prevented—the aggrandisement of France; but that if Russia was desirous to have Moldavia and Wallachia, it would consent to her making the acquisition, provided that it was not in consequence of a partition of the Turkish provinces with the emperor Napoleon.

The most compromising of these words, those which one would not hazard without the faculty of withdrawing them in case of need, were spoken by general Wilson to M. de Romanzoff, who reported them a moment afterwards to general Savary. The others were said by lord Gower himself with an arrogance which was not likely to destroy the strangeness of their effect. That smart way of explaining the Copenhagen expedition, that commission given to Russia to justify England to Denmark, were one of the most offensive of familiarities to the Russian cabinet. The emperor of Russia felt it deeply, and insisted that the overtures of England should be received with the greatest haughtiness. In reply to the proposal for justifying to Copenhagen the carrying off of the Danish fleet, he caused a formal demand of a formal explanation on that subject to be made, and he required lord Gower to give an immediate and categorical answer to the offer of mediation which the Russian cabinet had addressed to the British cabinet. Lord Gower, since so honourably known by the name of lord Granville, seems on this occasion to have shaken off his habitual indolence, insisted imperiously on being made acquainted with the secret of the negotiations at Tilsit, and declared that until England was informed of what had been done at that celebrated interview, she should hold herself dispensed from all explanation respecting what she had done at Copenhagen. As to the Russian mediation, lord Gower, being pressed to declare definitively whether he consented to accept it or not, replied proudly that he did not.

Such was the issue of the explanations with lord Gower. As for the overtures with which general Wilson was charged, M. de Romanzoff received them superciliously, as words of no importance, and dismissed Wilson himself, without seeming to comprehend what the latter had meant to say. He had thoroughly understood him, however, as we shall presently see.

M. de Romanzoff, formerly a minister of Catherine's, retaining a reflection of the glory of that princess, heir of her vast ambition, a great personage in all respects, had become in these circumstances the intimate confidant of Alexander and of all his dreams. Minister of commerce, he had just been appointed minister for foreign affairs; and Alexander, seeking an ambassador who might be suitable for Paris, would not send him thither, though he possessed every quality for such a post, solely that he might keep him about his person. The young sovereign and the old minister ardently coveted the provinces of the Danube. Finland, an acquisition immediately more desirable, because it was a necessary, whereas the provinces of the Danube were but superfluities, did not interest them by far so much. Moldavia and Wallachia led to Constantinople, and this was what allured them. They would, therefore, have accepted them, no matter from what hand; and, in the impatience of their desires, they retained only so much judgment as was requisite to appreciate the donor the most capable of giving speedily and solidly. In regard to this point, Napoleon had all their preference. From whom, in fact, could one at that period receive something, and something considerable, unless from Napoleon? To take territory in any part of the European continent without his assent would have entailed war with him; and war with him, by whatever number it had been waged, had not hitherto proved successful. Supposing, even, that a new general coalition could be formed, such battles as those of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, presented no very cheering prospect; and at this time, too, when, in the state of the French army, any encounter with it must have the same consequences. Besides, if England, throwing out slight baits here and there, had shown an easy disposition in regard to the provinces of the Danube, could Russia flatter herself that Austria would manifest the like disposition? Had she not at St. Petersburg her ambassador, M. de Meerveldz, who was every day inquiring aloud, and of every body, the secret of the negotiations at Tilsit, and who declared that, if Moldavia and Wallachia were the price of the new alliance, they must be prepared to destroy the last Austrian before they should obtain the consent of the court of Vienna? They must, therefore, not hope that a coalition would be formed to ensure such a gift to Russia. This gift, conferred in spite of Austria, could come only from the man who, for fifteen years, had invariably conquered her, that is to say from Napoleon; and, the emperor of Russia leagued with the emperor of France, not a creature in Europe would dare to oppose what they had jointly determined upon.

It was necessary, therefore, to persist in the career commenced at Tilsit, and to obtain from Napoleon, by contriving to please him, the realisation of the hopes to which he had so complaisantly lent himself on the banks of the Niemen. The value which he set on all that was expected from him it was easy to

discover. If the war continued, he would attempt fresh enterprises in Italy, in Portugal, perhaps even in Spain. In those countries there were Bourbons, who must form a glaring, an intolerable contrast with his dynasty. He had said nothing on this subject at Tilsit or elsewhere to any creature whatever; if, nevertheless, peace were further adjourned, it was easy to foresee that he would not stop short in his activity, that he would prosecute in the West that work of renovation which consisted in dethroning the sovereigns who were allies or relations of the ancient house of Bourbon. But Russia was not at all interested in preventing enterprises of that kind. It was indeed of little consequence to Russia whether a Bourbon or a Bonaparte reigned at Naples, at Florence, at Milan, at Madrid. The ideas introduced in the train of the new dynasties created by Napoleon did not yet threaten the authority of the czars. As for the influence of France, Russia would have no reason to regret her aggrandisement, if that influence were employed to facilitate the march of the Moscovites towards Constantinople. The emperor Alexander, therefore, had no cause to be uneasy about what Napoleon might be tempted to undertake in the south and west of Europe; and if he winked at it, he had every reason to hope that Napoleon would let him do what he pleased in the East. Napoleon might condescend more or less to the desires of Alexander, permit him to advance to the Danube, to the foot of the Balkans, or even to the Bosphorus; but the least that he could grant was Wallachia and Moldavia. All that Napoleon had said on this subject, at least all that Alexander conceived that he had heard, seemed to admit of no doubt. Alexander, ruminating day and night over his recollections of Tilsit, M. de Romanzoff ruminating over what Alexander had related to him, had accustomed themselves to consider Moldavia and Wallachia as the smallest of the gifts which they might hope for. By dint of reckoning upon this gift, they had even arrived at a sort of anticipated satiety, and they began already to conceive new desires. Unluckily, they had not confined themselves to this intimate and secret enjoyment of their future conquests; they had thought fit to communicate it to many confidants, to some in order to diffuse their inward satisfaction, to others to justify themselves for the sudden change in Russian politics. They had thus spread around them a conviction that Moldavia and Wallachia were the assured price of the new alliance; and they were instigated to wish for the possession of them, not only by the passion for possessing them, but also by the urgent desire to escape passing for dupes.

Recent events served, therefore, only to confirm Alexander and M. de Romanzoff in the policy adopted at Tilsit. Since the mediation turned to war, they must derive from war all that Napoleon had promised to make it produce; only, to bind him the more firmly, they must lend themselves to what he should desire. He was evidently about to require that the English and Swedish legation should be sent away; that the Russian army should march

for Finland, to oblige Sweden to close the Sound. They must satisfy him on all these points, that he might consent to leave the Russian troops in Wallachia and Moldavia. Singularly enough, to march into Finland ought to have been the primary desire of Russia, as it was her primary interest.* However, so decidedly had they taken the route to the East, that marching to Finland was an absolute sacrifice on their part, which they made solely that they might be suffered to retain Bucharest and Yassy.

The emperor Alexander then had in the department of foreign affairs an insignificant minister, without passions, without ideas, a disagreeable confidant to talk with about matters which left him perfectly cold : this was M. de Budberg. Alexander dismissed him, and executed his intention of confiding the foreign affairs to M. de Romanzoff himself. There was left in the cabinet one of the members of that little occult society, which had long governed the empire—prince Kotschoubey. He was the youngest and the most reserved of them. But he was a witness of the past, a troublesome judge of the present ; and, besides, Czartoryski and M. de Novosiltzoff, with whom he lived, scarcely disguised their disapprobation of the new turn which things had taken. He could not keep about him critics so annoying, and he was obliged moreover to give them a sign of his displeasure. The ministry of the interior was therefore withdrawn from M. de Kotschoubey, M. de Labanoff, one of the personages who had figured at Tilsit, was called to the ministry of war, M. de Tchitchagoff to the marine ; M. de Novosiltzoff was recommended to travel. Prince Czartoryski, too particular a friend of the sovereign for friendship not to cause politics to be forgotten in regard to him, perceived that the affected silence which the emperor observed with him relative to the affairs of the empire was redoubled. Lastly, for the embassy to Paris was selected the person who seemed fittest for succeeding there. Alexander would have wished to send thither, as we have just said, M. de Romanzoff himself, but he

* Historians too often make historical personages think and speak without having any means of knowing either their thoughts or their language. I do not allow myself here to report the most secret thoughts and the most private conversations of the emperor Alexander, solely because, in order to do so, I could support myself upon documents of incontestable authority. I have said in a note to Vol. VII., Book XXVII., that there is in the Louvre a series of conversations of generals Savary and Caulaincourt with the emperor Alexander and with M. de Romanzoff, daily conversations, of such familiarity and privacy that I durst not give them entire, for Alexander made the French envoys acquainted with his very pleasures ; that these conversations, committed to writing at the moment when they had just taken place, reported with minute fidelity, in question and answer, and depicted with striking truth what was passing from day to day in the mind of the emperor and of his minister. From the solicitations and the ill-dissembled agitations of both, it is impossible not to discern clearly what they thought. Other authentic and secret documents, as, for instance, the personal correspondence of Napoleon and Alexander, complete this collection of proofs, and enable me to give as certain the details which I furnish in this part of my narrative.

chose rather to keep him about his person. He had for grand marshal of the palace a Russian nobleman who was devoted to him : this was M. de Tolstoy, and this nobleman had a brother, general de Tolstoy, an officer distinguished for his spirit and his services. Alexander thought that the latter, from attachment to his master, would not seek to render himself disagreeable in France, as M. de Markoff had made it his business to do ; that, from ambition, he would be delighted to attach his name to a policy of aggrandizement, and that, from profession, he would find pleasure in a military court, and please it in his turn, and follow it everywhere in its rapid movements. At the same time, the emperor purposed to send to Napoleon on this subject, and submit to him the choice of general count Tolstoy, before he should definitively appoint him.

General Savary had not ceased to be surrounded at St. Petersburg by the attentions of Alexander, and by the cold politeness of high Russian society. Though he knew not at first all that had been said at Tilsit, and had learned it only from a later communication of Napoleon's, who had thought fit to acquaint him with it in order to prevent any faults of ignorance on his part, he perceived that Russia was ready to do whatever was wished, in consideration of the relinquishment of one or two provinces, not in the North but in the East. Without involving Napoleon more than he was obliged to do, without stepping out of his part, he had sought to render himself agreeable at St. Petersburg, and had succeeded in flattering with prudence the passions of the sovereign. Hence, no sooner had the news of the events at Copenhagen been received, no sooner had the warm explanations with lord Gower taken place, than Alexander and M. de Romanzoff sent for general Savary, and, in the language befitting each of them, communicated to him the resolutions of the Russian cabinet.

"You know," said Alexander to the general, in several very long conversations, "that our efforts for peace end in war; I expected it, but I confess I did not expect either the Copenhagen expedition or the arrogance of the British cabinet. My resolution is taken, and I am ready to fulfil my engagements. In my interview with the emperor Napoleon, we calculated that, if the war were to continue, I should be led to declare myself in December, and I could wish that it were not earlier, that I might not have war with the English till after the shutting up of the Baltic. No matter—I shall declare myself forthwith. Tell your master that, if he desires it, I will send back lord Gower. Cronstadt is armed, and, if the English are determined to make an attack on it, they shall see that fighting the Russians is a very different affair from fighting the Turks or the Spaniards. However, I shall not decide upon any thing without sending a courier to Paris, for we must not run the risk of thwarting the calculations of Napoleon. Besides, before a rupture, I should like my fleets to have all got back to Russian ports. Be this as it may, I am entirely disposed to follow that conduct which shall best suit your master. Let him even

send me, if he chooses, a note ready written, and I will order it to be delivered to lord Gower together with passports. As for Sweden, I am not prepared, and I ask for time to re-organize my regiments, which suffered severely in the late war, and which are some distance from Finland, and would have to be brought from the south to the north of the empire. Besides, on this theatre my army is not sufficient for me. In the shoal waters of the gulfs of the North-galley, flotillas are much used. The Swedes have a numerous one: mine is not yet equipped, and I will not run the risk of receiving a check from so weak a State. Tell your master, then, that, as soon as my means are prepared, I will crush Sweden; that he must give me till December or January; but, as for the English, I am ready to declare myself immediately. I am even of opinion that we ought not to stop there, but require of Austria her adhesion, voluntary or compulsory, to a continental coalition. In this case, too, I am disposed to receive a note drawn up in Paris, to be sent to Vienna; for there is no demi-alliance, and in all things we must act in perfect harmony. I wish my friendship with Napoleon to be complete, and with this view I have chosen M. de Tolstoy. I have not, like your master, abundance of eminent men in every line. M. de Markoff possesses understanding, but yet he only stirred up discord. I have preferred M. de Tolstoy to any other, because he belongs to a family which is devoted to me, because he is a soldier, because he can ride, and attend the Emperor to the chase, to war, and wherever it is fit that he should. If he is not liked, let me know it, and I will send another, so much have I it at heart to prevent the slightest cloud. We shall certainly not be urged to fight just yet; but tell Napoleon that I am weak, changeable, surrounded by his enemies; that he must not reckon upon me. I shall be told that Napoleon is insatiable, that he wants all for himself, nothing for others; that he is equally crafty and violent; that he promises me much, that he will give me nothing; that he spares me just now, but when he has got out of me all that he wishes, he will fall upon me in my turn; and that, separated from my allies, whom I shall have suffered to be destroyed, I must make up my mind to endure the same fate. I believe it not. I have seen Napoleon; I flatter myself that I have inspired him with part of the sentiments with which he has inspired me; and I am certain that he is sincere. But, when one is at a distance, and we cannot see each other, jealousies speedily spring up. On the first doubt, on the first unpleasant impression, let him write to me, or send me word through you or any other confidential person he shall choose, and all shall be explained. For my part, I promise him entire frankness, and I expect the like from him. Oh that I could see him, as at Tilsit, every day, every hour! what talent for conversation! what an understanding! what a genius! what a gainer I should be by living frequently near him! how many things he has taught me in a few days! But we are so far distant! however, I hope to visit him soon. In spring I shall go to Paris, and I shall have occasion

to admire him in his Council of State, amidst his troops, in every place, in short, where he appears so great. But, till then, we must endeavour to understand each other through an intermediary, and to render the mutual confidence as complete as possible. For my part, I am doing all I can to that end, but I do not exercise here that ascendancy which Napoleon exercises in Paris. This country, you perceive, has been surprised at the rather too abrupt change which has taken place. It is apprehensive of the injuries which the English can inflict on its commerce; it is angry at your victories. These are interests which must be gratified, sentiments which must be soothed. Send French merchants hither; buy our naval stores and our productions; we will buy in return your Parisian commodities; the re-establishment of commerce will put an end to all the anxieties which the upper classes conceived on account of their revenues. Assist me, above all, to conciliate the whole nation for you, by doing something for the just ambition of Russia. Those wretched Turks, who are at this day slaughtering your partisans, who are striking off the heads of all that are reputed to be friends of the French (this is what was actually taking place at the moment in Constantinople, thanks to the suggestions of Austria and England),—those wretched Turks are no match for me, and I should think that, if they were put into the balance with me, you would not find them to equal me in weight. Your master has, no doubt, told you what passed at Tilsit."

Here the emperor appeared inquisitive and restless. He was impatient to open himself to general Savary on the subject that interested him most, and at the same time fearful of committing an indiscretion by disclosing himself to one who was not acquainted with the secret. He had, however, a new motive for explaining himself to the representative of Napoleon. An armistice between the Turks and the Russians had been just signed in consequence of the French mediation—an armistice which stipulated the restitution of the vessels taken from the Turks by admiral Siniavin, the interdiction of all hostility before spring, and, lastly, the evacuation of the banks of the Danube. In reality, there was but this last condition which affected the emperor Alexander, but this he would not admit, and complained in a general manner of the armistice, which he imputed to the unfriendly intervention of the minister of France.

He did not think, he said to general Savary, about the provinces of the Danube; it was your emperor, who, on receiving the news of Selim's downfall, exclaimed at Tilsit: "One can do nothing with those barbarians! Providence releases me from restraint in regard to them; let us settle matters at their expense!" I entered into this track, continued the emperor Alexander, and M. de Romanzoff with me. The nation has followed us, and it is not too notable an advantage on that point to render it favourable to France. Finland, to which you urge me to march, is a desert, the possession of which smiles on nobody, which, besides, must be

taken from an old ally, by a sort of defection which wounds the national delicacy, and affords pretexts to the enemies of the alliance. We must, therefore, seek elsewhere specious reasons for our abrupt change of conduct. Tell the emperor Napoleon all this: persuade him that I am far less influenced by the desire to possess an additional province, than by the desire of rendering an alliance from which I expect great things solid and agreeable to my nation. Ah! repeated the emperor, if I could but go to Paris at this moment, all would be settled in a few minutes' conversation; but I cannot, before the month of March.

On uttering these last words, the emperor Alexander questioned general Savary with a restless inquisitiveness, in order to learn whether he had not heard from Napoleon, whether he was not in the secret of his plans, of his resolutions, in regard to the East and the West.

General Savary used infinite art not to discourage the emperor Alexander; told him, and told him truly, that he could not yet know what grand ideas the continuation of the war might suggest to the emperor Napoleon, but that he would certainly do every thing to satisfy his powerful ally.

M. de Romanzoff was still more explicit than his sovereign, related to general Savary the overtures of general Wilson, the effect which they had produced on the emperor Alexander, and the eagerness of that prince to seize this occasion of proving his fidelity to France, by accepting from her hand what he might receive from the hand of England. He expressed to him more strongly than ever his resolution to declare himself against England and Sweden; against Austria herself, if it were necessary to bring over this latter power to the politics of Tilsit. Thus it was that, in the language of the day (for people create a language for every new circumstance), they termed the system of tolerance which they had reciprocally promised one another for the enterprises which they might be tempted to engage in, each for himself. M. de Romanzoff added, that Russia must obtain an equivalent for all that she was disposed to permit, were it only for the sake of rendering the new alliance popular and durable. Receiving at this moment despatches from Constantinople, which brought intelligence of fresh disturbances, M. de Romanzoff said, smiling, to general Savary, that he saw plainly that it was all over with the old Ottoman empire, and that, unless the emperor Alexander interfered, the emperor Napoleon himself would soon be obliged to declare in the *Moniteur* that "the succession of the sultans was vacant, and that the natural heirs must come forward."

While everything was lavished on general Savary, solicitations, caresses, familiar effusions, and even presents, the emperor Alexander, without saying a word about that, directed orders to be given to his army not to evacuate the provinces of the Danube, upon pretext that the armistice could not be ratified as it then stood. He and his minister repeated that they must be left in

quiet on the subject of the Turks ; that the Russians must not be required to abase themselves before barbarians ; that they ought to turn their attention as soon as possible to a territorial arrangement in the East, to send confidential ambassadors to each other, and above all to send French purchasers to St. Petersburg to supply the place of English purchasers. Alexander specially solicited two things ; in the first place, to be authorised to send to France for education the cadets destined to serve in the Russian navy, who were usually brought up in England, where they contracted a factious spirit ; secondly, liberty to purchase in the French manufactories muskets to supersede those of the Russian soldiers, which were of bad quality, adding, that the two armies, being now destined to serve the same cause, might then use the same arms. He accompanied these gracious expressions with a magnificent present of furs for the emperor Napoleon, saying that he would " be his furrier," and repeated that he expected M. de Tolstoy, whom he meant to despatch as soon as he should be definitely approved at Paris.

On learning these details, faithfully reported by general Savary, Napoleon was at once gratified and embarrassed, for he saw that he could dispose at pleasure of the emperor Alexander and his principal minister. But he had reflected coolly since Tilsit, and began to think that it was a serious matter to allow a fresh step to be taken towards Constantinople by the gigantic empire of Peter the Great—an empire which for a century past had so rapidly increased that it was enough to terrify the world. General Sebastiani, on his part, wrote to him from Constantinople that the Russians were abhorred ; that, if the Turks had the slightest hope of deriving support from France, they would voluntarily throw themselves into her arms ; and that, instead of having to fight, in order to force them to become subjects of Russia, a trifling assistance might perhaps suffice to aid them to become subjects of France ; that all the parts of the empire, fit, from their situation, to become French, would give themselves up to us spontaneously ; that, in this case, it was with Austria, not with Russia, that we ought to seek to arrange matters ; that an understanding with Austria would be easier and more advantageous, whether one purposed to partition or to preserve the Ottoman empire ; for, if it were to be partitioned, she would demand less, always satisfied so that Russia had no share of the banks of the Danube ; and if one decided to preserve it, she would deem herself so fortunate in such a resolution, that one would have her concurrence with very trifling sacrifices. These various ideas, which had all their specious side, had succeeded and alternately combated each other in the mind of Napoleon, whose activity never rested, and he resolved not to be in too great a hurry to decide what course to pursue on so important a subject. In a system of moderate ambition, to refuse satisfactions to Russian ambition would have been very wise. But with what France had undertaken, with what she was

about further to undertake, it was adding to the temerity of French politics to engage in new events, without attaching Russia completely to her by a sacrifice in the East.

Napoleon thought to satisfy Moscovite ambition, not towards the East, to which it was strongly attracted, but towards the North, which had very little attraction for it, and to give up Finland to Russia, upon pretext of pushing her against Sweden. Such a conquest as Finland, said he to himself, is a fine acquisition, and the emperor Alexander ought to find in it a first satisfaction for Russian opinion, which will give him time to wait for others. In fact, Finland was a fine acquisition, considering real European interests; for, if Russia, in taking Moldavia and Wallachia, would take an alarming stride for Europe towards the Dardanelles, she would take a stride equally alarming towards the Sound, by possessing herself of Finland. Unfortunately, while she thus obtained an extension to be regretted for the future independence of Europe, she would be receiving a present in her estimation almost worthless. Napoleon gave a great deal in reality, very little in appearance; and this was the contrary to what he ought to have done to purchase, at as cheap a rate as possible, the new alliance which was about to become the foundation of all his ulterior enterprises. He flattered himself, therefore, that he should satisfy Russia with Finland; and, as for the provinces of the Danube, he resolved to defer any decision in regard to them, without however destroying the hopes which he had need to keep up.

He, too, had had great difficulty to find an ambassador suitable for the court of St. Petersburg, and he had finally fixed upon M. de Caulaincourt, at this time grand equerry, a soldier by profession, reputed to be upright, intelligent, worthy, but most unjustly compromised in the affair of the Duke of Enghien (which Napoleon almost regarded as a recommendation for the embassy to Russia), but well fitted to acquire influence over the young emperor, to follow him everywhere, and to disguise, by his very straightforwardness, the somewhat artful tendency of a mission, the sole aim of which was not to perform all that he had been taught to hope for. Napoleon informed M. de Caulaincourt of what had passed at Tilsit, acknowledged that, in striving to satisfy the emperor Alexander, he had no intention to make concessions too dangerous for Europe, and recommended to him not to spare any pains for maintaining an alliance upon which must thenceforth rest all his policy. He placed in his suite some of the most distinguished young men of his court, and allowed him the sum of 800,000 francs a year, that he might worthily represent the great Empire.

He wrote at the same time to the emperor Alexander, thanking him for his presents, offering magnificent ones in return (Sèvres porcelain of the greatest beauty), earnestly soliciting that he would assist him in restoring peace, by forcing England to submit to it; requesting him to send away immediately the ambassadors of England and Sweden from St. Petersburg; apprising him that a

French army was going to occupy Denmark, in virtue of a treaty of alliance concluded with the court of Copenhagen, and urging him to march a Russian army into Sweden, that the Sound might thus be closed on both coasts ; giving him afresh his assent to the conquest of Finland ; acquainting him with the measures which he was taking in regard to England, in order to decide him to adhere to the policy of Tilsit, and also informing him of the entry of numerous armies into the Spanish peninsula, for the purpose of closing it definitively against the English ; telling him finally that he had nothing to do with the wording of the armistice with the Porte, that he disapproved of it (which implied a tacit approbation of the prolonged occupation of the provinces of the Danube), and that, in regard to the maintenance or the partition of the Ottoman empire, that question was so important, so interesting, both to the present and the future, as to require his mature consideration ; that he could not discuss it in writing, and that he purposed to examine it thoroughly with M. de Tolstoy ; that he reserved it for that ambassador ; and that it was even to wait for him that he had deferred his departure for Italy, though he was in urgent haste to repair to that country. Let us unite, said Napoleon to Alexander, and we shall accomplish the greatest things of modern times ! Napoleon, moreover sent word to the emperor and M. de Romanzoff that the minister Dècres was about to purchase twenty millions' worth of naval stores in the ports of Russia ; that the French navy would receive all the Russian cadets who should be sent to it for instruction ; and, lastly, that fifty thousand muskets, after the best model, were at the disposal of the imperial government, which might send for them to any place that it should be pleased to point out.

While he was writing thus cordially to the emperor Alexander, Napoleon recommended to M. de Caulaincourt not to talk too much about an approaching interview ; for, in a new imperial *tête-à-tête*, he should be obliged to come to a conclusion respecting Turkey, which he extremely dreaded. At any rate, Finland granted immediately, the provinces of the Danube left in prospect, the silence observed relative to their prolonged occupation, lastly, many demonstrations of friendship, appeared to Napoleon, and they really were, sufficient means for living in harmony for a longer or shorter but limited time.

Napoleon, unfortunately, had not merely regarded the outrage of England against Denmark as an occasion for conciliating the opinion of Europe ; he had, on the contrary, discovered in it a pretext for venturing upon fresh enterprises ; and he resolved to take advantage of the prolongation of the war to complete all the arrangements which he meditated. He thought that, in order the better to attain this end, it might be well to conciliate Austria, and to put an end to that extremely unpleasant state with her, arising, independently of the ordinary grievances of that court, from the recent events of the war. Austria was angry with her-

self for having armed without profiting by the opportunity for acting, which offered after Eylau and before Friedland, for having incurred useless expenses, and for having shown, for no benefit whatever, dispositions of which Napoleon could not be the dupe. She was uneasy about what he might require by way of punishing her, more uneasy still about what he might have promised Russia on the Danube, and but little cheered by the language of England, who was incessantly repeating that she must, on the one hand, prepare seriously for war, and, on the other, reconcile Russia, by herself conceding to her all that Napoleon was ready to grant her; that is to say, after the terrible calamities of the last fifteen years, she was to inflict upon herself a new one more terrible than all the others, namely, that of seeing Russia on the Lower Danube.

Napoleon, who had no difficulty to discern the uneasiness of Austria, was solicitous to put an end to it, that he might be more free in his actions. He had received at Fontainebleau, with perfect courtesy, the duke of Würzburg, brother of the emperor Francis, transferred, as we have several times observed, from principality to principality, and most desirous to bring about a good understanding between Austria and France, that he might not have to suffer still more by their quarrels. Napoleon entered, at length, and with the utmost frankness, into explanations with this prince, completely satisfied him respecting his intentions towards the court of Vienna, from which, he said, he had no desire to take anything, but to which, on the contrary, he was ready to give up the fortress of Braunau, left in the hands of the French, ever since the treachery committed at the Mouths of the Cattaro. Napoleon declared that, the Mouths of the Cattaro having been restored to him, he considered himself as having a right and interest in keeping Braunau, an important place, which commanded the course of the Inn; that, on the side of Istria, he desired nothing more than the maintenance of the military road previously granted for the passage of French troops proceeding to Dalmatia; that, at most, if they should consent to it at Vienna, he should propose a rectification of the frontiers between the kingdom of Italy and the empire of Austria, a rectification limited to the exchange of the small Italian territories situated on the left bank of the Isonzo for the small Austrian territories situated on the right bank, so as to take the *thalweg* of that river for the boundary; that, this done, he should require nothing more, and would be quite disposed to respect scrupulously the letter of the treaties. In regard to general policy, Napoleon added that he joined Russia in soliciting Austria to assist him in restoring peace, by closing the coasts of the Adriatic to English commerce; that the atrocious affair of Copenhagen rendered this a duty for all the powers; that if Austria pursued this course, she would have the honour of re-establishing peace, for England would not hold out against the strongly expressed unanimity of the Con-

tinent; that, finally, this union on all points being obtained, the court of Vienna would no doubt renounce useless, expensive, and annoying armaments; that Napoleon, on his part, would not have any more urgent concern than to withdraw his armies, and to convey them to the coast of Lower Italy. As for Turkey, Napoleon spoke of it very vaguely and manifested no disposition for any speedy resolution. Moreover, he always gave it to be understood that nothing would be done in the East but in concert with Austria, that is to say, in allotting her share to her, in case the Ottoman empire should cease to exist.

These explanations, which were honestly given, and which were received with joy by the duke of Würzburg—these explanations, transmitted to Vienna, imparted a real relief. Deep as was the regret felt for having neglected to seize the moment when Napoleon was marching towards the Niemen, to place himself between it and the Rhine, nothing better was desired, now that the opportunity was lost, than to remain quiet, and not to have such an enemy to contend with, when one was alone and had no other ally than England, a not very helpful ally, who, when she had urged on the continental powers to war, and made them fight, quietly drew back to her island, complaining of the bad quality of the auxiliary troops. To learn that it could recover Braunau without sustaining any loss in Istria, to learn, moreover, that nothing speedy was preparing in the East, would have afforded real joy to the Austrian cabinet, if, in the present state of things, it had been capable of feeling joy. It appeared inclined, therefore, to do all that Napoleon desired, as well respecting the *thalweg* of the Isonzo as the steps to be taken with England, whose conduct at Copenhagen was so odious that, even at Vienna, there was no hesitation to condemn it strongly. In consequence, powers were sent to M. de Metternich, ambassador of Austria at Paris, to sign a convention, embracing all the objects upon which concert was desirable and appeared easy after the explanations exchanged at Fontainebleau.

It was agreed that the fortress of Braunau should be given up to Austria; that the *thalweg* of the Isonzo should be taken for the frontier of the Austrian and Italian possessions; and that a military road through Istria should continue open to French troops proceeding to Dalmatia. The convention containing these stipulations was signed at Fontainebleau on the 10th of October. To the written stipulations were added formal promises relative to England. Towards this old ally Austria could not proceed by an abrupt and firm declaration of war; but she promised to arrive at the desired result by having recourse to forms which would diminish in no respect the firmness of her resolutions. Accordingly, she directed M. de Stahrenberg, her ambassador in London, to complain of the act perpetrated upon Copenhagen, as an outrage which must be deeply felt by all the neutral States; to require an answer to the offers of mediation

made in April by the court of Austria, in July by the court of Russia, and to signify that, if England did not soon reply to overtures of peace so often repeated, reserving a right afterwards to debate the conditions in the presence of the mediating powers, Austria should be compelled to break off all connexion with her, and to recall her ambassador. To these official communications was added the secret declaration that Austria, left entirely alone on the Continent, was incapable of making head against Russia and France united; that she was of course obliged to give way; that, besides, at this moment, France was granting her tolerable conditions; that decidedly she neither could nor would think of war; and that England, on her part, ought to think of peace, otherwise she would force her best friends to separate themselves from her. It is true that, if the cabinet spoke thus, the passionate partisans of war strove to induce a belief that this was only a transient resolution to obtain the restoration of Braunau, a resolution which would change as soon as Russia had been brought back to a different policy. Notwithstanding these assertions of the war-party at Vienna, the Austrian cabinet in reality desired nothing better than to find its pacific representations listened to in London, and had resolved to break off its diplomatic relations with England, in case the latter persisted in turning a deaf ear to any accommodation.

Respecting her armaments Austria gave much less sincere assurances. She affirmed that she was making drafts from her skeletons, and dismissing the men who had momentarily filled them, that she was selling her magazines, that, in short, she was reducing herself to the strictest peace establishment. In reality she was only discharging those men who had nearly attained the age for liberation, and replacing them with young recruits, on whose military education she bestowed particular pains, under the direction of the archduke Charles, who was always engaged in making new improvements in the organisation of the Austrian army. In fact, she was selling only such articles in the magazines as were unfit to be kept, and filling her arsenals with arms and stores of all kinds. In short, Austria, adhering temporarily to the views of Napoleon to spare herself a war, wished, nevertheless, to be ready to revenge her reverses, if fresh circumstances should lead to the resumption of arms. For the present she desired peace, even a general peace.

Napoleon, whose plan in all quarters was to carry back hostilities towards the coasts of the Continent, and for this purpose to pacify the interior, had declared to Prussia that he would cheerfully resume the movement of evacuation, suspended for a while in consequence of delay in the payment of the contributions, but that it was necessary to settle as speedily as possible respecting the amount of those contributions and their mode of payment. Prussia having proposed to send prince William, Napoleon intimated that he would receive him with all possible respect. That

unfortunate power was so depressed that it had declared not only its adhesion to the continental system, but also its readiness to conclude a formal treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with France. As for Denmark, she had signed a treaty of this kind, stipulated for the despatch of French troops to the islands of Fünen and Seeland, to close the Sound, to cross it on the ice, and to invade Sweden at the moment when the Russians should commence operations against Finland.

Napoleon, being obliged by circumstances to continue the war with England, and armed with all the means of the Continent, thought of employing them with all the energy and ability of which he was capable. Even before he was acquainted with the result of the Copenhagen expedition, and as soon as he knew that this expedition was directed towards the Baltic, he had ordered admiral Decrès to go to Boulogne, to inspect the flotilla, and to see if it could take on board the army which he intended to bring back from Germany, as soon as Prussia should have paid her contributions. The departure of the English expedition, sent towards the Sound, was a unique occasion for surprising England when half disarmed. M. Decrès, repairing in all haste to Boulogne, Vimereux, Ambleteuse, Calais, Dunkirk, Antwerp, had unfortunately found the flotilla in a state which rendered it unfit to receive on board a numerous army. The circular port formed at Boulogne was covered two feet deep with sand; the ports of Vimereux and Ambleteuse, three feet; and a very few years more would suffice to bury those creations of the genius of Napoleon and of the perseverance of our soldiers. Most of the vessels, hastily built, and with green wood, required extensive repair. Out of the 1200 or 1300 of these boats, not more than about 300 had been kept in a state fit to serve at sea, and these 300 were incessantly employed in manœuvring and forming the line of defence from the Fort de l'Heurt to the Fort de la Crèche. As for the other 900 transport boats, picked up everywhere, and at every age, they were nearly past service, in consequence of having lain four years at moorings. The sailors, organised for the most part in battalions, had lost some of their qualities as seamen, but as landsmen they formed the finest troops in the world. General Gouvion St. Cyr, who commanded the camp of Boulogne, declared that they were not surpassed by any in the French army, the imperial guard included. Removed back into ships, and having soon become sailors again, they were sufficient to man twelve sail of the line. As for the Dutch flotilla, partly sent home, partly remaining at Boulogne, it suffered less in its *materiel*, being better built; but it was weary of its inactivity, and the men regretted the want of employment better suited to their energy and their courage. It was not possible, therefore, to send the flotilla to sea immediately, and to put 150,000 men on board of it, as in 1804. But, with an expense of five or six millions, and in two months' time by

destroying a fifth of the boats and repairing the others, one might embark in the two flotillas, Dutch and French, about 90,000 men and three or four thousand horses. M. Decrès, having returned to Paris after this inspection, Napoleon was of opinion, like his minister himself, that the sailors of Holland ought no longer to be detained for a service so uncertain as that of this flotilla, always going and never gone ; that it was difficult to get out of these petty harbours with so great a number of craft at once, and that it would very soon be impossible for those harbours to contain them ; that it would be better to divide this expedition, to send home the Dutch sailors with part of their *matériel*, to keep the best war-boats, to destroy the others, to repair those that should be preserved, and to fit them for the embarkation of 60,000 men, then to put the Dutch sailors who had been sent home aboard the Texel fleet, the useless French sailors aboard the Flushing squadron, and to procure in this manner, besides the flotilla, capable of throwing at once 60,000 men on the coasts of England, the Texel and Flushing squadrons, capable of carrying 30,000 from the mouths of the Meuse to the mouths of the Thames, without reckoning all the expeditions which might sail from Brest and all the other points of the Continent. This opinion being adopted, orders were despatched, and the Boulogne flotilla, rendered more manageable, combined at the same time with the squadrons which were organising at the Texel, Flushing, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Cadiz, Toulon, Genoa, and Tarento, took its place in the vast system conceived by Napoleon—the system of camps formed near the great fleets, incessantly threatening Great Britain with a formidable expedition against her soil or against her colonies.

Napoleon issued likewise all the orders for the Sicilian expedition and for the complete provisioning of the Ionian Islands, to which his whole attention was at this moment called by the language held by the English agents at Vienna and St. Petersburg. From this language, in fact, it might be concluded that all imaginable efforts would be made to wrest these islands from the French. Napoleon prescribed to his brother Joseph, with a warmth of expression raised even to passion, to recover Scylla and Reggio, left in the possession of the English ever since the expedition to St. Euphemia ; to assemble part of the regiments composing the army of Naples around Baiæ and around Reggio, and to hold them in readiness for embarkation. He enjoined prince Eugene to make his troops fall back from Upper Italy towards Central Italy, in order to replace those which should be employed in maritime expeditions. He ordered king Joseph and prince Eugene to multiply the supplies of provisions sent to Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante. Lastly, he repeated more expressly than ever the order to the two divisions at Rochefort and Cadiz, to contrive to get out of those ports, and to proceed to Toulon. He despatched admiral Ganteaume to take the command of the fleet there, destined to

sweep the Mediterranean, to complete the conquest of the kingdom of Naples by the reduction of Sicily, and to consolidate the French domination in the Ionian Islands by the transport of vast resources to those islands. Meanwhile the naval engineers were recommended to hasten the building of the ships begun on the whole coast of Europe.

While he was thus engaged with the maritime positions situated in Italy, Napoleon had urged anew the expedition to Portugal. The three camps of St. Lo, Pontivy, and Napoleon, collected under general Junot at Bayonne, presented there a nominal effective of 26,000 men, a real effective of 23,000, 2000 of whom were cavalry, and 36 pieces of artillery. A reinforcement of three or four thousand men was on the march to join it. On the 12th of October, the second day after the signature of the convention with Austria, Napoleon ordered general Junot to cross the frontier of Spain, contenting himself with a mere notice given at Madrid of the passage of French troops. He prescribed to general Junot the route of Burgos, Valladolid, Salamanca, Ciudad-Rodrigo, Alcantara, and the right bank of the Tagus to Lisbon. He recommended to him the most rapid march. Spain had promised to join her forces to those of France, in order to concur in the expedition, and naturally to participate in the distribution of the booty. Napoleon had not only accepted, but insisted on the real despatch of the Spanish force, reserving to himself to fix subsequently the composition and the price when they should have conquered Portugal. But, not reckoning upon Spain or upon any troops that she could send, he prepared a second army for the possible case that Portugal might make some resistance, and for the far more probable case that England might assemble at the mouths of the Tagus the forces returning from the Copenhagen expedition. Immediately after his arrival at Paris, Napoleon directed that the five legions of reserve, so frequently mentioned, and which had orders to replace the camps charged with the defence of the coasts, should be completely organised, instructed, and armed. He had required the five senators who commanded them to make all necessary arrangements for marching off two or three of the six battalions of which they were composed. Having learned that these two or three battalions of each legion were ready, he ordered them to be assembled at Bayonne, and formed into three divisions under generals Barbou, Vedel, and Malher; to be completed with two divisions of the Parisian guard, which the return of that guard, seasoned in Poland, rendered disposable, with four Swiss battalions, stationed some at Rennes, the others at Boulogne and Marseilles, lastly, with the 3rd battalion of the 5th light, in garrison at Cherbourg, and the 1st of the 47th of the line, in garrison at Grenoble.

Here were 21 or 22 battalions, which were about to march from the seat of each legion, that is to say, from Rennes, Versailles, Lille, Metz and Grenoble, and to reach Bayonne

towards the end of November. They were to form a corps of 23 or 24 thousand men, accompanied by forty pieces of artillery and some hundred horse, under the command of one of the most distinguished generals of division of the time, general Dupont, who had distinguished himself at Albeck, Diernstein, Hall, and Friedland, and destined by Napoleon to be soon promoted to marshal. It was a second army, sufficient to support that of Junot, whatever importance the events in Portugal might acquire. It took the name of second corps of observation of the Gironde, Junot's army having already received the title of first corps. Neither of these armies was deficient in anything but cavalry. Napoleon was preparing for them a good and numerous cavalry at Compiègne, Chartres, Orleans, and Tours. During the campaign in Poland, he had, as the reader must recollect, taken as great pains to keep up the dépôts of the cavalry as those of the infantry. He had incessantly supplied them with men and horses, and he could draft from them and employ in the south reinforcements which the peace of Tilsit rendered it unnecessary for him to send to the north. He ordered a brigade of 1000 hussars to be collected at Compiègne, at Chartres a brigade of 1200 chasseurs, at Orleans a brigade of 1500 dragoons, and a fourth, of 1400 cuirassiers, at Tours, which formed a total of 5000 horse, drawn from the dépôts, and sufficiently numerous for the mountainous countries in which the two armies of the Gironde were called to act. These were mere precautions, for it was doubtful whether so large a force would be required in Portugal; but Napoleon had a great desire to draw the English to that quarter; and, though the soldiers whom he sent thither were young, he thought them sufficient to be opposed to British troops, and more than sufficient to beat the southern armies, of which at that time he made no account.

Everything, therefore, was prepared for taking possession of Portugal, independently of the assistance promised by the Spaniards. An answer had been received from the court of Lisbon such as Napoleon had foreseen, and such as he needed, after the affair of Copenhagen, to dispense him from showing any indulgence. The prince-regent of Portugal, son-in-law, as we know, of the king and queen of Spain, was, no less from hereditary tradition than from personal weakness, the devoted subject of England. His ministers differed in opinion, it is true, and some of them thought that dependence on England was neither the situation desirable for Portugal, nor the surest means of selling her wines and procuring corn. But others thought that to live by England and through England was a good thing at all times, and a much better since France entered the career of revolution, as, in approaching the latter, they ran the risk of changing not only their industrial system, but also their social system. The prince-regent, apprised by M. de Lima, his ambassador at Paris, and by M. de Rayneval, *chargé d'affaires* of France at Lisbon, of the

absolute will of Napoleon, had concerted with the British cabinet the conduct to be pursued, with the two-fold object of sparing himself the presence of a French army, and causing the least possible injury to the English interests. In consequence, he had come to an understanding with Mr. Canning, through the medium of lord Strangford, and had resolved to concede to France the apparent exclusion of the British flag, and even, if compelled, a sham declaration of war against England, but, in regard to the merchants of the latter, to refuse any measure against persons and property; for Lisbon and Oporto had become downright English factories, where merchants, capitals, shipping, were all English. To grant the seizure of persons and property, which Napoleon insisted upon, would have been ravage and ruin to those factories. This answer being agreed upon, it was hoped that, if France was content with it, the commerce of Portugal, so advantageous to British activity, so convenient to Portuguese indolence, would come off with a momentary restriction, and that the English royal navy would be quit also by sailing direct from Portsmouth to Gibraltar without touching at Lisbon. Still, it would not fail, in case of need, to put into some of the least frequented points of the coast of Portugal, upon pretext of stress of weather, for which the court of Portugal would excuse it, by alleging the laws of humanity. If France would not accept such conditions, the court of Lisbon, rather than break with England, had made up its mind to the last extremities, not to a contest with French troops (it was incapable of this noble despair), but to a flight beyond sea.

This race of Braganza, grown old, like its neighbour, the race of the Spanish Bourbons, sunk, like the latter, in ignorance, effeminacy, cowardice, had taken an aversion both to the age in which such appalling revolutions were occurring, and to the very soil of Europe, which served them for a theatre. It went so far in its shameful misanthropy as to resolve to retire to South America, the territory of which it shared with Spain. The flatterers of its vulgar propensities boasted incessantly of the riches of its Transatlantic possessions, as people boast before an opulent man, whom they are encouraging to ruin himself, of his patrimony, which he knows nothing about. They told it, that it was not worth while to contest with the oppressors of Europe the possession of that petty country, Portugal, alternately rocky and sandy, while it had beyond sea a magnificent empire, almost as extensive of itself as that dreary Europe, which a million of greedy soldiers were fighting for—an empire sown with gold, silver, diamonds, where it would find peace, without a single enemy to fear. To flee from Portugal, to abandon its sterile shores to the English and to the French, who might drench it with their blood as much as they pleased, to leave to the Portuguese people, the old companion in arms of the Braganzas, to defend its independence, if it were still tenacious of that,—such

were the disgraceful projects which, from time to time, allayed the terrors of the regent of Portugal and of his family. This unworthy weakness in the prince was combated only by another weakness, that is, by the trouble of taking an important resolution, of quitting the places where he had passed a luxurious life, of equipping a fleet, to convey him with his household, his courtiers, and his wealth ; lastly, of crossing the sea, and defying one novelty in fleeing from another. Between these two weaknesses the court of Portugal hesitated, but ready to embark, if the footfalls of a French army should reach its ear. An official reply was, therefore, given to M. de Rayneval, that Portugal would break with Great Britain, though she could scarcely do without her ; that the former would even go so far as to declare war against the latter ; but that it was repugnant to the honour of the prince-regent to order the English merchants to be arrested and their property seized.

Napoleon was too sagacious to be satisfied with such subterfuges. He clearly perceived that the answer had been concerted in London,* that the exclusion of the English would be but a sham, and that his principal object would not be attained. He knew, moreover, that the family of Braganza entertained a design of retiring to Brazil ; and he was not sorry for it, for, unfortunately, since the disaster at Copenhagen, his ideas had taken another direction. He purposed, not to complete by the occupation of Portugal the closing of the shores of the Continent, but to appropriate Portugal to himself, to be disposed of at his pleasure. Instead of profiting by the moral advantage over England, given him by the scandalous violence committed by the latter against Denmark, he had resolved to lay himself under no restrictions towards the friends and favourers of the English policy, and to destroy them all for the profit of the Bonaparte family, saying to himself that, at the end of the war, there would be neither more nor less than another State suppressed in Europe, which would add nothing to the difficulties of peace ; that he should adopt, according to custom, the *casus presens* as the basis of the negotiations ; and that, if the face of the Peninsula was changed, one would be obliged to admit it in the state in which it should be found, and to introduce it into the general treaty in its new state. In consequence, he resolved to appropriate Portugal to himself, designing to come to an understanding with Spain, and even to make use of it to revolutionise Spain, for she displeased him—she cramped him—she revolted him in her present state as much as the courts of Naples and Lisbon, which he had already driven, or, which he

* This is no assertion invented for justifying the conduct of Napoleon towards Portugal, but an authentic truth officially proved. In fact, some time afterwards, when the court of Lisbon, having fled to Brazil, had nothing more to fear from the French armies, Mr. Canning acknowledged in parliament that all the answers of Portugal to Napoleon had been concerted with the British ministry. Despatches since published furnish proof of this still more in detail, and with stronger evidence.

was about to drive, from their tottering thrones. Such was the commencement of the greatest faults, of the greatest misfortunes, of his reign! My heart is wrung in approaching that sad story, for it is not only the origin of the misfortunes of one of the most extraordinary, the most seducing, of men, but it is the origin of the misfortunes of our hapless country, dragged down with its hero into an appalling abyss.

Napoleon, therefore, ordered M. de Rayneval to leave Lisbon, and passports to be delivered to M. de Lima, recommended to general Junot to hasten the march of his troops, and not to listen to any proposal whatever, upon pretext that he was not to enter into any negotiations, and that his only commission was to close Lisbon against the English. The intention of Napoleon, in making the troops march without relaxation or intermission towards Lisbon, was to seize the Portuguese fleet, and to confiscate all English property both at Lisbon and Oporto. If the court of Lisbon should betake itself to flight, he determined to carry off all the naval stores and commercial effects that he could. If it stayed, on the contrary, and submitted to his demands, the capture of the Portuguese fleet, and the booty taken from the English, would compensate him for not being able to destroy the house of Braganza, for it would be impossible to treat a submissive and unarmed court with rigour.

But Portugal would remain to be disposed of in case the house of Braganza should retire to America. To take possession of it for France was not admissible, even for a conqueror who had already constituted French departments on the Po, and who was soon to constitute more on the Tiber and on the Elbe. To give it to one of the princes of the house of Bonaparte, who had not yet received a crown, seemed more reasonable; but it was adopting for the whole Peninsula an arrangement which would have a definitive character, and on that head Napoleon designed to leave a doubt that did not forbid any ulterior combination. For some time past a fatal idea had begun to predominate in his mind. Having already expelled the Bourbons of Naples from their throne, he frequently said to himself that he should be obliged some day to act in the same manner towards the Bourbons of Spain, who were not enterprising enough to attack him openly, as those of Naples had done, but who, at bottom, were quite as hostile to him; who had tried to betray him just before Jena; who would not fail to seize yet the first opportunity to do so; who at last, perhaps, would find a fatal one for him, and who, if they betrayed him not wilfully, would betray him *de facto*, by suffering the Spanish power to perish in their hands—a power as necessary to France as to Spain herself, and as completely annihilated in 1807, as if it had never existed. When Bonaparte thought of the danger of having Bourbons on his rear—a danger not very alarming for himself, but extremely annoying for his successors, who would not have his genius, and who might, per-

haps, find in the successors of Charles IV. qualities which they no longer had themselves ; when he thought of all the meannesses, all the indignities, all the perfidies, of the court of Madrid, not of the unfortunate Charles IV., but of his guilty wife and her ignoble favourite ; when he thought of the state of that power, still so great under Charles III., having then finances and a respectable navy, now having neither a dollar nor a fleet, and leaving inert resources, which, in other hands, would have already served by their union with those of France to reduce England, he was seized with indignation for the present, with fear for the future ; he said to himself, that he must put an end to this state of things, and avail himself of the submission of the Continent to his views—of the devoted concurrence which Russia offered to his policy—of the inevitable prolongation of the war to which England doomed Europe, and of the odium which she had recently excited by her conduct towards Denmark, to complete the renovation of the face of the West, to substitute everywhere Bonapartes for Bourbons, to regenerate a noble and generous nation, lulled to sleep in sloth and ignorance, to restore its power to it, to procure for France a faithful, useful ally, instead of an unfaithful, useless, and vexatious ally. Lastly, Napoleon said to himself, that the greatness of the result would absolve him from the violence or the craft which it might perhaps be necessary to employ for the overthrow of a court always ready to betray him, while, in his incessant expeditions, he moved to any distance from the West, prompt to prostrate itself when he returned, finally giving a hundred real reasons, but no ostensible reason, for destroying it.

These thoughts would have been true, just, nay, even realisable, if he had not already undertaken in the North more work than it was possible to accomplish in several reigns,—if he had not already taken on himself the task of constituting Italy, Germany, Poland. Of all these works, not the easiest, but the most urgent, the most useful after the constitution of Italy, would have been the regeneration of Spain. Of the 400,000 veteran soldiers employed from the Rhine to the Vistula, 100,000 would have sufficed for that purpose, and could not have had a better employment. But to add to so many enterprises in the North a new enterprise in the South, to attempt it with troops scarcely organised, was extremely serious and extremely hazardous. Napoleon did not think so. He had not met with a difficulty which he had not surmounted, from the Rhine to the Niemen, from the Ocean to the Adriatic, from the Julian Alps to the Strait of Messina, from the Strait of Messina to the banks of the Jordan. He had a profound contempt for the southern troops, their officers, their commanders, made little more account of the English troops, and considered the Spains as not more difficult to subdue than the Calabrias. They were more extensive, it is true ; which signified that, if 30,000 had sufficed in the Calabrias, 80,000 or 100,000 would

suffice in Spain, especially when they should bring the brave Spanish nation, instead of the licentiousness into which it was plunged, a regeneration for which it most earnestly wished. It was not, therefore, the material difficulty which made Napoleon hesitate; it was the moral difficulty, it was the impossibility of finding, in the eyes of the world, a plausible pretext for treating Charles IV. and his wife as he would have treated Caroline of Naples and her husband. Now, a dynasty which, on his return from Tilsit, sent him three ambassadors to pay him homage; which, while betraying him secretly when it could, gave him its armies, its fleets, whenever he asked for them—such a dynasty furnished no motive for dethroning it, which the public sentiment of Europe could accept as specious. Powerful and glorious as Napoleon was; though to the victories of Montenotte, of Castiglione, of Rivoli, he had added those of the Pyramids, of Marengo, of Ulm, of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Friedland; though, to the Concordat, to the Civil Code, he had added a hundred measures of humanity and civilisation, it was not possible, without revolting the world, to come forward some day and say: Charles IV. is an imbecile prince, deceived by his wife, ruled by a favourite, who degrades and ruins Spain; and I, Napoleon, in virtue of my genius, of my providential mission, I dethrone him, for the purpose of regenerating Spain. Such modes of proceeding humanity does not allow to any man whatever. It sometimes forgives them after the event, after success, and then it adores in them the hand of God, if benefit to nations has resulted from them. But, till then, it regards them as an outrage on the sacred independence of those nations.

Napoleon could not then dethrone Charles IV. for his imbecility, for his weakness, for the adultery of his wife, for the debasement of Spain. He would have needed a grievance that should have conferred on him the right to enter his neighbour's dominions and to change the dynasty reigning there. He would have wanted a treachery like that which the queen of Naples ventured to commit, when, after signing a treaty of neutrality, she attacked the French army in rear; or a massacre such as that at Verona, when the republic of Venice slaughtered our wounded and our sick, while the French army was marching to Vienna. But Napoleon had nothing to allege, excepting an equivocal proclamation, issued just before the battle of Jena, calling the Spanish nation to arms—a proclamation, which he had affected to consider as insignificant, which was accompanied, it is true, by secret communications with England, since demonstrated, and strongly suspected at the time, but denied by the court of Spain; and such grievances were not to justify that Roman sentence already pronounced against the Bourbons of Naples—*The Bourbons of Spain have ceased to reign.*

Napoleon, however, expected the intestine divisions prevailing in the Esecorial to furnish a pretext for interfering, for entering

as deliverer, as peace-maker, perhaps as an offended neighbour. But, if he had a general systematic idea as to the end to be attained, he had not fixed either the day or the mode of acting. He would even have accommodated himself to a family alliance between the two courts which should have promised a complete regeneration of Spain, and, through that regeneration, a sincere and useful alliance between the two nations. In regard, therefore, to Portugal, he purposed not to take any definitive course, which should bind him towards the court of Madrid. He could, for instance, have given Portugal to Spain, and this would have been the safest step to take, in exchange for the Balearic Islands, the Philippines, or some other distant possession. He would thus have transported the Spanish nation with joy, by gratifying the most ancient and most constant of its ambitions; he would have enchanted the court itself, by throwing a veil over its turpitudes; he would have awakened a fondness for the alliance of France, which hitherto had appeared only burdensome to the Spaniards. But to act in this manner would have been rewarding cowardice and treachery equally with the most tried and serviceable fidelity. It could scarcely be required of an ally so dissatisfied as Napoleon had reason to be. There was one other course to pursue, that was to appropriate to himself, in exchange for Portugal, some Spanish provinces bordering on our frontier, and to acquire a footing beyond the Pyrenees, as he had done in Italy beyond the Alps, by the possession of Piedmont: a detestable policy, fit at most for Austria, which has always coveted the possession of the back of the Alps, and whose territories, besides, composed of conquests, ill bound together, are not so formed by Nature as to excite in her a fondness for well-defined frontiers. To make himself master of the Biscayan provinces, and those bordering the Ebro, such as Aragon and Catalonia, would therefore have been a fault against geography, a sure way to wound all Spaniards to the heart, and an inefficacious method of placing their government under the dependence of Napoleon; but, as for submissive, incapable of defending itself, this government was so, but skillful, active, attached, in short all that could be wished, it would not have become so by the cession of Aragon or Catalonia to France. It would thereby have been rendered more contemptible, but not stronger, more courageous, more industrious.

This manner of disposing of Portugal would have been the worst of all, and the most dangerous. Napoleon was not inclined to it. He had, however, examined it like all the others; and at this very period, which proves that he had thought of it, he directed application to be made to the French legation at Madrid, for a statistical account of the Biscayan provinces, and of the provinces watered by the Ebro in its course. He had about him at that time a dangerous counsellor—dangerous, not because he was deficient in good sense, but because he was deficient in the love of truth: this was M. de Talleyrand, who, having guessed

the subject that engrossed the secret thoughts of Napoleon, practised the most mischievous of seductions upon him, by conversing with him incessantly on the topics that engaged his mind. Power has not a more dangerous flatterer than the disgraced courtier who is anxious to recover its favour. Fouché, the minister, having lost in 1802 the portfolio of the police, for having disapproved of that excellent institution, the Consulate for life, had exerted himself to recover his lost portfolio, by seconding by a thousand intrigues the fatal institution of the Empire. M. de Talleyrand was playing at this moment a similar part. He had sorely displeased Napoleon by insisting on relinquishing the portfolio of the foreign affairs for the situation of grand dignitary; and he strove to please him again, by giving him advice, which he was fond of receiving. M. de Talleyrand was of the party at Fontainebleau. He saw, since the affair of Copenhagen, the series of wars resumed and continued, France pushing Russia to the North and to the East, that she might herself fall upon the South and the West. The question of Portugal became urgent, and, if he had not genius sufficient to judge what arrangements were best adapted to Europe, he was well enough acquainted with human passions to judge that Napoleon was full of thoughts, still vague but absorbing, relative to the Peninsula. This discovery made, he had endeavoured to lead the conversation to this subject, and he had seen the coldness of Napoleon towards him disappear all at once, conversation revived, and, if not confidence, at least ease restored. He had profited by it, and had not ceased to add, to the already hideous picture of the court of Spain, colours not needed by that picture to offend the eye of Napoleon. In regard to Portugal, he had appeared to be strongly of opinion that to descend upon the Ebro, to establish himself there, in compensation for the cession to Spain of the banks of the Tagus, would be a position *ad interim* useful and advantageous to take. Napoleon was not inclined to this plan, and preferred another. But M. de Talleyrand had, nevertheless, become his most intimate confidant, after having been treated for two months with extreme coldness. Napoleon, on his return from the chase, or on leaving the circle of the ladies, was seen regularly in *tête-à-tête* with M. de Talleyrand, talking at great length, with animation, sometimes with a gloomy thoughtfulness, on a subject evidently of importance, of which every body was ignorant, and of which even none sought an explanation, so powerful, so prosperous, so pacific, did the Empire appear since Tilsit. Napoleon, walking in the vast galleries of Fontainebleau, sometimes slowly, sometimes with a speed proportioned to that of his thoughts, put to the torture the infirm courtier who could not keep up with him but by immolating his body, as he immolated his soul in flattering the mischievous and deplorable extravagance of genius. One man only, deprived of the confidence which he had enjoyed, the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, penetrated the subject of these conversa-

tions, durst not interrupt them, nor oppose his assiduities to those of M. de Talleyrand; for Napoleon, having become with time more imperious towards him, without being less friendly, was less accessible to the counsels of his timid wisdom. A few words dropped by the arch-chancellor Cambacérès had been sufficient to reveal the opposition of that clear-sighted statesman to any new enterprise, and particularly to any interference in the inextricable affairs of the Peninsula, where corrupt governments reigned over half-savage populations, where the difficulties which Joseph had encountered in the Calabrias would be found multiplied tenfold. Napoleon had, therefore, perfectly discerned the opinion of prince Cambacérès, and, fearing the disapproval of a wise man, he, who feared not the world, showed the same friendship for him as ever, but not the same confidence.*

There had just appeared at Fontainebleau another personage, an obscure one, who was rarely admitted to figure in the presence of Napoleon, but clever and crafty as any secret agent could be: this was M. Yzquierdo, the confidential man of the prince of the Peace, and sent to Paris, as we have said above, to treat seriously about the affairs which M. de Massaredo and M. de Frias entered upon merely as a matter of form. He was not only charged with the interests of Spain, but also with the personal interests of the prince of the Peace, to whom he was much attached, having been so distinguished and appreciated by him as to be entrusted with the most important missions. He did the best he could for the affairs of his country and those of Emmanuel Godoy; for, though devoted to the latter, he was a good Spaniard. Endowed with extraordinary sagacity, he had foreseen that the critical moment for Spain was approaching; for, on the one hand, Napoleon became daily more disgusted with an incapable and perfidious ally; and, on the other hand, having successively touched on all the European questions, he was naturally led to that of the Peninsula, and induced to turn to the affairs of the South by the conclusion, apparent at least, of those of the North. Accordingly, this subtle and insinuating agent exerted all his efforts to be informed of what was passing in the counsels of the Emperor. He had found means to accomplish his purpose through the grand-marshal of the palace, Duroc, who had married a Spanish lady, daughter of M. d'Hervaz, formerly at the head of the financial affairs of the court of Madrid, afterwards marquis d'Almenara and ambassador at Constantinople. M. Yzquierdo had cultivated this valuable connexion, and sought, notwithstanding the integrity and discretion of the grand-marshal, either to discover the designs of Napoleon, or to get some useful words conveyed to him. He had not failed, on occasion of Portugal, to appear more frequently at Fontainebleau, and to endeavour to

* I report here the assertion of prince Cambacérès himself, confirmed by the testimony of eye-witnesses, some formerly ministers of Napoleon, others members of his court, and by a variety of correspondence.

obtain the most advantageous result for Spain and for his patron.

The court of Madrid, though it felt all its desire awakened at the idea of an operation against Portugal, nevertheless saw not without vexation the house of Braganza pushed towards Brazil, for it had felt great uneasiness about its American colonies, ever since the United States had shaken off the yoke of England. The establishment of an independent European State in Brazil filled it with dread of a new commotion, which might lead Mexico, Peru, and the provinces of the La Plata, to constitute themselves free States also; and, in the moments when its foresight got the better of its greediness, it would rather have seen the Braganzas remain at Lisbon than see a chance of acquiring Portugal arising from their departure. It was not probable, however, that the Braganzas, saved a first time in 1802 by Spain, which had cost the latter the island of Trinidad, could be again saved in 1807. Spain must therefore submit to their removal, voluntary or compulsory, to Brazil. In this situation, the court of Madrid could not do better than endeavour to acquire Portugal. But it was well aware that it had not deserved so rich a present from Napoleon; it feared that it should be obliged to purchase it with sacrifices, perhaps even to consent to its being divided, and, in this case, M. Yzquierdo had a secondary commission, which was to obtain one of the provinces of Portugal for his patron, the prince of the Peace. The latter, seeing from day to day a formidable storm gathering against him, as well at court as in the nation at large, purposed, in case he should be precipitated from the pinnacle of greatness, to drop, not into nothing, but into an independent and solidly secured principality. The queen ardently wished her favourite so desirable a retreat. The good-natured Charles IV. thought it due to the eminent services of the man who, he said, had for twenty years assisted him to bear the burden of the crown. In consequence, M. Yzquierdo had received from his sovereigns, as well as from the prince of the Peace himself, the express recommendation to follow up this result, in case Portugal should not be integrally given to Spain. In case of the partition of Portugal, there was another ambition still to gratify, that of the queen of Etruria, the favourite daughter of the king and queen of Spain, widow of the prince of Parma, mother of a king five years old, and regent of the kingdom of Etruria, instituted some years before by the First Consul. It was much doubted whether Napoleon would leave possessions in Italy to Spain any more than to Austria; and, with this forecast, part of Portugal was solicited for the queen of Etruria. Portugal, divided then into two principalities, vassals of the crown of Spain, would become in reality a Spanish province. Moreover, the court of Madrid, in its indolence, in its debasement, cherished an ambitious desire, which was to acquire a title that should cover its present degradation, and it wished that

Charles IV. should be called *King of the Spains and Emperor of the Americas*. Thus every one in that degraded court would have been satisfied. The favourite would have had a principality wherein to hide his turpitudes ; the queen would have had the pleasure of providing for her favourite and with him for her preferred daughter ; and the king would have picked up in passing a title for the amusement of his imbecile vanity.

Such were the ideas, to which M. Yzquierdo was commissioned to obtain assent at Fontainebleau. Of all possible projects the latter was the one which differed least from the views of Napoleon. He wanted not at first, as we have observed, any arrangement which could become definitive. He meant purely and simply to give Portugal to the court of Madrid, a gift which it had not deserved, and which would have raised it in the estimation of the Spaniards. He had renounced the idea lauded by M. de Talleyrand, of gaining a footing beyond the Pyrenees by the acquisition of the provinces of the Ebro. Thenceforward he should prefer, saving some modification, the plan of partition brought by M. Yzquierdo, and which had for the moment the only advantages to which he aspired. In the first place Napoleon was resolved to clear Italy of all foreign princes, and, after turning the Austrians out of it, he purposed to remove the Spaniards also, not as being dangerous. People, therefore, had rightly guessed his real intention, by supposing that he would seek to recover Etruria by means of an exchange for a portion of Portugal. Then, though filled with contempt for the favourite who was degrading and ruining Spain, he resolved to attach him a little longer, that he might have him at his disposal in the different circumstances which he foresaw or intended to bring about. But he thought that it was too much to give half of Portugal to the queen of Etruria as the price of Tuscany, and the other half to the favourite as the price of his subservience. In consequence, taking little pains to persuade people, to whom he had only to signify his will, he dictated to M. de Champagny, on the morning of the 23d of October, a note containing his definitive resolutions.* He granted to the queen of Etruria, for her son, a State containing a population of 800,000 souls, situated on the Douro, and having Oporto for its capital, which was to be called the kingdom of North Lusitania. At the other extremity of Portugal, in the southern part, he granted to the prince of the Peace a State with a population of 400,000 souls, composed of the Algarves and the Alentejo, styled the principality of the Algarves. These two small States balanced the population of Tuscany, at that time computed at 1,200,000 souls. Napoleon was not sufficiently satisfied with Spain to give her more than he took from her. He reserved the central part of Portugal, that is to say,

* It is from this very note and the identical instructions sent from Madrid to M. Yzquierdo, both preserved in the Louvre, among the papers of Napoleon, that I am writing this account.

Lisbon, the Tagus, the Upper Douro, bearing the names of Portuguese Estramadura, Beyra, and Tras-os-Montes, and comprising a population of 2,000,000 inhabitants, in order to dispose of it at the peace. This wholly provisional arrangement suited him wonderfully well, since it left every thing in suspense, for it afforded either the means of subsequently recovering the Spanish colonies, by restoring two-thirds of Portugal to the house of Braganza, or to make what arrangement soever he pleased with the house of Spain, if he should decide on suffering it to reign in attaching it to him by the bonds of a marriage. At any rate, it was agreed that the new Portuguese principalities should be constituted into sovereignties, vassals of the crown of Spain, and that poor king Charles IV. should be styled, agreeably to his desire, *king of the Spains and emperor of the Americas*, and bear, like Napoleon, the double title of Imperial and Royal Majesty.

Besides these conditions, Napoleon required that Spain should unite with the French troops a division of 10,000 Spaniards to take possession of the province of Oporto, one of 10 or 11 thousand, to second the movement of the French upon Lisbon, and one of 6000 to occupy the Algarves. It was understood that general Junot should command the French and allied troops, unless the prince of the Peace or Charles IV. should go to the army, which they had promised not to do, for Napoleon would not have entrusted to such generals the life of a single soldier of his. By disposing of Portugal in this manner, he should recover Etruria immediately; this, which Napoleon was solicitous to do, on account of his arrangements in Italy, would hold out an alluring bait to the ambition of the prince of the Peace, enable him to defer every resolution in regard to the Peninsula, and not even require him finally to decide the question of the establishment of the Braganzas in America.

The treaty containing this provisional partition of Portugal was drawn up conformably to the note which Napoleon had dictated to M. de Champagny, and signed by M. Yzquierdo for Spain, and by the grand-marshal Duroc for France. It was signed at Fontainebleau itself, on the 27th of October; and it has obtained, by the title of Treaty of Fontainebleau, an unfortunate celebrity, because it was the first act of the invasion of the Peninsula.

No sooner were the signatures given, than orders were despatched to general Junot, whose troops, having entered Spain on the 17th, had already reached Salamanca, purposing to proceed to the Tagus through Alcantara, and to follow the right bank, while general Solano, marquis del Socorro, with 10,000 Spaniards, would follow the left bank. General Junot had been expressly recommended to send to Paris all the Portuguese emissaries whom he should fall in with, saying that he had no power to treat, that his instructions were to march to Lisbon, as a friend if he were not resisted, as a conqueror if he met with any opposition whatever.

M. de Talleyrand, for having listened to all the effusions of Napoleon in regard to Spain, obtained what he desired, that is to say, a certain supremacy over the department of foreign affairs. Napoleon, irritated at first to see him relinquish the portfolio of foreign affairs for the purely honorary dignity of vice-grand-elect, had signified to him that he should no longer have any part in the diplomacy of the Empire. But, overcome by M. de Talleyrand's address, he decreed that the vice-grand-elect should succeed in their functions not only the grand-elect, absent because he reigned at Naples, but also the arch-chancellor of State, because he reigned at Milan. The reader will recollect, no doubt, that part of the duties of the arch-chancellor of State consisted in the presentation of ambassadors, in the custody of treaties, in short, the honorary part of the imperial diplomacy. M. de Talleyrand, therefore, combining an office of formality conferred on him by decree with the important duty attributed to him by the confidence of the Emperor, found himself at once dignitary and minister, a situation to which he had always aspired, and which Napoleon had declared that he would never grant. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès made this remark to Napoleon, who was slightly embarrassed, and promised that the decree should not be signed. But the arch-chancellor Cambacérès was just then setting off to visit his native city, Montpellier, which he had not seen for a long time; and, no sooner was he gone than the decree so ardently desired by M. de Talleyrand was signed and published as an official act.* Thus, in this decisive and fatal moment, prudence withdrew and complaisance remained—complaisance more dangerous in M. de Talleyrand than in any other person, because with him it assumed all the forms of good sense.

Napoleon's intention was to set out for Italy as soon as he had received M. de Tolstoy, for he had not visited since 1805 that country of his predilection. He purposed to carry thither the benefit of his vivifying presence, to embrace his adopted son Eugene Beauharnais and his eldest brother Joseph, and to converse with Lucien himself, whom he hoped to prevail upon to return into the bosom of the imperial family, perhaps even to place on a throne. But, all at once, when on the point of setting off, intelligence from Madrid stopped and obliged him to suspend his departure.† The accounts from that capital, which had for some time begun to assume a grave character, were of the most strange

* A circumstance well worthy of remark, and which will appear singular, is, that the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, in his valuable manuscript memoirs, relates that Napoleon adhered to his purpose, and that M. de Talleyrand did not obtain what he wished. This is a mistake of that grave personage, for the correspondence of Napoleon and the *Moniteur* of November 7, 1807, No. 311, prove that the decree was signed. Napoleon, to avoid, no doubt, the embarrassment of an explanation, probably never spoke further on the subject to the arch-chancellor, who might believe that the decree did not exist.

† The correspondence of Napoleon proves this fact in the most authentic manner.

and unexpected nature. They intimated that, on the 27th of October, the very day on which the treaty of Fontainebleau was signed in France, the prince of the Asturias had been arrested at the Escorial, and constituted a prisoner in his apartments; that his papers had been seized; that among them had been found proofs of a conspiracy against the throne; and that a criminal process would be commenced against him. Immediately afterwards, a letter of the 29th, signed by Charles IV. himself, informed Napoleon that his eldest son, seduced by miscreants, had formed a double design against the life of his mother and the crown of his father. The unfortunate king added that such a design ought to be punished; that search was making for its instigators; but that the prince, the author of or accomplice in such abominable projects, could not be permitted to reign; that one of his brothers, more worthy of the supreme rank, should have his place in the paternal heart and on the throne.

To prosecute criminally the heir to the crown, to change the order of succession, were resolutions of immense importance, which could not but move Napoleon, already deeply engaged with the affairs of Spain, and forbade his departure. The appeal made for his friendship, almost for his advice, in acquainting him with this family misfortune—a misfortune most terrible if it were true, most infamous if but a calumny of an unnatural mother, and believed by an imbecile father—obliged him to inquire minutely into the facts, and almost to interfere, in order to obtain a command of the consequences. Besides, just at this time arrived letters from the prince of the Asturias, imploring the protection of Napoleon against implacable enemies, and soliciting to become not only his *protégé*, but his relation, his adopted son, by obtaining the hand of one of the French princesses.* Thus these unfortunate Bourbons, both father and son, themselves called upon, nay almost forced, that dread conqueror to interfere in their affairs at the moment when he, thoroughly disgusted with their incapacity, was too well disposed to hurl them from a throne on which they were not only useless but dangerous to the common cause of France and Spain.

We should not have a just conception of these strange circumstances, were we not to turn back and to take a survey of what had occurred at the court of Spain for a year past. We have seen elsewhere (Vol. IV.) a picture of that degenerate court, ruled by an insolent favourite, who had contrived to usurp, in a manner, the royal authority, thanks to the passion which he had excited twenty years before in a queen devoid of modesty. If there were a country in Europe capable of exhibiting in its most hideous fea-

* The well known letter, in which Ferdinand applies to Napoleon for his protection and for the hand of a princess of his family, is dated the 11th of October. But, for reasons which we shall state elsewhere, it was inclosed by M. de Beauharnais in a despatch till the 20th, left Madrid on the 20th or 21st, could not arrive in Paris before the 28th, and probably reached Fontainebleau on the 29th. It then took the couriers seven or eight days to travel from Madrid to Paris.

tures, the spectacle of the corruption of courts, it was assuredly Spain. Behind the Pyrenees, between three seas, almost cut off from communication with Europe, sheltered by her armies and her ideas, amidst an hereditary opulence, which had its source in the treasures of the New World, which had kept up the indolence of the nation as well as that of its princes; in a hot climate, which excites the senses more than the mind; an old court might well fall asleep, become voluptuous and degenerate, between a clergy intolerant for heresy but tolerant for vice, and a nation accustomed to consider royalty, whatever it might do, as equally sacred with the Deity himself. Towards the conclusion of the last century, a wise, enlightened, and industrious prince and a minister worthy of him, Charles III. and M. de Florida Blanca, had endeavoured to stop the general decline, but had only suspended for a moment the melancholy course of things. In the next reign, Spain had descended to the lowest step of abasement, though the fine qualities of the nation were only benumbed. King Charles IV. always upright, well-intentioned, but incapable of any other exertion than that of hunting, regarding it as a favour of Heaven that some one should undertake the task of reigning for him; his wife, always dissolute as a Roman princess of the Lower Empire, always submissive to the old *garde du corps*, who had become prince of the Peace, and reserving her heart for him, while she gave up her person to vulgar gallants of his choosing; the prince of the Peace, always vain, light, indolent, ignorant, deceitful, and cowardly, having every vice but cruelty, always domineering over his master, or taking the trouble to conceive for him soft and capricious resolutions, which sufficed to keep a debased government going—the king, the queen, the prince of the Peace, had brought Spain into a state difficult to be described. No finances, no navy, no army, no policy, no authority over colonies ready to revolt, no respect from the indignant nation, no relations with Europe, which disdained a cowardly, perfidious court, without a will of its own, no longer even a support in France, for Napoleon had been led by contempt to believe that everything was allowable towards a power which had arrived at so abject a condition: such was Spain in October, 1807.

The first interest of the Spanish monarchy, ever since, shut up between the Pyrenees and the seas that surround her, she has neither Netherlands nor Italy to disturb her—the first interest is the navy, which then included the administration of her colonies and that of her arsenals. Her colonies contained neither soldiers, nor muskets to arm the colonists, in default of soldiers. Her captains-general were mostly officers so timid and so incapable that the governor of the provinces of La Plata had given up Buenos Ayres to the English without fighting, and that a Frenchman, M. de Liniers, had to put himself at the head of 500 men and himself undertake to expel the invaders, which he had done with complete success. The Spaniards, indignant, had deposed

the captain-general, and resolved to appoint M. Liniers in his place, but he would accept only the provisional title of military commandant. In vain did the chain of the Cordilleras pour forth metals from its rich flanks; gold and silver dug out of their bowels lay useless in the cellars of the captain-generalships. There was not a Spanish ship that durst go to fetch them. The governor of the Philippines, for example, being in want of ammunition, provisions, money to buy them with, had been obliged to apply to the brave captain Bourayne, commander of the French frigate *La Canonnière*, whose gallant fights we have already related, to procure piastres for him. Captain Bourayne had brought to the amount of 12,000,000, after making a trip from the Philippines to Mexico and back, and thus twice crossing half the globe. The Spanish government, in order to have a little of this valuable American coin at Madrid, was obliged to sell considerable sums to the United States and to Holland, and sometimes even to England, who, being in absolute need of it herself, consented to undertake the transport of it to Europe, and to give one-half the amount to the enemy, on condition of keeping the other half herself.

As for the navy itself, its state was this. Composed of 76 ships of the line and 54 frigates under Charles III., it had dwindled under Charles IV. to 33 sail of the line and 20 frigates. Of those 33 ships of the line, there were 8 to be destroyed immediately, as not worth refitting. There were left 25, 5 of them three-deckers, well built and very fine ships, 11 of 74 guns, indifferent or bad, 9 of 54 and 64, mostly old and on too small a scale, since the adoption of the new dimensions in ship-building. The 20 frigates were divided thus: 10 equipped or fit for equipping, 10 bad or requiring repair. In this whole navy, there were but 6 sail ready to put to sea, having on board provisions for barely three months, their crews incomplete, and their keels so filthy that they were scarcely navigable. These were the 6 sail at Carthagena, armed and equipped for three years past, and which had never weighed anchor but to show themselves at the mouth of the harbour, and to go back immediately. There was not a ship capable of putting to sea either at Cadiz or at Ferrol. At Cadiz there were, it is true, 6 sail of the line, armed, but without provisions or crews. There was no want of seamen; but, having nothing to pay them with, the government durst not engage them, and they were left unemployed in the harbours. The small number that had been raised, instead of being on board the squadron, were employed in gun-boats, between Algeiras and Cadiz, for the protection of the coasting-trade. Thus the whole Spanish navy in a state of activity was reduced to 6 sail of the line armed and equipped at Carthagena (and these without a single frigate), and 6 armed at Cadiz, but not equipped. Of the 20 frigates, there were but 4

armed and 6 capable of being armed. The future presented a prospect as dreary as the present; for in all Spain there were but two ships of the line building, and which had been upon the stocks so long that they were looked upon as not susceptible of being finished.

Ferrol, Cadiz, Carthagena, were destitute of timber, iron, copper, hemp. Those magnificent arsenals, built in several reigns, and worthy of Spanish greatness, as well for their extent as for their appropriation to all the wants of a powerful navy, were falling to ruin. The harbours were choked with mud. The superb wet dock of Carthagena was becoming filled with sand and filth. The numerous canals which place the harbour of Cadiz in communication with the rich plains of Andalusia, were encumbered with mud and wrecks of vessels. In one of these canals lay sunk a ship of the line, the *St. Gabriel*, two frigates, a corvette, three large lighters, two transports, and a great quantity of boats. One of the two magazines of the arsenal of Cadiz, destroyed nine years before by fire, had not been rebuilt. The basins, destined for dry docks, were ruined by the filtering of water into them. Of the two basins at Carthagena, built fifty years before, and never repaired, the one destined to be kept dry had rendered it necessary to burn the timber of several ships for the service of the machine employed in emptying it. The *San Pedro de Alcantara*, which was under repair in it, had, nevertheless, been well nigh swamped there. The rope-walks of Cadiz and Carthagena were the finest in Europe, but there were not even a few hundred-weight of hemp to employ them. At the same time, Seville, Grenada, Valencia, were earnestly soliciting that the stocks of hemp left upon their hands might be purchased. The beeches and oaks of Old Castille, Biscay, the Asturias, destined for Ferrol; the oaks of the Sierra de Ronda, destined for Cadiz; the noble pines of Andalusia, Murcia, Catalonia, destined for Carthagena and Cadiz; felled and lying on the ground, were rotting there for want of the means of transport to convey them to the stocks where they were to be employed. These materials were scarce, not only because none were bought, but because they were sold. Upon pretext of getting rid of refuse lumber, the administration of the port of Carthagena, in order to raise money to pay certain salaries, had sold the most valuable materials, especially metals. The board charged with the provisioning of the squadron at Carthagena could not obtain supplies, because it was 18 millions of reals in arrear with the contractors. The workmen deserted, not from treachery, but from sheer want. Out of 5000 workmen, there were scarcely 700 left at Carthagena. Some had died of the epidemic disease which had desolated the coasts of Spain some years before, others had fled to Gibraltar, and would eat the bread of England in her service. Those at Cadiz found themselves, from the same causes, considerably diminished in number. In 1807 nine months' pay

was owing them, and they were obliged to hold their hand. The sailors, in like manner, were dispersed in the interior, or in foreign countries. There were some of them to whom twenty-seven months' pay was owing. The few resources that were to be procured, were expended in the maintenance of a staff that would have been sufficient for several great navies. This establishment included one high-admiral, two admirals, 29 vice-admirals, 63 officers corresponding in rank with rear-admiral, 80 captains of ships of the line, 134 captains of frigates, upwards of 12 intendants, 6 treasurers, 11 *commissaires-ordonnateurs*, 74 commissioners of the navy, and all these for a naval power reduced to 33 sail of the line and 20 frigates, of which six ships of the line and four frigates only were armed and equipped! So low was sunk the navy of one of those nations of the globe most naturally destined for the sea, of an insular nation almost as much as the English, having finer harbours than theirs, such as Ferrol, Cadiz, Carthagena; timber which the English have not, such as the oaks of Old Castille, Leon, Biscay, the Asturias, and La Ronda; the pines of Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, Catalonia; materials of all kinds, as the iron of the Pyrenees, the copper of Mexico and Peru, the hemp of Valencia, Grenada, Seville; lastly, skilful and numerous workmen, brave sailors, officers capable, like Gravina, of dying the death of heroes. All these facts which we have just stated were scarcely known at Madrid.* When the

* The Spanish government, in fact, knew nothing, or as good as nothing, of the details we are giving respecting the state of the navy, and of those which we have given relative to the army and the finances. Napoleon was acquainted with the greater part of them by his agents, who were very numerous and strongly stimulated by his incessant curiosity. But their reports were not the only source of his information. When, a few months later, he entered Spain, the facts relative to the navy were entirely known, thanks to an inspection ordered in the ports, and to a valuable work by M. Munoz, the ablest engineer in the Spanish navy. M. O'Farrill was ordered to draw up a similar work concerning the army, and M. de Azanza respecting the finances. These documents, prepared before the general insurrection in Spain, had for their groundwork, as to the army, general inspections; as to the finances, the papers of the chest of consolidation. The whole was sent, with the confirmatory papers, to Napoleon, who, for several months governed Spain, from his palace at Bayonne. There every thing was cleared up, and he learned accurately what had before been suspected, the deplorable state of the Spanish administration. It is from the voluminous and very curious collection of these papers deposited in the Louvre with the papers of Napoleon that the authentic particulars which I here give respecting the administrative affairs of Spain are derived. I have made a careful comparison of all these statements, which does not allow me to conceive a single doubt respecting their accuracy. Messrs. Munoz, O'Farrill, Azanza, writing neither for the public nor for an assembly, entering into polemics with nobody, stating purely and simply the resources that could be disposed of, were forced to tell the truth, which they had no interest to conceal, and moreover supported by irrefragable documents, such as quite recent inspections, or official registers and statements. For the rest, their statements very nearly corresponded with what Napoleon's agents had previously communicated to him. The study of all these documents has therefore enabled me to draw a complete picture of the state of the Spanish monarchy, which could not at this day be sketched in Spain: for the documents were transmitted to France at the moment of the invasion, and have remained there ever since. I have thought this picture useful, nay, even necessary, for the understanding of events; and it is for this reason that I have taken the trouble to compose it, and that I give my readers that of reading it.

Spanish administration was asked, how many ships there were, and how many either building, or armed, or equipped, it could not tell. When asked at what time such a division would be ready to weigh anchor, it was still more embarrassed for an answer. All that the government knew was that the navy was neglected. It knew it, and even wished it to be so. The navy appeared to it a secondary interest, secondary for a nation which had to defend the Floridas, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, La Plata, the Philippines! The engaging in a contest with England appeared to it a chimera—a chimera when France and Spain combined had ports such as Copenhagen, the Texel, Antwerp, Flushing, Cherbourg, Brest, Rochefort, Ferrol, Lisbon, Cadiz, Carthagena, Toulon, Genoa, Tarento, Venice, and could not send out 120 sail of the line! The government, that is to say the prince of the Peace, was sometimes base enough to pour forth jests upon the Spanish navy; he had sarcasms instead of tears for Trafalgar! The fact was, that at heart he detested France, that troublesome ally who reproached him incessantly for his criminal supineness; and he preferred England, because she gave him hopes, if he would betray the cause of the maritime nations, of the quiet so congenial to his cowardice. Thus, while he affected contempt for the navy, the medium for contending against England, he professed great esteem for the land-army, the medium for resisting the counsels of France. The prince of the Peace was fond of talking about his grenadiers, his dragoons, his hussars. The state of that army, the object of his predilection, was nevertheless as follows:

The Spanish army was composed of about 58,000 infantry and artillery, 15 or 16 thousand cavalry, 6000 royal guards, 11,000 Swiss, 2000 Irish, and lastly, 28,000 provincial militia, in all about 120,000 men, capable of furnishing from 50 to 60 thousand combatants at most. The infantry was weak, puny, and recruited in part out of the scum of the population. The cavalry was formed of more select men; only a very small part of it was mounted; the fine breed of Spanish horses, so mettlesome and so gentle, declining from day to day. The royal guards, Spanish and Walloons, were the only portion that made a really imposing appearance. The militia, composed of peasants who were not trained, who could not be displaced, were of scarcely any use. The Swiss auxiliaries were, as everywhere else, thorough soldiers, faithful, steady. After deducting, therefore, the 14,000 men sent to the north of Germany, there were left no more than 15 or 16 thousand men to despatch towards Portugal of the 26,000 promised by the treaty of Fontainebleau. The presidios of Africa, especially Ceuta, that formidable *vis-à-vis* of Gibraltar, the capture of which by the English or the Moors would have rendered the passage from the Mediterranean to the Ocean impracticable, contained neither garrisons nor provisions. At Ceuta, instead of a garrison of 6000 men, prescribed by the regulations and by custom, there were but 3000. At the

famous camp of St. Roch, before Gibraltar, there were at most 8 or 9 thousand men. The rest of the Spanish army, dispersed in the provinces, was there employed in performing the duty of the police, because there was then no gendarmerie in Spain. The assemblage of any army whatever would have been impossible; for the 14,000 sent to Germany and the 16,000 marched towards Portugal, almost entirely absorbed the disposable portion of the regular troops. For the rest, the whole of the military force, ill clothed, ill fed, rarely paid, destitute of emulation, of military spirit, of instruction, was a body without soul. There, as in the navy, the staff consumed all the resources. It numbered of officers of the highest rank, three captains-general, answering to the rank of marshal, 87 lieutenant-generals, 127 *maréchaux de camp*, 252 brigadiers (an intermediate rank between that of *maréchal de camp* and that of colonel), and an unknown number of colonels; for there were some whose titles were real, others provisional or honorary, and between both they were not reckoned at fewer than 2000. Such was all that was left of those formidable bands, which, in the 15th and 16th centuries, had made Europe tremble. Such, too, was all the service rendered by the marked predilection of the prince of the Peace for the army!

As for the finances, which, with the land forces and the naval forces, constitute the complement of the power of a State, they corresponded to the state of those forces, and served to account for it. There were debts owing to Holland, to the Bank, to the public, to the great farms, for loans at fixed and annual dates, 114 millions; in arrears of pay and salaries 111 millions; in royal *vales* (paper money, 50 per cent. below par) 1033 millions; which formed a debt demandable of 1258 millions, part due shortly, part immediately, and which might be called *dribbling*; for, 110 millions of arrears of pay and salaries, 32 millions owing to the great farms, 8 millions promised by monthly instalments to France and not paid, 7 millions of annual interest due to Holland, 7 millions of interest of *vales* not provided for, might well be termed dribbling debts for a government. The expenses and the revenues were composed as follows: 126 millions of revenues, and 159 millions of expenses, leaving, of course, a yearly deficit of 33 millions, that is to say, a fifth of the necessities of the State unprovided for. The customs, tobacco, the salt-works, tolls, bore the principal burdens. Land, thanks to its owners, mostly nobles or priests, paid nothing but tithe for the benefit of the clergy. With such a system of taxation, a revenue of not more than 100 millions would have been obtained, if America had not furnished a supplement of 25 or 26 millions. Spain contributed much more considerable sums, but great part of which remained in the hands of the collectors of the public revenue. Manufactures, long since destroyed, no longer produced either beautiful silks or beautiful cloths, notwithstanding the mulberry-trees of Andalusia and the magnificent flocks of the Spanish breed. Some

cottons, manufactured in Catalonia, were rather a pretext for smuggling than a real branch of industry; for then, as at present, they served to attribute a Spanish origin to English cottons. Trade was ruined, for it was reduced to a few clandestine exchanges of piastres, the export of which was prohibited, for English goods, the import of which was alike prohibited, and to the importation (permitted in this case) of certain productions of French luxury. The supply of the colonies and of the navy, which alone had for a long time kept up a relic of activity in the ports of Spain, had dwindled to nothing in consequence of the war. The contraband trade of the English in South America, facilitated by the conquest of Trinidad, was sufficient there. Agriculture, behind-hand in its processes, scarcely capable of modification according to the new methods, on account of the heat of the climate and an absolute want of water, ravaged moreover by the *mesta*, that is to say, by the annual migration of seven or eight million sheep from the north to the south of the Peninsula, had been for ages in a stationary state. Thus the people were poor, the middle class ruined, the nobility over head and ears in debt, and the clergy itself, though richly endowed, and more numerous than the army and navy put together, distressed also by the sale of a seventh of its property, demanded and obtained from the court of Rome on account of the public necessities. But amidst this general poverty, there was a nation, strong, haughty, proud of its past greatness as if that greatness had still existed; having lost the habit of fighting, but capable of the most courageous self-devotion; ignorant, fanatic, hating other nations; knowing, nevertheless, that on the other side of the Pyrenees useful reforms had taken place, great things been accomplished, and calling for, but at the same time dreading the intelligence of foreigners; in short, full of contradictions, of oddities, of noble and endearing qualities, and at the moment, weary in the highest degree of its inactivity for a century past, deeply grieved at its humiliations, indignant at the spectacles which it had to witness.

It was before the face of a nation so nearly on the point of losing its patience that the silly favourite, the ruler of the indolence of his sovereign, of the vices of his queen, pursued his disgraceful course. While specie was scarce in a country possessing Peru and Mexico, and the country had to shift with a discredited paper-money, Emmanuel Godoy, from a vague presentiment, was amassing sums in gold and silver, which the free command of all the resources of the treasury permitted him to accumulate, and which public rumour foolishly exaggerated, for it talked of several hundred millions hoarded in his palace. Thus, while the nation felt itself impoverished, it believed that all the national wealth was in the possession of Emmanuel Godoy. To the public scandal of his adulterous intercourse with the queen were added many other scandals. After having married Doña Maria Luisa de Bourbon infanta of Spain, own niece of Charles III., cousin-german of

Charles IV., sister of the cardinal of Bourbon, whom he had chosen in order to draw near the throne, and whom he neglected from dislike of her modest virtues, he had publicly attached himself, by marriage according to some, by long habit according to others, to a young lady named Josefa Tudo, by whom he had several children. Desirous of giving a certain consecration to this connexion, he had obtained for mademoiselle Josefa the title of countess of Castillo Fiel (*Château Fidèle*), and in addition to this title a grandezza for the eldest of her children. He loaded her with wealth, and surrounded her with a sort of power; for it was to her house persons went to see him when they wished to converse freely with him; thither, too, the agents of European diplomacy repaired to receive their instructions; it was with his discourse that ambassadors filled their despatches; and, while pouring out to her the cares, the vexations, the anxieties, to which his blind levity exposed him, he could find, in the youth and beauty of a sister of mademoiselle Tudo's, pleasures which crowned the scandals of his life. And all Spain was acquainted with this disgraceful licentiousness; the queen herself was acquainted with it, and bore with it: the king alone was ignorant of it, and thanked Heaven for sending him a man who laboured and governed for him!

The unfortunate Spanish nation, not knowing, between an insolent favourite, a guilty queen, and an imbecile king, to whom to give its heart, had given it to the heir to the crown, the prince of the Asturias, since Ferdinand VII., who was not much more worthy of the love of a great people than his parents. This prince, then twenty-three years old, was left a widower by the princess of Naples, who died, it was reported, by poison administered by the hand of the queen and the favourite; which was false, but admitted to be true by all Spain. Repulsed by his mother, who construed his habitual sadness into a censure, by the prince of the Peace, who imagined that he discovered in it a jealousy of authority, oppressed by both, obliged to seek a refuge around him, he had found it in his young wife, to whom he had become fondly attached. As the two houses of Naples and Spain mortally hated each other, and the young princess arrived at the Escorial with sentiments derived from her family, she had not contributed to reconcile Ferdinand with his parents, but, on the contrary, fomented the aversion which he entertained for them. Accordingly, with his limited faculties of head and heart, listening to every report conformable to his hatred, Ferdinand believed that he had been deprived by a crime of the woman whom he loved, and this crime he imputed to his mother as well as to the adulterous favourite who governed her. It may be conceived what passions must have fermented in these vulgar, ardent, idle souls. The prince was awkward, weak, and false, whose whole understanding consisted in a certain shrewdness, and whose whole character in a certain obstinacy. But in the eyes of an impassioned nation,

feeling a necessity to love one of its masters, and to hope that the future would be better than the present, his awkwardness passed for modesty, his unsociable sadness for the grief of a virtuous son, his obstinacy for firmness, and on the report of some opposition made to various acts of the prince of the Peace, people had been pleased to invest him with the noblest and the most energetic virtues.

In the course of 1807, a rumour was suddenly spread, that the health of the king was declining, and that he was near his end. Appearances, in fact, were alarming. This king, honest and blind, had no suspicion of the infamous proceedings which, unknown to him, disgraced his reign. Endowed, nevertheless, with a certain good sense, he was well aware that there were misfortunes around him, for, in spite of the pains taken to deceive him, the loss of Trinidad, the disaster of Trafalgar, the paper-money substituted for specie, could not wear the appearance of prosperity and greatness. He laid the blame on circumstances, and felt thoroughly convinced that, but for the prince of the Peace, things would have gone on worse. In reality he was melancholy and ill. It was believed that his death was at hand. The nation, without any ill-will to him, regarded his death as the end of its humiliations; the prince of the Asturias as the end of his slavery; the queen and Godoy as the end of their power. As for these last, it was more than the end of a usurped power—it was a catastrophe; for they supposed that the prince of the Asturias would take his revenge, and they measured that revenge by their own sentiments. From this motive it was that the prince of the Peace had attached such value to becoming sovereign of the Algarves.

Various means were successively devised by the queen and by the favourite to secure them from the dangers they anticipated.

They thought at first of seizing the prince of the Asturias, and forcing him to contract a marriage, which would place him under their influence. For the accomplishment of this design, they cast their eyes on Doña Maria Theresa de Bourbon, sister of Doña Maria Luisa, princess of the Peace. They thought that, in marrying this infanta, Ferdinand, having become brother-in-law of Emmanuel Godoy, would be either reconciled or controlled. But to this plan Ferdinand opposed invincible and even offensive refusals. I, said he, become brother-in-law of Emmanuel Godoy!—never!—that would be a disgrace! These refusals, expressed in such language, redoubled the anxieties of the queen and the favourite. They no longer thought of fortifying themselves against the consequences of the king's death, then supposed to be much nearer than it was destined to be. The prince of the Peace was already generalissimo of all the Spanish armies. He resolved, and the queen warmly approved this resolution, to give himself new powers, in order to unite by degrees in his own hands all the prerogatives of royalty, and, when he should consider himself strong

enough, to exclude Ferdinand from the throne. He intended to get him declared incapable of reigning, the crown transferred to a younger head, to bring about in this manner the necessity of a regency, and to attribute that regency to himself, which would ensure to him the continuance of the power that he had exercised for so many years. This plan once resolved upon, they began by completing the nominal authority of the prince, for his real authority had long been as entire as it could be. They persuaded the king, that, thanks to Emmanuel Godoy, the army was in a flourishing state, but that the navy was not in a like predicament; that the latter needed to receive the influence of that genius which upheld the Spanish monarchy; that to place it under the direct authority of the prince of the Peace would render its reorganisation certain, and afford great satisfaction to the mighty Emperor of the French, who complained incessantly of the decline of the Spanish navy. Charles IV. adopted this proposal with the joy which he always felt in stripping himself of his authority in favour of Emmanuel Godoy; and the latter was gratified by a royal decree with the title of grand-admiral, a title which had been borne by the illustrious conqueror of Lepanto, Don John of Austria, and more recently by Don Philip, brother of Charles III. To this title, which conferred on Emmanuel Godoy the command of all the naval forces, besides the command of all the land forces, which he already had, was added that of Most Serene Highness. A council of admiralty composed of his own creatures was formed about the prince for the purpose of seconding him, and, notwithstanding the public poverty, it was decided that a palace, called the palace of the Admiralty, should be erected for it in the finest quarter of Madrid. Thus instead of any benefit, the navy beheld only the creation of new charges, tending solely to aggravate its distress.

It was not enough to unite the command of all the forces of the monarchy in the hands of the prince of the Peace; it was proposed to make him master of the palace, and, in some sort, of the person of the king. It was insinuated about the latter, that his unnatural son, detached from his parents by the mischievous influences of the house of Naples, and surrounded by perfidious subjects, was more and more to be feared every day; that the spirit of disorder peculiar to the age might perhaps second his evil designs, and therefore it was requisite that the powerful hand of Emmanuel (so Charles IV. called him in his confiding friendship) should extend over the royal dwelling, to preserve it from all danger. In consequence, the prince was further appointed colonel-general of the king's military household. From that moment he commanded in the palace itself, and was chief of all the troops composing the royal guard. No sooner had he received this new title, which completed his omnipotence, than he hastened to make reforms in different corps of the guard. Besides two regiments of foot, one called the Spanish guards, the other called the Walloon guards, which formed an effective force of 6000 men, there

was a regiment of cavalry, called the royal carbineers, and further a corps of *élite*, called the life-guards, divided into four companies, the Spanish, the Flemish, the Italian, and the American, commemorating by those names all the ancient dominions of Spain. On this corps, the most enlightened of all, thanks to the selection of the men of whom it was composed, and a good judge of what was passing in Spain, the prince of the Peace could not place entire reliance. He conceived the idea of dissolving it, upon the pretext of putting an end to all denominations which no longer corresponded with the reality of things, and to compose out of it two companies only, designated by the titles of first and second. He availed himself of this occasion to remove from it all those men whom he distrusted, and in particular many French emigrants, who had sought an asylum with the Bourbons of Spain, and who, devoted with body and soul to the good Charles IV. were nevertheless, from their better education, more capable than the others of appreciating the unworthy administration which dishonoured the monarchy. Emmanuel Godoy, in excluding them, removed honest men, whom he dreaded, and gave vent to his hatred against France, which every instant became more violent.

Emmanuel Godoy did not confine himself to this measure. He created his brother a grandee of Spain, and appointed him colonel of the regiment of Spanish guards. Lastly, he chose a guard for himself from among the royal carbineers. All these precautions taken, he caused all the members of the council of Castille whom he thought he could influence, to be sounded one after another for the purpose of preparing them for a change in the order of succession to the throne. The councils of Castille and of the Indies were two bodies which tempered the absolute authority of the kings of Spain, as the parliaments tempered that of the kings of France. There was, however, a difference in their attributions; for, besides a jurisdiction of appeal from all the tribunals of the kingdom which belonged to them, they had administrative attributions, the council of Castille relative to the internal affairs of the kingdom, the council of the Indies relative to the vast affairs of the possessions beyond sea. In consequence of an uninterrupted enjoyment of the royal confidence for a century past, and the necessity which all royalty is under of surrounding itself with a certain public assent, no great affair of the monarchy was resolved upon without consulting the opinion of these two councils. The prince of the Peace, who had already introduced into them a good number of his creatures, was naturally desirous to ensure their concurrence in his criminal designs. But, enslaved as they were, they appeared by no means inclined to countenance a change in the succession to the throne. Secret efforts, however, to work upon them continued to be made, and underhand influence was resorted to with the colonels of the regiments. The language held to both, represented that the prince of the Asturias was at once incapable and wicked, and that at the death of the king the

monarchy might be brought into peril by hands as mischievous as they were unskilful.

The prince of the Peace extended his intrigues far beyond the court of Spain. Though he detested France on account of the severe and annoying advice which he received from that quarter, he knew that all power resided in her, and that the plans to which he attached his salvation would be chimerical unless they had the support of Napoleon. He strove, therefore, to make sure of him by a thousand meannesses, especially since the famous proclamation, the recollection of which disturbed his sleep. Having learned that Napoleon, who liked to ride Spanish horses, had recently lost in the war one of those which the king of Spain had given him, he had offered him four, selected from among the finest in the kingdom. Having formed a false idea of the imperial court, borrowed from the court of Madrid, he had taken it into his head that certain persons were worth the trouble of gaining, that Murat was the first military man, that he possessed a great ascendancy over Napoleon: him, therefore he thought of gaining. With this motive he had commenced a secret correspondence with him,* reinforced by pre-

* There are in the Louvre specimens of this correspondence, the communication of which Napoleon had procured, either through Murat himself, or by his own active vigilance. These specimens furnish a singular idea of the baseness of the prince of the Peace. To make the reader better acquainted with this personage, his character, and his views, we quote the following letter, copied with all the faults of language that it contains. He will thus be enabled to judge the better of the kind of education received at that period by the persons composing the court of Spain:—

“To his Imperial and Royal Highness the Grand-Duke of Berg.”*

“The letter of your Imperial Highness dated Venice the 7th of December, is the greatest proof to me of the eminent character which constitutes the heart of a great prince like your Imperial Highness. I have never doubted the virtues that characterise you, and never has my soul conceived the base idea of mistrust. Yes, prince, I have vowed to your Highness fidelity in the friendship with which you honour me, and my correspondence will last as long as my existence.

“I was very sorry to be obliged to keep from your Imperial Highness a secret which I was forced to do by the word of my sovereign, signed in a treaty with his Imperial and Royal Majesty. My gratitude to your Imperial Highness would have induced me to reveal it, if the Emperor had not required it. But as I cannot help thinking that your Imperial Highness must now be acquainted with it, I cannot but unfold my sentiments to you. It is now that I begin to enjoy the tranquillity afforded me by a treaty which places me under the protection of the Emperor. I could not want for any thing during the life-time of my king, since his majesty honours me with his most singular esteem; but if, unfortunately, he should die, then my enemies would strive to disparage my services, and to destroy my reputation. I have not a friend in the world besides your Imperial Highness, and though I am persuaded that your power would have saved me from affliction, I nevertheless considered that your efforts would not have been powerful enough to avert the first stroke of infamy. Your Imperial Highness sees, therefore, whether that which has been agreed upon in the treaty is not to me of inestimable value. On this account I venture to take the liberty of expressing my gratitude to his Imperial and Royal Majesty in the letter herewith enclosed. I should have made a point of acquitting myself

* As we have not discovered in this letter any peculiarities of language worth mentioning, which might have rendered an exact transcript of the original desirable, we are content to furnish as close an English version of it as we are able.—TRANSLATOR.

sents, and particularly one of superb horses. The imprudent Murat on his part, deeming it useful to form connexions wherever crowns might chance to become vacant, had taken pains to procure for himself in the Peninsula a friend so powerful as the prince of the Peace. The crown of Portugal, which seemed likely soon to be vacant, was not foreign to this calculation.

The secret intrigues of the prince of the Peace for changing the succession to the throne, secret as they were, did not fail to transpire at Madrid, and added to an unexampled accumulation of titles, they had roused minds. The prince of the Asturias, equally exasperated and alarmed, had opened himself respecting his situation to a few friends on whom he thought that he could rely. The principal were his former governor, the duke de San Carlos, grand-master of the king's household, a very honest personage, having no other merit but that of a courtier; the duke de l'Infantado, one of the highest nobles in Spain, a military man not following his profession, having ambition, little talent, upright intentions, and enjoying universal consideration; lastly, an ecclesiastic, who had taught the prince the little he knew, the canon Escoiquiz, then banished to Toledo where he was a member of the archiepiscopal chapter, a clerical *bel-esprit*, a man extremely conversant in literature, very little in politics, tenderly attached to his pupil and fondly loved by him, afflicted at the situation to which he beheld him reduced, resolved to extricate him from it by all the means in his power, and, though very well intentioned, yet sensible to the pro-

earlier of this respectable duty, if the expression of the treaty itself had not opposed it.

"I wait with the utmost impatience for the explanations which your Imperial Highness shall be pleased to offer me immediately after your arrival in Paris; and since his Imperial and Royal Majesty has demonstrated that he should see with pleasure the king my master distinguish marshal Duroc with the Golden Fleece, I have the honour to accompany it with this letter; and at the same time your Imperial Highness will find another forwarded herewith, which the Emperor will be pleased to give to the King of Westphalia, in demonstration of the alliance which exists, in fact, between his Catholic Majesty and all the sovereigns of the family of his Imperial and Royal Majesty.

"The trial of the criminal seducers of the prince of the Asturias is prosecuted according to the dispositions of our laws, because the king has been pleased to divest himself of his sovereign authority, by which he could have tried them alone, and left the judges at liberty to consult his Majesty upon their sentence. They have all incurred the penalty of being stripped of their dignities, and the two most inculpatated have deserved capital punishment; but the queen has disposed the will of the king to clemency, and the punishment of death will be commuted into perpetual imprisonment; and as for the others, they are to be banished from the kingdom. Care has been taken to refrain from the slightest mention of subjects of his Imperial and Royal Majesty, out of regard for what he has caused to be signified.

"I am very sorry that I am not able to write to your Imperial Highness in your own language, but I will not deprive myself of the satisfaction of addressing to you my original letter with this literal translation. It is not possible to transcribe the language of the heart, but on mine are imprinted the gratitude and admiration, with which will ever have for your Imperial Highness, with the highest consideration,

"Your invariable servant,

"San Lorenzo, December 20th, 1807."

"MANUEL.

spect which opened before him of being some day the friend, the director of the conscience, of the king of Spain. It was in the society of these personages and of a few ladies of the court attached to the deceased princess of the Asturias, that Ferdinand poured forth the bitter sentiments with which he was filled. The canon Escoiquiz being absent, he was secretly sent for to Madrid, because, in the opinion of Ferdinand and his little court, he was deemed the most capable of giving good advice. As he possessed more learning than the others, understood Virgil and Cicero, and was acquainted with the French authors, a degree of science uncommon at the court of Spain, it was conceived that in this labyrinth of horrible intrigues he would best direct the oppressed prince. On the arrival of the canon from Toledo, it was agreed that, in the serious danger which threatened him, the prince had but one resource—to throw himself at the feet of Napoleon, to invoke his protection, and, to ensure it more completely, to ask for a princess of the Bonaparte family in marriage. The canon Escoiquiz saw the advantages in such an alliance: the first, to secure an all-powerful protector; the second, to attain the end which Napoleon must have had in view, that of attaching Spain to his dynasty by close and solid ties. This counsel was listened to, though it was not to Ferdinand's taste. The young prince, in fact, fostered at the bottom of his heart some of the least commendable of Spanish passions, and especially a bitter hatred of foreign nations, and above all of the French revolution and its illustrious chief. These passions, which were natural to him, had been further fomented by his wife, the princess of Naples. However, full of confidence in the superior understanding of the canon Escoiquiz, he adopted his advice and resolved to conform to it. The canon had travelled; and for France and for Napoleon he entertained those sentiments which every enlightened Spaniard must feel.

But, if the prince of the Peace had the means of establishing relations of all kinds with the court of France, the prince of the Asturias, on the contrary, banished to the Escorial, closely and continually watched, had no means of transmitting his thoughts and his wishes to Napoleon. He and his friends resolved to address themselves to the ambassador of France, M. de Beauharnais.

M. de Beauharnais, brother of the first husband of the empress Josephine, had succeeded general Beurnonville at Madrid in 1806. He was a man of moderate understanding, an awkward and parsimonious ambassador, not fit for the delicate business of his station, and still less for making the figure which that station requires; endowed nevertheless with some good sense and perfect integrity. To all this he added a very ridiculous pride, arising from the sense of his situation, because he had, as we have just observed, the honour to be brother-in-law of the consort of his sovereign.

His gravity, his probity, his awkwardness, ill accorded with the trickery and the levity of the favourite, and he liked the latter

as little as he esteemed him. He transmitted to Napoleon reports conformable to what he felt. Hence he was considered at Madrid as an enemy of the grand-admiral. These were favourable circumstances for Ferdinand's confidants. The canon Escoiquiz undertook to call on M. de Beauharnais; and he obtained access to him upon the pretext of presenting him with a poem which he had composed on the conquest of Mexico. The canon proceeded by degrees to more intimate communications, opened himself entirely to the ambassador of France, made him acquainted with the situation of the prince, with his dangers, with his wishes, and with the desire which he had conceived of obtaining a wife from the hand of Napoleon, being determined not on any account to have the one destined for him by Emmanuel Godoy.*

M. de Beauharnais was much too new in the profession in

* M. de Torenó and several historians, both French and Spanish, have alleged that M. de Beauharnais had received from Paris, or had taken upon himself, the commission to enter into communication with the prince of the Asturias, either for the purpose of instilling into him the idea of marrying a French princess, or of dividing the royal family of Spain, and thus securing the means of sowing dissensions in it of which advantage was afterwards taken. This is a complete error, as is proved by the official and the secret correspondence of M. de Beauharnais. In this double correspondence the ambassador relates how the agents of the prince of the Asturias came to him, and from his account, perfectly sincere, for he was incapable of lying, it evidently results that this intercourse originated with the prince of the Asturias, and not with the French legation. We shall presently quote two papers, which perfectly clear up this point. The first is a despatch from M. de Champagny, in which that minister, in reply to a letter of M. de Beauharnais, full of reserve, enjoins him, in very sharp language, to express himself more clearly. This first despatch proves positively that it was not Napoleon who had the idea of interfering with the interior of the royal family of Spain, and that, on the contrary, application was made to him. The second is the very letter of prince Ferdinand to M. de Beauharnais, in which that prince had enclosed the proposal of marriage addressed to Napoleon. The proposal of marriage has been published; but the letter in which it was enclosed was never known or published. The mere perusal of this second paper will prove that neither M. de Beauharnais nor his government commenced the intercourse with the prince of the Asturias. From the tone of this letter, it is easy to perceive that the prince sought those to whom he addresses himself, and was not sought by them.

Here is the despatch of M. de Champagny to M. de Beauharnais:—

“Paris, 9th September, 1807.

“Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,—I have received your confidential letter, and lose no time in replying to it, without admitting an intermediary between you and me. All the means that you deem it proper to employ in order to make me acquainted either with the persons with whom you are likely to have to treat, or with the state of the affairs which you have to conduct, will appear very good to me, if they shall tend to throw upon them more light, and in a surer manner. You need not have any fears about the use which I shall make of your letters. Any communication through the offices (*bureaux*), whenever it does take place, will always be without danger; they deserve the utmost confidence, and, for several years past, they have been guardians of the greatest interests of the government and depositories of its most important secrets. Besides, it is one of the first duties of every minister to a foreign court to inform his government, without restriction and without reserve, of all that he sees, of all that he hears, of all that comes to his knowledge. Placed for the purpose of seeing and hearing, furnished with all the means of gaining information, what he learns does not belong to himself, it is the property of him whose representative he is. You know this duty better than any one, and it is no doubt in order to fulfil it in its

which he was engaged not to be alarmed at so delicate a position, for the overture involved his assenting to a clandestine intercourse with the heir to the crown. He was fearful of being deceived by intriguers and compromised with the court of Spain. He refused at first to believe the canon Escóiquiz, and received his overtures with a coolness capable of discouraging men less determined to make themselves listened to and understood. But the canon

whole extent that you wish to multiply these means of communication with me: I am far from objecting to that.

"Your confidential letter contains very important things, so important that it is to be regretted that you have not represented them in greater detail, and in particular that you have not stated how they have come to you. Such was the reflection of the Emperor when I had the honour of conversing with him on the subject. What have been your relations with the young prince of whom you speak? What are the positive reasons which you have for judging of him in a certain manner? He implores, you say, on his knees, the protection of the Emperor; how do you know this? Has he told you so himself? or by whom has he desired that you should be told it? These questions are asked you by the Emperor, and it is he who has made the reflection which I mentioned above, that a minister ought to have no secrets from his government.

"CHAMPAGNY."

Here follows the letter of prince Ferdinand to M. de Beauharnais:—

"You will permit me, monsieur l'ambassadeur, to express to you all my gratitude for all the proofs of esteem and affection which you have given me in the secret and indirect correspondence that we have had hitherto through the person whom you know, and who has all my confidence. I owe, in short, to your kindness, which I shall never forget, the happiness of being able to express directly, and without risk, to the great Emperor your master, the sentiments so long retained in my heart. I avail myself therefore of this happy moment to address by your hands to his Imperial and Royal Majesty the accompanying letter, and, fearful of annoying him by misplaced prolixity, I, as yet, only half express the esteem, respect, and affection, which I feel for his august person; and I request you, monsieur l'ambassadeur, to make amends for this in the letters which you will have the honour to write to him.

"You will likewise do me the favour to add to his Imperial and Royal Majesty, that I conjure him to excuse any faults against usage and style which there may be in my said letter, as well on account of my being a foreigner, as in consideration of the anxiety and restraint under which I am obliged to write it, being, as you know, beset even in my chamber with spies, who watch me, and forced to avail myself for this purpose of the few moments that I can steal from their malicious eyes. As I flatter myself that I shall obtain in this affair the protection of his Imperial and Royal Majesty, and that in consequence the communications will become more necessary and more frequent, I charge the said person who has hitherto had this commission to take his measures in concert with you for conducting it safely, as he has thus far had no warrant for the said commission but the tokens agreed upon; being thoroughly assured of his integrity, his discretion, and his prudence, I give him by this letter my full and absolute powers for negotiating this affair till its conclusion, and I ratify all that he shall say or do on this point in my name, as if I had said and done it myself, which you will have the goodness to communicate to his Imperial Majesty with the most sincere expressions of my gratitude.

"You will also have the goodness to tell him that, if his Imperial Majesty should happen to deem it useful, at whatever time it might be, for me to send to his court with suitable secrecy some confidential person, to give him more complete information concerning my situation than can be given in writing, or for any other purpose that his wisdom may judge necessary, his Imperial Majesty has but to send you word to be instantly obeyed, as he shall be in every thing that shall depend on me.

"I repeat, sir, the assurances of my esteem and gratitude. I request you to preserve this letter as a testimony of the perpetuity of my sentiments, and I pray God to have you in his holy keeping.

"Written and signed by my own hand, and sealed with my seal,

"The Escorial, 11th of October, 1807."

"FERDINAND."

devised a singular method of obtaining credit : this was to establish an exchange of signs between the prince and M. de Beauharnais in the visits which the latter made to the Escorial for the purpose of paying his respects to the court. These signs, agreed upon beforehand, could not leave any doubt respecting the secret mission which the canon Escoiquiz alleged that he had received from Ferdinand. In fact, M. de Beauharnais, on his first visit to the Escorial, observed the prince attentively, perceived the preconcerted signs, was, moreover, on his own part the object of the most marked attentions, and could no longer feel any uncertainty respecting the mission of the canon Escoiquiz. When he was satisfied on this point, he still deferred listening to him till he should be authorised by his court to enter upon business of that kind. He then sent to Paris a mysterious despatch, saying that an innocent son, cruelly treated by his father and his mother, solicited the support of Napoleon, and desired to become his grateful and devoted *protégé*. Napoleon, angry at this ridiculous mystery, ordered M. de Beauharnais to be enjoined to make himself more clear and intelligible. The latter obeyed, and related all that had passed. He gave a detailed account of it in a secret correspondence, which exhibited alike his awkwardness and his sincerity, and which neither was to be, nor was, deposited in the office for foreign affairs. He was told in reply that he must hear every thing, promise nothing more than a friendly interest for the misfortunes of the prince, and, as for the proposal of marriage, to declare that the overture was too vague to be taken into consideration, and to be followed either by assent or refusal.

Commenced in July, 1807, this intercourse was continued in August and September, with the same fear of committing himself on the part of M. Beauharnais, and the same desire to be accepted on the part of Ferdinand. That prince at length determined to have two letters delivered by the canon Escoiquiz, one for the ambassador, the other for Napoleon himself, in which deploring his wretched situation and the dangers with which he was threatened, he formally solicited the protection of France, and the hand of a princess of the Bonaparte family. These two letters, dated the 11th of October, were not despatched till the 20th, in consequence of the pains taken by M. de Beauharnais to procure a safe messenger, and did not arrive before the 27th or 28th, when other tidings not less important, the subject of which we are about to state, reached Paris.

While Ferdinand was applying to Napoleon, not knowing whether the French protection would be prompt enough, or signified strongly enough, to save him, he had resolved to take at the same time his precautions at Madrid itself. In accord with his friends, he conceived the idea of making an appeal to his father, in order to open his eyes, denouncing the crimes of the prince of the Peace, the complicity of the queen, and, if not her adulterous connexion with the favourite, at least her abject submission to

the will of that ruler of the royal household ; lastly, beseeching him to put an end to the scandals, to the calamities which desolated Spain, and to the dangers which threatened an unfortunate son. Ferdinand was to deliver to the king a paper containing these revelations, with a request that, after reading, he would return it to him, for an indiscretion might endanger his life. The minute of this paper was in the hand-writing of the canon Escoiquiz. Independently of this proceeding, the authors of the plan had conceived the further idea, in case the king should die suddenly, to give to the duke de l'Infantado powers signed beforehand by Ferdinand, by virtue of which the duke should have the military command of Madrid and New Castille, that he might be enabled to resist by force of arms, if necessary, any attempt of the prince of the Peace. Such were the means prepared by this coterie to guard against any design of usurpation, whether real or imaginary ; and assuredly these means showed neither great depth of understanding, nor great boldness of character. But, during these proceedings of the prince and his friends, spies posted about them had observed unusual goings and comings. They had seen Ferdinand himself writing several times, which it was not customary for him to do, and they had heard him, in his exasperation against his mother and the favourite, use expressions of extreme bitterness. The entry of the French troops into Spain, a subject of endless conjectures, had also given occasion for very inconsiderate language on the part of the prince and his friends. The latter already looked upon themselves as certain of the protection of France, and liked to boast of it: though they had long made it a crime in Emmanuel Godoy to seek it, and to pay for it with a blind submission, they took pleasure in insinuating, nay, sometimes in saying plainly, that it was not for nothing that the French armies were crossing the Pyrenees, and that the contemptible government which oppressed Spain would not be long in discovering this ; which was unfortunately more true than they themselves imagined, and than they soon had occasion to wish.

Among the persons commissioned to watch Ferdinand, one (it is said that she was a lady of the court) having either been entrusted with the prince's secrets, or having cast an indiscreet eye over his papers, revealed all to the queen. The latter, on learning these particulars, was seized with a violent paroxysm of rage. The prince of the Peace was not at that moment at the Escorial, distant about a dozen leagues from Madrid. He was accustomed to pass a week alternately at the Escorial and Madrid. He was ill, it was said, in consequence of his debaucheries. He was sent for secretly, and left his palace by a private door, desiring on this occasion that his presence at the Escorial should not be known, and to prevent all idea that he could be the instigator of the scenes which were preparing. The queen, more exasperated than he, strove to persuade the king that the circumstances denounced proved nothing less than an extensive conspiracy against his

throne and life, insisted that it was necessary to act immediately, without fear of publicity now become inevitable, to fall unawares upon the apartments of the prince, and to seize his papers before he had time to destroy them. The weak Charles IV., incapable of perceiving how far he was involving himself by such a step, consented to all that was desired of him, and that same evening, the 27th of October, the day on which the treaty was signed at Fontainebleau, permitted his son's apartments to be violated and his papers seized. The prince who, excepting a little shrewdness, had neither understanding nor courage, was thunderstruck, and delivered without resistance all that he had. The papers which we have just mentioned, mixed with others more insignificant, were carried to the queen, who determined to examine them herself. One may conceive the rage of that princess on reading the paper in which all the turpitudes of the favourite were denounced, and her own at least hinted at. Imbecile and enslaved as was the unfortunate Charles IV., this paper would not have been sufficient to persuade him that his son meditated a crime, and it might perhaps, by opening his eyes, have attained the end proposed by the canon Escoiquiz and Ferdinand. But, unluckily, there were other papers, such as a cipher destined for a mysterious correspondence, and the order appointing the duke de l'Infantado commandant of New Castille, in which a blank had been left for the date to be inserted at the moment of the king's death. These last papers were sufficient for the queen to found all imaginable suppositions upon, in order to deceive the unfortunate Charles IV., in order to deceive herself. After perusing these papers, unable to repress her passion, she said, perhaps she believed, that they furnished proofs of a conspiracy tending to dethrone her and her husband, to threaten even their lives; or why that cipher, if not to correspond with conspirators? why that appointment of a military commandant by Ferdinand, who was not yet king, if not to consummate a criminal usurpation? This demonstration laid before poor Charles IV., with no other proofs than many outbursts of rage, filled him with affliction. He shed tears of sorrow over a son whom he still loved, and whom he was grieved to find so culpable. He then thanked Heaven for saving his life, his throne, his wife, and his friend Emmanuel, from so great a danger. The queen, excited by the vehemence natural to the sex, to take an initiative in all this convenient for the favourite—the queen declared that the case demanded a prompt, an energetic repression, which should satisfy the outraged majesty of the throne and secure the State from the repetition of such plots. It was therefore resolved that the prince and his accomplices should be arrested that very instant, that the ministers and the principal personages of the State should then be summoned, that the discovery just made should be communicated to them, with the royal resolution to institute a criminal process against the culprits. This was an abominable and a sense-

less resolution, for, after such a clamour, it was imperative to prosecute the prince to the utmost, to convict him of the crime, were he innocent, to deprive him of his rights to the throne and thus to give that throne, suspended on the brink of an abyss, such a shock as might, and actually did, precipitate it into that abyss. But to prosecute the prince, to get him condemned by sold judges, to deprive him of the crown, was precisely what that infuriated queen aimed at, whatever the peril incurred by it. All that she wished for was accomplished. Godoy was sent back to Madrid, to induce a belief that he had never left it, and that he had no hand in the tragic scenes at the Escorial. The king went to Ferdinand, demanded his sword, and constituted him prisoner in his own apartments. Couriers were then despatched in all directions, to give orders for the apprehension of the alleged accomplices of the prince. The ministers and the members of the councils were convoked, and, with consternation in their countenances, received the communication of all that had been decided upon. They gave their silent assent, not from zeal, but from timidity.

It was not possible, after such scandal, to conceal from the Spanish nation the deplorable events of which the Escorial had just been the theatre. In enslaved countries, where all publicity is prohibited, important news circulates not the less speedily, nor the less completely. It flies from mouth to mouth, propagated by an ardent curiosity, and exaggerated by a credulity that is not undeceived. The scenes passing at the Escorial were already known to all Madrid, and would soon be known to all Spain. Still, to publish officially the alleged discovery of the plot, would be denouncing the prince to the nation and rendering the misfortunes of the throne irreparable. But the queen and the favourite would have it so. In consequence, they required an act of publicity, and, in a country where there was no such thing but for the most important events, such as a birth, the death of a king, a declaration of war, a signature of peace, a great victory, a great defeat, the following royal decree was communicated to all the authorities of the kingdom:

“God, who watches over his creatures, does not permit the consummation of atrocious deeds when the victims are innocent; accordingly, his omnipotence has preserved me from the most terrible catastrophe. All my subjects are perfectly acquainted with my religious sentiments and the regularity of my morals; all love me, and I receive from all proofs of the veneration due to a father who loves his children. I was living in the persuasion of this truth, when an unknown hand came to reveal to me the most monstrous and unheard of plan framed against me in my own palace. My own life, so often threatened, had become an incumbrance to my successor, who, infatuated, blinded, and abjuring all the principles of the Christian faith, taught him through my care and my paternal affection, had entered into a conspiracy for de-

throning me. I therefore resolved to ascertain myself the truth of the fact, and surprising my son in his own apartments, I found in his possession the cipher used for his communications with the villains and the instructions which he received from them. I summoned the governor *ad interim* of the council to examine these papers in concert with the other ministers; they applied themselves assiduously to all the necessary investigations. Every thing was done, and the result was the discovery of several culprits; I decreed that they should be apprehended, and my son was under arrest in his own habitation. This sorrow was wanting to all those which afflict me; it is likewise that which it is most important to make its author expiate; and in the mean time, till I order the publication of the result of the proceedings commenced, I will not neglect to manifest to my subjects my affliction, which the proofs of their loyalty will have the effect of diminishing. You will consider this as understood, to the end that the knowledge of it may be diffused in the suitable form.

“San Lorenzo (the Escorial), 30th October 1807.

“*To the Governor ad interim of the Council.*”

In this court, where one durst not do any thing without referring to Paris, where the oppressed son, the involuntarily oppressing father, the favourite, the persecutor of both, sought in Napoleon a support under their misfortune, their silliness, or their crime, it was not possible to commit such deplorable extravagances without writing to him on the subject. In consequence, on the very day previous to the official act just quoted, a letter to Napoleon was dictated to the unhappy Charles IV. full of a ridiculous sorrow, destitute of dignity, in which he said that he was betrayed by his son, and threatened in his person and his power, and announced nothing less than a determination to change the order of the succession to the throne.*

* I subjoin the very text of that letter.

Letter of King Charles IV. to the Emperor Napoleon.

“Sir, my brother, at the moment when I was wholly occupied with the means of co-operating in the destruction of our common enemy, when I believed that all the plots of the *ci-devant* queen of Naples were buried with her daughter, I see, with a horror which makes me shudder, that the spirit of intrigue has penetrated into the very bosom of my palace. Alas! my heart bleeds in giving an account of so frightful a deed. My eldest son, heir presumptive to my throne, had formed a horrible plot to dethrone me: he had gone to such an excessive length as to engage in an attempt against the life of his mother. Such an atrocious crime ought to be punished with the most exemplary severity of the law. The law which called him to the succession must be revoked; one of his brothers will be more worthy to take his place both in my heart and on the throne. I am at this moment in search of his accomplices, in order to investigate thoroughly this plan of the blackest villany, and I will not lose a single moment in making your Imperial and Royal Majesty acquainted with it; beseeching you to assist me with your understanding and your counsels.

“Whereupon I pray God, my good brother, to have your Imperial and Royal Majesty in his holy keeping.

“Saint Laurent, 29th October, 1807.”

“CHARLES.

Napoleon, as we have seen above, had not received the letter of the 11th of October, in which Ferdinand solicits his protection and a wife, till the 28th of the same month. He received successively, on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of November, those of his ambassador and of Charles IV., which informed him of the scandal which the sovereigns of the Escorial had not been afraid to occasion. He was therefore obliged in some measure to interfere in the affairs of Spain, whether he would or not, and certainly much earlier than he had expected or wished to do so. For some time past, as we have already related, he said to himself, that it was dangerous to leave Bourbons on a throne at once so lofty and so near a neighbour; and that he must, besides, relinquish all hope of deriving any useful service from Spain, while it should continue in the hands of a degenerate race. He knew not what pretext to use for striking the prostrate slaves at his feet, detesting him, well disposed to betray him, trying sometimes to do so, then disavowing with humility the treacheries in which they had scarcely engaged. Neither did he disguise from himself the danger, in dethroning the Spanish dynasty, of galling an ardent, untractable nation, desirous of changes, incapable of effecting them itself, and ready to revolt against the foreign hand that should attempt to effect them for it. He delayed, therefore, being in no hurry, nor yet decided what course to pursue; witness the treaty of Fontainebleau, which contained nothing but adjournments. But a son applying to him for a wife and his protection, a father denouncing that son to him as a criminal, offered, one might say forced upon him, an occasion for interfering immediately in the affairs of Spain; and still, full of doubts and anxieties, desiring, dreading what he was about to undertake, undertaking it from a sort of fatal impulsion, he gave hasty orders, signs of a strongly excited mind.

Hitherto the only object of the movements of troops prescribed by him had been Portugal.* But from this moment the preparations received an extent and an acceleration, which could not leave any uncertainty respecting their object. He had composed general Junot's army, destined to take possession of Portugal, with the three camps of St. Lo, Pontivy, and Napoleon; general Dupont's army of reserve (known by the name of second corps of the Gironde) with the first, second, and third battalions of five legions of reserve and some Swiss battalions. These two armies, the one already in Spain, the other on march for Bayonne, formed an effective of about 50,000 men. These would not be enough, if serious events should take place in the Peninsula; for the second only of these armies could be employed in Spain. Napoleon

* The repeated perusal of his most secret correspondence has proved to me that, till the events at the Escorial, he thought of Portugal only, and that after those events he thought solely of Spain. The dates of his orders, compared with the dates of the news from Madrid, cannot leave a doubt concerning their correlation, and prove that the one were the certain consequence of the others.

hastened its march toward Bayonne, ordered general Dupont to go immediately and put himself at its head, and resolved to compose a third, which borrowed its title from the specious necessity for watching the coasts of the Ocean, deprived of the troops which had been employed in guarding them. He called this third army Corps of Observation of the Coasts of the Ocean, and gave the command of it to marshal Moncey, who had formerly served in Spain, and resolved that it should be about 34,000 strong. In order to compose it, he drafted from the dépôts of the regiments of the grand army stationed along the Rhine from Basle to Wesel. These dépôts, which had received several conscriptions, and had no further detachments to send to the grand army, were full of young soldiers, whose training had already commenced, and with some of them was nearly finished. For a corps of observation, whether in France or in Spain, Napoleon thought these young soldiers quite sufficient. He gave orders, therefore, for drafting from the 48 dépôts stationed on the Rhine, 48 provisional battalions, composed of four companies, of 150 men each, being 600 men per battalion, making a total of 28,000 infantry. He ordered four of these battalions to be united and to form a regiment, two regiments to form a brigade, two brigades a division, and the entire corps to form three divisions, under generals Musnier, Gobert, and Morlot. The points where they were to be organized were Metz, Sedan, Nancy. These troops were to have the organisation of provisional corps, each battalion being still dependent on the regiment from which it was detached. Napoleon gave orders for attaching to each division a battery of foot artillery, for forming at Besançon and La Fère three other batteries of horse artillery, which would make the whole artillery of the corps amount to 36 pieces. General Mouton had orders to proceed to Metz, Nancy, and Sedan, to superintend the execution of these measures. The four brigades of cavalry, of provisional formation also, assembled at Compiègne, Chartres, Orleans, and Tours, were distributed between the two corps of generals Moncey and Dupont. The cuirassiers and the chasseurs were attached to that of general Dupont, the dragoons and the hussars to that of marshal Moncey. The army of general Junot being sufficient for the occupation of Portugal, there would consequently be left to meet events in Spain the corps of general Dupont, entitled Second of the Gironde, and the corps of marshal Moncey, entitled Corps of Observation of the Coasts of the Ocean, forming between those two alone about 60,000 men. Lastly, the news from Madrid growing worse from day to day, Napoleon prescribed, as he had before done, the establishment of relays of carts from Metz, Nancy, and Sedan, to Bordeaux, that his troops might travel post. To encourage them to endure fatigue, and also to conceal his object, he directed the soldiers to be told that they were going to the relief of their brethren in Portugal, threatened by the landing of an English army.

Napoleon made a retrograde movement of his veteran soldiers towards the Rhine coincide with this movement of his conscripts towards Spain. All the countries beyond the Vistula were evacuated. Marshal Davout, who, with the Poles, the Saxons, his third corps, and part of the dragoons, had remained in Poland, beyond the Vistula, and formed the first command, fell back between the Vistula and the Oder, occupying Thorn, Warsaw, and Posen, his cavalry upon the Oder itself. Poland, strongly recommended to Napoleon by the King of Saxony, thus obtained a considerable relief. Marshal Soult, who formed the second command, received orders to evacuate Old Prussia, and to fall back upon Prussian and Swedish Pomerania, his cavalry alone continuing to live in the island of Nogat. On the right of the Vistula there were left only Oudinot's grenadiers at Dantzic. The first corps, transferred to Marshal Victor, continued to occupy Berlin, with the heavy cavalry in rear, on the banks of the Elbe. Marshal Mortier, with the fifth and sixth corps and two divisions of dragoons, was left in Upper and Lower Silesia. The prince of Ponte Corvo, commanding alone the shores of the Baltic, since the reduction of Stralsund and the dissolution of the corps of marshal Brune, was to occupy Lübeck with Dupas' division, Lünenburg with Boudet's division, Hamburg with the Spaniards, Bremen with the Dutch. All the surplus cavalry not comprehended in these different commands was sent into Hanover. The Bavarians, the Würtembergers, the Baden troops, the Hessians, and the Italians, were authorised to return home. The heavy siege artillery, the stores of clothing, shoes, arms, made at a high price in Poland and Germany, were despatched to Magdeburg. The imperial guard, to the number of 12,000 men, hastened to march towards Paris.

Napoleon, in prescribing these movements, had the two-fold intention of relieving the north of Europe from its burden, and of bringing back a few regiments of old troops to France. Independently of the guard which would soon arrive, he ordered the return of a certain portion of the foot artillery, and many skeletons of dragoons. With his usual dexterity, he managed this business so that there should result from this change, instead of a dissolution, a better organization of these *corps d'armée*.

The corps of Lannes, composed of Oudinot's grenadiers, had at first been left at Dantzic. There were grenadiers sufficient for Dantzic, both as a defence and as a burden. Napoleon pronounced the dissolution of Verdier's division, composed of four fine regiments of infantry. Two of these regiments, the 2nd and 12th light, forming part of the garrison of Paris, were recalled to that capital. The two others, the 72nd and the 3rd of the line, were attached to St. Hilaire's division, to compensate it for three regiments, the 43rd, 55th, and 14th of the line, which were taken from it because they had their dépôt at the camp of Boulogne and at Sedan. This division still comprised five regiments, a number

which Napoleon would not exceed. Morand's division, having six regiments, was diminished by the 51st. Dupas' division, which, with the Saxons and Poles, composed Mortier's corps at Friedland, now dissolved, formed only a temporary assemblage, and bore heavily on the city of Lübeck. Napoleon took from it the 4th light, which belonged to the garrison of Paris, and the 15th of the line, which belonged to Brest. Lastly, the 44th of the line, left in garrison at Dantzic to rest itself there after the disaster of Eylau, being no longer necessary in that city, was recalled. The 7th of the line, having become disposable by the evacuation of Braunau, was likewise recalled. The artillery of Verdier's dissolved division joined the corps returning to France. In the North the arm of the dragoons was more numerous than it needed to be. The third squadrons of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 9th 10th, 15th, 4th regiments, after turning over all their men to the first two squadrons, were likewise to return to France.

Thus, without disorganizing his corps, by restoring them to more uniform proportions, and breaking only temporary aggregations, Napoleon contrived to create means for bringing ten fine regiments of infantry, belonging almost all either to Paris or to the camps on the coasts; which was an additional congruity, for these regiments, being those which had contributed most to the corps of Portugal and the Gironde, were thus brought near to their detachments. That profound art of disposing troops is perhaps the loftiest part of the science of war. It is necessary for every government, even though pacific, by title of good administration. The grand army in the North was still about 300,000 French, exclusive of the Poles and Saxons left in Poland, and the Bavarians and Würtembergers, the Badenese, the Hessians, and the Italians, marching to their own countries, but not disbanded, and ready to return at the first call. Adding to the grand army the armies of Upper Italy, Dalmatia, Naples, the Ionian Islands, Spain, and the interior, Napoleon had then 800,000 French troops, and at least 150,000 allied troops,* a

* We think it right to quote here a curious letter from Napoleon to Joseph, in which he shows him, and in great confidence, the immense extent of his forces, a letter which betrays, along with his pride at seeing them so great, his embarrassment at having to pay such a number.

Letter from the Emperor to the King of Naples.

“Fontainebleau, 21st of October, 1807.

“The urgent necessity there is for me to establish good order in the state of my military force, to avoid producing derangement in all my affairs, requires that I should establish my army in Naples on a definitive footing, and that I should know that it is duly kept up.

“You will judge what attention I am obliged to pay to details when you know that I have more than 800,000 men on foot. I have still an army on the Passarge, near the Niemen; I have one at Warsaw; I have one in Silesia; I have one at Hamburg; I have one at Berlin; I have one at Boulogne; I have one on march for Portugal; I have a second, which I am assembling at Bayonne; I have one in Italy; I have one in Dalmatia, which I am at this moment reinforcing with six thousand men; I have one at Naples; I have garrisons on all my maritime frontiers. You may judge, therefore, when this tide flows back into the interior

colossal, an alarming force, if we moreover consider that the greater part of it was composed of veteran soldiers, that the conscripts themselves were introduced into old skeletons, that all of them were commanded by the most experienced, the ablest officers that war has ever produced; and, lastly, that these marched under the orders of the greatest of captains.

After he had withdrawn his old troops from the Rhine, and pushed his young soldiers towards the Pyrenees, Napoleon, full of an eager curiosity, waited impatiently for tidings from Madrid, which, he conceived, must follow in rapid succession, in consequence of so flagrant a step as the arrest of the presumptive heir to the crown. Having come to no fixed resolution, hoping for that event which should be most conformable to his wishes, not relying in the least on the intelligence of M. de Beauharnais, though he had full reliance on his integrity, he gave him no other instruction than to observe all that passed, and report it to Paris with all possible despatch.

It is by successive shocks that great revolutions develop themselves, and always with longer intervals between them than human impatience would wish for. Such was the case at this time in Spain. Events did not follow one another so rapidly as had been at first expected.

The prince of the Asturias, engaged in a scheme in which there was assuredly very little criminality, the object of which, after all, was only to open the eyes of a deceived father, and to prevent usurpation—the prince of the Asturias, engaged in this scheme without prudence, without discretion, without courage—soon proved that he deserved the slavery from which he had aimed at releasing himself. Shut up alone in his apartments, terrified when he thought of the fate which the founder of the Escorial, Philip II., had inflicted on the Infant Don Carlos, full of exaggerated ideas of the cruelty of the favourite, credulous enough to admit that this favourite and his mother had caused his wife to be poisoned, he imagined that he was undone, and thought to save his life by the basest of means, by informing against his alleged accomplices. This son, worthy, as we see, of those against whose oppression he was struggling, formed the design of throwing himself at the feet of his mother and confessing every thing to her—a confession which could scarcely satisfy her if he told her nothing but the truth; but which would become the most infamous perfidy, if, to please her, he charged his accomplices with supposititious crimes. After the communication to the members of the councils, quoted above, the king had gone to seek in hunting that oblivion of the cares of government which he could not endure longer than a few moments. The queen was alone at the Escorial,

of my dominions, and I shall cease to find foreign alleviation, how necessary it will be that all my expenses should be rigidly calculated.

“ You ought to have an inspector of reviews skilful enough to make out a statement of what a regiment ought to cost you according to our regulations.”

still transported with anger. Emmanuel Godoy remaining ill at Madrid, where he pretended to be much worse than he really was. Ferdinand sent to beseech his mother to come to see him in his apartments, to receive his confession and the assurance of his repentance and submission. That princess, who had more understanding than her son, who had no desire for a reconciliation, the probable consequence of the interview solicited by the prince, sent to him M. de Caballero, minister of grace and justice, an extremely circumspect personage, capable of assuming all sorts of parts, but preferring to all others that one which should bring him nearest to the victorious party. Ferdinand deeply humbled himself before this minister of his father's, declared what had passed, confining his account to the truth, which was not very overwhelming: he maintained that he had designed only to fore-arm himself against any attacks upon his rights, and added, what was still unknown, that he had written to Napoleon, to solicit from him the hand of a French princess. The most serious thing in his confession was his naming the dukes de San Carlos and de l'Infantade, and above all the canon Escoiquiz, as the instigators who had led him astray. The result of the declaration was the immediate apprehension with unexampled brutality and incarceration at the Escorial, of the personages whom he had denounced. The prisoners answered, with a dignity and firmness which did them honour, all the questions which were put to them, and, reducing the accusation to so much of it as was true, declared that they had only designed to enlighten Charles IV., deceived by an unworthy favourite, to deliver the prince of Asturias from an intolerable oppression, and to prevent, in case of the king's death, an act of usurpation foreseen and dreaded by all Spain. The firmness of these honest men, culpable, no doubt, for having engaged in irregular proceedings, but having an extraordinary situation for their excuse,—their firmness, we say, threw dishonour on both the infamous court that would fain have sacrificed them to its vengeance, and on the pusillanimous prince who repaid their devoted attachment by the basest desertion.

The effect, however, of this audacious and foolish proceeding was immense throughout the whole Peninsula. There was but one cry of rage and indignation against the prince of the Peace, and against the queen, who were bent, it was said, on sacrificing a virtuous son, the only hope of the nation. People were not acquainted with the bottom of things, but they refused to believe that absurd imputation levelled against the prince of Asturias, of harbouring a design to dethrone his father; and the popular good sense discerned that there was nothing more in the inculpatory acts than an effort to undeceive Charles IV., and some precautions to prevent the favourite from usurping the supreme authority. At length the application made by Ferdinand to Napoleon becoming known by degrees, the scandalous trial at the Escorial was attributed to the anger which the court must have felt on that

point. The public mind, conforming immediately to what the adored heir to the crown had done, approved of it without reserve. It was admitted that it was an excellent idea to apply to that great man, who had re-established order and religion in France, who could, if he pleased, regenerate Spain, without making her pass through a revolution: it was above all a wise idea to think of uniting the two houses by the ties of blood; for that union alone could put an end to the jealousies which still separated the Bourbons from the Bonapartes. Ferdinand was applauded for having had confidence in Napoleon; they felt indebted to Napoleon for having inspired him with it; and immediately, with the fickleness, the ardour, of a warm-hearted nation, the whole population of Spain, conceived but one wish, uttered but one cry: that was, to insist that the long columns of French troops proceeding towards Lisbon should turn aside for a moment to Madrid, to deliver a deceived father and a persecuted son from the monster who oppressed them both. This sentiment was general, unanimous, in all classes of the nation: singular contrast with the sentiments which were soon to burst forth in that same Spain, hostile to France and to her chief!

After having long despised Spain for having suffered all kinds of scandals before her face, the favourite began to be alarmed on hearing the cry of reprobation raised against him in all quarters. Leaving his bed, to which he affected to be confined by severe indisposition, he resolved to show himself at the Escorial as peace-maker and reconciler. The excited passions of the queen were more difficult to repress than his own; and he had some trouble to make her sensible that they must stop short in the course which they were pursuing, unless they meant to provoke a sort of popular insurrection. The signature of the treaty of Fontainebleau had just been communicated to him, though that treaty was not yet to receive the consecration of publicity. Emmanuel Godoy was rejoiced that he had obtained the quality of sovereign prince, with the guarantee of that new quality by France. He found in this a reason for taking courage, for avoiding any violent crisis, for seeking, in short, gentler means of attaining his end. To dishonour the prince of the Asturias seemed to him safer than to inflict on him a condemnation which would revolt all Spain, and after which that prince would become the idol of the Spanish nation.*

* M. de Toreno has alleged, and other writers have repeated, that the motive which caused the proceedings commenced against the prince of the Asturias to be suspended, was no other than an injunction addressed by Napoleon to the prince of the Peace, not to compromise in any way the agents of the French government, or that government itself. This is a mere supposition, contradicted by facts and dates. It would have been easy to continue these proceedings without introducing into them the French ambassador, the communications with whom were the smallest of the grievances, while the other papers, such as that revealing to Charles IV. the conduct of the favourite, the cipher, the eventual appointment of the duke de l'Infantado, constituted the alleged crimes of the prince and his accomplices. What affords a still stronger proof of this is, that the proceedings against the accomplices of the prince were continued, and that, the grievances remaining exactly the same, the difficulty, had there been any,

A first step had been already taken in this course by the anxiety of the prince to offer his confession, for which he was not asked, and to denounce accomplices who were not thought of. In consequence, Emmanuel Godoy persuaded the queen, but not without difficulty, to grant a pardon, which the prince should solicit with humility, and acknowledging his guilt. He went therefore to Ferdinand's apartment, which had been converted into a prison, and was received, not with the contempt which he ought to have met with from a prince endowed with any dignity, but with the satisfaction experienced by an accused person who feels that he is saved. Emmanuel Godoy then proposed to Ferdinand, or Ferdinand to him, to write a letter to his father and another to his mother, in which he should solicit the most humiliating pardon, and after that all should be forgotten. Those two letters were conceived in the following terms.

"November 5th, 1807.

"Sire and my Father,

"I have rendered myself culpable in offending against your Majesty, I have offended against my father and my king. But I repent of it, and I promise your Majesty the most humble obedience. I ought not to do anything without the consent of your Majesty, but I was taken by surprise. I have denounced the guilty persons, and I beseech your Majesty to forgive me, and to permit your grateful son to kiss your feet."

"Madame and my Mother,

"I deeply repent of the great fault which I have committed against the king and against you, my father and my mother. I therefore implore your pardon with the greatest submission, as well as for my obstinacy in denying the truth to you the other night. I therefore beseech your Majesty from the bottom of my heart to deign to interpose your mediation with my father, that he will be pleased to permit me his grateful son to kiss his Majesty's feet."

After these letters were signed, a new public act of Charles IV. pronounced the pardon of the accused prince, reserving, however,

would have been as great with them as with the prince. But this invention, I repeat, is peremptorily contradicted by the dates. The begging pardon, and the royal act which grants it, are of the 5th of November. Now, at this time the arrest of the prince was scarcely known at Paris; for the seizure of his papers was on the 27th of October, his arrest on the 28th, and the circulation of all these facts at Madrid on the 29th. No explicit account then could have left Madrid before the 29th of October. All the couriers at that time took seven or eight days for the journey. The news therefore could not have reached Paris before the 5th of November. Had it even left on the 27th, it could not have been there before the 3rd, and assuredly there would not have been time to order at Paris on the 3rd, an act which was consummated at Madrid on the 5th, which had even been resolved on there on the 3rd or the 4th. The dates are consequently sufficient to contradict such a supposition. The prince of the Peace was induced to act the part of conciliator solely because the enterprise of obtaining the condemnation of the heir presumptive, in order to deprive him of his rights to the throne, was beyond his audacity and the patience of the Spanish nation.

the continuation of the proceedings commenced against his accomplices, and forbidding the circulation of the first act, in which he had been denounced to the Spanish nation. But it was too late to smother so great a scandal. The deplorable scenes at the Escorial were inseparable from one another, and none could remain concealed. The first disgraced the king, the queen, the favourite; the last disgraced the prince of the Asturias.

The effect on public opinion was not, however, what one would have supposed. Though all the actors in these scenes had deserved nearly equal censure, the father for his weakness, the mother and the favourite for their guilty passions, the son for his cowardly desertion of his friends, the Spanish people, nevertheless, resolved not to find any fault but with the favourite and the queen; neither would they regard the conduct of the prince as any thing more than a consequence of the oppression under which he groaned; his confessions as declarations either supposititious or extorted; and continued to love him with idolatry, to invest him with all imaginable virtues, to demand of Napoleon a movement of his mighty arm towards Spain. All at once, Napoleon became the tutelary deity, invoked on every side and by every voice. It is the only moment perhaps in which the Spanish people has ever admired with transport a hero who was not a Spaniard, and appealed to a foreign influence.

At the same time that Napoleon was informed of the accusation preferred against the prince of the Asturias, he also received intelligence of the pardon granted to that prince. He was as much surprised at the one as at the other; but he clearly saw that the course of this drama, which would have been tragic in another age, but which was only disgusting in ours, was slackening, to be resumed by and by, and to end subsequently in its conclusion. Though the step taken by the prince of the Asturias had disposed him favourably, he knew not whether it would be right to trust such a character; he knew not whether, in his weakness and in his passions, there were not reasons for seeing in him an impotent ally or a perfidious enemy. To give him a princess of the house of Bonaparte, apparently the easiest solution, was not, therefore, a very safe course. Besides, history exhibited but few encouraging instances in regard to princesses charged to attach Spain to us by marriages. Neither did it seem that to allow Charles IV., the prince of the Peace, and the queen, to continue to reign, would be a solution promising much duration, as well on account of the king's health, as that of the indignation ready to burst forth. To change the dynasty, appeared, therefore, the simplest course. But still, in this case, there was the danger of revolting the opinion of the Spanish nation, and, above all, the opinion of Europe, there being no pretext for dethroning princes, who, divided among themselves, were united only in calling in Napoleon as a friend and master. Persevering in his doubts, as Spain in her agitations, Napoleon resolved to avail himself of that momentary respite to devote a few days to Italy, and to regulate several important

affairs that demanded his presence. Besides, he was to meet in Italy his brother Lucien, to reconcile himself with him, to receive from his hand a daughter, who might be the princess destined for Spain, if the less violent plan of uniting the two houses by a marriage should be definitively adopted. These resolutions taken, he gave counter-orders to his armies, not to stop their march towards Spain, but to slacken the rapidity of that march. He directed that the troops of the corps of the Coasts of the Ocean, which were to have been conveyed post to Bordeaux, should perform that march on foot and without any haste. He enjoined general Dupont to make such arrangements that the second corps of the Gironde might enter Spain about the end of November, and he prescribed to him to go to Valladolid, without advancing further towards Portugal. He despatched from Paris his chamberlain, M. de Tournon, whose good sense he appreciated, with orders to go to Spain, to observe what was passing there, to ascertain thoroughly whether the prince of the Asturias had many partisans, whether the old court still retained any, and with the further commission to carry an answer to the various communications of Charles IV. In this answer, full of civility and generosity, Napoleon recommended to Charles IV. mildness and indulgence towards his son, denied that he had received any application from him, and strove to avoid sowing fresh seeds of discord, though he had more interest in exciting dissensions than in pacifying Spain.

This done, Napoleon, expecting that he should soon have to turn his attention again to that quarter, left Fontainebleau on the 16th of November, accompanied by Murat, by the ministers of the marine and the interior, by Messrs. Sganzin and de Proni, directors of several important services, and proceeded towards Milan, to embrace his beloved son prince Eugene de Beauharnais. On leaving, he gave orders for the triumphal reception of the imperial guard, which would soon arrive in Paris.

He wished to be absent from this solemnity, and, if possible, that nobody should even think of him. He wished that honour should be done to the army, to the army alone, by the festivities given to the guard which was the *élite* of that army. Accordingly, writing to the minister of the interior to prescribe the details of the ceremony, he said:—"In the emblems and inscriptions which shall be employed in this ceremony, my guard ought to be kept in view, not myself, and it ought to be shown that, in honouring the guard, the whole grand army is honoured."

Accordingly, on the 25th of November, the prefect of the Seine and the *maires* of Paris proceeded to the barrier of La Villette, followed by an immense concourse of people, to receive the heroes of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Friedland. Marshal Bessières was at their head. A triumphal arch had been erected at that spot. The ensigns stepped out of the ranks, lowered the standards, on which the magistrates of the capital placed crowns of gold, bearing the inscription "*The City of Paris to the grand Army.*"

Then the guard, numbering twelve thousand veteran soldiers, sun-burnt, mutilated, some of them having already gray beards, filed off through Paris, with an enthusiastic crowd at their heels, applauding their triumph. A plentiful repast, provided in the Champs Élysées, was offered to these twelve thousand soldiers by the city of Paris, which, in this fraternal and national solemnity, represented France, as well as the guard represented the army. The weather was not favourable towards the conclusion of the day, which was frequently rendered unpleasant by the rain; for it seemed that this army, which had no other share in our greatness and our faults but its heroism, was not lucky. Of the thousand millions decreed by the Convention, was left nothing but a *fête* promised in 1806 to the whole army of Austerlitz; of that *fête* was left nothing but this entertainment to the guard, which was damped by the weather and deprived of the presence of Napoleon. But the glory of the French army might well dispense with such frivolous pomp. History will relate that everybody in France from 1789 to 1845, excepting the army, mingled faults with his services; for while innocent victims were slaughtered in 1793, it was defending the country; while Napoleon violated the rules of prudence in 1807 and 1808, it confined itself to fighting; and, at all times, under all governments, it knew but how to devote itself and to die for the existence and the greatness of France.

BOOK XXIX.

ARANJUEZ.

EXPEDITION against Portugal—Composition of the Army destined for that Expedition—First entry of the French into Spain—March from Ciudad-Rodrigo to Alcantara—Dreadful hardships—General Junot, hastening towards Lisbon, follows the right of the Tagus, along the back of the mountains of Бейта—Arrival of the French army at Abrantes, in the most deplorable state—General Junot determines to march to Lisbon with the companies of *élite*—On learning the approach of the French, the prince-regent of Portugal decides to sail for Brazil—Precipitate embarkation of the court and of the principal Portuguese families—Occupation of Lisbon by general Junot—Further occurrences at the Escorial—State of the court of Spain since the arrest of the prince of the Asturias and the humiliating pardon granted to him—Continuation of the proceedings against his accomplices—Mistrust and fears which begin to seize the court—The idea of proceeding to America, after the example of the court of Braganza, occurs to the queen and to the prince of the Peace—Opposition of Charles IV. to this scheme—Before recurring to this extreme resource, the Spanish government seeks to reconcile itself with Napoleon, and renews, in the king's name, the application made by Ferdinand for a French princess.—To this application are added urgent solicitations for the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau—These communications cannot reach Napoleon till he is in Italy—His arrival at Milan—Works of public utility ordered in all the places through which he passes—Journey to Venice—Meeting of princes and sovereigns in that city—Plans of Napoleon for restoring Venice to her former commercial prosperity—Trip to Udine, Palma-Nova, and Osopo—Return to Milan by Legnago and Mantua—Interview at Mantua with Lucien Bonaparte—Residence at Milan—Fresh military orders relative to Spain, and postponement of the answers to be given to Charles IV.—Political affairs of the kingdom of Italy—Adoption of Eugene de Beauharnais, and the succession to the crown of Italy secured to his descendants—Milan Decrees opposed to the new maritime ordinances of England—Departure of Napoleon for Turin—Works ordered to connect Genoa with Piedmont, Piedmont with France—Return to Paris, on the 1st January, 1808—Napoleon is unable to delay any longer his answer to Charles IV. and the adoption of a definitive resolution respecting Spain—Three parties are formed—a marriage, a partition of territory, a change of dynasty—Irresistible impulsion of Napoleon towards the change of dynasty—Though decided as to the end, Napoleon is not fixed in regard to the means, and meanwhile he increases the number of the troops which he has in the Peninsula, and answers Charles IV. in an evasive manner—Levy of the Conscription of 1809—Colossal force of France at this period—System of military organization suggested to Napoleon by the dislocation of his regiments which have battalions in Germany, in Italy, in Spain—Napoleon is desirous of terminating this time all the affairs of the south of Europe—Aggravation of his quarrel with the Pope—General Miollis is ordered to occupy the Roman States—The

movement of the English troops towards the Peninsular, strips Sicily, and furnishes the long looked-for occasion for an expedition against that island—Union of French squadrons in the Mediterranean—Attempt to convey sixteen thousand men to Sicily and immense supplies to Corfu—Continuation of occurrences in Spain—Conclusion of the proceedings at the Escorial—Charles IV., on receiving the evasive answers of Napoleon, sends him another letter full of grief and uneasiness, and requiring an explanation relative to the accumulation of the French troops towards the Pyrenees—Being pressed with questions, Napoleon feels the necessity for coming to the point—He at length fixes upon his means of execution, and purposes, by frightening the court of Spain, to induce it to run away like the house of Braganza—This serious enterprise renders the Russian alliance more necessary for him than ever—Attitude of M. de Tolstoy at Paris—His alarming reports to the court of Russia—Explanation of Alexander with M. de Caulaincourt—Apprised by the latter of the danger which threatens the alliance, Napoleon writes to Alexander, and consents to enter into discussion on the partition of the empire of the East—Joy of Alexander and M. de Romanzoff—Various plans of partition—First idea of an interview at Erfurt—Invasion of Finland—Satisfaction at St. Petersburg—Napoleon, rendered easy respecting the Russian alliance, makes dispositions for bringing about a *dénoûment* in Spain, in the course of the month of March—Various orders given between the 20th and the 25th of February, to intimidate the court of Spain, and to dispose it to flight—Appointment of Murat to command the French army—Ignorance in which Napoleon leaves him respecting his political designs—Instructions relative to the march of the troops—Order for surprising St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, and Barcelona—The plan adopted placing the Spanish colonies in danger, Napoleon wards off that danger by an extraordinary order despatched to admiral Rosily—Entry of Murat into Spain—His reception in the Biscayan provinces and Castille—Character of those provinces—Entry into Vittoria and Burgos—State of the French Troops—Their youth, their destitution, their diseases—Embarrassment of Murat, arising from his ignorance of Napoleon's political object—Surprise of St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, and Barcelona—Mischievous effect produced by the capture of those three places—Alarm conceived at Madrid on receiving the last news from Paris—Definitive plan to retire to America—Opposition of Cabelero, the minister, to this plan—Reported preparation for the voyage—Extraordinary emotion among the population of Madrid and Aranjuez—The prince of the Asturias and his uncle Don Antonio opposed to all idea of retiring—The departure of the court fixed for the 15th or 16th of March—The population of Aranjuez and its environs, moved by curiosity, indignation, and secret tampering, collects in crowds about the royal residences, and exhibits alarming demonstrations—The court is obliged to publish on the 16th a proclamation contradicting the rumours of a voyage—It nevertheless continues its preparations—Revolution at Aranjuez in the night between the 17th and 18th of March—The populace breaks into the palace of the prince of the Peace, utterly destroys it, and seeks the prince himself with the intention of putting him to death—The king is obliged to strip Emmanuel Godoy of all his dignities—The search after the prince is continued—After hiding for thirty-six hours under some rush mats, he is discovered at the moment of leaving his retreat—A few of the Life Guards succeed in rescuing him from the fury of the people, and conduct him to their barracks, after receiving several wounds—The prince of the Asturias persuades the mob to disperse, by promising them that the prince of the Peace shall be brought to trial—The king and queen, alarmed at the three days' commotion, and hoping to save the lives of themselves and the favourite by abdicating, sign their abdication on the 19th of March—Character of the revolution of Aranjuez.

BOOK XXVIII.

WHILE Napoleon, resolved as to the end that he should pursue in Spain, uncertain as to the means, was travelling to Italy, full of confidence in the immensity of his power, the French armies were advancing into the Peninsula, and about to encounter for the first time the hardships which awaited them in that inhospitable country.

The army ordered to enter it first was that of general Junot: his commission, as we have seen, was to take possession of Portugal. It was composed of about 26,000 men; 23,000 present under arms, and followed by a reinforcement of from three to four thousand men drafted from the depots. It was distributed into three divisions, under generals Laborde, Loison, and Travot. It had for the principal officer of the staff general Thiébault, and for commander-in-chief, the brave Junot, the devoted aide-de-camp of Napoleon, for a moment ambassador in Portugal, an intelligent officer, bold to temerity, having no other defect than a natural ardour of disposition, destined to terminate one day in a mental malady. The army was composed of young soldiers of the conscription of 1807, levied in 1806, but embodied in the old skeletons and sufficiently trained. They were very capable of behaving well under fire, but unluckily not seasoned to fatigue, which, nevertheless, was likely to be their principal trial. Napoleon, anxious that they should enter Lisbon speedily, in order to catch there, not the royal family about which he cared very little, but the Portuguese fleet, and the immense wealth belonging to English merchants, had given orders to general Junot to redouble his celerity, and not to spare his soldiers either fatigue or privations, in order to arrive in time. Junot, with his ardour, was not the man to correct by a discreet discernment so much of that order as might prove dangerous in the country which they were about to traverse.

On the 17th of October, the army entered Spain in several columns, in order to find subsistence the more easily. It marched upon Valladolid, by Tolosa, Vittoria, and Burgos. Notwithstanding the promises of the prince of the Peace, scarcely any thing had been provided upon the route, and at night it was necessary to collect in haste whatever could be found to feed the troops,

worn out with the fatigues of the day. The lodgings were detestable, full of vermin, and so filthy that our soldiers chose rather to lie in the fields or in the streets than to accept the wretched shelter that was offered them. The population received them with the curiosity natural to a lively people, fond of sights, and for which its inert government had procured scarcely any for a century past. The higher classes behaved well to our troops; but the lower showed towards them their sullen hatred of foreigners. On the route to Salamanca, several of our stragglers were stabbed with knives, though they conducted themselves with the most cautious discretion.

The army, before reaching Salamanca, where it made a short halt, had already suffered much from fatigue, and left a certain number of men behind. General Junot, who had a provident chief of the staff established at Valladolid, Salamanca, and in advance of Ciudad Rodrigo, depots, consisting of a commandant, several managing clerks, and a detachment, to collect the fatigued or sick, and to send them off by and by to the army, in parties sufficiently numerous to defend themselves. The order to march without intermission having reached the army at Salamanca, it left that city, on the 12th of November, formed into three divisions. On its route from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, it had to cross the chain of mountains which separates the valley of the Douro from that of the Tagus, and which is a prolongation of the Guadarrama. From Salamanca to Alcantara it would have to travel fifty leagues through a poor, mountainous, woody country, inhabited by herdsmen only, who were accustomed to drive their flocks thither twice a year—in autumn, when they removed from Old Castille into Estramadura, and in spring when they returned from Estramadura into Old Castille. Though the Spanish authorities had promised to prepare provisions, scarcely any were found at Sanmunos, an intermediate point, half-way between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. The troops travelled nineteen leagues in two days, without any thing to eat but a little goat's flesh, which they procured by seizing the flocks which they fell in with on their route. At Ciudad Rodrigo, a considerable town and a fortress of great importance, they found a governor very unfavourably disposed, who excused himself by alleging the ignorance in which he had been left of the passage of the French army, and who took no pains to procure the supplies that he had neglected to provide. Some provisions were, however, collected, sufficient to afford the soldiers half a ration; a new depot was organized for rallying the stragglers, whose number increased at every step, and the army advanced towards the mountains, for the purpose of passing out of the basin of the Douro into that of the Tagus. The weather had all at once become frightful, as is the case in these southern countries, where Nature, in extremes, like the inhabitants, passes with singular violence from the mildest to the most inclement temperature. Rain and snow succeeded each other without intermission. The tracks followed by the different

columns were completely covered, and not discernible even under the feet of men and horses. Misled by half savage guides, who were themselves frequently mistaken from having never passed the bounds of their own village, several columns lost their way, and arrived at the village of Peña Parda, nearly on the crest of the chain, worn out with fatigue and hunger, having left part of their men behind them, on the way. For food they were obliged to go, for the purpose of passing the night, to La Moraleja, on the back of the mountains. A tremendous tempest overtook them. In a moment all the torrents overflowed. What with the howling of the wind and the roaring of the water, our inexperienced soldiers, having had scarcely any thing to eat for several days, having no hope of better quarters for the following days, were seized with one of those sudden demoralizations, which surprise and depress young minds not much accustomed to the hardships of the military life. Night having come on, and the drums, relaxed by the rain, giving no sound, a sort of confusion took place in this march. The soldiers, ceasing to distinguish objects, having great difficulty to discern one another, and endeavouring to communicate by shouts, made the mountains ring with their wild hooping and hallooing. The officers were no longer heeded or heard; indiscipline had accompanied despair and the scene had become terrific. A first column, however, had arrived, at about eleven o'clock at night at La Moraleja; and, having found a detachment which had already gone to bed, made known the state in which it had left the rest of the army. The men who were least fatigued were selected and dispatched to the aid of their comrades. Large fires were kindled, a light was placed on the top of the steeple, and the great bell was rung, to draw the men who had lost their way towards this point. To add to their hardships, no more preparations had been made at La Moraleja than elsewhere. No provisions whatever were to be had. The soldiers, in the delirium of hunger, respecting nothing, fell to plundering and ravaging that unfortunate place, which thus became the victim of the neglect of the Spanish government to fulfil its promises. There was not, at the moment of arrival, one fourth of the men around the colours. By degrees, during the night, all who had not sunk under fatigue, all who were not drowned in the torrents, or murdered by the herdsmen of Estramadura, reached the devastated quarters of La Moraleja. A few more goats sufficed, not to satisfy the hunger of the soldiers, but to prevent their dying of inanition. It was impossible to stop in such a place, and next day the troops marched for Alcantara, where they at length reached the banks of the Tagus and the frontier of Portugal.

The general-in-chief Junot had preceded his army thither, in order to make amends by his attentions for the carelessness of the Spanish government. The town afforded rather more resources than the wild mountains of Estramadura. These resources, however, were not very considerable, and they had been partly ab-

sorbed by the Spanish troops of general Carafa, who, with a division of nine or ten thousand men, was to support the movement of the French troops, and to descend the left of the Tagus, while general Junot should descend the right. A few bullocks and a few sheep were collected, and distributed among the regiments; bread sufficient to allow half a ration to each man was procured; and a bait was granted to the army, as well in order to rally it as to enable it to recover its exhausted strength. It had left behind or lost in the forests and the torrents a fifth of its effective, that is to say from four to five thousand men. Half the cavalry was dismounted, many horses had died of hunger, or could not follow for want of shoeing. As for the artillery, the army had been compelled to employ oxen to draw it, and, that means soon failing, they had not more than six pieces at Alcantara. In respect to ammunition, that they had been obliged to abandon by the way, together with the rest of the *matériel*.

The embarrassment of the unfortunate general Junot was extreme. On the one hand he was stimulated by the orders of Napoleon, by the certainty that, if he did not soon reach Lisbon, he should find either that the Portuguese fleet had sailed with the wealth of Portugal, or meet with an organized resistance, which he should have trouble to overcome; on the other hand, he saw before him the backs of the mountains of Beyra, sloping towards the Tagus, consisting of a multitude of abrupt spurs, separated from one another by frightful ravines, apparently cut out, as seems to be expressed by the name of Tailladas given to some of them, entirely destitute of inhabitants, destitute of every resource, and rendered still more dreary by the autumnal deluges of rain. Add to this that our soldiers, having left France in haste, and being unable to take their baggage along with them, were mostly without shoes, without cartridges, and not in a fit state to undergo a long march, or to conquer a serious resistance, if they should meet with one, which was not impossible; for the Portuguese had still 25,000 tolerably good troops, well disposed to defend themselves, since the prospect of belonging to Spain did not incline them to give a favourable reception to the invaders of their country. Neither was the concurrence of the Spaniards to be depended upon; for, instead of twenty battalions, they had furnished us with only eight, and animated by sentiments so adverse to the French, that it had been found necessary to send them to their cantonments.

In the face of this alternative, either to allow events that might excite regret to be consummated at Lisbon, or to encounter fresh fatigues with exhausted troops, in crossing a country more frightful than that which he had just traversed, general Junot did not hesitate, and preferred the course of obedience to that of prudence. He therefore took the resolution to continue this precipitate march by crossing the series of spurs detached from Beyra, which border the Tagus from Alcantara to Abrantes. He picked up some

shoes and a few bullocks, availed himself of a depot of powder existing on the spot, and of the paper upon which were written the voluminous records of the knights of Alcantara for making cartridges. He then divided his army into two parts, one composed of the infantry of the first and second divisions, the other of the infantry of the third division, of the cavalry, of the artillery, and of the stragglers. He pushed forward the first, and left the second at Alcantara, with orders to rejoin him, as soon as it should be somewhat rallied, recruited, and provided with means of transport. He took with him only a few mountain guns, which, from their calibre, were lighter to draw.

He resolved to leave Alcantara on the 20th of November, and to cross the frontier of Portugal on the right of the Tagus, while general Carafa, was to cross it on the left. It would, no doubt, have been much better to pass the Tagus, to penetrate further into Estramadura, to reach Badajoz, to take the high road from Badajoz to Elvas, which the Spaniards generally follow, through Alentejo, a level province and easy to travel through. But it would have been requisite to descend the Peninsula as far as Badajoz, then to make a long circuit to the right to reach Lisbon. Napoleon giving orders at Paris, from the mere inspection of the map, and preferring the road that led most speedily to Lisbon, had directed the right of the Tagus to be followed from Alcantara to Abrantes, while the Spaniards were to follow the left. In this manner one not only made sure of the advantage of celerity, but also of that of not having subsequently to effect a passage of the Tagus when approaching Lisbon. If, however, Napoleon could have known that the troops would meet with deluging rains in Portugal, that, through the negligence of his allies, the army would arrive at Alcantara exhausted with hunger and fatigue, he would have chosen rather to lose a few days than to prosecute a march which was soon to resemble a rout. But here began to be revealed those calamitous inconveniences of an extreme policy, which, resolved to act at once upon the Vistula and the Tagus, at Dantzic and at Lisbon, was obliged to issue orders from a great distance, and to employ weak soldiers and inexperienced generals, when robust soldiers and able generals were employed elsewhere. There are lieutenants who act wrong from timidity, others from excess of zeal. The latter are the rarest, and in general the most useful, though frequently dangerous. The brave Junot was one of these latter. He hesitated not, then, to leave Alcantara on the 20th of November, sending away, as we have said, part of the Spanish troops, which seemed far from steady, and assigning to the others the duty of following the left bank of the Tagus, while he should pursue the right. Of an army which had at Bayonne an effective of 23,000 men present under arms, out of 26,000; he had with him but 15,000 at most; not that the others were all dead or lost, but because they were incapable of continuing that hasty march. He advanced along the Tagus, by paths formed on

the side of the mountains, compelled incessantly to ascend or descend, sometimes rising to the very crests of the spurs which run out from Beyra, sometimes plunging into the deep ravines which separate them, having the summit of the mountains on his right, the river on his left. He directed his two divisions of infantry upon Castel-Branco by two different roads. The first took the Idanha-Nova road; the second that to Rosmaniãl. They were each accompanied by some Spanish light troops. The weather was still terrible, the rain incessant, the road scarcely passable. The first division, commanded by general Laborde, having to cross an overflowed torrent, wider and deeper than the others, that brave general alighted, walked into the water up to his waist, and remained in that position till all his soldiers had passed. At night, they had nothing to eat but goats' flesh, acorns, and one ounce of bread per man. They arrived on the following day at Castel-Branco, where the two divisions joined, in a state difficult to be described. The first that arrived, which had had fewer difficulties to surmount, went and bivouacked outside the town, that it might leave to the other, which was still more fatigued than itself, the advantage of lodging in it. Guards were posted at every oven, to prevent pillage. Thanks to this precaution, two ounces of bread could be allotted to each man. They were without meat, but had rice, vegetables, and wine. The soldiers were pale, haggard, and almost all barefoot. To stop would have been to expose them to the danger of dying from hunger, to say nothing of the inconvenience of losing valuable time. They set off, therefore, in the hope of reaching Abrantes, a wealthy and populous town, situated beyond the regions of the mountains, in an open and fertile country. The troops marched thither in two columns, one, formed of the first division, by Sobreira-Formosa, the other formed of the second division, by Perdigao. The first had fourteen leagues to travel, and four or five torrents to cross. They were so swollen by the rain that they could not be passed without danger. The soldiers formed a chain with their muskets, to defend themselves against the force of the water. Some, debilitated or worn out with fatigue, were occasionally hurried away by the current. The officers, full of zeal, with the intention of setting the stronger the example of assisting the weaker, took upon their shoulders the men who were incapable of passing, and thus helped them to cross the torrents. On the road they found but a single village, that of Sarcedas, and the soldiers, dying of hunger, plundered it, in spite of the efforts of the general in chief to prevent them. It was eleven at night before they reached Sobreira-Formosa, in a state of absolute despair. For the first hour, not more than a sixth of the men had joined. They found some chesnuts, and a few cattle, and these were the whole of their fare. The second division had, on its part, experienced cruel hardships in its march to Perdigao.

The rest of the route to Abrantes was not rendered so fatiguing

by asperities of soil, but equally marked by sterility and destitution. At length, after unparalleled fatigues and privations, the troops arrived on the 24th at Abrantes, to the number of four or five thousand men, wan, wasted, with bleeding feet, tattered clothes, unserviceable muskets, for the soldiers had used them for sticks to assist them in crossing the torrents and climbing the mountains. To arrive in this state in a very populous town would have been offering it a temptation to close its gates against such assailants, and to defend itself from them by merely leaving them to die of hunger. But, fortunately, the glorious victories gained in all parts of the world by the old soldiers of France, protected our young troops wherever they might be. Such was the renown of the French army that, at its approach, but one sentiment pervaded the population, that of satisfying it by supplying its wants as speedily as possible. If they had time to become acquainted with it, they soon ceased to detest it, without ceasing to fear it, and they offered it cheerfully that which on the first day they had offered under an impression of terror.

The general-in-chief had preceded his army to Abrantes. in order to prepare beforehand that relief which its deplorable state demanded. The inhabitants complied with all his requisitions. They collected cattle, bread in abundance; and, for the first time since their departure from Salamanca, for twelve days, the soldiers received complete rations. Excellent wine, shoes, clothing, and means of conveyance, were procured for them. They were even enabled to send off vehicles to the rear, to pick up the sick and the fatigued men. The weather had not yet become serene and dry; but they were in a fine, level, warm country, covered with orange trees, exhaling the delicious perfumes of the South, presenting a spectacle of comfort and wealth. The effect on those young soldiers, accessible to all sensations, was rapid, and they passed in two days from the most gloomy despair to a sort of joy and confidence. Many of them were still bewildered among the rocks of Beyra, and they came by degrees, in detached parties, to receive in their turn the delightful impression of a fine country, abounding in resources of every kind.

Junot had the arms repaired, and, collecting the companies of *élite*, formed a column of 4000 men, capable of continuing the march for Lisbon. Having prevented by his celerity a resistance which, in the mountains of Beyra, might have become invincible, he had gained a first prize of his efforts. But he wanted to reach Lisbon, so as to seize on their passage all who should attempt to escape from that capital. This second success it was scarcely possible to obtain.

At this moment incredible confusion prevailed at Lisbon. The prince-regent, governing for his mother, who was afflicted with insanity, had wavered among a thousand contrary resolutions. In concord with the cabinet of London, he had endeavoured to prevail upon Napoleon to accept a middle term, which consisted

in closing his ports against the English, without confiscating their property. Napoleon having refused this, the prince-regent had been again thrown into great perplexity. His ministers, divided respecting the course to be pursued, advised some of them, that they should live as they had always lived, that is, continue attached to England, and with her aid to resist Napoleon; others, that they should forsake past errors, enter into the views of France, expel the English, and thus spare themselves a foreign invasion. Others again proposed a third course, to which we have already adverted, that of retiring to Brazil, leaving the unfortunate land of the Braganzas to the English and the French, who would soon be fighting for its wrecks. Amidst these painful hesitations, the prince-regent, as soon as he was apprised of the march of the French army upon Valladolid, had acceded to all the demands of Napoleon, declared war against Great Britain, decreed the seizure of all its property, giving time, however, to the English merchants to carry away or sell the most valuable of their effects. He had, lastly, despatched messengers to meet general Junot, and to stop the French army; but unluckily they sought him on routes which he had not taken. Lord Strangford, the English ambassador, had received his passports, and retired on board the English fleet, which had immediately commenced the blockade of the Tagus.

The unexpected appearance of the French army on the route from Alcantara to Abrantes, where none of the emissaries sent off could slacken its march, struck inexpressible terror into the soul of the regent, a terror shared by all his relations and councillors. The idea of flight then became uppermost in all the others. Lord Strangford, knowing what was passing, lost no time in making his appearance again at Lisbon, bringing news from Paris forwarded from London, giving information of the resolution taken by Napoleon to dethrone the house of Braganza.* This intelli-

* Several historians, as well Portuguese as Spanish and French, have asserted that Lord Strangford decided the prince-regent, by producing a *Moniteur* of the 11th of November, which had come by way of London, containing an imperial decree, similar to that which had pronounced the forfeiture of the house of Naples, and declaring that *the house of Braganza had ceased to reign*. This assertion, if not totally inaccurate, is, nevertheless, erroneous. Neither the *Moniteur* of the 11th of November, nor of any anterior or posterior date, contains any decree declaring that the house of Braganza *had ceased to reign*. This form, used in 1806 against the house of Naples, after an unpardonable treachery, could not be employed against reigning families, which had not furnished Napoleon with any pretext for treating them in that manner. Neither does the *depôt* of the minutes at the secretary of state's office, any more than the *Moniteur*, contain the alleged decree. But the *Moniteur* of the 12th of November contains, under the head Paris, and date of the 12th, an article relative to the various expeditions of the English against Copenhagen, Alexandria, Constantinople, and Buenos-Ayres. In this article, evidently dictated by Napoleon, and tending to show the consequences to which all the governments that sacrificed themselves to the English policy were liable, we find the following passage:—

“After these four expeditions, which so clearly demonstrate the moral and military decline of England, we shall advert to the situation in which they now leave Portugal. The prince-regent of Portugal loses his throne; he loses it, influenced by the intrigues of the English; he loses it for refusing to seize the English merchandise at Lisbon. And what does England, that so mighty ally?

gence and his presence decided definitively the departure of the royal family for Brazil. In the supposition that the government might be forced to close the Tagus against the English, all that was left of the Portuguese fleet, that is to say, one ship of 80 guns, seven of 74, three frigates, and three brigs, had been armed somehow or other. The arrival of Junot at Abrantes, which is only three days' march from Lisbon, being known in the capital on the 27th of November, the royal family and part of the aristocracy were conveyed on board, together with all the valuable effects that they could carry off. In terrible weather, amidst pelting rain, the princes, the princesses, the queen-mother, with wildly rolling eyes in consequence of her mental malady, almost all the persons composing the court, many of the great families, men, women, children, servants, to the number of seven or eight thousand, were seen confusedly embarking in the squadron and in about a score of large vessels employed in the Brazil trade. The furniture of the royal palaces and of the wealthy houses of Lisbon, the funds in the public chests, the money which the regent had for some time past taken care to amass, that which the fugitive families were able to procure, all lay on the quays of the Tagus, half-buried in mud, before the eyes of an astounded population, alternately melted by so grievous a spectacle, and irritated at so cowardly a flight, which left it without government and without means of defence. So great was the precipitation that, on board some of these vessels laden with wealth, the most indispensable articles of provision were forgotten to be brought. Everything was embarked by the 27th; and thirty-six ships of war, or merchantmen, ranged around the admiral's ship, in the middle of the Tagus, as broad before Lisbon as an arm of the sea, waited for a favourable wind, while a population of three hundred thousand souls, divided between grief, anger, curiosity, and terror, sorrowfully gazed at them. At the mouth of the Tagus, the English fleet was cruising to receive the emigrants, and to protect them, if necessary, with its guns.

Thus passed the whole of the 27th, the wind not permitting the expedition to leave the Tagus; anxiety prevailed in the Portuguese fleet: for, if a French detachment had arrived in time at Lisbon and hastened to the tower of Belem, the Tagus would have been closed.

Meanwhile general Junot, leading in haste his unfortunate

She looks on with indifference at what is passing in Portugal. What will she do when Portugal is taken? Will she go and seize Brazil? No: if the English make such an attempt, the Catholics will expel them. The downfall of the house of Braganza will be a new proof that the ruin of all who attach themselves to England is inevitable."

This is probably what is meant by the decree declaring that the house of Braganza had ceased to reign: and this the *Moniteur*, which, published at Paris on the 13th, reaching London on the 15th or 16th, might through the Admiralty be received by the English fleet on the 23rd or 24th, and communicated to the prince-regent of Portugal.

soldiers, arrived breathless under the walls of Lisbon. He had been detained during the 26th and 27th before the Zezera, the waters of which had risen from twelve to fifteen feet in a few hours, and which falls into the Tagus near Punhette. He passed it, with some thousand men, in boats, brought by well paid seamen, and amidst the greatest dangers; for these boats were carried away by the current with great violence into the Tagus, and were then obliged to work up the stream to get to the point for landing. On the 28th Junot marched for Santarem, across the inundations, which covered to a distance the banks of the Tagus, and in which the soldiers sometimes travelled for a league together with the water up to their knees. On the 29th he reached Saccavem, and there received intelligence from Lisbon. He learned that the royal family had embarked with the whole court, and that it was taking away with it the Portuguese fleet laden with wealth. There was now no hope left of arriving in time; but it was necessary to prevent a rising which it would have been impossible to quell with a few thousand exhausted men and not a single piece of cannon. General Junot resolutely pursued his course, and left Saccavem on the morning of the 30th, with a column of not more than 1500 grenadiers and with an escort of some Portuguese horse, met with by the way, which he obliged to accompany him. He entered Lisbon at eight in the morning, was received by a commission of the government to which the prince-regent had consigned the kingdom, and by a French emigrant, M. de Novion, who was at the head of the police, and who performed that duty with equal intelligence and energy. General Junot found the capital quiet, mortified at the presence of foreigners, but submissive, and, besides, so indignant at the flight of the court, as to feel little less embittered against it than against those who were come to take its throne. The Portuguese fleet, having waited under sail the whole of the 27th and part of the 28th, had at length crossed in the evening the bar of the Tagus, thanks to a change of wind, and fugitive royalty had been greeted with salutes by the English fleet. Admiral Sidney Smith detached a strong squadron to accompany that royalty to America, where it was about to commence with Brazil the enfranchisement of all the Portuguese and Spanish colonies; for it was given to the French revolution to change the face of the New World as well as that of the Old; and those thrones of the Peninsula, which it hurled into the Ocean, were destined to produce by their fall a reflux that was felt on the other side of the Atlantic.

General Junot found, therefore, that part of the results which he was pursuing with such ardour had escaped him. But a few old ships, so crazy that those on board them were fearful they might not reach Brazil, some precious stones, some coined metals, and lastly a family, the capture of which would have been a great embarrassment, were not equivalent to the advantage of

becoming master of the most important positions of the coast of Europe without striking a blow, and of having prevented a resistance, which could not have been conquered, had ever so little energy been exerted. General Junot and his army had, therefore, won the prize of their perseverance. But it was requisite to establish himself at Lisbon, to rally the army, to give it rest, to provide it with necessaries, and to restore to it the imposing aspect which it had lost during that memorable march.

Towards the evening of the 30th, part of the first division arrived. Junot possessed himself of the forts and of the positions commanding Lisbon, which is situated on several hills on the shore of the expansive waters of the Tagus. The commission of the government, and particularly the commandant of the police force, M. de Novion, assisted him to keep order; in which they acted as good citizens, for disturbance would only have led to useless bloodshed, and perhaps to the sacking of Lisbon. Junot distributed the troops in the manner best suited to their welfare and their safety, amidst a hostile population of 300,000 souls. Having solidly established the first detachments that arrived, he turned his attention to rallying the others. Many of the soldiers had been drowned or murdered. These losses, however, though much to be regretted, were not so great as there was reason to fear from the small number of men who appeared in the ranks on the day that they entered Lisbon. The lists subsequently made proved that the dead and missing did not exceed 1,700. There were left, therefore, 21 or 22 thousand soldiers, well tried already by that campaign, and followed by three or four thousand, who, brought by a frequented route of stations (*étapes*) would arrive safe and sound at the goal which their predecessors had not reached without great difficulty and fatigue. Most of the men left behind had collected into parties, marching more slowly than the heads of columns, but defending themselves against the peasantry, and living upon what they could find in the woods. The flocks of goats and sheep which they fell in with by the way furnished their principal subsistence. When once at Abrantes, they embarked in boats, which carried them down the Tagus to Lisbon. The artillery, which arrived much later, was likewise put on board boats, and by this expeditious mode of conveyance carried to the general rallying point. The cavalry arrived without horses. But Portugal would soon supply the army with all that it wanted. There was at Lisbon a magnificent arsenal, appropriated alike to the land and the sea service, peopled with three thousand very skilful workmen, desiring nothing better than to continue to earn their livelihood, even by working for the French. Junot employed them in repairing or remaking all the *matériel* of the army, and in making gun-carriages for the numerous artillery existing in Lisbon, which was to be mounted in battery against the English. Near the capital was posted the Portuguese army, 25,000 strong, waiting for its fate

to be pronounced. The Portuguese soldiers, in general, liked better to live in their villages than under their colours. Junot gave them furloughs, so that no more than 6000 were left in the ranks. He took all the horses of the cavalry, and remounted the French cavalry with them. He did the same by the artillery, and, in a few days, his army, rallied, armed, new-clothed, rested from its fatigues, exhibited the finest aspect. There were no funds in the chests for defraying these expenses. But, till the payment of the taxes, commerce, encouraged by the language and the acts of general Junot, advanced him five millions, in order to supply the most urgent wants, and thus he was enabled to pay for all that the army consumed. General Junot established his first division in Lisbon; the second, half in Lisbon, and half opposite to Abrantes; the third, on the back of the mountains at the foot of which Lisbon is seated, from Peniche to Coimbra. He sent his cavalry, under general Kellermann, into the plain of the Alentejo, to enforce all over it the recognition of the French authority. He placed at Setuval general Carafa's Spaniards, who had accompanied him. He established a well guarded and well supplied route of stations (*étapes*) through Leiria, Coimbra, Almeida, Salamanca, and Bayonne. In the first moment, all appeared quiet and almost cheering. There was but one very embarrassing difficulty from the commencement, that was to provision, in spite of the English, a capital with 300,000 inhabitants, accustomed to receive by sea corn and cattle from the coast of Africa. General Junot treated with several merchants, and gave commissions on all sides for bringing supplies from the interior. He was ably seconded by Thiébault, chief of the staff, and by M. Hermann, whom Napoleon had sent to him to superintend the Portuguese finances. The latter was a man of the highest integrity, well acquainted with the country, having long performed the diplomatic functions both at Lisbon and at Madrid. Thanks to the combined exertions of these different agents, there was no want of any thing, for some time at least, and a beginning was even made to equip the remnant of the Portuguese fleet. At the same moment, the Spanish general Taranco occupied the province of Oporto with seven or eight thousand men, and general Solano that of the Algarves with three or four thousand.

While a French army was penetrating into Portugal, Napoleon, who had prepared two others to enter the Peninsula, had ordered general Dupont, commanding the second corps of the Gironde, to take one of his divisions to Vittoria, upon pretext of assisting general Junot against the English. Shortly before the march of this division, a reinforcement of three or four thousand men, destined to be incorporated into the three divisions of the army of Portugal, had already taken the road for Salamanca. Thus the French became accustomed to consider the Spanish boundary as an abolished demarcation and Spain itself as an open road, which

they made use of, without even informing the sovereign of the country. General Dupont's first division, in fact, had reached Vittoria before M. de Beauharnais had given notice of that movement to the cabinet of Madrid. It was the prince of the Peace who first spoke of it to M. de Beauharnais, with a visible anxiety. At the same time, he had made many excuses for the want of preparations along the route followed by general Junot, and had attributed that neglect to important engagements resulting from the process at the Escorial.

Since that process, and notwithstanding the pardon granted to the prince of the Asturias, the agitation, both in the court of Spain and in the country in general, had not ceased to increase. The prince of the Asturias, whose abject submission and whose cowardly betrayal of his friends ought to have disgraced him, was, on the contrary, adored by a nation, which, finding in that degenerate family no other prince to love, was fain to excuse every thing in him, and imputed whatever was equivocal in his conduct to his enemies, to their threats, and to their tyranny. The application for a French princess, addressed by Ferdinand to Napoleon, an application now well known, had turned the eyes of the nation, as well as those of the prince, towards the high protector, who ruled at this moment the destinies of the world. The French troops that had already entered the Spanish territory, those which were accumulating between Bordeaux and Bayonne, far exceeding the force necessary for the occupation of Portugal, accredited the opinion that this powerful protector designed to interfere in the affairs of Spain ; and the whole nation rejoiced in the belief that it would be in the way which accorded with their wishes, that is to say, to overthrow the favourite, confine the queen in a convent, Charles IV. in a hunting-lodge, and give the crown to Ferdinand VII., united to a French princess. The attitude of M. de Beauharnais tended only to favour these illusions. This ambassador, filled with aversion for the favourite, led by his secret intercourse with the prince of the Asturias to take an interest in his behalf, flattering himself that this prince would marry a French princess (*mademoiselle de Tascher*), who was his relation, abounded in all the sentiments of the Spaniards themselves ; and these, concluding that the representative of France had orders to be what he appeared, conceived such an increasing enthusiasm for Napoleon, that our troops, instead of being a subject of alarm to the most mistrustful people in the world, had, on the contrary, become a subject of hope for it.

To no purpose did some more sagacious minds say to themselves that, to overthrow a favourite abhorred by the Spanish nation, so many soldiers were not required ; that the nod of the omnipotent emperor of the French would be sufficient to reduce him to nothing ; that those troops which were collecting were, perhaps, the instruments long ago prepared, of a more important resolution, tending to exclude the Bourbons from all the thrones

of Europe: to no purpose some clear-sighted minds made these remarks; they found no acceptance, because they were contrary to the passion that possessed all hearts.

Fear, infusing juster apprehensions into the queen and her favourite, opened their eyes to their own danger. The queen and the favourite were both sensible, and the queen more deeply than her paramour, what contempt they must excite in the great man who ruled Europe. They felt how far their weak incapacity was beneath his great designs; and the veil with which he covered his intentions, added to their presentiments the terror which arises from obscurity. Though Napoleon had signed the treaty of Fontainebleau, though, by this treaty, he had recognised Emmanuel Godoy sovereign prince of the Algarves, they were, neither of them, quite easy. In the first place, Junot had seized into his own hands the entire administration of Portugal, without excepting the provinces occupied by the Spanish troops. In the next, Napoleon had required that the treaty of Fontainebleau should continue to be kept secret. Wherefore this secrecy, when Portugal was in the power of the allied troops, when the house of Braganza was gone, and had, in some measure, left the throne vacant by its departure? To these questions were added the letters of Yzquierdo, the agent, who could not disguise from his patron the apprehensions with which he began to be filled. These apprehensions, it is true, were not grounded on any precise fact; for Napoleon had not communicated his determination respecting Spain to a single creature—indeed, he could not communicate it, for he was yet uncertain what he should do. But of that fatal propensity for everywhere superseding the Bourbon family by his own—a propensity which swayed his soul to such a degree as to make him unmindful of all prudence, some clear-sighted spirits had a presentiment, and, without his saying a word, his intention was guessed by more than one observer. The silence which he kept, though engaged in very apparent preparations, had struck in particular the agent Yzquierdo, the cleverest of men at discovering what was intended to be concealed from him; and he was incessantly writing to the prince of the Peace that, though Napoleon had set out for Italy, yet around his ministers and his confidants there was not a word to be picked up; and yet, that in all he saw there was a mystery which filled him with uneasiness.

Hence the prince of the Peace and the queen were extremely agitated. The queen often indisposed, disguising her trouble under an affected tranquillity, her age under the most elegant personal decorations, nevertheless gave way, in spite of herself, to frequent bursts of anger. She filled the palace with her storming, demanded the sacrifice of all those whom she considered as her enemies, foolishly insisted on the execution of the canon Escoiquiz and the duke de l'Infantado, and was enraged with Caballero, the obsequious minister of justice, who, trembling all

over, merely opposed to her desires the difficulties arising from the ancient laws of the kingdom, inviolate and inviolable. She went so far as to declare that minister a traitor, sold to Ferdinand. The latter, on his part, dissatisfied with this same minister, called him a vile executer of the commands of his mother, and promised himself to take signal vengeance on him at a future time. The prince of the Peace, believing it to be for his interest even to pacify the queen, loaded her with attentions and passed from an insulting indifference towards her to incessant demonstrations of kindness. Though he went in the evening to the demoiselles Tudo to rest his weary soul, weary with intrigue and alarm, he paid in the morning to that exasperated queen all the attendance of a faithful courtier; and these two paramours, whom, from their numerous infidelities, one would have supposed to be disgusted with each other, were brought back by mutual terrors and mutual antipathies into an intimacy wearing all the semblance of love. In public the queen manifested redoubled affection for the prince of the Peace, and took delight in defying by such demonstrations the modesty of those who witnessed them and the aversion of her enemies. The court was deserted: all respectable persons had forsaken it. When the royal family appeared outside the gardens of the Escorial, the people remained silent, excepting for the prince of the Asturias, whom they followed with their cheers, to such a degree that the queen had obtained a police ordinance by which all acclamations were prohibited. To such a length did she carry the extravagance of her requisitions as to order a *Te Deum* to return thanks to Heaven for the miraculous preservation which it had vouchsafed to the king, in thwarting the plots of the prince of the Asturias. Of the members of the grandezza, all convoked, four only had attended, two Spaniards, two foreigners, confounded all four at their own baseness. At leaving the church, the queen had shown a tenderness, a familiarity, with Emmanuel Godoy, disgusting to the beholders; while poor Charles IV. perceived none of these infamous proceedings, though, having a confused feeling of the peril of his situation, he had unintentionally crowned the scandal by supporting himself on the arm of the favourite, as on the mighty arm from which he hoped for salvation. Deplorable, disgraceful spectacle, not only for the throne, but for humanity itself, the degradation of which, manifested in so exalted a situation, was the more striking.

Every morning, the prince of the Peace, went, as we have said, to the demoiselles Tudo, to pour forth the tribulations of his soul, which, notwithstanding its levity, was deeply afflicted. In that house, to which the curious resorted in quest of news, great joy had been conceived and expressed at the treaty of Fontainebleau; a joy soon embittered by the order received from Paris to keep that treaty secret, by the continual entry of French troops, and by the letters of Yzquierdo, the agent. As the public was delighted to learn whatever was unfavourable to the prince of the Peace, his

confidants endeavoured to oppose to the torrent of bad news a contrary torrent, referring with exaggeration to all the tokens of favour obtained from the Tuileries. Thus, in spite of the order to keep secret the treaty of Fontainebleau, all its particulars had been repeated, and with the greatest detail, at the residence of the demoiselles Tudo. It had been there related that the north of Portugal had been given to the queen of Etruria, the south to the prince of the Peace, constituted sovereign prince of the Algarves, and the middle reserved to be subsequently disposed of. In this manner the presence of the French armies was accounted for; and, as for their number, far superior to that which the mere occupation of Portugal would have required, that was attributed to the great projects of Napoleon in regard to Gibraltar. To prevent the mischievous effects which the entry of the other corps speedily expected could not fail to produce, it was said that the French army would amount to at least 80,000 men, that the prince of the Peace would command it in person, and that consequently people need not be alarmed on that subject. As for the proceedings against the accomplices of the prince of Asturias, which excited universal indignation, and which, it was said, Napoleon would not suffer to go on, the friends of the prince of the Peace alleged that the court had intelligence from Paris, that Napoleon had declared the affair of the Escorial to be an affair foreign to France, and that he highly approved of the punishment of the intriguers, who had designed to shake the throne.

Neither the prince of the Peace, nor the women of such different rank who interested themselves in his fate, gave much credit to this intelligence. They were tormented by fear, which suggested to them precautions of the nature of those taken in the East against Fortune or against tyranny. Thus gold and precious stones were amassed at the palace of the prince of the Peace. Superb dresses were stripped of their diamonds, which were carried to his residence, together with considerable sums in specie. Everybody might see at night laden mules setting out from his habitation; some taking the road for Cadiz, others that for Ferrol. The people, according to custom, exaggerated these circumstances, and exaggerated them most immoderately. They talked of five hundred millions in specie collected in his palace, and then sent off in several convoys for unknown destinations. These fabulous stories, concurrent with the flight of the house of Braganza, had led in all quarters to the conclusion that the prince of the Peace purposed to carry away the royal family to Mexico, to prolong beyond sea a power which was expiring in Europe. Propagated with incredible rapidity, this supposition had excited the indignation of all the Spaniards. The idea of seeing the royal family of Spain betaking itself to a cowardly flight, like the royal family of Portugal, carrying away an adored prince a prisoner, leaving a vacant kingdom to Napoleon, revolted them; and this fear had increased, if possible, the popular fury excited by the

favourite. Every week the rumour that the riches of the crown had been packed up, to be secretly conveyed to Cadiz, and that the prince of the Peace was about to conduct the royal family to Seville, was spread anew as a sinister report, exasperated all minds, let loose all tongues, then subsided for a moment, when found not to be confirmed by facts, like the hollow murmurs that precede the tempest.

And, false as are in general the rumours which circulate among an agitated people, these were not without foundation. Long before the flight of the house of Braganza, the project of that flight had been communicated to the court of Madrid, submitted to its judgment, and so far discussed with it, as to be mentioned to the French ambassador. Struck with this example, the prince of the Peace, when he despaired of his situation, was fond of musing upon an asylum in America, to which he could go to seek repose, safety, and the continuance of his power. He had opened himself on this subject to the queen, who liked this scheme much ; and, in order to dispose the king to agree to it, he had begun to alarm him respecting the intentions of Napoleon. After telling him on this subject more than he knew, but not more than was really meditated, he had expatiated at great length on the plan of flight to America, as the safest and even the most profitable course for Spain. To withstand the armies of Napoleon was, according to the prince of the Peace, impossible. They might enter into a struggle, but it must end in their succumbing to him whom all Europe had in vain endeavoured to oppose ; and in this contest they should lose not Spain alone, but the magnificent empire of the Indies, a hundred times more desirable than the European territory of the house of Bourbon. The provinces beyond sea, strongly agitated already by the insurrection of the English colonies, desiring nothing better than to declare themselves independent, warmly urged to that step by the British agents, would take advantage of the war, that must absorb all the forces of the mother-country, to shake off her yoke ; and thus they should see not only the Spains, but Mexico, Peru, Colombia, La Plata, the Philippines, wrested from them. On the contrary, by removing to the colonies, they should preserve them by the presence of the reigning family, whom they would be happy to have at their head to form an independent empire ; and, if Napoleon, becoming more odious to Europe, in proportion as he became more powerful, should ultimately fall, they might return to the old continent, more assured of the fidelity of the provinces of America, which they should have bound to themselves by stronger ties, and having meanwhile escaped by a mere voyage the general convulsion of all the States. If, on the contrary, they rant of the Old World should die on his usurped throne, and leave his consolidated dynasty upon it, they should find in the New World a regenerated empire, affording wherewithal to make them forget everything that they had left behind in Europe.

These ideas, the only forcible and sensible ideas that the favourite had ever conceived, for, if they renounced all intention of disputing the possession of Spain by an heroic resistance, the best thing to be done was to preserve to the nation the two Indies, and to the reigning family a throne, how distant soever it might be—these ideas were of a nature to confound Charles IV. To defend himself by arms he most assuredly had no thoughts of. To go from the Escorial to Cadiz, to embark, to cross the sea, to deprive himself for ever of the diversions of the chase in the Pardo, appalled him almost as much as a battle. He preferred banishing far from him these sinister forebodings, and to throw himself, he said, into the arms of his *magnanimous friend, Napoleon*. It must be added, to the honour of this good and unfortunate prince, that, notwithstanding his intellectual mediocrity, he appreciated whatever was great in Napoleon, that he admired his exploits; and that, if he had been capable of any efforts, he would have assisted him to beat England, for the interest of both countries, which he comprehended whenever he chanced to think about it. Accordingly, he replied to those who talked to him of a distant retreat, that they must endeavour to divine the intentions of Napoleon and conform to them, for, at bottom, they could not be bad; that the prince of the Asturias had, after all, not been so very ill-advised in applying for a princess of the Bonaparte family for a wife; that it was a means of strengthening the alliance of the two countries, and putting an end to the animosity of the two races; that it was not possible for Napoleon, after giving Ferdinand one of his adopted daughters, to harbour an intention of dethroning him. He was too great, too magnanimous a hero, to commit such a breach of faith. It was, perhaps, the first time in his life that this unfortunate king, whose mind, roused under the stimulus of circumstances, conceived an idea of his own, and appeared to adhere to it. He had already thought of this marriage of the heir to the crown with a niece of Napoleon, and he had not to do violence to himself to adopt such a project. He desired, therefore, that the application made by Ferdinand in an irregular manner should be repeated regularly, in the name of the crown of Spain, with suitable solemnity and the powers necessary for treating. If Napoleon assented, he was bound towards the house of Bourbon; if he refused, they should know what to infer respecting his intentions, and it would then be time to think of retiring.

Nothing could be more disagreeable to the queen and the favourite than such a marriage; for Ferdinand, husband of a French princess, protected by Napoleon, protector in his turn of the house of Spain, would become all-powerful. The fall of the favourite and the destruction of the queen's influence must ensue. But not to renew Ferdinand's proposal in the name of the crown, was declaring that he had acted wrong not only in regard to the form but in regard to the main point; it was showing Napoleon

that they desired not his alliance; it was depriving themselves of a sure means of sounding his intentions; and, above all, depriving themselves of arguments indispensable with Charles IV. for inducing him to approve of the project of flight to America. Such were the reasons which reconciled the queen and the favourite to the idea of applying for a princess, that is to say, of renewing Ferdinand's clandestine proposal, in the name of the crown. This was perhaps the only occasion when there was any necessity for debating a resolution with Charles IV., the only occasion assuredly on which a resolution of his became that of the government.

In consequence, a most affectionate letter was prepared for Charles IV. to write, soliciting Napoleon to unite the heir to the crown of Spain with a princess of the house of Bonaparte. But this was not the only demand. In a second letter, annexed to the first, the king sued to Napoleon for the immediate execution of the treaty of Fontainebleau, the publication of that treaty, the entry into possession of the sharers in the Portuguese provinces of the portion allotted to each. This suit was suggested by the prince of the Peace, who had those points much at heart, for he was impatient to be proclaimed a sovereign prince: they were moreover for the well-judged interest of the house of Spain, since, by this treaty, Charles IV. had received the guarantee of his dominions and the title of king of the Spains and emperor of the Americas. The publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau would have been at the moment a powerful preservative against the projects, real or supposed, of invasion.

While awaiting this publication, there were persons who, as we have said, had not hesitated to commit all kinds of faults and to divulge the whole treaty. People talked publicly in the streets of Madrid, exaggerating even the assertions of Tulo House, that the prince of the Peace would soon be declared king of Portugal, and Charles IV. emperor of the Indies; that, in short, the favour of Napoleon to Emmanuel Godoy was about to be shown in a signal manner. In the very brief moments in which people gave credit to these rumours, they half-opened their eyes; they said that, no doubt, Napoleon was preparing to dethrone the last of the Bourbons, as he had dethroned all the others, that he had concerted with Godoy to get them delivered up to him, and that he was giving him Portugal, that Godoy, in return, might give him Spain. In this they calumniated that personage, whom it was so difficult to calumniate; for, if it was true that he had enslaved, degraded, ruined, his masters, it was not true that he had betrayed them in favour of Napoleon. Fortunately for the popularity of Napoleon in Spain, these reports gained not long credit. M. de Beauharnais, who was left by his court in complete ignorance, affirmed that he had no knowledge of that treaty, and with such sincerity that nobody doubted his word. The assertions of the favourite's friends were, therefore, taken for one

of their accustomed boastings, and people again began to believe what pleased them, that is to say, that Ferdinand was about to become first the husband of an adopted daughter of Napoleon, then king, and that the odious faction which oppressed and disgraced the Escorial would thus be swept away. And, what is a singular fact in this gloomy and melancholy history of the fall of the Spanish Bourbons, while the prince of the Peace was soliciting at Paris the authorization to publish the treaty of Fontainebleau, M. de Beauharnais, on his part, was applying for the authorization to contradict it.

The letters of Charles IV. and the dispatches of M. de Beauharnais had to make a long journey to reach Napoleon, then in Italy, and travelling from town to town with his usual rapidity. In the state of the communications at that period, it took not less than seven days to go from Madrid to Paris, not less than five days to go from Paris to Milan; and, if Napoleon was at that moment on a journey either to Venice or to Palma Nova, it was sometimes fourteen or fifteen days after the departure of dispatches from Spain that they were received by him. The transmission of answers required the same time; and these delays suited Napoleon, who would fain have slackened the pace of Time, so loth was he to take any resolutions relative to Spain, divided as he was between the desire of dethroning the Bourbons everywhere, and apprehension on account of the violent and odious means which he should be obliged to employ for its accomplishment.

Having left Paris on the 16th of November, Napoleon had arrived at Milan on the 21st, having previously visited several interesting points. He had even taken by surprise his son Eugene Beauharnais, who had not had time to hasten off to meet him. Appearing on the morning of his arrival at the cathedral of Milan, to hear *Te Deum*, in the afternoon at the palace of Monza to visit the vice-queen, his daughter, in the evening at the theatre of La Scala, to show himself to the Italians, he had conversed in the intervals with the functionaries charged with the most important offices. He spent the 23d, the 24th, and the 25th, in the dispatch of a great deal of business and in giving a multitude of orders. Struck, while traversing the new road over Mont-Cenis, which was his work, with the absolute deficiency of accommodation for travellers, for want of population on those snow-covered heights, he gave orders for the creation of a commune, divided into three hamlets, one at the foot of the ascent, one at the summit, and one on the descent. The hamlet situated on the summit was to be the chief place of the commune. He prescribed the erection of a church, an inn, an hospital, and a barrack. He granted exemption from taxes for all the peasants who should settle in the new commune, and commenced the population by the establishment of a certain number of soldiers in cantonments,

charged to keep the road in repair on ordinary occasions, and, in case of accident, to assemble at the points where their assistance might be necessary. Having fixed the budget of the kingdom of Italy, paid serious attention to the Italian army, convoked the three colleges of the Possidenti, Dotti, and Commerciali for the moment of his return to Milan, that is to say for the 10th of December, he set off for Venice, taking the road to Brescia, Verona, and Padua, greeted on his passage by the acclamations of an enthusiastic people. Ever usefully employed, even amidst festivities, he had rectified, in passing, the drawing of the fortifications of Peschiera, reserving his decision upon those of Mantua till his return. On the road, he had fallen in with a party of relations—the king and queen of Bavaria, whose daughter Eugene had married; his sister Elisa, princess of Lucca, and soon to be *gouvernante* of Tuscany; and lastly his brother Joseph, whom he had not seen since he nominated him king of Naples, and whom he fondly loved, notwithstanding numerous reproaches on account of his lax mode of governing. At Fusina, a small port on the lagoons, where travellers bound for Venice embark, the authorities and the population awaited him in gondolas decorated with rich hangings, to conduct him to the seat of the ancient queen of the seas. The people of Venice, who consoled themselves for no longer forming an independent republic with the satisfaction of having escaped from tyrannical laws, with the hope of soon belonging to an extensive kingdom, comprizing all Italy; lastly, with the promise of vast works destined to render its waters navigable, had displayed for the reception of Napoleon all the luxury of which they were wont to make a parade when their doge wedded the sea. Innumerable gondolas, bedecked with a thousand colours, ringing with the sound of instruments, escorted the barges, bringing, along with the master of the world, the viceroy and the vice-queen of Italy, the king and queen of Bavaria, the princess of Lucca, the king of Naples, the grand-duke of Berg, the prince of Neufchatel, and most of the generals of the old army of Italy. After allowing the necessary time for receptions, Napoleon passed the following days in visiting the public establishments, the dock-yards, the arsenal, the canals, accompanied everywhere by Messrs. Deérès, Proni, and Sganzin. Having finished the examination of these places he issued a decree, containing twelve heads, which embraced all the wants of regenerated Venice. He began, in virtue of this decree, with re-establishing a number of taxes, abolished since the fall of the republic, but justified by long experience, little burdensome in themselves, and indispensable for defraying the expenses of a wholly artificial existence; for Venice, like Holland, is a work of art rather than of Nature. The means being insured, he thought of their application. In the first place, he organized an administration for keeping the canals in good condition and for deepening the lagoons; he next decreed a grand

canal, for conveying vessels from the arsenal to the passage of Malamocco, a basin for 74-gun ships, hydraulic works, both on the Brenta, which brings its waters into the lagoons, and at the different outlets by which they discharge themselves into the Adriatic. He instituted, moreover, a free port, into which commerce might bring merchandise before the payment of the duties of customs. He provided for the public health, by transferring burials from churches to an island destined for that purpose. He attended to the pleasures of the people in ordering the Place of St. Mark, the everlasting object of the pride and the historical recollections of the Venetians, to be repaired and lighted. Lastly, he ensured a subsistence to seamen by the re-establishment of all the old charitable institutions. After dispensing these benefits and receiving in return a thousand acclamations, Napoleon set off to visit the Friule, to inspect the fortifications of Palma Nova and Osopo, which he had continued to direct from a distance, and which he considered, with Mantua and Alexandria, as pledges of the possession of Italy. Osopo and Palma Nova on the Isonzo, Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio, Alexandria on the Tanaro, were, in his estimation, the stages of an almost invincible resistance against the Germans, if the Italians exerted any energy in defending themselves. He had come by Porto Legnago to Mantua, where he was to meet his brother Lucien, to try to bring about a reconciliation, for which he was anxiously desirous, but which he would grant only on certain conditions. M. de Meneval went in the night to an hotel to fetch Lucien, and conducted him to the palace occupied by Napoleon. Lucien, instead of throwing himself into the arms of his brother, accosted him with a very excusable loftiness (as he was the only one of the five brothers who had no power) but carried perhaps beyond what a well-understood dignity would have required. The interview was, therefore, unpleasant and stormy, but not without useful result. Among the number of the combinations possible in Spain, Napoleon still included the union of a French princess with Ferdinand. In fact, he had that moment received the letter of Charles IV. renewing the proposal for a marriage, and though he inclined to a more radical resolution, still he did not exclude from his plans that kind of middle term. He therefore desired Lucien to give him a daughter, the offspring of a first marriage, to be brought up about the empress-mother, to initiate her thoroughly into his views, and then send her to Spain to regenerate the race of the Bourbons. If he should not decide to intrust her with this part, there would not fail to be other thrones, more or less exalted, on which he could place her by means of an alliance. As for Lucien himself, he was disposed to confer on him the quality of French prince, even to make him king of Portugal, which would have placed him near his daughter, on condition that he would annul his second marriage, compensating his wife so repudiated by a title and a handsome annuity. These arrangements were possible, but they were required with authority, re-

fused with irritation, and the brothers parted, agitated, angered, but not at variance, since part of what Napoleon desired was complied with by Lucien Bonaparte, a few days afterwards, sending his daughter to Paris. On the very next day, Napoleon set off on his return to Milan, where he arrived on the 15th of December.

Dispatches from Spain and from all parts of the Empire were waiting there for him, and he had more than one resolution to take. The letters of his agents relative to the Peninsula, the letters of Charles IV. applying for a French princess and for the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau, had been delivered to him while on his journey. To resolve such important questions was impossible in the state of mind in which he found himself. He would not yet involve himself in any engagement, for he had not definitively decided on any point, though he inclined, as we have said, to the resolution for dethroning the Bourbons. In consequence, he ordered M. de Champagny to write to Madrid, that he had received the letters of king Charles IV., that he appreciated their importance, but that, exclusively absorbed by the affairs of Italy, where he had but a few days to stay, he could not devote to those of Spain that attention to which they were entitled; and that, on his return to Paris, he should give such answers as the king's letters deserved. He insisted anew that the treaty of Fontainebleau should remain secret for some time longer; and as for M. de Beaulharnais, taking no heed of his advice and opinions, he addressed to him insignificant answers, but formal on one point, namely, the prohibition to show any preference for the parties into which the court of Spain was divided, or to afford any cause for inferring to which side the French cabinet leaned.

It was not true, however, that, wholly engrossed by the affairs of Italy, Napoleon could not think of those of Spain. He had, on the contrary, issued fresh military orders, tending to increase his forces by degrees, both on this and on the other side of the Pyrenees; so that, whatever course he should adopt, he might have but one resolution to express, when he should have decided upon it. All that he learned of the state of Spain contributed to persuade him that the moment of a crisis was at hand; for it seemed no longer possible to place the favourite on a throne, to instil patience into Ferdinand, and to repress the indignation of the Spanish people. He determined, therefore, to be ready to avail himself of an occasion, and to this end to have considerable forces in the Peninsula, without diminishing either the grand army or the army of Italy, both which served to keep Europe in alliance with him or in subjection. Besides the army of general Junot, necessary for Portugal, he had prepared, as we have seen, two other corps, that of general Dupont and that of marshal Moncey, and these he deemed insufficient. He considered that those two corps, proceeding along the road to Burgos and Valladolid, upon pretext of Portugal, enabled by a movement to the left to march upon Madrid, would keep in awe the capital and the two Castilles. But

Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, provinces so important of themselves, and likewise for their spirit, their position, and the fortresses which they contained, ought, he conceived, to be occupied, if not by forces to be marched thither immediately, at least by forces which should be quite ready to enter them. He resolved, therefore, to have two divisions prepared; one which, placed near St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port, might, upon any pretext whatever, fall upon Pampeluna; the other, which, assembled at Perpignan, might, in like manner, enter Barcelona, and take possession of that city and also of the forts which command it. Master of Pampeluna and of the forts of Barcelona, Napoleon would have two solid bases for the armies that were to advance upon Madrid. At any rate, though the crisis at the Escorial seemed imminent to him, he determined neither to hasten it, nor to assume too ostensibly the part of invader, by marching troops elsewhere than on the Burgos, Valladolid, and Salamanca road, which was the road to Portugal. The probable assemblage of English troops on the coasts of the Peninsula could not fail to furnish subsequently specious motives for introducing fresh troops into the interior of Spain. Meanwhile it was sufficient for him to keep them assembled on the frontier. General Junot's army, composed of the old camps in Bretagne, had left some depot battalions, of which might be formed a division of three or four thousand men, quite sufficient to occupy Pampeluna and to awe Navarre. These battalions, five in number, belonged to the 15th, 47th, 70th, and 86th of the line. One Swiss battalion, cantoned in the vicinity, afforded the means of raising them to six. Napoleon gave orders for their immediate assemblage at St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port, under the command of general Mouton, and for adding to them a company of foot-artillery. As for the Perpignan division, he sought the elements for that in Italy itself. He there had Lombard and Neapolitan regiments, fit to be employed in the climate of Spain, but needing to be instructed in war by the French. The return of the auxiliary troops to their country admitted of the immediate disposal of part of the Italian regiments stationed nearest to France. Napoleon, therefore, directed four Italian battalions, three resident at Turin, and one at Genoa, to march for Avignon. A fine Neapolitan regiment, which his brother Joseph had already sent him to gain experience in war, was near Grenoble. The same order was sent to it for Avignon. Four Lombard and Neapolitan squadrons, six or seven hundred strong, with several companies of artillery, were directed to the same point. The French regiment, which had left the fortress of Braunau, restored to the Austrians, was crossing the Alps to return to Italy. Its route was prescribed with a view to its being sent to the south of France. Lastly, the five regiments of chasseurs and the four regiments of cuirassiers, transferred in the preceding winter from Italy to Poland, had their depots in Piedmont, and these depots well supplied with men and horses, like all those of the army. Napoleon drafted from them two more

fine brigades of cavalry, which formed a division of 1200 horse under general Bessières. By joining to these troops some French or Swiss battalions residing in Provence, it would be possible to form a corps of from ten to twelve thousand men for Catalonia.

These dispositions being prescribed to the troops which were not yet to cross the Pyrenees, Napoleon gave orders for a new movement to those which had already passed them. He enjoined general Dupont, whose first division had arrived as far as Vittoria, to set in motion the other two, so as to have all three united in the first days of January, with the appearance of being on march for Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, that is to say for Lisbon, but with the precaution to observe the bridge over the Douro on the Madrid road, and to be ready to occupy it on the first occasion. He ordered marshal Monecy, with the corps of the Coasts of the Ocean, to occupy the positions left vacant by general Dupont, and to march one of his divisions towards Vittoria. These movements could not much increase the jealousy of the court of Spain, because they would take place on the route for Lisbon. To render them still more natural, Napoleon instructed M. de Beauharnais to communicate to the Spanish ministry the most alarming intelligence of an assemblage of English forces at Gibraltar—an assemblage real enough, by the by, and no fiction; for he had just learned that the British government had caused Sicily to be almost entirely evacuated, and that it was preparing to send the troops which had returned from Copenhagen to Portugal. He warmly urged the Spanish cabinet to provide for the safety of Ceuta, Cadiz, the camp of St. Roeh, the Balearic Islands; and, while giving it useful intelligence, he threw an air of greater probability over the pretexts alleged for the introduction of fresh French troops into Spain.

Napoleon had made haste to dispatch the affairs of Italy, that he might return to Paris, where he could attend so much more closely to the object that incessantly engaged his thoughts. There was, nevertheless, one question which he would have been more capable of resolving at Paris than at Milan, because he would there have had around him superior intelligence, and for which, nevertheless, he would not defer his decision for a single day. That question related to the recent orders in council issued by the British government respecting the navigation of neutrals. By these ordinances, England was about to plunge deeper than ever into the system of violence; and Napoleon, as it may easily be conceived, was determined not to be left behind. To a hard blow he made a point of replying immediately by one still harder. The reader is acquainted with the steps which had been previously taken in this fatal track. To the pretension of seizing enemy's property even under a neutral flag, and of applying the right of blockade to vast extents of coast, which it was physically impossible to blockade, Napoleon had at first replied by the prohibition of English commerce on all the coasts of the Empire and of the countries under his influence; then,

his irritation increasing in proportion to the violence of the Admiralty, he had, by the famous Berlin decree, declared the British islands in a state of blockade, forbidden the traffic in English goods in all countries under his sway, ordered their seizure and confiscation everywhere, and given notice that every ship which should have touched at any place in the three kingdoms, or at any of the English colonies, should be excluded from the ports belonging to France, or dependent on her will. Various supplementary decrees had imposed upon vessels laden with colonial commodities the obligation to provide themselves with certificates of origin delivered by French agents. In default of these certificates all goods were liable to confiscation. The alliance concluded with Russia and with Denmark, the adhesion promised by Austria, the insured adhesion of the two governments of the Peninsula, were about to extend these formidable dispositions to the entire Continent.

England had at length perceived that the system of interdiction, carried to extremity, was more prejudicial to her than to France, for she had more need to sell than the Continent to buy, that the colonial productions, the almost general monopoly of which she had secured, for her ships detained, under various pretexts, even the vessels of the United States themselves, remained unsold in the warehouses; that she should suffer, in point of importation as much as in point of exportation, for she would not be able to obtain certain raw materials which were indispensable for her, such as the wools of Spain and the naval stores of the North; that, in this state of trade, France would have much less reason to complain, for she would furnish the Continent with the stuffs which the English manufactures would cease to supply; that, as for colonial produce, there would reach her, either by privateers or by vessels escaping the cruisers, a certain quantity, for which she would be obliged to pay a high price, but which would suffice for her wants; and that, after all, the dearth of sugar and coffee would not be productive of such great inconveniences to France as the suppression of all exchanges would entail on England. The British cabinet had, therefore, relinquished its system of exclusion, and devised means for facilitating general commerce, but, by obliging it to pass wholly through Great Britain, and making it moreover her tributary. In consequence, it had decided by three orders in council, dated the 11th of November, 1807, that every vessel belonging to a nation not at declared war with Great Britain, though more or less dependent on France, might freely enter the ports of the United Kingdom or its colonies, then go whithersoever it pleased, provided that it had touched in England either to carry thither or to receive goods, and had there paid duties of customs equivalent on an average to 25 per cent. Every vessel, on the contrary, which should not have touched in the ports of Great Britain and have among her papers certificates of origin delivered by French agents, was to be seized and declared lawful prize. Accordingly merchantmen, in as far at least

as violent laws can be carried into execution over the immense extent of the seas, were compelled to touch in England to pay the customs, or to go thither to supply themselves with English commodities and merchandise. All commerce, therefore, was to be carried on through the English ports; all merchandise was to come from them or to pay duty there.—Thanks to these regulations, the English had a sure means of sending us their colonial productions which did not carry with them, like cotton stuffs, for instance, the proof of their origin. They called, in fact, neutral vessels into the Thames, loaded them with sugar and coffee, then conveyed them to within sight of our coast, in order to spare their being searched, and thus introduced them into our ports or those of Holland, furnished with false papers, which enabled them to pass for neutrals coming direct from America.

Napoleon, on receiving at Milan, where he then was, the orders of the 11th of November, wrote first to Paris, to the minister of the finances and the director of the customs, requiring a report on these orders. But, not having patience to wait for their answers, he issued on the 17th of December a decree, known by the appellation of the Milan decree, still more severe than the preceding. In the Berlin decree, he had done no more than exclude from the ports of the Empire every vessel which should have touched in England: this time he went much further, and declared every vessel which should have touched in England or in her colonies, and submitted to an obligation to pay a duty there, denationalised, therefore lawful prize. By further regulations, he fixed heavy penalties for captains and seamen who should make false declarations. While Napoleon was issuing this decree, Messrs. Gaudin, Cretet, Defermon, and Collin de Sussy, in answer to his questions, proposed a measure tending to nearly the same end, but still more severe: it was to forbid all commercial intercourse with the French Empire to such nations as should not themselves have ceased all commerce with England. The Milan decree, such as it was, served to cut off more strictly than ever the communications which England had purposed to re-open for her advantage. But this advantage was purchased at the expense of a redoubled violence, which was soon destined to weary France and her allies as much as England herself.

Excepting this short diversion, Napoleon bestowed all the time that he had left to the administration of the kingdom of Italy.

The three colleges of the Possidenti, Commerciali, and Dotti, met, agreeably to the convocation which they had received, at Milan, towards the end of December, to listen to the communication of several essential acts. By the first of these acts, Napoleon officially adopted prince Eugene Beauharnais as his son. By the second, he fixed the consequence of this adoption, by ensuring to prince Eugene the succession to the crown of Italy and by restricting his right of inheritance to that crown alone, which precluded the possibility of his succeeding some day to that

of France. After he had established his brothers and his sisters, it was natural that he should satisfy perhaps the warmest of his affections, that excited in him by the children of the empress Josephine, and particularly Eugène de Beauharnais, who had served him with modesty, prudence, and zeal in Italy. This prince was highly esteemed by the Italians, who had never lived under so mild and so enlightened a government, and who for two years past had been resting in the quiet of peace from the horrors of war.

The crown of Italy continuing for the present united to that of France, and Eugène de Beauharnais being still only heir presumptive to it, with the title of viceroy, Napoleon resolved that he should be called prince of Venice, and that this should thenceforward be the title borne by every heir presumptive to the crown of Italy. He created the title of princess of Bologna for the infant daughter recently produced by his marriage with the princess Augusta of Bavaria. Lastly, desirous of bestowing a new mark of favour on the duke de Melzi, formerly vice-president of the Italian republic, he created him duke of Lodi, a title borrowed from one of the splendid achievements of our early campaigns. He then turned his attention towards modifying in some points the constitution of Italy—a constitution of little importance in itself, the will of Napoleon doing everything in Italy, a circumstance not to be regretted for the moment, for, with the exception of the exigences arising from the general war, that will neither purposed nor accomplished any thing but what was beneficial there. The college of the Possidenti, the wealthiest of the three, voted the erection at its expense of a monument to perpetuate the memory of the benefits with which Napoleon had loaded Italy.

These operations finished, Napoleon set out for Piedmont, inspected the great fortress of Alexandria, complimented on the spot itself general Chasseloup, entrusted with the construction of that fortress, then proceeded to Turin, where he granted further advantages to those provinces which had become French. With a view to connect Liguria with Piedmont, he decreed a canal, which, discharging itself into the sea at Savona, and crossing the Appenines in their lowest part to reach the Bormida at Carcara, was intended to join the Po and the Mediterranean. He gave orders for the improvement of the navigation from Alexandria to the Po, so that it should be rendered passable for craft in all seasons. He caused some points on the high road from Alexandria to Savona to be rectified, and determined that it should be put into communication with the Turin road by a branch from Carcara to Ceva. He decided upon the opening of the high road of Mont Genève, through Briançon, Fenestrelle, and Pignerol, which, joined to that of Mont Cenis, was to complete the communications of France with Piedmont by the Cottian Alps. He decreed also the construction of several bridges: one, of stone,

over the Po at Turin; another, of stone, over the Doira; one, of wood, over the Sesia, at Verceil; one, of wood, over the Bormida, between Alexandria and Tortona; lastly, three, of less importance, likewise of wood, over three streams that run between Turin and Verceil. He took care at the same time to ensure financial means sufficient for these extensive works; for he was not one of those who give orders for new creations, without considering how the consequent expences are to be defrayed. A balance owing by the purchasers of national domains, the produce of the mortgaged domains, an advance raised upon the salt monopoly, were to provide for these useful expences.

Napoleon left Turin, accompanied by the acclamations of the grateful population, and arrived at Paris on the 1st of January, 1808, late in the day, but in time to receive the homage of the court, the public authorities, and the Parisians. His return to the capital of the Empire was to be the signal for the most important determinations of his reign. It behoved him, in fact, to adopt some resolution in regard to Spain, for he could no longer defer answering Charles IV. He was obliged also to decide respecting the court of Rome, the relations with which became every day more difficult. Napoleon was thus about to run against the two oldest, the two most formidable vestiges of the ancient system, the Bourbons of Spain and the Papacy.

Swayed incessantly, ever since the Continent was pacified, by the systematic idea of placing Bonapartes on all thrones instead of Bourbons, drawn towards this object by family feeling and also by his reforming genius, which was averse to leaving at his side degenerate royalties, either useless or prejudicial to the common cause, Napoleon, as we have seen, was agitated by the most diverse ideas in regard to Spain. Three courses presented themselves to his mind: the first, to attach Spain to himself by the marriage of a French princess with the prince of the Asturias, and by the overthrow of the favourite, without requiring of the Spaniards anything that could wound their pride or their ambition; secondly, to grant all that we have just mentioned, marriage, overthrow of the favourite, but to make Spain pay for it by sacrifices of territory, which should secure to us the banks of the Ebro, the coasts of Catalonia, and the joint possession of the Spanish colonies; thirdly and lastly, to resort to extreme means, that is to say, to dethrone the Bourbons, to impose a new dynasty upon the Spaniards, without demanding of them any sacrifice of territory, any commercial advantage, and contenting himself with having, as the sole result, closely bound the destinies of Spain to those of France.

Of these three courses not one was good (we shall presently explain why), but they were far from being equally bad.

To grant Ferdinand a French princess, to add to this boon the overthrow of the favourite, without requiring any sacrifice for this double satisfaction, would have transported the Spanish nation

with joy, would have gained him for some time an absolute devotedness on its part, and would have secured him its energetic support against any minister who had not kept steadily in the track of French policy. But gratitude in nations, as in individuals, is of brief duration: Spanish jealousy would soon have roused again, when the memory of Napoleon's benefits was effaced, and Ferdinand, who had all the defects of the Spanish character, without any of its good qualities, would have become in a short time as inimical to France as Emmanuel Godoy. His incapacity, his indolence, would have rendered the counsels of Napoleon as annoying to him, as they were at this moment to the favourite; after a few days' warm gratitude, things would have resumed their old course; ignorance, carelessness, aversion to all improvement, jealousy of foreign superiority, would have been, as in times past, the character of the Spanish government in a new reign. A French princess, it is true, would have been placed near the throne, to repeat there the good advice proceeding from Paris; but it would have required a very rare superiority to withstand such contrary tendencies, and this very superiority would perhaps have rendered her odious. The past was not cheering for a French princess, bringing noble and attractive qualities into Spain. Besides, one cannot create at pleasure princesses enriched with all the gifts of Nature, and those whom Napoleon had then at his disposal gave no indications of the brilliant faculties, which the situation would have rendered as necessary for their part as dangerous for themselves.

The second plan, that of requiring, in consideration of the marriage, of the overthrow of the favourite, and of the cession of Portugal, large sacrifices, such as the surrender of the provinces of the Ebro, and the opening of the Spanish colonies to the French, was merely the first plan greatly aggravated. The provinces of the Ebro offered an advantage more apparent than real; for those provinces, on account of their vicinity, disliked the French more than any. They would not, even in time, have contracted a fondness for the French, any more than the Milanese have contracted a fondness for Austria. The Pyrenees would always have reminded them that they were Spanish and not French; and, so far from giving us a soldier or a piastre, it would have cost us a great many men and a great deal of money to keep them. The alleged sway which they would have secured to us over Spain, would be, under Napoleon at least, quite illusory. To start from Pampeluna or Saragossa, instead of Bayonne, for the purpose of marching to Madrid, was not so great a difference as to induce a belief that Spain would thus pass, in regard to us, from a state of independence to a state of submission; on the contrary, we should have exasperated the Spaniards by this dismemberment of their territory; we should have so embittered their joy at seeing Ferdinand married to a French princess and the favourite overthrown, that we should have caused ingratitude

to spring up on the very first day. Lisbon itself would have had no charms in their eyes, had they been obliged to give Saragossa and Barcelona for it. As for the opening of the Spanish colonies to the French, this was a serious advantage, sufficiently serious to be desired, but easy to be obtained without exciting resentment, had it been the only price exacted for Portugal, the marriage, and the overthrow of the favourite. This second plan, therefore, had not the merit of attaching Spain to us for a single day; and for the sake of some territorial cessions which it would be impossible to retain, it would expose us to the everlasting hatred of the Spaniards.

The third course, towards which Napoleon appeared to be urged in an irresistible manner, consisted in dethroning the Bourbons, in the definitive approximation of France and Spain by the establishment of one and the same dynasty in both countries, in regenerating the latter, in order to render it useful either to itself or to the common cause, in taking nothing from it; on the contrary, in giving it every thing, Portugal, the overthrow of the favourite, internal reforms, in renewing, in short, the policy of Louis XIV., which involved nothing too great for a man who had surpassed all known greatness. Not only had this policy of Louis XIV. nothing too great for Napoleon, but it was, it must be acknowledged, the natural policy of France. To unite in one and the same spirit, in one and the same interest, the whole of the West, that is to say, France and the two peninsulas, Italian and Spanish, to oppose their continental power to the coalition of the courts of the North, their maritime power to the pretensions of England, was assuredly the true, the legitimate ambition, which one could have wished for Napoleon, that which would have been justified by the rules of sound policy, had it not succeeded. But the punishment of the prodigal who has incurred foolish expences consists in being no longer able to defray necessary expences. Napoleon, for having undertaken in the North an immense, an exorbitant task, out of the real interests of France, such as to constitute a French Germany, to the great displeasure of the German populations, to undertake the restoration of Poland in spite of Austria and Prussia, was about to feel the want of those forces, which the execution of the most profoundly political designs would have required. He was, in fact, obliged at that very moment to keep three hundred thousand men between the Oder and the Vistula, to ensure the submission of Germany and the alliance of Russia, one hundred and twenty thousand men in Italy, to deter Austria from all idea of recrossing the Alps. If he required one or two hundred thousand more men to coerce Spain, to prevent the entrance of the English, who were likely to find a convenient and firm footing there, for they had merely the Bay of Biscay to cross in order to reach that country--if he must keep these different armies in Germany, in Italy, in Spain, it would be a mass of eight or nine hundred thousand men that

became necessary, and there must thence result an extension of cares, of efforts, of command, to which in the end, France and even his genius would prove inadequate.

What was then passing afforded already a striking proof of this, since, in order to procure troops without weakening the grand army, without stripping Germany and Italy, Napoleon was obliged to set his wits to work in a thousand ways, and had not hitherto contrived to find any thing but conscripts, commanded by officers picked up in the dépôts or dragged from retirement. It was a first and strong indication of the situation which Napoleon had created by the immoderate multiplication of his enterprises. Another circumstance served greatly to aggravate this insufficiency of resources. The submission of the court of Spain, though mingled with many secret perfidies, though rendered barren by the incapacity of the Spanish administration, had all the appearance of the most absolute devotedness. Napoleon had, therefore, no specious grievance to allege against the court of the Escorial; and the dictatorial act of dethroning Charles IV. for reasons highly politic, it is true, but contrary to simple equity, difficult to make the multitude comprehend, and needing, besides, definitive success to be admitted, was liable to excite insurrection in a proud, jealous nation, filled with ardent hatred against foreigners. One ran the risk, therefore, of revolting its moral feeling, and, to repress it, there would have needed forces very different from those which Napoleon was then able to collect. It was not young conscripts, brave no doubt, but not imposing in appearance, that would have been wanted: it was veteran soldiers, capable of striking terror by their number and their aspect, and who, seizing unawares on all points at once of the affrighted Peninsula, would prevent any outbreak of the public feeling, overawe the half-savage populace of Spain, lastly, afford the middle classes wishing for a new order of things, inclined to hope for it from France, time to confirm themselves in their sentiments and to diffuse them around them. On these conditions, the extraordinary act to which Napoleon was reduced would have had a chance of succeeding; and, the first movement of revolt being thus prevented, the Spanish nation would have learned by degrees to acknowledge the benefits which France was bringing it. But, attempted with inferior resources, the plan of which Napoleon cherished the idea was liable to prove the commencement of a series of disasters.

There was one more condition necessary for the success of this enterprise, that was to keep up in all its intimacy the new alliance which Napoleon had concluded at Tilsit; for, if he were forced to re-commence either the campaign of Austerlitz or that of Friedland while engaged in Spain, besides the difficulty of conquering at these two extremities of the European world, it would be imposing not only a double task upon himself, but rendering the second a hundred times more difficult; for the Spaniards must receive extreme encouragement from any war that might break

out in the North. He would then be obliged, whatever condescendence he might show for the ambition of Alexander, to take his own course, and to prevent the inconvenience of the dispersion of the French forces, by purchasing at any price the concurrence of the great empire of the North; to pay, in short, with Moldavia and Wallachia for the possibility of dethroning the Bourbons of Spain with impunity.

Lastly, when all these conditions were attained there would still be a serious danger, serious both for Spain and France—the possible, nay, probable loss of the rich Spanish colonies. These colonies, in fact, had been already secretly worked up by the spirit of revolt. The example of the United States had strongly developed in them the disposition for independence, and the shameful neglect of the mother-country, which left them without defence, disposed them to it still more. There was reason, therefore, to apprehend that a new dynasty, and that imposed upon the nation, would furnish the colonies with the pretext which they were seeking to rise, and that the English protection would furnish them moreover with the means of doing so. In this case, but too easy to be foreseen, Spain, while waiting till she had opened for herself other sources of prosperity, would be ruined, and France would have done nothing more than enrich English commerce with all the advantages which the traffic of the vast Spanish colonies must afford it.

Such were the three plans between which Napoleon had to choose. They presented, each of them, their inconveniences; for the first, which would have fulfilled all the wishes of the Spaniards at once, by ridding them of the favourite, by assuring them of the protection of Napoleon through a French marriage, by giving them Lisbon without territorial compensation, would perhaps have been but a cheat. The second, which would have required all these advantages to be paid for by a cruel sacrifice of territory, would have revolted them. The third and last, which solved the question in a decisive manner, which definitively established friendship between France and Spain, which regenerated the latter, without demanding any other sacrifice from her than that of a debased dynasty, might, nevertheless, provoke the nation to insurrection, and would then require such a disposable force as Napoleon had not reserved for himself; and, as a last inconvenience, would bring the Spanish colonies into great danger.

Every thing considered, Napoleon could not have done better than to adopt the first plan; that is to say, to deliver Spain from the favourite, to grant her the hand of a French princess, to cede Portugal to her, without requiring the provinces of the Ebro in return, which would have raised the popular joy to intoxication, and to demand at most the opening of the colonies, perhaps the cession of the Balearic Islands or of the Philippines, from which Spain derived no benefit; serious and the only desirable advantages, which she would have relinquished to us without regret,

and without any change whatever in her sentiments towards us. Her gratitude might not have been of long duration, but it might have lasted long enough for bringing the maritime war to a conclusion, for obtaining, during the latter period of that war, the sincere concurrence of the Spaniards against the English, for acquiring, even in their own estimation, the right to demand it, and, if not obtained, the right to punish their ingratitude.

But this plan, the only prudent one, because it was the only one which added no new enterprizes to those with which the Empire was already overburdened, won no approbation, either from Napoleon, with whose secret desires it disagreed, or from M. de Talleyrand, who had not the courage to support it, though he began from that time to be alarmed at the consequences that might arise from the policy which he had complaisantly flattered. He had been seen, with a view to regain the imperial favour, obsequiously entering into all Napoleon's ideas, making himself his secret confidant, his patient interlocutor; and now, prudence counterbalancing in him the desire to please, he hesitated and sought in the second scheme a middle term, in which the courtier and the statesman concurred. He seemed to think that they ought not to enter too deeply into the affairs of the Peninsula; that it would be well to get all they could from Spain, then leave her to herself, and, for this purpose, without pretending to the honour of regenerating her, give her a French princess since she desired one, rid her of the favourite since she was tired of him, and lastly give her the reserved portion of Portugal too distant from France to be kept by us, but make her pay for it with Aragon, Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, the opening of the Spanish colonies, and, having thus obtained compensation for what we should have given, let her alone, but watch her from the top of the walls of Barcelona, Saragossa, and Pampeluna.* Such was the way in which M. de Talleyrand strove to bring back Napoleon from the fatal track into which he had urged him.

But the latter, who judged soundly of this plan, because he disliked it, perceived as much danger in defying as in adopting the last; because it was as difficult in his estimation to take Sara-

* This may serve to explain how it happens that M. de Talleyrand, after flattering more than any other the disposition of Napoleon to interfere in the affairs of Spain, could since maintain that he had dissented from what was done at this period. He had alone encouraged Napoleon to change the state of things in the Peninsula, which rendered the dethronement of the Bourbons almost inevitable. This fact is proved by authentic documents; but, in truth, the dispatches in which M. de Talleyrand gives an account of his negotiations with M. Yzquierdo prove that he preferred a marriage with Ferdinand and the acquisition of the provinces of the Ebro to the decisive measure of overthrowing the Bourbons. It is by supporting himself on this equivocation that M. de Talleyrand asserted that he had not approved of the enterprize against Spain. He had, nevertheless, pushed on Napoleon to this enterprize, when men the most worthy of confidence, such as the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, would have withdrawn him from it; and, after he had so pushed him, the preference given to the very worst of the three possible solutions is not a valid manner of redeeming his responsibility.

gossa, Barcelona, and Pampeluna from the Spaniards as to take from them a degraded dynasty. He therefore always turned away from it, and reverted irresistibly to the idea of expelling the Bourbons from the last throne that was left them in Europe, and said to himself that he must take advantage of the moment when he was all-powerful on the Continent, when England had just authorized every thing by her conduct at Copenhagen, when he was young, victorious, obeyed, served by Fortune, to complete his system by a signal blow struck at the Spanish dynasty, after which he, the army, France, the West, would rest themselves, dazzled with his glory, satisfied with the order which he should have established, with the wise reforms which he should have effected. He said to himself that, after all, the difficulty could not be much greater than that which had been encountered in the kingdom of Naples; that, supposing the Spaniards to be as energetic as the banditti of the Calabrias, it would be sufficient to triple or quadruple the extent of the Calabrias, and, instead of 25,000 Frenchmen, to imagine 100,000, in order to form an idea of the obstacles to be overcome; that his young soldiers, who had everywhere proved themselves the best troops in Europe, would certainly be capable of conquering degenerate Spaniards, and that, by sending to the depôts one more conscription, he should have the hundred thousand conscripts and more, necessary for this new enterprize; that the grand army should remain intact between the Oder and the Vistula, to overawe Europe; that moreover, Finland, given up to Russia, Moldavia and Wallachia promised, would ensure him the concurrence of the emperor Alexander in the accomplishment of his designs; that, in short, what he purposed to do in Spain was the last consequence to be drawn from his victories, the definitive establishment of his family, the complete consummation of his destinies.

However, in January, 1808, on his return from Italy, even after the proceedings at the Escorial, Napoleon's resolution was not irrevocably taken, and he sometimes recurred to the idea of stopping short at a marriage, which would bind the two houses together, when a family incident gave rise to a sort of material impossibility in regard to this combination. Napoleon had, as we have already related, called to Paris Lucien's daughter by a first marriage, who had been sent to him, that she might not be made a victim to the quarrels of her relations. But, unfortunately, this girl, brought up in exile, often hearing bitter complaints against the omnipotent family which shared among themselves all the thrones of Europe, regardless of a distant and forgotten brother—this girl had not brought with her to Paris such sentiments as it was desirable that she should have done. Placed about her grandmother, the empress-mother, she nevertheless met with a severity from her, with a neglect from her aunts, which could not produce more favourable impressions of those, whom she had been taught to fear more than to love. Accordingly, in her cor-

respondence with her relations in Italy, she expressed the disappointment that she felt. Napoleon, in the supposition that he should send her to share the throne of Spain, desirous of ascertaining whether she had brought with her such dispositions as accorded with his policy, directed that she should be closely watched, and gave orders that her correspondence should be read at the post-office. Scarcely had she arrived in Paris before letters were seized, in which she made reports concerning her grandmother, her aunts, her uncle Napoleon, far from favourable to the imperial family. When these letters were delivered to Napoleon, he smiled maliciously, and immediately summoned his mother, his brothers, and his sisters, to the Tuileries, and caused the letters which had been intercepted to be read in family meeting. He was highly diverted at the anger excited in those present at this scene, all of whom were treated harshly enough in this correspondence; then, passing from an ironical mirth to a cold severity, he insisted that his young niece should be sent back within twenty-four hours, and accordingly on the following day she was on the road for Italy. There was then no princess of the Bonaparte family left to be given to Spain; for mademoiselle de Tascher, recently admitted into the imperial family, did not belong to that house.* Napoleon had recently adopted this young person, niece of the empress Josephine, and had sent her to Germany, to be there married to the heir of the princely house of Arenberg. In mixing his blood with that of the Bourbons, he wished it to be his own blood, and not that of his wife, strong as was the affection which he felt for her.

Even without this incident Napoleon would probably have preferred the more decisive measure, that is to say, the dethronement of the Bourbons. At any rate, he had no longer any choice. To overthrow them and to substitute for them a member of his family was the only solution that was left him. But the pretext to be alleged for dethroning them, without deeply wounding the public feeling in Spain, in France, in Europe, was still the point that most embarrassed him. Unable to find it in the abject submission of the Spanish government to his will, he looked to events for it. The dissensions of the court, the scandalous passions of the queen and the favourite, the hatred which they felt for the heir to the crown and that which they excited in him, the impatience of the nation, ready to break forth—all these passions, which kept in-

* The duchess of Abrantes, in her Memoirs, which bespeak a clever but not well-informed person, says that prince Lucien's daughter had not come to Paris, and that the refusal of her father to send her thither had thus become the cause of important events; for Napoleon, obliged to renounce the idea of a union with the Bourbons of Spain had from that time resolved to dethrone them. This assertion is inaccurate. Prince Lucien's daughter did come to Paris, but not stay there on account of the incident which I have just related. The particulars here given were derived from a member of the imperial family, an eyewitness of the scene described, and from a personage who is a member of one of our assemblies, and was appointed to conduct the princess to Italy, a commission which he declined.

creasing from hour to hour, might produce a sudden explosion, and give rise to the desired pretext. It was easy, moreover, to perceive that the successive introduction of French troops into Spain contributed greatly to increase the impatience of all minds, by the hopes excited in some, the fears excited in others, the expectations awakened in all, and that it might perhaps end in provoking a catastrophe. Besides, there might arise from all these causes a result highly agreeable to Napoleon, namely the flight of the royal family of Spain, in imitation of the royal family of Portugal, going, like that, to seek an asylum in America. Such a flight would have set Napoleon quite at ease, by giving up to him a vacant throne, which the Spanish nation, in its indignation against the fugitives, might perhaps itself award to him. This new emigration of a European dynasty to America became, from that moment, the solution to which he adhered, as the least odious, the least revolting, for the civilised public. A sure way to bring about this result was to increase the number of the French troops in Spain, while enveloping his intentions in more profound mystery than ever. This he failed not to do. Being obliged to answer the letters of Charles IV., which solicited of him the hand of a French princess for Ferdinand and the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau, he replied to the first that, highly honoured for his house by the desire expressed by the royal family of Spain, he must nevertheless beg to be informed, before entering into any explanations, if the prince of the Asturias, recently prosecuted as a state criminal, had been again taken into favour by his august parents; for nobody, he said, would *ally himself with a dishonoured son*. To the second he answered that affairs were not yet sufficiently advanced in Portugal to permit the administration to be parcelled out, and above all the military command to be divided, in presence of the English, ready to land; that he must also beware of agitating the minds of the people by premature disclosure of the lot which awaited them; that, from all these motives, the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau must be deferred for some time longer. It was M. de Vandeul, an *employé* of the French legation, who had to deliver these two so ambiguous letters without adding any explanation tending to diminish the obscurity. To this redoubled mysteriousness Napoleon added a further augmentation of his forces.

We have seen what pains he had taken to organise the corps destined for Spain without weakening his armies in Germany and Italy. He had, in fact, composed the army of Portugal with the late camps in Normandy and Bretagne, the army of general Dupont, called Corps of the Gironde, with the three first battalions of the five legions of reserve and some Swiss and Parisian battalions; the army of marshal Monecy, called Corps of Observation of the Coasts of the Ocean, with twelve provisional regiments taken from the depôts of the grand army; the division of the Western Pyrenees, destined for Pampeluna, with some battalions

left in the camps in Bretagne and Normandy ; lastly, the division of the Eastern Pyrenees, with the Italian and Neapolitan regiments, which had not served in Germany, and which the return of the army of Italy rendered disposable. These last two divisions he resolved to reinforce, and to form, moreover, a general reserve for all these corps.

He augmented the division of the Western Pyrenees by adding to it the fourth battalions of the five legions of reserve, the organization of which was just completed. These amounted to 3000 men, who, added to those already marching by St. Jean-Pied-de-Port for Pampeluna, would form a division of six or seven thousand, sufficient to occupy that fortress and to observe Aragon. It was placed under the command of general Merle, and general Mouton, who had been at first appointed to that command, was commissioned to go and inspect the other *corps d'armée*. Napoleon augmented the division of the Eastern Pyrenees, composed of Italians, by adding to it the provisional battalions drawn from the French dépôts situated between Alexandria and Turin, swarming with conscripts already trained. This new French division was to consist of 5000 men, and, added to the Italian division of six or seven thousand, commanded by general Lechi, to form, under general Duhesme, a corps quite sufficient for Catalonia.

As for the general reserve, Napoleon organized it at Orleans for the infantry, at Poitiers for the cavalry. He had recourse to the same process which he had employed for composing marshal Moncey's corps, and he assembled at Orleans fresh provisional battalions, drawn from the dépôts which had not yet furnished detachments for Spain. General Verdier was to command these six new provisional regiments of infantry, designated by the numbers 13 to 18. Napoleon assembled at Poitiers four new provisional regiments of cavalry, likewise drawn from the dépôts, consisting of 3000 horse of all arms, cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars, and chasseurs, under a general of cavalry of distinguished merit, general Lasalle. He restored to the camp of Boulogne, to the garrison of Paris, and to the camps in Bretagne, the ten old regiments brought back from the grand army ; which prepared for him, in case of need, new reserves of a superior quality. Lastly, he despatched secretly for Bordeaux some detachments of the imperial guard, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, expecting that he should be obliged to go himself to Spain, to bring about the *dénouement* which he desired. Computing general Dupont's corps at 25 thousand men, marshal Moncey's at 32 thousand, the division of the Western Pyrenees at 6 or 7, the corps of the Eastern Pyrenees at 11 or 12, the two reserves of Orleans and Poitiers at 10 thousand, the troops of the guard at 2 or 3 thousand, the whole force destined for Spain may be set down at 80 and some odd thousand men, exclusive of the army of Portugal, forming a total amount of more than 100,000 new soldiers destined

for the Peninsula. But they were so young, so little inured to fatigue, that there was reason to expect a great difference between the number of men entered on the muster-roll and the number of the men present under arms. However, one-fourth of this effective was still on march in the course of January, 1808. Napoleon, with a view to advance the *dénouement*, prescribed to his troops a decided movement upon Madrid. The high road leading to that capital divaricates opposite to Burgos. One branch passes through the kingdom of Leon, by Valladolid and Segovia, crosses the Guadarrama towards St. Ildefonso, and descends by the Escorial upon Madrid. The other traverses Old Castille, passing through Aranda, crosses the Guadarrama at Somosierra, a name famous in our military annals, and descends by Buitrago and Chamartin upon Madrid. The two corps of Dupont and Monecy being, the first at Valladolid (in the route to Salamanca), the second between Vittoria and Burgos, before the divarication, had not yet taken a single step which could betray the intention of marching upon Madrid. Napoleon ordered general Dupont to direct one of his divisions upon Segovia, and marshal Monecy one of his upon Aranda, upon pretext of extending himself for the sake of subsistence. From that moment the direction upon Madrid would be unmasked. But the entry of the French troops into Catalonia and Navarre, which it was at length necessary to prescribe, in order to occupy Barcelona, told still more plainly that the real object of these movements was a very different one from Lisbon. For the purpose of furnishing an explanation that would be but half credible, Napoleon, while ordering general Duhesme to penetrate into Catalonia, general Merle to enter Navarre, instructed M. de Beauharnais to announce the intention of a double movement of troops upon Cadiz, one through Catalonia, the other through Estramadura and Andalusia. The French fleet lying at Cadiz might be the motive of this expedition. If, however, this alleged object was in some degree doubted, either at court or in the country, nothing further could result from it than an increased agitation, which Napoleon would not be sorry for, since he wished to bring about, if not immediately at least speedily, the flight of the royal family.

Napoleon found too great advantage in keeping his depôts continually full, by means of conscripts, called out beforehand, and trained for twelve or fifteen months before they were employed, not to persevere in this system of anticipated conscription, especially at a moment when he purposed to form numerous camps along the whole coast of Europe by the side of his fleets. In consequence, after demanding the conscription of 1808 in the spring of 1807, he resolved to demand the conscription of 1809 in the winter of 1808. This demand furnished him, besides, with occasion for a communication to the Senate, and for a specious explanation of the immense assemblage of troops collecting at the foot of the Pyrenees. The Senate was therefore called

together on the 21st of January, to hear a report on the negotiations with Portugal, and on the resolution taken, nay already executed, of seizing the patrimony of the house of Braganza. This was made a text for developing the system of occupation of all the coasts of the Continent, in order to reply to the maritime blockade by the continental blockade. The conscription of 1808, said M. Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, author of the report presented to the Senate, had been the signal and the means of the continental peace signed at Tilsit; the conscription of 1809 would be the signal for the maritime peace. The latter, unfortunately, was still to be signed in a place that no man knew or could tell. The promise to employ in the dépôts alone the young conscripts called out a year before-hand was renewed on this occasion, to weaken the moral effect of these anticipated calls. Another report declared the incorporation with the Empire, in consequence of anterior treaties, of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, and Flushing; Kehl and Cassel as indispensable annexions to the fortresses of Strasburg and Mayence; Wesel as a point of great importance on the lower course of the Rhine; lastly, Flushing, as the port of a maritime establishment, to which Antwerp was the dock-yard. This last communication led to an imperial profession of faith respecting the disinterestedness of France, which, having had in her hands Austria, Germany, Prussia, Poland, had kept nothing for herself, and was content with such insignificant acquisitions as Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, or Flushing. Napoleon meant the new kingdom of Westphalia, for instance, to be considered not as an extension of territory, since it was given to an independent prince, but as a mere extension of the federative system of the French empire.

Good or bad, these argumentations, submitted in brilliant and magniloquent language, for which Napoleon furnished the ideas and M. Regnault the style, were received, as usual, with a respectful inclination of the head by the senators, and followed by the vote of the conscription of 1809.

This new contingent of 80,000 men would raise the mass of the French troops spread over the banks of the Vistula and the Oder, the shores of the Baltic, the Alps, the Po, the Adige, the Isonzo, the coasts of Illyria and of the Calabrias, lastly on the Ebro and on the Tagus, to nearly 900,000 men. Adding to these 100,000 allies at least, here were more than a million of men, three-fourths of whom were veteran soldiers, equal at least to the soldiers of Cæsar, and led by a man, who, in point of military genius, was superior to the Roman captain. What was there impossible with such colossal forces, the greatest that mortal ever had at his disposal, if political prudence had but stepped in to repress the intoxication of victory? Napoleon, when enumerating them, felt a dangerous satisfaction: he was puzzled only how to pay them, but reckoned upon the continuation of the war to enable them to live in foreign countries, or upon a peace to permit him to

reduce their effective without diminishing their skeletons. Supported by this prodigious military power, he dared to will any thing, to attempt any thing, considering himself, at that height, as above all the rules of ordinary morality, empowered to give and take away thrones, like another Providence, always justified like it by the vastness of his designs and of the results.

From this period dates the origin of an idea, with which Napoleon was ever afterwards prepossessed on the subject of military organization, which was not absolutely good in itself, but which for him alone might have had advantages: this was to convert the French regiments into legions, nearly resembling the Roman legions. The battalion, composed of seven or eight hundred men, and having for its measure the physical power of man, who cannot command directly a greater number; the regiment, composed of three or four battalions, and having for its measure the solicitude of the colonel, who cannot extend paternal care to a greater number of individuals, have been, in modern times, the basis of the military organization. With several regiments has been formed the brigade, with several brigades, the division, with several divisions the army. In general there has been left on the frontiers a battalion, called the *dépôt* battalion, in which it has been customary to collect all the weakly men, convalescents, untrained recruits, with the officers least capable of active service, to serve at once as a place of rest and instruction, and to furnish the war battalions with a constant recruit. It was by managing this organization with profound skill, that Napoleon had contrived to create those armies, which, starting from the Rhine, sometimes from the Adize or the Volturno, went to fight and to conquer on the Vistula or the Niemen. The constant attention bestowed on the *dépôts* had been the secret cause of his successes, as much as his genius for war. Now his art was about to become complicated, his solicitude extended, in proportion as these *dépôts*, placed on the Po and on the Rhine, having already sent detachments to the armies in Prussia and Poland, were required to send more to the armies in Spain, Portugal, and Illyria. To follow with the eye 116 French regiments of infantry, 80 of cavalry, from which have been drawn a considerable number of provisional corps, besides the imperial guard, the Swiss, the Poles, the Italians, the Irish, and the German and Spanish auxiliaries; to follow with the eye the regiment and its detachments in every country, to direct its formation, training, location, so as to be assured of the best employment of each, and to prevent the disorganization which might arise from the dislocation of parts,—for a regiment whose *dépôt* was on the Rhine had sometimes battalions in Poland, Germany, Spain, Portugal—all this required a laborious and singularly wearisome attention, even for the most indefatigable of all geniuses. Napoleon, therefore, conceived the idea of sixty legions, instead of a hundred and twenty regiments, each composed of eight war battalions, commanded by a *maréchal-de-camp*, several colonels and

lieutenant-colonels, capable of furnishing war-battalions in Poland, in Italy, and in Spain, and having a single *depôt*, to which all the detachments drawn from it should be sent back. This was a departure from the principle of the regiment, a juster basis, as we have observed, since it has for its measure the physical force of the *chef-de-bataillon*, and the moral force of the colonel, and substituting in its stead a new and completely arbitrary composition, for the convenience of a unique position, unique as the genius and the fortune of Napoleon; for who, excepting him, could ever have battalions of one and the same regiment to send to Poland, to Italy, to Spain? This conception he had so much at heart, that he never afterwards ceased to think of it during his reign, and even in exile. However, upon the objections of Messrs. Lacuée and Clarke, he contented himself with a middle plan, which, instead of abandoning the principle of the regiment, augmented its composition, so as to diminish the total number of the corps. He decided by a decree, which was not definitively signed till the 18th of February, that all the infantry regiments should be composed of five battalions, four for war, one at the *depôt*; each battalion, of six companies, one of grenadiers, one of voltigeurs, and four of fusileers. The *depôt* battalion was fixed at four companies only, as the companies of the *élite* were not to be formed unless in war. Agreeably to this decree, each company consisted of 140 men, and the whole regiment of 3,970, 108 of whom were officers, and 3,862 subalterns and privates. The colonel and four *chefs-de-bataillon* commanded the war battalions, and the major remained at the *depôt*. In this formation, which already exceeded the natural proportions of the regiment, and which was induced by the situation of Napoleon and of France, a regiment having its *depôt* on the Rhine, for example, could have two war battalions with the grand army, one on the coast of Normandy, and one in Spain. A regiment having its *depôt* in Piedmont, might have two of its war battalions in Dalmatia, one in Lombardy, and one in Catalonia. In this manner all the corps had a share in all the species of warfare at once; and, when hostilities ceased in the North, care was taken to allow all those who had just served in Poland to rest themselves, and to send off for Spain all who had not been in the late campaigns, or all which had either strength or the desire to make several successively. But this composition of the regiments, which had perhaps some advantages for Napoleon and for the Empire, such as it had become, is a singular proof of the influence which an extreme policy exercised already on the military organization. While the extension of his enterprizes was about to weaken the armies of Napoleon by dispersing them, it was about to weaken also the regiment itself, by extending it beyond measure, by diminishing the energy of family spirit in brethren in arms, too distant from one another. A military corps is a whole, which has its natural proportions, its architecture, if one may be allowed the expression, which we are liable to distort by any attempt to extend it too much.

For the rest, several dispositions of this decree revealed the noble and manly sentiments of the great man who had conceived it. The eagle of the regiment, an object of the respect, the love, the devotedness of the soldiers, for it is their honour, was always to be where the greatest number of battalions were, and to be consigned to the care of the eagle-bearer, who was to have the rank and pay of lieutenant, who should have served ten years, or have distinguished himself in the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland. Beside him were to be placed, with the title of second and third eagle-bearer, with the rank of sergeant and the pay of sergeant-major, two old soldiers, who had been in the great battles, but who had not been able to obtain promotion, as illiterate men. It was a worthy mode of employing and rewarding brave fellows, whose intelligence was not equal to their courage. Every thing in the State received, as we see, the influence of the immoderate genius of Napoleon and the impress of his great soul.

Elevated by the sense of his power, conceiving that he had a right to do whatever he pleased since England dared do everything, considering the continental war as finished, and the prolongation of the maritime war as a useless delay of the completion of his plans, Napoleon resolved to demolish all the obstacles that counteracted his will. While he was giving the orders that we have just stated, for the purpose of bringing the Peninsula into the system of his Empire, he issued nearly similar orders for bringing the Italian Peninsula into the same system, and for putting an end, on the one hand, to the sovereignty of the Pope, who annoyed him in the centre of Italy, on the other, to that of the Bourbons of Naples who defied him from the centre of the island of Sicily.

We have seen how the refusal to restore the Legations to the Holy See, after the coronation, then the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, which had completely reduced the Roman States to a mere enclosure of the French Empire, had successively galled Pius VII., and converted his habitual mildness into a continual and sometimes violent irritation against Napoleon, to whom he was nevertheless attached. The privation of the principalities of Benevento and Ponte Corvo, granted to M. de Talleyrand and to marshal Bernadotte, the occupation of Ancona, the continual passages of French troops, had raised the displeasure and the exasperation of his Holiness to the utmost. Accordingly, he refused to comply with any of the applications of France, and rejected them all, some for specious reasons, others for reasons which were not specious, and which he took no pains to render so. He had, in the first place, refused to annul the first marriage of prince Jerome, consummated without any formality; and could not be induced to do anything more than wink at the dissolution pronounced by the French ecclesiastical authority. He had refused to acknowledge Joseph as king of Naples, received at Rome the refractory Neapolitan cardinals, and given asylum in the suburbs of that capital to all the banditti who murdered the French soldiers. He had

kept with him the consul of the dethroned king of Naples, alleging that this king, who had retired to Sicily, was at least sovereign of that island, and consequently had a right to keep a representative at Rome. He had not consented to exclude the English from the Roman States, saying that, he was an independent sovereign, and that, as such, he could be at peace or war with whomsoever he pleased; adding that, in his quality of head of the Christian Church, his duty forbade him to go to war with any of the Christian powers, even though not Catholic. He delayed the canonical institution of the bishops, insisted on a journey to Rome in the case of the Italian bishops, contested the extension of the French Concordat to the Italian provinces which had become French, such as Liguria and Piedmont, and the extension of the Italian Concordat to the Venetian provinces, annexed the last to the kingdom of Italy. Lastly, he would not assent to any of the arrangements proposed for the new German Church; and on every subject, be it what it might, he objected the natural difficulties arising out of it, and gladly created such as did not exist. Napoleon thus reaped the reward of his neglect to satisfy the court of Rome, which he could have kept in the best dispositions by means of a few sacrifices of territory that would have been easy to him; for, without touching the kingdoms of Lombardy and Naples, he had Parma, Placentia, Tuscany, for rounding the dominions of the Holy See. It is true that his imperious determination to subject all Italy to his system of warfare against the English would have proved, in any case, a serious difficulty. But assuredly it would have been possible to obtain from the satisfied Pope, under the form of a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, his adhesion to all the conditions of war which he meant to impose upon Italy.

Taking no account of the motives which had alienated his Holiness from him, Napoleon ordered him to be told, "You are sovereign of Rome, it is true, but comprized in the French Empire; you are Pope, I am emperor, such as were the German emperors, such as Charlemagne was still more anciently; and I am Charlemagne for you by more than one title, by title of power, by title of benefaction. You will, therefore, obey the laws of the federative system of the Empire, and close your territory against my enemies." The manner of this pretension offended Pius VII. still more than the matter. His eyes, usually so mild, flashed with all the fire of indignation, and he declared to cardinal Fesch that he recognized no sovereign above him upon earth; that, if it were intended to renew the tyranny of the German emperors of the middle ages, he would renew the resistance of Gregory VII.; and that, though it was alleged that the spiritual arms had lost their force, he would show that they could still be powerful against a sovereign of recent origin, whom he had consecrated with his own hands, and who owed part of his moral authority to that consecration. To this Napoleon replied that, in the 19th

century, he feared the spiritual arms but little ; that, however, he would not afford any legitimate pretext for their employment, by abstaining from touching religious matters; that he should do no more than strike the temporal sovereign; that he should leave at the Vatican the respected bishop of Rome, the chief of the bishops of Christendom, and, as for the temporal prince, whose spiritual sovereignty should have received no injury, not a creature either in France or Spain would interest himself about him.

Cardinal Fesch, whose haughty and meddling disposition and inferior capacity were liable to embroil the easiest negotiations, having been superseded by M. Alquier, accustomed successively, at the courts of Madrid and Naples, to treat with the old royalties, and disposed to humour them, the situation had nevertheless remained the same, and the relations between the two governments had retained all their acrimony. The pontifical court, however, resolved to send a cardinal to Paris, to put an end by a compromise to the differences which divided Rome and the Empire, and made choice of cardinal Litta. Napoleon rejected him as one of the cardinals animated with the worst spirit. It then selected the French cardinal de Bayanne, an enlightened and discreet member of the Sacred College. At the same time, the Pope, to prove that Cardinal Consalvi was not the instigator of his resistance, as Napoleon supposed, took from this friend the secretaryship of State, and gave it to an aged prelate, without talent and without energy—cardinal Casoni. They shall see, he exclaimed, with a pride, which, notwithstanding his mildness, would break forth all at once when he was irritated—they shall see that it is with me, with me alone, they have to deal;—it is I who must be crushed, trampled under foot by French soldiers, if they are resolved to do violence to my authority.

Napoleon, ceasing to impose upon himself any restraint, as we have said, caused the provinces of Urbino, Ancona, and Macerata, which formed the coast of the Adriatic, to be militarily occupied by general Lemarois; and then the Holy See, Pope and cardinals, fearing that these provinces would ultimately share the fate of the Legations, thought for a moment of compounding, and an accommodation took place, the conditions of which were the following:

The Pope, independent sovereign of his dominions, proclaimed such, guaranteed such, by France, would nevertheless contract an alliance with her, and whenever she may be at war, would exclude her enemies from the territory of the Roman States;

The French troops should occupy Ancona, Civita Vecchia, and Ostia, but be subsisted at the expense of the French Government;

The Pope would engage to clear and put into good condition, the muddy harbour of Ancona;

He would recognize king Joseph, send away king Ferdinand's consul, the murderers of the French, and the Neapolitan cardinals

refusing the oath, and renounce his ancient right of investiture over the crown of Naples;

He would consent to extend the Concordat of Italy and the Concordat of France to all the provinces of Italy converted into French provinces;

He would nominate without delay the French and Italian bishops, and not require the latter to travel to Rome;

He would appoint plenipotentiaries charged to conclude a Germanic Concordat;

Lastly, to satisfy Napoleon respecting the spirit of the Sacred College, and to proportion the influence of France to the extension of her territory, he would increase the number of the French cardinals to one-third of the total number of the cardinals.

This arrangement was nearly completed when the Pope, impelled by unlucky suggestions, and in particular offended by two clauses, that which obliged the Holy See to close its territory against the enemies of France, and that which increased the number of the French cardinals—clauses, the first of which was inevitable in the situation of the Roman States, and the second adapted to pacify for the future—the Pope peremptorily refused his assent.

Then, without listening further to a single observation, without listening to the offer of withdrawing a first refusal, he ordered passports to be sent to the cardinal de Bayanne, and despatched the necessary orders for the invasion of the Roman States. At bottom, he was decided, there, as in Spain, to come to a definitive solution, that is to say, to leave the Pope at the Vatican, with an ample revenue, with a purely spiritual authority, and to deprive him of the temporal sovereignty of central Italy. But, expecting to have to do with the Spaniards in two or three months, that is, towards Easter, he had no wish that religious causes should be added to political causes to irritate a fanatical people. He formed, therefore, the design of occupying for the moment Rome and the provinces bordering the Mediterranean, as he had already caused those which border the Adriatic to be occupied. Accordingly, he ordered the general commanding in Tuscany to assemble 2500 men at Perugia, general Lemarois to march as many upon Foligno, general Miollis to put himself at the head of these two brigades, to advance upon Rome, to pick up by the way a column of 3000 men, ordered by Joseph to start from Terracina, and with these 8000 soldiers, to take possession of the capital of the Christian world. General Miollis was to enter, by fair means or by force, the Castle of St. Angelo, to take the command of the Papal troops, to leave the Pope at the Vatican, with a guard of honour, to interfere in no respect in the government, to say that he came to occupy Rome for a longer or shorter time, in a purely military interest, and to keep off the enemies of France from the Roman States. He was to make himself master of the police alone, to

expel all the banditti who made Rome their retreat, to send off the Neapolitan cardinals to Naples, and to have recourse to the public chests for what was necessary for the maintenance of the French troops.

The illustrious Miollis, an old soldier of the republic, combining with an inflexible character a most cultivated mind, the purest probity, and much experience in treating with Italian princes, was better qualified than any other for performing this rigorous commission and paying at the same time the respect due to the head of Christendom. Napoleon allowed him a considerable salary, with orders to live in high style at Rome, and to accustom the Romans to regard the French general established at the Castle of St. Angelo as the real head of the government, much more than the pontiff left at the Vatican.

The invasion of Portugal had drawn towards Gibraltar the troops which the English had in Sicily, and those which they had brought back beaten from Alexandria. Not more than seven or eight thousand men were left in Sicily to preserve that wreck of her crown for their unfortunate victim, queen Caroline. This was the time for preparing an expedition against that island, and to take advantage of the junction of the French fleets in the Mediterranean to convey that expedition. Napoleon had ordered admiral Rosily, commanding the French fleet at Cadiz, and admiral Allemand, commanding the fine Rochefort division, to weigh anchor on the first favourable occasion, and to form a junction with the Toulon division. At his instigation, the same order had been given to the Spanish division at Carthageua, commanded by admiral Valdes, an order executed with tolerable punctuality, since the Spanish government showed itself so submissive, and he expected to have twenty and odd sail at Toulon under admiral Ganteaume, if all these junctions were successfully effected. With one only of these junctions, that of the Rochefort squadron, one of the most probable on account of the point of starting, and the most desirable on account of the quality of the crews and of the commander, there would be ships sufficient to transport an army to Sicily and to revictual Corfu, the second and not the least important object of the expedition. He therefore ordered admiral Ganteaume to collect at Toulon, and to take on board the division already assembled in that port a considerable mass of stores of all kinds, such as corn, biscuit, powder, projectiles, gun-carriages, tools; and to land this cargo at Corfu, whatever might be the success of the operation against Sicily. He directed Joseph to assemble at Baïæ eight or nine thousand men, completely equipped, and at Scylla, opposite to the lighthouse, seven or eight thousand more, with a great quantity of feluccas and craft, capable of crossing the small arm of the sea which separates Sicily from Calabria. He desired that every thing should be ready, so that admiral Ganteaume, having left Toulon and arrived off Baïæ, might embark the eight or nine

thousand men concentrated at that point, convey them in twenty-four hours to the north of the light-house, where the other seven or eight thousand assembled at Scylla and embarked in the small vessels that should have been procured, would have arrived on their part. With these 15 or 16 thousand men the light-house was to be taken, and armed as well as the fort of Scylla, and these two points which closed the Strait being gained by the French, they would make themselves masters for ever of the passage. This result obtained, not an English soldier would dare to remain in Sicily.

But this bold enterprise presupposed that the orders repeated by Napoleon relative to the two points which the English still possessed on the coast of Calabria, Scylla and Reggio, would have been carried into execution. Napoleon had several times been angry with Joseph, because, with an army of more than 40,000 men, he suffered the English still to possess a foot of the continent of Italy. "It is a shame," he wrote to him, "that the English can still resist us upon land. I beg you not to write to me till this disgrace is retrieved; and, if it is not soon, I will send one of my generals to supersede you in the command of my army in Naples." Joseph, smarting under these reproaches, had charged general Regnier to attack the two fortified points of Scylla and Reggio, which so grievously offended the eyes of Napoleon. They were on the point of being taken—but they were not taken. Napoleon was extremely angry. However, his irritation against his brother's want of energy made no change in the state of things; it was agreed that the plan of the expedition should be modified, for it was impossible to be master of the strait, while the coast of the Calabrias, which ought naturally to have belonged to the French, was not yet in their possession. In consequence admiral Ganteaume was to proceed first to Corfu, to land the vast mass of warlike stores on board the fleet, then to return to the strait, touch at Reggio, which would probably be taken at the presumed time of his appearance in these seas, embark a dozen thousand men there, and convey them by the interior of the strait to the south of the light-house. The season was an additional motive with admiral Ganteaume for thus acting; for, in operating by the interior of the strait and to the south of the light-house, he should be screened from the violent winds, which in winter blow from the north-west and render the approach to the north coast of Sicily dangerous.

These dispositions being adopted, admiral Ganteaume held himself in readiness to embark on the first appearance of one of the naval divisions expected every moment from Carthage, Cadiz, or Rochefort. The reader will recollect, no doubt, that on the very judicious observations of admiral Decrès, it had been agreed that the Brest and Lorient divisions should remain at sea, and that those of Rochefort and Cadiz should alone receive orders to penetrate into the Mediterranean. Admiral Rosily was extremely anxious to leave Cadiz, where he had been detained upwards of

two years. But it was more difficult for him to get out than any other, on account of the Strait of Gibraltar. It is to the immensity of the seas that the facility of escape is owing; but in the narrow channel of a strait, within reach of such a post as Gibraltar, it is impossible to elude an enemy and to give him the slip. The sea between the coast of Spain and that of Africa was covered with small vessels mounting guard for the English fleet, which kept in the offing, in order to entice admiral Rosily to venture out. But no sooner was he under weigh than the whole naval force of the enemy was seen bearing down upon him. Rosily's division was completely armed, thanks to the resources of the port of Cadiz, abundant for the French government, which paid well, null for the Spanish government, which never paid. It was manned, moreover, by excellent crews, which had been at sea and sustained the greatest sea-fight of the age, that of Trafalgar. Admiral Rosily, an old seaman, as experienced as he was brave, would not have shrunk from fighting an English division, even superior in force to his own; but, with six sail of the line and two or three frigates, he could not defy twelve or fifteen sail of the line and a multitude of frigates without running the risk of a fresh disaster. Thus, though he had received the order to leave Cadiz in September, 1807, he had not succeeded in getting out in February, 1808.

Rear-admiral Allemand, the boldest naval officer that France then had, especially as a navigator, found himself also closely blockaded in Rochefort, and the disasters experienced by captain Soleil's frigates furnished a proof of this. But once out of the Pertuis by a daring venture, the Ocean expanded before him, and, with excellent crews, good ships, and his boldness at sea, he had many chances of escaping the English. Several times he weighed anchor, and several times he beheld the enemy bearing down in such number, that it would have been impossible to escape. One day, however, the 17th of January, 1808, favoured by thick weather, he set sail, got out unperceived, dashed into the Bay of Biscay, and doubled Cape Ortegal without accident, ran along the whole of Spain, arrived within sight of the projecting coasts of Europe and Africa, and in a dark night, and with a tremendous west wind, he threw himself boldly into the Strait, so well guarded that admiral Rosily could not have appeared in it had he not covered himself with English colours. It has long been proverbially said that Fortune favours the brave; on this occasion, at any rate, she certainly did; for in a few hours admiral Allemand found himself, with his whole division in the open Mediterranean, having passed Gibraltar and Ceuta without being perceived. On the 3rd of February, he appeared in sight of Toulon, and made a signal to admiral Ganteaume to come out, that they might proceed together to the goal marked for them by the Emperor. The joy of this brave seaman was extreme, at having performed so successfully such a dangerous trip.

The Spanish division at Carthagená, much less closely watched than that of admiral Rosily, because it was more than a hundred leagues from the Strait, and at that time the people ceased to do the Spanish navy so much honour as to believe it to be enterprising—the division at Carthagená had few difficulties to conquer in order to get out. It had, therefore, been able to weigh anchor and to sail for Toulon, agreeably to the orders of Napoleon. It was commanded by admiral Valdes, and composed of one very fine three-decker, one ship of 80, and four of 74 guns. After lying immoveably in the harbour for three years, their bottoms were foul; they were but moderately manned, and had not on board provisions for three months. Whether the admiral had received secret orders not to execute his commission, or the timidity of the Spanish sailors had become extreme, the squadron had sailed round the Balearic Islands, to find an asylum there in case of need, and, on the first appearance of an English sail, had taken refuge there, informing its government, which lost no time in transmitting the intelligence to Paris, that it was blocked up and knew not when it would be possible to put to sea again. Whether treachery or faintheartedness, the result was absolutely the same for the plans of Napoleon, and exhibited in the strongest light the manner in which Spain was accustomed to perform her duty as an ally.

For the rest, admiral Ganteaume had orders to sail on the first junction that should happen to increase his force. The five ships at Toulon having, in fact, been joined by the five from Rochfort, he had nothing to fear in the Mediterranean. The ships equipped at Toulon were far less efficient than those which had arrived from Rochfort; and the crews of those in particular, that were equipped in the port of Genoa consisted of boys picked up on the quays of that great city, the Genoese sailors themselves having fled into the Appenine mountains. Nevertheless, as an excellent spirit prevailed in the Toulon squadron, a spirit which was traditional in that port, and which rear-admiral Cosmao strove to strengthen by his example, good-will made amends for inexperience, and the Toulon division was likely to behave honourably. Admiral Ganteaume, with two excellent lieutenants, rear-admirals Allemand and Cosmao, had two three-deckers, one 80-gun ship, seven seventy-fours, two frigates, two corvettes, two large flutes, in all sixteen sail. After taking time to divide among the whole fleet the immense stores which he was ordered to carry to Corfu, he weighed anchor on the 10th of February, 1808, steering for the Ionian Islands, whence he was to return to the strait of Sicily, to convey a French army to Catanea, when he should have accomplished the first part of his mission. He sailed on the 10th of February, and was out of sight before any enemy's ship made her appearance. With the composition of his fleet, and in the state of the enemy's forces in the Mediterranean, every thing bespoke a successful result. In case of separation, the rendezvous was the point of Italy opposite to the coast of Epire, having for refuge the gulf of Tarento, the Mouths of

the Cattaro, and Corfu itself, the primary object of the expedition.

While this voyage, which was long and lasted two months, was commencing, events in Spain were following their deplorable course. The letters of Napoleon, in answer to the proposal of marriage and the request to publish the treaty of Fontainebleau, written on the 10th of January, and dispatched on the 20th, did not reach Madrid till the 27th or 28th, and were not delivered before the 1st of February. These were not of a nature to cheer the court of Spain. To add to its unhappiness the process at the Escorial was just then finished with extraordinary *éclat*, and to the confusion of those by whom it was set on foot.

Notwithstanding all the efforts made to get the friends of the prince of the Asturias declared accomplices in a crime which had no existence, their innocence, supported by the public opinion, had saved them. The marquis d'Ayerbo, the count d'Orgas, the dukes de San Carlos and de l'Infantado, had conducted themselves with perfect dignity. But the canon Escoïquiz, in particular, had displayed an almost provoking firmness, excited as he was by the danger, by the ambition to sustain his part, by the affection of his royal pupil, by the indignation of an honest man. In spite of the unbecoming threats of the director of this process, Simon de Viegas, one of the vilest agents of the court, Escoïquiz, without disavowing the papers on which the accusation was founded, had persisted in maintaining and demonstrating his innocence, saying that, in fact, he had endeavoured in those papers to unveil the turpitudes and the crimes of the favourite; that in so doing, he was serving the king, not betraying him; that the blank order, signed beforehand, to confer military powers on the duke de l'Infantado was a legitimate precaution against a plan of usurpation which every body was acquainted with, and proof of which he engaged to furnish, if he were placed in presence of Godoy, and permitted to call witnesses who were all ready to reveal fearful truths. The courage of this poor, unarmed priest, having no other support against an all-powerful court than public opinion, had disconcerted the accusers and excited general interest: for, though the proceedings were secret, the details of them were known from day to day, and transmitted from mouth to mouth with a rapidity which nothing but the warmest passion can account for, in a country without newspapers and almost without roads. The judges beginning to waver, there had been added to them a reinforcement of magistrates supposed to be devoted, for the purpose of rendering the condemnation more certain. The fiscal, Don Simon de Viegas, had conformed to the order which he had received, to require the punishment of death against the accused. The court, working in all possible ways on the judges upon whom it conceived that it could rely, made application to them to pronounce the condemnation required by the fiscal, not for the purpose of carrying it into execution, but to

afford the king occasion to exercise his clemency. It had, it was alleged, but one object in view; this was to render the royal authority more respectable by punishing with a sentence of death the mere thought of failing in duty to the king, and to endear him still more to the people, by furnishing occasion for a signal act of clemency towards the accused to emanate from him. It was, in fact, the design of the court to obtain a sentence of death, in order to prevent its execution. But nobody had sufficient confidence in it to trust it with the lives of the most honoured members of the Spanish grandezza; and, besides, public opinion, ready to break loose against the double-dealing judges who should sacrifice innocence, was more imposing than the court. One of the judges, related to the minister of grace and justice, Don Eugenio Caballero, seized with a mortal disease, would not leave the world without expressing an opinion worthy of a great magistrate. He requested his colleagues composing the extraordinary tribunal to come to his house to deliberate beside his death-bed. When they were assembled, Don Eugenio maintained that it was impossible to try the accomplices in a crime, real or false, without the principal author; that is to say, without the prince of the Asturias, and that, according to the laws of the kingdom, that prince could be summoned and heard only before the assembled Cortes; that, moreover, the crime was imaginary; that the proofs furnished were null or destitute of legal character, for they were copies, and not the originals, which they had before them; that the unknown person, who had denounced these facts, ought, according to the Spanish laws, to come forward and depose upon the faith of an oath; that, in the state of the proceedings, without the accused principal, without proofs, without witnesses, with all that was otherwise known concerning the alleged offence imputed to a prince, the object of the love of the nation, and to great personages objects of its respect, upright judges ought to declare themselves incapable of pronouncing, and to beseech the king to annul so scandalous a process.

No sooner had this courageous citizen of an absolute monarchy, in which, absolute as it was, there were laws and magistrates imbued with their spirit—no sooner had he given his opinion, than his colleagues adopted that opinion and joined in it with a sort of patriotic enthusiasm. They all embraced one another after this decision, like men about to die. People believed, in fact, not Charles IV., but the court, to be capable of every thing against judges who had disappointed its calculations, and exaggerated its cruelty though they could not exaggerate its baseness.

When this decision was known, it transported the public with joy, and filled the court with despondence. Poor Charles IV. was persuaded that he ought to display his own justice, in default of that of the magistrates, and a royal decree was wrung from him, in virtue of which the dukes de San Carlos, and de l'Infantado, the marquis d'Ayerbo, and the count d'Orgas were exiled to the distance of sixty leagues from the capital, and

stripped of all their dignities and decorations. The canon Eseoiquiz, the most hated of all, was treated still more severely. He was deprived of his ecclesiastical benefices, and doomed to end his days in the monastery of Tardon. The cardinal de Bourbon, archbishop of Toledo, brother of the princess of the blood married to Emmanuel Godoy, was moreover required to make the chapter of Toledo pronounce the degradation of the canon Eseoiquiz, a member of that chapter. The cardinal obstinately refused to comply. On this occasion, he ventured to reveal to Charles IV. the scandals of the monarchy, and the melancholy situation of the princess his sister, united to the favourite, who had added to all his other crimes that of bigamy. He went so far, it is said, as to insist that his sister should be given up to him and be permitted to shut herself up in a religious retreat, there to deplore a union which brought upon her disgrace and misery. The only answer received by the cardinal was an order to retire to his diocese.

The courageous magistrate who had so nobly done his duty, Don Eugenio Caballero, being dead, his funeral became a sort of triumph. All the religious congregations disputed the honour of burying him gratuitously, and all the most respectable people in Madrid accompanied the magistrate who had so worthily finished his career to his last home. As for the accused, the public rejoiced to see their lives saved, especially after the exaggerated apprehensions occasioned by their trial. No fears were entertained for the consequences of this trial to their reputation, for they were surrounded by universal esteem, even beyond their merit; neither was any uneasiness felt about their exile, for nobody imagined that it would last long. All the world, in fact, expected a speedy catastrophe, whether it were to proceed from the public indignation excited to the highest degree, or to be the work of the French troops, silently advancing towards the capital, without telling what they came to do there. People still flattered themselves that they would do what was generally wished, namely, hurl the favourite from that throne half of which he had usurped, and unite the prince of the Asturias with a French princess amid the thunder of their guns.

While the sympathies of an excited nation surrounded those who declared themselves against the court, that court was filled both with rage and terror. It was an immemorial custom for the royal family to leave, in January, the cold and bleak residence of the Escorial, to enjoy the climate of Aranjuez, a magnificent domain, crossed by the Tagus, and where spring, as is the case in southern latitudes, begins to be felt in the month of March, sometimes even so early as the end of February. It was customary too, Madrid lying in the way, for the court to pass a few days there, to receive the homage of the capital. Expecting this year to be greeted with demonstrations of aversion alone, the court passed the gates of Madrid without stopping, and went on to hide its shame, mortification, and alarm at Aranjuez.

It had, in fact, not a single support to hope for in any quarter. The Spanish people manifested an implacable hatred for it, and scarcely made any difference in favour of the king by despising instead of hating him. As for the terrible Emperor of the French, whom that court had alternately flattered and betrayed, whose favour since Jena, it hoped to have regained by a year of meannesses, he covered himself all at once with an impenetrable veil, and maintained an alarming silence respecting his designs. The French armies, directed at first upon Portugal, were now executing a movement upon Madrid, upon pretext of marching towards Cadiz or Gibraltar. But it was an unheard of proceeding to invade in that manner, and without further explanation, the territory of a great power. The answer which Napoleon had returned to the proposal of marriage could not be regarded as serious; for he wished to know, he said, before he gave a French princess to Ferdinand, whether that prince was readmitted into the good graces of his parents, and this question he asked Charles IV., who had formally acquainted him with the arrest of the prince of the Asturias and the pardon which followed it. The refusal to publish the treaty of Fontainebleau, which contained the concession of a sovereignty to Emmanuel Godoy, and the formal guarantee of the dominions belonging to the crown of Spain, could have none but a sinister signification. From all these considerations, despondence prevailed at Aranjuez, in the interior of royalty, and at Buen Retiro, in the residence of the Countess de Castel Fiel, the favourite of the favourite. Both here and there, they began to open their eyes, and to discover that, by dint of meannesses, they had inspired Napoleon with the audacity to overthrow a degraded dynasty, despised by all the Spaniards. Every day the idea of imitating the house of Braganza and retiring to America recurred more and more frequently to the minds of the leaders of the court, and gave occasion to more and more frequent rumours. Emmanuel Godoy and the queen had almost definitively decided upon this resolution, and they secretly made their preparations; for the loads of valuable effects sent off for the ports were more numerous and more noticed than usual. But it was first necessary to gain the sanction of the king, whose weakness dreaded a change of place almost as much as the horrors of a war; it was also necessary to decide the princes of the blood, Don Antonio, brother of Charles IV., Ferdinand, his son and heir, as well as the younger Infants. The commission of one indiscretion would be sufficient to cause the whole nation to rise against such a design. The prince of the Peace, in order to cover the preparations which were perceived at Ferrol and Cadiz, circulated a report that he was going in person, in his quality of grand-admiral to inspect the ports, and that he was to begin with those of the South.

But, before undertaking this flight, which, even for the queen and Godoy, was but an extreme course, it would be proper to endeavour by all means to draw from Napoleon the secret of his

intentions, and to bend, if possible, his formidable will. There was nothing, in fact, that ought to have been attempted, before they had themselves decided on leaving Spain, and before they had extorted the compliance of Charles IV. In consequence, in reply to the last answer of Napoleon, Charles IV. was prevailed upon to write another letter, dated the 5th of February, eight or ten days before the conclusion of the process at the Escorial, with a view to force him to an explanation, to touch his heart, if it were possible, to appeal even to his honour, deeply interested in keeping the promises that he had given. In this letter, Charles IV. confessed the alarm which began to be felt at the approach of the French troops, reminded Napoleon of all that he had done to gratify him, all the proofs of attachment that he had given him, the sacrifice of his navy, the sending of his armies to distant countries, and solicited of him, in return for so faithful an alliance, a frank and honest declaration of his intentions; as he could not suppose that they were any other than what Spain had deserved. The poor king knew not, when writing in this manner, that this faithful alliance had been intermingled with a thousand secret treacheries, that the sacrifice of his navy had served only to cause the destruction of the two fleets at Trafalgar, that the sending of a division to Hamburg had been of no other service than that of a demonstration, and that Spain had been an auxiliary useless to herself and to her allies, sometimes even the occasion of great uneasiness to them. Ignorant of these things, as of all others, he addressed these questions to Napoleon in perfect sincerity, under the dictation of those who knew, thought, and willed for him. This unfortunate prince could not believe that, at the close of his life, having never sought to do an injury, he could be reduced to the necessity either of fighting or of running away, convinced as he was that, to reign honourably and safely, it was sufficient to have never wilfully done harm; of which he was very sure, for he had never done any thing but hunt and look after his horses and his fowling-pieces.

This letter, destined for Napoleon, was followed by most pressing letters to M. Yzquierdo. He was implored to procure at any price, no matter what it cost, precise intelligence of the intentions of France; to endeavour to change them by means of sacrifices, if they were hostile; or, if they were not to be changed, to communicate them at least, that one might be able to combat them or to avoid their consequences. All the necessary credits were opened for him, in case there should be any means of succeeding in such a commission.

The dispatches in question arrived in Paris in the middle of February. Napoleon had evaded the application for a French princess for Ferdinand, by feigning ignorance whether that prince had been restored to favour by his parents. Unable to allege any further doubt on this subject, and directly questioned concerning his intentions, he was sensible that the time for the *dénouement* had

arrived, and that, after taking a fixed resolution to dethrone the Bourbons, he must at length fix upon the means of accomplishing it, without revolting too violently the public feeling of Spain, France, and Europe. This was the only point upon which he had really hesitated; for, if he had for a moment admitted the plan of allying the two dynasties, by a marriage, as practicable, and the plan of appropriating to himself a large portion of the Spanish territory as worth discussing, at bottom, he had always preferred, as the safest, the most decisive, nay, the most honest course, to take nothing from Spain but her dynasty and her barbarism, and suffering her to keep her territory, her colonies, and her independence. But the means of rendering endurable this act of a conqueror, even in times when not only the crowns of kings, but their heads had fallen—the means were difficult to find. The family of Braganza had, itself, by its flight, suggested a medium to him, to which he had finally adhered as we have seen: this was to induce the court of Spain to embark at Cadiz for the New World. Nothing would then be more simple than to present himself to a deserted nation, to declare to it that, instead of a degenerate dynasty, cowardly enough to abandon its throne and its people, he would give it a new, glorious, peaceably reforming dynasty, bringing to Spain the benefits of the French Revolution without its calamities, a participation in the greatness of France, without the horrible wars which France had had to sustain. This solution was natural, less liable to censure than the other, and furnished by the very cowardice of the adulterated families which reigned over the South of Europe. It became, moreover, more probable from day to day; since at each new fit of terror that should seize the court of Spain, the report of a retreat to America, echo of the internal agitations of the palace, was circulated in the capital. It would be sufficient to push this terror to the utmost, to make the French troops advance definitively towards Madrid, continuing to observe a threatening silence respecting their destination. In consequence Napoleon made all arrangements for bringing about the catastrophe in March; for if it should be necessary to act in Spain, spring would be the most favourable season for introducing his young soldiers into that arid and parched country, which, physically as well as morally, is the commencement of Africa. It was now the middle of February. Napoleon had a month to the middle of March to make his last preparations. He began them, therefore, immediately after he had received the interrogatory letter of king Charles IV., dated the 5th of February; in which that unfortunate prince besought him to explain his intentions in regard to Spain.

But, before provoking at Madrid the *dénouement* which he desired, he was obliged to decide upon the course to be pursued on a question not less important than that of Spain, on the question of the East, for at the moment one was linked to the other. If anything, in fact, could add to the imprudence of undertaking

new enterprises, when he had already such momentous ones on his hands, it would be that of engaging in the affairs of Spain with Russia discontented. Accustomed as Europe was to new spectacles, prepared as it was for the approaching end of the Bourbons of Spain, its foresight was far behind the reality; and the overthrow of one of the most ancient thrones in the world was destined to excite a deep emotion, to transfer from the head of England to that of France the reprobation called forth by the crime of Copenhagen. Though Prussia was crushed, Austria alternately irritated and trembling, it would have been supremely imprudent not to secure, on the eve of an act of the greatest audacity, the certain adhesion of Russia. It was, in fact, one of the most serious inconveniences of the enterprize against Spain, that it inevitably entailed sacrifices in the East; and it was, as we shall see hereafter, one of the most lamentable faults of the Emperor, in these circumstances, not to have known how to make those sacrifices frankly. It would have been otherwise if, having undertaken less in the North, if, having given up Germany to satisfy Prussia, he had not had to leave on the Vistula 300,000 veteran soldiers, who composed the real force of the French army. Confining himself then to the occupation of Italy and Spain, having his armies concentrated behind the Rhine, and nobody to fear or to support beyond that frontier, he might have dispensed with purchasing by sacrifices the concurrence of Russia. And if she had resolved to take advantage of the occasion to fall upon the East, Austria herself, though inconsolable for the loss of Italy, would have become the ally of France for the purpose of defending the Lower Danube. But Napoleon, having destroyed Prussia, created ephemeral royalties in Germany, and sowed the seeds of hatred and ingratitude from the Rhine to the Vistula, required an ally in the North, even though dearly purchased.

General Savary had been succeeded at St. Petersburg by M. de Caulaincourt, and nearly at the same time M. de Tolstoy, ambassador of Russia, had arrived at Paris. The latter was, as we have said, a soldier, brother of the grand marshal of the palace, imbued with the opinions of the Russian aristocracy in regard to France, but member of a family which enjoyed the imperial favour, which placed that favour above its prejudices, and which discovered in the conquest of Finland and of the Danubian provinces a sufficient excuse for the deserters who had gone over from the English policy to the French policy. "My brother has devoted himself," said the grand marshal Tolstoy, to M. de Caulaincourt; "he has accepted the embassy to Paris, but, if he does not obtain for Russia something of consequence he is ruined and all of us along with him."* These words prove in what spirit the new ambassador came to France. Alexander had related to him what had passed at Tilsit, in the way in which he was fond of calling it to mind

* These words are literally extracted from the secret correspondence so frequently quoted by us.

and understanding it, and, according to this communication, much altered from the conversations of Napoleon. M. de Tolstoy had conceived that all had been told, that the sacrifice of the empire of the East was made, that he had come to Paris merely to sign the partition of Turkey, and the acquisition, if not of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, at least of the plains of the Danube as far as the Balkans. Besides, he had visited by the way the unfortunate sovereigns of Prussia, despoiled of part of their dominions, and deprived of nearly the whole of their revenues by the prolonged occupation of the provinces that were left them. M. de Tolstoy, thinking that if the conquest of the provinces of the East interested the glory of Russia, the evacuation of the Prussian provinces interested her honour, came to Paris prepossessed with the two-fold notion of obtaining a share of the Turkish empire and the evacuation of Prussia. Add to all this that he was techy, irritable, suspicious, and excessively proud of the glory of the Russian armies.

Napoleon had promised to give him a favourable reception, to make him fond of residing at Paris, that he might contribute by his reports to the maintenance of the alliance. But he found him so fiery and so intractable on the double affair of the evacuation of Prussia and the acquisition of the provinces of the Danube, that he was annoyed at it. He felt so strong, and was himself so far from patient, that he could not long endure the persistence of M. de Tolstoy. Napoleon, only half disguising the vexation that he felt, told the new ambassador that if, after evacuating the whole of Old Prussia and part of Pomerania, he continued to occupy Brandenburg and Silesia, it was because Prussia had refused to pay the war contributions; that he desired nothing more than to withdraw his troops as soon as they should be paid; that, for the rest, if he tarried in Prussia beyond the intended time, the Russians, on their part, were tarrying without any avowable motive in the provinces of the Danube, and that Moldavia and Wallachia were assuredly equivalent to Silesia. Without precisely saying so, Napoleon appeared, in the eyes of a prejudiced person, like M. de Tolstoy, to make the evacuation of Silesia dependent on that of Moldavia and Wallachia, and almost to link the acquisition of the latter by the Russians to the acquisition of the former by the French. The temper of M. de Tolstoy ought to have given way to the elevation of Napoleon, but the Russian minister felt grievously mortified; and, as we always seek the society that sympathizes most with our own sentiments, he kept company in preference with the infatuated persons of the old French nobility, a far from numerous class, who revenged themselves by their animadversions, for not being yet admitted into the imperial court. He held a language that was not friendly, and had well nigh quarrelled with marshal Ney, who was not of a passive disposition, about the merit of the Russian and the French armies, and behaved more like the representative of an unfriendly court than of one

which wished to be, and which really was, at least for the moment, a close ally. M. de Talleyrand, with his disdainful *sang-froid*, was instructed to curb, to calm, to repress, if needful, the troublesome temper of M. de Tolstoy.

Things went on more smoothly at St. Petersburg between M. de Caulaincourt and the emperor Alexander, but the latter dissembled no more than his ambassador the mortification which he experienced. M. de Caulaincourt was a grave man, whose face was stamped with the integrity that dwelt in his soul, having but one weakness, the incapability of consoling himself for the part which he had acted in the affair of the duke d'Enghien; which rendered him sensible, beyond measure, to the esteem that was manifested for him, and which furnished the emperor Alexander with the means of swaying him. M. de Caulaincourt found the Emperor full of courtesy and kindness towards him, but wounded to the heart to see that the promises made to him were not immediately realized. At Tilsit, Napoleon had said to the emperor Alexander that, if the war continued and if Russia took part in it, she might find towards the Baltic an increase of security, towards the Black Sea an increase of greatness; and he had talked eventually of the distribution to be made of the provinces of the Turkish empire, without, however, stipulating any thing positive. But if, on the one hand, in the excitement of these communications he had perhaps said more than he meant to grant, the emperor Alexander had understood more than he had really said to him; and, on his return to St. Petersburg, in a discontented company, in order to pacify it, he had made in confidence many indiscreet and exaggerated communications. By degrees a notion became current in the drawing-rooms of St. Petersburg, that Russia, though vanquished at Friedland, had brought back from Tilsit the gift of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia. Those who were well disposed towards the emperor Alexander, or at least who were not pre-determined to censure the government, considered that this was a very fine price for several unsuccessful campaigns; that, if Russia owed such extensive conquests to the friendship of France, she did right to cultivate and to preserve that friendship. Those, on the contrary, who still cherished in their hearts all the sentiments excited by the late war, or who were angry with the emperor for his inconstancy, such as Messrs. de Czartoryski, Novosilzoff, Strogonoff, and Kotschoubey, representing the forsaken policy—these alleged that the conquest of Finland, to which Russia was urged, was of no value, that it was a country of lakes and marshes, totally destitute of inhabitants; that, moreover, this conquest was immoral, since it was gained from a relation and an ally, the king of Sweden; that, for the rest, it would be the only one that Napoleon would allow the emperor Alexander to make; that he would never put Moldavia and Wallachia into his hands, of which people would very soon be con-

vinced; that the French alliance was, therefore, at once a desertion, an inconsistency, and a cheat.

This language, repeated to the emperor Alexander, deeply vexed him, and, seeing by the reports of M. de Tolstoy that it was likely to be some day verified, he expressed to M. de Caulaincourt his extreme mortification on the subject. He received him with great cordiality, manifested for him an esteem for which, as he perceived, that ambassador was eager, and then, coming to what concerned the Russian interests, he launched out into bitter complaints. He had never meant, he said, to link the fate of Silesia with that of Moldavia and Wallachia. He had stipulated and obtained from the friendship of the emperor Napoleon the restitution of part of the Prussian dominions, a restitution necessary, indispensable, to the honour of Russia. He should have been content with that restitution, and have retired to his own empire, satisfied with having spared his unfortunate allies some of the consequences of the war, if the emperor Napoleon, desirous to engage him in his system, had not afforded him a glimpse of aggrandizements both to the north and to the south of the empire, and had not been the first to speak to him about Moldavia and Wallachia. Urged to enter this track, he had done all that Napoleon desired; he had declared war against England, in spite of the interests of Russian commerce; he had resolved upon war with Sweden, in spite of the ties of relationship; and, when he, and every body in the empire, expected to receive the price of all this compliance with a foreign policy, there comes all at once intelligence from Paris that he must renounce the most legitimate hopes. The czar could not recover from his surprise or get the better of his vexation. To pretend to make the fate of Silesia dependent on that of Moldavia and Wallachia, and to keep back the one from the Prussians in order to give the two others to the Russians was a proceeding which rendered it a duty of honour to refuse every thing. He could not pay with the spoils of an unfortunate friend, whom he was accused of having too much sacrificed already, for acquisitions that he might be permitted to make on the Danube. "*Those unfortunate Prussians,*" said Alexander, to M. de Caulaincourt, "*have nothing to eat.* Relieve me from their importunities, and I shall have nothing else to trouble me in my relations with France. Besides, what would Napoleon do with Silesia? Would he keep it himself? But in that case he would be my neighbour, and neighbours, as he has himself told me, are never friends. Of what advantage to him would be a province so distant from his empire? Let him take what he pleases around him, near to him, I shall think it natural and regular. He has taken Etruria; he is going, it is said, to take the Roman States; and contemplates one knows not what against Spain—be it so! Let him do what suits him in the South, but leave us to do, in like manner, what suits us in the North,

and not approach too near our frontiers. If he does not want Silesia for himself, could he give it to any one else equally serviceable to him with me? Assuredly not, and in restoring it to the Prussians, which is the simplest of solutions, he must not in retaliation refuse me what he has promised. He would then disappoint not only my expectations but those of the Russian nation, which would esteem Finland to be not worth the war which it will cost us with England and Sweden, which would say, 'that I have been duped by the great man with whom I have conversed at Tilsit; that one cannot meet him without danger, either on the field of battle, or in a negociation; and that it would have been better, without continuing an impolitic and dangerous war, to separate in peace but with indifference and the coldness which distance justifies.'"

Such had been, an dsuch was, every day, the language of the emperor Alexander to M. de Caulaincourt. He did not add that, if he had been taught to hope for the provinces of the Danube, it was without their being promised to him, and that if, out of a mere hope, the Russian nation, misled by the rumours of the court, had made a formal engagement, the fault was his, owing to his indiscretion, nay, his weakness, since he had not been able to control those around him but by promising more than he could perform. Alexander did not add this, but it was evident that, if one were not to come to his relief, by granting what he had imprudently suffered the nation to hope for, he would be cruelly hurt, and his minister Romanzoff also, and that, if the sudden change of policy effected at Tilsit was too recent for one to venture upon another equally sudden, there would still be left at the bottom of the heart a deep wound constantly bleeding, and from which fresh wars would be likely soon to ensue.

M. de Caulaincourt, affirming with his persuasive honesty the good faith of Napoleon, protesting that every thing would be cleared up, attributing to a misunderstanding, to the jealous susceptibility of M. de Tolstoy, the sinister reports which had come from Paris, succeeded in restoring some composure to the mind of the emperor Alexander. The latter at length began to find fault with M. de Tolstoy himself, with his awkwardness, with his ill temper, and declared before M. de Caulaincourt that he would not fail, if he again found M. de Tolstoy, as he did formerly M. de Markoff, bent on embroiling the two courts, to make a signal example of those who should study to thwart, instead of endeavouring to serve him. The emperor Alexander had appeared highly gratified by the magnificent presents of Sèvres porcelain sent to St. Petersburg, by the cession of fifty thousand muskets, and by the reception of the Russian cadets into the French navy. But nothing touched that heart, full of a single passion, excepting the object of that passion. The provinces of the Danube or nothing; that was impressed upon his countenance as in his soul, deeply smitten with ambition and renown.

For the rest, M. de Caulaincourt, in order to ascertain precisely whether the nation shared the sentiments of its Sovereign, sent one of the *employés* of the embassy to Moscow, to pick up what was said there. This *employé*, transported into the circles of the old Russian aristocracy, whose language was more natural and more true than at St. Petersburg, heard it repeated that the young czar had very rapidly passed from hatred to friendship in espousing the policy of France at Tilsit; that he had very lightly compromised the interests of Russian commerce by declaring war against Great Britain; that Finland was a very slender compensation for such sacrifices; that Wallachia and Moldavia at least would be required to make suitable payment for them; but that those fine provinces would never be obtained from Napoleon; and that their young Emperor would, this time, have to pay the penalty of a new inconsistency by a new disappointment.

M. de Caulaincourt lost no time in transmitting these various particulars to Napoleon, and declared that without doubt the court of Russia, though deeply mortified would not go to war, but that it was not to be relied upon, if that were not granted to it, which, with or without reason, it had flattered itself that it should obtain.

General Savary, returning from St. Petersburg, corroborated by his testimony the reports of M. de Caulaincourt, supported them by the recital of a multitude of particulars which he had himself collected, and confirmed Napoleon in the idea that it depended on himself to attach the emperor Alexander entirely, to chain him to all his projects, whatever they might be, by means of a concession in the East. Decided, ever since the middle of February, to extinguish the Bourbons of Spain, Napoleon hesitated no longer, and resolved to pay on the banks of the Danube for the new power, which he thought himself on the point of acquiring on the banks of the Ebro and the Tagus.

It was assuredly the best measure that he could adopt; for, though it was very grievous to have to lead the Russians by the hand, himself, to Constantinople, or at least to bring them nearer to that object of their everlasting ambition, still it was necessary to be consistent, and to submit to the condition of the enterprize in which he was about to engage. He was obliged to grant one or two provinces on the Danube, in order to acquire the right of dethroning in Spain one of the oldest dynasties in Europe, and to renew the policy of Louis XIV. beyond the Pyrenees. For the rest, if Napoleon had done no more than give Moldavia and Wallachia, without Bulgaria, to the Russians, that is to say, lead them to the banks of the Danube, taking care to stop them there; if at the same time he had procured Bosnia, Servia, and Bulgaria, for the Austrians, for the purpose of opposing them to the Russians, by placing them upon the road to Constantinople, the mischief would not have been by far so great. Albania and the Morea would have been a fine compensation for France, and she

would not have bought too dearly the concession which she was obliged to make, in order to ensure the Russian alliance. The daily language of the Emperor Alexander and of M. de Romanzoff left no doubt of their acquiescence in these conditions. Here then it was requisite to stop: to pay for the Russian alliance, since we had made it a necessity; but not to push the dismemberment of old Europe any further, not to contribute more to the growth of the young colossus, sprung from the ices of the pole, and enlarging for a century past in a manner to appal the world.

Napoleon, however, whether he designed to occupy the imagination of Alexander, or whether, reduced to the necessity of a sacrifice, he sought to envelop it in an immense recomposition, or, lastly, whether he thought to derive from circumstances, besides the overthrow of the dynasty of the Bourbons, the entire acquisition of the coasts of the Mediterranean—Napoleon conceived that he ought not to stop at the mere concession of Moldavia and Wallachia, which would have settled every thing, and assented to the raising of the immense question of the complete partition of the Ottoman empire. At the moment, the Turks, secretly excited by Austria, publicly by England, both asserting that France was about to sacrifice them to Russian ambition—the Turks conducted themselves in the most odious manner towards the French. Not daring to strike off their heads, they struck off those of their partizans, and behaved, in short, like furious barbarians, intoxicated with blood and pillage. Napoleon, exasperated against them, at length determined to write a letter to the emperor Alexander, in which he announced his intention of discussing the question of the empire of the East, of considering it under all its aspects, of solving it definitively; in which he also expressed a desire to admit Austria as a sharer, and specified as an essential condition of this partition, whatever it might be, partial or total, more advantageous for these or for those, a gigantic expedition to India, across the continent of Asia, executed by a French, Austrian, and Russian army. It was M. de Caulaincourt who delivered Napoleon's letter to the emperor Alexander. The Czar was already apprized by a dispatch from M. de Tolstoy of the favourable change which had taken place at Paris, and he received the ambassador of France with transports of joy. He insisted on reading Napoleon's letter immediately, and in his presence. He read it with an emotion which he was unable to repress. "Ah, the great man!" he exclaimed every moment—"the great man! There! he has come back to the ideas of Tilsit! Tell him," he frequently repeated to M. de Caulaincourt, "that I am devoted to him for life; that my empire, my armies, and all are at his disposal. When I ask him to grant something to satisfy the pride of the Russian nation, it is not out of ambition that I speak, it is for the purpose of giving him that nation whole and entire, and as devoted to his great projects as I am myself. Your master," he added, "purposes to interest Austria in the dismemberment of the Turkish empire; he

is in the right. It is a wise conception: I cordially join in it. He designs an expedition to India: I consent to that too. I have already made him acquainted, in our long conversations at Tilsit, with the difficulties attending it. He is accustomed to take no account of obstacles; nevertheless, the climate and distances here present such as surpass all that he can imagine. But let him be easy; the preparations on my part shall be proportioned to the difficulties. Now we must come to an understanding about the distribution of the territories which we are going to wrest from Turkish barbarism. Discuss this subject thoroughly with M. de Romanzoff. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that all this cannot be usefully, definitively discussed, but in an interview between me and Napoleon. As soon as our ideas have arrived at a commencement of maturity I shall leave St. Petersburg, and go to meet your Emperor at whatever distance he pleases. I should like to go as far as Paris, but I cannot; besides, it is a meeting upon business that we want, not a meeting for parade and pleasure. We might choose Weimar, where we should be among our own family. But even there we should be annoyed by a thousand things. At Erfurt we should be more free, more to ourselves. Propose that place to your sovereign; when his answer arrives I will set out immediately, and I shall travel like a courier."

As he said these things and a thousand others, which it were useless to repeat, the Emperor, overflowing with a joy which he could not repress, acknowledged that M. de Caulaincourt was right some time before, when endeavouring to tranquillize him respecting the intentions of Napoleon, in imputing the momentary disagreement to mere misunderstandings. He again repeated that he was sure it was M. de Tolstoy, who had been awkward, warm, perhaps even indocile, to the new policy of the Russian cabinet; that he would change him and send another who should be entirely to the liking of Napoleon, but he knew not where to find such a one; that he everywhere met with refractory spirits; but he was determined to quell them, whatever severity he was obliged to use, and *make them pursue the grand system of Tilsit.*

M. de Caulaincourt found old M. de Romanzoff not less warm, less young, in the expression of his joy.—“Here we are then come back again to the ideas of Tilsit,” he repeated to M. de Caulaincourt. “Those we comprehend, we enter into them; they are worthy of the great man who is an honour to the age and to human nature.” After incredible demonstrations of satisfaction and of devotedness to France, M. de Romanzoff ventured upon that difficult question of partition. There commenced embarrassment, nay even, we must say, confusion. To lay daring hands on the extensive countries which are of such importance to the equilibrium of the world, and which belong not only to the stupid possessors, who keep them in barbarism and sterility, but far more to Europe itself, so deeply interested in their indepen-

dence—to lay hands on these countries, even in idea, embarrassed the greedy Russian minister, who devoured them in his longings, and the French minister, who gave them up from necessity to the Moscovite monster of ambition. Though both were furnished with their instructions, and knew what to think, what to say, on the subject which brought them together, neither was willing to speak the first word. The most hungry was, of course, the first to speak, and he did speak. He spoke, in that interview and in several others, with entire freedom, and with an unparalleled boldness of ambition.

Two plans presented themselves: in the first place, a partial partition, which should leave to the Turks that portion of their European territory extending from the Balkans to the Bosphorus, consequently the two straits and the city of Constantinople, and all their Asiatic provinces; in the second place, a complete partition, which should leave to the Turks none of their European territory, and take from them all their Asiatic provinces washed by the Mediterranean.

The first plan was that which seemed to have occupied the two emperors at Tilsit. It presented but few difficulties. France was to have all the maritime provinces, Albania, which adjoins Dalmatia, the Morea, and Candia. Russia was to obtain Moldavia and Wallachia, which form the left of the Danube, Bulgaria, which forms the right, and thus stop at the Balkans. Austria, to console herself for seeing Russia established at the mouths of the Danube, was to take Bosnia in full property, and Servia as an appanage for one of the archdukes. In this system the Turks would retain the most essential part of their European provinces, those which geography and the nature of the population have hitherto amply ensured to them, that is to say, the part to the south of the Balkans, the two straits, Constantinople, and the whole of the Asiatic empire. There would thus be taken from them such provinces only as they could no longer govern, Moldavia, Wallachia, to which they had already been obliged to concede a sort of independence; Servia, which was at that moment striving to emancipate itself by arms; Epire, which belonged to Ali, pacha of Janina, more than to the Porte; lastly, Greece, which already appeared disposed to defy the sword of its ancient conquerors rather than to endure their yoke. The division of these provinces among the copartners was made agreeably to geography. France gained, it is true, superb maritime positions. Still, besides the inconvenience of herself bringing the Russians near to Constantinople, there was another not less serious, namely, that of giving to Russia and Austria that which, from the contiguity of territory, must continue theirs, and taking for France such as could not remain hers unless in the hypothesis of a greatness impossible to be long maintained. Had we kept the most essential part of that greatness, the Rhine and the Alps, and even the back of the Alps, that is to say, Piedmont, Greece was still too far from

us to be preserved. All this was, therefore, in reality, but a sorry concession towards the East for the triumph in the West of great designs no doubt, but unseasonable, extravagant, which must add new burdens to those which already oppressed the Empire.

The second plan was a sort of convulsion of the civilized world. The Turkish empire was to be swept away completely both from Europe and from Asia. The Russians, according to this new plan, were to pass the Balkans and to occupy the southern slope, namely, ancient Thrace as far as the straits, too; obtain the object of their desires, Constantinople, and a portion of the shore of Asia, to ensure to them the possession of the straits. Austria, acquiring also a better share, and employed in keeping France and Russia apart, would obtain, besides Bosnia and Servia, both in full property, Macedonia itself as far as the sea, with the exception of Salonichi. France, retaining her former allotment, Albania, Thessaly as far as Salonichi, the Morea, Candia, would have further all the islands of the Archipelago, Cyprus, Syria, and Egypt. The Turks, flung back to the extremity of Asia Minor, and upon the Euphrates, would be at liberty to adhere there to that religion of the Koran which had caused them to lose their empire in Europe and three-fourths of that in Asia.

In this chimerical division of the world, destined perhaps to become some day a reality, with the exception of what was then reserved for France, there was one point, however, on which it was impossible to agree, and which was as strongly contested as if all these plans were to be carried into speedy execution. Constantinople interested both the pride and the ambition of the Russians, and, among nations, one is not more eager than another. The Russians coveted the city of Constantinople itself, as a symbol of the empire of the East: they coveted the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as the keys of the seas. M. de Caulaincourt participated in the sentiments of Napoleon, who recoiled with pride and horror, when he was asked to give up Constantinople to the rulers of the North, peremptorily refused, and proposed to make Constantinople and the two straits a sort of neutral State—a kind of Hanseatic town, like Hamburg or Bremen. At length, when the Russian minister persisted in the demand of the city of Constantinople in particular, as though it had been for St. Sophia alone, M. de Caulaincourt acceded, saving the pleasure of his master, but reserving the Dardanelles for France, as being the route by land for Syria and Egypt, which would have made the French battalions travel the same road as the ancient crusaders. The Russians, having St. Sophia, would not relinquish to the French the Strait of the Dardanelles, which they were importunate to leave in the hands of the Turks, weak as they were. They refused Constantinople on those terms, and declared, what was indeed true, that they should prefer the first partial partition, which left the south of the Balkans and Constantinople to the Turks. Satisfied, in this case, with having the extensive plains

of the Danube as far as the Balkans, they consented to postpone the rest of their conquest, and chose rather to see the keys of the seas in the hands of the Turks than to put them into those of the French.

It was to no purpose to continue the discussion on this important subject; the parties could not come to an understanding, and the interminable quarrel which arose—daring and silly anticipation of ages—revealed the true interest of Europe against Russia in the question concerning Constantinople. The French Empire having become, at this time, extensive as Europe itself, was alive to all its interests, and would not give up the strait from which the Russians will some day threaten the independence of the European continent. It was quite enough to concede Finland to them, to afford them the means of taking a step towards the Sound, another strait, from which, at some future time, they will be not less threatening. When, indeed, the Russian colossus shall have one foot on the Dardanelles and the other on the Sound, the Old World will be enslaved, freedom will have fled to America; chimerical at this moment to narrow minds, these forebodings will some day be realised; for Europe, unwisely divided, like the cities of Greece before the kings of Macedonia, will probably experience the like fate.

After long discussion, the Russian minister and the French ambassador had done no more than ripen their ideas, as they said. There was nothing but a meeting of the two sovereigns that could settle these mighty differences. It was therefore agreed that an exposition of the two plans should be addressed to Napoleon, with a request to send his opinions, and an offer of an interview for the purpose of reconciling them with those of the emperor Alexander. For this interview there was to be selected a place very near to France, such as Erfurt for instance. But to write such things was repugnant even to those who had dared to utter them. M. de Caulaincourt, apprised sometimes by his good sense of their chimerical and alarming nature, preferred leaving to M. de Romanzoff the task of committing them to writing. The latter accepted it, and presented a note, written entirely with his own hand, which M. de Caulaincourt was to despatch immediately to Napoleon. If, however, he ventured to write, he dared not to sign it. He delivered it himself, in his own hand-writing, but not signed; and, to give it full authenticity, the emperor Alexander declared orally to M. de Caulaincourt that this note had his full approbation, and was to be received, though without signature, as the authentic expression of the ideas of the Russian cabinet.*

* We think it right to quote this paper itself, perhaps the most curious monument of those extraordinary times, copied literally from the *Minute* in the hand-writing of M. de Romanzoff, sent to Napoleon and now preserved in the *dépôt* of the Louvre. We have had before us the original document, and we affirm the strict accuracy of the following copy:—

"Since his majesty, the Emperor of the French and the king of Italy, &c., has

However, it was not enough to discuss eventually plans of partition of the Turkish empire. Napoleon conceived that some-

recently judged that, in order to attain a general peace and to secure the tranquillity of Europe, it would be expedient to weaken the Ottoman empire by the dismemberment of its provinces, the emperor Alexander, faithful to his engagements and to his friendship, is ready to concur in it.

"The first idea which could not fail to present itself to the emperor of all the Russias, who is fond of calling to mind the occurrences at Tilsit, when this overture was made to him, was that the Emperor, his ally, purposed to proceed immediately to the execution of what the two monarchs had agreed upon in the treaty of alliance relative to the Turks, and that he added to it the proposal of an expedition to India.

"It had been settled at Tilsit that the Ottoman power was to be driven back into Asia, retaining in Europe nothing but the city of Constantinople and Romelia.

"There was drawn at the same time this consequence, that the Emperor of the French should acquire Albania, the Morea, and the island of Candia.

"Wallachia and Moldavia were next allotted to Russia, giving that empire the Danube for its boundary, comprehending Bessarabia, which is in fact a stripe of sea-coast, and which is commonly considered as forming part of Moldavia; if to this portion be added Bulgaria, the emperor is ready to concur in the expedition to India, of which there had then been no question, provided that this expedition to India, as the Emperor Napoleon himself has just traced its route, shall proceed through Asia Minor.

"The emperor Alexander applauded himself for the idea of gaining the concurrence of a corps of Austrian troops in the expedition to India; and, as the Emperor, his ally, seemed to wish that it should not be numerous, he conceives that this concurrence would be adequately compensated by awarding to Austria, Turkish Croatia and Bosnia, unless the Emperor of the French should find it convenient to retain a portion of them. There might moreover be offered to Austria a less direct but very considerable interest, by settling the future condition of Serbia, incontestably one of the fine provinces of the Ottoman empire, in the following manner:—

"The Servians are a warlike people, and that quality, which always commands esteem, must excite a wish to regulate their lot judiciously.

"The Servians, fraught with a feeling of just vengeance against the Turks, have holdly shaken off the yoke of their oppressors, and are, it is said, resolved never to wear it again. In order to consolidate peace, it seems necessary, therefore, to take care to make them independent of the Turks.

"The peace of Tilsit determines nothing in regard to them. Their own wish, expressed strongly and more than once, has led them to implore the emperor Alexander to admit them into the number of his subjects; this attachment to his person makes him desirous that they should live happy and content, without insisting upon extending his sway; his majesty seeks no acquisitions that could obstruct peace; he makes with pleasure this sacrifice, and all those which can contribute to render it speedy and solid. He proposes, in consequence, to erect Serbia into an independent kingdom, to give its crown to one of the archdukes who is not the head of any sovereign branch, and who is sufficiently remote from the succession to the throne of Austria; and in this case it should be stipulated that this kingdom should never be incorporated with the mass of the dominions of that house.

"This whole supposition of the dismemberment of the Turkish provinces, as explained above, being founded upon the engagements at Tilsit, has not appeared to offer any difficulty to the two persons commissioned by the two emperors to discuss together the means of attaining the ends proposed by their imperial Majesties.

"This emperor of Russia is ready to take part in a treaty between the three emperors, which should fix the conditions above expressed; but, on the other hand, having conceived that the letter which he recently received from the Emperor of the French seemed to indicate the resolution of a much more extensive dismemberment of the Ottoman empire than that which had been projected between them at Tilsit, that monarch, in order to meet the interests of the three imperial courts, and particularly in order to give the Emperor, his

thing more positive was needed to satisfy the Russians, something which, while imposing a less sacrifice on him, would touch them

ally, all the proofs of friendship and deference that are in his power, has declared that, without wanting a further diminution of the strength of the Ottoman Porte, he would cheerfully concur in it.

"He has laid down as the principle of his interest in this greater partition that his share of the increased acquisition should be moderate in extent or magnitude, and that he would consent that the share of his ally in particular should be marked out of much larger proportion. His Majesty has added that beside this principle of moderation he placed one of wisdom, which consisted in not finding himself by this new plan of partition worse placed than he is at present in regard to boundaries and commercial relations.

"Setting out with these two principles, the emperor Alexander would see, not only without jealousy but with pleasure, the Emperor Napoleon acquire and incorporate with his dominions, in addition to what has been mentioned above, all the islands of the Archipelago, Cyprus, Rhodes, and even whatever is left of the sea-ports of the Levant, Syria, and Egypt.

In case of this more extensive partition, the emperor Alexander would change his preceding opinion respecting the state of Servia; studying to form an honourable and highly advantageous share for the house of Austria, he should wish that Servia should be incorporated with the mass of the Austrian dominions, and that there should be added to it Macedonia; with the exception of that part of Macedonia which France might desire in order to fortify her Albanian frontier, so as that France might obtain Salonichi. This line of the Austrian frontier might be drawn from Scopia to Orphane, and would make the power of the house of Austria extend to the sea.

"Croatia might belong to France or to Austria, as the Emperor Napoleon pleases.

"The emperor Alexander cannot disguise from his ally that, finding a particular satisfaction in all that has been said at Tilsit, he places, according to the advice of the Emperor his friend, those possessions of the house of Austria between theirs, in order to avoid the point of contact, always so liable to cool friendship.

"The share of Russia in this new and extensive partition would have added to that which was awarded to her in the preceding plan, the possession of the city of Constantinople, with a radius of a few leagues in Asia, and in Europe part of Rometia, so as that the frontier of Russia, on the side of the new possessions of Austria, setting out from Bulgaria, should follow the frontier of Servia to a little beyond Solismick and the chain of mountains which runs from Solismick to Trajanopol inclusive, and then the river Moriza to the sea.

"In the conversation that has taken place respecting this second plan of partition, there has been this difference of opinion, that one of the two persons conceived that, if Russia were to possess Constantinople, France ought to possess the Dardanelles, or, at least, to appropriate to herself that which was on the Asiatic side: this assertion was contested, on the other part, upon the ground of the immense disproportion proposed to be made in the shares of this new and greater partition, and that even the occupation of the fort would utterly destroy the principle of the emperor of Russia not to be worse placed than he now is in regard to his geographical and commercial relations.

"The emperor Alexander, moved by the feeling of his extreme friendship for the Emperor Napoleon, has declared, with a view to remove the difficulty; 1stly, that he would agree to a military road for France, running through the new possessions of Austria and Russia, opening to her a military route to the ports of Syria; 2dly, that, if the Emperor Napoleon wished to possess Smyrna or any other point on the coast of Natolia, from the point of that coast which is opposite to Mitylene to that which is situated opposite to Rhodes, and should send troops thither to conquer them, the emperor Alexander is ready to assist in this enterprise, by joining, for this purpose, a corps of his troops to the French troops; 3dly, that if Smyrna, or any other possession on the coast of Natolia, such as has just been pointed out, having come under the dominion of France, should afterwards be attacked not only by the Turks, but even by the English, in hatred of that treaty, his Majesty the emperor of Russia will in that case proceed to the aid of his ally whenever he shall be required to do so.

"4thly. His Majesty thinks that the house of Austria might, on the same

deeply, when from words they should proceed to deeds—this was the conquest of Finland. He had ordered M. de Caulaincourt to urge warmly the expedition against Sweden, from the motive that we have just mentioned, and also because he was desirous to compromise Russia irrevocably in his system. Once engaged against the Swedes, she could not fail to be so against the English, and to proceed, in regard to them, from a mere declaration of hostilities to hostilities themselves. But, singularly enough, the Russians were reluctant to undertake the conquest of Finland, the most useful one, nevertheless, of all those which they were meditating, and it seemed to be sufficient to have obtained the authorisation for it, without being in haste to carry it into execution. It was with regret that they diverted part of their forces either from the East or from the Polish provinces, greatly agitated at that moment. Nevertheless, continually urged by M. de Caulaincourt, they did at length invade Finland in the course of February, at the very time when the plan of partition of which we have been treating was under discussion.

Notwithstanding all his efforts, the emperor Alexander could not assemble more than 25,000 men on the frontier of Finland. He had entrusted the command of them to general Buxhövdén, the same who had displayed his incapacity at Austerlitz, and who displayed it still more in the war with Sweden. Excellent troops had been given him, with good lieutenants, especially the heroic and indefatigable Bagration, who, when one war was finished, longed to begin another. Napoleon had strongly urged them to act during the frosts, that they might be able to cross without difficulty the waters which cover Finland, a country studded with lakes, forests, granitic rocks, dropped upon this earth like *aérolites*. A brave Swedish officer, general Klingspor, with 15,000 regular troops, steady as Swedish troops always are, and four or five

footing, assist France in taking possession of Salonichi, and proceed to the aid of that port whenever it shall be required of her.

“5thly. The emperor of Russia declares that he has no wish to acquire the south coast of the Black Sea which is in Asia, though, in the discussion, it was thought that it might be desirable for him.

“6thly. The emperor of Russia has declared that, whatever might be the success of his troops in India, he should not desire to possess anything there, and that he would cheerfully consent that France should make for herself all the territorial acquisitions in India which she might think fit; and that it should be likewise at her option to cede any portion of the conquests which she might make there to her allies.

“If the two allies agree together in a precise manner that they adopt one or the other of these two plans of partition, his Majesty the emperor Alexander will have extreme pleasure in repairing to the personal interview which has been proposed to him, and which could perhaps take place at Erfurt. He conceives that it would be advantageous if the basis of the engagements that are to be made there, were previously fixed with a sort of precision, that the two emperors may have nothing to add to the extreme satisfaction of seeing one another but that of being enabled to sign without delay the fate of this part of the globe, and thereby, as they propose to themselves, to force England to desire that peace from which she now keeps aloof wilfully and with such boasting.”

thousand militia, defended the country. If the Swedish government, less regardless of all the warnings which it had received, had taken its precautions and directed all its forces upon that point, instead of threatening the Danes with ridiculous attempts, it might have advantageously disputed the possession of that valuable province. But it had left there too few troops, and those too untrained, to oppose any efficacious resistance. The Russians, on their part, attacked upon a very ill-conceived plan, which attested the profound incapacity of their commander-in-chief. Finland, from Wiborg to Abo, from Abo to Uleaborg, forms a triangle, two sides of which are washed by the gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, while the third is bordered by the Russian frontier. Common sense intimated that it was requisite to operate on the side of the triangle bordering the Russian frontier, that is to say, by the Savolax, because it was the shortest and the least defended line. The Swedes, in fact, occupied the two sides which form the coasts of the gulf of Finland and Bothnia: they were spread through the sea-ports, peopled in general by Swedes, the ancient colonists of Finland. If, instead of traversing the two maritime sides of the triangle for the purpose of disputing these with them, the Russians had followed with a column of 15,000 men the side which borders their frontier from Wiborg to Uleaborg, sending along the coast only a column of 10,000 men, to occupy as fast as the Swedes evacuated it, and also to blockade the fortresses, they would have arrived before the Swedes at Uleaborg, and taken not only Finland, but general Klingspor and the little army charged with the defence of the country. They did nothing of the kind, advanced along the coast in three columns, commanded by generals Gortschakoff, Touthkoff, and Bagration, driving before them the Swedes, who defended themselves as vigorously as they were attacked, in a series of partial actions. The left column, having arrived at Sweaborg, while the other two were marching upon Tavastehus, undertook the blockade of that great maritime fortress, which consisted of several fortified islands, and which was defended by old admiral Cronstedt with 7000 men. The columns of the centre and the right advanced from Tavastehus to Abo, after traversing the side of the Finland triangle which borders the Gulf of Finland. General Bagration was left at Abo, and general Touthkoff was afterwards sent along the side that borders the Gulf of Bothnia, running direct north to Uleaborg. A weak column had been directed upon the essential line, that from Wiborg to Uleaborg. Thus the Russians did nothing more than push the enemy before them, merely taking from them a few prisoners, and bringing about themselves a concentration of the Swedes, who, had they thrown themselves in mass upon the true line of operation, from Uleaborg to Wiborg, by the Savolax, might have made them atone for so vicious a manner of operating. There were, nevertheless, brilliant petty actions, which proved the bravery of the troops of the two nations, and the experience ac-

quired by the Russian officers in their wars against us, but the ignorance of their staff in all that concerned the general conduct of the operations. It was not thus that French generals, educated in the school of Napoleon, would have acted upon such a theatre of war. The Russians, having invaded but not conquered the country, undertook the siege of the fortresses on the coast, among others that of Sweaborg, which the frost could not but singularly facilitate.

A month or thereabout had sufficed for this military march, which was only the commencement of the war in Finland,—a month employed by the Russian cabinet in the discussion of the partition of the East. The king of Sweden, on learning the invasion of his dominions, to revenge himself apparently for the surprise sustained from a brother-in-law, ventured upon an act which is hardly customary any longer even in Turkey; he caused the Russian ambassador, M. d'Alopeus, to be seized, instead of merely sending him away; which excited general indignation in the whole diplomatic body residing at Stockholm. Alexander replied with suitable dignity to this strange conduct; he dismissed with infinite marks of attention M. de Stedingk, ambassador from Sweden at St. Petersburg, an old man universally respected; but he revenged himself in a different and more skilful manner. He took advantage of the occasion to pronounce the union of Finland with the Russian empire. This conquest was the sole result of the mighty plans projected at Tilsit: but, though the only one, it was sufficient to justify the policy followed at that moment by the emperor Alexander, and it is a proof that Russia cannot conquer but with the concurrence of France.

Notwithstanding the disdain which the Russians had affected for the conquest of Finland, the fact itself, which seemed to be consummated, though a great deal of blood was yet to be spilt,—the fact deeply affected the mind of the public at St. Petersburg. It was remarked that having met with nothing but defeats in the service of England, Russia had, after only a few months' friendship with France, acquired an important province, but little cultivated and thinly peopled it is true, in which respects it was very much like the rest of the empire, but admirably situated as a land and sea frontier; and people began to hope that the policy of the French alliance might prove as fertile as the government flattered itself that it would. The emperor and his minister were radiant with joy. Their usual critics, Messrs. de Czartoryski and Novosiltzoff, were less disdainful and less bitter in their animadversions. The society in St. Petersburg itself manifested its content with M. de Caulaincourt in quite new attentions, addressed not only to his person, which was surrounded by the public esteem, but also to his government, with which it began to be satisfied.

The emperor and M. de Romanzoff, who had just received intelligence of the invasion of Etruria and Portugal, of the movements of troops towards Rome and Madrid, and who could not

doubt that those movements had a very serious motive, never spoke of them but with singular levity, without any appearance of pre-occupation, and as men who gave up the weak, in order that they might be allowed to oppress in their turn. But, though they felt a real satisfaction, they were very urgent with M. de Caulaincourt for a speedy answer to the various proposals for partition and the appointment of a place for an interview to be held very shortly, in order to settle matters definitively. Spring was near at hand, for it was almost the end of February, and they wanted, they said, against the opening of the navigation, something striking, that should make people forget the disasters of the preceding year. The opening of the navigation in the northern seas is a period of rejoicing; for light makes its appearance again, warmth returns, commerce brings its treasures. The productions of the North are exchanged for those of civilised Europe or for specie. But this year the English flag, the usual instrument of these exchanges, was not to appear, or if it did, it must float from the mast-heads of men-of-war. The English shipping, instead of bringing treasures, was not to show anything but the muzzles of its guns. There was wanted to oppose to this sad spectacle some great national joy, excited by interests of a different kind, the interests of Russian ambition.

M. de Caulaincourt, who accurately reported to his master the ideas of this ambitious court, had communicated everything to Napoleon with his usual veracity. But, in explaining the wishes of Russia, he represented as certain that, for the present, she was fully satisfied, and that, for the rest, she could be fed for some time with hopes.

Napoleon, successively informed of this situation at the end of February and in the beginning of March, had clearly foreseen all the emotions, all the plans more or less chimerical, all the hopes more or less exaggerated, that his letter would produce at St. Petersburg; but he had said to himself that, in the immediate invasion of Finland, and in the acceptance of a discussion opened for the partition of the Turkish empire, there was food enough for several months for the imagination of the Russian nation and of its sovereign; and that, during this interval, he could prosecute his plans respecting the West. It is not true, as one would be disposed to believe from what precedes, that he entirely deceived Russia, and that, in reality, he never intended to grant her at any price a concession in the East. He knew that, by relinquishing Moldavia and Wallachia, and even Moldavia alone, he should satisfy the czar, and pay his debt to Russian ambition, whatever French ambition might presume to do in the West. He had, therefore, this resource, in all cases, for realizing the hopes which he had led the emperor Alexander to conceive. But if he went further, and was not sorry to employ in this manner the lively imagination of his new ally, it was because, on his part, his own imagination plunged deeper into this futurity than

that of his contemporaries. The Turks, since the fall of Selim, appeared to have reached the term of their existence. Napoleon asked himself if he must not put an end to this ever-threatening ruin; and, excited by his maritime struggle with the English, he again asked himself if the time had not arrived for making himself master of all the coasts of the Mediterranean, and for availing himself of the momentary attachment with which he had inspired Russia, to direct an army upon India, across the partitioned continent of Asia. Though chimerical in the eyes of a generation reduced, like ours, to very moderate proportions, these projects must not be judged of from our present point of view. It must be recollected that the man who conceived such daring schemes could at pleasure make and unmake kings, pronounce by a word the doom of the greatest monarchies in Europe; and though, in our opinion, he deceived himself, we must not believe that we accurately measure the extent of his error, in measuring it according to our present ideas; for, by judging thus, our littleness would deceive itself as much as his greatness did. Having attained the summit of omnipotence, subject to a continual fermentation of ideas, he conceived that all these questions ought to be investigated; and though he dreaded the solution as much as his ally desired it, he did not deceive him by bringing them under discussion; for, in the immensity of his views, he was sometimes quite disposed to resolve them.

Be this as it may, Napoleon, having pushed the emperor Alexander upon Finland, having given him the partition of the Turkish empire to discuss, said to himself that he had several months before him, and he decided to carry at length into execution the plan which he had fixed upon relative to Spain.

We have already seen what this plan was. It consisted in progressively increasing the terror of the court of Spain, till he should induce it to flee, as the house of Braganza had done. For this purpose, he had recourse to the most crafty means; and on this occasion he employed his genius in a way that cannot be too deeply regretted. All the troops were ready. General Dupont, with 25,000 men, was on the Valladolid road, one division upon Segovia, taking the direction of Madrid. Marshal Moncey, with 30,000, was between Burgos and Aranda, the direct road for Madrid. General Duhesme, with seven or eight thousand men, almost all Italians, was marching upon Barcelona: 5000 French from Piedmont and Provence were on march to join him. One division of 3000 men was proceeding by St. Jean-Pied-de-Port, for Pampeluna. A second, composed of the fourth battalions of the five legions of reserve, was gone to reinforce the first. A reserve of infantry was organizing at Orleans, one of cavalry at Poitiers. These made about 80,000 men, all young soldiers, who had never seen fire, but well officered, and full of the military spirit which at that period animated our armies.

It was necessary to give a commander to these forces. Napo-

leon chose a very indiscreet one for a political mission of such importance, but he placed him in such a situation as to preclude the possibility of any indiscretion. This commander was Murat, still discontented at being only grand-duke, impatient to become king, no matter where, having taken part in the wars in Italy, Austria, Prussia, Poland, and contributed to erect thrones at Naples, Florence, Milan, the Hague, Cassel, Warsaw, without gaining one of those thrones for himself; inconsolable above all for not having obtained that of Poland, and eager for any war which might offer fresh chances of reigning. The Peninsula, where at this moment the throne of Portugal was vacant, where that of Spain tottered, was for him the land of dreams, as Mexico or Peru formerly was for the Spanish adventurers. Good-natured and generous as Murat was, if he was required to hasten the downfall of Charles IV., by means not the most creditable or avowable, in his ardour for reigning he was the man to undertake the commission. There was nothing to be feared on his part but too much zeal. However, more intelligent, more shrewd, than he has in general been deemed (the circumstances which are about to follow will furnish proof of this), he was capable, in an important interest of ambition, of being even discreet and reserved. He had, at all events, as we have seen above, formed particular relations with Emmanuel Godoy, relations, cultivated by the latter with equal eagerness, each believing that the other would assist him in the attainment of the object of his wishes, and both deceiving themselves, for Godoy was no more in a condition to give a king to the Spaniards than Murat an idea to Napoleon. To send Murat to Spain was, therefore, inviting him to a feast. But Napoleon, designing to frighten the reigning house by the despatch of numerous troops combined with absolute silence respecting his intentions, made use of his brother-in-law conformably to the plan which he had adopted. He had had him by his side both in Italy and Paris, without uttering a single word concerning his plans relative to Spain, at the very moment when he was thinking of them the most. On the 20th of February, having seen him in the course of the day without saying a word to him about the mission which he destined for him, he directed the minister of war to make him set out in the night for Bayonne, in order to assume the command of the troops entering Spain. Murat was to be there on the 26th and to find there his instructions. Those instructions were to this effect: to take the general command of the corps of the Gironde and of the Ocean, of the division of the Eastern Pyrenees, of the division of the Western Pyrenees, and of all the troops which were penetrating further into Spain; to repair in the first days of March to Burgos, whither the detachments of the imperial guard were to proceed; to place his head-quarters at the centre of the corps of marshal Monecy, that is to say, at Burgos itself; to advance with this corps upon the Madrid road by Aranda and Somosierra; to direct that of general Dupont thither

by Segovia and the Escorial; to be master by about the 15th of March of the two passes of the Guadarrama; to collect 600,000 rations of biscuit already made at Bayonne, so that the troops should be supplied for a fortnight, in case of a forced march; to await orders from Paris for any ulterior movement; to occupy immediately the citadel of Pampeluna, the forts of Barcelona, the fortress of St. Sebastian; to give the Spanish commandants, as a reason for this occupation, the ordinary rule of war to secure one's rear, when marching forward even in a friendly country; to keep all the troops well together, as one is accustomed to do on approaching the enemy; taking care that the pay should never be in arrear, so that the soldiers, having money, might not be tempted to consume without paying, and, as there was reason to distrust the Neapolitans who were entering Catalonia, to order the first Italian who should plunder to be shot; not to seek, not to accept of communication with the court of Spain, without having a formal order; not to answer any letter from the prince of the Peace; to say, in case of being questioned in such a manner as not to be able to keep silence, that the French troops were entering Spain for a purpose known to Napoleon alone, a purpose certainly advantageous to the cause of Spain and of France; to pronounce vaguely the words Cadiz, Gibraltar, without saying anything positive; to intimate particularly to the Biscayan provinces, that whatever might happen, their privileges would be respected; to publish, on reaching Burgos, an order of the day, recommending to the troops the strictest discipline and the most fraternal relations with the generous Spanish people, the friend and ally of the French people; never to mix up with all these protestations of friendship any other name than that of the Spanish people, and never to mention king Charles IV. or his government, under any form whatever.

Such is the substance of the instructions addressed to Murat on the 20th of February; confirmed and developed in the following days in posterior orders. General Belliard was placed about him as chief of the staff, general Grouchy as commander of his cavalry, general Lariboissière was charged with the direction of the artillery of the army. The latter was to despatch for Bayonne, from all the dépôts of artillery, situated in the West and the South, considerable stores, particularly tools and fireworks capable of blowing up the gate of a town or of a strong castle. The mode of carriage in Spain being on the back of mules, orders were immediately sent off to Bayonne to purchase five hundred of the best and handsomest of those animals. M. Mollien, minister of the public treasury, was desired to send several millions in specie, two of them in gold, to Bayonne, to defray all the expenses of the army, and to pay them in ready money. He was, moreover, to prepare an equitable tariff, showing the comparative value of the French and Spanish coins, which was to be published in every town in Spain

through which the troops should pass, in order to prevent quarrels between the soldiers and the inhabitants.

To these instructions, given for the army entering Spain, were added others for the army in Portugal. Napoleon designed that Spain should not be put to any expense in an enterprise which was about to cost her the reigning dynasty. But he was not equally scrupulous in regard to Portugal, which he was authorised to treat as a conquered country and the ally of England. Calculating the wealth of that kingdom rather by that of the colonies than by that of the mother-country, he directed Junot to impose upon it a contribution of one hundred millions. He recommended the most extreme severity for any attempt at insurrection, reminding him, as an example to be followed, of the terrible manner in which he had repressed Cairo in Egypt, Pavia and Verona in Italy. He ordered him to dissolve the Portuguese army, and to send to France all that could not be disbanded. He expressly enjoined him to have an eye on the Spanish divisions which had concurred in the invasion of Portugal, to move them as far as he could from the frontiers of Spain, to keep the bulk of his forces at Lisbon, and two small French divisions of four or five thousand men each, the one at Almeida to awe the Spanish troops of general Taranco, who occupied Oporto, the other at Badajoz, to march, if needful, for Andalusia; to keep this order absolutely secret, and, if he heard that any collision had taken place between the Spaniards and the French, to circulate among the Portuguese that the cause of this collision was no other than Portugal itself, the possession of which was demanded by the Spaniards, but refused them.

Napoleon lastly gave orders to the guard, for he foresaw that he should be obliged to go himself to Spain, either to direct the war, if war should break out there, or to direct the political affairs, if his policy should bring about a like termination of the events in Spain to those in Portugal, by the flight of the royal family. He had successively despatched for Bayonne the Mamelukes, the Poles, the seamen of the guard, several detachments of chasseurs and horse grenadiers, and a regiment of fusileers, that is to say, about 3000 men. He sent the brave Lepic to command them, with orders to be in the first days of March at Burgos, the infantry in Burgos itself, the cavalry on the road from Bayonne to Burgos.

These military dispositions were not sufficient to fulfil completely the object which Napoleon proposed to himself. While his troops were to advance mysteriously upon Madrid, having no cheering words but for the Spanish people, and none whatever for the reigning family, he set his diplomacy to work in the same spirit. M. de Beauharnais applied incessantly at Paris for instructions against a catastrophe which appeared imminent. He solicited in particular permission to confer some demonstrations of interest on Ferdinand, still convinced that the favourite must be overthrown for the benefit of that prince, and the fusion of the two dynasties be effected by a marriage. Napoleon, who was now far

from entertaining such a plan, and who frequently laughed at the credulity of M. de Beauharnais, his awkwardness, his avarice, the importance which he was fond of assuming, and who left him where he was, because an honest man without talent suited him better than another to perform the ridiculous part of an ambassador who was left ignorant of everything, directed that he should be enjoined to observe the strictest neutrality between the factions which divided Spain, to show no demonstrations of interest for any of them, to answer merely, when asked concerning the dispositions of the Emperor of the French, that he was displeased, extremely displeased, without saying at what; to add, if anything was said to him concerning the march of the French armies, that Gibraltar, Cadiz, probably required a concentration of troops, for the English were bringing large forces towards that point; but that the Spanish cabinet was so indiscreet that it could not be trusted with the secret of a single military operation.

These instructions were sufficient for the part which M. de Beauharnais had to act. But Napoleon employed more certain means for striking terror into the unhappy court of Spain. M. Yzquierdo was still in Paris, hovering about the Tuileries, sometimes at the grand-marshal Duroc's, with whom he had negotiated the treaty of Fontainebleau, sometimes at M. de Talleyrand's, the principal go-between in the whole Spanish business. Seeing that it was impossible for him to obtain the publication of the treaty of Fontainebleau, he had thence concluded that other measures were contemplated in Paris; that this partition of Portugal had been but a provisional arrangement for obtaining the immediate cession of Tuscany; and that, no doubt, the overthrow of the dynasty itself was meditated. With his usual perspicacity, he had completely detected, not the means but the end at which Napoleon was aiming. He had endeavoured, by artfully sounding M. de Talleyrand, to discover whether large concessions of territory or of commerce might not, accompanied by a marriage, appease the wrath, real or feigned, of the conqueror.

M. de Talleyrand, who was inclined to an intermediate plan, had listened to M. Yzquierdo, and perhaps as much proposed as adopted the ideas, of which this agent of Emmanuel Godoy's desired to make essay. These ideas agreed precisely with the second plan, which we have already detailed. It purported, in fact, to marry Ferdinand to a French princess, to take for France the provinces of the Ebro in exchange for the part of Portugal left disposable, to open the Spanish colonies to the French, to bind the two crowns together not only by a marriage but by a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, which should render either war or peace common to both, and lastly to give to Charles IV. the title of emperor of the Americas. Such were the ideas which M. Yzquierdo put forward, as much to sound the court of the Tuileries as to arrive at a conclusion. All at once, Napoleon ordered him to be treated with extreme harshness, to be sent

away, as if one was weary of his tergiversations, as if one would have nothing more to do with a court so weak, so incapable, so insincere; in short, to impel him to set out for Madrid, that he might carry thither the terror with which he had been filled. The grand-marshal Duroc had orders to write to M. Yzquierdo that he would do well to return immediately to Madrid,* to disperse the thick clouds which had arisen between the two courts. It was not said what clouds; but M. Yzquierdo took the hint, and it would be sufficient to make him set out to excite in the court of Spain an agitation, which would not let it rest anywhere, and which must lead to a definitive resolution. M. Yzquierdo left Paris the same day.

It was requisite, at the same time, to answer the letter of the 5th of February, in which the terrified Charles IV. had besought Napoleon to satisfy him respecting his intentions, and respecting the march of the French troops, which at that moment were advancing towards Madrid. In this letter Charles IV. had abstained from alluding to the marriage of his son with a niece of Napoleon's, seeing that the latter affected to think no more of that proposal. Like one who is striving to pick a quarrel, Napoleon, instead of endeavouring in his answer to dispel the alarm of Charles IV., seemed to complain that, on the subject of the marriage, there should be observed a silence of which he had himself set the example. This answer, dated the 25th of February, was very short and very dry. He therein mentioned that, on the 18th of November, king Charles had asked him for a French princess, that he answered on the 10th of January by a conditional consent; that on the 5th of February, king Charles, writing again to him, made no further mention of the marriage; and he added that this last silence left him in doubts which it was necessary to remove in order to decide upon objects of great importance.

This new letter, which was but a refusal to relieve the uneasiness of the unfortunate Charles IV., and which, combined with other circumstances of the moment, must have filled him with terror, was brought by M. de Tournon, chamberlain of the Emperor, who had been previously sent to Madrid on a similar mission, and who to great devotedness united much good sense and love of truth. He had instructions to observe attentively the progress and conduct of the French troops, the dispositions of the Spanish people in regard to them, to take particular notice also of what was passing at the Escorial, then to return to Burgos about the 15th of March, and there await the arrival of Napoleon. The latter had, in fact, calculated that his orders, given between the 20th and the 25th of February, would have their consequences in Spain in the middle of March, and that, at this

* The letter is in the Louvre, and bears date the 24th of February.

period, he ought to be in person at Burgos, to derive from events, always fertile in unforeseen cases, the result which he desired.

There was, therefore, every reason to believe that the court of Spain, already strongly tempted to follow the example of the house of Braganza, when it should see the French army advancing upon Madrid, M. de Beauharnais saying nothing because he knew nothing, and M. Yzquierdo saying much, because he feared much, would no longer hesitate to set out for Cadiz. If, however, in spite of recommendations given to the French troops, to treat the Spanish people as friends, an unforeseen collision should take place, there would then be a solution again. He might consider himself as betrayed by allies among whom he had come amicably for an important expedition interesting the alliance, and he should revenge himself by deposing the Bourbons of Spain, as he had deposed those of Naples for a treachery real or supposed. Napoleon, acting thus as a conqueror, who cares little about the means, provided that he attains his end, reckoning upon great results, such as the regeneration of Spain, the re-establishment of the natural alliances of France, to excuse himself in the eyes of posterity for the dark machination which he was employing towards a friendly court—Napoleon conceived that he had at length discovered the true way of overturning the Bourbons without resorting to atrocious violences, which, in less humane ages than ours, conquerors have never hesitated to commit. He thought that, on giving a slight shake to the throne of Spain, without violently hurling Charles IV. from it, he might induce that weak prince, his guilty wife, and his cowardly favourite, to forsake it, in order to seek another in America. But this plan, devised to avoid shocking Europe and France too much, gave rise to an objection which had caused Napoleon to hesitate long about adopting it. By driving the reigning house to retreat, like that of Portugal, to the New World, he should inevitably bring upon Spain the loss of her colonies, as had been the case with Portugal. The Braganzas in Brazil, the Bourbons in Mexico, in Peru, on the banks of the La Plata, would found empires, enemies of their usurped mother-countries, friends of England, who would find for a long time in the supply of these colonies wherewithal to indemnify herself for the closing of the Continent. No doubt, on penetrating into a distant futurity, one might discover in these colonies new nations, offering to their old mother-countries more means of exchange, more occasions for profit, as was already exemplified in the case of England and the United States. But Spain, Portugal, were not industrious England; the Americans of the South were not the Americans of the North; and all that could be foreseen for a long series of years was the loss of the Spanish colonies, and the working of them for the benefit of British commerce. To the flight, therefore, of Charles IV. to America were attached, together with a great convenience for the usurpation of the throne, great and serious inconveniences in

respect to the future lot of the Spanish colonies. This must be a subject of grievous affliction to the Spaniards themselves, hence discontent and revolt, and an injury to our commerce proportionate to the advantage that would be derived by the commerce of the enemy.

Napoleon, extremely well informed respecting these complicated interests, devised a new combination, much more artful than any of those to which we have adverted, and having for its object to correct the only inconvenience of the plan which he had definitively adopted. There was at Cadiz a fine French squadron, capable of commanding the harbour and the road. He resolved to employ it in detaining the Bourbons at the moment when they should attempt to embark, and, after driving them by fear from Aranjuez to Cadiz, stop them by force at Cadiz itself, before they should have sailed, under the escort of England, for Vera Cruz. In consequence, he sent off to admiral Rosily a despatch in cipher, dated the 21st of February, containing an express order to take such a position in the road of Cadiz as to prevent the departure of any vessel, and to stop the fugitive royal family, if it should imitate the folly, so said the despatch, of the court of Lisbon.*

Assuredly, if one were to judge of these acts according to ordinary morality, which renders sacred the property of another, we must brand them for ever, as we brand those of the criminal who has made free with what does not belong to him; and, even if we judge of them upon different principles, we cannot avoid inflicting severe censure upon them. But thrones are a different thing from private property. They are taken away or given by war or policy, and sometimes to the great advantage of the nations which are thus arbitrarily disposed of. But whoever aims at playing the part of Providence should beware of failing, of being either odious or unfortunate in attempting to be great, of not obtaining the results that ought to serve for excuse. He ought, in short, to be shy of any enterprise which he dare not avow, and for which he is necessitated to have recourse to knavery and lying. Napoleon reasoned upon what he was about to do as ambitious policy always reasons. That Spanish nation, he said to himself, so proud, so generous, deserved a better fate than to be subjected to an incapable and degraded court; it deserved to be regenerated; when regenerated, it would be capable of rendering great services to France and to itself, of assisting to overthrow the maritime tyranny of England, of contributing to the emancipation of the commerce of Europe, of being called, in short, to brilliant and mighty destinies. To interdict himself from all this for the sake of an imbecile king, of a lewd queen, of an abject favourite, was more than could be expected of an impetuous spirit, which darts upon its object, like the eagle upon his prey, the moment he descries it from the

* At the end of this volume will be found a note explaining how I came to discover the secret of all the machinations, which have hitherto been totally unknown.

elevation where he dwells. The result was destined to prove to what danger he exposes himself who attempts to perform one of those parts so far above humanity, who chooses to hold himself dispensed from regarding the lives, the welfare, of men, upon pretext of the aim towards which he is advancing.

Murat had executed with perfect submission the orders of Napoleon, transmitted by the minister of war. Setting out immediately for Bayonne, he had arrived in that town on the 26th, as his instructions enjoined him to do. His departure was so sudden, that he had with him neither staff nor horses for his personal service. He was accompanied only by the aides-de-camp who ought to attend an officer of his rank, marshal, grand-duke, and imperial prince, all in one. He had despatched them in all directions to ascertain the position and state of the corps, to put himself into communication with them, to assume the direction of affairs. The mystery which Napoleon had observed in his instructions hurt his vanity, but so clearly did he perceive their drift, and so well did it please him, that he asked for nothing more, and fell to work in order to execute punctually the commands of his master.

Bayonne exhibited a spectacle of confusion, for there was not at this point the immense military display which a war of fifteen years had accumulated on the frontier of the Rhine or of the Alps, and everything there had to be created at once. Moreover, the troops which arrived, composed of conscripts recently organised, were in want of necessaries, and of the experience which might make amends for it. People were busy baking the biscuit, making shoes and great coats, creating the means of transport, of which they were totally destitute; for it had been impossible to procure the 500 mules which Napoleon had ordered to be bought, as those valuable animals were not to be found anywhere but in Poitou. The money itself was behind-hand, for want of conveyances. The artillery of the various corps had scarcely joined, and the retarded *materiel* of Junot's army, crossing that arriving for the armies in Spain, increased the disorder. Notwithstanding the clearness, the precision, the vigour, which Napoleon infused on this occasion as formerly into the despatch of his orders, their execution was affected by the distance, by the precipitation, by the inexperience, of the administrators, the most capable being employed in other parts of Europe.

Murat, who possessed intelligence, whom Napoleon, by his grand lessons and continual remonstrances, had trained to command, passed several days at Bayonne to introduce some order there, to inform himself of what had been executed and what delayed, that he might apprise Napoleon, and that the latter might apply the remedy. He then set out for Vittoria. He crossed the frontier on the 10th of March, and proceeded the same day to Tolosa. If ever there was an officer who, by his good looks, his martial air, his open and quite southern manners,

suit the Spaniards, it was assuredly Murat. He was formed at once to please and to awe them, and, among the French princes destined to reign, he would have been incontestably the best that could be chosen for ascending the throne of Spain. We shall see hereafter how grievous a fault it was to prefer another to him. The population of the Biscayan provinces received him with great demonstrations of joy. These excellent people, the handsomest, the most sprightly, the bravest, and the most laborious of those that inhabit the Peninsula, had not the same passions as the rest of the Spaniards. They had neither the same antipathy to foreigners, nor the same national prejudices. Situated between the plains of Gascony and those of Castille, in a mountainous region, speaking a distinct language, living by the illicit traffic which they carried on with France and Spain, enjoying extensive privileges, of which they availed themselves for continuing that traffic, privileges for which they were indebted to the difficulty of conquering their mountains and their courage, theirs was a kind of neutral country, a Switzerland, as it were, between France and Spain. They were, therefore, but loosely attached to the Spanish rule, and would not have been sorry to belong to a great empire, which would have enabled them to extend to a distance their industrious activity. They welcomed Murat with boisterous acclamations, and indicated in a thousand ways a wish to belong to France. The French troops were cordially received; they observed strict discipline, paid for all they had, and, by consuming the produce of the country, were an advantage to it rather than a burden.

Murat was not less favourably received at Vittoria, the capital of Alava, the third of the Biscayan provinces, in which the Spanish spirit begins to express itself more strongly. He entered it on the 11th in the carriage of the bishop, who, with all the authorities of the country, had hastened to meet him. The population thronged to the gates of the towns, and gave the most brilliant reception to the general who had become a prince, and was destined to be soon a king. The French soldiers, though very numerous in Spain, more numerous than was consistent with the war with Portugal, had not yet afforded the slightest cause for complaint. If people ascribed any political intention to their coming, it was against the court, a court equally execrated and despised. There was no reason, therefore, for checking either the curiosity which they excited or the hopes which they raised. The authorities, to which orders had been sent from Madrid to prepare provisions, in order to prevent all dissatisfaction, had collected them in tolerable abundance. Murat, having given notice that the consumption of the army would be paid for by France, the authorities answered, with Castilian pride, that they received the French as allies, as friends, and that Spanish hospitality was never paid for.

Thus, at this first moment, things went on in the best manner.

The illusions were reciprocal. While these half-Spaniards were giving such a favourable reception to our troops and their illustrious chief, the latter fancied that everything would be easy in Spain, that the French were wished for there, that a king of their nation would be accepted with joy, and with still more joy if that king were himself. Struck by the deep and universal hatred excited by the favourite, he soon discovered that the support of Emmanuel Godoy was but a feeble stay to secure for himself in Spain, and that, to obtain the popular favour there, he must, on the contrary, let it be understood that he had come to overthrow him.

From Vittoria Murat proceeded to Burgos, which was to be the seat of his head-quarters. When you leave Vittoria and pass the Ebro at Miranda, the boundary at which the Spanish officers of the customs were then stationed, and where they continued not long since to be placed, you quit the mountainous, diversified, smiling, ever-verdant country of the Pyrenean Switzerland, and enter real Spain. The Ebro, which, at Miranda, is but a large rivulet, running among flints—the Ebro being crossed, you pass the defiles of Pancorbo, a kind of fissure in a line of rocks, which form the last ledge of the Pyrenees, and enter Castille. There commence prodigious plains, extensive views, stern and dreary scenes. On the vast plateau of the Castilles, the sun is serene and scorching in summer, the air foggy and chilly in winter, and at all times raw. Dwellings are rare ; the cultivation is uniform, and presents to the eye, excepting when the crops have grown up and are ripening, nothing but vast fields of stubble, upon which subsist the flocks, absolute masters of the soil of Spain, over which they travel twice a-year from north to south and from south to north, like birds of passage. With this new aspect of physical nature is united, on entering the Castilles, a different aspect of moral nature. The inhabitant, handsome, particularly in the country—handsome, but less sprightly and less alert than the Biscayan mountaineer, tall, well-made, grave, always armed with a gun or a dagger, ready to employ it against a countryman, still more ready against a foreigner, displays in an exaggerated form all the features, good or bad, of the Spanish character. He is at once more ignorant, more savage, more cruel, more brave, than the inhabitants of the towns. The latter, with their imperfect instruction, like half-civilised Turks, have lost with their ferocity part of their energy. The mass of the people in Spain, which by its vices and its virtues, preserved the national independence, exhibits a peculiar trait which distinguishes it from the other nations of Europe. Along with ardent passions, there is to be found in it a sort of public spirit, owing to its mode of life, to its aggregation in large villages, where it lives all the time that it does not devote to the land, on which it bestows but little, confining itself to a single ploughing, then sowing, and harvest, and doing nothing afterwards. While the French, Belgian, English, and Lombard peasantry, dispersed

over the soil, engaged in various and incessant agricultural occupations, are not induced either by proximity or leisure to attend to anything but their labour, you find the Spanish peasant, covered with a cloak, supported by a stick, along with a party of his fellows in the public place of the village, talking about the king, the queen, the events of the time, with an astonishing curiosity, or joining in games, dances, songs, running to bull-fights, a sanguinary amusement, of which no class of the nation can deprive itself, scarcely eyeing the passing foreigner, or eyeing him with contemptuous pride, which, on the slightest civility, suddenly changes to unaffected ease and freedom. The Spaniard, at this period, was more than ever disposed to turn his attention with redoubled zeal to public affairs. Thrust to the extremity of the Continent, it was more than a century since he had been seriously involved in the affairs of Europe. A few sea-fights, some operations in Italy, a momentary war in the Pyrenees in 1793, had not been sufficient to exhaust or even to satisfy his energetic passions. Looking on with the impatience of a spectator, who would fain act a part in the great events of the age, nobody could be better prepared to take an immoderate part in all things.

Such was the country, such the people, amidst which we arrived in March, 1808, on crossing the Ebro. Murat was again well received at Burgos, the capital of Old Castille, that is to say, with curiosity and hope. Meanwhile, the lower class, less concerned than the citizens about what the French were come to do in Spain, seemed more displeased at seeing foreigners overrun their country; and, between the petulant hastiness of our young soldiers and the proud gravity of the lowest class of the Spanish people, there were collisions here and there, and some stabs with the knife, instantaneously revenged by sword-cuts. In this first meeting of the two nations there was one unlucky circumstance. There should have been set before these proud Spaniards, so inclined to despise all who were not their countrymen, some of the soldiers of the grand army, who would have made an impression upon them by their superannuated age, their wounds, their grey moustaches. But our legions, composed of conscripts of 1807 and 1808, who had never seen fire, commanded, as we have said, by officers taken out of the depôts or drawn from retirement (this was the case in particular with the officers of the five legions of reserve), had nothing whereby to gain respect but the immense renown of our armies. Marched in haste from the depôts, before they were completely clothed, shod, or armed, they had not even the showiness of equipment to compensate for their youthful looks. They had, therefore, the two-fold disadvantage of not being sufficiently imposing and of exhibiting the appearance of a greedy poverty, which had come to eat up the country that it was invading. Among our soldiers there were many sick, some from having suffered fatigues, for which they were not sufficiently prepared,

others having caught the itch from Spanish beggars. One-fifth of the army was infected with this loathsome disease. It had been found necessary, in order to secure the troops of the imperial guard from it, to make them bivouack in the open air. The Spaniards, conceiving that these were the soldiers who had conquered Europe, said to themselves, that it could not be difficult to gain victories, since such troops had sufficed, not yet knowing, though they soon learned to their cost and our own, that, such as they were, these young soldiers were capable of conquering them and stronger than they, thanks to the spirit which animated them, and to the military skill which superabounded in all parts of the French army. It was only the cuirassiers, whose large stature and imposing armour disguised youth, and the guard, incomparable troops, that inspired the populace of the Spanish towns with the respect which they ought to have inspired from the very first instant. For the rest, at this moment, there was not yet a thought of resistance; nothing but good was expected from the French; and, with the exception of some accidental collisions between men of the lowest class and our conscripts, overtaken by the wine of Spain, or excited by the beauty of the women, cordiality prevailed. Certain reflecting Spaniards, indeed, said to themselves that this extraordinary accumulation of troops must forebode something else than the overthrow of the prince of the Peace; for, in the then state of minds, it would have required but a word from Napoleon to hurl him from power. But people would not believe or hope for anything but the fall of the favourite: they would not think of any object but that. Another rumour, moreover, that of an expedition against Gibraltar, artfully circulated, completed the general illusion.

No sooner had Murat entered Spain than two letters from his friend the prince of the Peace came, one after another, to congratulate and at the same time to question him. The desire to answer him, which, under any other circumstance, would have been vehement in the impetuous Murat, was easily surmounted by the fear of renewing his relations with so unpopular a personage, and by the still greater fear of displeasing Napoleon. The two letters were left unanswered. For the rest, the questions of the prince of the Peace were not the only ones to which Murat was exposed. The civil, military, and ecclesiastical authorities, which hastened around him to see and to entertain him, provoked his natural indiscretion in a thousand indirect ways. But he curbed himself, in the first place, because he was not acquainted with Napoleon's designs; and, secondly, because the general object, of which he had a glimpse, was so important, that less intelligence and less tact than he possessed would have been sufficient to impose silence on him. Still his vexation at finding himself in the midst of this tumult without any but military instructions was extreme. Accordingly, as soon as he had arrived in Spain, he did not fail to write to Napoleon a detailed report on the state of the troops, on their destitution, on

their diseases, on their favourable reception by the Spaniards, on the unpopularity of the prince of the Peace, on the enthusiasm of the Spaniards for Napoleon, on the facility of doing what one would in Spain, but also on the necessity of deciding what one purposed to do, and on the embarrassment of being left without instructions to meet the events that were preparing. "I conceived, sire," he wrote to Napoleon—"I conceived, after so many years' service and attachment, that I had deserved your confidence, and, invested, above all, with the command of your troops, that I ought to know to what ends they are about to be employed. I beseech you," he added, "to give me instructions. Be they what they may, they shall be executed. Do you intend to overthrow Godoy, to place Ferdinand on the throne?—Nothing is easier. One word from your lips will suffice. Would you change the dynasty of the Bourbons, regenerate Spain by giving her one of the princes of your house?—Again nothing is easier. Your will shall be received as that of Providence." Brave but weak observer, he durst not add a last assertion, more true than any of those with which he filled his reports, that he should have been the best received of the foreign princes who could have been substituted for the reigning dynasty.

Napoleon, whose intention was to terrify the court by his silence, and at the same time to cheer the population by a friendly attitude, in order to reach Madrid without striking a blow, and to take pacific possession of a vacant throne,—Napoleon felt a movement of impatience on reading Murat's letters, full of home questions. "When I prescribed to you," said he, "to march militarily, to keep your divisions well together, and at a distance from fighting, to supply them abundantly that they might not commit any disorder, to avoid all collision, to take no part in the divisions of the court of Spain, and to send me the questions that might be addressed to you, were not these instructions? The rest does not concern you, and if I say nothing to you, it is because you ought to know nothing."

To this reprimand he added such orders as circumstances required. He prescribed by a decree that the battalions detached from their regiments should be furnished immediately with funds, to be placed to the account of the administration of the corps; to take from his guard young sub-officers, sufficiently lettered, having served in the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, to be appointed officers, and thus to supply the regiments which were deficient of them; to subject immediately all those who had the itch to proper treatment; to encamp the troops as soon as the cold season, which could not last much longer in Spain, was over; to despatch the brigade composed of the fourth battalions of the legions of reserve to join that of general Darmagnac, already ordered to occupy Pampeluna, to arm it, to leave 1000 men there, then to take the entire division of the Eastern Pyrenees between Vittoria and Burgos, in order to cover the rear of the

army; to collect [at the same point all the regiments on march composed of reinforcements destined for the provisional regiments; to send thither besides, and without delay, Verdier's division (called above the Orleans reserve), to form in this manner a considerable corps, under the command of marshal Bessières, which, with the guard, could not amount to less than from 12,000 to 15,000 men, and which, in case of collision, would secure the line of retreat of the army against the Spanish troops directed to occupy the North of Portugal. Napoleon then settled about the march upon Madrid. He ordered Murat to make both marshal Moncey's corps and general Dupont's pass the Guadarrama, the one by the Somosierra road, the other by that of Segovia, on the 19th or 20th of March, to be on the 22nd or 23rd under the walls of Madrid, to ask leave to rest himself there, before he continued his march for Cadiz; to break open the gates of Madrid, if they should be closed against him, but not till he had done all that was possible to prevent a collision. To all these directions was added, and that repeatedly, the recommendation to be silent on the subject of political affairs, to supply all the wants of the troops, that they might not take anything, and even to delay the movement for a day or two, if the means of subsistence and transport should not be sufficient.

Murat was, therefore, obliged to be content to learn nothing more, and set about punctually obeying the Emperor's orders, certain that, after all, this mystery could conceal nothing but what he desired, that is to say, the overthrow of the Bourbons of Spain, and the vacating of one of the finest thrones in the world.

The occupation of the fortresses, repeatedly ordered by the Emperor, was executed. Generals Duhesme and Darmagnac, the one at Barcelona, the other at Pampeluna, had at first occupied the towns only, and not the fortresses commanding those towns. A secret order, emanating from Madrid, prescribed to the Spanish generals to receive the French amicably, to open the towns to them, but as far as possible to refuse them admission into the citadels. General Duhesme, arriving at Barcelona at the head of about 7000 men, mostly Italians, had been received with affected politeness by the authorities, with kindness and curiosity by the townspeople, with distrust by the populace. The incontinence of the Italians had drawn upon them more than one infliction of the knife. The seriousness of the circumstances having occasioned the closing of the manufactories, there was a great number of unemployed workmen ready to take part in any kind of disturbance. General Duhesme, placed with 7000 men amidst a city of 150,000 souls, though followed at a little distance by 5000 French, was in a critical position, especially as he was not master of the citadel of Barcelona and of the fort of Mont-Jouy, which entirely commands the city. In consequence, he agreed with general Lechi, commanding the Italians, upon a plan for carrying the fortresses, when a repeated order to possess himself of

them, came and put an end to all his hesitations. One morning, getting his troops under arms, he directed one part of them upon the citadel, another upon Mont-Jouy. At the principal gate of the citadel, a French post mounted guard as well as a Spanish post. Advantage was taken of this circumstance to penetrate into the interior. Owing to the negligence of the Spanish officers, half of the garrison was dispersed in the city. The French, therefore, found themselves in far superior force within the citadel, and made themselves masters of it without striking a blow. At Fort Mont-Jouy the result was different. Admission was refused by the officer commanding there, brigadier Alvarez, who afterwards energetically defended Girona. Though part of his troops were absent and dispersed, as had been the case at the citadel, he assumed an attitude of defence. General Duhesme, who had directed the bulk of his force towards this point, declared, on his part, that he should instantly commence the attack. The captain-general of Catalonia, count Ezpeleta, fearing a collision, which he had been recommended to avoid, came to the determination to yield, and to give up Mont-Jouy to the French. They established themselves there immediately. Masters of these two fortresses which command Barcelona, they had nothing more to fear; but they did not enter them without exciting in the population of Catalonia a painful, and, under the circumstances, a very injurious emotion.

At Pampeluna, general Darmagnac, a brave man, full of energy and honour, who would more willingly have scaled by main force than stealthily surprised a fortress which he was ordered to occupy, made use of a clever expedient to get into the citadel. He was lodged in a house at a little distance from the principal gate. He had a hundred well-armed grenadiers concealed there. His troops were accustomed to go in the morning into the citadel itself to fetch their provisions. He sent about fifty picked men, who repaired without arms to the gate of the citadel just before the distribution, and who, pretending to be waiting, approached the post guarding the gate, fell upon it, and disarmed it, while the hundred grenadiers, in ambush in general Darmagnac's house, running up in all haste, completed the capture. The French troops, secretly assembled, came up at the same moment, and the citadel was conquered, but to the great displeasure of general Darmagnac, who, reporting what he had done to the minister of war, observed: "These are disgraceful commissions." At Pampeluna, as at Barcelona, the emotion was vehement and general.

The troops had less trouble at St. Sebastian. A duke de Crillon, of French extraction, commanded there. Murat summoned him to surrender the place. He flatly refused to comply. Murat replied that he had orders to occupy it, not with hostile views, but, with mere views of military prudence, to secure the rear of the army; and that, if any resistance were made, he

should open his fire immediately. The duke de Crillon, forewarned, like all the other commandants of fortresses, that a collision was to be avoided, surrendered St. Sebastian, on condition that Murat should restore it if his compliance was not approved at Madrid. Murat assented to this puerile reserve, and sent a battalion of French troops into St. Sebastian.

This sudden occupation of the fortresses, effected in the last days of February and the first days of March, produced a most baneful impression in Spain. Those persons of foresight, who had remarked that to take possession of Portugal, already conquered besides, that, to overthrow a favourite, detested by the nation, there was no need for so many troops, began to find their remarks justified and to meet with more assent. In the countries in particular, which had witnessed these surprises, accompanied with more or less violence, the people had well nigh come to blows with the troops. The middle class, which, less hostile to foreigners than the populace, less excited by the clergy, more disposed to changes, had taken pleasure in hoping from us for the fall of the favourite and the regeneration of Spain, was sorely grieved. The populace manifested a first movement of rage, which the firm attitude of our soldiers and our officers soon succeeded in repressing. Two circumstances contributed further to aggravate these feelings of disappointment among the middle class, and jealous anger among the populace; the first and the most grievous was the contribution of one hundred millions imposed upon the Portuguese; the second, not so generally known to the public, was the marriage of mademoiselle de Tascher to the prince of Aremberg. They began to complain in all quarters that the French treated very ill those from whom they were receiving hospitality, and they asked one another what would be the burden of Spain, if she had to pay a proportionate contribution to that laid upon Portugal. As for the marriage of mademoiselle de Tascher, it greatly affected the enlightened class, to which it was more particularly known. They had persuaded themselves, in fact, that it was not a daughter of Lucien's, a person unknown in Spain, but a niece of the empress's recently adopted, and related to the ambassador Beauharnais, that Napoleon destined for the prince of the Asturias. The marriage of that young lady with the prince of Aremberg blighted the hopes of all those who reckoned upon the speedy union of a French princess with Ferdinand. The dethronement of the Bourbons became thenceforward the only intention that they could attribute to the Emperor. The middle class, and above all the nobility, might perhaps have accommodated themselves to a change of dynasty, which should have insured to them the regeneration of Spain, without making her pass through the cruel ordeal of the French revolution; but the clergy, and particularly the monks, who regarded the French as dangerous foes to their existence, repelled such an idea with indignation, and had no

difficulty to act upon a still fanatical people, eager for movement and tumult. The clergy, corresponding from one end of Spain to the other, by the dioceses and by the convents, had a powerful means of communicating to all parts, with incredible speed, the impressions which they had an interest in propagating. These first impressions, however, were but a forerunning sign of the hatred that was to break forth against us. For a moment a different object engrossed the minds of the Spaniards: this was the court—the court in which an unnatural mother and an execrated favourite, governing a weak king, kept a young and adored prince under oppression. It was towards Madrid, towards Aranjuez, that all eyes were turned, and to which the French were called to consummate there a revolution universally desired. Certain acts tended, it is true, to excite doubts respecting their intentions; but these acts, some of them explained as mere military precautions, the others as measures solely applicable to Portugal, quickly passed out of the memory of a nation occupied with a single object; and people soon began again to think of the court, to wish for its downfall, and to demand it of the French.

The moment of the catastrophe was actually approaching. Napoleon had made M. Yzquierdo leave Paris about the 25th of February to carry terror to the hearts of the sovereigns of Spain, and M. de Tournon to deliver a new letter, alarming from its very insignificance; for, when he had been asked for a princess for Ferdinand, he had evaded the application by inquiring if that prince was restored to favour; and now, when marriage was no longer mentioned, he complained that nothing was said about it. These contradictions, with the sinister explanations furnished by M. Yzquierdo's reports, by the march of the French troops, by the silence of Murat, were soon to bring about the long expected crisis at Madrid.

M. Yzquierdo, arriving at Madrid on the 3rd or 4th of March, was presented on the 5th at Aranjuez to the whole royal family. His reports were of the most alarming nature, and filled with terror not only the royal family but the intimate circle of the prince of the Peace, his mother, his sisters, and his mistress, mademoiselle Tudo. M. Yzquierdo, after explaining the state of the negotiation, commenced with M. de Talleyrand, on the subject of ceding to the French the provinces of the Ebro and the opening of the Spanish colonies—M. Yzquierdo declared that this negotiation, afflicting as it might appear, was itself but a blind; that Napoleon evidently wanted something else, that is to say, the throne of Spain for one of his brothers.

M. Yzquierdo easily succeeded in convincing the court of Aranjuez, already terror-stricken, and in persuading it that, unless it adopted a decisive course, it was undone. The arrival of M. de Tournon, and the delivery of the letter of which he was the bearer, were not likely to dispel the alarms excited by M. Yzquierdo. Charles IV., ill, suffering from rheumatism in the

arm, received M. de Tournon with a politeness, through which might be perceived profound affliction; the queen and the favourite received him with a forced smile, that but ill concealed their furious hatred. Charles IV. told him, in a tone penetrated with grief, that he should soon write to his ally the Emperor Napoleon, and hastened to put an end to a useless and painful interview. From that moment the resolution to leave the country was taken. It was a cruel sacrifice for Charles IV. to quit the three or four palaces situated around Madrid, among which he was accustomed to divide his life, going from one to another at every change of season, like those animals which change climates in following the sun. It was to him a severe privation to renounce the chase in the Parde, to wait instead for Napoleon, and to place the fate of the house of Spain at the disposal of his omnipotence. The good king Charles IV. had too honest a heart, and too limited an understanding, to surmise a single one of Napoleon's combinations, and he was inclined to think that, by waiting for him and placing confidence in him, all would be arranged for the best. It is certain that this simple self-surrender of weakness must have strangely embarrassed Napoleon, and perhaps produced different results. But the prince of the Peace and the queen, well aware that they had no favour to hope for, that the interference of Napoleon, whatever it might be, would at least act against them, left no option to Charles IV., and induced him to retire to Andalusia. It is probable that they placed before his view nothing more than this first removal, relying upon events for deciding the definitive retreat to America. Their resolution on this head was so firm, that the prince of the Peace, hurried away by his usual intemperance of language, declared that he would carry off the king rather than consent to his awaiting the arrival of the French at Aranjuez.

However, that he might not deprive himself of every resource on the part of France, M. Yzquierdo was obliged to return immediately to Paris, to have recourse to supplications with Napoleon, to gold with his agents, in order to avert the stroke which threatened the house of Spain, and to sign all the treaties which might be required, how disgraceful soever they might be. He set out again in haste, on the morning of the 11th of March, to reach Paris before a fatal order was given. His distress was such that those who met him, and there were many going and coming on the road, were forcibly struck by it.

The resolution to retire to Andalusia being taken, it was necessary to reconcile to it many minds both at Aranjuez and Madrid. The prince of the Asturias, judging of Napoleon's intentions by the demonstrations of interest which he received from M. de Beauharnais, regarded the French as deliverers, and would not submit to be dragged far away from them, a prisoner to the queen and the prince of the Peace. He declared this loudly, since they had talked of the journey to Andalusia, and they

talked of it, in fact, at the moment as a determined resolution. He had won to his opinion his uncle Don Antonio, who felt as much aversion as himself for the queen and the favourite, and likewise all the members of the royal family, excepting the queen of Etruria, who had recently arrived from Tuscany to take possession of the north of Portugal. This princess, dear to the queen, was for that reason odious to Ferdinand, but nobody cared much about her opinion. All who had any weight in the royal family were decidedly adverse to the plan of flight, and in favour of waiting for the French. The queen and the favourite, giving themselves no concern about these oppositions, were determined to conquer them, and, by fair means or force, to take the whole royal family to Seville. But there were still other more formidable oppositions to overcome. The council of Castille, secretly consulted, had rejected the idea of a disgraceful retreat, and replied that the French ought not to have been admitted into Spain, but, after having so easily admitted them, it was necessary either to take the sudden resolution to resist them, by raising the whole nation against them, or to receive them with open arms, appealing to the good faith of these allies, welcomed in Spain as friends and brothers. Another opposition, more unlooked-for than all the rest, suddenly burst forth. The minister of justice, M. de Caballero, who had appeared more attached than he was to the fortune of the prince of the Peace, called by his functions as minister of justice to attend frequently during the proceedings at the Escorial, had thereby gained all the odium of them, though without deserving it; for he had maintained, before both the king and the queen, that neither in the papers which had been found nor in the facts collected was there sufficient evidence for instituting criminal prosecutions. He had even on this account incurred the anger of the queen, who had called him a traitor sold to the prince of the Asturias. The public, nevertheless, believed him to be much more culpable than he really was. As for the journey to Andalusia, he would not hear of it, saying that it would be a cowardly desertion of the nation, that the French ought not to have been introduced into Spain, but that now it was expedient to wait for them, that it was for those who distrusted them to retire, but that probably Charles IV., whose conduct had always been honourable towards them, would perhaps have no reason to repent having waited for them. Another minister, M. de Cevallos, who subsequently would fain have passed himself off for an antagonist of the prince of the Peace, though he was servilely submissive to him, and all whose patriotism consisted in a stupid hatred of the French—M. de Cevallos, minister of foreign affairs, remained a quiet spectator of this conflict, and left M. de Caballero to withstand singly the plan of flight. The prince of the Peace, regardless of his opposition, gave all the orders for the intended journey to Andalusia. Seeking to conceal the object of this journey, he talked vaguely of a personal project for inspecting the ports, the super-

intendence of which, since he was grand-admiral, belonged specially to him.

The convoys of money and moveables already remarked, the preparations of the court, and particularly of the Tудо family, soon left no doubt. It would be difficult to form an idea of the indignation of the Spaniards on learning that they were about to be abandoned by the house of Bourbon, as the Portuguese had been by the house of Braganza. Concerning themselves but little about the advantages which such a resolution might afterwards have for the preservation of the colonies, they said to themselves that, if the French had such evil intentions, the government was either silly in not having foreseen them, or criminal in having favoured them; that, at all events, they must be resisted to the last extremity; that all the Spaniards, having the king and the princes at their head, ought to cover the capital with their bodies and perish rather than suffer it to be entered; but to run away cowardly was an indignity, a treason; that, for the rest, there was in this flight something besides a precaution of prudence for the benefit of the royal family, merely a calculation for prolonging the usurped power of the favourite; for, if the intention was to escape the French, it was because they were known to be adverse to Emmanuel Godoy and favourable to the prince of the Asturias. This last idea becoming general had restored their popularity to the French, and people said that, instead of running away or fighting them, they ought to go to meet and welcome them, since the prince of the Peace had such a strong distrust of their intentions. The exasperation of all classes against the court was at its height. The nobility, the middle class, the common people, and the army, all spoke one and the same language at Madrid; and this language was as open, as bold, as immoderate, as it is possible to be on the eve of great events in the most free countries. In the army, in particular, a body of men very ill-treated by the prince of the Peace, who had overturned its organisation, the life-guards, manifested the greatest irritation, and resolved to oppose the king's departure even by force. Among the officers of this corps there were several absolutely devoted to the prince of the Asturias, and in frequent communication with him, receiving, it is alleged, suggestions and orders from him.

This boisterous opposition had not shaken either the prince of the Peace or the queen in their projects, and merely excited in them a desire to withdraw themselves the sooner from such hatred and such dangers, by retiring first to Andalusia, afterwards, if they must, to America. The prince of the Peace had given orders accordingly. He had made the troops destined to occupy Portugal fall back; for, on the eve of losing Spain, there was something else to think of than the Algarves and North Lusitania. General Taranco had been obliged to leave Oporto, to march into Gallicia, and from Gallicia into the kingdom of Leon. General Carafa had had to ascend the Tagus, and to advance as

far as Talavera; general Solano, marquis del Socorro, to return from Elvas towards Badajoz, and proceed for Seville. Assuredly, the prince of the Peace had no idea of entering with these forces, consisting of six or seven thousand men each, into a contest with the French army. He probably destined them much more to cover the retreat of the royal family, than to organise a desperate defence in the south of Spain. Several frigates were eventually prepared in the port of Cadiz.*

The prince of the Peace, according to his custom of passing a week alternately at Madrid and with their majesties, had returned, on Sunday, the 13th of March, to Aranjuez, a magnificent royal residence seated on the bank of the Tagus, decorated in the Italian style, with superb gardens, somewhat reminding you of the Arabic taste. This residence, as you come from Madrid, is on the right of a high road, as wide as the avenue of the Champs Elysées. Opposite to the palace this road expands into a spacious place. On the left are several fine mansions belonging to ministers and to grandees of the court, and one of which in particular was occupied by the prince of the Peace. A multitude of small houses, inhabited by shopkeepers and tradesmen whom the court and its numerous establishment draw after them, form what may be called the town of Aranjuez.

No sooner had he arrived than the prince of the Peace gave definitive orders for the departure, which was fixed for Tuesday or Wednesday, the 15th or 16th of March. The major-domo of the court had already caused the royal carriages to be got ready; and relays of horses were stationed on the Ocaña road, which leads to Seville. Directions had been given at Madrid to the Walloon and Spanish guards and to the life-guards, who were not on duty, to hold themselves in readiness to set out for Aranjuez.

But, although no account had been made of the opposition of certain ministers, it became at length necessary to inform them of the definitive resolution of the court, and to apply to them for the signature of various orders. The prince of the Peace, as soon as he arrived at Aranjuez, had summoned several of them to the royal residence, in particular the marquis de Caballero, who had kept him waiting. The prince of the Peace, somewhat nettled, received him very ungraciously. The minister, persisting in his opposition, refused to concur either by his consent or by his signature in the departure, which was no longer merely projected but

* The domestic resolutions of the Spanish government are in general known from hearsay only, for there is nothing in writing on this subject by any well-informed man. The marquis de Caballero, however, when subsequently questioned by Murat, delivered to him three very instructive memoirs concerning the events which preceded the disturbance at Aranjuez, and the manuscripts exist in the secretary of state's office. M. de Caballero, relating the discussions which he had with the prince of the Peace, respecting the projected departure, details all that passed on this occasion, and furnishes a great many facts that are extremely curious. In particular, he heard the prince of the Peace assert that he had just caused five frigates to be got ready at Cadiz for conveying the royal family beyond sea.

resolved upon—I order you to sign, said the prince to him, in a movement of anger.—I take no orders but from the king, replied M. de Caballero.—Such an opposition, from a man not distinguished by boldness of character, must have proved to what a degree the authority of the favourite was already shaken. The other ministers having come in, a sharp altercation took place among them. M. de Caballero, urged to the highest pitch of irritation, reproached M. de Cevallos for his base complaisance towards the prince of the Peace, and had no supporter but the minister of the marine. They separated without coming to any conclusion, and, on leaving the palace, these counsellors of the crown, retaining in their countenances and in their language the agitation which they were full of, dropped words which apprised the public of the matter in hand, and of the danger with which it was threatened.

The prince of the Asturias, on his part, and his uncle Don Antonio, had communicated to their confidants what they knew, and had, in some measure, applied for aid against the violence that was preparing for them. The attached officers whom the prince numbered in the life-guards had spoken to their men, who were disposed to infringe all the rules of subordination, at the first word that should be said to them. The household, who knew, from the very preparations which had been made, how near at hand the journey was, and were sorry to leave the old abode in which they were accustomed to dwell, had forewarned the inhabitants of Aranjuez. The latter, grieved to be deprived of the presence of the court, had resolved to prevent its departure; and they had, by reporting the design of flight in the surrounding country, drawn together the formidable peasants of La Mancha, grievously vexed also to see the court leaving them, and taking from them the advantage of its supply. The affluence to Aranjuez became extreme, and faces the most sinister and the most strange began already to make their appearance. A singular personage, the count de Montijo, persecuted by the court, having, together with the birth and fortune of a grandee, the art and a disposition for exciting the popular masses, was in the midst of this concourse, ready to give it the signal for insurrection. In consequence, there were seen tradesmen of Aranjuez, peasants of La Mancha, brought together by anxiety, interest, passion, keeping continual watch about the palace.

Monday, the 14th, the day after the altercation between M. Caballero and the prince of the Peace, was extremely stormy. On Tuesday, the 15th, the sight of the last preparations of the court, the language of the dissident ministers, certain words attributed to the prince of the Asturias, who, it was said, asked for aid against the violence of those who purposed to carry him off to Andalusia, produced such an emotion that a popular insurrection was expected every moment to break out. There was

already the aspect, the shouts of one; nothing was wanting but acts of violence.

On the morning of the next day, Wednesday, the 16th, the authors of the project of a journey, seeing that the departure would be rendered impossible unless a moment's tranquillity could be restored to that agitated population, proposed to publish a proclamation, by which Charles IV. should promise not to leave Aranjuez. Accordingly this proclamation was immediately drawn up, read, and posted in all the principal streets of Aranjuez, and sent in the utmost haste to Madrid.—“My dear subjects,” such was the substance of it, “be not alarmed, either at the arrival of the troops of my magnanimous ally, the Emperor of the French, which have entered Spain to repel a landing of the enemy on our coasts, or at my alleged intention of departure. No; it is not true that I want to leave my beloved people. I will stay with you, live among you, relying on your attachment, if I should need it against any enemy whatsoever. Spaniards, be easy then—your king will not leave you.”

This proclamation infused into men's minds a degree of security, and calmed them for a moment. The multitude, collected in front of the royal residence, called for its sovereigns, who appeared at the windows of the palace, cheering with all its might, shouting, “Long live the king!” “Death to the prince of the Peace!” “Death to the favourite who dishonours and betrays his master!” Thus ended the 16th, amidst a satisfaction which unfortunately was to be but transient.

On the following day, the 17th, in spite of the royal promises, the journey seemed still to be resolved upon. The carriages remained loaded in the courts of the palace. The horses were waiting at the relays. The troops forming the garrison of Madrid composed of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and of the company of life-guards not on duty, set out for Aranjuez. Part of the populace of the capital and a multitude of curious persons followed and performed the trip, a distance of seven or eight leagues, along with them. By the way, this train set up shouts against the queen and against the prince of the Peace, and asked the officers and soldiers if they would let their sovereigns be carried off by an unworthy usurper, who meant to take them away with him to tyrannise over them the more safely. The troops, thus accompanied, reached Aranjuez towards the close of the day, and were quartered upon the inhabitants, which was not the way to recal them to military subordination. A last circumstance completely convinced the multitude that the royal promises were but a deception: this was that the demoiselles Tulo themselves had arrived at Aranjuez, and were to set off that evening, it was said, for Andalusia.

The concourse about the king's palace and that of the prince of the Peace was more considerable than on the preceding days, for, with the terrified inhabitants of Aranjuez, with the peasants of

La Mancha, were mingled soldiers without arms, who, having once arrived at their lodgings, came out again to join the mob and the curious persons, who had left Madrid in great number. The life-guards, at least those not on duty, evidently excited by the friends of the prince of the Asturias, divided into bands, forming volunteer patrols, sometimes towards the king's stables, sometimes towards the residence of the prince of the Peace.

Towards midnight a singular incident, which occurred in front of the palace of the prince of the Peace, became the spark that produced the explosion. A lady coming out of this palace, under the arm of an officer, escorted by a few hussars, of whom the prince composed his guard, was perceived by a band of the life-guards and of inquisitive persons. They recognised, or thought they recognised, mademoiselle Josepha Tudo, who, according to them, was going to get into a carriage. The crowd pressed around her. The prince's hussars having attempted to open a passage, a gun was fired, it is not known by whom. A frightful tumult instantly arose. The life-guards ran to their quarters, saddled their horses, and brandishing their swords, rushed upon the prince's hussars whom they met. The Walloon and Spanish guards also took to their arms, rather for the purpose of joining the mob than of enforcing respect for the royal authority. The people, no longer containing themselves, assembled beneath the windows of the palace, called for the king with loud shouts, insisted on seeing him that they might let him hear the expression of their good wishes, by furiously shouting, "Long live the king!" "Death to the prince of the Peace!" After terrifying him by greeting him with such acclamations, they proceeded to the other side of Aranjuez, towards the residence of the prince of the Peace, which they surrounded on all sides. To force the doors and to rush in appeared at first to this mob which set out in the career of revolutions, an outrage beyond its daring. They paused for a moment, hesitating, but full of impatience, and devouring their prey with their eyes before they seized it. All at once a person, a messenger, it was said, from the palace, appeared at the gate of the prince, to obtain admittance. It was refused him. He insisted. The guards of the house, conceiving that they were attacked, thought of defending themselves. Amidst this agitation, a shot was fired. Hesitation was then at an end. The enraged crowd dashed against the gates, broke them in, penetrated into the magnificent abode of the favourite, ravaged it, flung out of the windows pictures, hangings, sumptuous furniture, destroyed without pillaging, more furious than greedy, as is the case in the movements of every mob, excited but not debased. They ran from apartment to apartment, in quest of the object of the public hatred, but found only the unfortunate wife of the prince of the Peace. The populace in Spain, even the very lowest of it, had at length become acquainted with the whole life of Emmanuel Godoy. They knew how many women he had, which he loved, which he did not love. They

knew the wretchedness of that august princess de Bourbon, unhappily united to a soldier in the guards, to throw on that soldier the royal lustre which he had not. The multitude, on perceiving her, fell at her feet, conducted her respectfully out of the stormed house, placed her in a carriage, and drew her in triumph to the palace of the sovereign. Having set her down in the abode of kings, which she ought never to have been obliged to leave, the mob, thinking that they had not done with the palace of the prince of the Peace, returned thither, searched for the owner himself in every corner of his mansion, and, not finding him, revenged themselves by a frightful devastation. The whole night was spent in searching, ravaging, and when daylight came, the favourite not being discovered, it was supposed that he had sought an asylum elsewhere.

It may be conceived what must have been at this moment the terror of Charles IV. and the despair of the queen. The remembrance of the French revolution had always filled them with horror. That revolution which they had so dreaded they beheld at last at their own door, raising the same cries, committing the same acts, though excited by different sentiments. They were dismayed, appalled, resigned to whatever should befall them. That queen, justly odious, felt nevertheless a true sentiment, which, without rendering her interesting, might, at least to a certain degree, excuse her scandalous life. She thought not in her terror either of her family or of herself, but of the ruler of her soul, the despicable Godoy. She inquired of everybody what had become of him; she despatched trusty servants to learn tidings of him. "Where is Emmanuel?" she exclaimed; "where can he be?" and she hid not the tears wrung from her by such uneasiness. The king himself, when his fear subsided, also inquired what they had done with poor Emmanuel, who, he said, was so attached to him. As for the prince of the Asturias, seeing his enemy pulled down, the crown ready to drop from the head of his father upon his own, and not knowing that he should soon fall to the ground, and be picked up at the point of the sword, he manifested a mean and perfidious joy, which was perceived by his mother, and drew from her the most violent reproaches.

The ministers and several nobles devoted to the king, having hurried to the palace, tumultuously advised his majesty to take from the prince of the Peace all his dignities and employments, as the only means of restoring tranquillity and saving the life of the prince himself. The king, because he was ready for anything, the queen, because she was more anxious to preserve the life than the power of her paramour, immediately assented; and a decree appeared on the morning of the 18th of March, declaring that the king withdrew from Don Emmanuel Godoy his appointments of grand-admiral and generalissimo, and authorised

him to proceed to what place soever he should be pleased to choose for his retreat.

Such was the end of this deplorable favourite, whose strange destiny was, in our times, a last vestige of the vices of the old courts, in contrast with the manners of the age; for, even in dissolute courts, they had come to respect public opinion—deplorable favourite on other accounts than those of scandal; for, with the exception of bloodshed, he had drawn upon Spain all evils at once, shame, disorganisation, ruin, and, in the last instance, popular insurrection. On learning the degradation of Emmanuel Godoy, the people with whom Aranjuez was thronged, and who were composed of several populations, not only of Aranjuez, but of Madrid, of Toledo, of the country of La Mancha, gave themselves up to a furious joy, as though on the morrow they should be the happiest people on earth. In all quarters there were singing, dancing, bonfires: they embraced in the streets, congratulating one another on this downfall, which gratified a still stronger feeling than that of interest—hatred for an insolent fortune which had offended all Spain. The news, carried in two or three hours to Madrid, produced there an absolute delirium.

As soon as this popular movement was known, the ambassador of France, destitute of talents but not of courage, hastened to the king, to cover him with his body if he had been in danger. The disturbance being ended by the fall of the favourite, whose enemy he had become in consequence of the interest that he felt in behalf of the prince of the Asturias, he appeared almost triumphant with the latter. He told Charles IV. that the French troops whose arrival was near at hand (they were at that moment passing the Guadarrama, to descend upon Madrid), would be at his command against all enemies at home and abroad, and he believed that, in giving this assurance, he was fulfilling the instructions of his august master, who would never suffer his friendship to be invoked in vain. Charles IV. thanked M. de Beaumont, and declared that in future he should be happy to treat of business with the ambassador of France, and without any intermediary. Unfortunate King! Fate had not reserved for him so heavy a burden.

The 18th was tranquil; but the multitude, once agitated, had need of new emotions. It wanted something else than a palace to destroy. It would have rejoiced to have the body of Emmanuel Godoy to tear in pieces. Search was everywhere made for him, and the queen trembled lest she should hear every moment of the discovery of his asylum and his death. All the ministers passed the night at the palace near the two sovereigns, whose eyes were not closed for an instant by sleep.

On the morning of the 19th, the popular agitation, calmed a first time by the proclamation of the 16th, and a second time by

the deposition of the favourite, which had been decreed on the 18th, had increased, like a wave which alternately rises and sinks. At the palace, the officers of the guards, finding all authority over their troops slipping out of their hands, had declared that it was not in their power to enforce respect for the royal authority, if it should be attacked. The king and the queen, in deep consternation, had sent for their son Ferdinand, to desire him to shield them by his popularity, and he had promised his good offices, with the secret joy of a conqueror, and the ease of a conspirator, sure of all the springs that he is to set at work; when, all at once, a fresh and violent rumour proved that there was reason to feel apprehensions for the day that was commencing.

The prince of the Peace, so assiduously sought for, had, nevertheless, not quitted his residence. At the moment when the doors of his palace were forced, he had taken a handful of gold and a pair of pistols, and hid himself in the loft under the roof, by rolling himself in a mat, a sort of rush carpet used in Spain. Continuing in this deplorable situation during the whole of the 18th, and during the night between the 18th and 19th, he could endure it no longer than till the morning of the 19th, when, after thirty-six hours' suffering, overcome by thirst, he had quitted his asylum, and found himself face to face with a soldier of the Walloon guards, who was on duty as sentry. Offering this man money, and not daring to add to his offer the threat of using his pistols, all he gained was to get himself denounced, and he was instantly delivered up. Fortunately for him, the mass of the populace was not then near his palace. Some of the life-guards coming up opportunely, placed him between their horses, and proceeded as fast as they could towards the quarters that served them for barracks. They were obliged to pass through all Aranjuez, and the populace, apprised of the circumstance, ran up in the twinkling of an eye. The prince was on foot, between two of the guards on horseback, leaning upon the pommels of their saddles, and defended by them against the attacks of the mob. The other guards, in front and rear, did their best to protect him, but could not prevent the furious rabble from aiming at him dangerous blows with stakes, forks, and all sorts of weapons snatched up in haste. With his feet trampled by the horses, with a large wound in his thigh, with one eye almost out of his head, he arrived at the barracks of the guards, where he was thrown, covered with blood, upon the straw in the stables—melancholy example of the favour of kings, when the popular fury comes to revenge itself in one day for twenty years' unmerited omnipotence! There is nothing in history more lamentable than the spectacle presented at that moment by this life-guardsman, returning, after sharing the royal bed and almost the throne, to the barracks and to the straw on which he had lain in his youth.

The king and the queen, on hearing of this fresh tumult, sent

again for Ferdinand, and besought him to forget his injuries, and to go and rescue the unfortunate Godoy. He promised to save him, and accordingly hastened to the quarters of the life-guards, which an unruly populace threatened to storm, dispersed it by the assurance that the culprit should be tried by the council of Castille, and that justice should be done upon him for all his crimes. At the desire of the heir to the crown, the mob dispersed, Ferdinand went to Godoy, whom he found bathed in blood, and told him, with a feigned generosity, that he forgave and pardoned all the injuries which he had received from him. The sight of an abhorred enemy restored to the prince of the Peace that presence of mind which he had not possessed for a moment since the beginning of the catastrophe. "Art thou king already," said he to Ferdinand, "to grant pardon?"—"No," replied the prince, "I am not; but I shall be soon."

The prince returned to the palace to tranquillise his parents, who were left in a state of tribulation difficult to be described, and ready, in order to save themselves and their dear Emmanuel, to make every possible sacrifice, even that of the throne. "What would they have of us," they exclaimed, "to induce them to spare our unfortunate friend? His dismissal? We have pronounced it. His being put upon his trial? We are going to pronounce it. Would they have the crown? We will lay that down too." A sort of aberration of mind had seized the king and the queen; they knew not what they said, and addressed themselves to every one, soliciting either support or advice. With a view to make them easy about the life of the prince of the Peace, it was proposed to send him under a proper escort to Grenada, using for the purpose the relays with which that road was provided. A carriage drawn by six mules was immediately brought in front of the barracks of the life-guards, that he might be put into it and removed from so dangerous a place of abode as Aranjuez. But no sooner were these preparations perceived, than the populace, surmising for what object they were destined, fell upon the carriage, broke it in pieces, and manifested a determination to prevent any departure.

This new incident completely deranged the heads of the unfortunate Charles IV. and his wife. They both believed that it was the French revolution recommencing its course in Spain; that it was not to the prince of the Peace alone, but to them also, that ill-will was borne; that to place the sceptre in the hands of Ferdinand would perhaps be the best means of dispelling this rising storm, and of saving their lives and that of their unhappy friend. This they said to all those who were around them, to M. de Caballero and M. de Cevallos, to the duke de Castel Franco, commander of the troops assembled in the royal residence, in short, to different persons of the court; and when they made this proposal, all present signified by a sorrowful and approving silence, that this would certainly be the simplest, the safest, the

most applauded solution, the solution most capable of stifling in its birth a revolution as appalling as the commencement of that which brought the head of Louis XVI. to the block. After a few moments of these vague parleys, of this consultation of distracted persons, Charles IV. said that he would abdicate: his ambitious wife replied that he was right; and, without a single voice being raised in contradiction, his ministers offered to draw up the act of abdication.

This act was instantly prepared, and published immediately, amidst a joy which had no parallel. Charles IV. therein declared that, weary of the fatigues of the throne, bowed by the weight of years and infirmities, he resigned to his son Ferdinand the crown which he had worn for twenty years.

The news of this abdication produced a sort of intoxication at Aranjuez. The people thronged to salute the young king, who had so long been the object of their wishes, and loaded him with a thousand benedictions. The court, outstripping the people, had forsaken the old sovereigns, as it forsakes their bodies when they are dead. They were left by themselves, somewhat less uneasy, but deeply dejected at their fall; and those who left them hastened around Ferdinand to assure this new master that it was he, he alone, whom they had had in their hearts for years past, when bowing their heads before his mother and the favourite. Ferdinand, whom Nature had formed for dissimulation, and whom the unhappiness of his youth had further perfected in that odious art, appeared pleased with everybody, and was pleased enough with Fortune to seem so with men. He retained provisionally his father's ministers, whom he could not change immediately, and instantly ordered them, for their first commission, to send for the duke de l'Infantado, exiled to the distance of sixty leagues from Madrid, and the canon Escoiquiz, shut up in the convent of Tardon. He immediately appointed the duke de l'Infantado captain of his guards and president of the council of Castille. Thus, one favour extorted, another favour begot; but this latter was destined to last for a few days only. The formidable Napoleon approached. His troops were at that moment descending from the heights of Somosierra upon Buitrago, and were but one good march from Madrid. Ferdinand's temporary ministers advised him to commence his reign by advances towards the Emperor of the French. The duke del Parque was sent to Murat, to arrange with that prince respecting the entry of the French into Madrid. The dukes de Medina-Celi and de Frias, and count Fernan-Nunez, were sent to Napoleon, who was supposed to be on the way to Spain, to swear friendship to him, and to renew the application for a French princess. This done at the close of this very first day, Ferdinand fell asleep, believing himself to be a king. He was destined to become such, but not till after long years of captivity, and a terrible war.

Thus fell the last Bourbons, to re-appear well or ill, gloriously

or scurvily, a few years later: they fell at Paris as at Aranjuez, as at Naples, beneath the French revolution which drove them before it, like the vengeful Furies pursuing guilty spirits. At Paris, this revolution had struck off the head of one Bourbon. At Naples, it had thrown another into the sea, and obliged him to take refuge in Sicily. At Aranjuez, it forced the last to abdicate, in order to save the life of an ignoble favourite, and made use not of a people smitten with liberty, but of a people smitten with royalty, differing therefore in its modes of acting, like the places into which it penetrated, but always terrible and regenerating, though fortunately less cruel, for it now dethroned without killing kings.

BOOK XXX.

BAYONNE.

DISTURBANCES at Madrid on the news of the events at Aranjuez—Murat hastens his arrival—On approaching Madrid he receives a message from the queen of Etruria—He sends M. de Monthyon to her—The latter finds the royal family in deep affliction and full of regret for having abdicated—Murat, on the return of M. de Monthyon, suggests to Charles IV. the idea of protesting against an abdication which was not free, and defers acknowledging Ferdinand VII.—Entry of the French into Madrid on the 23rd of March—Secret protest of Charles IV.—Ferdinand VII. hastens to Madrid to take possession of the crown—Displeasure of Murat at the entry of Ferdinand—M. de Beaumont advises Ferdinand to go to meet the Emperor of the French—Effect of the news from Spain on the resolutions of Napoleon—New course adopted by him on hearing of the revolution at Aranjuez—He conceives at Paris the same plan as Murat at Madrid, that of not acknowledging Ferdinand, and of making Charles IV. resign the crown to him—Mission of general Savary to Madrid—Return of M. de Tournon to Paris—Momentary doubt which arises in the mind of Napoleon—Singular despatch of the 29th, which contradicts all that he had thought and wished—News from Madrid, arrived on the 30th, induces Napoleon to return to his former projects—He approves of Murat's conduct, and the removal of the whole family of Spain to Bayonne—He sets out for Bordeaux—Murat, with Napoleon's sanction, assists general Savary in the execution of the arranged plan—Ferdinand VII. having brought together at Madrid his confidants, the Due de l'Infantado and the canon Escoiquiz, deliberates on the conduct to be pursued towards the French—Motives which induce him to have an interview with Napoleon—A meeting with general Savary confirms his decision—He resolves on his departure, and leaves his uncle, Don Antonio, at the head of a regency at Madrid—Sentiments of the Spaniards on seeing him depart—The aged sovereigns, on hearing that he is going to Napoleon, wish to follow his example, in order to plead their cause in person—Joy and foolish hopes of Murat on seeing the Spanish princes give themselves up—Spirit of the Spanish people—Their feelings towards our troops—Conduct and position of Murat at Madrid—Ferdinand VII.'s journey from Madrid to Burgos, and from Burgos to Vittoria—His stay at Vittoria—His motives for stopping in that town—Savary leaves him, in order to receive fresh instructions—Establishment of Napoleon at Bayonne—His letter to Ferdinand VII., and orders given concerning him—Ferdinand VII. at length decides on going to

Bayonne—His arrival there—His reception by Napoleon—First mention of what is required of him—Napoleon openly declares his intention to take possession of the crown of Spain, and offers him in compensation that of Etruria—Resistance and illusions of Ferdinand VII.—Napoleon, to put an end to the affair, awaits the arrival of Charles IV., who insisted on coming to Bayonne—Departure of the aged sovereigns—Deliverance of the prince of the Peace—Meeting at Bayonne of all the Spanish princes—Napoleon's reception of Charles IV.—He receives him as king—Ferdinand resumes the rank of prince of the Asturias—Agreement of Napoleon with Charles IV. to insure him a retreat in France on his giving up the crown of Spain—Resistance of Ferdinand VII.—Napoleon is ready to finish by an act of arbitrary power, when the events at Madrid bring matters to the desired conclusion—Insurrection on the 2nd of May at Madrid—Energetic measures taken by Murat—Counter-movement at Bayonne—Emotion of Charles IV. on hearing of the 2nd of May—Violent scene between father, mother, and son—Terror and resignation of Ferdinand VII.—Treaty for the cession of the Spanish crown to Napoleon—Departure of Charles IV. for Compiègne and of Ferdinand VII. for Valençay—Napoleon destines the crown of Spain for Joseph, and that of Naples for Murat—Sorrow and rage of Murat on hearing Napoleon's resolutions—He takes no less trouble to obtain from the Spanish authorities an expression of their wishes in favour of Joseph—Equivocal declaration of the Junta and Council of Castille, expressing a conditional vote for Joseph—Dissatisfaction of Napoleon with Murat—Whilst waiting for Joseph's answer, in order to proclaim the new dynasty, Napoleon attempts to repair the violence used towards Spain, by an extraordinary use of his resources—Monetary aid to Spain—Division of the army, so as to defend the coasts and prevent any resistance—Vast maritime projects—Arrival of Joseph at Bayonne—He is proclaimed king of Spain—Junta convoked at Bayonne—Its deliberations—Spanish Constitution—Acceptance of it, and acknowledgment of Joseph by the Junta—Conclusion of affairs at Bayonne, and departure of Joseph for Madrid, of Napoleon for Paris.

BOOK XXX.

THE fall of the prince of the Peace had already produced a sort of ferocious joy among the people of Madrid. The news of the abdication of Charles IV., and of the accession of Ferdinand VII., crowned it. In the eyes of the multitude no joy is complete without a riot. It was known that the prince of the Peace had stopped at Aranjuez: an assault was made upon his family and upon the persons who enjoyed his confidence. Their houses were ravaged, and their persons pursued; but, thanks to the courage of M. de Beauharnais, not one of them fell into the hands of the mob. Immediately on the abdication of Charles IV., the latter returned to Madrid in time to offer an asylum to the family of Godoy. His mother, the brother of Emmanuel, and his sisters, married to some of the highest nobility in Spain, passed a frightful night under the roofs of their palaces. M. de Beauharnais offered them an asylum in the hotel of the embassy, where they would be protected by the fear inspired by the French arms—for Murat was then only on his march to Madrid. The plundering and burning were continued during the whole of the 20th, which was Sunday, and the mob was not obstructed by any public force. There were two Swiss regiments at Madrid (those of de Preux and Reding); but these foreign soldiers, still worse circumstanced than others in a case of popular agitation, did not dare to show themselves, and took no means of stopping the disorder. A kind of fatigue, the assembling of a few citizens who had taken up arms of their own accord, and a proclamation of Ferdinand's—who did not wish to dishonour his new reign by any gross excesses—put an end to their abominable conduct. Madrid was full of joy at seeing the end of a hateful reign, and the commencement of a new one so ardently desired. In their satisfied minds scarcely did there remain room for disquiet on learning that the French were approaching the capital. After having hoped that they would overthrow the favourite, the Spanish people now flattered themselves that they were about to recognise Ferdinand VII.; and, whatever might be the case, the people, elated at what they had just done, and proud of having themselves conquered the dreaded favourite, assumed an immense confidence in themselves, and seemed no longer to fear any one.

In the simplicity of their joy, they believed only what pleased themselves, and in their eyes the French were nothing more than auxiliaries come to inaugurate the reign of Ferdinand VII. With such a disposition of mind our troops were sure of being well received.

A great part of the troops had already passed the Guadarrama. On the 20th the two first divisions of marshal Moncey's corps were between Cavanillas and Buitrago, and the third at Somo-Sierra. On the same day the first division of general Dupont was at Guadarrama, ready to descend upon the Escorial; the second of the same corps was at Segovia, the third at Valladolid. Thus, Murat was in a condition to enter Madrid, in twenty-four hours, with two divisions of marshal Moncey, one of general Dupont, the whole of the cavalry and the guards; that is, with 30,000 men. But there only remained in that capital two Swiss regiments completely discouraged, and a people without arms. Murat had consequently no resistance to fear.

He was deeply troubled by the disorders in the capital, and was afraid that in Europe the French would be accused of having desired to throw Spain into utter confusion in order to seize upon it more easily. He was also wholly ignorant whether this unforeseen situation was that which Napoleon most desired, and that especially, which would lead most surely to a vacancy on the throne of Spain. Humanity, obedience, and ambition caused a most painful conflict in his mind. In this state of mind he wrote to Napoleon to make him acquainted with what he had just learned, to complain anew of not having been admitted into his secrets, to express the pain which the events in Madrid had caused him, and to announce to him that he was just about to enter that capital, in order, at all costs, to repress the excesses of a barbarous populace. At the same time he put his columns in motion, and advanced to lead marshal Moncey's troops to San-Agostino, and those of general Dupont to the Escorial.

On the next day, the 21st, being in person at El-Molar, he received a courier in disguise, who was the bearer of a letter from the queen of Etruria. That princess, whom he had known in Italy, and to whom he was bound by friendship, appealed to his heart in the name of an august and deeply unfortunate family. She informed him that her aged parents were threatened with the greatest danger, to guard against which they had recourse to his generous protection. She entreated him to come himself, and secretly, to Aranjuez, to witness their deplorable situation, and to devise some means to extricate them from it.

This deeply afflicted young woman, but little versed in the knowledge of business, although she had more talent than her deceased husband, supposed that a commander-in-chief representing Napoleon, and at the head of a French army at the gates of one of the largest capitals in Europe, could secretly withdraw for a day or two from head-quarters, as he may have done perhaps at Florence, in a

time of peace, and when he was more occupied with pleasure than with war or negotiations. Murat replied, with great courtesy, "that he was fully sensible of the misfortunes of the royal family of Spain, but that it was impossible for him to leave his head-quarters where he was detained by imperative duties; but that he would send in his stead M. de Monthyon, one of his officers, a man thoroughly to be relied on, to whom she might say freely all that she would have confided to him."*

M. de Monthyon set out from El-Molar on the 21st, reached Aranjuez on the 22nd, and found the family of the aged sovereigns in the greatest distress. In a fit of fear, Charles IV. and his queen had been led to divest themselves of the supreme authority. The queen, who was the principal author of all the determinations of the court, had been led to this abdication by her desire to save the life of the prince of the Peace, and to release herself and her husband from dangers which she had greatly exaggerated. But when the first moment was past, the silence and solitude succeeding popular tumult, new dangers threatening the prince of the Peace, whose trial had been ordered by Ferdinand VII., she was seized with a double vexation, at seeing herself fallen, and of not knowing the object of her criminal afflictions to be in safety. And as the emotions of her mind were reproduced immediately in the mind of her feeble husband, she had filled him with the same regret and the same vexation. To increase the misfortune, it was just notified to them in the name of Ferdinand VII., that it was necessary for them to go to Badajoz, at the extremity of Estramadura, far from the protection of the French, in order to live there in seclusion, misery perhaps, whilst a hated son reigned, avenged himself, and probably would sacrifice the unfortunate Godoy! With such a prospect in view their fall had become more cruel, and the young queen of Etruria, whom this exile afflicted in proportion to her age, added to all the vexations of the royal family her own despair. Connected with Murat, deriving succour from her relation with him, she had been employed to invoke the protection of the French army.

Such was the situation in which M. de Monthyon found this unfortunate family: he was surrounded, assailed with prayers and the most earnest entreaties by the aged king, the aged queen, and the young queen of Etruria; they related to him the sufferings of the days just past, the violence to which they had been subjected, and that to which perhaps, they were about to be subjected again, the injunction that had been received to set out for Badajoz, and above all, the dangers that threatened Emmanuel Godoy. They

* I make no supposition here. I write after the originals deposited in the Louvre, a small number of which, with very considerable alterations, were published in the *Moniteur*. Murat's correspondence with Napoleon, the most important of all which relates to the affairs of Spain, has never been published. Some fragments of that of M. de Monthyon were inserted in the *Moniteur*, but greatly altered. My narrative follows the autograph originals.

spoke of the latter still more than of the royal family itself; they earnestly begged for him the protection of France, offering to refer all that had happened to the decision of Murat, to make him the arbiter of the destinies of Spain, and finally, to submit to everything which he should order.

M. de Monthyon immediately set out again, to rejoin Murat who, during the 22nd, had drawn nearer to Madrid, in order to enter the city on the 23rd, the day almost indicated beforehand in the instructions of Napoleon. He communicated to him what he had seen and heard in his interview with the aged sovereigns, their bitter regret and their desire to submit the late events in Spain to Napoleon. Murat, on hearing this recital, was seized with a kind of sudden illumination. He was not in the secrets of the policy of which he was the instrument; but he had sometimes supposed that Napoleon wished, by frightening Charles IV., to induce him to flee, and to procure for himself the crown of Spain as well as that of Portugal, by the desertion of their possessors. This plan being defeated by the revolution of Aranjuez, Murat thought it was necessary to make a completely new one, to spring from the circumstances themselves. In consequence, he formed the idea of changing the regret which the old sovereigns exhibited at their fall into a formal protest against the abdication of the 19th; and, after having obtained their signature to such a protest, and having it confided to his hands, to refuse the recognition of Ferdinand VII.; this he was very naturally able to do, for it was impossible to recognise Ferdinand VII., who had come to the throne in such a manner, without first having referred to the authority of Napoleon. The result of this combination would be to leave Spain without a sovereign; for the old king, fallen in fact, would not resume the throne by protesting, and thanks to this protest, the royal authority of Ferdinand VII. would remain in suspense. Between a king who was no longer king, who could no longer be so, and a king who was not so yet, who could never be so, if it was not wished that he should, Spain was about to be without any other master than the general commanding the French army. Fortune thus restored the means which she had taken away by preventing the departure of Charles IV.

Murat's mind, sharpened by ambition, had just found out all that the genius of Napoleon, in the exercise of its deepest cunning, devised some days later, on the news of the recent events. Without losing a moment, and with all the vivacity of his desires, he caused M. de Monthyon to set out again for Aranjuez, giving him orders immediately to revisit the royal family, and, since they declared that they had been constrained, to propose to them to protest against the abdication of the 19th, to protest secretly if they dared not do it publicly, and to enclose this protest in a letter to the Emperor, who would not fail to arrive in a few days in Spain, and who would thus be constituted arbiter of the hateful usurpation committed by the son to the injury of the father.

Murat promised to gain Napoleon's favour for the cause of the old sovereigns, and in the mean time to protect not only them, but the unfortunate Godoy, who had become the prisoner of Ferdinand VII.

M. de Monthyon set out again for Aranjuez, and Murat hastened to write to the Emperor, in order to inform him of what had taken place, and to submit to him the combination which he had devised. Having arrived on the evening of the 22nd at Chamartin, on the very heights which command Madrid, he prepared to make his entry on the next day. He had just received the duke del Parque, the envoy of Ferdinand VII., commissioned to compliment him in the name of the new king of Spain, to offer him entrance into Madrid, provisions and quarters for the army, and an assurance of the friendly intentions of the young court towards France. Murat gave the duke del Parque a very gracious reception, through which however appeared something of that presumption which was natural to him; and, while accepting the assurances of which he was commissioned to be the bearer, expressed to him with sufficient clearness, that the Emperor alone could recognise Ferdinand VII., and legalise, in the name of the rights of nations, the revolutions of Aranjuez. He declared to him, that, whilst awaiting the imperial decision, he could only look upon the new government as a government *de facto*, and give to Ferdinand no other title except that of prince of the Asturias. This kind of relation was accepted, since Napoleon's lieutenant would admit of none other, and everything was arranged for the entry of the French into Madrid on the next day, the 23rd of March, 1808.

The leaders of the new court, though not very wise, nevertheless perceived the necessity of preventing any collision with the French; for their assumption of royalty—the offspring of a mere revolution in the palace—might have been put an end to by a regiment of cavalry. In consequence, they issued orders to the people of Madrid to give a good reception to the French, and posted up a proclamation on the corners of all the streets, in which Ferdinand VII. appealed to those feelings of good-will which ought to influence one towards another nations so long and closely allied. The Spaniards comprehending this policy as well as their young king, and drawn, moreover, by curiosity, were then perfectly well-disposed to run forth to meet Murat, and to lavish their acclamations upon him.

On the morning of the 23d, Murat waited on the heights situated behind Madrid, which are merely the last declivities of the Guadarrama, with a part of his army, which consisted at this moment of the first two divisions of marshal Monecy, the cavalry of the whole corps, and those detachments of the imperial guard which had been sent from Paris to form Napoleon's escort. He made his entry in the middle of the day, at the head of a brilliant staff, and delighted all the Spaniards by his noble mien, and his trusting and gracious smile. The imperial guard made

a singular impression upon the Spaniards; and the cuirassiers, by their great size, their accoutrements, and their discipline, were no less imposing. The infantry of marshal Moncey, however, consisting for the most part of boys badly clothed, and worn out with fatigue, excited more pity than fear, which was unlucky amongst a people whose senses it was more necessary to affect than their reason. Nevertheless the whole of this military spectacle produced a certain effect on the imagination of the Spaniards; and they highly applauded both the French and their chiefs.

By a piece of involuntary negligence, rather than any want of respect, which no one intended to show, the arrangement of a proper lodging for the commander-in-chief of the French army had been omitted. At the gates of Madrid, Murat alighted at the abandoned palace of Buen-Retiro, and occupied the apartments which had been inhabited by the demoiselles Tudo before their departure. He was offended by this want of attention. But he was immediately offered the former dwelling of the prince of the Peace, situated near the magnificent palace of the royal family of Spain. The authorities civil and military, the clergy, and the diplomatic body came to visit him. He received them with grace and dignity almost like a sovereign—although he had no other title than that of commander-in-chief of the French army.

Whilst he was entering Madrid, he was informed that the people were about to bring thither, as a prisoner, loaded with chains, and under the safe conduct of the life-guards, the unfortunate Godoy, whose trial they were eager to have the pleasure of seeing immediately commenced. Murat, both from generosity and calculation, in order to spare the feelings of the former court, now called to become the instrument of new combinations, was resolved not to tolerate any act of cruelty towards the fallen favourite. Fearing lest the presence of Godoy, who was an object of such hatred to the multitude, might provoke a popular tumult, and especially at the moment of the entrance of the French troops, he sent one of his officers with a clear and simple order to put off the removal of the prisoner, and to detain him in a village close to Madrid. This order found and fixed the prince of the Peace in the village of Pinto, where he was detained some days. Murat immediately ordered a detachment of cavalry to proceed to Aranjuez, in order to protect the old sovereigns, to oppose their being removed to Badajoz, and to give them courage to follow his counsels, by giving them security. At the same time he announced, that neither he nor his master would allow the severities which were in preparation against Emmanuel Godoy.

M. de Monthyon had found the family of the old sovereigns still more afflicted than on his first visit, still more alarmed for the fate of the prince of the Peace, still more pained by the solitude in which they were left, still more irritated at the triumph of Ferdinand VII., and, consequently, still more disposed to throw themselves into the arms of France. The idea of a

protest, calculated to lead to the recovery of their power, or to enable them to avenge themselves, and at the same time quite in conformity with facts, could not be otherwise than received with delight. It was so, and immediately thereupon Charles IV. showed himself ready to sign it. The wording, however, which Murat proposed, was not that which seemed quite suitable to the old sovereigns, although they were not difficult to please, and bad judges, in fact, of the suitable phraseology. They were afraid that such a step, if it was known, might place their own lives and that of the favourite in jeopardy. They therefore asked a few hours, in order to consider the form which might appear to be the best, engaging, however, to do as might be desired, and to date the protest from the day which would most properly correspond with the entire freedom of their appeal to the justice of Napoleon. M. de Monthyon was sent back to Murat with all these assurances, and a new appeal to the protection of the French army.

Murat, certain of being able to dispose of the old sovereigns according to his wishes, for the success of plans of which he was the author, resolved to act equally upon Ferdinand VII., in order to induce him not yet to take the crown, not to perform any act of sovereignty to the latest time he could, and especially not to make his solemn entry into Madrid. Murat thought, as long as Ferdinand VII. should not be king, and Charles IV. not being really so, things would go better in the sense of his own hopes. He desired, moreover, to obtain another determination from Ferdinand VII., which appeared to him urgent. When the notion of a journey to Andalusia was in contemplation, the prince of the Peace had given orders to the Spanish troops to repossess the frontiers of Portugal, Taranco's division to go to Old Castille, and Solano's to Estramadura. The latter, having already reached Talavera, was approaching Madrid, and might occasion a collision, which was contrary to Murat's views, who understood very well that the affairs of Spain were to be managed by address, and not by force. In order, however, to make the Spanish troops retrace their steps, it was necessary to procure an order from Ferdinand himself.

For this purpose, Murat sent for M. de Beauharnais, whom he very much distrusted, because he knew that the latter was attached to Ferdinand VII., and to whom he imputed a greater degree of *finesse* than this honourable though unskillful ambassador was capable of employing in any political plot. He persuaded him to go immediately to Aranjuez, and, by using his influence over Ferdinand VII., to obtain from him the decision which the circumstances required. Murat began by frightening him with respect to the manner in which he had so completely misunderstood the intentions of Napoleon, by contributing to prevent the journey to Andalusia (right or wrong, this was, in fact, imputed to M. de Beauharnais). In order to disquiet him

still more, Murat affirmed to him what he really did not know, that Napoleon would have wished a renewal of the scenes of Lisbon. He then suggested to him, as a certain means of repairing his fault, the idea of betaking himself immediately to Aranjuez, in order to obtain a command from Ferdinand VII. to make the Spanish troops retrace their steps, and not come to Madrid; and, moreover, that he should leave the question of his sovereignty in suspense, till Napoleon's decision. M. de Beauharnais, yielding to his advice, set out the same hour for Aranjuez, in order to accomplish, if not the whole, at least a part of what Murat desired.

Having reached the presence of Ferdinand, he first asked, with his usual positiveness, for an order for sending back the Spanish troops into their former positions. Ferdinand had not yet by his side his two chief advisers, the canon Escoiquiz and the duc de l'Infantado, who had been in exile too far from Madrid to have had time to return. He had retained some of his father's ministers, especially MM. de Cevallos and de Caballero, and after having consulted them, he caused orders to be sent to general Taranco and to the marquis of Solano in particular, to return by Toledo and Talavera to Badajoz. M. de Beauharnais, having discharged the first part of his commission, whether he did not understand Murat's intentions with regard to the second, or did not wish to conform to them, applied himself to persuading Ferdinand that it was necessary for him, at all costs, to secure the good-will of Napoleon, and for that purpose to hasten to meet him, and to throw himself into his arms, asking for his friendship, his protection, and a wife; that the sooner he took such a step, the sooner he would be certain of reigning; that the best thing would be to set out immediately from Aranjuez on such a journey; that he would not have to proceed very far, for he would find Napoleon on the way; and, finally, that he ought only to come to Madrid in order to pass through it as quickly as possible, to proceed to Burgos or to Vittoria.

All this was done in good faith on the part of M. de Beauharnais, who entertained no doubt that he should contribute on his part, as Murat on his, to the invention of an intrigue to which Ferdinand would speedily succumb. Ferdinand VII. did not reject the advice, but he deferred his decision till the arrival of his two confidential advisers, without whom he did not wish to undertake anything so serious. He adopted as much of the advice of M. de Beauharnais as suited his present convenience, that was, immediately to quit Aranjuez and to go to Madrid; and he announced his solemn entry into the capital for the 24th, the next day.

M. de Beauharnais, having returned to Madrid, ingenuously related to Murat all he had said and done. The latter thought he perceived in his conduct a perfidious calculation, in order to lead Ferdinand to enter Madrid immediately, and to take possession of

his crown a little earlier than he would otherwise have done. Without loss of time he denounced him to the Emperor as a secret accomplice of Ferdinand VII., as an active agent in the revolution which had hurled the old king from his throne, and as a dangerous ambassador, who favoured the cause of the new sovereignty, the only one which there was any reason to fear. These accusations, dictated by the jealous ambition of Murat, were, however, unfounded, or at least greatly exaggerated. M. de Beauharnais had been from the first warmly attached to Ferdinand, because he appeared to him the only person in the court deserving the least interest; this attachment had perhaps become warmer since the time in which the question had been raised of his marrying a lady of the Beauharnais family, but he sincerely believed that a close union with Ferdinand VII. was the very best solution of the difficulty for France; and by urging this prince to take the road to France, he was desirous of leading him not to Madrid, but to the feet of Napoleon, in order to insure that result which he thought the best. And, moreover, he was neither sufficiently active nor sufficiently able to have taken any part whatever in the late revolution, which he had only appeased by bringing to the old sovereign at the moment of danger the assistance of his unskilfulness and of his courage.

Those who directed the affairs of the new sovereignty had everything arranged for the entry of Ferdinand VII. into Madrid. Although they were ignorant of the designs of Napoleon, they said to themselves, that Ferdinand's sovereignty, being the youngest and most vigorous, ought to be the least agreeable to the French, if they had any evil intentions with regard to the crown of Spain. For this reason, they considered it as a pressing matter, that he should enter Madrid and receive from the people of the capital their acclamations, which would be a kind of national consecration. Murat having entered on the 23d, it was in their opinion too much to be behind even a day. Accordingly, it was announced that the new court would remove from Aranjuez to Madrid on the 24th, without any other pageantry except a few guards and the popular enthusiasm.

Accordingly, on the 24th, Ferdinand, having set out early from Aranjuez, alighted from his carriage at one of the gates of the city, that of Atocha, mounted his horse, and, surrounded by the officers of his court, traversed the beautiful promenade of the Prado, and entered the interior of Madrid by the wide street of Alcalá, in the midst of an immense multitude, who, after having long yearned for the termination of the old reign and the commencement of the new, at length saw their hopes realised, and sought in some measure by the vigour of their shouts to drive away the thoughts of the dangers which threatened Spain. The whole population, intoxicated with joy, were at the windows or in the streets. The women scattered flowers from the tops of the houses. The men threw themselves down before the young king

and spread their cloaks under his horse's feet. Others, brandishing their pogniards, swore to die for his cause, for the danger made itself confusedly felt in their ardent minds. That crafty and malicious prince, so little worthy of being loved, was at that moment surrounded by as much love as was shown for Titus by the Romans, or by the French for Henry IV. He constituted the delight of Spain, who had no idea what was to befall him—no doubt at all of his future—him or herself!

Ferdinand VII., having reached the palace, there received the public authorities. During the day the diplomatic body came to pay their respects to him, as if he were an undisputed king, although not recognised by all the men of Spain. M. de Beaucharnais, kept back by Murat, did not appear; his absence greatly alarmed the new court, and embarrassed the members of the diplomatic body itself, who had given way to their secret feelings by signifying so quickly their adherence to the sovereignty of the Bourbons. The ministers of weak and dependent courts excused themselves. The representative of Russia also sent his excuse, but less humbly; he alleged diplomatic usages, which are invariable, and by virtue of which addresses of ceremony are presented to every new king, without at all prejudging the question of his definitive recognition.

Murat received these explanations of a course of conduct which displeased him with ill-concealed dissatisfaction, because he already looked upon Ferdinand as a rival for the crown of Spain; and when it was proposed to him to go and pay a visit to him, he refused, absolutely declaring that in his eyes Charles IV. was still king of Spain, and Ferdinand prince of the Asturias, till Napoleon had pronounced his decision on this melancholy conflict. On the evening of the 21st, as we have said, he had written from El-Molar an account of all that had taken place to Napoleon; he had communicated to him his own plan, which consisted in making Charles IV. protest, and in not recognising Ferdinand VII., in order that Spain might find herself in the condition of being between a king who was no longer so, and a prince who had not yet become one. On the 22d and 23d, occupied with his march and his entry into Madrid, he was not able to write. On the 24th he wrote an account of what had taken place in the two days preceding, and, continuing to be inspired by the events, he added a new idea to his plan—an idea with which M. de Beaucharnais had innocently furnished him, and of which he was about to make a treacherous use, that of sending Ferdinand to meet Napoleon, in order that the latter might make himself master of his person, and then do with him what he pleased. There would then be no other person to deal with except Charles IV., from whom it would be easy to snatch the sceptre, incapable as he was of holding it in his weak hands, and Spain herself not being disposed to leave it there.

Whilst these events were occurring in Spain, Napoleon had

been successively apprised of them five or six days after their occurrence—for such was the time then necessary for a communication between Madrid and Paris. From the 24th till the 27th, he was made acquainted with the rising at Aranjuez, then with the overthrow of the favourite, and finally, with the forced abdication of Charles IV. This solution, the most unexpected of all, although not the least natural, surprised without disconcerting him. The desired departure of the reigning family, which would have rendered the crown of Spain vacant, not having been effected, the first plan proved nothing more than an abortive combination. Napoleon, however, saw in these very events a new means of arriving at his end, and that means was in complete accordance with what the circumstances had suggested to Murat. Long before the letters in which the latter put forward his ideas had arrived in Paris, Napoleon had thought of not recognising Ferdinand VII., whose young sovereignty, eagerly desired by the Spaniards, it would be difficult to destroy, and to consider Charles IV. still as king, whose old sovereignty, worn-out and hateful to the Spaniards, it would be easy to overturn. Besides, under the form of arbitration between the father and the son, it would be easy to give an advantage to the cause of the father, who would not fail soon after to cede the crown of Spain to Napoleon, under the influence of the queen's advice and that of the prince of the Peace, who would wish, above all things, to be avenged on Ferdinand VII. If, moreover, under pretext of this arbitration, Ferdinand VII. could be brought to go and meet Napoleon, it would then be easy to become master of his person, and the difficulty would be greatly simplified, for he would have nothing more before him than the old dethroned sovereigns, convenient instruments in hands which could secure that repose which in their old age they required, and the vengeance for which their malicious hearts were greedy. The sceptre might be left for some time in their hands, and then they could be prevailed upon to surrender it in return for a quiet and opulent retirement,—or even, perhaps, to carry them off at the same time, by taking advantage of the fear with which a nascent revolution inspired them, and of the aversion felt for them by a people disgusted with their vices.

It was thus Napoleon, by being drawn on into this way of conquering a foreign throne without employing war, proceeding from one act of cunning to another, became daily more guilty. Some have laid all this to the account of his natural perfidiousness, and others to the imprudence of Murat, who had involved him in it against his own will. The truth, however, is as we have stated it here. Both, inspired by ambition and guided by circumstance, concurred according to their position in this dark work; and as to the project of not recognising the son and of using the instrumentality of the angry father against the rebellious son, it sprung up at the same time, both in Paris and Madrid, in the heads of Napoleon and Murat on the consideration of the

events themselves; for the conditions being such as they have been related, did not admit of any other mode of action.*

Napoleon instantly summoned the attendance of general Savary, already employed in missions of the greatest magnitude, and who, at that time had just returned from St. Petersburg, where, as has been seen, he had given abundant proofs of suppleness as well as of firmness. Napoleon opened to him the whole of his thoughts respecting Spain, his desire of regenerating the country and of binding it to France by a change of dynasty; the difficulties which surrounded the enterprise, alternately opposed or promoted by events; the new phase presented by the revolution of Aranjuez; and, finally, the possibility of conducting it to the desired end, by making use of Charles IV. against Ferdinand VII. Napoleon expressed to general Savary his intention of not recognising the son—of affecting a religious regard for the authority of the father—of maintaining this authority as long as might be necessary to secure the crown, and of making him yield it up immediately, or at a later period, according to circumstances—to draw Ferdinand VII. away from Madrid, to lead him to Burgos or Bayonne—finally, to make sure of his person, and to obtain from him the cession of his rights by means of an indemnity in Italy, such as Etruria, for example. Napoleon enjoined Savary to act with discretion, to allure Ferdinand to Bayonne, with the hope of seeing the dispute decided in his favour; but, if he should prove obstinate, boldly to publish the protest of Charles IV., to declare that he alone was king of Spain, and to treat Ferdinand VII. as a son, and as a subject, like a rebel. The least violent means were always to be preferred.† Napoleon wished

* What is here stated is proved by the letters of both Murat and Napoleon, by their contents and their dates.

† It has been denied that general Savary ever received, or Napoleon ever gave, this commission. It has been attempted to show that the deplorable events of Bayonne sprang by chance, from the concurrence of events; that the royal family of Spain, father, mother, son, brother, and uncles, had all been drawn by a sort of involuntary allurements to throw themselves into the hands of Napoleon, who, when he found them all united, was not able to resist the temptation of seizing upon them. I do not know that Napoleon would be more excusable even on this hypothesis. But however that may be, the proofs exist, and leave no room for doubt. For myself, who have no desire to tarnish the glory of Napoleon, I will speak the truth here, as I have done in the case of the duc d'Enghien, under the responsibility which always rests upon an historian, of stating facts precisely as they took place. I have given before the thoughts of Napoleon with respect to the invasion of Spain; here I relate with accuracy, on the authority of unquestionable documents—the autograph letters contained in the Louvre—the succession of his ideas with respect to the meeting at Bayonne. On the authority of this correspondence, there cannot be a doubt that general Savary received the commission which I have attributed to him. As soon, in fact, as he arrives, he writes to the Emperor, "*I have stated your intentions to prince Murat.*" Prince Murat replies to the Emperor, "*Now that I know your views, everything shall be done according to your desire.*" Then Murat from day to day gives an account of everything which is done by him to induce the son to go to Bayonne; then the father, the brothers, and all the princes, referring always to the plans of Napoleon, transmitted by general Savary, and other agents sent afterwards. Napoleon's letters, besides, contain his approval of all

general Savary immediately to proceed to Madrid, to go and tell Murat a secret which had been concealed from him till that moment, which he had indeed obtained a glimpse of, but which it was necessary to communicate to him by a confidential man, who should be capable of guiding him in this tortuous course, in which the slightest false step might prove fatal. General Savary immediately set out in order to execute completely and without reserve the wishes of Napoleon.

There took place, however, in the mind of Napoleon, one of those sudden changes, which astonish those who are unacquainted with the nature of the human mind, and which men hasten to call inconsistencies, when met with in the conduct of men of less acknowledged superiority than those on whose history I am now engaged. Although a sort of fatal inclination drew him towards the usurpation of the crown of Spain, he never concealed from himself any of the inconveniences attached to this deplorable undertaking. He anticipated the blame that would be thrown upon him by public opinion, the indignation of the Spaniards, their obstinate resistance, and their advantage which might be taken of that resistance by England; he foresaw all these inconveniences with astonishing clearness; and yet, blinded not by the difficulties, but with regard to his immense power to conquer them, drawn by the passion of founding a new order in Europe, he proceeded towards his object, troubled however, from time to time, by the sudden though fleeting apparition of the most sinister images. An incident, ill-understood even at this day, caused one of those accidental changes to spring up in his mind, and led him to give orders the very reverse of those he had despatched before—orders which certain badly-informed historians have brought forward, as a proof that, in the affairs of Spain he had no wish to do what was done, and that he had been more guilty and further involved than he wished by the imprudent ambition of Murat.

Among the agents of Napoleon travelling in Spain, there was one in whom he had a well-placed confidence: this was de Tournon, his chamberlain, a man of cool mind, little inclined to illusions, and sufficiently devoted to his master to tell him the truth. He was one of those persons whom Napoleon was well pleased to send on any mission apparently indifferent, such as that of delivering a letter of congratulation or condolence; because, as he travelled, he observed much, observed well, and reported faithfully what he had observed. M. de Tournon, during the last six months, had taken several journeys to Spain as the bearer of

these acts, at first in covert phrases, then in plain language—so plain as to direct marshal Bessières to arrest Ferdinand VII., if the latter should refuse to proceed to Bayonne. Thus, the determination of Napoleon to cause the Spanish princes to be allured to Bayonne cannot be denied, any more than that the commission of conducting them thither was given to general Savary.

letters from Napoleon to Charles IV. He had formed his opinion of the Peninsula, and of what was going on there, with a sagacity which events too well justified. Thus, for example, he had clearly seen that the old court was reaching the term of its dominion; that a new court was in preparation already adored by the Spaniards; that it was necessary to try to attach it to France, by the need which it had of French protection; to be very careful of taking away the crown of Spain either by force or stratagem, inasmuch as a fanatical people would make a desperate resistance, and the advantages which might be gathered from such a conquest would not be worth the efforts necessary to effect it. M. de Tournon had very clearly seen all this, and was not afraid to say so in his numerous journeys in the presence both of Murat and his officers, all eager for bold enterprises, entertaining a profound contempt for the Spaniards, and not believing for a moment that they could resist our arms, before which the best soldiers in Europe had given way. M. de Tournon, during his sojourn in Madrid, having seen the preludes to the revolution of Aranjuez, and the popular enthusiasm in favour of the young king, still remained convinced that it would be folly to seize upon Spain, either by circuitous means or open force, and that it would be a hundred times better to make an ally of Ferdinand VII., who would be still more submissive than Charles IV., because the prince of the Peace and the old queen would no longer be at his side to subject his submissiveness to the fluctuation of their caprices or resentments. Napoleon had given orders to M. de Tournon to be at Burgos on the 15th of March, proposing to arrive there himself at the same time, and being anxious to collect from the mouth of a man, in whom he could confide, the details of all that might have taken place. M. de Tournon, on his way to Burgos, being obliged to pass through the head quarters of Murat, neither concealed from him nor his officers the fear with which the enterprise in which they were engaged inspired him, exposed himself to all their raillery (Murat in particular found fault with him), and went to Burgos on the 15th, as he had been ordered. From Burgos he wrote to Napoleon, in order humbly to entreat him, but with the earnestness of an honest man, not to take any further definite part before having seen Spain with his own eyes, above all not to found his determination on the information forwarded to him by brave but heedless soldiers, who thought of nothing but battles and crowns; that it would be found they had made cruel miscalculations respecting Spain, and disregarded what perhaps might turn out dreadful evils. He waited at Burgos till the 24th, and not finding Napoleon arrive, he set out for Paris, which, with the greatest expedition, he could not reach till the 29th, in consequence of the state of the roads and of the relays of horses, both worn out by the excessive use at that time made of them.

Murat, occupied as he had been with his entrance into Madrid, wrote no despatches on the 22nd and 23rd, and Napoleon was without news on the 28th and 29th. He was very uneasy as to what might have happened in Spain, and in this state of extreme anxiety he was led for a moment to look at things in a less favourable point of view. The unexpected arrival of an eye-witness who was wise and well-informed, and with a full conviction and entire disinterestedness contradicted the interested accounts given by military men, the arrival of such a witness produced in Napoleon's mind a sudden, and, unhappily, too short a change of resolutions, for it lasted scarcely twenty-four hours. Napoleon shared all the anxieties of M. de Tournon at the idea of the French entering Madrid at the very moment of a political revolution, mixing with their natural forwardness in the strife of the factions which divided Spain, coming into collision with the Spaniards and involving him in immense difficulties, perhaps in a war of extermination with a fierce people, passionately attached to their independence. He immediately wrote to Murat that M. de Tournon was just about to set out, and to bring him new orders; that he was proceeding too quickly, and was in too great a hurry to appear under the walls of Madrid (yet Murat was rather behind than in advance of the period determined upon by Napoleon for his entrance into the capital); that he was not only proceeding too quickly in directing his *corps d'armée* upon Madrid, but that he directed general Dupont too soon to go beyond the Guadarrama; that as soon as he had been informed of the return of the Spanish troops under general Tarengo towards Old Castillo, he ought not to have weakened the garrisons of Segovia and Valladolid; that it was necessary to beware of mixing himself up with the Spaniards, of taking any part in their divisions, and especially of coming into collision with them, for every war of this description was ruinous; that it was a mistake to suppose the Spaniards to be little to be feared because they were disarmed; that independently of their natural fierceness, they would have all the energy of a new people, whom political passions had not exhausted; that the army, though scarcely amounting to 100,000 men, and incapable of resisting the weakest French force, would separate, in order to go into every province, and to serve as the *kernel for continual insurrection*; that the priests, monks, and nobles, knowing well that they could only come to reform the old social condition of Spain, would use all their influence to stir up a fanatical people against them; that England would not fail to take advantage of the circumstances to involve us in immense difficulties, and create for us new embarrassments; that it was therefore necessary to do nothing hastily, and to maintain the greatest possible reserve between the father and the son; that with regard to the father, it was impossible to suffer him to reign longer, because the government of the queen and the favourite had become intole-

nable to the Spaniards; that with respect to the son, he was in reality an enemy of France, for he shared in the highest degree in all the Spanish prejudices, and that the aversion which he was supposed to entertain for his father's policy—a policy of concessions towards France—constituted some part of the popularity which he enjoyed; that experience had proved how little influence marriages exercised in changing the policy of princes; that Ferdinand would then before long be the declared enemy of the French; that, nevertheless, it was necessary not to break with him, for, mean as he was, *our opposition would make him a hero*; that, between the impossibility of allowing the father to reign and of putting confidence in the son, it was necessary not to be hasty in choosing; above all, to give no one reason to divine the course we were likely to adopt, which was the more easily done, as he (Napoleon) *did not yet know it himself*; that it was necessary to give hopes of the possibility of a kind and disinterested arbitration, and that as to an interview with Ferdinand VII., that should not be thought of, except in case France should be decidedly obliged to acknowledge him; that, in a word, prudence advised to do nothing hastily—nothing precipitately; that prince Murat should especially guard against the suggestions of his personal interests; that Napoleon would think for him, provided he did not think for himself; that the crown of Portugal would always be at his disposal to reward the services of the most faithful of his lieutenants—of him, who, to all his own merits, added the advantage of being his sister's husband.

Such was the wise counsel which Napoleon, under the influence and by the instrumentality of M. de Tournon, was about to address to his lieutenant, when, after having been two days without news, he received Murat's letters of the 24th, in which the latter informed him of his peaceable entrance into Madrid, the excellent reception which had been given him, the inclination of the old sovereigns to throw themselves into his arms, their eagerness to protest against the abdication of the 19th,—the facility, in fine, of rendering the throne vacant by refusing to recognise Ferdinand VII., and thus placing Spain between a king who had abdicated and one who was not acknowledged. Napoleon then finding all the means again in his hands in which he had ceased to believe for a moment, returned to the plan suggested to Murat and himself by the revolution of Aranjuez, and confirmed the orders which had been just confided to general Savary before the arrival of M. de Tournon. In consequence of this, Napoleon, in a fresh letter, dated on the 30th, wrote to Murat that he approved of the whole of his conduct, and that he had done well by entering Madrid; that it was, however, necessary to continue to avoid every kind of collision, especially to guard against any mischief being done to the prince of the Peace, even to send him to Bayonne, if he could; carefully to protect the old sove-

reigns, to bring them from Aranjuez to the Escorial, where they would be in the midst of the French army; to beware of acknowledging Ferdinand VII., and finally, to wait for the arrival of the French court at Bayonne, whither it was about immediately to proceed. Napoleon caused M. de Tournon to set out immediately, without putting into his hands the cautious letter of which we have just given an analysis,* but without having been able to conceal either the slight disapprobation which he had felt regarding the conduct of Murat, or the apprehension which the possible consequences of this Spanish affair excited in his mind. He sent him back without the letter, with the mission to continue to observe everything, and to prepare apartments for him at Madrid. Napoleon himself took his departure on the 2nd of April for Bordeaux, where he wished to remain some days, in order to receive further letters from Murat, and to give to all those who were to be conducted to Bayonne, compulsorily or voluntarily, time to be brought or to repair thither. He left M. de Talleyrand at Paris, to engage the attention and satisfy the demands of the representatives of European diplomacy, who would require to be re-assured or satisfied on the arrival of every courier who should arrive from Madrid. M. de Tolstoy claimed this care and attention more than any of the rest. Napoleon took with him the docile and faithful M. de Champagny, from whom he had no great objections to fear, and even preceded his household, so eager was he to get nearer to the theatre of events. Expecting to remain for a considerable time on the frontiers of Spain, and to receive there many princes and princesses, he gave directions for the empress to come and join him there in a few days. He arrived at Bordeaux on the 4th of April, very impatient to receive news of Murat.

The events at Madrid, which had stagnated for a moment, whilst Murat was waiting for orders from Paris, and Ferdinand VII. was expecting his two principal confidential advisers, canon Escoiquiz and the duke de l'Infantedo, soon resumed their course. Murat, even while yielding to the impulse of his usual boldness, could not avoid feeling occasional anxiety with regard to his conduct, and asking himself whether he had well or ill comprehended the Emperor's intentions. He was therefore delighted on receiving the letter of the 30th, and in spite of the momentary blame, the secret of which M. de Tournon had divulged in Madrid, he only persevered with the greater zeal and

* The letter, of which the analysis is here given will be found given word for word, and its authenticity discussed, in a special note placed at the end of the volume, in order not to interrupt the course of the narrative. In this note I have been desirous of discussing the principal points of the Spanish affairs, and of establishing the foundations on which my historical assertions rest. The letter in question called for special attention in consequence of its importance, and I think I have succeeded in proving and explaining its existence, which I was at first disposed to doubt.

cunning in the plan, so little worthy of his honour, which he had invented as quickly as his master. General Savary had just arrived, as the bearer of the Emperor's secret wishes, which were in such sad harmony with those of Murat, and he had no more hesitation as to the course to be pursued. The plan indicated by events appeared to Murat to be, not to acknowledge Ferdinand VII., to induce him, if possible, to meet the Emperor, if he resisted to avail himself of the protest of Charles IV., in order to declare the latter the only king of Spain, and Ferdinand VII. a rebellious son and usurper; to rescue the prince of the Peace from the hands of his executioners, both from humanity and politic calculation, for he was about to become, in existing circumstances, a very useful instrument; this plan, too, was agreeable to the commands of Napoleon, who was on his way to Bayonne. Murat and general Savary came to an understanding as to the manner in which this difficult plot was to be brought to a successful issue. They had a very convenient auxiliary in M. de Beauharnais; and the more convenient, as he was convinced, in his blind confidence, that Ferdinand VII. could do nothing better than hasten to meet Napoleon, and to throw himself into his arms or at his feet in order to obtain the recognition of his new title, the confirmation of all that had taken place at Aranjuez, and the hand of a French princess. M. de Beauharnais daily advised Ferdinand to adopt this course, as the latter, who was most eager to receive permission from Napoleon to reign, but dared not yet take any steps in the absence of his favourites, promised to follow the advice of the French ambassador as soon as he should have collected around him in Madrid those in whom he placed his confidence. He had already removed from his ministry those who were regarded as being the most devoted to the prince of the Peace, or towards whom he felt no inclination. The administration of the war department had been committed to M. O'Farrell, an officer of distinction, who had formerly commanded the Spanish troops in Tuscany; the finances to M. d'Azanza, a highly respected former minister; the department of justice to Don Sebastian Pinuela, who had obtained great reputation in the administration of the laws. He had removed M. de Caballero, who alone, in late times, had made any opposition to the prince of the Peace, but who was accused of playing no very respectable character in the prosecution of the suit of the Escorial; and he had retained in the office of foreign affairs M. de Cevallos, the humble servant on all occasions of the prince of the Peace, and especially in the great question of the journey to Andalusia. Cevallos pretended at this time to be the most faithful friend of the new court, which had in its eyes a most excellent title; his detestation of the French, whom, however, he was ready to serve as soon as their arms were triumphant.

The duke de l'Infantado having at length arrived, Ferdinand

VII., as we have said, appointed him governor of the council of Castille and commandant of his military house. He had also the satisfaction of again seeing and embracing his preceptor, whom he had most unworthily given up in the suit of the Escorial, but whom he loved from habit, and to whom he was accustomed to open his heart, which he did to very few. He wished to lead him with dignities and to make him grand inquisitor, which canon Escoïquiz, with a feigned disinterestedness, declined, imitating in this respect the conduct of cardinal de Fleury, and desiring nothing more than to be the preceptor of his royal pupil, but in reality under this title aspiring to be governor of Spain and the Indies. He only accepted the title of councillor of state and the *cordón* of Charles III. just as if to afford his king the pleasure of giving him something. It was with the help of these different persons, and by forming a more secret council with the duke de l'Infantado and canon Escoïquiz, in which the most important decisions were to be made, and those grand questions to be solved, on which his own fate and that of his monarchy depended.

The questions which Ferdinand had to resolve may all be comprised in a single one: should he go to meet Napoleon in order to obtain his good-will, an acknowledgment of his new title and the hand of a French princess? Or should he rather proudly await in Madrid, surrounded by the fidelity and enthusiasm of the nation, what the French would dare to attempt against the dynasty? Even before resolving this grave question, various acts of obsequiousness towards Napoleon had been performed. After having sent three grandees of the court, count Fernand Nievez, the duke of Medina Celi, and the duke of Frias, the infant Don Carlos was despatched to meet him—to go as far as Burgos, Vittoria, Irun, and, if necessary, even to Bayonne. This first mark of respect being shown to Napoleon, it remained to know what concessions must be made to insure his favour in case he should assume the duty of acting as arbiter between father and son. Several days were occupied in deliberating on this difficult subject.

First of all, it would have been necessary to know what were Napoleon's intentions with regard to Spain, when he had added to the 30,000 men, sent to Lisbon another army estimated at not less than 80,000, whose march by Bayonne and Perpignan, by Castille and Catalonia, clearly indicated some very different object from Portugal. But Ferdinand's councillors, both those whom he had recently introduced into the ministry and those who had formed a part of it in the time of the prince of the Peace, were absolutely ignorant of the diplomatic relations with France. M. de Cevallos, the minister of foreign affairs, had never been initiated into any of the negotiations carried on in Paris by M. Yzquierdo. The prince of the Peace and the queen alone were acquainted with them, and Charles IV. knew nothing more than

they thought fit to tell him. Besides, these negotiations themselves, as M. Yzquierdo sagaciously asserted, were perhaps nothing more than a lure, to conceal under a feigned dispute the secret designs of Napoleon.

Thus Ferdinand's councillors, new as well as old, knew nothing of what the prince of the Peace was acquainted with, and he himself only knew what M. Yzquierdo had rather guessed than ascertained. Whilst these deliberations were being carried on, a despatch from Yzquierdo arrived in Madrid, addressed to the prince of the Peace, and written from Paris on the 24th, before anything was known of the revolution of Aranjuez. In this despatch Yzquierdo gave the details of the pretended negotiation going on between the cabinets of Madrid and Paris. It appeared, according to the language of this negotiation, that Napoleon required a perpetual treaty of alliance between the two countries, the opening of the Spanish colonies to the French, and finally, in order to avoid difficulties, the free passage of the troops destined for the protection of Portugal, and the exchange of that kingdom for the provinces on the Ebro situated at the foot of the Pyrenees, such as Navarre, Arragon, and Catalonia. On these conditions, Yzquierdo informed the prince, the emperor Napoleon would grant the king of Spain the title of emperor of the Americas, would acknowledge Ferdinand VII. as heir presumptive to the crown of Spain, and give him a French princess in marriage. He had, as he said, earnestly contended against these conditions, and especially against that which related to the cession of the provinces on the Ebro, but without success. He did not add, because he had already stated it personally in his short journey to Madrid, that Napoleon had a very different object in view, and aimed at taking away the crown itself. In other respects, the contents of this despatch were perfectly correct, for M. de Talleyrand, on his part, had made a similar report to the Emperor, offering, if he desired, to come to a conclusion with the court of Spain on these conditions.

When Ferdinand's councillors received M. Yzquierdo's despatch, which was not intended for them, in their ignorance of men and business they thought themselves thoroughly masters of the secret of Napoleon's policy. They thought that, in reality, there were no other questions between the governments of France and Spain than those mentioned in the despatch of Yzquierdo, and that Napoleon had no idea whatever of seizing upon the crown of Spain. They reasoned as follows:—First, that Napoleon would not dare to brave the power of Spain by making an attempt upon the crown; as true Spaniards, they could not entertain this idea. That he had any desire to do so, they thought still less admissible. Had he not, after the battles of Austerlitz and Jena, left their thrones to the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia? He had up till this time dethroned only the Bourbons

of Naples, who had drawn down this severe treatment upon themselves by unpardonable treachery. But the court of Spain had done nothing to deserve a similar fate, since it had, on the contrary, lavished all its resources in the service of France. The only questions to be decided, therefore, according to Ferdinand's councillors, were, whether they should exchange a few provinces for the kingdom of Portugal, consent to open the Spanish Indies to the French, and agree to an alliance which already existed in justice and in fact, and which, after all, was for the true interests of both countries. The only nice point was the sacrifice of the provinces on the Ebro, a sacrifice which the nation would most unwillingly make, and which might prove very injurious to the popularity of the young king. On this point, however, the language of Yzquierdo conveyed nothing absolute. It was, so to speak, in exchange for a military road to Portugal that the French cabinet appeared desirous of obtaining the provinces on the Ebro. But if they preferred supporting the bondage of this military road, then they might dispense with the cession of the provinces asked, and escape with the inconvenient but temporary passage of the French troops; for as soon as Napoleon should have a new war in the north (which could not fail to happen) he would be forced to evacuate Portugal, and Spain would be freed from the presence of his troops.

Such was their manner of interpreting Yzquierdo's despatch. Ferdinand's councillors said to themselves that the worst which could happen from a direct negotiation with Napoleon would be the being obliged to make some concessions with regard to the colonies; stipulate anew an alliance which had not ceased to exist, and to concede a military route to Portugal; and that, in return, the acknowledgment of the title of the new king would be certainly obtained. It was this last consideration which exercised the greatest influence on the minds of those ignorant advisers and of their ignorant master, and which caused all others to be regarded as of no importance. Although it never entered their minds that the recognition of Ferdinand VII. might be refused, certain symptoms had given them some uneasiness on this subject. The attentions shown by Murat to the old sovereigns, the eagerness to protect them by a detachment of French cavalry, the declaration that no act of violence would be allowed against the prince of the Peace, some proposals which had come from Aranjuez, when the old court consoled itself by boasting of the protection of its powerful friend Napoleon, all these circumstances excited some apprehensions in the minds of Ferdinand and his little court of some decided change of policy in favour of Charles IV., a change brought about by the intervention of France. Although M. de Beaucharnais had given them reason to hope for the good-will of Napoleon without promising it, they had obtained nothing from the ambassadors for many days

but vague words—the reiterated advice to throw themselves into the arms of Napoleon in order to obtain his favour, which was, therefore, not yet acquired, since it was necessary to go so far to attain it. Murat, who stood in a still closer and more direct communication with the Emperor of the French, was still less favourable. He showed no inclination to pay court to any except the old sovereigns, and only gave the young king the title of prince of the Asturias. From the tenor of other propositions from Aranjuez, they began to fear that the old sovereigns entertained the idea of going in person to meet Napoleon to inform him of the manner in which the revolution of Aranjuez had been effected, to surprise his favour, and obtain redress of their wrongs. They were afraid that power might thus return to Charles IV., and if not into the hands of the prince of the Peace, at least to the queen, who would put Ferdinand again in the sad situation of an oppressed son, the duke de l'Infantada and canon Escoïquiz in strong castles, and thus be avenged upon both for the few days of abasement to which she had been obliged to submit, and, above all, for the fall of her favourite, for whom she would always continue inconsolable.

This was the reason which above all others, far more than their ignorance of affairs or than foreign suggestions, led Ferdinand VII. and his silly councillors to adopt the idea of going in a body to meet Napoleon. The danger of compromising by an imprudent negotiation the provinces, colonial privileges, or some other great interest of the Spanish monarchy, never even presented itself to their minds, so exclusively were they occupied with the fear that Charles IV. would go to plead for himself, and perhaps gain his cause from Napoleon. They would have been a hundred times better pleased to see Napoleon reign in Spain than to see the queen again in possession of the royal authority. This same feeling was entertained by the old sovereigns in their turn; and, to the misfortune of Spain and France, this feeling caused the sceptre of Philip V. to fall into the hands of the Bonaparte family.

This fear no sooner took full possession of the minds of the new court, than the question of going to meet Napoleon was decided, and the deliberations to which the journey might still give rise, were the mere hesitations of feeble minds, incapable even of willing resolutely what they desired to do. Efforts were not wanting, either on the part of Murat or of General Savary, to put an end to these hesitations. Murat availed himself of M. de Beauharnais to repeat daily in Ferdinand's ears the advice to set out, impressing on this unfortunate ambassador that this was the only means of repairing the fault that he had committed by hindering the journey to Andalusia. Murat had also seen canon Escoïquiz. The latter, looking upon himself as necessarily much more clever than a soldier who had passed his life on the battle-field,

flattered himself with being able very easily to penetrate the secret of the court of France by a few moments' conversation with the person who represented it at the head of the French army. Murat saw him, took good care not to promise beforehand the recognition of Ferdinand VII., but declared many times that Napoleon's intentions were altogether friendly; that, he had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain, and that, if his troops were at the gates of Madrid at the moment of the last revolution, it was a pure accident; but that, Europe being able to make him responsible for this revolution, he was obliged to be very sure, before recognising the new king, that everything had taken place legitimately and naturally at Aranjuez; that no one was better able to give him complete information on the subject than Ferdinand VII.; and that the presence of this prince, as well as the explanations which he could give, would not fail to produce a decisive effect on the Emperor's mind. Murat thus duped the poor canon, who flattered himself with duping him, and who went away convinced that this journey would infallibly lead to the recognition of the prince of the Asturias as king of Spain.

It was known that general Savary had arrived in Madrid, and, although he was in a position inferior to that of Murat, he was regarded as being perhaps more thoroughly informed of Napoleon's real thoughts than the commander-in-chief. An interview with him was therefore desired. The canon Escóiquiz and the duke de l'Infántado wished to converse with him themselves, and then to present him to Ferdinand VII. After having received still more explicit assurances from him than those given by Murat, because general Savary was less bound to reserve, they presented him to the prince of the Asturias. The prince questioned general Savary as to the utility of the journey he was advised to undertake, and the consequences of an interview with Napoleon. At that time there was no question about going to Bayonne, but only to Burgos or Vittoria; for the Emperor, they were assured, was on the point of arriving, and the matter at issue was that of doing him homage, of anticipating the meeting of the old sovereigns with him, and of being the first to speak in order to explain so as to convince him of the necessity of the inexplicable revolution of Aranjuez. General Savary, without pledging the Emperor's word—with whose intentions on matters unknown when he had left Paris he was, he said, unacquainted—had no trouble in misleading persons who would have deceived themselves had no one else deceived them. Affecting to speak merely his own sentiments, he alleged that, when Napoleon should have seen the Spanish prince, heard from his own mouth an account of the late events, and above all, become convinced that France would find in him a faithful ally, he would acknowledge him as king of Spain. That took place on this occasion which usually happens

in conversations of this kind: general Savary thought he had promised nothing by giving abundant reason to hope, and Ferdinand VII. thought that everything he had been given reason to hope for was actually promised. The general had no sooner quitted the prince, than the resolution already taken of going to meet Napoleon, was definitively settled. An incident, however, was very near compromising the result which Murat and Savary were anxious to effect.

The Emperor had given orders to rescue the prince of the Peace from the fury of the enemies who were eager for his death, in order not to suffer the commission of a crime before the eyes, and in some measure on the responsibility of the French army; and secondly, in order to have in his hands an instrument, by whose aid he reckoned on being able to influence the old sovereigns according to his will. The old queen, on her part, warmly seconded by the imbecile goodness of Charles IV., asked, as a favour of more value in her eyes than the crown or almost than life itself, the deliverance of him whom she always called Emmanuel, their best, their only friend, who was, she said, the victim of his too strong feeling of friendship for the French. Thus, to save the favourite became not only an act of humanity, but the surest means of filling the old court with gratitude and joy, and of moulding it at will. Murat, with all the arrogance of power, demanded that the prince of the Peace should be given up to him. The prince, who had first been detained in the village of Pinto, had afterwards been conveyed to Villa-Viciosa, a sort of royal mansion, where he was in greater security. He had been sent thither under an escort of the life-guards, resolved to murder rather than give him up. After having loaded him with irons, his trial was conducted with a degree of barbarous ferocity, inspired at once by hatred, by a desire of doing dishonour to the old court, and of guarding, by the death of this old favourite, against a reverse of fortune. Ferdinand VII. and his councillors lent themselves to these indignities as much on their own account as on that of the base rabble whom they were desirous of flattering.

Murat declared to them that, unless they delivered up the prince to him, he would order his dragoons to cut to pieces the life-guards who kept him imprisoned, and thus settle the difficulty by main force. It must be said to the honour of this valiant man, that on this occasion he was as much impelled by a generous indignation as by any calculations of advantage. The more he insisted, the more the confidential advisers of Ferdinand, who were incapable of comprehending any noble sentiment, saw in his persistence a design of making use of the prince of the Peace against Ferdinand VII., and it was confidently said that the idea of assassinating the prisoner was for a moment entertained by certain excited minds, it is not known which, amongst the most influential of the new court.

General Savary, more wary than Murat, thought he perceived that the very warmth which was manifested in demanding the release of the prince of the Peace excited a degree of distrust injurious to their principal object, which was the departure of Ferdinand VII., and he took upon himself to renounce for the moment the surrender of the prince of the Peace, stating that this would be a matter of subsequent arrangement, like all the others, in the conferences which were about to take place between the new king of Spain and the Emperor of the French.

This concession having been made, the departure of Ferdinand was resolved upon. The prince wished first of all to go to Aranjuez to visit his father, whom he had left there deserted, nay, almost in a state of destitution, since the 19th of March (it was then the 7th or 8th of April), without deigning to see him even once. He was desirous of obtaining a letter from him to Napoleon, in order in some measure to bind his old father by a testimony of good-will given in his favour. Charles IV., however, received the visit of this unnatural son very badly; and the queen still worse. They refused to give him any testimonial with which he might arm himself to establish his good conduct in the events of Aranjuez.

Although somewhat disconcerted by this refusal, he nevertheless made preparations to set out on the 10th of April. He left behind him a regency composed of his uncle, the infant Don Antonio, O'Farrill, minister of war, Azanza, minister of finance, and Don Sebastian de Pinuela, minister of justice, with a commission to give orders during his absence in cases of urgency, and to refer to him on all matters not requiring immediate decision, and in all cases to consult and advise with the council of Castille. Ferdinand took with him his two most confidential friends, the duke de l'Infantado and the canon Escóiquiz, Cevallos, minister of state, and two experienced negotiators in the persons of MM. de Musquiz and Labrador. He was, besides, accompanied by the duke of San Carlos and the grandees who constituted his new household. Cevallos was charged with corresponding with the regency left behind in Madrid.

It was, however, no easy matter to make this resolution acceptable to the people of the capital. Some, from a feeling of pride peculiarly Spanish, thought it would have been enough to send the infant Don Carlos, the king's brother, to meet Napoleon, and believed in all sincerity that the sovereign of degenerate Spain was at least equal to the Emperor of the French, the conqueror of the Continent, and master of Europe. Others, and they comprised the largest number, began to see through the motives which had brought so many French to the Peninsula, put a sinister interpretation on the refusal to acknowledge Ferdinand VII., and to look upon this going to meet Napoleon as the act of a dupe, for this was to put himself into his powerful hands. They were far from supposing that Ferdinand and his advisers would push their folly so far as to go to Bayonne, or the French terri-

tory, but they considered that the nearer they approached the Pyrenees, the more they would place themselves within reach of Napoleon and his armies. There was an inexpressible commotion in Madrid at the news of this journey, and a regular tumult would have taken place had not a proclamation been issued by Ferdinand VII. calculated to appease their minds, by saying that Napoleon was coming in person to Madrid, there to knit more firmly the bonds of a new alliance, and to consolidate the happiness of the Spaniards, and that they could not neglect the duty of going to meet a guest so illustrious and so great as the victor of Austerlitz and Friedland.

This proclamation prevented the tumult without entirely removing the suspicions which the common sense of the people had led them to entertain. Ferdinand took his departure on the 10th of April, surrounded by an immense multitude, who saluted him with a melancholy interest, and with protestations of unbounded devotedness. Amongst a part of the people, however, it was easy to see a kind of disdainful compassion for the foolish credulity of the young king.

It had been agreed upon with Murat that general Savary, for fear of some alteration in Ferdinand's mind, or that of those who accompanied him, should make the journey along with them, to draw them on from Burgos to Vittoria, and from Vittoria to Bayonne, where it was to be presumed the Emperor had stopped. It was agreed, besides, that the demand for delivering up the prince of the Peace should be deferred till Ferdinand had crossed the frontiers, and that even then care should be taken to abstain from that step, or any other calculated to give offence.

By means of generals Savary and Reille, successively sent to Madrid, Napoleon had informed Murat of his determination of getting possession of Ferdinand VII. by inducing him to come to Bayonne; of placing Charles IV. again for a few days upon the throne; and then availing himself of this unfortunate prince to make him cede the crown. He had at the same time enjoined Murat, if Ferdinand VII. could not be prevailed upon to set out, to publish the protest of Charles IV., to declare that he alone was king, and Ferdinand VII. nothing more than a rebel son. The facility, however, with which Ferdinand VII. was persuaded to go to meet Napoleon relieved him from having recourse to these violent means, and from replacing the sceptre of Spain in the hands of Charles IV. However weak those hands might have been, and however easy it might appear to have snatched from them a sceptre only restored for a moment, Murat was, nevertheless, much better pleased not to be obliged to follow the long course which kept him still at a distance from the object to which all his wishes tended. He saw, therefore, that it was necessary to be satisfied with making Ferdinand VII. set out without restoring the sceptre to Charles IV. Ferdinand VII., whom the Spaniards eagerly desired for their king, being once in the hands of Napo-

leon, there only remained Charles IV., whom the Spaniards would not have on any conditions, and he might even be prevailed upon to consent to go to Bayonne. Then all the Bourbons, old and young, popular and unpopular, would be at the disposal of Napoleon, and the throne of Spain would be in truth vacant.

What Murat had foreseen did not fail to come to pass. The departure of Ferdinand VII. was scarcely known when the old sovereigns were also eager to be on the road. It had been quite impossible to inspire them with a moment's confidence ever since the 17th of March. Spain had become hateful to them. They constantly spoke of quitting it, and of going to occupy even an humble farm in France, a country which their powerful friend Napoleon had rendered at once so calm, so peaceable, and so safe. But the case was altered altogether when they learned that Ferdinand VII. had set out in order to have a personal interview with Napoleon. Although they had neither any great hope nor a great ambition of resuming the sceptre, they were filled with envy at the idea of Ferdinand gaining his cause with the arbiter of their destiny—of his being recognised and settled as king by the acknowledgment of France—thus becoming their master, and that of the unfortunate Godoy, and of being able to decide their fate and that of all their creatures. Not being able to bear this idea, they conceived an ardent desire to proceed in person to plead their cause against an unnatural son in the presence of the all-powerful sovereign who was approaching the Pyrenees. The queen of Etruria, who hated her brother Ferdinand, and by whom she was hated in return, had also to defend the rights of her young son, now become king of North Lusitania. She was afraid that his claims might be entirely forgotten in the general confusion of everything in the Peninsula, and was desirous of going with her father and mother to throw herself into the arms of Napoleon, in order to obtain from him justice and protection. She therefore contributed to render the desire of her aged parents more eager, and to urge them to take the road to Bayonne. In this manner these unfortunate Bourbons were seized with a sort of emulation to give themselves up to this terrible conqueror, who attracted them as snakes are said to charm birds, which are drawn to them by an irresistible and mysterious attraction.

The expression of this desire was immediately communicated to Murat, who received its announcement with inexpressible joy. Had he merely obeyed his first impulse, he would have put the old court into carriages to make them set out immediately after the young one. But he was afraid of giving too great offence by making all the members of the family leave at the same time, of provoking reflections in the mind of Ferdinand and his advisers, which might lead them, perhaps, to relinquish their journey; and, above all, of adopting such a course without the express assent of the Emperor. He therefore confined himself to the immediate despatch of this important news, not doubting

the answer, and contemplating with pleasure the whole of the princes who had any right to the crown of Spain hastening of their own accord towards the gulf open for them at Bayonne. He entertained foolish hopes, and persuaded himself that everything was possible in Spain to power mingled with a little address.

During this time Ferdinand and his court were proceeding on their way to Burgos, with that slowness usual with these indolent princes of degenerate Spain. The eager homage of the population, too, contributed not a little to delay their progress. Everywhere the people broke to pieces the busts of Emmanuel Godoy, and carried about in procession those of Ferdinand VII. crowned with flowers. The towns through which the prince passed pardoned the object of his journey, which procured them the pleasure of seeing him; but, deeply impressed with fear for his fate, they swore to devote themselves for him should there be need. They gave a fuller and more energetic expression to these feelings whenever they could be remarked by the French, as if they wished to warn them both of their distrust and of the devotedness which they were ready to exhibit.

On their arrival at Burgos, Ferdinand VII. and his travelling companions experienced a surprise which gave rise in their minds to the beginning of regret. General Savary had always said to them that the only thing in view was to go to meet Napoleon; that he was on his way to Old Castille, where they would meet him, perhaps even at Burgos. The ardent desire of being the first to see him, to anticipate the old rulers, had wholly deprived them of all clear-sightedness, so that they failed to see a snare so obvious. But, on approaching the Pyrenees and plunging into the midst of French armies, a sort of shuddering had seized them, and they were almost tempted to stop, so much the more, as they heard nothing whatever of Napoleon or of his speedy arrival. (He was then at Bordeaux.) General Savary, who never quitted them, presented himself immediately, gave firmness to their wavering confidence, assured them they were at last going to meet Napoleon; that the further they advanced towards him, the more he would be disposed to favour them; and besides, that they would be thus made certain of the fate which awaited them two days earlier. It is a sure means of drawing on agitated minds to promise them an earlier clearing up of the doubts which agitate them. It was then determined to proceed to Vittoria, where they arrived on the evening of the 15th of April.

At Vittoria, Ferdinand's hesitation changed into absolute resistance, and he refused to prosecute his journey further. Firstly, he had been informed that Napoleon, so far from having crossed the frontiers, was still only at Bordeaux, and Spanish susceptibility was deeply offended by having advanced so far towards a meeting when the other party had proceeded so small a distance. Secondly, as they approached the frontiers of France, the truth began to

burst upon them. In Madrid, in the midst of hostile factions, eager to anticipate one another in obtaining Napoleon's favour, in the midst of a people infatuated respecting itself, which imagined that no foreign hand would dare to touch the crown of Charles V., it had been possible to suppose that the French army had been sent to Spain solely with a view to the interests of the royal family; but, in the neighbourhood of France, where every one clearly saw the object of Napoleon; where the French armies, long assembled, had indiscreetly talked of what they supposed to be the object of their mission, it was more difficult to remain in illusion. Every one at Bayonne and its neighbourhood said that Napoleon was simply about to complete his political system by placing the Bonaparte family on the throne of Spain instead of that of the Bourbons. This conduct was looked upon as quite natural in a conqueror, who was the founder of a dynasty, always supposing that the enterprise was crowned with success, and especially that in these changes the Spanish colonies did not go to enlarge the British empire beyond the seas. These ideas had passed from the French Basque provinces into the Basque provinces of Spain, and produced such a sensation in the minds of Ferdinand VII. and the canon Escóiquiz, that a resolution was immediately adopted to stop at Vittoria. The reason given was one of etiquette, which had its weight; for it was not a very dignified step to proceed even beyond the frontiers of Spain to meet Napoleon. In order to draw the Spaniards on to Vittoria, general Savary had constantly given them reason to hope, and almost to be certain, of meeting Napoleon at the next post. But the certain news of his being still at Bordeaux no longer permitted the employment of such means. He then said that, since the object of the journey was to see Napoleon, in order to solicit the acknowledgment of the new royalty, it was necessary to put trifling considerations aside, and to proceed towards the object which they wished to attain; that, after all, those who came to meet Napoleon had need of him, whilst he had no need of them; and therefore it was natural that they should take that road which other business, of great importance, had hitherto prevented him from pursuing; and that, finally, it was necessary to cease rebelling, like children, against the consequences of a step which had been taken from motives of peculiar interest. The general, with whom a sort of military vivacity often baffled prudence, when he saw that he was not listened to, suddenly changed his bearing; from being fawning and wily he became arrogant and harsh, and mounting his horse, said that they might do as they pleased, but for his own part he would return to Bayonne to join the Emperor, and that they might probably have to repent of their change of determination. He left them frightened, but for the moment obstinate in their resistance.

General Savary immediately set out for Bayonne, where he arrived on the 14th of April, a few hours before the Emperor, who

did not reach that city till the evening of the same day. The latter had remained some days at Bordeaux, in order to give the Spanish princes time to approach the frontiers and to be relieved from the necessity of going to meet them, which he would have been obliged to do had he been at Bayonne. He occupied his leisure in Bordeaux, as he usually did, in informing himself of everything connected with the interests of the country, in ascertaining the nature and extent of the commerce of that large city, and the means of keeping up the relations of France with its colonies. Having seen with his own eyes how greatly the city of Bordeaux was suffering from the war, he had given orders for a loan of several millions from the extraordinary treasury, and for a considerable purchase of wines on account of the civil list. Having arrived at Bayonne on the 14th, he heard with great satisfaction all that had taken place at Madrid for the promotion of his designs, and adopted suitable measures to ensure their definitive execution.

After having concerted these measures with general Savary, he agreed to send him back to Vittoria as the bearer of an answer to a letter which Ferdinand had already addressed to him. This answer was couched in terms calculated to draw this prince to Bayonne, without entering into any formal agreement with him. In it Napoleon said that the papers of Charles IV. ought to have convinced him of his imperial good-will (in allusion to the advice of indulgence given to Charles IV. at the time of the process at the Escorial); that, consequently, there could be no doubt concerning his personal dispositions; that, while directing his troops to such points of the coasts of Europe as were best calculated to second his operations against England, he had conceived the design of going to Madrid, in order to urge his august friend, Charles IV., in passing, to adopt some indispensable reforms, and especially to dismiss the prince of the Peace; that he had often advised this dismissal, and, if he had not insisted upon it more, it was merely out of forbearance towards his august weaknesses—weaknesses which must be pardoned—for kings, like other men, were only *weakness and error*; that he had been surprised in the very midst of these projects by the events of Aranjuez; that he had no idea of constituting himself the judge of them, but that his armies, being actually on the spot, he did not wish to appear in the eyes of Europe to be either the promoter or accomplice of a revolution which had overturned the throne of an ally and a friend; that he made no pretensions to a right to intermeddle in the internal affairs of Spain, but that, if it could be shown that the abdication of Charles IV. had been voluntary, he should have no difficulty in recognising him—the prince of the Asturias—as lawful sovereign of Spain; that, for this purpose, a conversation of some hours appeared desirable, and that, notwithstanding the reserve maintained for a month past on the part of France, there was no reason to apprehend in the Emperor of the French a judge

prejudiced against him. This was followed by some advice, couched in the softest language, on the subject of the prosecution designed against the prince of the Peace; on the inconvenience that would result from dishonouring not only the prince, but the king and the queen, from initiating a jealous and ill-disposed multitude into the secrets of state affairs, and from teaching them the habit of laying hands upon those who had long governed it; for, added Napoleon, *the people are glad to avenge the homage which they render us*. Finally, he showed himself still disposed to the idea of a marriage, if the explanations which were to be given at Bayonne should prove such as to satisfy him.

This letter, which was a clever mixture of indulgence, haughtiness, and reason, would have been an admirable piece of eloquence, had it not been the means of concealing a treacherous delusion. General Savary was to bear this letter to Vittoria, to give in person the necessary developments of its contents; or, if necessary, to add some of his cunning words, of which he was prodigal, and which should decide Ferdinand VII. without binding the Emperor. It was, however, necessary to make provision for the case of Ferdinand VII. and his advisers resisting all these artifices. Should this case arise, Napoleon had no idea of stopping half-way. He decided, therefore, that force was to be employed. In addition to the corps of observation of the Western Pyrenees, he had ordered the reserve of provisional infantry, under general Verdier, to pass into Spain, as well as a corps of provisional cavalry under general Lasalle, and numerous detachments of the mounted imperial guards. These troops, having formed a junction under marshal Bessières, were to occupy Old Castille, and to protect the rear of the army. He sent orders to Murat, as well as to marshal Bessières, not to hesitate, and upon the mere authority of general Savary to cause the prince of the Asturias to be arrested—giving publicity at the same moment to the protest of Charles IV.—declaring that the latter alone was king, and the son nothing but a usurper, who had set on foot the revolutions of Aranjuez in order to seize upon the crown. If Ferdinand VII., however, agreed to cross the frontier and come to Bayonne, Napoleon entirely agreed to the opinion of Murat, that the sceptre should not be restored to Charles IV., from whom it must soon be again taken away, and that the aged sovereigns should be sent towards Bayonne, since they had themselves expressed that desire. He continued to recommend to him, as soon as Ferdinand VII. had crossed the frontier, to insist upon the prince of the Peace being delivered up to him, willingly or by force, and to send him to Bayonne. Such were the arrangements which were to complete, in case of necessity, by force, if cunning failed, this dark scheme laid against the crown of Spain.*

* The account here given is according to the minutes of the orders still existing in the Louvre.

After having given these orders, and sent general Savary back to Vittoria, Napoleon occupied himself with forming an establishment at Bayonne, which might admit of his sojourning there for some months. Independently of the empress Josephine, he expected to receive there a great number of princes and princesses, and for this reason he resolved to keep at his disposal the apartments which he occupied in the interior of the town. This country is one of the most attractive in Europe—to it, however, Napoleon has unfortunately attached recollections much less pleasing than those with which he filled Egypt, Italy, Germany, and Poland. In this country, composed of beautiful hills, watered by the Adour, crowned by the Pyrenees, and bounded on the horizon by the sea, there was, about a league from Bayonne, a small château of regular architecture, and of uncertain origin, constructed, as it is said, for one of those princesses whom France and Spain formerly mutually gave in marriage. This château stands in the midst of a beautiful garden, in a most charming position, and under a sun as brilliant as that of Italy. Napoleon was anxious to get immediate possession of the place. In order to satisfy the desire, it was happily unnecessary to have recourse either to those artifices or that violence which were needed against the crown of Spain. Its owner was delighted to sell it him for 100,000 francs. It was decorated in haste with such resources as the country offered. The garden was converted into a camp for the troops of the imperial guard. Napoleon established himself there on the 17th, and left the apartments he occupied in Bayonne free, in order to accommodate in them the royal family of Spain, all the members of which he hoped soon to bring together there.

General Savary having set out in all haste for Vittoria, found Ferdinand there, surrounded not only by the advisers who had followed him, but by many other important individuals, who had hastened thither to offer him their services and their homage. Among the latter, there was a person of great consideration: this was Urquijo, formerly prime minister, brutally disgraced in 1802, when the influence of the prince of the Peace had finally become supreme, and who then retired into Biscay, his native country. Urquijo, who was a man of firm, penetrating, but morose mind, spoke to Ferdinand, in the presence of his other advisers, like a wise and experienced statesman. He told him and them that nothing could be more imprudent than the prince's journey, if they proceeded beyond the frontiers; that, as far as respect was concerned, everything had been done which the greatest and most illustrious sovereign could desire, by coming to receive him at the verge of the kingdom; that to go beyond, was to prove wanting in the dignity due to the Spanish crown, and to commit an act of remarkable folly; that any one who had read with attention the account of the revolution of Aranjuez, inserted in the official journal (*Moniteur*), must have seen the lurking intention to discredit the new king,

to dispute his title, to inspire a feeling of sympathy for the deposed sovereign—all which disclosed the purpose of Napoleon to be, to treat the one as a usurper and the other as incapable of reigning; that any one who had for some time observed the policy of Napoleon with respect to Spain must have discovered the plan of getting rid of the house of Bourbon, and of making the Peninsula a part of the system of the French empire; that the indifference affected towards the proclamation of the prince of the Peace, accompanied by the care taken to disperse the Spanish fleets and armies, by bringing the one into the ports of France, and sending the other to the North, revealed even to obviousness the project of taking vengeance on the first opportunity, and that the re-union of so many troops in the South at the conclusion of affairs in the North could no longer leave a doubt on such a subject.

MM. de Musquiz and de Labrador, who at the different courts of Europe had learned to form some just ideas of general politics, gave unequivocal marks of assent to these wise observations; but no attention was paid to their advice. The advisers who were in favour were the mediocore and versatile Cevallos, who concealed his duplicity under impetuosity, and had never pardoned Urquijo for the wrongs which he had formerly done to this eminent man, for he had been the subordinate instrument of his disgrace, and was, therefore, but little disposed to receive his ideas, and the two particular confidants of the prince, the duke de l'Infantado and the canon Escoiquiz; both of them delighted to dream of a happy reign under their own benignant sway, and rejecting everything calculated to disturb this dream of their vanity. None of the parties were willing to admit that they had commenced and actively urged forward the most fatal of imprudent steps. They found it very difficult to believe that they could be at the beginning of a long series of misfortunes, instead of being at the commencement of a long course of prosperity. On these grounds they rejected the sinister prophecies of M. de Urquijo, as the views of a gloomy mind, embittered by the disgrace inflicted upon him. "What?" said the duke de l'Infantado, with the strongest assurance, "what! is it likely that a hero, surrounded by such a halo of glory, would condescend to such base treachery?" "You do not know heroes," replied Urquijo, with bitterness and disdain: "you have not read Plutarch! Read him, and you will learn that the greatest of all have built their reputation on heaps of dead bodies. The founders of dynasties especially have been those who have most frequently built up their work in treachery, violence, and robbery! What did not our Charles V. do in Germany, Italy, and even in Spain? and I do not go back to the worst of your princes! Posterity takes no account of anything but the results. If the authors of so many guilty deeds founded great empires, and rendered nations powerful and fortunate, it attributes no

blame to princes for having robbed, or for the armies which they sacrificed." The duke de l'Infantado and the canon Escoiquiz, having continued to insist upon the reprobation to which Napoleon would expose himself by usurping the crown, and on the commotions which he would excite both in Spain and in Europe, and the perpetual war which he would draw upon himself, Urquijo replied, that Europe had known nothing else but to be beaten by the French; that coalitions, badly managed and thwarted by intestine divisions, had no chance of success; that only a single power, Austria, was still in a condition to fight a battle; but that, even with the support of England, it would be crushed, and be obliged to pay for its resistance by new losses of territory; that Spain might be able to carry on a war of partisans, but that in reality its character would be confined to serving as a scene of action for the English and French; that it would be horribly ravaged, and that its colonies would avail themselves of the opportunity to shake off the yoke of the mother-country; that if Napoleon knew how to curb his views of aggrandisement, and to give good institutions to the countries which submitted to his system, he would give a permanent foundation to himself and his dynasty; that the people of the Peninsula, bound to those of France by interests of all kinds, whenever they came to see that they were fighting for the cause of a family much more than for that of the nation, would end by attaching themselves to a government which promoted civilisation; that, after all, the dynasties which had regenerated Spain had always come from without; that Napoleon only needed to join a little prudence to his genius to make the Bourbons utterly lose their cause; that in every case Spain would be inundated with a deluge of evils, and certainly lose its colonies; that they should, therefore, avoid running into Napoleon's nets, and retrace their steps as soon as possible; that, if this could not be done, the king should be concealed, and under a disguise conducted back to Madrid or into the south of Spain, and that there, placed at the head of the nation, he would have a better chance of treating with Napoleon on acceptable conditions.

It is very rare that a statesman entertains as clear a view of the future as Urquijo displayed on this occasion. His only answer, however, was the disdainful smile of blind ignorance, and in his vexation he set out immediately without any desire to accompany the king, to whom he was asked to continue to give his counsels, whilst they absolutely refused to follow them. "If," said he, "you wish me to go alone to Bayonne, to discuss, negotiate, and make head against the common enemy, whilst you withdraw into the depths of the Peninsula, be it so: but otherwise I have no desire, by accompanying you, *to tarnish my reputation, the only thing that remains to me under my disfavour, and in the midst of the misfortunes of our common country.*"

Urquijo not having been listened to, immediately withdrew,

and left the advisers of Ferdinand to themselves; they continued madly intent on their plans, but nevertheless somewhat troubled at the sinister predictions of a man of such penetrating views and firmness of mind. On general Savary's arrival with Napoleon's letter, they resumed their confidence in their own judgment and in destiny. This letter, in which they ought to have seen in every line a concealed and menacing intention, for the strange pretension of becoming judge in a dispute between father and son ought to have revealed to them the wish to condemn one of the two, and obviously that one of the two the more capable of reigning, so far from opening their eyes, only made them close them the more. The only passage that attracted their attention was that in which Napoleon said that he needed to be informed concerning the events of Aranjuez, and that he hoped, after a conversation with Ferdinand VII., to be in a condition to have no difficulty in acknowledging him as king of Spain. This vague promise filled them again with all their illusions. In it they saw the certainty of hearing this recognition the next morning after their arrival in Bayonne, and they had the simplicity to ask general Savary if this was not the way in which Napoleon's letter must be interpreted; to which the general replied, that they were no doubt right in so interpreting it, and that it could not well mean anything else. Being thus reassured, they resolved to set out from Vittoria on the morning of the 19th, in order to sleep that night at Irun. A courier was sent before them to announce their arrival at Bayonne. It ought to be added, also, that the troops under general Verdier had so completely surrounded them at Vittoria, that they would not have had it in their power to choose, had they wished to act otherwise. They did not even notice this constraint, so blind were they to their danger.

But the people of the surrounding provinces, who had been together to see Ferdinand, did not reason on his situation like his advisers. Urquijo had repeated every where and to every one the advice which he had given at the court of Ferdinand. His words had found an echo, and multitudes of faithful subjects had assembled to oppose the departure of the young king. On the morning of the 19th, the day fixed for their departure, and when the royal carriages were already in waiting, there arose a sudden commotion among the people. A crowd of armed peasants, who had lain for some days on the ground, either before the gate or in the interior of the royal dwelling, manifested an intention of opposing his journey. One of them, armed with a sickle, cut the traces and unyoked the mules, which were led back to the stables. A collision would then have taken place between the French troops which formed Ferdinand's escort and the people, had not the infantry fortunately been ordered to remain in their barracks, with their guns loaded, and lighted matches ready to apply to the cannon. The cavalry of the guard alone were in the square where the carriages were, but at a certain distance from the crowd, with

drawn swords, and in a position of threatening firmness. Ferdinand's advisers, fearing that a collision would injure their cause, sent the duke de l'Infantado into the street to speak to the people. The duke, who was greatly respected, rushed into the midst of the crowd, succeeded in calming the people by appealing to the respect due to the royal wishes, and assured them that by going to Bayonne they were certain of returning in a few days, with the recognition of Ferdinand as king, and a renewal of the French alliance. The people were appeased rather from respect than conviction. The mules were put to afresh without any opposition, and Ferdinand VII., getting into the carriage, saluted the people, who received him with acclamations mingled with cries of anger and pity. The splendid squadrons of the imperial guards, breaking into a gallop, immediately surrounded the royal carriages, as if to render homage to him whom they were carrying off as a prisoner. Thus took his departure this foolish prince, deceived by his own wishes still more than by the ability of his adversary, deceived as if he had been the most simple and most honourable of the princes of his time, whilst he was in fact one of the most hypocritical and least sincere. The Spanish people saw him set out with vexation and contempt, saying among themselves, that, instead of their king, they would soon see a stranger, supported by formidable armies.

Ferdinand slept at the small town of Irun, with the view of crossing the frontiers the next day. On the morning of the 28th he in fact crossed the Bidassoa, and was very much surprised to find no one to receive him except the three Spanish grandees, returned from their mission to Napoleon, and after having seen him, bringing nothing but the gloomiest presentiments. But it was now too late to return; the bridge of the Bidassoa was crossed, and there was now nothing left but to plunge into the gulf which they had not had sense enough to see till they were swallowed up. On approaching Bayonne, the prince met marshals Duroc and Bessières coming to compliment him, but only conferring on him the title of prince of the Asturias. There was still nothing in this calculated to make them very uneasy, for Napoleon had adopted, as the theme of his policy, to take no notice of anything which had taken place at Aranjuez till after he had received explanations. They were therefore suffered to pass a few hours longer without alarm.

When they reached Bayonne, Ferdinand found there a few troops under arms, and a small number of people, for no one had been forewarned of his coming. He was conducted to a residence very different from the magnificent palaces of the kings of Spain, but it was the only one in the town at their disposal for the purpose.

He had scarcely alighted from the carriage, when Napoleon, who had hastened on horseback from the château de Marac, made him the first visit. The Emperor of the French embraced

the Spanish prince with every semblance of the greatest courtesy, always addressing him by the title of prince of the Asturias—which, in fact, was a part of the policy he had proposed to himself—and quitted him after a short interview, for the purpose, as he said, of leaving him to refresh himself, without having said aught that could give rise to any interpretation whatever.

In the course of an hour, the chamberlains waited upon the prince, to invite him and his suite to dine at the château de Marac. Ferdinand repaired thither towards the close of day, attended by his small retinue, and was received in the same manner as before, that is to say, with refined politeness, but with extreme reserve on every point relative to politics. After dinner, the Emperor entered into general conversation with Ferdinand and his counsellors, and speedily discovered, beneath the habitually immoveable countenance and general reserve of the young king, a mediocrity of character by no means exempt from deceit; in the conversational powers of Escoïquiz, the king's preceptor, he discerned a cultivated mind, which was, however, unskilled in politics; and beneath the gravity of the duke de l'Infantado, an honest man indeed, but one who thought more highly of himself than he should; ambition, without talent, constituting the sum total of his merit.

Napoleon saw at a glance the kind of men he had to deal with, and speedily dismissed them all, under the pretext that they must be fatigued with their journey; he, however, detained the canon Escoïquiz, by expressing his desire, which in fact was tantamount to a command, to have some conversation with him. He deputed general Savary to tell the prince of the Asturias everything which he was himself about to communicate to the preceptor, with whom he preferred conversing himself, as he considered him a man of more intelligence.

His secret was doubly oppressive to him, for he had not only kept it long, but this secret was itself a perfidy, a species of crime to which his breast was a stranger. He felt constrained to reveal it to the least ignorant of the counsellors of Ferdinand, to exonerate himself, in some measure, by the frankness in which he couched the *exposé* of his designs, and by the candid and simple avowal of motives of the highest policy for the line of conduct which he adopted.

He set out, therefore, by flattering the canon, saying he knew that he was a man of learning, and that he could therefore speak freely to him. Without further preamble, and as if compelled at once to unburden his heart, Napoleon declared that he had invited the princes of Spain to come to France for the purpose of taking from them all, father as well as son, the crown of their ancestors; that he had for some years been aware of the treachery of the court of Madrid; that he had not taken any notice of it, but that now, being quit of the affairs of the North, he intended to regulate those of the South; that Spain was indispensable to his de-

signs against England, and that he was indispensable to Spain in order to restore her grandeur ; that without him, she would stagnate eternally under a weak and degenerate dynasty ; that old Charles IV. was an imbecile king ; that his son, though more energetic, was quite below par, and less trustworthy—witness the revolution of Aranjuez, the secret of which was known at Paris, without any one's having been obliged to go to Madrid in order to learn it ; that Spain, under such rulers, would never gain the moral, administrative, and political regeneration which was indispensable to enable her to regain her rank among the nations ; that, as for him, Napoleon, he had never found aught among the Bourbons save perfidy and hollow friendship ; that he was far too experienced to have any faith in the efficacy of marriages ; that a high-minded princess was a treasure not always at his disposal ; that, even supposing it were, he doubted whether she would be able to influence this taciturn and vulgar prince, whose only talent, if indeed he had any, consisted in the art of dissimulation ; that he, Napoleon, everywhere conqueror and founder of a dynasty, was obliged to trample under foot a multitude of secondary considerations, in order to reach his goal, which was placed at an immense height ; that he had no taste whatever for evil, but it in fact cost him an effort to do wrong, but that, wherever his chariot passed, all must get out of the way, or be crushed by the wheels ; that, in fine, his mind was made up ; he intended to take the crown of Spain from Ferdinand VII., but he would soften the blow by offering him an indemnity ; that he had, in fact, already selected one for him, well calculated to promote his repose ; it was no other than the beautiful and peaceful Etruria—where this prince might go and reign, secure from the revolutions of Europe, where he would be far happier than in the midst of his Spaniards—who were possessed by the revolutionary spirit of the times, and could only be subdued, settled, and made prosperous, by a powerful and energetic prince.

While making this audacious declaration, Napoleon was sometimes caressing, sometimes imperious, and reached the very acme of the cynicism of ambition. The poor canon was quite confounded. The honour of being flattered—he, an humble canon of Toledo—by one of the greatest men of the age, struggled with the indignation that filled his breast at hearing such declarations. He was thunderstruck and stupified, but his talent for discussion did not forsake him, and he immediately employed it with Napoleon, who resolved that he would indemnify him for his pains by giving him a hearing.

The unfortunate preceptor commenced by justifying the Bourbon family to the head of the house of Bonaparte. He reminded him that, up to the moment of the greatest horrors of the French revolution, Spain had not declared war till after the death of Louis XVI.; that she had herself seized the first opportunity of returning to a system of peace, and from the system of peace to

that of alliance between the two States; that, since that time, she had lavished on France her fleets, her armies, her treasures; that, if she had not rendered better service, it was owing, not to want of good-will, but to want of knowledge; that the prince of the Peace alone was to blame, for that he was the sole author of all the ills of Spain and the cause of her weakness as an ally; that, however, this detestable favourite was for ever banished from the throne; that, under a young prince, attached to Napoleon, bound to him by the ties of gratitude and by relationship, and directed by his counsels, Spain would be speedily regenerated, and regain that rank which she ought ever to have maintained among the nations, and would, without the cost of any effort or sacrifice, render France every service that could be expected from her; that, in the contrary case, Spain would make a desperate resistance, she would be seconded by England, and perhaps by a part of Europe; the colonies would be lost, a misfortune equally great to France and to Spain, and an indelible stain would tarnish the glory of a splendid reign.

"Bad policy this of yours, M. le Canon! bad policy!" replied Napoleon, with a gracious but ironical smile. "With all your learning, you will not fail to condemn me, if I suffer the only occasion to escape me, which offers, by the submission of the Continent and the distress of England, to complete the execution of my plan. As for your Bourbons, they have always served me against the grain, ready to betray me at the first brush. A brother would suit me better, whatever you may say. The regeneration of Spain is out of the question by princes of an old family, which, in spite of itself, is always supported by old abuses. My resolve is fixed; this revolution must be carried through. Spain shall not lose a single village; she shall retain all her possessions. I have already adopted precautions that she shall preserve her colonies. As for your prince, he shall be indemnified, if he submits with a good grace to the force of events. It is for you to use your influence in prevailing upon him to accept those indemnities which I have in reserve for him. You are sufficiently well informed to know that, in doing this, I only follow the laws of sound policy, which have their exigencies and their unavoidable rigours."

In saying this and other things of a like import, in words which betrayed regret rather than remorse at the intended spoliation, Napoleon gradually became mild and friendly, and sometimes even extremely familiar in his manner to the poor preceptor, whose lofty figure formed a strange contrast with his own. Astounded at this firm resolve, Escóiquiz, with tears in his eyes, enlarged on the virtues of his young prince; he endeavoured to exonerate Ferdinand from the revolution of Aranjuez; tried to prove that Charles IV. had abdicated voluntarily; that the authority of Ferdinand VII. was consequently quite legitimate, &c. &c. To all this Napoleon replied, with a smile of incredulity, that he knew

the whole story, that the revolution of Aranjuez was not quite such a natural event as the canon tried to make him believe; that Ferdinand VII. had given way to culpable impatience, that he had done wrong in declaring a succession open which nevertheless he ought not to enjoy, and that, as a punishment for having sought to reign too soon, he should not reign at all.

The canon endeavoured to soften Napoleon by dilating on the virtues of Ferdinand VII., and to move him by portraying the position to which his unhappy advisers would be reduced in the sight of Spain, of Europe, and of posterity; that they would be eternally dishonoured for having given credit to the word of Napoleon, which had summoned them to Bayonne, by leading them to expect that he intended to recognise the new king; that they would be accused of folly, nay of treason, whereas their only crime was, that they had believed the word of a great man.

"You are honourable men, every one of you," replied Napoleon, "and you especially, M. le Canon, are an admirable preceptor, for the laudable zeal with which you defend your pupil. No, depend upon it, it will merely be said that you have yielded to superior force; neither you nor Spain will be able to resist me. Policy, policy, M. le Canon, must be the main spring of every action of such a man as I am. Go to your prince, and induce him to become king of Etruria, if he wishes to be king of any place, for you may positively assure him that he shall no longer be king of Spain!"

The unfortunate preceptor of Ferdinand VII. withdrew in consternation; he found his pupil equally surprised and wretched, in consequence of the interview which he had just had with general Savary. The latter, without any preliminary form, and without entering into any of those developments, which Napoleon had contrived to introduce by way of excuses, had signified to Ferdinand VII. that he must renounce the crown of Spain, and accept Etruria as an indemnity for the patrimony of Charles V. and Philip V.

Great was the agitation which prevailed at this little court, which had hitherto been completely blind to its fate. All rallied round the prince, weeping and raving, and concluded by believing what they wished, that their misfortunes were not real; that the whole was a stratagem of Napoleon's, for it was impossible that he should touch a person so sacred as Ferdinand VII., or a thing so inviolable as the crown of Spain. Napoleon, they were sure, only wanted some immense concession of territory, or some important colony, and therefore held out this terrible menace to the house of Spain; that, in a word, it was a threat, and nothing more. They therefore flattered themselves that it was enough not to yield to this intimidation, in order to triumph, and they resolved to resist and to reject all the propositions of Napoleon. M. de Cevallos was commissioned to treat with M. de Champagny on the basis of an absolute refusal.

On the following morning M. de Cevallos repaired to the

château de Marac, for the purpose of having a conference with M. de Champagny. This man, whose low cunning did not restrain his impetuous temper, spoke to M. de Champagny with a vehemence which was not the result of courage, for here crowns alone, not individuals, were in jeopardy. He spoke so loud that Napoleon heard him, and, coming in, exclaimed: "What! you talk of fidelity to the rights of Ferdinand VII.! You, who ought faithfully to have served his father, whose minister you were! You, who have abandoned him for a usurping son, and have throughout acted the part of a traitor!"

M. de Cevallos, to whom these words might have been spoken with justice by any one who had nothing wherewith to reproach himself, immediately retired to his new master, to relate to him all that had passed. It was at once considered, by the advisers of Ferdinand, that such a negotiator possessed neither sufficient authority nor tact to defend the rights of his sovereign; and the mission was, therefore, confided to M. de Labrador, who, in various embassies in which he had been engaged, had learnt the art of negotiating great political questions with the requisite reserve. The basis of the negotiation remained unaltered, namely, the inalienable right of Ferdinand VII. to the crown of Spain, or, in default of his, that of Charles IV., the only legitimate king, if Ferdinand VII. were not so.

Napoleon was rather chagrined at this resistance, but he hoped that it would soon give way to necessity, and especially before Charles IV. should come and make good his claims, which were far better founded than those of Ferdinand VII.; for, although the idea of protesting against this abdication had been suggested to him by Murat, it was not less true that his abdication had been the result of moral violence exercised over his feeble character, and that he was fully justified in reclaiming his crown. Hence, in taking away the crown from Ferdinand VII., it would have been but an act of justice to have restored it to Charles IV. Napoleon, regarding the presence of Charles IV. as indispensable to oppose to the pretensions of the son the rights of the father, which, while it did not create the rights of Bonaparte, nevertheless threw all these rights into a state of confusion, by which he hoped to profit, urgently pressed Murat to induce the aged sovereign to quit, and also to send him the prince of the Peace, who was still a prisoner at Villa Viciosa. Napoleon enjoined Murat to employ force if needful, not for the depuration of the old court—which had earnestly desired to set out, and which nobody sought to detain—but to effect the deliverance of the prince of the Peace, whom the Spaniards were unwilling to release at any price. He also recommended that, in order to prepare the mind of the public, the junta of the government and the council of Castille should be made acquainted with the protest of Charles IV., which reduced the royalty of Ferdinand VII. to nothing, without re-establishing that of Charles, and thus commenced a convenient sort of inter-

regnum for the accomplishment of his projected usurpation. He endeavoured to make Murat comprehend that he must not wait for a majority of opinions in effecting a change which was not consonant to the minds of the Spaniards, but constrain them by fear, and afterwards gain over men of judgment, by demonstrating the good which a French royalty would effect, by assuring them that a change of dynasty would not cost Spain one colony or even a single village, an advantage which would result from no other arrangement; and if this should fail to secure their assent, to have recourse to a display of military force.

Napoleon desired Murat to be well on his guard, to fortify two or three points in Madrid, such as the royal palaces, the Admiralty, the Buen Retiro; not to permit a single officer to sleep in the city, to insist that they should all be lodged with their soldiers; in a word, so to conduct himself as if he were on the eve of an insurrection which he considered inevitable; for the Spaniards would probably try the mettle of the French; that, in this case, he must meet them with energy, so as to deprive them of every hope of effectual resistance; that he must not forget how he carried on war in the streets of Egypt, in Italy, and elsewhere; that he must not upon any account come to an engagement within the city, but occupy the heads of the principal streets with strong batteries, make the power of his guns felt, and wherever the crowd should be bold enough to show itself, openly annihilate it by the swords of the cuirassiers. Thus was Napoleon led from artifice to violence by this usurpation of the crown of Spain.

On a single point only Murat had outstripped the instructions of Napoleon: this was relative to the departure of the aged sovereigns and the deliverance of the prince of the Peace. He informed Charles IV. and his queen, in reply to the expression of their desires, that it would give the Emperor pleasure to have them near him, and that, consequently, they had nothing to do but to prepare for their departure, and that he was about to demand the release of the prince of the Peace, in order that he might travel with them as far as Bayonne: intelligence doubly welcome, which shed a gleam of joy into hearts that had been sad since the fatal days of Aranjuez.

As soon as he had learnt that Ferdinand VII. had actually crossed the frontier, Murat felt at liberty to throw off the mask, especially as the Spaniards, who were irritated at the weakness of their princes, and humbled at being under their sway, seemed ready for a moment to throw off their allegiance to a family so unworthy of the loyalty of the nation. For a few days, therefore, all went on smoothly; but, as soon as he began to speak of the deliverance of the prince of the Peace, there was a sort of commotion among them. The multitude, greedy of revenge, were in despair at seeing their victim escape them. The higher classes, and among them were the men who were compromised in the revolution of Aranjuez, feared that, in the midst of all these political changes, the prince of

the Peace might some day regain power, and revenge himself upon them for the past. These diverse motives made them politely refuse to set him at liberty. The junta of the government, composed of the ministers and the infant Don Antonio, were, more than any others, filled with these sad apprehensions. They had from the very first offered a firm resistance to the demands of Murat, and pretended that, having no authority to decide a question of such importance, they must refer it to Ferdinand VII. In fact, they addressed themselves to him, and demanded his orders. Ferdinand, greatly embarrassed how he should reply to this message, declared that this question should be treated and resolved upon at Bayonne, together with those various points which were about to occupy the two sovereigns of France and of Spain.

The reply of Ferdinand having been instantly transmitted to Murat, he considered the question settled by the orders of Napoleon, and demanded that the prince of the Peace should be instantly released from prison, in order that he might send him to Bayonne. He however stated that Emmanuel Godoy should be for ever exiled from Spain, and would be transported to France, where his life would be the only boon granted to him. Murat, after having addressed this communication to the junta, directed a body of cavalry upon Villa Viciosa, with orders to carry off the prisoner either with consent or by force. The marquis de Chasteler, under whose custody he was placed, deeming it an honour to serve the national hatred, refused to give him up; when the junta, in order to prevent a collision, sent him word straightway to deliver up the prisoner.

The unfortunate ruler of Spain, who had till lately been surrounded by all the superfluities of luxury, surpassing royalty itself in sumptuousness as he had also surpassed it in power, arrived at the camp of Murat almost without clothes, his beard unshaven, and his body covered with wounds which were scarcely healed, and marked with the chains which had galled him. In this deplorable state he for the first time met the friend whom he had chosen in the bosom of the imperial court, in the prospect of far other fortune than what he realised this day. Murat, whose generosity never failed him, loaded Emmanuel Godoy with kindness, supplied him with everything he needed, and sent him on to Bayonne under the escort of one of his aide-de-camps and a body of cavalry.

Having executed this part of Napoleon's orders, Murat turned his attention to the departure of the old sovereigns, who, in the midst of their misfortunes, were filled with joy that their friend was saved, and that they should soon be in the presence of the all-powerful Emperor, who would avenge them of their enemies. The preparations for their journey being completed—preparations which principally consisted in obtaining possession of the most valuable of the crown jewels—they desired Murat to arrange their departure. They went, accordingly, on the 23rd, from the Escorial

to the Pardo, and there passed the night in the midst of the French troops, where they saw and embraced Murat with the greatest enthusiasm and joy. They set out from thence for Buitrago, taking the high road to Bayonne, and travelled with that leisure which their age and infirmities demanded. On their route they met with some marks of respect, but none of sympathy. The presence of the old queen, who for twenty years had been an object of hatred and contempt to the nation, was enough to stifle every display of affection.

Murat was now almost sole master of Spain, and might have fancied himself a king. He proceeded, by order of Napoleon, to communicate to the junta the protest of Charles IV., drawn up in a great measure under his own dictation, and to demand by the proclamation of that document the suppression of the name of Ferdinand VII. in the acts of the government. The junta, greatly embarrassed, wished to make the council of Castille share the responsibility by consulting it. The council, however, returned the document, and refused to give an opinion. Murat then settled the question by a word, and it was agreed that the acts of the government should be published in the name of the king, without specifying what king. Thus the throne of Spain had suddenly become vacant, and the Spaniards, with profound grief, began to take cognisance of their true position. Sometimes indignant at the folly and weakness of their princes, who suffered themselves to be deceived and plunged into an abyss from which they could not possibly extricate themselves, and then, overwhelmed with pity for their fate, they turned their fury against those foreigners who had insinuated themselves into their territory by stratagem and violence. Those of enlightened minds, now clearly seeing why the French had invaded Spain, fluctuated between their hatred to the foreigners and their desire to see Spain reorganised as France had been by the hand of Napoleon.

Attracted, in company with their wives, to the fêtes given by Murat, they were sometime entrapped and half seduced, but never entirely conquered. The populace, on the contrary, never gave in to this species of seduction under any form. Sometimes the appearance of the national guard and of our cavalry would call forth their enthusiasm, and they even admired Murat; but our infantry, composed chiefly of young men, scarcely trained, suffering from the itch, and completing their military instruction under their own eyes, did not inspire them with any respect whatever, and they were even buoyed up with the confident expectation that they would be our victors. The lazy peasants of the environs had rushed to Madrid with their muskets and their cutlasses, and were in the habit of defying us with their looks before combating us with their arms. Some of them, excited by fanatical monks, committed the most horrible assassinations. One of their number killed two of our soldiers and wounded a third with his sword, under the inspiration, as he said, of the Blessed Virgin. The priest of

Caramanchel, a village at the very gates of Madrid, assassinated one of our officers. Murat made a memorable example of the authors of these crimes, but he could not thereby appease the hatred which now began to manifest itself. The minds of men were excited to such a pitch, that on one occasion a horse having run away on the grand promenade of the Prado, everybody took to flight under the idea that a combat was about to commence between the French and the Spaniards.

Murat always contrived to deceive himself in regard to the disposition of the Spaniards, but, stimulated by the reiterated advice of Napoleon, he adopted some precautionary measures. He lodged the guard and the cuirassiers within the city, but placed the rest of the troops upon the heights which commanded Madrid. To the three divisions of marshal Monecy he added the first division of general Dupont, and thus occupied Madrid with the guard, the whole of the cavalry, and four divisions of infantry. The second division of general Dupont was stationed at the Escorial, and the third at Segovia. The troops were lodged under tents around the whole of Madrid. Though there was some difficulty in furnishing them with provisions, on account of the insufficiency of conveyance, they had nevertheless an abundant supply. The remedies which were applied to our young soldiers for the disease under which they were suffering, had almost restored them to health. They were now exercised daily, and began to acquire that strength which it would have been desirable for them to have had from the time they entered Spain. Murat had placed over them officers selected from among the subalterns of the guards, and, in fact, took infinite pains in the organisation of an army which he regarded as the support of his future crown. The division under general Dupont especially was extremely fine. Unhappily, however, this should have been displayed, we repeat it, in its maturity to the Spaniards, and not have grown up under their eyes.

Murat, consecrating himself to a work in which he delighted, sometimes even applauded by the Spanish populace, who were dazzled by his presence and by the splendid squadrons of the imperial guard, master of the junta, which, balanced between two absent monarchs, uncertain which to obey, yielded to present authority—Murat thought himself already king of Spain. His aides-de-camp, in their turn, dreamt that they were grandees of the new court, flattered him more and more; while he, re-echoing these flatteries to Paris, wrote to Napoleon—"I am master here in your name; give the word, and Spain will do all you desire; she will give the crown to whichever of the French princes you may be pleased to designate." Napoleon merely replied to these idle assurances by reiterating his order to fortify the principal palace of Madrid, and to keep the officers lodged with their troops; measures which Murat executed rather as an act of obedience than from a conviction of their utility.

The prince of the Peace performed the journey to Bayonne with the utmost speed, so as not to give the populace time to create a mob on his road, and arrived at his destination long before his old sovereigns. Napoleon was extremely impatient to see this former ruler of the Spanish monarchy, and, above all, to make use of him. After a few moments' conversation, he saw that the favourite was as inferior in talent as he had been described; remarkable only for some physical advantages which had endeared him to the queen of Spain, and a certain shrewdness, combined with much experience in state affairs, but calumniated by those who had depicted him as a monster. Napoleon, however, in pity for his misfortunes, refrained from manifesting the disdain which such a head of the empire inspired him with, and he hastened to set his mind at ease respecting his future destiny, and that of his old masters, which he promised to render secure, peaceable, and opulent, and worthy of the ancient possessors of Spain and the Indies.

To these promises Napoleon added another, not less soothing, that of promptly and cruelly avenging them on Ferdinand VII., by making him descend from the throne; and he called upon the prince of the Peace to second him in these projects with the queen and Charles IV. This he readily promised to do, and this promise it would be easy to keep, because both the father and mother were so irritated against their son, that they would rather have seen a stranger, nay, an enemy, on the throne of their ancestors than Ferdinand VII.

The arrival of Charles IV. and the queen was announced for the 30th of April. It was the policy of Napoleon that the old sovereigns should be received with royal honours, and everything was arranged for their reception as if they were still in the enjoyment of their power, and as if the revolution of Aranjuez had never taken place. He ordered the troops to be drawn up under arms, sent his court to meet them, commanded the cannon of the forts to be fired, the flags to be hoisted in the vessels in the waters of the Adour, and prepared to put the crowning honour upon his plans by his own presence. At mid-day they made their entry into Bayonne, amid the firing of guns and the ringing of bells. They were received at the gates of the city by the civil and military authorities, were met on their road by the two princes, Ferdinand VII. and the infant Don Carlos, who welcomed them with visible though repressed indignation, alighted at the government palace which was placed at their disposal, and for an instant might perhaps have pleased themselves with the fond delusion that they were still in possession of the supreme power; but this was the last and vain shadow with which Napoleon amused their old age before he precipitated them all, father as well as children, into that abyss into which he desired to plunge all the Bourbons.

A moment afterwards, Napoleon himself arrived, at full gallop,

accompanied by his lieutenants, in order to pay his all-potent homage to the aged pair, the victims of his ambitious calculation. He was scarcely in the presence of Charles IV., whom he had never before seen, when he opened his arms, and the unfortunate descendant of Louis XIV. flung himself into them, weeping, as he would have done to a friend from whom he hoped to receive consolation in his misfortune.

The queen exerted all the art of a woman of the court to please, especially with the empress Josephine, who had arrived a few days before at Bayonne, and had hastened to greet the sovereigns of Spain. After a short interview, Napoleon quitted Charles IV., surrounded by the Spaniards who had assembled at Bayonne, and by the French officers and chamberlains who were appointed to constitute his suite of honour. According to the desires of Napoleon, who wished none of the usages of the court of Spain to be neglected on this occasion, there was a general kissing of hands. Each of the Spaniards present approached, and, kneeling down, kissed the hand of the aged king and of the queen his consort. Ferdinand, taking his rank as son and prince of the Asturias, went in his turn to kneel before his august parents, but their countenances plainly indicated the sentiments which filled their breasts.

As soon as this ceremony was over, the king and queen, who were much fatigued, rose to retire. Ferdinand VII. and his brother being about to follow them into their apartment, Charles IV., unable any longer to contain himself, stopped his eldest son, exclaiming, "Unhappy man! hast thou not sufficiently dishonoured my white hair; at least have respect to my repose;" and thus the king refused to see him except in public. Ferdinand VII., reduced in a few hours by this single etiquette to the quality of prince of the Asturias, felt that he was lost: he was punished, and Charles IV. avenged. But Charles was soon obliged to resign into the hands of Napoleon the price at which that vengeance had been attained.

The aged sovereigns desired with the utmost impatience to embrace their friend, their beloved Emmanuel, whom they had not seen since the fatal night of the 17th of March. They threw themselves into his arms, and Napoleon, who wished to give them time to unbosom themselves and enjoy unrestrained intercourse, deferred till the following day the reception which he had prepared for them at Marac, and left them at liberty the whole day to converse freely of their situation and their future lot.

The prince of the Peace promptly informed them of the subject that was mooted at Bayonne. This neither astonished nor afflicted them, for they had no longer any pretensions to reign, and they had the satisfaction of learning that Napoleon, in avenging them of Ferdinand VII., designed to give them in France a secure and magnificent retreat, revenues equal to those of the wealthiest reigning princes of Europe, and all this for the

loss of a power of which they had long foreseen the approaching termination. It was therefore by no means difficult to make them fall in with the projects of Napoleon, to which they were in fact resigned, even while they were yet in ignorance of the indemnification which he had in reserve for them.

On the following day Napoleon invited them to dine at the château de Marac, where he proposed entertaining them daily with every mark of distinction. Charles IV. and his consort went thither in the imperial carriages, so different from the antique vehicles of the court of Spain, which were built on the same model as those of Louis XIV. Charles had the greatest difficulty to get into and alight from the carriage, and manifested in the minutest points how utterly he was a stranger to the usages and ideas of the present age.

When he had arrived at the château de Marac, Napoleon hastened to the coach-door to receive him, and the aged monarch leaned on his arm as he put his foot to the ground. "Support yourself upon me," said Napoleon; "I have strength enough for us both." "I depend most surely on it," replied the old king, and testified his sincere gratitude to the Emperor, happy at finding in France repose, security, and opulence for the remainder of his days.

Napoleon had forgotten to insert the name of the prince of the Peace in the list of the persons invited. Charles IV., not seeing him, cried out with a vivacity which embarrassed all the attendants, "Where is Emmanuel?" The Emperor desired that the prince of the Peace might be sought for, and this friend, without whom he could no longer exist, was brought to Charles IV.

While Napoleon thus strove to soften the lot of this aged, dethroned, childish king, the empress Josephine watched with her accustomed grace over the queen of Spain, and procured her those fertile amusements which were within her reach, by offering her all the newest and most exquisite personal ornaments of Paris. But the wife of Charles IV. was more difficult to console than her husband, owing to her understanding and her ambition. Nevertheless, she could fully reckon on two consolations—the safety of Emmanuel Godoy and the dethronement of Ferdinand.

Napoleon having loaded his august and unhappy guests with favours, was impatient to arrive at a conclusion, and set to work the various instruments which he had at his disposal. By his desire, Charles IV. addressed a letter to Ferdinand, reminding him of his culpable conduct in the scenes at Aranjuez, his imprudent ambition, his inability to reign over a country which through his delinquency was abandoned to revolutionary agitation, and requiring him to resign the crown. This demand clearly revealed to the councillors of the duped Ferdinand how the negotiations were to be carried on after the arrival of the

old court. It was evident that the crown was demanded from the son in order that it might rest for a certain number of days, or perhaps hours, on the head of his father, and then pass from his aged head to that of a prince of the Bonaparte family.

The advisers of the young king replied to this demand by a very clever letter, in which Ferdinand VII., speaking to his father as a submissive and respectful son, declared himself ready to restore the crown, although he had received it in consequence of a voluntary abdication, subject, however, to two conditions: the first, that Charles IV. would reign himself; the second, that the restoration should take place publicly at Madrid, in presence of the Spanish nation. Without these two conditions, Ferdinand formally refused to restore the crown to his father; because, if the latter would not reign, Ferdinand considered himself as the only legitimate king, in accordance with the laws of the Spanish monarchy; and if the retrocession took place elsewhere than at Madrid, in the very bosom of the assembled nation, it would be neither free, dignified, nor secure.

This reply was able and suitable. But Charles IV. was desired to reply to it, to enlarge on the irregularity of the abdication, on the violence by which it had been brought about, on the incapability of Ferdinand to govern Spain, just awoke out of a long sleep and ready to plunge headlong into revolutions, and on the necessity of confiding to Napoleon the charge of securing the happiness of the people of the Peninsula. The letter concluded by an indication of menacing measures if this obstinacy were persevered in. To this reply the young court opposed a counter-reply, similar to the first reply of Ferdinand VII.

The negotiation did not make any progress, for the interchange of this idle correspondence had occupied from the 1st to the 4th of May. Napoleon began to manifest the most lively impatience, and resolved to declare Ferdinand VII. a rebel, and to restore the crown to Charles IV., who should then transmit it to him, after a delay more or less brief. By the intervention of the prince of the Peace, he, in the first place, caused an act to be drawn up, by which Charles IV. declared himself the sole legitimate king of the Spanish dominions, but that, being himself incapable of exercising his authority, he appointed the grand-duke of Berg his lieutenant, confided to him his royal powers, and especially the command of the troops. Napoleon regarded this transition as necessary in passing the royalty from the Bourbons to the Bonapartes. He hurried the despatch of this decree with the reiterated order given a few days before, that all the Spanish princes still remaining in Madrid should quit it immediately; the youngest of the infants, Don Francisco de Paula, Don Antonio, uncle of Ferdinand, and president of the junta, and the queen of Etruria, who had been prevented by indisposition from accompanying her parents. After having taken these measures, he prepared to put an end to the scenes of Bayonne by a solution which he himself

intended to propose, when the events of Madrid facilitated the *dénouement* which he desired by enabling him to dispense with the employment of force.

While Napoleon corresponded with Madrid, Ferdinand VII., on his side, neglected nothing to transmit thither intelligence which was calculated to enlist the national interest in his favour, and above all counteract the bad effect which his indiscreet conduct had produced. He was not ignorant that the Spaniards felt as much pity, and almost as much dislike, to his person as to that of his aged father, for having fallen into the snare laid by Napoleon. He therefore, by means of couriers, who set out from Bayonne in disguise, and traversed the mountains of Aragon to gain Madrid, spread abroad such intelligence as he deemed most likely to reinstate him in the public opinion. He made known that they wished to treat him with treachery and violence at Bayonne, in order to wrench from him the sacrifice of his rights, but that he resisted, and would resist every menace, and that his people should hear of his death rather than of his submission to the wishes of the foreigner. He depicted himself as the most noble, the most interesting of victims, so as to enlist every generous heart in his favour.

These couriers, in order to avoid the direct route, which was covered with French troops, lost a day or two in reaching Madrid, but they all arrived there safely, and the news which they carried, and which was rapidly spread, regained Ferdinand VII. the good feeling which had for a moment been alienated. The universally credited report that Ferdinand VII. was the object of brutal violence at Bayonne, and that he opposed it by heroic resistance, regained him the favour of the populace of the capital, numerically strengthened, as we have already said, by the idle peasants from the environs.

Unable to have recourse to the press, which was closely watched by the agents of Murat, manuscript bulletins were employed, and these bulletins, reproduced in profusion, and circulated with incredible rapidity, excited the passions of the people to the highest pitch.

The junta of the government, profoundly dissembling its secret sentiments, affected great deference for the desires of Murat, but devoted, as was natural, to Ferdinand VII., it was, in fact, the agent of the communications with Bayonne, and of the publications which resulted from it. It despatched emissaries to Ferdinand, to ascertain whether he wished it to withdraw itself from the French,—whether it should in some place proclaim the legitimate sovereign, provoke a rising of the nation, and declare war against the usurper. While waiting for a reply to these propositions, the junta, after interminable delays, yielded to the demands of Murat, which were calculated to serve the designs of Napoleon.

Among these demands, one had caused much perplexity

in the junta; it was that which required that all the members of the royal family still in Madrid should be sent to Bayonne. On the one hand, the old queen of Spain desired that the young infant Don Francisco, who had been left behind in consequence of the state of his health, should be sent to her; on the other hand, the queen of Etruria, who had remained at Madrid from a similar cause, was herself urgent to go, terrified at the state of agitation which was daily increasing among the Spaniards. Murat, who had been commissioned by the Emperor to make all the members of the royal family repair to Bayonne, imperiously demanded this two-fold departure. With regard to the queen of Etruria there could be no difficulty whatever, because she was an independent princess, and was anxious to depart; but with regard to the young infant Don Francisco, who, on account of his age, was placed under royal authority, he was actually dependent on the junta of the government, which exercised that authority in the absence of the king.

The junta easily divined the motives of these successive departures, and assembled, during the night between the 30th of April to the 1st of May, to deliberate on the demand of Murat. The numbers were augmented by the adjunction of the divers presidents of the councils of Castille and the Indies, and several members of those councils. The sitting was extremely agitated. Some of the members demanded that a positive refusal should be given to a proposition, the evident object of which was to remove the last representatives of the royal family; and that, rather than yield, open resistance should be resorted to.

The minister of war, M. O'Farrill, exposed the state of the army, the corps of which were disorganised and dispersed, some in the North, some in Portugal, and some on the coasts, which did not leave in Madrid at this present moment a combined force of more than 3000 military. Men of more ardent temperaments proposed that the populace should be supplied with knives and fowling-pieces, and the nation seek its safety in one grand act of popular desperation. The majority were of opinion that Murat should be answered by a dissembled refusal, and everything avoided that might provoke a collision.

Besides the junta, a party of patriots, discontented at what they called its weakness, desired that the departure of the infants should be prevented by every possible means, and infused their passions into the people; though certainly there was not much necessity for exciting them.

The 1st of May, which fell on a Sunday, attracted an immense concourse of country people into the city; and wild, energetic figures, mingled amid the numerous groups which took their stations in the different squares of Madrid. At the Puerto del Sol, a large square situated in the centre of the city, from which issue the principal streets, such as that of Mayor, Alcala, Montera, and las Carretas, a dense and menacing crowd was

assembled. Murat sent thither a few hundred dragoons, whose very appearance dispersed the multitude, and compelled them to remain tranquil.

Murat, to whom the junta had communicated its refusal in very mild terms, replied that he should take no notice whatever of it, and that, on the following morning, the 2nd of May, he should make the queen of Etruria and the infant Don Francisco set out; a declaration to which the junta did not give any reply.

The next morning, at eight o'clock, the court carriages accordingly drew up before the palace to receive the royal personages. The queen of Etruria displayed great readiness to depart; but the infant Don Francisco burst into tears, so at least it was reported, at the gates of the palace. These details passed from mouth to mouth in the ranks of the assembled throng, and produced a lively agitation. Suddenly an aide-de-camp of Murat's arrived, having been sent by him to pay his respects to the queen at the moment of her departure. At the sight of the French uniform, the populace raised a shout, pelted the aide-de-camp with stones, and were preparing to murder him, when a dozen grenadiers of the imperial guard, who were on duty at the palace occupied by Murat, whence the tumult could be seen, rushed into the thick of the crowd, bayonet in hand, and rescued the aide-de-camp, who was on the very point of being massacred. Some discharges of musketry which were fired in this conflict were the signal for a general rising, and a universal firing was heard on all sides. A furious populace, composed chiefly of the peasants who had come from the environs, threw themselves upon the French officers who were dispersed in the various houses of Madrid in spite of the recommendations of Napoleon, and upon the detached soldiers who came by squadrons to receive their rations. Several were slaughtered with horrible ferocity, while others were indebted for their lives to the humanity of the citizens, who concealed them in their houses.

Murat mounted his horse at the first alarm, and issued his orders with the resolve of a general who is accustomed to all the chances of war. He ordered the troops of the camp to fall back and enter Madrid by all the gates at the same moment. The most distant, those under general Grouchy, stationed near Buen Retiro, were to enter by the main streets of San Geronimo and Alcala, and march towards the Puerto del Sol; while colonel Frederichs, setting out with the fusiliers who were keeping guard at the palace situated at the opposite extremity, were to go by Mayor-street, to meet general Grouchy, towards the Puerto del Sol, which was the centre of the movement. General Lefranc, who was stationed at the convent of St. Bernard, was to march thither concentrically by the gate of Fuencarral. At the same instant the cuirassiers and the cavalry, arriving by the road of Caravanchel, received orders to advance by the gate of Toledo.

Murat, at the head of the cavalry of the guard, was in the rear of the palace at the foot of the height of St. Vincent, near the gate by which those troops that were on duty at the royal palace del Campo were to enter. Thus, placed just without the populous quarters, and in a commanding position, he could readily repair wherever his presence might be required.

The action commenced in the square of the palace, whither Murat had directed a battalion of the infantry of the guard, preceded by a battery. A shower of musketry, followed by a volley of grape-shot, very speedily cleared the square. The people fled with such precipitation, that, as is generally the case in occurrences of this kind, the number of victims was comparatively small.

Colonel Frederichs marched with his fusiliers by the streets Plateria and Mayor towards the Puerto del Sol, whither the troops of general Grouchy were also marching by the streets Alcala and St. Geronimo. Our soldiers, young and old, advanced with that steadiness for which they were indebted to experienced and warlike leaders. The populace, backed by the peasants, who were braver than themselves, could not hold out; but, stopping at the corner of the cross streets, fired upon our soldiers, and then disappeared into the houses, in order to fire from the windows. They were pursued by our soldiers, despatched with the bayonet, and the fanatics found with arms in their hands were thrown from the windows.

The two French columns, marching to meet one another, had enclosed in the centre, that is to say, in the Puerta del Sol, the infuriated mob, which by its denseness formed an obstacle, and had not even the liberty of flight. The most obstinate among the crowd fired upon our troops. Several squadrons of the chasseurs, and the Mamelukes of the guard, rushed, sabre in hand, amid this mass of people, and compelled them to disperse by every outlet that was still left open. The Mamelukes especially used their curved sabres with great dexterity, cutting off the heads of several with a stroke, and thus spread a panic, the remembrance of which left a lasting impression upon the people of Madrid. The crowd, repelled on every side, had no other resource than to take refuge in the houses, and to fire from the windows. The troops of general Grouchy had many a murderous execution to perform in the street of St. Geronimo, especially in the hotel of the duke de Híjar, whence a deadly fire had issued.

The troops under general Lefranc sustained a very obstinate combat at the arsenal, where a part of the garrison of Madrid had been shut up with orders not to fight. The insurgents, having repaired thither, fired upon our troops, and the corps of Spanish artillery was then compelled, in spite of itself, to enter into the combat. The storming of a strong edifice, while exposed to the fire of the enemy, who sent a brisk shower of musketry upon us

from every part, cost us several men. But our soldiers led the assault with energy, dislodged the defenders, and made them pay dear for this engagement. The arsenal was carried before the people had time to take possession of the arms and ammunition.

Two or three hours sufficed to suppress this sedition, and after the taking of the arsenal only a few isolated shots were heard here and there. Murat had constituted a court-martial at the post-office, which ordered the immediate execution of all the peasants who were seized with arms in their hands. Some of these, by way of example, were shot on the spot, upon the Prado itself; while others, who endeavoured to fly to the environs, were pursued by the cuirassiers, and cut down by their sabres. The troops of the camp who arrived at this instant found no occasion to use their arms. Everything was quieted by the terror of prompt repression, and by the presence of the ministers, O'Farrill and Azanza, who, accompanied by general Harispe, chief of Murat's staff, put a stop to this combat wherever there was yet any trace of it. They demanded, and their request was granted without difficulty, that an immediate stop should be put to the executions which had been ordered by the court-martial established at the post-office.

This fatal morning, which was afterwards to be most fearfully re-echoed throughout Spain, had the immediate effect of restraining the populace of Madrid, by taking from them every illusion of their strength, and teaching them that our young soldiers, led on by experienced officers, were as invincible to the ferocious peasants of Spain, as they were at Essling and Wagram to the most disciplined soldiers of Europe.

The infant Don Antonio, who at the nocturnal session of the junta had not been one of the fomenters of the revolt, but had even appeared annoyed at the braggings of the partisans of the insurrectionary movement, said to Murat in the evening, like a man who was able to breathe after a long fatigue, "At length they will cease to reiterate that peasants armed with knives will be able to rout the regular troops."

The impression, in fact, upon the people of Madrid, was profound, and in their excitement they stated and believed that several thousand of their fellow-citizens had been killed or wounded. However, there were not many after all, for the insurgents scarcely lost 400 men, and the French about 100 at the most. But terror, as usual, magnified these numbers, and gave a moral importance to this morning very superior to its material importance.

From this moment Murat could act as he pleased. On the following morning he sent off not only the infant Don Francisco, but the queen of Etruria, her son, and the aged infant Don Antonio himself, who was imbued with all the sentiments of the insurgents save their energy, and who asked for nothing better than to go to Bayonne and find there, what all the other princes of Spain expected to find, repose with certain losses. The infant

Don Antonio readily consented to set out immediately, and abandoned the presidency of the junta of the government without even informing that body of his intentions.

Murat had now received the decree of Charles IV., which conferred on him the lieutenancy-general of the kingdom. He summoned the junta, made them accept him as president in the room of Don Antonio, and was from this moment invested with all the powers of royalty. He took up his abode in the palace, where he occupied the apartments of the prince of the Asturias, and, resuming, in his correspondence with Napoleon, his habitual language, he wrote that the entire force of resistance on the part of the Spaniards was exhausted on the morning of the 2nd of May; that it was only needful to designate the king destined for Spain, and that this king would reign without obstacle. In more letters than one he had already stated, as a fact, which he cited without comment, that the Spaniards, impatient to be relieved from their long and painful anxieties, frequently cried out, "Let us run to the grand-duke de Berg and proclaim him king." There was, however, some truth in these vain allusions; if they were to have a French king, Murat, by his military renown, his courtly bearing, his southern bravadoes, his presence at Madrid, would have been the most readily accepted by the Spanish nation.

The news from Madrid arrived at Bayonne on the 5th of May, at four o'clock in the afternoon. When he received it, Napoleon saw at a glance that it was the very means of producing that shock which he needed for terminating this lengthened species of negotiation with the Spanish princes. He immediately went to Charles IV., with the despatch of Murat in his hand, and displayed much more irritation than he really felt at these Sicilian vespers which had been attempted in the streets of Madrid. He loved his soldiers, but he who could sacrifice 10,000 or 20,000 in one morning was not the man to regret the loss of a paltry 100 for so great an achievement as the conquest of the throne of Spain. However, he pretended to be extremely angry in the presence of these aged sovereigns, who were terrified to see the violence of the man upon whom they were dependent. The infants, with Ferdinand VII. at their head, were immediately summoned. As soon as they entered the apartment of their parents, they were apostrophised by their father and mother with extreme violence. "See what you have done, sir!" exclaimed Charles IV. "The blood of my subjects has flowed, and the blood of the soldiers of my friend, my ally, the great Napoleon, has also been shed. See to what ravages you would expose Spain if we had had to deal with a less generous conqueror! Look at the consequences of all that you and your friends have done, in order that you might enjoy some few days too soon that crown which I was in as much haste as you were to place upon your head. It is you who have unchained the people, and there is no longer a master over them

to-day. Restore, restore that crown which is too weighty for you, and give it to him who alone is capable of bearing it."

While uttering these words, the aged king, who was condemned to act this afflicting comedy, kept brandishing a long gold-headed cane, upon which, in consequence of his infirmities, he generally leaned, and it was evident to all present that he menaced his son with it.

The father had scarcely finished, when the aged queen, with a violence which was certainly not feigned, flew upon Ferdinand, loaded him with abuse, reproached him with being a wicked son, with having wished to dethrone his father, with having desired to murder his mother, with being false, perfidious, heartless, without bowels of compassion, &c., &c.

While listening to all these apostrophes, Ferdinand VII. stood immovable, his eyes rivetted on the floor with a sort of stupified insensibility. He said nothing, he manifested nothing, but he suffered everything. Several times his mother called upon him to answer, went up to him, menaced him with her hand, and exclaimed, "Yes, I see very well you are just as you always were. Whenever your father and I wished to give you any exhortations which were for your own interest, you held your tongue, and only replied to our counsels by silence and hatred. Speak to your father, sir, to your mother, to our friend, our protector, the great Napoleon." But the prince, quite insensible, was perfectly silent, merely affirming, in a quiet way, that he had nothing whatever to do with the disturbances of the 2nd of May.

Napoleon, greatly embarrassed, nay, almost confused at a scene like this, although it furthered the solution he desired, said to Ferdinand, in a cold but imperious tone, that if he had not resigned the crown to his father that same evening, he should be treated as a rebellious son, the author or accomplice of a conspiracy which, on the days of the 17th, 18th, and 19th of March, had ended in depriving the legitimate sovereign of his crown. He then retired to Marac to wait for the prince of the Peace, for the purpose of concluding with him a definitive arrangement, under the present impression of the events at Madrid.

"What a mother! what a son!" cried Napoleon, as he returned to Marac, addressing those around him. "The prince of the Peace is certainly a very inferior sort of person, that is true enough; but, after all, he is perhaps the least incompetent of this degenerate court. He proposed to them the only reasonable idea—an idea which might have led to great results had it been carried out with courage and resolution: it was this, to go and found a Spanish empire in America, there to save both the dynasty and the finest part of the patrimony of Charles V. But they could do nothing that was noble or great. The old people by their want of energy, the son by his perfidy, have ruined this design, and now behold them actually denouncing each other to the very

power upon which they are dependent." Napoleon spoke long, grandly, and with rare eloquence, on the vast subject of America, of Spain, of the translation of the Bourbons into the Indian empire. After having judged others, he proceeded to judge himself, for he added these words: "What I am doing now is not good in a certain point of view; I know that well enough; but policy demands that I should not leave in my rear, and that too so near Paris, a dynasty inimical to mine."

That evening the prince of the Peace went to Marac, and the results which Napoleon obtained by means so deeply to be regretted, was defined in the following treaty, which was signed by the prince of the Peace himself and by the grand-marshal Duroc:—

"Charles IV., recognising the impossibility that he and his family should secure the peace of Spain, resigns the crown, of which he declares himself the sole legitimate possessor, to Napoleon, that he may dispose of it as it shall seem good to him. He resigns it to him on the following conditions:—

"I. The integrity of the soil of Spain and of its colonies, no portion whatsoever of which shall be severed.

"II. The preservation of the Catholic faith as the dominant religion, to the exclusion of every other.

"III. That Charles IV. shall, for his life, have the château and forest of Compiègne and the château of Chambord in perpetuity, together with a civil list of 30,000,000 reals (9,500,000 francs), to be paid by the treasury of France.

"IV. A proportionable revenue for all the princes of the royal family."

Ferdinand VII. had returned home; his eyes were at length opened to his actual situation, and the firm resolve of Napoleon not only to intimidate but to dethrone him. His counsellors also were undeceived; among them, one only, the canon Escoiquiz, though he was not the least honest, nevertheless gave his young master the most undignified counsel; namely, to accept the crown of Etruria, in order that Ferdinand might remain king of some place, and he, Escoiquiz, the director of some king, it mattered not of what realm.

The other counsellors, with more reason, conceived that this would be tantamount to a declaration to Spain that it need not take any further steps with regard to Ferdinand, since he accepted a foreign crown as an indemnification for that which had been snatched from him. They conceived that, to accept nothing save an alimentary pension, would be an indication to Spain that he had been dealt with treacherously, that he protested against this treachery; that, in fine, he always thought of Spain, and consequently she ought always to think of him.

Ferdinand VII., however, signed a treaty in his turn, by which Napoleon secured to him the château of Navarre, with a net revenue of 1,000,000 francs, besides 400,000 francs for each of the

infants, on condition of their common renunciation of the crown of Spain.

A couple of châteaux and 10,000,000 francs a-year were the price that was to be paid to the father and the children for this magnificent crown of Spain; a very moderate, nay, a very mean price; but to this was to be added a fearful complement then unknown—six years' hateful war, the death of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, the lamentable division of the forces of the Empire, and an indelible stain upon the glory of the conqueror.

Napoleon, who, blinded by power, did not foresee the consequences of this fatal step, hastened to execute the conditions. Success restored his natural generosity. He gave orders that every possible attention should be shown to a family which had just fallen beneath the strokes of his policy, as so many others had fallen beneath the strokes of his sword. He charged the prince Cambacérès to receive the aged sovereigns; and, while the necessary arrangements were completing at Compiègne, he wished them to have a first essay of French hospitality at Fontainebleau, a place which was more calculated than any other to afford pleasure to Charles IV. He assigned to them the company of the aged and mild arch-chancellor as more congenial to their humour. This was the first intimation of the affair of Spain which Napoleon gave to this grave personage, for he dared no longer speak to him of projects which could not bear the scrutiny of a politician who was as wise as he was devoted.

As for the young prince, he assigned to him the château of Valençay as a residence until that of Navarre should be completed, and as a companion he gave a man as subtle as he was dissipated, the prince de Talleyrand,* who had lately become proprietor of this same château of Valençay by an act of imperial munificence. Napoleon wrote to him the following letter, for Napoleon executed with the refinement of the manners of the nineteenth century a policy which was worthy of the knavery of the fifteenth:—

“ *To the Prince de Bénévent.*

“ Bayonne, May 9th, 1808.

“ The prince of the Asturias, the infant Don Antonio his uncle, and the infant Don Carlos his brother, will set out from this place on Wednesday next, rest on Friday and Saturday at Bordeaux, and on the following Wednesday reach Valençay. Be there on Monday evening. My chamberlain de Tournon will proceed thither by post, in order to prepare everything for their reception. Take care that there be plenty of table and bed linen, and that the kitchen be well supplied. There will be about ten or twelve persons in their train, and double the number of servants. I have given orders to the general who acts as chief inspector of the gendarmerie at Paris to go thither and organise the service of *surveillance*.

"I desire that the princes be received without external pomp, but heartily and with sympathy, and that you do everything in your power to amuse them. If you have a theatre at Valençay, and can engage some comedians to come, it will not be a bad plan. You had better bring madame de Talleyrand thither, with four or five other ladies. If the prince of the Asturias should fall in love with some pretty woman it would not be amiss, especially if we were sure of her. It is a matter of great importance to me that the prince of the Asturias should not take any false step. I desire, therefore, that he be amused and occupied. Stern policy would demand that I should shut him up in Bitché, or some other fortress; but, as he has thrown himself into my arms, and has promised to do nothing without my orders, and that everything shall go on in Spain as I desire, I have adopted the plan of sending him to a country-seat, surrounding him with pleasure and *surveillance*. This will probably last throughout the month of May and a part of June, when the affairs of Spain may have taken a turn, and I shall then know what part to act.

"With regard to yourself, your mission is extremely honourable. To receive under your roof three illustrious personages, in order to amuse them, is quite in keeping with the character of the nation, and also with your rank."

Charles IV. quitted the frontier of Spain with a broken heart, for he bade adieu to his native land, to his throne, and to those habits which had always constituted his pleasure, so far at least as he was capable of enjoyment. The popular agitation, however, of which he had seen the first indications, had so greatly troubled him, and the intestine divisions of his family had so overwhelmed him with grief, that he fondly consoled himself for his fall with the prospects of finding in France security, rest, an opulent retreat, religious exercises, and the fine hunting grounds of Compiègne. His aged consort, disconsolate at the loss of her throne, had also more than one indemnification: revenge, the secured presence of the prince of the Peace, and ample revenues.

Ferdinand VII., who had passed from stupid blindness to positive terror, was full of regrets; and few will conjecture the subject of these regrets. He regretted having sent to the junta of the government, in reply to its interrogations, the secret order to convoke the Cortes, to excite the nation to rise, and to make open war upon the French. He dreaded lest the execution of this order should irritate Napoleon, and place in jeopardy his own person, his allowance, and the estate of Navarre. He therefore sent a fresh messenger, and recommended the junta to act with extreme prudence, counselling that it should do nothing that might alienate the French. Not content with this precautionary measure, he had scarcely set out for Valençay when he wrote to Napoleon, to ask for one of his nieces in marriage; and not forgetting his preceptor, Escorquiz, he requested for him the confirmation of two royal favours which he had conferred on him

on succeeding his father, which favours consisted in the grand *cordon* of Charles III., and the appointment of councillor of state! It is evident that the victims of Napoleon's ambition might charge themselves with having annihilated all remorse in him, and all interest in the public.

Napoleon, master of the crown of Spain, hastened to dispose of it. This crown, the most illustrious next to that of France of all the crowns which he had had at his command, seemed to him to belong of right to his brother Joseph, now king of the peaceful and considerable kingdom of Naples. Napoleon was led to this choice by affection in the first instance, for he preferred Joseph to his other brothers; secondly, by a certain respect for hierarchy, because Joseph was the eldest; and lastly, by confidence, for he had more in him than in any of his other brothers. He considered Jerome devoted to him, but too young; Louis honest, but so soured by illness, domestic troubles, and pride, that he deemed him capable of taking the most vexatious steps. With regard to Joseph, while he reproached him for an excess of vanity and weakness, he nevertheless judged him a sensible man, mild, and very much attached to his person; and he resolved that to him alone he would confide that important kingdom which lay so near France. This choice was by no means the least fault which Napoleon committed in this fatal affair of Spain. Joseph could not possibly be at Madrid before the expiration of two months, and these two months would suffice to decide upon the submission or insurrection of Spain. He was weak, inactive, not much of a soldier, and quite incapable of commanding the Spaniards or inspiring them with respect.

Murat, on the other hand, was actually at Madrid; he was liked by the Spaniards, and, by the promptness of his resolutions, was the very man to stifle an insurrection at its birth; from being accustomed to command the army in the absence of Napoleon, he knew how to make the French generals obey him: to Murat, therefore, ought to have been confided the charge of restraining and gaining the Spaniards. But Napoleon had confidence in none but his brothers; he saw in Murat merely a simple ally; he was afraid of his levity and the ambition of his wife, although she was his own sister, and he determined to give him only the kingdom of Naples.

He accordingly wrote to Joseph as follows:—

"King Charles, by a treaty which I have just concluded with him, has ceded to me all his rights to the crown of Spain. * * * This crown I have destined for you. The kingdom of Naples cannot be compared with Spain; there are eleven millions of inhabitants, a revenue of above 150 millions, and the possession of America. Besides this, it is the crown which will place you at Madrid, three days' journey from France, and which entirely defends one of its frontiers. At Madrid you are actually in France; Naples is at the other end of the world.

"I desire therefore that, immediately on the receipt of this letter, you will commit the regency to whomsoever you please, and the command of the troops to marshal Jourdan, and that you set out for Bayonne by the shortest route possible, Turin, Mont Cenis, and Lyons. * * * Keep the secret from everybody; as it is, it will only be suspected too readily. * * * &c. &c."

Such was the simple and expeditious manner in which crowns were then disposed of, nay, even the crown of Charles V. and of Philip II.

Napoleon wrote to Murat to inform him of what had passed at Bayonne, announced that he had made choice of Joseph to reign in Spain, the consequent vacancy of the kingdom of Naples, which, added to the vacancy of the kingdom of Portugal (for the treaty of Fontainebleau vanished with Charles IV.), left an option between two vacant thrones. Napoleon, in the same despatch, offered Murat the choice of whichever of the two he preferred, leading him, however, to prefer that of Naples, because, by the maritime projects which he meditated, before securing Sicily to him, this kingdom would, as formerly, comprise about six millions of inhabitants. He enjoined him, meanwhile, to make himself master of Madrid with all authority, to make sure of it with the greatest vigour, to inform the junta of the government, the councils of Castille and the Indies, of the renunciation of Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII., and to compel these divers bodies to ask for Joseph Bonaparté as king of Spain.

It would be difficult to form any idea of the surprise and grief of Murat in learning the choice, however natural, which Napoleon had just decreed. The command of the French armies in the Peninsula, so speedily converted into the lieutenantancy-general of a kingdom, had appeared to him a certain presage of his elevation to the throne of Spain. The overthrow of all his hopes was a blow that profoundly shook, not his mind only, but even his strong constitution, the proof of which was speedily visible. The fair crown of Naples, with which Napoleon sought to dazzle his eyes, was far from indemnifying him, and appeared to him nothing better than a painful disgrace. He nevertheless refrained—so great was his submission to his all-powerful brother-in-law—from testifying to him any discontent; but in his reply he maintained a silence upon this subject which plainly proved what he felt, and clearly showed M. de la Forêt, who had made himself master of his confidence, the painful sentiments that filled his breast. M. de la Forêt, formerly minister at Berlin, had been sent to him in place of M. de Beauharnais, punished by an unmerited recall for blunders which he had committed, and which were inevitable in the situation in which he was placed, even if he had been more skilful.

Murat had, however, still one chance; namely, that Joseph would not accept the crown of Spain, or that the very difficulties of its transmission to a prince removed to a distance from Madrid,

and who had not in his hands the reins of the Spanish government, might induce Napoleon to change his mind. He therefore tried to conquer his painful emotion, conceived a sort of hope, and laboured sincerely to execute the orders he had received. The junta of the government, no longer under the presidency of Don Antonio, and enlarged as we have seen by several members of the councils of Castille and the Indies, was naturally attached to Ferdinand VII., for the men who composed it were Spaniards at heart; but they were irresolute, and knew not what part to take to promote the interests of their country. As Spaniards, it cost them much to renounce the ancient dynasty, which for a century had reigned over Spain, and was as completely identified with the country as if it had descended directly from Ferdinand and Isabella. This attachment on their part was strengthened by the energetic passions of the people, who, excited by hatred to foreigners, by their aversion to the favourite Godoy, saw in Ferdinand VII. the victim of both, and were everywhere disposed to insurrection. But they were restrained by the apprehensions entertained by all men of discernment, that, if opposition were made to the French, they should see Spain turned into a field of battle for the armies of Europe; a fanatic and barbarian populace entering the lists, to the detriment of all men of honour; and, lastly, the colonies shaking off the yoke of Spain, or perhaps opening their arms to the English. Such was the conflict of ideas which made the junta hesitate, and agitated the breast of every Spaniard who understood and cherished the interests of his country.

Where the mind is uncertain the conduct will be so also. The junta, and with it the enlightened classes, acted therefore amid these grave occurrences an indecisive and equivocal part. In receiving the renunciations of Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII., and the declarations by which these princes released the Spaniards from their oath of allegiance, the members of the junta, though firmly persuaded that these renunciations had been extorted by force, felt disposed to bow before a superior destiny. The recent recommendations of Ferdinand VII., which engaged them to abstain from every act of imprudence, gave the finishing stroke to confirm them in this resolution. They were, however, for a moment in painful uncertainty, when the reply to the former questions of the junta, inquiring whether they should assemble in any other place than Madrid, convoke the Cortes, and make national war upon the French, reached them by a secret messenger, who had lost much time in traversing the Castilles. The first reply to these questions had been in the affirmative, as will be remembered, and was dated on the morning of the 5th of May, shortly before that eventful scene took place at the residence of the aged monarch Charles IV. which had decided the renunciations.

After mature reflection, the members of the junta, considering that what had since passed between the father and the son had completely changed the face of things, induced Ferdinand VII. to

resign his royalty, and himself to counsel them to act with prudence, conceived that they could take no account of orders which were annulled by posterior resolutions. It therefore testified its perfect resignation to Murat, its readiness to obey his commands, and to recognise the king whom Napoleon should give them. Those especially who, from conviction or interest, adopted the idea of a change of dynasty—the marquis de Caballero for example—were disposed to serve the new sovereign with great energy, especially if Murat, with whom they were acquainted, was to be invested with that dignity.

Murat, however, had more to demand from them than passive concurrence. He had orders to elicit from the junta and the councils of Castille and the Indies the formal demand of Joseph Bonaparte as king of Spain. This was too much for the weakness of some and the interested calculations of others. To drop the rights of the house of Bourbon, without taking upon themselves the responsibility of a change of dynasty, was all that could have been expected from them. To compromise themselves for a new prince, on condition of doing so before his face, and thus to acquire all his favour, might have suited ambitious minds; but it was not in accordance with their feelings to compromise themselves for an absent prince, who was unknown, and was not even witness of the ardour manifested in his service.

Murat, therefore, found their courage completely cooled when he proposed to the junta that it should concert with the councils of Castille and the Indies to call Joseph Bonaparte to the throne of Spain. Some did not conceal their apprehensions, others their want of zeal for the interests of an absent king. In all this there was much to flatter the secret inclinations of Murat, for it was evident that the initiative of the Spanish authorities would have been far more easily obtained, if he himself had been proposed, both because he pleased, and because he was upon the spot. He did not, however, on this account, insist the less urgently and energetically with the Spanish authorities, in order to extort from them what he had been commissioned to obtain.

The councils of Castille and of the Indies, which in some respects answered, as we have already said, to the former French parliaments, had always sought occasion to extend their power; now, however, far from seeking to extend it, they availed themselves of its circumscribed limits, and exclaimed against the pretension which was suggested to them of trenching upon the rights of the throne, and of deciding whether one dynasty had deserved to descend from it and another to mount it. However, after numerous and active negotiations, in which the marquis de Caballero was the negotiator, the councils of Castille and the Indies agreed upon a declaration, to the effect that, in case Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII. should have definitively renounced their rights to the crown, the sovereign whom they considered most capable of promoting the happiness of Spain was the prince

Joseph Bonaparte, who reigned with so much wisdom in a part of the ancient Spanish patrimony in the kingdom of Naples. Thus the councils did not take upon themselves to pronounce on the rights of Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII., but confined themselves, in case of a well recognised vacancy of the throne, to signify a preference, which, after all, amounted to no more than a mark of high consideration for one of the most esteemed princes of the family of Bonaparte.

Murat transmitted this result to Napoleon, without concealing from him the trouble it had cost him to obtain it, and the extreme difficulties which an absent candidate would meet with. It was easy to perceive that he expressed a sort of satisfaction in seeing objections started against the candidacy of prince Joseph which might revive his own. Napoleon, who was not in the habit of sparing him, refrained nevertheless from irritating him at a moment when he stood in need of his zeal, and contented himself with addressing to M. de la Forêt the most violent and unjust reprimands, saying that he had placed him near the person of prince Murat in order that he might give him wise and good counsels, not flatter his inclinations; that the indecision which was met with at Madrid proceeded only from the weakness of action displayed before the Spanish authorities; that the grand-duke of Berg was lulling himself with the hope of reigning over Spain, and that his conduct evidenced this; that this was a vain delusion, which must be crushed, for no one in Spain would ever think of having him for king; that it would never be forgotten that he was the author of the whole plot which had effected the dispossession of the fallen family, and the general who had commanded the slaughter of the 2nd of May; that a prince who was a stranger to all these acts, to whom no recollections of intrigue or rigour were attached, would be far better received; and that the reward of the services rendered by prince Murat would be the kingdom of Naples, destined to become vacant by the very success of what had been done at Madrid.

This reprimand, which was addressed to M. de la Forêt in order that it might come to the ears of Murat, was a melancholy reward to the latter for his complaisance in seconding an odious machination: a melancholy reward, we say, but a well-merited reward, for thus should all those be treated who lend their aid to guilty designs.

After having manifested his discontent to Murat in this indirect way, Napoleon considered that, while waiting for the definitive proclamation of the new dynasty, it would be well to employ the few weeks that must elapse in preparing the administrative reorganisation of Spain. He wished to exonerate himself in the eyes of the statesmen of every country for the act which he had just committed by a marvellous use of the resources of Spain; and no man—for it is impossible to deny this—was more capable than he was of redeeming, by his manner of reigning, the crime

which he had committed in order to reign. The projects which he formed, and which Spain baffled by fanatic and generous resistance, were the most comprehensive, the best combined, which he had ever conceived in his life.

He commenced, in the first instance, by desiring that all the documents made use of by the Spanish administration relative to the finances, the army, and the navy, should be sent to him at Bayonne. Very few were found, for, as we have said elsewhere, the finances were a state secret of the minister of finances, a creature of the prince of the Peace. The distribution of the army and the navy, their condition, their resources, their wants, depended upon local circumstances, which were scarcely known to the central administration at Madrid. When Murat applied, in the name of the Emperor, for a statement of the navy, a printed annual was presented to him; but Napoleon was not the man to be contented with documents such as these. To M. O'Farill, the minister of war, and M. Azanza, the minister of finance, the principal persons of the junta, he sent marks of esteem, and even flattering intimations which might lead them to expect some great favour under the new reign, and requested of them an immediate thorough investigation of every part of the service. He ordered that engineers should forthwith be despatched to every port, and officers to all the principal military stations, to obtain accurate and positive documents on every subject.

The Spaniards were not accustomed to such activity or rigorous precision, but they were at last roused by this all-powerful energy, of which Murat gave a fresh instance on the arrival of every courier, and they sent to Napoleon a tabular statement of the monarchy, a table which we have already made known. It was singular that Napoleon, in demanding these documents, said to Murat, "I shall want them, in the first instance, for the measures which I shall order; and I shall want them afterwards in order that posterity may learn in the sequel in what state I find the Spanish monarchy." Thus he was himself conscious that, in order to justify himself, he should be compelled to demonstrate the state in which he found Spain, and the state in which he hoped to leave her. But avenging Providence granted him only half this justification.

The first and most urgent need of Spain was want of money. Murat had not wherewith to furnish the pay of the troops, or to send the indispensable funds to the ports for sending a few vessels to sea. Ferdinand VII., on his accession to the throne, had found means to dispose of sums in cash which belonged either to the consolidated fund or to the prince of the Peace, and which had been seized the moment the old court had set out for Andalusia. He had employed them in making several large presents, and—what was of more importance—in paying to the annuitants of the State a sum of money of which they

stood in great need, and for which they had been waiting for some months. This done, there was nothing left. Murat, exhausted, and reduced to the necessity of paying his own personal expenses out of the chest of the French army, had informed Napoleon of the desperate state of the finances, and demanded immediate pecuniary aid, relying on the wealth which victory had placed in the hands of Napoleon. But Napoleon, fearful of dissipating a treasure which he had destined as a recompense for his army in case of continued prosperity, or as a fund for creating grand resources of defence in case of reverses, at first replied that he had no money—an answer which he always gave when he was applied to—at all events, when not required for works of beneficence.

Speedily sensible that Spain was actually more denuded than he had supposed, Napoleon reconsidered his refusal, and decided upon succouring her—his first punishment for desiring to be master of her. Nevertheless, he would not suffer his hand to be seen even while conferring a benefit, for he knew that there would be no haste to repay if only himself were known to be the debtor. He therefore pretended to obtain a loan to Spain of 100 millions of reals, 25 millions of francs from the Bank of France upon the crown jewels of Spain, which Charles IV. was, according to his engagements, to have left at Madrid. But the principal of these jewels could not be found, for they had been carried off by the old queen. Napoleon, however, concluded this financial operation upon reasonable conditions, which he obtained the more easily from the Bank as it only lent its name to the treasurer of the army. It was secretly stipulated with the governor of the Bank that Napoleon should furnish the funds and run all the chances of the loan, but that the Bank should act with all the precaution and circumspection of a creditor acting on his own account. In order that no time might be lost, Napoleon instantly threw into the treasury of Spain several millions of the specie which he had accumulated at Bayonne; thus, by his energetic foresight, abridging the delays which are ordinarily attached to all transactions of this nature.

With these first succours, far more efficacious from being in specie and not in royal Vales (paper-money issued by the prince of the Peace at a loss of 50 per cent.), he gave a large sum to the public functionaries and to the army, but he reserved the greater part of his store of cash for the service of the ports, which more than any other he was anxious to re-animate. Although he did not foresee a general insurrection in Spain, especially after all that Murat continued to write him, Napoleon was especially distrustful of the army. He commanded that it should receive a distribution, which, had it been executed in time, might have averted many evils. He was at first very anxious that the troops of general Solano should be sent from Madrid and marched to Andalusia. He subsequently renewed this order, but prescribed that a portion of them should be sent to the camp of St. Roch,

before Gibraltar, another to Portugal, for the purpose of employing them on the coast, where they would be useful rather than dangerous in face of the English. He commanded that the 1st division of general Dupont should instantly be sent from the Escorial to Toledo, and from Toledo to Cordova and Cadiz, to protect the fleet of admiral Rosily, which had become the object of his greatest care since the change of the dynasty was known. He at the same time enjoined that the 2nd division of general Dupont should go to Toledo, and there be ready to support the 1st, and the 3rd to the Escorial, in order that it might be at hand to aid the two others.

He made divers other dispositions for the purpose of reinforcing general Dupont. He added to his first division a strong artillery, 2000 dragoons, and four Swiss regiments, serving in Spain. He announced to the latter that he would take them into his pay, and grant them exactly the same conditions as those which they enjoyed in Spain, not doubting that they would be far prouder to serve Napoleon than Ferdinand VII.; but he added, in writing to Murat, that if these Swiss troops were *in a current of French opinion* they would conduct themselves well, but ill if they were *in a current of Spanish opinion*. He consequently ordered that the two regiments of Preux and of Reding, which had formed part of the garrison of Madrid, should assemble at Talavera, in order to be placed on the route of general Dupont, who should take them up in passing. He commanded that the two Swiss regiments which were at Carthagena and Malaga should assemble at Grenada, whence they should join general Dupont in Andalusia. Among other things, he prescribed to general Junot to march the Spanish troops to the Portuguese frontiers, and to remove the French troops from thence, taking two divisions of the latter, the one towards Upper Castille to Almeida, the other towards Andalusia to Elyas.

There general Dupont was to control the Andalusians with 10,000 French of his 1st division, 4000 or 5000 of the division sent by general Junot, and 5000 Swiss. The Spaniards assembled in the camp of St. Roch were to join him, and in common to protect the interest of the new order of things against the English and the discontented Spaniards. The fleet of admiral Rosily had therefore nothing more to fear.

Napoleon next ordered that a large portion of the Spanish troops stationed in the South should be sent to the Balearic Isles, to Ceuta, and all the other presidencies of Africa, in order that these important points should be well secured against every attack of the English, and also that as few Spanish troops as possible should at this moment remain on the continent of Spain. He made one division go northwards, that is to say, towards Ferrol, for an expedition to the colonies—the importance and object of which will afterwards be seen. Lastly, he desired Murat to dispose of a certain number of those who were stationed in the environs of Madrid, on the route of the Pyrenees, to prepare

them gradually to pass into France, under the pretext that they were to go and share the glory of the Romana division in an expedition for Scania against the English and the Swedes.

A similar disposition was prescribed for the life-guard, which had displayed such hatred to the prince of the Peace and so much devotion to Ferdinand VII., and who for this reason were greatly suspected. A northern campaign, side by side with the French army, was the bait held out to them in making them choose between this glorious mission and their disbandment.

It is impossible duly to conceive a more able distribution; for the Spanish troops, dispersed on the frontiers of the Peninsula, in Africa, in America, and in the north of Europe, moreover, placed everywhere under the *surveillance* of the French army, could no longer be an object of apprehension. Unhappily, however, the unanimous effort of a great nation speedily defeated the most profound combinations of genius.

Let us now come to the dispositions relative to the navy. The first care of Napoleon, in the very first moment, was to secure the Spanish colonies from the dangers of an insurrection, by this means gaining the hearts of the Spainards in securing the interest which most nearly touched them, and exalting their imaginations by finally realising those vast maritime projects which he meditated since the days of Tilsit, but for the carrying out of which he had hitherto, in the first instance, wanted time, and, in the second, the free co-operation of Spain.

Napoleon commenced by commanding multiplied communication, as well with the French colonies as with those of Spain. To this end he sent off from France, from Portugal, and Spain, small vessels bearing proclamations filled with the most seductive promises, with papers emanating from all the commercial companies confirming these proclamations, with commissioners charged to spread them abroad; lastly, with warlike stores and provisions, of which the recent events in Buenos Ayres had revealed the urgent need. All the colonies had, in fact, manifested the greatest zeal to defend the domination of Spain, and their want of arms alone had prevented this zeal from being efficacious. Napoleon, who not only ordered everything, but himself carried those orders into execution wherever he might himself be, had already discovered at Bayonne, a port from which there was at that time a good deal of intercourse with the Spanish colonies, the means of communicating with America. He had there found out a vessel very small, very neatly rigged, very inexpensive to build, almost imperceptible at sea on account of her small sails, and able to escape all the enemy's cruisers. He despatched one which was already complete, immediately caused six others to be put upon the stocks under the name of *mouches* [flies], in order to send them to Spanish America laden with arms and communications for the authorities. One month sufficed to build them; he was therefore sure that he should very soon have an adequate number ready to send out.

He had ascertained, by observations made at Cadiz, that this port was the best for distant expeditions, because vessels steering for the coast of Africa, and running down it as far as the latitude of the trade-winds, were not obliged to double any of the Spanish capes, where they generally encountered the enemy's cruisers. He desired that from this port a multitude of little vessels should be immediately despatched, carrying, like the others, a number of proclamations and warlike stores.

Having provided for frequent communication with the colonies, he turned his attention to sending considerable forces thither. He commanded that armaments should be equipped at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena. A part of the loan granted to Spain was to be employed in this object, and to obtain the double result of gladdening the eyes of the Spaniards by the sight of great maritime activity, and of preparing expeditions capable of saving the colonial possessions. There were at Ferrol two ships of the line and two frigates ready for sea. He commanded that two other vessels should be immediately refitted; that these six ships should be manned, freighted with arms and ammunition, and kept in readiness to receive from 3000 to 4000 soldiers, who were at that moment on their way to Ferrol. This expedition was destined for Rio de la Plata, and, as a few hundred men under the command of a French officer, M. de Liniérs, had sufficed to expel the English from Buenos Ayres, and a hundred French at Caraccas to defeat the attempt of the insurgent Miranda, there was every reason to hope that the sending of such a succour would suffice to secure the vast possessions of South America from every hostile attempt.

At Cadiz there had long been six sail of the line equipped. Napoleon commanded that they should be furnished with whatever they might require in regard to crews and provisions; that to these should be added five other vessels, which the resources of this port, if there were a supply of money, would be adequate to refit, to arm, and to equip. There were already at Cadiz five French ships of the line and several French frigates, under admiral Rosily, the glorious remains, as we have before said, of the disaster of Trafalgar, and as well organised as the best of the English ships. Napoleon wished to reinforce this division by two other vessels, by means of a very ingenious combination, which was highly advantageous to Spain. He sent from the funds of the French treasury the necessary advance for the construction of two new ships, which were to be put on the stocks at Carthagena, a port where ship-building was continually going on, while in that of Cadiz the timber was reserved for repairing the armed fleet. In return for this advance, Spain was to lend France the *Santa Anna* and the *San Carlos*, two magnificent three-deckers, which were to be returned after the completion of the two vessels at Carthagena.

Napoleon prescribed to the battalion of the marines of the guard, from 600 to 700 strong, which had followed the detachments of the guards in Spain, to repair to general Dupont at Cadiz.

Besides these 600 or 700 excellent seamen, admiral Rosily might be able, without weakening his own squadron, to take from it 300 or 400 men, whom general Dupont should replace by giving conscripts from his battalions, and by these means it would be perfectly easy to man the two vessels borrowed from the arsenal at Cadiz. Thus, therefore, there would be immediately at Cadiz seven French sail of the line, five or six Spanish, making in all twelve or thirteen, and, with the five Spanish the equipment of which had been commenced, a total of eighteen, to be employed, as will soon be seen, in the execution of the grandest designs.

At Carthageua, the construction of two new French vessels for the account of France was about to re-animate the works and to re-assemble the dispersed workmen. From this port a squadron of six vessels had sailed for Toulon. There were left two others capable of keeping the sea, and these Napoleon commanded to be immediately armed, and to be joined by several frigates. He enjoined the fleet of Carthageua, which had taken refuge at Mahon, to repair to Toulon or to return to Carthageua, where, with the two vessels which were about to be manned, it would form a division of eight vessels. "Take to yourself the glory," wrote Napoleon to Murat, "of having, during your short administration, re-animated the Spanish navy; it is the best means of attaching the Spaniards to us, and of assigning an honourable motive for our presence among them."

It is easy to see that these preparations, which were calculated to reawaken activity in all the ports of Spain, would act in concert with the naval forces already created throughout the whole extent of the French empire. We have before said that the project of Napoleon was to station in all the ports of Europe, from the Sound to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Toulon, from Toulon to Corfu and Venice, fleets completely equipped, and at the side of these fleets camps, which the return of the grand army would enable him to compose of the finest troops, for the purpose of ruining and disheartening England by the already impending possibility of an immense expedition to every part of the globe—for Sicily, Egypt, Algiers, the Indies, Ireland, nay, England herself. In this way Napoleon showed whither his projects tended, and what they would become by the union of Spain and France under the same authority.

The expedition of Corfu, destined principally for Sicily, had many storms to encounter, but had been master of the Mediterranean for two months, from the 10th of February to the 10th of May. Admiral Ganteaume, who, as we have stated, left Toulon on the 10th of February with the two divisions of Toulon and Rochefort, consisting of ten sail of the line, two frigates, two corvettes, and one flute, encountered a fearful tempest on the night of the 11th. This squadron once dispersed could not rally. With his three-decker, *Le Commerce de Paris*, and the division of Rochefort, he had kept out at sea, doubled Sicily, and arrived in sight of Corfu, which he entered on the 23rd.

Rear-admiral Cosmao, on his part, with four ships of the line, two frigates, two flutes, had long battled with the seas of Sicily, in order to rejoin the admiral; had afterwards gained Cape Santa Maria, the rendezvous which had been assigned at the extremity of the Otranto territory, and, instead of entering Corfu, where he would have found the rest of the fleet, had returned to the gulf, to Tarento, on the false report of the approach of the English squadron.

Admiral Ganteaume, who sailed from Corfu on the 25th of February to join the division of Cosmao, was tossed about by a frightful tempest for nineteen days, and at length fell in with his lieutenant on the 13th of March: thus collecting his ten ships of the line, his two frigates, his two corvettes, and one of his two flutes, he took them back to Corfu. He had there landed a considerable quantity of provisions and stores, and increased the garrison to 6000 men. He was preparing to enter the strait of Messina, to effect the passage of the French troops into Sicily, when he received intelligence from Joseph that the English admiral Strachan was at Palermo with seventeen vessels; he was therefore obliged to return to Toulon, leaving at Corfu his newly-equipped frigates, and taking with him the *Pomone* and the *Pauline*, which had exhausted their stores and worn out their rigging by their prolonged sojourn in that island. He encountered the equinoctial gales, and did not make Toulon till the 10th of April.

This expedition of two months, though greatly impeded by weather, nevertheless gave Napoleon extreme satisfaction, and he ordered that the most pompous eulogiums should be lavished upon the admirals and officers in all the public journals throughout the empire. He arrived at the conclusion that, with a little more daring and more practice, his admirals would be able to attempt great things. He accordingly commanded that admiral Ganteaume's ten ships should be instantly repaired, provided with excellent crews and two good officers—rear-admirals Cosmao and Allemand; to put to sea the *Austerlitz*, the *Breslau*, and the *Donauwerth*, and that there should be added to them two Russian vessels which had taken refuge at Toulon, for which step he had obtained the concurrence of the Russian government. He decreed a new levy of seamen on the coast of Provence, Liguria, Tuscany, and Corsica, with an addition of conscripts for manning the three new vessels, the *Austerlitz*, the *Breslau*, and the *Donauwerth*. He ordered that several frigates and old ships should be equipped as flutes, so that he might be able to embark 2000 men and 800 horses. The arrival of the Spanish division from Carthage, if it came from the Balearic islands to Toulon, would thereby augment by a third or even a fourth the means of transport.

We have spoken of the preparation commanded at Carthage and at Cadiz. General Junot had found at Lisbon two vessels ready for sea, and one on the stocks on the eve of being launched. Napoleon had sent to him several officers and some sailors, and had

desired him to enrol the Danish, Spanish, and Portuguese sailors who might be found unemployed at Lisbon, to man the three Portuguese vessels.

At Rochefort, Napoleon had supplied the place of Allemand's division by three ships of the line already under sail, and a fourth just launched. At Lorient, he had a division consisting of three new ships of the line, besides *Le Vétéran*, which was about to return thither, with several frigates and store-ships. He ordered preparations to be made at the last-mentioned port for the embarkment of 4000 or 5000 men. At Brest, there still remained seven ships of the old fleet in good condition; to these were to be added several frigates and other ships armed *en flûte*, that is to say, having only one tier of guns, so that a very few of them would be capable of embarking 12,000 men. Admiral Villameuz was to command this squadron.

Finally, there were already at Flushing eight new ships of the line, just come down from Antwerp; besides about a dozen others in the course of construction, several of which were ready for launching. Napoleon ordered that a portion of the crews should be detached from the ships forming this flotilla at Boulogne and organised into marine battalions, serving alternately by land and by sea, and made capable of manning ships of war. The flotilla, reduced to such limits as the roads of Boulogne could easily contain, was still sufficiently considerable to transport 80,000 men in two or three trips across the Channel. In the harbour of Texel, king Louis had eight ships of war ready for sea, and several detachments of Dutch troops.

Napoleon had thus forty-two French ships of war, equipped and manned; twenty Spanish ships already equipped or nearly so; ten Dutch, and eleven Russian ships, in the various ports of France; twelve Russian vessels in the Adriatic, together with one or two belonging to Denmark. In addition to all these, he hoped to be able to build thirty-five more ships by the close of the year; namely, twelve at Flushing, one at Brest, five at Lorient, five at Rochefort, one at Bordeaux, one at Lisbon, four at Toulon, one at Genoa, one at Spezzia, and three or four at Venice. These thirty-five ships were already two-thirds finished. He calculated that the completion of all these naval constructions would put him in possession of 131 ships of the line; and his design was to station 7000 men at the Texel, 25,000 at Antwerp, 80,000 at Boulogne, 50,000 at Brest, 10,000 between Lorient and Rochefort, 6000 Spainards at Ferrol, 20,000 French round Lisbon, 30,000 round Cadiz, 20,000 round Carthagena, 25,000 at Toulon, 15,000 at Reggio, and 15,000 at Tarento. With 131 ships of the line, and about 300,000 men always ready to embark at one point or another, it would be easy to keep the English in continual alarm.

Whilst this vast development of force was accomplishing, Napoleon calculated that the English would have ten ships of war in the Baltic, keeping watch over the Russians and the operations in Holland; eight to observe the fleet assembled at

the Texel and at the outlets of the Meuse: twenty-four to oppose the eight or ten at Flushing, the seven at Brest, the four at Lorient, and the three at Rochefort; four to hold in check the expedition at Ferrol, twelve to oppose the armament at Lisbon, twenty to make head against the armament at Cadiz, and twenty-two or twenty-four against the armament at Toulon. For all this, 102 ships were required, to say nothing of the naval forces necessary to be kept up on the coasts of America, India, and other parts of the world. It must inevitably have been ruinous to Great Britain to condemn her to a continuance of these efforts for the space of two or three years.

But Napoleon was not disposed to confine himself to empty threats, whatever degree of alarm or expense it might occasion to England. He determined to direct his immense preparations to two immediate results; viz., an expedition to India, and one to Egypt. This two-fold scheme engrossed his whole attention whenever it was diverted from the straits of Calais. He had given orders for adding to the divisions of ships armed for war a certain number of transports, consisting of old frigates and other vessels armed *en flûte*, and capable of conveying numerous forces and great quantities of provisions, without the inconvenience of numerous vessels. By this means he could embark 12,000 men at Brest, 4000 or 5000 at Lorient, 5000 at Rochefort, all with supplies of provisions for six months. At Toulon there were arrangements for embarking 20,000 men, with provisions for three years. At Cadiz he had given orders for similar preparations for 20,000 men, but with reference to a more remote period.

Profiting by the perplexity of England, when thus menaced on all points at once, it was determined that the Lorient expedition should be the first to sail, conveying 4000 or 5000 men to the Isle of France. This augmentation of troops, ammunition, and naval force, would render the Isle of France a formidable post to the trade of India. The Brest expedition was to be the next in the order of departure. In the event of its also reaching the Isle of France, general Decaen, with a force of between 16,000 and 17,000 troops, and a powerful squadron, would be enabled to overthrow, or at least to shake, the British empire in India. After the lapse of a little time, admiral Ganteaume, with 20,000 men, was to proceed either to Sicily or Egypt, whilst the fleet at Cadiz would follow in the one or the other direction. The least important result that might be expected from these combined movements, would be the conveyance of supplies to our colonies in the Ocean, and the conquest of an important point in the Mediterranean; whilst in both those quarters the English navy would find so much occupation that any attempt against the Spanish colonies would be out of the question.

Whilst Napoleon was warmly discussing these plans, alternately with the minister Decrès and with the admirals charged with the several commands, he directed the arrangements of the whole

project, and verified the details by the opinions of practical men. In his intervals of leisure, he mounted his horse, and rode along the sea-shore, visiting the mouth of the Adour, and collecting, by his own personal observation, much information relative to naval affairs. During his visit to the Landes, he had seen numbers of fine firs and oaks felled, and lying on the ground rotting, for want of the means of transport. On beholding this waste of useful resources, he determined to conquer nature by the force of art. "*My heart bleeds*," he said, in a letter addressed to M. Decrès, "to see all this valuable wood perishing uselessly." He forthwith gave orders for transporting a portion of the timber by water down the Adour to Mont-de-Marsan; from thence it was to be drawn by teams of oxen to Langon, and afterwards to be floated by the Garonne to Bordeaux and Rochelle. But this mode of conveyance being very expensive, he continued building ships at Bayonne, in order to use the timber remaining in that part of the country. The bar which obstructs the river was the only obstacle that opposed these works. There being only fourteen feet water at high tide, the depth was insufficient to float a 74-gun ship, which Napoleon wished to construct in that port. He devised works for throwing back the bar some hundred fathoms, which would have procured a depth of twenty or thirty feet of water; for, at a little distance out, the sea becomes extremely deep, and the bar sunk in proportion. He sent for engineers from Holland to discuss and arrange the plan of the works. He next entertained various schemes for furnishing the colonies with recruits and supplies of corn, which they wanted, and for bringing home to the mother-country the sugar and coffee which they could not use. He proposed to give the owners of merchant-vessels a certain sum per ton for the transport of troops and stores; but this proposition was met by demands so exorbitant, that he determined on sending out sloops and frigates to convey the troops and corn, and to bring back colonial produce at the charge of the State. "Extraordinary circumstances," he used to observe, "demand extraordinary measures. To remain inactive, and to do nothing, would be the worst thing possible, for our colonists would perish of hunger whilst surrounded by their barrels of sugar and coffee, and we should be in want of those valuable articles, with our warehouses stored with unsold corn and salted provisions."

About this time there arrived in Bayonne a certain number of Spaniards, men of high respectability, who had been selected, by order of Napoleon, from the different provinces of Spain, for the purpose of forming a junta. They had readily responded to his summons;—some, because they felt convinced that, for the welfare of Spain, to save her from a destructive war, to preserve her colonies, and ensure her regeneration, it was necessary to support the Napoleon dynasty; others, because they were attracted by interest and curiosity, or by the sympathy which an extraordinary

man never fails to inspire. Meanwhile, the insurrectional movement, commenced in Madrid on the 2nd of May, had simultaneously spread into several of the provinces. In Andalusia it was favoured by the distance of the French troops; in Aragon by the national spirit prevailing in that frontier province; in the Asturias by the old feeling of independence peculiar to that inaccessible region. There the sentiments of the intelligent class of the people were subdued by those of the populace who were less alive to political considerations than offended at the deposition of a national dynasty. In those provinces the attempt to nominate deputies for the junta would have been abortive, and therefore the government of Madrid took upon itself the task of nominating them. Some of the deputies, though commissioned to proceed to Bayonne, were afraid to go, for the idea began to be generally spread abroad that those who went thither would never return. A sort of popular and superstitious terror pervaded the public mind. The troops destined for the Pyrenees, and especially the life-guards, refused to march—a circumstance the more unfortunate, as it served to strengthen the insurrectionary feeling. Napoleon, warned by Murat of this disposition of the public mind, sent away, for a few days, MM. de Frias, de Medina-Celi, and some other persons of note, for the purpose of showing that it was possible for persons to leave Bayonne after having been there.

The end of May was now approaching, and the warmth of public feeling in Spain was visibly declining. This change was especially assignable to the delay in proclaiming the new king. Murat urgently insisted that matters should be brought to a crisis; first, for determining a question which had incessantly occupied his mind; and next, for checking the increasing indifference felt towards him by the Spaniards. Napoleon, who clearly perceived the personal motives of his brother-in-law, and who could not hasten the arrival of the answer he expected from Naples, wrote in a very angry tone to Murat. The latter, agitated by a thousand fears and hopes, which he alternately conceived and abandoned, and tormented by the unjust reproaches of Napoleon, fell ill of a fever, caused not less by anxiety of mind than by the effect of the climate. This circumstance, which placed his life in jeopardy, served to convince the ignorant class of the people that Napoleon's lieutenant had been struck by the avenging hand of Providence. This popular superstition, together with the sudden suspension of the authority of the lieutenant-general, were not a little unfortunate in the then existing circumstances.

At the commencement of June, after a delay of three weeks, Napoleon received intimation of the arrival of Joseph, and his acceptance of the proposal made to him:—the delay of both the answer and the arrival having been the unavoidable consequence of distance. Napoleon determined on at once proclaiming his brother king of Spain, so that he might present himself

with that title in Bayonne, and there receive the homage of the junta. He issued a decree, in which, resting upon the declarations of the council of Castille, he proclaimed Joseph Bonaparte king of Spain and the Indies, guaranteeing to the new sovereign the integrity of his dominions in Europe, Africa, America, and Asia. On the 7th of June Napoleon set out to meet Joseph on the road to Pau: he overwhelmed him with demonstrations of regard, which, though dictated by policy, were not the less sincere; for he loved his brother, and wished to give him credit in the eyes of the junta. Joseph, though transported with joy by the high position in which he found himself, was nevertheless dismayed by the difficulties he beheld in perspective, difficulties of which the insurrection in Calabria already afforded a distinct prognostic. Like all persons suddenly raised to greatness, he was less happy than jealous envy supposed. He received with a certain degree of alarm the sovereignty of Spain, which Murat had so ardently longed for; and his perplexed thoughts turned with regret to the fair kingdom of Naples, which was insufficient to satisfy the ambition of Murat. This strange state of things arose out of one of the many singular positions presented by the Bonaparte family, who, after being at one moment elevated by a great man to the region of marvels, descended again to the region of reality; falling from the height of the loftiest thrones of the earth.

As soon as Joseph arrived, Napoleon presented to him those Spaniards of high rank and importance whom he had successively invited to Bayonne, either to be members of the junta, or because they were men of consideration whom he wished to know, and who, flattered by such a mark of attention, readily obeyed his summons. Joseph's countenance possessed some traces of the classic beauty which marked that of Napoleon; he had not, it is true, the perfect regularity of features, or that grandeur of expression which imparted to the conqueror of Rivoli and Austerlitz a resemblance to Cæsar or Alexander. But Joseph, on the other hand, possessed extreme amiability of manners, and a certain grace, combined with some slight share of borrowed dignity. The brothers of Napoleon had, in their intercourse with him, contracted the facility of conversing on military affairs, on diplomacy and government; and on all those subjects they possessed such an amount of general information as was requisite to make them feel at ease in the extraordinary positions to which the author of their fortunes had raised them; moreover, they were not wanting in natural intelligence. The Spanish grandees, who were ignorant, and vain of their own greatness, had already been fascinated by the presence of Napoleon; and Joseph, by his amiable manners, and a display of the stock of information he had acquired in Naples, succeeded in pleasing and inspiring them with confidence in his capacity. Servility is contagious; and the Spaniards who were gathered round the new king began to laud his virtues, and even to put faith in his high

qualities. The dukes de San Carlos, de l'Infantado, del Parque, de Frias, de Híjar, and de Castel Franco; the counts de Fernan-Núñez, de Orgaz, and even the famous Cevallos, with all his hostility to the French, were already persuaded that the interests of Spain demanded submission to the new dynasty; a fact which certainly admitted of no doubt. O'Farrill and de Azanza, the ministers of war and of finance, who had been invited to Bayonne, were led to the same conviction; which was, however, on their part, much more natural, for, not being courtiers, but mere men of business, they were not influenced by private or personal feelings, and had no political object but to secure the greatest degree of benefit to their country. In the minds of such men there could exist no doubt of the advantage of superseding the old dynasty by the new one. Moreover, their introduction to Napoleon had filled them with admiration, and made them almost forget his conduct towards the dethroned family. They readily pledged themselves to serve the new king. Whilst awaiting the arrival of Joseph, Napoleon, in conjunction with the Spaniards present in Bayonne, had drawn up the plan of a constitution adapted at once to the age and to the manners of Spain. It was determined that the junta should assemble in the ancient episcopal palace of Bayonne, which was arranged for the purpose; that there the king should be recognised and the constitution discussed, so as to give the appearance of a free and voluntary adoption. The whole plan was carried into effect with military promptitude and precision. Joseph had arrived on the 7th of June. On the 15th the junta was convoked, the president being señor de Azanza, minister of finance under Ferdinand VII., now destined to fill the same post under Joseph Bonaparte, and well worthy to fill it under any enlightened sovereign. Señor de Urquijo discharged the duties of secretary. After a few formal speeches (all adverting to the advantage of receiving from the hand of Napoleon a member of that miraculous dynasty, which had been sent on earth for the regeneration of thrones, and announcing that that member was Joseph Bonaparte), the imperial decree proclaiming Joseph king of Spain and of the Indies was read. The junta then waited on the new king to offer the homage of the Spanish nation; of which, unluckily, they represented the intelligence but not the passions. After taking leave of Joseph, the junta visited Napoleon, returned thanks to the powerful benefactor, to whom, they believed, they owed a bright and prosperous future.

Several succeeding days were occupied in discussing the plan of the constitution; some changes were suggested and taken into consideration. It was framed on the model of the French constitution, with some modifications adapted to the manners of the Spaniards; and it contained the following provisions:—

An hereditary monarchy, transmissible in the male line, in the order of primogeniture, reversible from the branch of Joseph, to those of Louis and Jerome. Any union of the crown

of Spain with the crown of France was expressly interdicted, and thus the independence of Spain was secured.

A senate composed of twenty-four members, like that of France, was entrusted with the defence of the constitution, and also empowered to protect the liberty of the press and personal liberty; a commission being appointed to make known cases in which either freedom of the press or of persons should be violated.

An assembly of the Cortes, comprising, under the name of the *Bench of Clergy*, twenty-five bishops, chosen by the king; under the name of *Bench of Nobility*, twenty-five grandees of Spain, also chosen by the king; sixty-two deputies from the provinces of Spain and the Indies; thirty deputies from the principal cities; fifteen eminent merchants; fifteen literary and scientific men, the latter representing the universities and academies; all to be elected by those whom they were to represent. The assembly, which was to be convoked at least every three years, was to discuss the laws, and to fix the revenue and expenditure for three years to come.

A permanent magistracy, dispensing justice according to the forms of modern legislature, under the supreme jurisdiction of a high court, which was to be no other than the Council of Castille, under the title of Court of Cassation.

Finally, a Council of State, for the supreme regulation of the government, on the model of that of France.

Such was the constitution of Bayonne, which was certainly alike adapted to the manners of Spain, and to the state of her political advancement. It made no mention of the inquisition, the clergy, or the privileges of the nobility; for it had been drawn up with a desire not to give umbrage to any class of the people. To the legislature was consigned the task of subsequently deducing consequences from the principles laid down in this act, which contained the germ of the regeneration of Spain.

The discussions on the constitution being ended, a royal sitting was held on the 7th of July, in the episcopal palace. Joseph, seated on the throne, read a speech expressive of the sentiments of devotion with which he was about to assume the government of Spain; then laying his hand on the Gospel, he took the oath of allegiance to the new constitution. At the close of these proceedings, which elicited loud and enthusiastic acclamations, the assembly adjourned to Marac, to compliment the man whose will ruled the events of the time.

It was urgent that Joseph should forthwith take possession of his kingdom. It was said that the Spaniards, irritated at sight of the blood shed on the 2nd of May in Madrid, and indignant at the artifice which had enticed the Bourbon family to Bayonne, were already showing symptoms of discontent; that an insurrectionary feeling prevailed in Andalusia, in Aragon, and in the Asturias, and that the route by which the king had to travel was scarcely safe. Nevertheless, it was indispensable that Joseph should go to relieve Murat, now ill, and in a delirium of impa-

tience to quit a country which had become hateful to him, and in which he could not remain without peril to his life.

Napoleon, beginning to perceive the real state of things, and unwilling to send his brother into a foreign country in a way which would not command respect, prepared new military forces for his escort. The reserves of infantry formed at Orleans, and the reserves of cavalry assembled at Poitiers, had already entered Spain under the command of generals Verdier and Lasalle, and they formed a *corps d'armée*, which occupied the centre of Castille. Some old regiments, drafted from the grand army, were sent to the coast camps, and, from the forces previously occupying those camps, four fine regiments were selected,—viz., the 13th of the line, and the 2nd, 4th, and 12th light infantry. To these were added some Polish lancers, and a superb regiment of cavalry, raised by Murat in the territory of Berg; and, out of all these various corps, Napoleon composed a division of veteran troops, amidst which Joseph was to advance on Madrid by short stages, thereby affording the troops the indulgence of slow marches, and giving the Spaniards ample opportunities of seeing their new king. The junta and the grandees of Spain followed in the suite of the king, all proceeding by short and slow journeys.

Joseph departed on the 9th of July, escorted by veteran troops, and preceded and followed by upwards of a hundred carriages, filled with the members of the junta. Napoleon conducted his brother to the frontier of France, where he affectionately took leave of him. He recommended him to be of good heart, whilst he hinted only partially what his keen intelligence enabled him to foresee. The irresolute spirit of Joseph would have sunk under the disclosures which his brother could have made; and yet Napoleon's keen glance, though it enabled him to see the impending future, did not discern one half of the evils which were destined to result from the great fault committed at Bayonne.

Such were the measures to which Napoleon was prompted by his deference to a systematic idea, rather than by feelings of family affection, for he had the means of establishing all his relations in high positions, without usurping the crown of Spain, and dethroning the last of the Bourbons reigning in Europe. By reason of the weakness of the Spanish Bourbons, he could not resort to force, for it would have been ridiculous to declare war against Charles IV. He therefore had recourse to stratagem, and he forced them to fly by arousing their fears. The indignation of Spain having arrested the unfortunate Bourbons in their flight, Napoleon took advantage of their family discord and enticed them to Bayonne by the hope of obtaining justice, which justice he dispensed in the manner of the judge in the fable, who gave an oyster-shell to each dissentient party. He was led on from stratagem to dishonesty, and thereby affixed to his name one of the two great stains which tarnish his glory. To have escaped from this stigma, he must have effected the good which he

intended to render to Spain; and, by Spain, he must have secured the advantages he contemplated for France. Providence did not reserve for him the opportunity of absolving himself from an act of perfidy unworthy of his character.

But why anticipate the justice which time never fails to award. In the events which remain to be narrated, stern justice will be seen arising out of the events themselves, and showing, by its punishment, that men of high genius, no more than those of ordinary capacity, can hope for dispensation for any departure from rectitude and common sense.

NOTES.

NOTE TO BOOK XXIX.

(See page 257.)

I SHOULD very much astonish both the public and contemporary historians (who are usually very prompt in making up their minds on doubtful questions), were I to describe the various perplexities I experienced before I could come to any satisfactory conclusion respecting Napoleon's real designs on Spain. As he ended by invading the country and giving the sovereignty to his brother Joseph, it has been inferred that he had all along projected the scheme which he ultimately executed. In like manner, there are persons who firmly believe that, because he made himself Emperor of France, he had entertained that project from the time when he commanded the army of Italy. The collectors of recollections have even gone so far as to look for the first traces of his projects in the School of Brienne. Moreau betrayed France in 1813:—this is an unquestionable fact. But there are persons who, not content with dating his civic delinquencies from the conspiracy of Georges, and his misunderstanding with the First Consul, trace them back to the conspiracies of Pichegru; and, following up the spirit of investigation, they go so far as to affirm that he conceived the first idea of betraying the French armies to the Austrians whilst he was engaged in studying the law at the School of Rennes. This is a most absurd mode of judging mankind. It is founded on a misunderstanding, not only of the individuals themselves, but of the progress of the human mind, which is slow and successive, and much less frequently determines events than is determined by them. In 1808 Napoleon dethroned the Spanish Bourbons. When did he determine on this step, and by what means did he propose to effect it? These are questions the solution of which presents the utmost difficulty, even to those who have the historical documents within their reach. I am the only historian who has possessed all the documents relating to those facts, thanks to the facilities afforded by my political position; and yet I was for a considerable time involved in great uncertainty. My doubts were only removed by discoveries which have been in part due to persevering investigation, and in part the result of mere good fortune. I will here subjoin an account of these discoveries for the information of the public, and for the satisfaction of men who regard conscientious inquiry on such points in the light of a duty.

First, I have a few observations to offer respecting the documents themselves. Of all the many writers who have treated of the events here in question, not one has had access to the real historical documents referring to them. All have merely written books from other books. This is evident, on a perusal of their works, to any one acquainted with facts. Even count de Toreno, whose work on the Spanish revolution is remarkable for talent, and what is better still, for sound political judgment, had not the means of consulting the necessary documents. He based his work on the authority of Spanish and French publications and existing traditions, collected in his

own country; and by these means his narrative was rendered in many respects highly valuable. Among French writers, one only, M. Arnand Lefevre, has had the advantage of being initiated into foreign affairs, and obtaining access to a few authentic documents. But could he, through this initiation, come to the knowledge of truth? A single remark will suffice to answer this question. The correspondence of the foreign office, in relation to this Spanish business, consists of a very few despatches from M. de Champagny, and in a very considerable number of despatches from M. de Beauharnais, the French ambassador at Madrid!

Now, it happened that M. de Champagny, who was a very honourable man, and sincerely devoted to the Emperor, knew nothing whatever of the affairs of Spain. M. de Beauharnais, also a man of strict integrity, but very incapable, was singled out as a fit personage to play the ridiculous part of an ambassador who was deceived, in order that he, in his turn, might the better deceive the court to which he was accredited. "Say nothing to Beauharnais,"—"I have said nothing to Beauharnais," are phrases of continual recurrence in the correspondence between Bonaparte and his agents in Spain. Finally, at the moment of the catastrophe, Napoleon despatched M. de la Forêt to second Murat, regarding M. de Beauharnais as a person utterly useless; and he dismissed the latter in disgrace, without even hearing his defence, which was a flagrant act of injustice. The correspondence of the department of foreign affairs, even when one enjoys the advantage of consulting it, comprises only a few very unimportant documents in relation to the affairs of Spain. Where then, it will be asked, are the documents to be found? In the correspondence between Napoleon and the agents he employed at the time. The agents in Paris were MM. Talleyrand and Duroc—in Madrid, first Murat, and afterwards general Savary, marshal Bessières, general count de Lobau, M. de Tournon, general Grouchy, M. de Monthyon (whose reports were subsequently published in a manner different from that in which he wrote them), and admiral Decrès, who was much engaged in this affair in reference to the Spanish colonies. These were Napoleon's real agents; the only persons who possessed any knowledge of the affair, and they were only partially informed, for each individual knew only that which concerned himself, and conjectured the rest as well as his intelligence enabled him. The correspondence of all these persons with Napoleon, and of Napoleon with them exists. It is an extensive and curious correspondence, preserved in the Louvre, and I am the only person who has read it. But though these documents seemed calculated to clear up all obscurity, they did not satisfy my doubt until after I had examined them with that sort of laborious attention which it is necessary to bestow on certain passages in the writings of the historians of antiquity, in order to elucidate historical facts.

In general, whenever I have perused the correspondence of Napoleon with his agents, I have found it so clear and precise that I never could be in doubt respecting facts and events; but, after reading this correspondence relative to Spain, I remained for a length of time in the most embarrassing perplexity. At first, Napoleon must have wavered long amidst a variety of projects; and, when at length his determination was fixed, he did not make known his designs. Possibly he might have disclosed them to Savary at the last moment, and in reference to one point—the compulsory journey of Ferdinand to Bayonne. On the 20th of February he had seen Murat, without mentioning the matter to him, and he transmitted to him, through the minister of the war department, the order to depart for Bayonne. He traced to him the march of the army on Madrid, adding not a single word relative to politics, and forbidding any question to be asked. Count Lobau and M. de Tournon, who were sent as observers, were not put in possession of any secret. At length, when the revolution of Aranjuez was accomplished, and Spain was without a king (Charles IV. having abdicated, and Ferdinand VII. not having been recognised), Napoleon despatched general Savary, and confided to him a part of the plan, that which consisted in bringing the father and son to Bayonne, either with their own free will or by force. On that

same day, M. de Tournon left Paris with instructions of a totally different nature. These instructions, which were subsequently published at Saint Helena, are not apocryphal, but perfectly authentic : they countermanded all that Murat and general Savary had been ordered to do, and what they actually did. It may be readily imagined how great was the difficulty of elucidating historical truth from amidst this mass of well-concocted dissimulation ; and, if this task was difficult, even with the help of genuine documents, it must be pronounced impossible without them.

I will now explain by what means I succeeded in arriving at the truth. By comparing one with another all the orders given, not only to confidential agents, but to agents who were mere instruments ;—by comparing the political with the military orders, and not only with the military, but even with the financial orders ;—by comparing those which were given with those which were executed, and with some little hints thrown out at the critical moment when Napoleon found it necessary to make a partial disclosure of his designs, in order to exact obedience ;—by these means, and the help of much patience, I succeeded in unravelling the truth, but not till after years of reflection. I may say years, for there is one point on which I did not satisfy myself until after three years of attentive examination and reflection.

Having thus shown the difficulty of my task, I will now state the conclusions at which I have arrived, and how I arrived at them.

That Napoleon had long and systematically entertained the idea of hurling the Bourbons from every throne in Europe admits of no doubt. But this idea did not take birth in his mind until 1806, after the treachery of the court of Naples, and after the dethronement of the king, which was announced on the day succeeding the battle of Austerlitz. Subsequently, the incapacity and meanness of the court of Spain, its secret treachery, which were perceptible, though not distinctly manifest ;—finally, the famous proclamation by which the prince of the Peace, on the very eve of the battle of Jena, summoned the whole Spanish nation to arms ; all these circumstances confirmed Napoleon in the idea that it was necessary to pursue towards the Spanish Bourbons the same course he had adopted towards the Bourbons of Naples. But at what time was this general and vague idea matured into a fixed scheme ? This is the first question. And after the idea had ripened into a fixed scheme, by what means was that scheme to be executed ? For the court of Spain had not the courage to make that demonstration of hostile spirit by which the Neapolitan court had furnished a just ground of offence. By what means, then, the scheme being fairly determined on, was it to be carried out ? This is the second question, and the most difficult of solution.

It has been said that, immediately after the proclamation of the prince of the Peace, Napoleon, then in Berlin, formed the project of deposing the king of Spain. Napoleon's correspondence, which almost in every line reveals his inmost feelings, bears evidence to the contrary. After the battle of Jena, he was wholly engrossed by thoughts of a great war in the north of Europe. The general idea of ultimately getting rid of the Bourbons, might have become confirmed in his mind ; but the project for its execution was not yet even in embryo. It has been alleged that Napoleon was induced to sign peace at Tilsit by M. Talleyrand, who represented the necessity of bringing matters to a close in the North, that he might be enabled to direct his whole attention to the South, that is to say, to Spain ; and it has also been stated that the question of dethroning the Spanish Bourbons was even discussed with the emperor Alexander, who consented to that step, on condition of sacrifices being made to himself in the East. All this is untrue. Napoleon was induced to treat for peace at Tilsit only by a consciousness of the difficulties of his position, which in 1807 was in no way dissimilar to what it was in 1812 ; the good fortune of the former year being wholly attributable to the excellence of the army at that period. Spain was entirely out of the question. The private correspondence of M. de Caulaincourt bears evidence that Alexander received his first intelligence on the subject when he learned the events that had taken place in Madrid. It is therefore a calumny on the

memory of that prince to allege that he was cognisant of the design of dethroning the king of Spain. Napoleon was desirous of concluding the continental peace at Tilsit, because he found that the Niemen was very far distant from the Rhine; and he had one grand object at heart, which was to constrain England to conclude a maritime peace by the union of all the powers of the Continent against her.

On his return to Paris, in July, 1807, Napoleon immediately directed attention to two objects; first, the internal administration of the empire, which had been neglected for the space of a year; and secondly, to turn to the best account the results of the policy he had pursued at Tilsit. Thus, whilst the cabinet of St. Petersburg, charged with the task of mediation, addressing England, saying—"Choose between peace and war—peace with us, or war with us!" Napoleon disposed matters so as to force the States still remaining neutral to declare themselves against England, in the event of her determination to continue hostilities. These neutral States were Denmark, Austria, and Portugal; and he prepared an army to constrain the latter power to obedience. But his correspondence and the nature of his orders prove that, as far as concerns Portugal, he was merely desirous of breaking up her neutrality. When, in August and September, 1807, the only answer returned by England to the question urgently pressed by Russia was the burning of Copenhagen, a general war-cry was raised against her; and then Napoleon determined to take advantage of two things, the prolongation of the war, and the universal indignation excited against Great Britain;—this indignation enabled Napoleon to pursue, in reference to England, a course which he never would have ventured upon under other circumstances.

His first attempt was made on Portugal, but, the secret understanding of that power with England soon becoming manifest, he resolved to reduce her under his own dominion. Not being able to do this in a direct way, he determined to divide the usurped power between himself and Spain, in consideration of the cession of Tuscany. At this time (October 1807) the question respecting the whole Peninsula was visibly raised in his mind by the question respecting Portugal. Words inadvertently dropped,—first, orders hurriedly issued, show the latent thought that had its origin in the events of Copenhagen. It was also at the period here alluded to that the disgraceful scenes enacted in the Escorial give birth to the extravagant idea of bringing the prince of the Asturias to trial, with the view of declaring the forfeiture of his claims to the crown, and transferring those claims to some one else, probably to the prince of the Peace, under the title of regent. It would moreover appear, from the orders of Napoleon, that the vile conduct pursued at the court of Spain served as a stimulant to his ambition, for, calculating the journeys of couriers according to the rate of expedition usual at the period, we find that, on receipt of the intelligence of what was passing in the Escorial, the military movements commenced; for at first he had determined to send forward the troops by forced marches, though he suspended that order on receiving in Paris intimation of the royal pardon accorded to the prince of the Asturias,

Led by the catastrophe at Copenhagen, and the necessity of continuing the war, to the thought of making himself master of Portugal, Napoleon's attention was next directed to the general affairs of the Peninsula, and the proceedings at the Escorial very much disposed him to take part in those affairs by force. A delay in carrying this wish into effect was the consequence of the pardon granted to Ferdinand, and he departed for Italy in November, 1807.

From what passed at Mantua between Lucien Bonaparte and Napoleon, it is evident that the latter thought of arranging the marriage of one of his nieces with Ferdinand, and that he was not quite determined about the dethronement of the Bourbons. Yet, in Italy he issued orders for the march of the troops, and such orders as prove that those troops were not mere reinforcements to the army of Portugal (as has been conjectured by those who imagine that he cherished no hostile design prior to the revolution of Aran-

juez), but troops destined to decide the fate of Spain, for, when in Italy, he organised the Duchesne division, which was despatched to invade Calabria.

On his return to Paris, in January, 1808, his orders were multiplied, and their rapid succession shows, that his plan was becoming matured, and that he was determined to make an end of the Spanish Bourbons.

There were two, or, it may be said, three ways by which this object might be accomplished.

1st. To give a French princess in marriage to Ferdinand, without requiring any sacrifice on the part of Spain.

2nd. To give a French princess in marriage to Ferdinand, and to demand the surrender of the provinces of the Ebro, and the opening of the ports of the Spanish colonies.

3rd. To dethrone the Bourbons.

As to the first plan, and in my opinion the wisest of the three, Napoleon seems not to have dwelt upon it long, for he speedily sent his niece back to Italy. This fact admits of no doubt, for it is attested by witnesses under whose observation it occurred. One of the Emperor's brothers is among these witnesses.

With regard to the second plan, it certainly was entertained, or at least thought of; for a despatch from M. Yzquierdo, received in Madrid by Ferdinand at the time of his father's abdication, and published by the Spaniards, bears evidence that the plan was discussed between MM. Yzquierdo and Talleyrand. Moreover, there exists in the archives of the Louvre a letter from M. de Talleyrand, in which he expounds this same plan to Napoleon, whilst M. Yzquierdo, on his side, explained it to the court of Spain, and at the same date. Of the existence of the project, there can consequently be no doubt. But was it seriously entertained? To a certain extent, I believe it was, for M. de Talleyrand, in his despatch to the Emperor, thus expresses himself:—"My opinion is that, if your Majesty thinks fit, M. Yzquierdo might, though with some little difficulty, be induced to sign; but only on condition of the troops being removed to some distance from the king's place of residence." The scheme either of marriage or no marriage, but with the surrender of the Ebro provinces and the opening of the colonial ports, had a certain degree of reality in the mind of M. de Talleyrand, who was here the intimate confidant of the Emperor. But was the plan entertained in perfect seriousness and with entire earnestness of purpose, or was it merely an eventuality which Napoleon held in reserve, while really tending to a different object? I believe this latter supposition to be the correct one. In the course of February and March, 1808, Napoleon discussed the plan of settling the pending affairs of Spain, on condition of the surrender of her Ebro provinces, and the opening of her colonial ports, with or without a marriage; but, at the same time, and more seriously, his views were directed to the dethronement.

The following are the reasons which determined my conviction on this subject:—

1st. The expressions employed by M. de Talleyrand prove that the project was only in part seriously entertained; for, if Napoleon had had no other object in view, and had earnestly designed to carry out the scheme, Talleyrand would not have made use of the expression, "*If your Majesty thinks fit.*" When Napoleon had a determined object in view, his own language, and also that of his agents, was imbued with the spirit of his resolution; it assumed an emphatic and positive tone, and never the tone of doubt.

2nd. Had Napoleon desired only to appropriate to himself the provinces of the Ebro, to open the colonial ports, and to conclude a marriage, he would not have deemed it necessary to overrun Spain with troops. He would have had no need to issue mysterious orders for marching on Madrid by all the routes at once. He had only to express his desire, and the court of Spain, after perhaps resisting for a while, would infallibly have yielded. He would, besides, have distinctly told Murat what he desired, instead of leaving him involved in doubt respecting the object for which the French army was destined.

3rd. Finally, Napoleon, who did not resolve until the last extremity to make to Russia the sacrifice of discussing the partition of the Turkish empire (which was one step towards the partition itself), would not, about the middle of February, the period of his definitive orders, have sent to Russia a dangerous lure, by proposing that she should explain her ideas on so grave a subject. Nothing short of an object so paramount as the dethronement of the Bourbons could have determined him to purchase, at such a sacrifice, the concurrence or the silence of Russia.

Thus, in February and March, 1808, everything tends to prove that the first and second projects, of marrying Ferdinand to a French princess, and exacting or not exacting territorial and commercial sacrifices, were no longer seriously entertained, if they had ever been so. The language of M. de Talleyrand would not have been so dubitory, nor would Napoleon have invaded Spain with so much mystery, or have made such great concessions to Russia for an object of secondary and even of minor importance, in comparison with the gigantic projects of the time.

It is clear that in February and March he had determined on dethroning the Bourbons, notwithstanding all the contrary affirmations of those who maintain that he had not determined on the step until he saw both the father and the son at Bayonne, and witnessed their intellectual incapability and moral degradation.

But, having ascertained the end he had in view, it is no easy matter to discover the means he wished to employ for its attainment. This is a point on which I was long doubtful, and my doubts were not cleared up until after several years of inquiry and reflection.

Prior to the revolution of Aranjuez, that is to say, before the dethronement of the father by the son, Napoleon did not disclose his intention to any person whatever. Not one of his ministers was aware of it, and Murat, as has been seen, was totally ignorant of the matter.

The idea has occurred to me, though it is not supported by any positive proof, that Napoleon wished to force the Spanish royal family to depart by filling them with alarm, in the same manner as the Braganza family had been frightened away. This idea was the first that occurred to me in the course of my investigation, and after much doubt and perplexity I have come back to it.

Whilst reading over five or six times the correspondence of Napoleon, especially that which he maintained with Murat, I alternately arrived at and abandoned this conviction. In the first place, I was forcibly struck with one remark. Napoleon repeatedly says to Murat, "Maintain the most perfect order, conciliate the populace, avoid any sort of collision:" which was equivalent to saying that he wished the dethronement should be effected without violence, in order to avoid war with the Spanish nation; but he added, "*Seek to remove the apprehensions of the royal family of Spain; address them in courteous terms.*"

On the 14th of March he thus wrote to Murat:—"I have ordered that on the 17th a passage shall be demanded, by way of Madrid, for 50,000 men, destined to proceed to Cadiz. Your conduct must be framed according to the nature of the answer that may be given. *But endeavour to be as encouraging as possible.*" On the 16th of March he writes:—"Continue to maintain friendly terms. Banish apprehension from the minds of the king, the prince of the Peace, the prince of the Asturias, and the queen."

On the 19th he wrote thus:—"I suppose you will receive this letter in Madrid, *where I am very anxious to learn that our troops entered peacefully, and with the consent of the king; in short, that all is proceeding tranquilly.* I am momentarily looking for the arrival of Tournon and Yzquierdo, so that I may know what to do for the arrangement of affairs. Announce in Madrid that I have arrived here. Maintain rigorous discipline among the troops. Take care that they receive their pay, so that they may be enabled to scatter money."

On the 25th he wrote as follows:—"I have received your letter of the

15th of March. I regret to learn that the weather has been so bad here, we have the finest weather imaginable. I presume you have been in Madrid since the day before yesterday. I have already intimated that the most important points to which you must direct attention, are to provision your troops, and let them rest;—*to maintain the best understanding with the king and the court, should they remain at Aranjuez*; to give out that the Swedish expedition and the affairs of the North detain me here for some days, but that I shall speedily arrive. In short, set my house in order for me. Declare publicly that your orders are to rest and refresh your troops in Madrid, and to await the Emperor's arrival; and that you are certain not to quit Madrid until such time as His Majesty shall arrive.

"Do not take part with any of the different factions which divide the country. Believe well to every one, and do nothing that may operate prejudicially on the course which I am about to take. Be careful always to keep up good supplies of provisions in the magazines of Buitrago and Aranda."

At first sight there appears nothing in these orders which betrays the design of alarming the court of Spain; and, having once read them, I relinquished the idea that Napoleon's intention was to frighten the royal family away. But a re-perusal of them convinced me that he wished to lull apprehension only till he could effect his entrance into Madrid, and to avoid a collision before his entrance. For example, in the letter of the 14th of March, which I first quoted, I remarked these words—"Whatever may be the intentions of the court of Spain, I wish to impress upon you the paramount importance of arriving in Madrid without hostilities—of encamping the corps by divisions, to make them appear more numerous, and to provision and rest my troops. Meanwhile, my differences with the court of Spain will be adjusted. *I hope the war will not take place; that is a point I have greatly at heart.* If I take all these precautions, it is because I am in the habit of not leaving anything to chance. If war had broken out, your position would be a good one, for you would have in your rear a force more than sufficient to protect you, and on your left flank, Duhesme's division, comprising 14,000 men."

In his letter of the 16th, after the words already quoted, viz., "Continue to maintain friendly terms. Banish apprehension from the minds of the king, the prince of the Peace, the prince of the Asturias, and the queen," he proceeds to say, "*the principal object is to accomplish the arrival in Madrid, there to let the troops rest, and procure fresh supplies of provisions.* Say that I am coming for the purpose of conciliating and arranging affairs."

"*Above all things avoid any act of hostility, unless you be positively forced to it.* I hope that all may be arranged. *It would be dangerous to irritate these people.*"

The intention was evident. Napoleon was desirous of entering Madrid without a collision, and he wished to inspire just such an amount of confidence as was requisite for averting a rupture. But by carefully comparing one with another the various passages in his letters, and looking into the whole of his arrangements, I have come back to the idea that though he wished to avoid a collision with the populace, he nevertheless wished the royal family to depart.

Accordingly, everything denoted the intended departure of the court, and Napoleon daily received intimation of the expected movement from Madrid. M. Yzquierdo, in conversation with M. de Talleyrand, had avowed the plan of departure. In this state of things, Napoleon was fully aware that it was only requisite to let matters take their natural course, and the flight would take place. Nay, more, the slightest interposition of his authority would have sufficed to prevent it: for on the 19th the French troops had arrived on the Guadarrama. A movement of cavalry on Aranjuez might in the space of a few hours have surrounded the court, and intercepted its flight. And there was another course still more easy, which was to dispatch a force in the direction least calculated to excite alarm—that of Talavera; this force, which might have passed for a reinforcement to Junot, might have surrounded Aranjuez, and have prevented all possibility of escape. But there is one

passage in Napoleon's correspondence more decisive than all the rest ; and it leaves scarcely a shade of doubt on the subject. I will here quote it. Murat, not knowing how to act, when the news of the intended flight of the court was everywhere spread about, addressed to Napoleon the following question :— " If the court should wish to depart for Seville, am I to allow it ? " On the 23rd of March Napoleon replied as follows :—

" I may suppose that you have arrived in Madrid to-day, or that you will arrive there to-morrow. You must maintain strict discipline. *Should the court be at Aranjuez, you will let it remain quietly there, and you will manifest friendly sentiments to the royal family. Should the court be at Seville, you will also leave it there undisturbed.* You will send aides-de-camp to the prince of the Peace to inform him that he has done wrong in avoiding the French troops, that he must not make any hostile movement, and that the king of Spain has nothing to fear from our troops."

Now, when it is recollected that Napoleon caused M. Yzquierdo to depart from Paris (there is extant a letter from Duroc containing the invitation to depart forthwith),—that he made him depart full of alarm—and that, whilst he ordered 80,000 men to advance on Madrid, he refused to give any explanation,—it is evident that everything was calculated to urge on the departure which accordingly took place, as far at least as depended on the court of Spain.

It may be said, it is true, that Napoleon intended to surround and capture them, and then to proclaim the abdication. In the first place, he might have surrounded them and he did not ; in the next place, to have done so would have been an overt and unjustifiable act of violence. The flight to Andalusia answered his purpose better, for it left the throne vacant, and thus the whole difficulty was solved.

Having arrived at this point in my investigation, I should have been convinced that Napoleon's plan was to force the court of Spain to fly, but for one serious consideration ; and that one so weighty that it caused me to hesitate several times and to abandon the opinion I had conceived. It is that the departure or flight of the Bourbons would have entailed the loss of the colonies. Now Spain, without her colonies, would have been, as every one must allow, a most onerous burden. All the commercial interest of the South was exclaiming at Bayonne—" Spare us at least from the consequences which have visited Portugal ! "

Now, to send the Bourbons to America was exactly the way to bring about those consequences, for the Bourbons would have raised the colonies in rebellion against the royalty of Joseph, and at the same time would have opened them to the English, a circumstance which it was most desirable to prevent.

This consideration very much staggered me, and for a considerable time I ceased to believe that Napoleon wished to cause the flight of the Spanish royal family. However, the facility for flight which was afforded them,—the order to allow them to fly, combined with the alarm spread from Paris by the departure of M. Yzquierdo, were also facts too conclusive to be disregarded. Amidst this perplexity, one fact rivetted my attention ; viz., that there was in Cadiz a French fleet, in possession of the road, and that possibly it might have been Napoleon's intention to make use of it to arrest the fugitive Bourbons, whose flight would have morally ruined them in the eyes of the Spanish nation. After having, on the one hand, induced them to abandon the throne, to enable him to take possession of it, he would, on the other hand, have arrested them, when on the point of embarking for America. This reflection came across my mind like a ray of light, for it explained and resolved every obscurity. Still it was but a mere conjecture. I once more read over the correspondence of M. Decrès, and in it I discovered the following fact :—that an order in cipher sent to admiral Rosily could not have been read, because the key to the cipher of the consulate was lost ; and that the admiral had sent to Paris a confidential and intelligent officer to receive the communications ; which had remained unknown, owing to the loss of the cipher. This circumstance appeared to me to be a remarkable confirmation

of my first conjecture. What could be the purport of this despatch in cipher? Could it be an order for the fleet to quit Cadiz and proceed to London? That order had been given three or four times in plain characters, that is to say, without employing the precaution of cipher. The despatch must, therefore, have related to something else,—something still more secret. I felt quite convinced that it must be the order for the arrest of the fugitive family. I renewed my search among the papers of the department for foreign affairs; but the despatch was not to be found there. I could scarcely entertain a hope of finding it in the department of the marine, where the archives, though arranged in admirable order, contain scarcely any documents of importance. Nevertheless, I resolved to make the search, and, contrary to my expectation, I found, in the historical section, the despatch in cipher, and fortunately accompanied by the key. It was written by M. Decrès, and in the following terms:—

“I do not seek to discover the object of the entrance of the French troops into Spain. The only point that concerns me is, that you and I have to answer to his majesty for his squadron. I recommend you, therefore, to take a position as distant as possible from the strong batteries, and which, at the same time, will defend the road against any attack either from within or without. You have provisions which will serve you in case of need whilst you are lying at anchor. Be cautious not to betray any inquietude, but stand on your guard against any event, and that without show, but merely as if it were the natural consequence of the orders you have received for holding yourself in readiness to depart. Place the Spanish vessels in the centre of, and under the guns of, the French ships.

“*Should the court of Spain, whether impelled by the force of events, or by an insatiation, which it is impossible to foresee, renew the scene that has been enacted at Lisbon, you must oppose its departure.* Leave events to take their natural course as far as you possibly can; but, should a crisis arise, do not hold any parley with the English, and seem as though you had not previously entertained any distrust; but silently adopt precautions for the safety of the squadron, and do all that is expected of your sagacity and personal merit in the service of his majesty. Feb. 21st, 1808.”

I naturally experienced very great satisfaction in having thus elucidated the truth; whilst, at the same time, I felt sincere regret to find the truth so mortifying; but it was the consequence of the plan of dethroning the Bourbons.

From that moment Napoleon's design was evident to me. First, it is important to note the date (the 21st), which corresponds with the dates of incidents which comprise the whole plan, viz., the departure of Murat and the instructions given to him—the composition of the whole army—the departure of M. Yzquierdo—the departure of M. de Tournon—the orders to Junot. Secondly, on comparing the despatch of Decrès with the order given to Murat to allow the royal family to depart if they wished so to do, it will be found that the one does not contradict the other, but that both perfectly coincide. Napoleon wished the court to depart from Madrid, that the throne might be left vacant, but he did not wish the royal family to quit Cadiz, lest the colonies should be excited to insurrection.

The great difficulty of arriving at the truth, even with the help of the most authentic documents, may be easily conceived; and I venture to affirm, that posterity will never know more than I have here elucidated. Napoleon made no disclosure on this subject; Murat has left behind him nothing but his correspondence; general Savary has left innumerable memoirs (containing statements repeatedly controverted by his own correspondence); M. de la Forest himself wrote to me the assurance that he knew nothing of the affair; prince Cambacères, in his memoirs, declares that he has no information to give; counts de Tournon and Lobau have left only their correspondence, which I have perused; and M. de Yzquierdo has left only a few letters, which are deposited in the Louvre, and which I have read. I therefore conclude that no further information on the subject can ever come to light, and that the truth may be summed up as follows:—

The idea of the invasion of Spain was not matured into a settled plan in the mind of Napoleon till after the treaty of Tilsit, and not before.

After the treaty of Tilsit, and before the burning of Copenhagen, he thought only of closing the ports of Portugal against Great Britain.

After the events at Copenhagen, the war being obstinately protracted, he wished to profit by its prolongation to effect a complete settlement of affairs throughout the south of Europe.

His first design was to share Portugal with Spain ; but the events at the Escorial suddenly stimulated him with the determination of an armed interference in the affairs of Spain.

The pardon of the prince of the Asturias caused him for a time to postpone the execution of his designs.

In Italy and in Paris he alternately entertained a variety of plans, viz., a marriage, a territorial dismemberment, with a partition of the colonies, and a dethronement.

He gradually determined, about the months of January and February, in favour of the last-named project—the dethronement.

That such was the fact, is evident from the mystery of his orders, the extraordinary accumulation of troops, the concession to Russia of the partition of the Ottoman empire,—all these were things useless and needless for the accomplishment of any secondary project, such as the marriage, or the appropriation of one or two provinces.

Finally, having once determined on the dethronement, he wished to bring about, without collision, the flight to Andalusia, and to prevent, by the arrest of the royal family in the bay of Cadiz, the consequences which their flight might entail on the colonies.

Such are, in my opinion, the real facts, collected with rigorous impartiality from historical documents, and the only facts which posterity can hope to obtain.

There remains only one doubt, which may be created by a letter (first sent forth to the world from St. Helena), bearing date the 29th of March, addressed to Murat, and censuring his whole conduct. This letter I will discuss and explain in the following note.

NOTE ON BOOK XXX.

(See page 299.)

THE letter I have mentioned above first appeared, if I mistake not, in the *Mémoires de Sainte-Hélène* ; and since then it has been printed in a multitude of publications. To me it has been a subject of diligent inquiry and examination, with the view of ascertaining its authenticity, respecting which I often had doubts. I will here explain the reasons on which those doubts were grounded, and also the reasons which definitively led me to believe it to be genuine. Of this fact, a series of the most careful comparisons brought me to an entire conviction on this subject.

I will commence by quoting the letter literally :—

“ March 29th, 1808.

“ MONSIEUR, GRAND DUKE OF BERG,

“ I fear that you may be deceiving me respecting the situation of Spain, and that you may be deceiving yourself. The affair of the 19th of March has very considerably embarrassed the state of things. Do not imagine that you are attacking an unarmed nation, and that your troops have only to show themselves in order to reduce Spain to subjection. The revolution of the 20th of March proves that there is spirit among the Spaniards. You have to deal with a people in the prime of their energies, fired with all the courage

and all the enthusiasm which animate men who have not been worn out by political excitement.

"The aristocracy and the clergy are the masters of Spain. Should they become alarmed for their privileges and their existence, they may raise against us levies *en masse*, which will perpetuate the war. I now have partisans; but if I present myself as a conqueror, I shall have none.

"The prince of the Peace is detested, because he is charged with having delivered Spain over to France; this is the grievance which favoured the usurpation of Ferdinand. The popular party is the weakest.

"The prince of the Asturias has none of the qualifications requisite for the head of a nation; nevertheless, for the sake of setting him up in opposition to us, he will be elevated into a hero. I will not consent to any violence being exercised towards the personages of that family. It never answers any purpose to render one's self odious, and to stir up hatred. Spain has upwards of 100,000 men in arms—more than enough to carry on internal war with advantage; and this force, if dispersed over various points, may serve to keep the whole monarchy in a state of insurrectionary ferment.

"I here point out to you all those obstacles which are inevitable. There are others which your judgment will enable you to comprehend.

"England will not let slip this opportunity of multiplying our embarrassments. She is daily forwarding *avisos* to the forces she keeps up on the coast of Portugal and in the Mediterranean, and she is enlisting Sicilian and Portuguese troops.

"The royal family not having quitted Spain to proceed to South America, nothing but a revolution can change the face of the country; and Spain is, perhaps, of all the countries of Europe, that which is least prepared for revolution. The persons who are sensible of the monstrous vices of the government and of the anarchy which has usurped the place of legal authority are in the minority: the majority take advantage of those vices and that anarchy.

"In the interest of my empire, I can effect much good to Spain. The question is, what are the best means of doing so?

"Shall I go to Madrid? Shall I set up the authority of a grand Protectorate, by deciding between the father and the son? It appears to me that it would be a very difficult matter to keep Charles IV. on the throne. His government and his favourite have sunk so low in popular estimation, that they could not support themselves for three months.

"Ferdinand is the enemy of France, and for that reason he has been made king. To place him on the throne will be to serve the factious, which for the space of twenty-five years have been seeking the annihilation of France. A family alliance would be but a feeble bond. Queen Elizabeth and other French princesses have been cruelly put to death, when they could, with impunity, be made the victims of atrocious vengeance. It appears to me that matters ought not to be precipitated; and that it will be well to take counsel of coming events. We must reinforce the corps on the frontiers of Portugal, and wait patiently.

"I do not approve of the course adopted by your imperial highness in so hurriedly taking possession of Madrid. The army ought to have been kept at the distance of ten leagues from the capital. You had no satisfactory assurance that the people and the magistracy would willingly recognise Ferdinand. The prince of the Peace must have partisans in the public departments; besides, the attachment of habit which is cherished towards the old king may produce results. Your entrance into Madrid, by exciting the alarm of the Spaniards, has powerfully served Ferdinand. I have ordered Savary to go to the old king, and to learn how things are proceeding. He will concert with your imperial highness. I will hereafter direct what course is to be adopted; in the mean while, I think it necessary to prescribe to you the following line of conduct:—You must not bind me to any interview in Spain, with Ferdinand, unless you judge the position of things to be such as will warrant me in recognising him as king of Spain. You must keep up an appear-

ance of amicable sentiments towards the king, the queen, and prince Godoy. You must exact for them and render to them the same honours as formerly. You must manage so that the Spaniards may have no suspicion of the course I am about to take ; this will not be difficult, since I do not myself know what that course will be.

" You must make known to the nobility and clergy that, if France should interfere in the affairs of Spain, their privileges and immunities will be respected. Inform them that the Emperor desires the improvement of the political institutions of Spain, that they may be raised to a level with the state of civilisation throughout Europe, and released from the control of favourites. Tell the magistrates, citizens, and all enlightened persons, that Spain must reconstruct the machine of her government ; that she must have laws which will protect her citizens against the arbitrary power and the usurpations of feudalism ; institutions which will revive industry, agriculture and the arts. Portray to them the state of tranquillity and happiness enjoyed by France, notwithstanding the wars in which she has been involved, and point to the glory of her religion, which owes its re-establishment to the Concordat I have signed with the Pope. Prove to them the advantages they may derive from a political regeneration : order and peace at home, respect and power abroad. Such must be the spirit of your addresses to the Spanish people, either in speaking or writing. Do not hurry on any measure. I can wait at Bayonne, or I can cross the Pyrenees, and fortifying myself in the direction of Portugal, I can continue the war in that quarter.

" I will attend to your private interests—do not trouble yourself about them Portugal will be at my disposal. Let no personal project occupy your thoughts or guide your conduct ; that would injure me, and would injure you still more. You go too fast in your instructions of the 14th. The movement you prescribe for general Dupont is too rapid ; the event of the 19th of March has rendered changes necessary. You must make new arrangements ; and you will receive instructions from my minister for foreign affairs. I desire that discipline may be maintained in the strictest manner :—no pardon even for the smallest faults. Let the inhabitants be treated with the greatest consideration ; above all, let churches and convents be respected.

" Our troops must avoid any sort of collision either with the corps of the Spanish army or with detachments. Not a cartridge must be fired on either side.

" Let Solano get beyond Badajoz, and keep watch upon him. Trace out yourself the marches of our army, so as to keep it always at the distance of several leagues from the Spanish corps. If war should be kindled, all is lost.

" The destinies of Spain must be determined by diplomacy and negotiations. I recommend you to avoid explanations with Solano, as well as with the other Spanish governors and generals.

" You will send me two expresses daily. In case of events of urgent importance you must despatch orderly officers. Send back immediately the chamberlain de Tournon, who is the bearer of this despatch, and deliver to him a detailed report, &c.

(Signed)

" NAPOLEON."

Before I proceed to discuss the authenticity of this letter, I have a word or two to say respecting the inferences which have been drawn from it. This document has been regarded as evidence that Napoleon did not approve of anything that was done in Spain—that all was done, without his knowledge and against his will, by Murat, prompted by his imprudence and his impatient ambition. This is a very false conclusion, for, the day before and the day after the date of this letter, and during a considerable interval succeeding it, Napoleon wrote a long series of letters, ordering Murat point by point to do everything that was done ; and when Murat, inspired by events, took some little upon himself, he received Napoleon's orders from Paris or Bayonne to do the very things which he had actually done. For example, Murat entered

Madrid on the 23rd, but he had received formal orders to enter one or two days earlier. It is, therefore, only by a false induction, that this document can be made to exempt Napoleon from the responsibility of the events of Spain, and to cast that responsibility on Murat.

The letter could only be the offspring of a moment of indecision, amidst a line of conduct marked by the most resolute and undeviating firmness. Even this indecision is marked with the impress of genius, for it betrays the most extraordinary and accurate prescience of all that actually came to pass. Nevertheless, it was indecision, for, during a brief space, Napoleon's will wavered, and he abandoned one day that which he had desired the day before, and which he again desired on the morrow. He seemed as though enlightened by a supernatural intelligence which unfolded the whole future before him.

This indecision, which at the first glance appears improbable, does not tend in any way to the justification of Napoleon; but it presents an interesting subject of reflection as regards the history of the human mind. It naturally creates astonishment that one of the most firm and resolute minds that ever man possessed, should, within a brief interval of time survey things under such contradictory aspects as led at one moment to determinations, alike at variance with those formed the moment before and with those formed the moment after. Nevertheless, those who know the human heart, those who have attentively observed its workings in great and trying circumstances, are fully aware how greatly even the firmest will is dependent on events, and how the smallest circumstances frequently suffice to shake the highest resolves. Many a victory enrolled in the annals of immortality might never have been won, because the veriest trifle would have caused the battle not to have been fought. Vacillation is in the ordinary course of things: the greatest minds are liable to it, and the firmest minds vary ere they resolve. The letter in question proves in a striking manner how clearly Napoleon could see the contrary side of the resolutions he formed; it proves, too, the extraordinary foresight with which he was endowed; but at the same time it shows how light was the weight of that foresight when balanced in the scale with his passions. I felt as it were a certain degree of philosophic interest in investigating the authenticity of this letter, and I will now proceed to detail the various views I took of it, before I definitively arrived at the conviction that it was genuine.

At first glance, the superior style of the letter, both in respect to ideas and language, leaves scarcely a doubt of its having been written by Napoleon. Few, besides himself, could discuss great political and military events in that masterly manner. Such is the impression it produced on the authors of all the works hitherto published in relation to Napoleon. But those writers, knowing little or nothing of official documents, were not, like myself, struck by the manifest discrepancies between the letter and certain unquestionable historical facts; accordingly, no doubt of its authenticity ever occurred to them. For my part, however, I saw such strong reasons for questioning that authenticity, that I fear I shall not be able in the eye of rigorous criticism to show that those doubts were unfounded.

In the first place, the letter stands in formal contradiction to all that preceded and all that followed it. Some have assigned to it the date of the 27th, others that of the 29th of March; but the real date, as will be seen, can be no other than the 29th. There exist letters from Napoleon, of dates between the 27th and the 30th, the purport of which is totally at variance with that now under consideration. In the communications dated between the 27th and the 30th, he approves of everything done by Murat; not only does he approve, but he orders the entrance into Madrid, and prescribes a plan for getting all the royal family of Spain into his power. The letter of the 29th of March is the only one, amidst a lengthened correspondence, which expresses any disapproval of the course pursued by Murat—a course which was, in fact, conformable with his own directions.

Secondly, almost all Napoleon's letters are in the collections in the Louvre;

but this one is not there. This circumstance does not, it is true, amount to any absolute proof, for out of 40,000 of the Emperor's letters, one is here and there missing; and the letter in question may possibly be one of the very few of which the minute has not been preserved. These are so very few in number, that they do not, perhaps, amount to 100 in the whole 40,000. Another curious circumstance is, that one of the Emperor's letters, from which the following is an extract, enumerates all the letters he wrote at this particular juncture, and makes no mention of the one of the 29th of March.

On his arrival at Bordeaux, he wrote to Murat, and, adverting to the letters he had successively addressed to him, he says—"I received at midnight your letter of the 3rd, by which I perceive that you have received mine of the 27th of March. My letter of the 30th, and Savary, who must by this time have arrived, will make you better acquainted with my intentions. General Reille will depart immediately to join you." Here not a word is said of the letter of the 29th. Can it be believed that he would not have mentioned it, had it been written; the more especially as it was a letter countermanding all that he had ordered on the 27th and the 30th? He might, at least, be expected to have alluded to it, by declaring that it was to be regarded as though it had never been received.

But the non-existence of this minute at the Louvre acquires additional significance from the following circumstance. The very voluminous correspondence of Murat, without the aid of which it would never have been possible to understand and narrate the events of Spain, exists in entirety in the Louvre. It contains exact and minute answers to all the Emperor's letters, even those of the least consequence. It may be said that this correspondence comprises question and answer on every point; yet there is no letter from Murat in reply to this letter—so important, so serious, and containing instructions so much at variance with those previously given. Throughout this correspondence Murat shows himself keenly sensible to the slightest reproaches of the Emperor; and can he be supposed to have left unanswered a letter expressive of so much disapproval, and differing so essentially from those which preceded and followed it? This is evidently impossible. Should there still remain any doubt on the question, it must vanish when it is found that Murat, in a letter dated April 4th (eleven o'clock at night) says—"M. de Tournon arrived this evening, he will have found your Majesty's place of residence ready prepared." Murat does not add, "he has delivered to me your letters, &c." It must be evident that M. de Tournon delivered nothing; above all, nothing so important as the letter of the 29th of March. I believe that the letter never was delivered, which, however, is no proof that it was not written, as I will presently show.

The discrepancy between this letter and all that preceded and followed it, its non-existence in the Louvre, the mutual silence of both Napoleon and Murat respecting it, caused me at first to entertain doubts of its authenticity, and at length convinced me that it could never have been delivered.

I will now explain how my doubts of its authenticity came to be removed, and how I arrived at the conviction of its having been written without having been delivered. That it is from the pen of Napoleon I entertain no doubt. Imitators may succeed in forging style, but not in forging ideas; besides, the writer must necessarily have been in the very vortex of events to have spoken with so much precision of the departure of general Savary, of the commission entrusted to M. de Tournon, and various other particulars of the same nature, with which the letter is full. There is one point which, in my opinion, completely establishes its authenticity; it is this:—"You have been too precipitate in your instructions of the 14th to general Dupont." Now, it happens that on the 14th instructions were given to general Dupont, which fairly deserve the reproach applied to them by Napoleon, when considered from the point of view in which he saw them at the moment. By urging general Dupont too forward, Murat left the rear of the army exposed to the attack of the Spanish general Taranco, who had been recalled from Portugal by command of the prince of the Peace. A person forging the letter could

not have been aware of this fact, which could be known only to one who had carefully read the orders of Napoleon. I also think that this fact proves that the letter could not have been forged at St. Helena by Napoleon himself, endeavouring in after-thoughts to justify the most serious mistake of his reign. He had too much pride to resort to such a device, for he disdained to justify by falsehood the death of the duke d'Enghien; and, moreover, it is impossible that he could have invented the circumstance relative to the orders of the 14th, for he had not at St. Helena the documents of the Louvre; and I have evidence, from what he wrote at St. Helena, that, without any desire to deviate from the truth, he was often incorrect in dates and facts when he had not official documents to refer to. The best "Memoirs" are not free from similar errors, and I have frequently detected them when comparing contemporary publications with the correspondence of their authors.

Thus, independently of its style, the letter bears internal evidence of its authenticity. But how are we to account for the contradiction between this letter and the correspondence which preceded and followed it? and, above all, how explain the silence of Murat, who does not even acknowledge the receipt of the letter? I have endeavoured to solve these questions by the following facts.

I found in the Louvre the correspondence of M. de Tournon. I there discovered that he alone, of all the French agents, had condemned the Spanish enterprise, and had implored Napoleon to suspend all decision on the subject until after he should see the country with his own eyes. I have also read in Murat's correspondence, that he himself, general Grouchy, and others, had at Somo-Sierra ridiculed the gloomy forebodings of M. de Tournon. Murat's correspondence, moreover, contains earnest solicitations that Napoleon will not form a decision from anything he may hear from M. de Tournon, the only person adverse to Murat and the officers of his staff. I have another proof of this fact. In the correspondence of M. de Tournon, it appears that he remained at Burgos until the evening of the 24th, impatiently waiting for the Emperor. It is authentically recorded that he arrived in Paris a few days afterwards. He could not, at the most speedy rate of travelling, have arrived before the 29th, which fixes the date of the letter in question at the 29th (at the very earliest), since it is mentioned in the letter itself that M. de Tournon was to deliver it. Having arrived on the 29th, he found that the Emperor had received no intelligence; for, Murat not having written either on the 22nd or 23rd, Napoleon necessarily passed two days without despatches from Spain; and it must have been the 28th and 29th, or possibly the 30th, when he received answers to his communications of the 22nd and 23rd, on account of the time then required for the journey from Madrid to Paris. There is consequently no letter from the Emperor, bearing date of the 28th or 29th, save the letter in question. M. de Tournon found the Emperor in the state of uneasiness naturally created by the absence of intelligence in critical circumstances (and circumstances were then critical indeed, Murat being at the gates of Madrid, and ready to enter). Napoleon being in this anxious condition of mind, is it not possible that M. de Tournon might have exercised considerable influence over him, and might have even persuaded him to write the letter here under consideration? Napoleon naturally charged him to deliver it, it being in some measure his own work. The phrase, "*M. de Tournon will deliver this letter to you,*" connects it with M. de Tournon, and the personal opinions of that individual connect it still more closely with him. In the next place, dates concur in fixing the transient indecision of Napoleon to the two days during which he received no news, after having been apprised of the movement of Murat on Madrid. Finally, having received on the 30th the letter of the 24th, in which Murat informs him how successfully everything had proceeded, he reverted to his former views, approved everything, and probably took back the letter from M. de Tournon, or it may be he despatched a courier to desire him not to deliver it, as the aspect of affairs was changed. However this may be, it is certain that the letter was not delivered, for Murat makes no more allusion to


it than if it had never been written, though, from what he heard from M. de Tournon, he must have been aware of the Emperor's transient displeasure.

One thing is certain, viz., that, between the evening of the 24th of March and the evening of the 4th of April, M. de Tournon went from Burgos to Paris, and from Paris to Madrid, which affords sufficient reason for believing that he did not stop a moment on his journey, and that he was in Paris on the 29th, on which day he might have caused the Emperor to vacillate and to write the letter. In this manner all is explained. The observation in the letter itself stating that it is to be delivered by M. de Tournon, and thereby connecting the document with that individual, enabled me, by inquiring into his personal opinions and comparing dates, to elucidate the mystery.

Now, it may be asked, how did this letter, which is not in the collection at the Louvre, gain publicity. Of that I know not. M. de Tournon is dead; M. de Las Cases, who was the first to send it forth to the world, is also dead. It is possible that M. de Las Cases received it from Napoleon, as evidence that he was not wholly in the dark respecting the affairs of Spain. It is also possible that it may have been brought to light through some unknown channel, which cannot now be traced out. But the style in which it is written, together with the facts to which it adverts, prove that it is not a forgery. Other facts equally authentic prove that it was not delivered. The well ascertained opinions of M. de Tournon, as well as the circumstance of his having been entrusted with it, connect it with him; dates identify it with a period which must have been to Napoleon one of great anxiety, and the apparent inconsistency it betrays may be thereby explained. Napoleon, in a moment of hesitation, dictated the counter-orders contained in this letter; then, his confidence being restored by the intelligence of Murat's successful entry into Madrid, he came back to his original plans, and did not transmit the letter, which at a subsequent period was discovered and made use of for the purpose of a justification. It proves one thing, which is, that Napoleon's intelligence always directed him rightly, whilst his passions frequently misled him, and that it would have been well had he followed the dictates of the former, without yielding to the influence of the latter. I conceived it to be important to verify this point of history, as it affords a curious insight into human character; and I trust the candid portion of the public will readily admit that, for the elucidation of truth, I have performed a more laborious task than historians frequently deem it necessary to undertake; moreover, I have had the means of consulting documents which are still less frequently accessible to writers in general.

END OF THE EIGHTH VOLUME.

ERRATUM.—Page 177, For Book XXVIII. read Book XXIX.





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